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Cervantes, Paul Francisco. "Earnings management intensity and earning surprises: persistence and market pricing." Thesis, The University of Arizona, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/192301.
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Malikov, Kamran. "Essays in earnings management." Thesis, University of Essex, 2016. http://repository.essex.ac.uk/17918/.
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This thesis examines three essays in earnings management using UK-based data samples. The first essay implements a first test of the debt covenant hypothesis for the UK. The results indicate that firms close to violation or in technical default of their interest coverage (debt to EBITDA) covenants engage in higher levels of RAM relative to firms far from violation. Mandatory IFRS adoption does not change the use of RAM for firms close to violation or in technical default of their interest coverage covenants. However, it increases the propensity for employing RAM for firm close to default of their debt to EBITDA covenants. The second essay examines the effect of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) on the debt covenant hypothesis. It finds that the use of RAM to avoid the possibility of interest coverage covenant violations decreases from the pre-issue period to the post-issue period. The results also show that the decrease in the use of RAM in the post SEO period to avoid the likelihood of breaching interest coverage covenant is more pervasive among SEO firms with low market to book ratios or high financial leverage. The third and final essay investigates revenue reclassification as an earnings management tool. More specifically, it examines whether firms use revenue reclassification by shifting other revenues to core revenues. The results establish that firms engage in revenue reclassification to inflate core revenues. They indicate that the period following mandatory IFRS adoption is associated with an increase in this practice as IRFS offers more latitude for revenue reclassification. Further tests reveal that revenue reclassification is more pervasive among firms with high incentives for earnings management such as those conducting seasoned equity offerings, those in financial distress, those with acquisitions financed by share for share exchange, and those reporting low core earnings or small increases in core earnings.
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Öhlund, Wiola, and Martin Örnryd. "Earnings Management : En studie om earnings management förekommer vid stock-for-stock-förvärv." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-202442.
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Denna studie undersöker ifall det förekommer earnings management (EM) vid stock-for-stock-förvärv på den svenska marknaden. Tidigare forskning har gett tydliga tecken på att EM sker inför företagsförvärv och det finns starka incitament att använda sig utav det. Detta undersöks genom att studera om det sker en ökning av diskretionära periodiseringar, som mäts genom Modified Jones Model, åren innan förvärvet till skillnad från tidigare år. Studien undersöker även om målföretagets relativa storlek har en påverkan på EM. Undersökningens resultat från första hypotesprövningen indikerar att EM förekommer i svenska bolag redan tre år innan stock-for-stock-förvärv. Resultatet från den andra hypotesprövningen visade ingen signifikant skillnad mellan grupperna Små förvärv och Stora förvärv medan resultatet från den tredje visade att storleksförhållandet mellan företagen har en inverkan på användningen av EM. Detta visades genom att företagen med de tio största förvärven har en signifikant högre summa diskretionära periodiseringar än de med de tio minsta förvärven.
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Acito, Andrew Alexei. "Does quarterly earnings guidance increase or reduce earnings management?" Diss., University of Iowa, 2011. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/1116.
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This study adds to the earnings guidance debate by investigating whether quarterly guidance is related to two forms of earnings management: (1) benchmark beating and (2) accounting irregularities. Using a post-Regulation Fair Disclosure sample, I find that firms regularly issuing earnings guidance display a discontinuity around zero in their distribution of management forecast errors and a larger discontinuity in their distribution of analyst forecast errors compared to non-guiding firms. Multivariate tests reveal that guiding firms recognize large abnormal accruals to beat their own guidance, but not to beat analyst forecasts, whereas non-guiding firms do recognize large abnormal accruals to beat analyst forecasts. Overall, guiding firms and non-guiding firms use similar levels of abnormal accruals to beat benchmarks. I also find no statistical relation between quarterly guidance and the likelihood of accounting irregularities. In sum, the evidence shows that while guiding firms and non-guiding firms manage earnings to different benchmarks, they are similar in terms of their aggregate earnings management.
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Bjurman, Albin, and Erik Weihagen. "How reliable are earnings? : A study about real activities manipulation and accrual-based management in Europe." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Företagsekonomi, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-73307.
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Background & Subject discussion: Financial reporting and earnings affect stakeholders’ decisions and is a vital component in firm’s information disclosure. Management possesses considerable influence over financial reports. Earnings consist of a cash-flow and accrual component. Earnings can be affected by managers’ judgment and decision either by accrual-based earnings management or real activities manipulation. Earnings management affects the relevance and reliability of financial reporting and is widely researched. Europe is consolidating and accounting and audit standards are harmonizing. Real activities manipulation is unobserved in Europe. Increased attention and regulations of earnings management are inducing more creative methods to alter earnings, such as stock repurchases. Purpose: The main purpose of this study is to investigate if real activities manipulation can be observed in Europe and to what extent in relationship to accrual-based activities to avoid reporting small losses. An underlying purpose is to study different methods of RAM, including some newer approaches to detect hypothesized RAM by stock repurchases. An additional purpose is to evaluate the different utilized detection methods to clarify effectiveness. The final purpose is to consider possible effects of EM on reliability and relevance of financial reporting. Conclusion: The result concludes that earnings management are performed by real activities manipulation. Stock repurchases, decreased discretionary expenses and production cost all indicate earnings management to avoid reporting earnings below a specific benchmark. The result questions the reliability and relevance of reported earnings.
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Smith, Kevin R. "Earnings Management Constraints and Market Reactions to Subsequent Earnings Surprises." Diss., Tucson, Arizona : University of Arizona, 2005. http://etd.library.arizona.edu/etd/GetFileServlet?file=file:///data1/pdf/etd/azu%5Fetd%5F1051%5F1%5Fm.pdf&type=application/pdf.
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Bondegård, Michael, and La David. "Earnings Management using Classification Shifting." Thesis, Uppsala University, Department of Business Studies, 2009. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-125152.
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Ge, Wen Xia. "Essays on Real Earnings Management." Thesis, McGill University, 2009. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=66691.
