Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Duopoly games'

We consider the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) in various contexts; games with quadratic payoff functions (which include Cournot duopoly, public good provision and emission abatement) and a linear duopoly game. For the games with quadratic payoffs we compute the largest feasible total utility in any CCE and show that it is achieved by a CCE involving only two strategy profiles. The improvement over and above the Nash equilibrium payoff is substantial in the various economic examples considered for this class of games. In case of the linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric CCE, and any unilateral perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.

This thesis analyses real options in competitive settings. We develop four real option models for competitive settings and one model for a monopolist's decision to invest. In the first model, the profits per unit and the number of units follow two different stochastic paths. In the second model, the profits and the investment cost pursue different paths. In the third model a monopolistic investor has the option to invest in a market where the number of units sold follows a stochastic birth and death process. The fourth and the fifth model are, similarly to the first two models, developed for competitive settings. In the fourth model the profits follow a stochastic process and there is a random time delay between the moment that the second firm enters the market (invests) and the moment that the firm starts its sales. In the fifth model there is also a time delay between the moment of entry and the moment of the first sales, but two stochastic factors are considered: the profits and the investment cost. For the competition models we analyse dissimilar games considering that the roles of the players are endogenous and also exogenous to the models, assuming that the first mover has a competitive advantage over the second mover. Closed form solutions are obtained for the value functions of the first and second mover and for their trigger functions, and numerical solutions are given for the trigger of the first mover in pre-emption settings. A numerical solution is presented for the monopolist's decision to invest. The introduction of third generation mobile technology in Portugal is analysed as an application of the competition models.

The concern of this thesis is to discuss different applications of two-player game theory in economics. It is divided into two main chapters - the theoretical part and the practical part. The theoretical part is composed of the classical game theory and the game theory with vector payoffs. In the first instance basic ideas of the classical game theory is introduced. Elaboration of the duopoly model follows. Subsequently basic ideas of the theory with vector payoffs and one of the solution concepts of game theory with vector payo s are included. The practical part follows. This part contains two examples which are the real application of the concept described in the theoretical part.

Doutoramento em Gestão.
A teoria de finanças empresariais estabelece que urn investimento deve ser realizado quando o seu Valor Actualizado Liquido for positivo. Ao considerar a decisão de investimento em termos de agora ou nunca, esta regra ignora a opção de adiar o investimento. Entretanto, a análise de opções reais - baseada na analogia entre a oportunidade de investimento em activos reais e os instrumentos financeiros derivados - melhorou, consideravelmente, o nosso entendimento sobre as decisões de investimento em ambiente de incerteza. Contudo, a maioria dos modelos de opções reais assume que as oportunidades se desenvolvem em ambientes monopolistas. 0 nosso trabalho analisa o efeito quer do valor da opção de espera quer do valor estratégico do investimento nos timings de investimento num cenário de duopólio - com empresas idênticas e inicialmente inactivas -, combinando a análise de opções reais com a teoria de jogos, "Opções e Jogos". Na presente tese, estabelecemos as funções-valor e as regras óptimas de investimento de urn novo modelo que incorpora, atraves de urn Movimento Geométrico Browniano, a incerteza associada à evolução do valor do projecto bern como a incerteza associada à chegada de novas oportunidades - recorrendo a urn processo de Poisson - e ainda interacções estratégicas.
Traditional corporate finance theory states that an investment project should be undertaken whenever its Net Present Value is greater than zero. This is generally incorrect since it considers only a now-or-never decision and ignores the value of the "option" to delay the investment. The real options literature has improved our understanding of investment problems under uncertainty. This literature stresses the similarity between a financial call option and the opportunity to invest in a real asset. However, most of the real options models assume implicitly a monopoly setting. One of our concerns consists in working out the joint effects of the value of the option to wait and the strategic value of investment, on the firms' timing on investment, in a duopoly setting, by combining game-theoretic and real options methods, Option Games. In our work we derive the strategic value functions and optimal investment rules of a new model, focused on specific and innovative settings regarding the evolution of the opportunity value, through a Geometric Brownian Motion, and the uncertainty related to the arrival of new opportunities - through a Poisson process - and the incorporation of strategic interactions.

In this work we introduce a topological method for the search of fixed points and periodic points for continuous maps defined on generalized rectangles in finite dimensional Euclidean spaces. We name our technique "Stretching Along the Paths" method, since we deal with maps that expand the arcs along one direction. Such theory was developed in the planar case by Papini and Zanolin in [11,12] and it has been extended to the N-dimensional framework by the author and Zanolin in [16]. In the bidimensional setting, elementary theorems from plane topology suffice, while in the higher dimension some results from degree theory are needed, leading to the study of the so-called "Cutting Surfaces" [16]. Our method is also significant from a dynamical point of view, as it allows to detect complex dynamics. As it is well-known, a prototypical example of chaotic system is represented by the Smale horseshoe. However, in order to prove conjugacy with the shift map, it requires the verification of hyperbolicity conditions, which are difficult or impossible to prove in practical cases. For such reason more general and less stringent definitions of horseshoe have been suggested so as to reproduce some geometrical features typical of the Smale horseshoe while discarding the hyperbolicity hypotheses. This led to the study of the so-called "topological (or geometrical) horseshoes" [2,5]. In particular, different characterizations have been proposed by various authors in order to establish the presence of complex dynamics for continuous maps defined on subsets of the N-dimensional Euclidean space (see, for instance, [10,21,23] and the references therein). The tools employed in these and related works range from the Conley index [10] to the Lefschetz fixed point theory [20]. On the other hand, our approach, although mathematically rigorous, avoids the use of more advanced topological theories and it is relatively easy to apply to specific models arising in applications. For example we have employed such method to study discrete and continuous-time models arising from economics and biology [9,18]. In more details, the topics considered