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the economic consequences of and constraints on real earnings management. My thesis consists of two essays. In the first essay, I examine the association between real earnings management and the cost of new corporate bond issues. Three types of real earnings management are considered: sales manipulation, overproduction and abnormal reduction of discretionary expenditures. Using the sample from 1993 to 2004, I find that cost of debt is negatively related to the proxies for sales manipulation, abnormal reduction of discretionary expenses and the overall real earnings management for firms without using stock options to compensate their managers. When managerial compensation is linked to option awards, however, the negative association between real earnings management and cost of debt is attenuated. Overproduction does not show a significant effect on bond yield spread. Overall, these results suggest that, in the primary bond market, mispricing of real earnings management exists, especially for firms that do not have executive stock option plans. In the second essay, I investigate the effect of quality board and takeover protection on real earnings management. Four types of real earnings management are considered in this essay: sales manipulation, overproduction, abnormal reduction of R&D expenses and abnormal reduction of discretionary expenditures (other than R&D). Using panel data from U.S. public firms in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act period (2004-2006), I find that the level of real earnings management (abnormal decline in R&D expenses and other discretionary expenses) increases with better board governance and decreases with higher takeover protection. The effects of these two governance factors on sales manipulation and overproduction cost are weak. Overall, the results suggest that the monitoring role of boards may put short-term market pressure on managers,Cette thèse à pour objectif d'examiner les conséquences économiques autant que les contraintes sur la vraie gestion de revenus. Ma thèse se compose de deux essais. Dans le premier essai, j'ai examiné la relation entre la vraie gestion de revenus et le coût des nouveaux emprunts obligataires d'une entreprise. Trois scénarios de vraie gestion de revenus sont considérés : la manipulation de ventes, l'effect de surproduction et enfin, la réduction anormale de dépenses discrétionnaires. En utilisant l'échantillon provenant de l'an 1993 à 2004, j'ai constaté que le coût de la dette est négativement relié aux procurations de la manipulation de ventes, de la réduction anormale de dépenses discrétionnaires et de la vraie gestion globale de revenus pour les sociétés qui n'emploient pas les options d'achat d'actions comme méthodes compensatoires exécutifs. Cependant, quand la compensation gestionnaire est reliée aux récompenses d'option, l'association négative entre de vrais revenus gestion et le coût de dette est diminuée. Dans ce cas, la surproduction ne cause pas d'effet significatif sur la diffusion de rendement en esclavage. De façon générale, ces résultats suggèrent que, sur le marché des obligations primaire des obligations, l'évaluation erronée de la vraie gestion de revenus existe encore, particulièrement pour les sociétés qui n'ont pas les plans d'options sur titres exécutifs.Dans le deuxième essai, j'ai étudié l'effet d'avoir accès à un conseil de qualité et de la protection de changement sur la vraie gestion de revenus. Quatre scénarios de vraie gestion de revenus sont considérés dans cette rédaction: la manipulation de ventes, la surproduction, la réduction anormale de R & D et la réduction anormale de dépenses discrétionnaires (autre que R&D). En utilisant des données de panneau des sociétés publiques établies dans la période du Sarbane
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Mashoka, Tareq Zaki. "Earnings management and loss reversal." Thesis, Brunel University, 2010. http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/4619.
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This research aims to detect and measure earnings management using a newly modified version of the standard Jones model (Jones, 1991). The standard model is extended to include a measure of discretionary accruals as an additional regressor instead of using the residuals. The variable used to measure discretionary accruals is a composite variable that consists of two components, one that represents the incentive and the other represents the tool of manipulation. The model is applied to detect earnings management in loss reversal companies for listed companies in Jordan and examine the market reaction to the loss reversal. The model is also applied on loss reversal companies for listed companies in the UK and the US. In chapter three, the new model is applied on listed companies in Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). The ASE is structured into two markets: the first market and the second market. Companies are motivated to be listed or remain listed in the first market since it only lists profitable companies. Companies reporting losses more frequently are listed in the second market. Results provide evidence of earnings management for companies listed in the first market. Companies that report a loss in a previous period manipulate in the following period to report profits. As a result of loss reversal, they preserve their place in the first market and avoid dropping back to the second market. This research conducts statistical simulation tests to compare the extended Jones model with the standard model. Results show that the extended model detects earnings management better than the standard one. This new model also separates discretionary accruals from measurement error (i.e. residuals) and makes it possible to accurately measure the whole amount of manipulation. Chapter four examines the investor reaction to the manipulation taking place in the first market. Results show that the market is pricing the discretionary accruals (the manipulation) as a component of net income, although they result only from earnings management. In chapter five, the model is applied on loss reversal firms listed in the UK and in the US. Results show that the companies manipulate to reverse losses and the manipulation depends on to the presence of R&D activities and the changing level in these activities.
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柴麗萍 and Lai-ping Mary Chai. "Earnings management by late reporters." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1999. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31238154.
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McCulloch, Brian William. "Earnings management with reversing accruals /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/8796.
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Chai, Lai-ping Mary. "Earnings management by late reporters /." Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 1999. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B20454831.
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Vasilescu, Camelia. "Earnings management in acquired companies." Thesis, University of Leeds, 2014. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/8388/.
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Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are very important corporate events for both acquirers and targets, and the quality of public accounting information has a significant role in mergers and acquisitions decisions. Acting on the shareholders’ behalf or pursuing their self-interests, targets’ managers have strong incentives to manipulate reported earnings prior to a deal in order to boost the stock price and generate higher gains for shareholders and themselves. Consistent with this view, researchers have dedicated much effort to examining whether acquirers and targets undertake earnings manipulation around takeovers. The objective of this thesis is to examine whether UK publicly listed targets engage in accruals and real-activity earnings management prior to M&A, and the consequences this has on targets’ shareholder wealth, in particular deal premium and stock return. Earnings management can occur through two main channels: accruals earnings management and real-activity earnings management. These two main earnings management tactics differ in their opacity, cost and the effect they cause to stock price performance prior to M&A (Roychowdhury et al., 2012). Most of the previous studies on this subject have focused exclusively on accruals earnings management, however, the evidence shows that opportunistic accruals earnings management is not a common practice among targets in M&A. More recent research on earnings management provides evidence that firms use multiple earnings manipulation strategies based on accruals and real-activities (e.g., Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2011), and managers prefer real-activities manipulation over accruals earnings manipulation as a way to increase reported earnings (Graham et al., 2005). The first empirical study of this thesis examines whether UK publicly listed targets attempt to manipulate earnings via accruals prior to a deal, and further, investigates the relationship between the deal premium and the targets’ earnings management behaviour. The results of the accruals tests under the cross-sectional modified-Jones model and performance-matched model, and using either the balance-sheet approach or the cash-flow approach, indicate that, on average, targets do not manage earnings upward prior to mergers and acquisitions. Furthermore, the analysis of the relationship between earnings management and deal premium provides evidence that the deal premium and the targets’ abnormal accruals are negatively related, which is consistent with the view that acquirers take into consideration the quality of targets’ earnings in making takeover decisions (e.g., Anilowski et al., 2009; Raman et al., 2013). The evidence in this study also suggests that the deal premium constrains targets’ accruals earnings management and acts as a strong disincentive to manipulate earnings. Consequently, the cost of detection explanation for the lack of earnings management by UK targets appears capable of explaining this relationship between the deal premium and the abnormal accruals of targets. The second empirical study builds on the results of the previous research, which finds no evidence of accruals manipulation by UK targets in M&A, and explores a potential explanation of this phenomenon. Specifically, this study examines whether firm diversification has an impact on earnings management by targets in M&A. An explicit distinction between industrial and geographical diversification is made in this study. Prior research provides evidence that the mode of diversification, such as industrial vs. geographical, can explain the difference in the correlation between discretionary accruals and diversification due to whether or not they are in different industry segments and/or whether business units are located in different countries (Kim and Kim, 2001). Using a panel data framework for a sample of publicly listed targets, the results of this empirical study suggest that industrial diversification mitigates earnings management prior to mergers and acquisitions. In addition, the results also show that a combination of industrial and geographical diversification alleviates earnings management. However, there is no clear empirical evidence that geographical diversification facilitates or mitigates earnings management. These results are consistent with those reported in Jiraporn et al. (2008) and El Mehdi and Seboui (2011), who find that industrial diversification decreases earnings management by US firms. Finally, the third empirical study investigates the earnings management behaviour of UK targets in M&A, in particular combined and simple strategies based on accruals and real-activities, and the impact of earnings management on targets’ stock overvaluation at the time of a deal. Prior literature provides evidence that at times of heightened scrutiny, such as M&A, earnings management via accruals is unlikely to be a dominant source of overvaluation (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Roychowdhury et al., 2012). Consistent with this view, the results of this study, which were derived from a panel data regression analysis, show that if targets engage in income-increasing earnings management, they are more likely to use combined strategies of earnings management via both accruals and real-activities simultaneously rather than simple strategies based solely on either accruals or real-activities. Furthermore, managers’ propensity to engage in combined strategies of earnings management prior to M&A is significantly higher than the propensity for accruals earnings management, despite the high and long-term costs of this earnings management method. Furthermore, the stock return tests performed in this study provide evidence that firms which exhibit evidence of combined earnings management strategies tend to be the most overvalued targets prior to M&A which is consistent with those results reported by Roychowdhury et al. (2012). To sum up, UK publicly listed targets are more likely to utilise combined earnings management strategies based on accruals and real-activities prior to a takeover, and these targets’ shareholders appear to gain the most if they sell their shares before the deal announcement. However, accruals earnings management as a sole method of earnings manipulation is not a widespread practice in UK mergers and acquisitions, and the deal premium constrains the targets’ accruals earnings management behaviour. If earnings manipulation by targets is detected, acquirers might adapt their takeover strategies by adjusting the deal price downward. Finally, industrial diversification mitigates earnings management by UK targets prior to mergers and acquisitions. Given the significant negative wealth consequences of both accruals and real-activity earnings manipulation, the findings of this thesis emphasise the fact that targets’ shareholders, board of directors and auditors, as well as financial advisors need to be alert to managers attempting to engage in earnings management via accruals, but also carefully monitor real-activities. Furthermore, investors, acquirers and financial analysts should be fully aware of the existence and severity of targets’ stock overvaluation when they make or facilitate important investment decisions.
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Redigolo, Giulia <1986>. "Essays on management earnings forecasts." Doctoral thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/6518.
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The purpose of the dissertation is to shed light on the iterative nature of management earnings forecasts characteristics by means of a new measure of consistency and to provide empirical evidence on both the cross-sectional determinants of the measure and its effects on the information environment. More precisely, the dissertation investigates i) the role of firm-specific variables in explaining the decision of keeping the set of management earnings forecasts characteristics constant over time; ii) whether the activity of financial analysts is sensitive to the consistency of a given set of earnings forecasts characteristics, and iii) potentially opportunistic disclosure practices whenever a company fails to meet market expectations through management earnings forecasts in a subsequent period.
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Al-Shattarat, Basiem. "Real earnings management activities, meeting earnings benchmarks and future performance : UK evidence." Thesis, University of Plymouth, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10026.1/8571.
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This thesis presents two essays on real earnings management and future performance. The first essay draws on empirical studies that examine the three types of real earnings management activities in the United Kingdom (UK) for firms that are more likely to manipulate their earnings to avoid missing earnings targets. These targets include the zero earnings, and last year’s earnings. Also drawing from empirical studies, the second essay investigates the impact of real earnings management on firms’ future operating performance in the UK. In the first essay, I examine earnings management through real activities manipulation by using a sample of UK firms over the period 2009-2013. According to the transaction cost theory and opportunistic perspective of earnings management, the results of the first essay reveal that managers in UK suspect firm-years that manage earnings upward utilise more real earnings management activities to achieve earnings benchmarks opportunistically. Specifically, I find that (1) firms which manage upward earnings have unusually low cash flows from operations by offering price discounts or/and more lenient credit terms to increase sales; (2) firms that manage upward earnings have unusually low discretionary expenditures by cutting/reducing expenditures spending to improve reported margin and (3) firms which manage upward earnings, incur unusually high production costs by producing more products to report lower costs of goods sold in order to achieve their targets. Further, I find evidence that UK firms’ meeting/beating earnings benchmarks around zero earnings and last year’s earnings engage in sales-based manipulation and reducing/cutting discretionary expenses simultaneously; they also engage in overproducing products and reducing discretionary expenses at the same time. Furthermore, I do not find, however, evidence that managers in UK firms are associated with high real earnings management through sales-based manipulation to meet/beat last year’s earnings. On the other hand, I find evidence that manager in UK firms engage in income-increasing earnings management through accounting choice (e.g., accrual-based earnings management) to meet an earnings target. Motivated by agency conflicts of real earnings management (e.g., opportunistic and signalling perspectives), the second essay investigates whether there is an association between UK firms that manipulate their business operations to meet earnings benchmarks (e.g., zero earnings, last year’s earnings) and subsequent operating performance. I implement Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) regression analysis to examine the effects of the magnitude of real earnings management on firms’ future performance. Empirical test results show that manipulation of operating activities such as sales, discretionary expenditures, and production costs to meet earnings benchmarks has a significant positive consequence for firms’ subsequent operating performance and signals firms’ good future performance. Further, I find evidence that firms that manipulate their operating activities in the absence of meeting/beating earnings benchmarks experience a decline in their subsequent operating performance. The findings of this research lend support to our understanding of the process that management follows to evaluate costs and benefits of real earnings management.
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Jeppson, Nathan Hans. "Innovation Focused Strategy and Earnings Management." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1363978241.
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Marinakis, Pantelis. "An investigation of earnings management and earnings manipulation in the UK." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2011. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/12874/.
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What causes managers to manipulate their financial statements? How best can shareholders or prospective investors, auditors, financial analysts and regulators detect earnings manipulations? Addressing these questions is of critical importance to the efficient functioning of capital markets. For an investor it can result to improved returns, for an auditor it can mean avoiding costly litigation, for an analyst it can mean avoiding a damaged reputation, and for a regulator it can lead to enhanced investor protection and fewer investment disasters. The objective of this thesis is two-fold. The first objective is to investigate the frequency and the magnitude of earnings management. Second, is to provide an analysis of the characteristics of companies discovered to manipulate earnings and the determinants of these manipulations. Exploratory interviews with the Financial Reporting Review Panel suggest that earnings manipulation usually results from escalating earnings management that after a certain stage violates accounting principles. This is analysed in a review of a series of companies publicly criticised for applying aggressive accounting practises. It is suggested that these cases involve specific accounting standards that require increased judgement from management. In order to gain a broader view of the extent that companies manage earnings, this thesis examines the distribution of earnings among thresholds such as zero earnings and earnings decreases. This thesis documents evidence of unusually low frequencies of small decreases in earnings and small losses and unusually high frequencies of small increases in earnings and small positive earnings. Additional evidence suggests that three components of earnings, cash flow from operations, changes in working capital and discretionary accruals, are used to achieve increases in earnings. Finally, this thesis presents evidence of the characteristics of firms that manipulate earnings and proposes a model for detecting earnings manipulation. Companies found to manipulate earnings appear to have lower accrual quality, declining performance, weaker corporate governance structure, weaker balance sheet and increased leverage. The output of this investigation is a scaled logistic probability model for discriminating accounting manipulations, where higher values suggest a greater probability of manipulation.
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Kwack, So Yean. "Impact of Connections Within the Top Management Team on Managerial Turnover, Earnings Management, and Voluntary Disclosure." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2016. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/375196.
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Business Administration/AccountingPh.D.
The top management team is important to understand as the executives within the top management team would have long-term implications for a firm's investment, operating and financing decisions which would affect the firm value. As these executives may have pre-existing connections outside the current firm, they are likely to be affected by these connections within the top management team. In this dissertation, I draw upon the literature in sociology that discusses different mechanisms of connections; 1) better information transfer, 2) cohesion and better coordination, and 3) favorable treatment to see how the connections within the top management team affects different decisions for the firm using data from 1999 to 2013. First, I find that the executives with connections to the CEO are less likely to be forced out and those with social connections to the CEO enjoy less sensitivity of involuntary turnover to performance. Notably, I find that this is consistent with CEOs favorably treating the connected executives rather than CEOs keeping connected executives for the benefits. Second, I find that firms with greater percentage of executives with connections to the CEO have greater accruals earnings management and lower likelihood of detection of accounting manipulations. I also show that the connections have an effect only when the joint tenure between the CEO and the executives are short. Finally, I document that firms with more closely connected top management team issue management earnings forecasts in a more precise form and issue more frequent and accurate forecasts. I show that this matters more when the top management team’s external network size is small.
Temple University--Theses
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Hansen, James Charles. "Earnings management around earnings benchmarks." 2004. http://purl.galileo.usg.edu/uga%5Fetd/hansen%5Fjames%5Fc%5F200408%5Fphd.
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Ow, Yong Keng Kevin. "Earnings Breaks and Earnings Management." Diss., 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10161/677.
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This paper examines the role of earnings management for firms that report at least three consecutive years of annual earnings increases (hereafter earnings string firms). Specifically, I examine how levels of earnings management change as earnings string firms approach the end of their earnings string patterns. My results show that earnings string firms engage in income-increasing earnings management consistent with an attempt to stretch these earnings string patterns. I also examine whether the cumulative effect of income-increasing earnings management activities during the earnings string period reduces the ability of these firms to continue reporting earnings increases. I do not find evidence to suggest that earnings string firms, on average, break their earnings string patterns because they ran out of accounting flexibility. However, there are two instances which the accumulated effect of income-increasing earnings management increases the likelihood of ending the earnings string. The two instances relate to firms which repeatedly engage in income-increasing earnings management throughout the earnings string period, and firms whose pre-managed earnings decline in the last year of the earnings string period. Finally, I show that firms that resume a subsequent series of reporting at least three consecutive years of annual earnings increases, on average, exhibit similar earnings management behavior. That is, these firms also increasingly resort to income-increasing earnings management toward the end of their second (or third) earnings strings.
Dissertation
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Hung, Chia-hsi, and 洪嘉禧. "Under earnings pressures, the impact of financial expertise and earnings management: accrual earnings management and real earnings management." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/86340025051149176057.
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碩士國立中央大學
會計學研究所
100
In 2002, the SEC issued its proposal on 407, including a tentative and restricted definition of a financial expert, which raised lots of concerns. To accommodate these concerns, the SEC expanded the definition of a financial expertise in 2003. Under this situation, does financial expertise improve a firm’s corporate governance environment? In this paper we use 1357 suspect firms from 2004 to 2007, which face earnings pressures, to examine the impact of whether audit committee with financial expertise, audit committee with more than one financial expertise and financial expertise(s) is(are) both in audit committee and compensation committee on discretionary earnings management and real earnings management. We find that audit committee with financial expertise and audit committee with more than one financial expertise reduce discretionary earnings management, and financial expertise(s) is(are) both in audit and compensation committee induce discretionary earnings management. Audit committee with financial expertise, audit committee with more than one financial expertise and financial expertise(s) is(are) both in audit and compensation committee have no association between real earnings management-stock repurchase.
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Min, Huang Shih, and 黃世旻. "Voluntary Earnings Forecast、Earning Management, and Market Reaction." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/72090714957515385475.
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碩士國立中正大學
會計學研究所
99
This study examines whether investors react to real and accounting earnings management activities differently in the pre-mandatory earnings forecast and the post-mandatory earnings forecast regimes after public firms were no longer required to issue earnings forecasts since January 2005. Our empirical results indicate that after public firms were waived the requirement of mandatory earnings forecasts, market participants react negatively to real earnings management activities irrespective of firms reporting earnings forecast. On the other hand, investors react positively to accounting earnings management activities for firms not issuing earnings forecasts, while the market reaction to accounting earnings management behaviors is insignificant for firms with voluntary earnings forecasts. We also find significant negative differences between the market reaction to accounting earnings management activities for firms with earnings forecasts and that for their counterparts. Moreover, levels of investors’ sophistication may result in different market reactions to earnings management behaviors. Accordingly, we conduct a more focused analysis by investigating how sophisticated and unsophisticated investors react to real and accounting earnings management activities differently for firms with earnings forecasts in the two regimes. The results document that sophisticated investors react to real earnings management behaviors more positively, although insignificant, relative to their counterparts. In addition, we find that sophisticated investors react to accounting earnings management activities more negatively as compared to their counterparts, after the waiver of mandatory earnings forecasts. The combined evidence suggests that sophisticated investors are more “experienced” than their counterparts in recognizing the meanings behind accounting numbers. Their negative market reaction provides further support for the notions that accounting earnings management is perceived “unfavorable,” and that voluntary earnings forecasts are considered to increase managerial discretion.
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"Management earnings forecasts, cash flow forecasts and earnings management." ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY, 2008. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3318443.
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Lin, Chun-Wei, and 林峻葳. "Meeting Mandatory Management Earnings Forecast through Real Earnings Management." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/d3kxc3.
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碩士國立中正大學
會計與資訊科技研究所
102
This paper discusses the relation between mandatory management earnings forecasts and real earnings management and this paper find some evidence and collated some literature. This paper find evidence, first, if Japanese firms have upwards MEFs, then have using real earnings management. Second, if Japanese firms revise more cumulative amount of the MEFs, then the Japan’s firms would give up revise MEFs rather than revise financial forecast directly. Third, if Japan’s firms have wider gap between initial forecasts and realized earnings, the Japan’s firms would give up revise MEFs too and revise financial forecast directly. Besides, this paper provided additional tests to get step further research on multiply relation of hypothesis. Key words: Mandatory earnings forecasts, real earnings management
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Hsu, Hsieh-tzu, and 徐謝慈. "The Relationship Between Earnings Management, Management Earnings Forecast Reputation and Earnings Forecast Revisions." Thesis, 2002. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/59641198656390002257.
Full textAbstract:
碩士元智大學
管理研究所
90
There are four motivations of this thesis. First, to discuss whether forced financial information disclosure may give another motivation to manage earnings. Second, the intermediate effect between management earnings forecast reputation and the expect earnings. Third, the effectiveness of the earnings management decision this year to the forecast error and earnings forecast revision decision in the future. At last, the effect factors of financial forecast revision, and the relationship between it and earnings management. After the revision of “Guideline Governing the Disclosure of Financial Forecast Information by Public Companies” promulgated in 1997, public offering and season equity offering should seriatim disclosure the financial forecast to three and two years. Focused on the firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC over the period of 1997 to 2000, this thesis discusses the relationship between management earnings forecast and earnings management. The empirical results documents that when the pre-management earnings is loss and pre-management earnings below (over) the financial forecast 80﹪(120﹪), managers will manage the earnings upward (down) by discretionary accruals. The pre-management earnings is loss has stronger relative effectiveness of earnings management thresholds to pre-management earnings below (over) the financial forecast 80﹪(120﹪). When the pre-management earnings is loss and pre-management earnings below the financial forecast 80﹪and management earnings forecast reputation is better, managers will manage the earnings upward more by discretionary accruals. If the discretionary accruals this year is higher, the earnings forecast error next year is larger. It shows that managers forecast is too optimistic. If the pre-management earnings is loss and pre-management earnings below the financial forecast 80﹪, the more the loss are, the higher the probability and the frequency of earnings forecast revision. After controlling the autogenous variables, the earnings management decision and the earnings forecast revision decision have alternative relationship.
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HO, WEI-TING, and 何韋霆. "Earnings Thresholds Effect and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/71438677782004713215.
Full textAbstract:
碩士逢甲大學
會計所
96
This paper aims to investigate whether firms manage earnings to meet or exceed previous period earnings. The empirical tests are conducted using TEJ database for firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and Gretai Securities Market with fiscal year ends between 2000 and 2005. Discretionary accruals, gain on disposal of fixed assets and investments, research and development expenditures and advertising expenditures are used to proxy for the magnitude of earnings management（EM）. The empirical results show that there is a positive relation between recent performance threshold and EM.
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Hsieh, Shan-Shung, and 謝勝雄. "Earnings Management Reconsideration：An Indirect Earnings Management Approach upon Analyzing Firm’s Management Objective." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/ngsgq9.
Full textAbstract:
碩士臺中技術學院
事業經營研究所
98
Earnings management is not limited to adjust the current accounting numbers directly and it can through other indirect channels, such as Schreand and Walther (2000) that was considered corporate administrator will report the nonrecurring items of prior earnings to adjust the benchmark let earnings numbers showed the most beneficial variation at current announcement, and then change investor or statement readers’ value recognition of current earnings. The strategic reference disclosure behavior is called indirect earnings management in this study. The research objects of this study are the listed companies in Taiwan and observe announced annual financial report, analyze desired achievement of firm’s management objective whether it’s the Maximizing, smoothing or the combination of dual strategic objects; and focus on strategic reminding sampling corporate and industries average of prior disposal investment G/L (gains and losses) and disposal assets G/L to proceed empirical research. This study adopt Paired Sample t test and Wilcoxon Signed-rank test for examination and use Logistic Regression Analysis to find out the correlation to help investor to accurately judge listed companies administrators’ firm’s management objective and its corporate’ characteristics as expectation. As empirical results showed, first, corporate administrators are intelligent, its Firm’s management objective are not dichotomy as traditional methodology of Maximizing and stabilities’ objects. Through indirect earnings management tools, almost corporate will adopt the dual strategic objects to achieve Maximizing and stabilities. Second, the corporate firm’s management objective are not permanence change, corporate administrators will do some change of each firm’s management objective based on each different annual condition. Third, the large size corporate should take more social responsibilities to cause higher political costs and consider the maintenance of external relationships with suppliers, customers, debtee…etc., and tend to use prior benefits reminding to achieve the Maximizing or dual strategic objects. Four, when corporate profitability is low, corporate administrators will avoid report losses and expect earnings to reach the best condition. It will tend to use prior benefits reminding to achieve the Maximizing or dual strategic objects.
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許雅婷. "The Relationships between Indirect Earnings Management and Direct Earnings Management." Thesis, 2003. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/67801887442127633177.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立彰化師範大學
會計學系
91
Past literatures about earnings management emphasis on the relationship between current or future earnings and earnings management, they did not consider that firms used past events to influence financial statement readers’ recognition of current earnings. The motive of this paper was to investigate if firms selectively chose past events to influence the users’ recognition of current earnings. The purpose of this study is to adopt the simultaneous equations approach to explore the relationship between the indirect earnings management and direct earnings management in Taiwan security market. The study uses firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange, adopted the framework of Schrand and Walther（2000）, divided samples into different purposes of strategical remind. The sample consists of the firms (except banking and insurance companies) traded in the Taiwan Stock Exchange between 1992 to 2001. We further used discretionary accrual items as independent variables and firm size; the structure of stockholders’ equity; EPS rate; debt-paying ability as control variables. In order to examine firms’ characteristic of different remind purposes, we collected data that were analyzed by using descriptive analysis, correlation analysis, multiple regression analysis, t-test and binomial test. The results of this paper are as follows：（1）As firms carry out indirect earnings management , it maybe means that the effect of direct earnings management wasn’t so powerful at that time; in other words, discretionary accrual items has been manipulated much. That is, as firms carry out indirect earnings management, their direct earnings management has been serious manipulated.（2）As to the direction relationship of indirect & direct earnings management .We found that when firms remind gain, direct earnings management turned upward. When firms remind loss, direct earnings management didn’t turn downward. The partial empirical results supported the hypotheses.（3）Firms do not carry indirect earnings management out, maybe they have their strategical consideration. The empirical results indicate discretionary accrual items have a significance at α=0.1, it implied the level of direct earnings manipulated very seriously. The result were support the hypotheses that these type of fimrs indeed have their strategical consideration.
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CHU, I.-CHIEH, and 朱怡潔. "The Effect of Earnings Management Incentives on Real Earnings Management." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/732y58.
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碩士靜宜大學
會計學系
106
One of the business objectives of the company is profit maximization. Because the purpose of the investment of its shareholders , internal and external stakeholders want to obtain benefits from the investee, the company hopes to obtain the maximum interests by means of operating, investing and financing activities. On the one hand, The company can attract more investors' funds from outside and also can protect the interests of stakeholders. As a result, the operating decisions made by the CEO of the company become very important. There have been many previous studies exploring the causes of earnings management and their internal relationships with CEOs, both of which indicate that CEOs indeed to use earnings manipulation because of their business-related interests. Therefore, this study uses the data of listed companies in Taiwan from 2005 to 2015, The effects of changes in variable compensations (cash dividends, stock dividends, stock options, and the sum of the three) held by CEOs on their degree of real earnings management and earnings smoothing , as well as whether there is any difference in real earnings management under the condition of the level of earnings volatility. In addition, this study also included that operational complexity of companys into additional tests, to explore whether operational complexity will affect the degree of CEO’s earnings management or earnings smoothing.
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Liang, Yu-non, and 梁佑農. "The Information of Earning Surprise and Non-management Earnings." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/28772298901717887379.
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碩士東吳大學
會計學系
100
Earning is the financial information that the investors most concerned when they want to make a decision about their investment. Their decisions often rely on the analyst’s forecast or the analysis of corporate financial statements. Because of the uncertainty of the analyst’s forecast and the earnings management, the investors made wrong decisions and got losses. This study will compare the influences of the earnings surprise or the earning without management on the investors by discussing the relations between the earning surprise, the non-management financial information and the stock returns. The empirical results show that the earning without real earning management do affected the stock returns and had a negative correlation. The results also show that the earning without real earning management had the greater impact on the stock returns than the earning surprise and the earning without accrual-based earning management.
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Tun-Chiao, Chang, and 張惇喬. "Detecting earnings management." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/15326460099048250097.
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碩士國立臺灣大學
會計學研究所
93
When Researchers in Taiwan deal with earnings-management-related issues, they adopt accrual- based models frequently. Especially, the Healy, DeAngelo, Jones, Modified Jones, and Industry Model are most commonly considered among these accrual-based models. However, there is no study about the fitness of these five models when they are applied to the Taiwan capital market. This article adopts Dechow and Sloan (1995)’s methodology. We build two samples which probably lead to the type I error to access the relative specification of these five models. Also, we prepare another two samples which could give rise to the type II error to test the relative power of each model. We describe and explain the empirical results and compare them with the original Dechow and Sloan’s experiment. The conclusions we draw are as follows: 1 In the first sample, the Jones and Modified Jones Model are more seldom to lead to type I error; DeAngelo Model has the lowest specification. 2 Sample (ii) shows that all these five models cannot produce the reject frequency close to the given confidence level. This result indicates that all these models perform not well. 3 Sample (iii) demonstrates that the Modified Jones Model produces more unbiased estimators than the other four and its power curve rises most steeply. We can infer that the Modified Jones Model estimate nondiscretionary accruals better. 4 In the last sample, all five models fail to reject the null hypothesis and make the type II error. This may be the result of the too small sample size or the lack of the assumptions accrual-based models require.
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Teng, Yi-chia, and 鄧伊珈. "Management Quality and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/90728589492930802248.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立高雄第一科技大學
財務管理研究所
100
Most of the former studies had discussed the relationship between corporate government and earnings management. There were few literature focused on the relationship between management quality and earnings management. Therefore, the paper examines the relationships among management quality, corporate government, and earnings management to companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange .The management quality consists of top management team size, educational levels and numbers of business educational background in the team .The empirical results show that there are significant negative relationship between top management team size and earnings management .We also find that there is no obviously association among percentage of the management team with a Master''s degree, number of business educational background in the team and earnings management.
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Yang, Mei-Ling, and 楊美玲. "Insider Ownership, Earnings Management and Earnings Thresholds." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/49389727592894687562.
Full textAbstract:
博士國立成功大學
會計學系碩博士班
97
This study examines the relationship between insider ownership and earnings management under different mechanisms of corporate governance and considers the effect of earnings thresholds on that relationship. Our findings suggest that in situations where firms have no controlling shareholders and in cases where they employ professional managers, the relationship between insider ownership and discretionary accrual is negative, supporting the convergence of interest hypothesis. Relatively, in the case of firms with controlling shareholders, the relationship between insider ownership and discretionary accruals is positive, supporting the entrenchment hypothesis and documenting that earnings management is one method where controlling shareholders decrease earnings quality in order to expropriate the interest of minority shareholders. However, this entrenchment effect will be weakened by employing professional managers without significant ownership. The main cause for the reversal of the relationship between insider ownership and earnings management is the existence of controlling shareholders. Finally, we tested the impact of the phenomenon of managing earnings to exceed earnings thresholds on the relationship between insider ownership and discretionary accruals, and found that BBUA (benchmark beaters using accruals) firms have more incentive and a greater capacity for managing earnings, which strengthens the associations between insider ownership and earnings management. The findings of this study can remind investors evaluating the financial statements of firms and authorities monitoring the reported information of listed firms that the earnings quality may not be good when the level of insider ownership is especially high or low or when firms exhibit the phenomenon of managing earnings to exceed earnings thresholds.
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Chang, Shu-Chun, and 張淑君. "Accruals-based Earnings Management and Earnings Informativeness." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/78552926861803813384.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立雲林科技大學
會計系
101
Earnings quality is a critical concerned by investors and analysts in the capital market. The financial information can provide users with the instant financial conditions and operating achievements of the company, thus, can be used as a reference for assessing the decisions of investment and credit. Aiming to improve the usefulness of the financial statements, management has influence on the policies of corporate financial reporting. Therefore, it’s possible for the management to use the discretion endowed by the generally accepted accounting principles to target the earnings threshold. Taking the companies listed (or OTC) from 2000 to 2009 as samples, the study examines the influence of accounting accruals-based earnings management on the earnings informativeness. It’s found that the magnitude of discretionary accruals is negatively associated with the earnings informativeness. This study implements several diagnostic checks and reveals the empirical findings are robust to the supplementary examinations.
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Kan-JungWu and 吳侃融. "Accrual Earnings Management and Real Earnings Management around Mergers and Acquisitions." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/16845351652463947347.
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HSIEH, TANG-MIN, and 謝當敏. "Accrual-Based Earnings Management, Real Earnings Management and Key Audit Matters." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/43k4wc.
Full textAbstract:
碩士輔仁大學
會計學系碩士班
106
The outbreak of 2008 global financial crisis negatively impacts every countries’ economies. These facts show that the traditonal audit reports even could not effectively reflect the information of investment risk. As a result, several institutions and governments around the world have embarked on the reform of audit report. Taiwan government also requires listed firms to adopt the new-type audit report from 2016 and public companies can defer this adoption to July 2018. This study aims to explore the relationship between key audit matters and accrual-based earnings management, the substitute or complementary relationship between accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management, as well as whether the key audit matters can weakened this relationship. The sample consists of listed firms in Taiwan from 2012 to 2017. The empirical results show that accrual-based earnings management of the companies with the key audit matters of the new audit report were less than that of companies without the key audit matters of the new audit report. In addition, this study also finds that there is a complementary relationship between accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management, and the adption of the new audit report inhibited this relationship. Furthermore, this study performs several sensitivity tests, including replacing the dummy variable of key audit matters with the number of key audit matters items / the word counts of key audit matters, and using another earnings management proxies. The empirical results of these sensitivity tests are similar to the main empirical results.
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Chang, Rui-Tang, and 張睿棠. "The relationship between earnings forecast and earnings management." Thesis, 2003. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/72678069304335284690.
Full textAbstract:
碩士東海大學
企業管理學系碩士班
91
Abstract This paper investigates the relationship between mandatory earnings forecast in the first half-year and earnings management in the later half-year. We also investigate whether the magnitude of the companies’ earnings management is more significant in the later half-year when the difference between the companies’ first semi-annual earnings and forecasted earnings which was updated in the first half-year is bigger. Empirical results show: 1.If the difference between the companies’ first semi-annual earnings and forecasted earnings in the first half-year is bigger, the companies will use discretionary accrual earnings to avoid some direct/ indirect costs of financial forecasted errors in the later half-year. 2.The first semi-annual forecasted earnings’ achievement is under 25%, its later half-year discretionary accrual earnings will be significantly bigger than forecasted earnings’ achievement over 75%. In order to avoid the relevance costs of financial forecasted errors, the companies will manipulate their earnings in the later half-year. 3.The difference between first semi-annual earnings and forecasted earnings which was updated in the first half-year is more obvious, companies will use discretionary accrual earnings to avoid updating forecast figures again in the later half-year.
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Kuan, Hsin-Yi, and 官心怡. "Management Earnings Forecasts as Targets for Earnings Manipulation." Thesis, 1994. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/45064995737247588217.
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Porter, Jason C. "Do analysts remove earnings management when forecasting earnings?" 2006. http://purl.galileo.usg.edu/uga%5Fetd/porter%5Fjason%5Fc%5F200608%5Fphd.
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She-ChihChiu and 邱碩志. "Is Abnormal Real Earnings Management A Top Priority in Earnings Management Strategies?" Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/zqse76.
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博士國立成功大學
會計學系
104
This paper examines how managers use earnings management strategies and the sequence between accrual-based and real earnings management. Based on a sample of U.S. publicly held companies during the period between 1992 and 2015, this paper documents that managers use accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management in a supplementary manner, controlling for the costs of conducting earnings management. In contrast to the literature, which shows that managers prefer real activity manipulation, this study shows that managers consider abnormal real activity manipulation as the last resort in their income-increasing earnings management strategies.
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Chang, Chia-Wei, and 張家瑋. "Management with Working Experience of CPA Firms, Earnings Threshold and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/08098193921675807871.
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碩士國立臺灣大學
會計學研究所
95
The unprecedented media and regulatory attention on auditor independence issues following the collapse of Enron Corporation has brought the “revolving door” into sharp focus. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2000), and the Independence Standards Board (ISB, 1999) suggest that audit quality can be impaired when executives previously worked for their companies’ audit firms. This study investigates whether the management of companies with working experience of CPA firms engages in earnings management more easily. In addition, this study also examines whether the management has incentives to manipulate earnings to exceed the following three earnings thresholds: report positive profits, sustain recent performance, and meet analysts’ expectations. Using the Modified Jones Model (Dechow, 1995) to calculate discretionary accruals from 2003 to 2005, this study finds that companies employing management with working experience of CPA firms reported larger positive discretionary accruals than other companies, after controlling for other factors that plausibly affect discretionary accruals. In addition, this study also observes that companies just meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts report larger positive discretionary accruals.
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Li, Meng-Huei, and 李孟徽. "Earnouts and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/36346705466335798944.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺灣大學
會計學研究所
104
Earnouts represent a means of acquisition payment that specify future obligation of the acquirer to transfer assets to the target as partial or full acquisition payment. In contrast to cash or stock payment, earnouts defer the payment until target firms meet performance thresholds or pre-specified economic events occur. SFAS 141(R) requires the acquirer to estimate and recognize the fair value of earnouts at the acquisition date instead of disclosing in financial statements. The empirical results in this study find that under SFAS 141(R), accrual-based earnings management and real activities earnings management are constrained in post-acquisition period for acquiring firms with earnout contracts. Under SFAS 141(R), information content and inputs of earnout-related assurance work increase. These circumstances could constrain opportunistic behavior of acquiring firms with earnout contracts.
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"Essays on earnings management." Tulane University, 2004.
Find full textAbstract:
Financial accounting standards permit managers to exercise discretion on reporting therefore provide space for earnings management. Managers can strategically manipulate earnings to affect perceptions of other stakeholders. Earnings management has been an active research field in accounting for decades. Recent scandal of Enron and Worldcom raised public concern about earnings management activities. My dissertation addresses two issues about earnings management My first essay investigates the relationship between timeliness and earnings quality. Timeliness and earnings quality are two essential qualitative properties incorporated in GAAP. However managers can affect them by exercising discretion on reporting dates and accruals. The literature has documented systematic behavior in timing and accruals as independent phenomena, and found significant market reactions to each. In this study, we examine the timing and accruals as a joint phenomenon and finds significant interaction between them. Our study also shows that the market assessment of earnings quality is affected by the timeliness of disclosure. The information relevance of earnings quality and earnings performance is associated with disclosure timing. The evidence indicates that report timing and accrual adjustments are joint disclosure strategy. Hence, timeliness and earnings quality should be considered as a joint issue in the deliberation of GAAP My second essay examines the effects of firm performance and growth on managers' decision of earnings management. We construct a simple model in which the market's price mechanism and managers' choice of earnings management are determined simultaneously. In the equilibrium, the level of earnings management increases with reported earnings and future growth, while the proportion of earnings managements in reported earnings decreases with reported earnings and increases in future growth. The model also predicts that the value relevance of earnings, as measured by the coefficients of price regress on earnings, increases with reported earnings and future growth. In the extension, we introduce uncertainty about the costs of earnings management into the basic model. Under this setting, the variance of earnings management increases with reported earnings and future growth. We empirically test those propositions and find strongly supporting results. Our study explicitly relates earnings management with firm performance and future growth and provides a new explanation to why discretionary accruals estimated from Jones (1991) model are related to firm performance and future growth as documented in Dechow, Sloan and Sweedney (1995) and McNichols (2000)acase@tulane.edu
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Chen, Kuan-Liang, and 陳冠良. "Timeliness and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/30258241567487397678.
Full textAbstract:
碩士輔仁大學
會計學系碩士班
93
Timeliness and earnings management are two important discretionary elements of the financial disclosure. Respectively, they influence the relevance and the reliability of accounting information, and also the investors’ decision makings. In order to explore the relationship between timeliness and earnings management, this study uses the difference between the actual disclosure date and the last year disclosure date to measure timeliness, and the performance adjusted discretionary accruals to measure earnings management. We define the abnormal (normal) disclosure date as beyond (within) eight days of the last year disclosure date. The empirical results are as follows： 1. This study finds that abnormally early/late reports have more earnings management activities. 2. The Hausman tests reject the endogenity of timings and accruals, so this study uses OLS to explore the interaction between them and finds that timings is positively associated with accruals and vise versa. 3. In the earnings boosting case, the early or late report is associated with more earnings management activities. 4. Early report and earnings management are relevant information in investors’ valuation decisions. 5. While financial reports are disclosed early than 5 days or late than 7 days, timings and accruals are not linearly associated. 6. In the early disclosure case, earnings management influences reporting timing, but in the late disclosure case, earnings management and report timing influence each other.
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Lai, Hung-Ching, and 賴虹靜. "Earnings Management and Hedging." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/43586261763604169475.
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碩士國立暨南國際大學
財務金融學系
100
Using a sample of U.S. S&P 500 firms from 2004 to 2010, this study examines the impact of hedging decision on earnings management. Empirical results indicate that hedged firms and firms with higher hedge ratio conduct less earnings management and reveal better earnings quality. Further, this study uses future earnings response coefficient, denoted by FREC, as proxy of earnings informativeness to investigate the impact of hedging decision on earnings informativeness. The results show that earnings of firms with high hedge ratio are more informativeness, suggesting that hedging decision can improve earnings informativeness. These findings are robust to different analysis models controlling endogenous problem and simultaneous decision problem.
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Wang, Yuying, and 王譽縈. "Substitution And Complementary Effects Of Accrual-Based Earnings Management And Real Earnings Management." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/62651068725109938870.
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碩士國立中正大學
企業管理研究所
100
We examine whether firms simultaneously use accrual-based earnings management (AEM) or real earnings management (REM) to engage in earnings management. Our findings, using five measures of REM, such as cash flows from operations, R&D expenditures, SG&A expenses, production cost, and gains on assets sales, based upon a 1991-2010 dataset on related within listed companies in Taiwan, firstly, we show that while firms use R&D expenditures of real earnings management to increase their earnings, there existing substitution effect between accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management. Secondary, we also find when firms through use real earnings management including cash flows from operations, production cost, gains on assets sales to increase their earnings, that existing a complementary effect between accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management. Our evidence provide a reference for investors, that when investors judge a company not only by accrual-based earnings management, but also by real earnings management to manipulate their earnings.
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Hu, Yung-Chun, and 胡永純. "The Association between the Earnings Forecasts and Earnings Management." Thesis, 1997. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/86089741788266918687.
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Chou, Ying-Yan, and 周櫻燕. "The impact of earnings management on analysts’ earnings forecasts." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/90733671649466259678.
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碩士中國文化大學
會計研究所
97
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of earnings management on analysts’ earnings forecasts. The research firms in the fourth quarter of 2007, analysts forecast earnings targets, the use of advanced Jones model abnormal accruals as a measure of earnings management. Empirical results show that earnings management and analyst earnings forecast accuracy to the relationship between negative, indicating the high earnings management analyst in the company's higher forecast accuracy. The empirical results of this may be interpreted as corporate earnings tend to smooth the way of management;, therefore, reduce the earnings variability (risk) levels, thereby increasing the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts.
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Ming-Chih, Shih, and 施明志. "Quarterly Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Losses and Decreases." Thesis, 2002. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/61181649872784349151.
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碩士國立臺灣大學
會計學研究所
90
ABSTRACT Graduate Institute of Accounting National Taiwan University Name : Shih, Ming — Chih Month / Year : June , 2002 Adviser : Lin, Chan-Jane Title : Quarterly Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Losses and Decreases The main purpose of this study is to investigate whether the managers also have incentives to manipulate quarterly earnings to avoid earnings decreases (both relative to the immediately preceding quarter and to the corresponding fiscal quarter in the previous year) and to avoid losses (both for individual quarters and for cumulative year-to-date earnings). Besides, we also examine the impact of company characteristics on the behavior of quarterly earnings management. This study use pooled cross-sectional distribution approach to detect whether there is discontinuity of the distribution of quarterly earnings near the threshold after earnings management. Data are collected from Taiwan Economic News Journal from 1986 to 2001. The empirical results are as follows: (1) The first and the third quarter and cumulative year-to-date quarterly earnings were manipulated by managers to avoid losses. (2) Quarterly earnings and cumulative year-to-date earnings were not manipulated by managers to avoid earnings decreases. (3) The quarterly earnings management is more pronounced in the group firms (in the traditional industry) than in the non-group firms (in the electronics industry).
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Chi-ChunHsieh and 謝季純. "Auditor Narcissism and Earnings Management to Achieve Earnings Benchmarks." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/3cny7s.
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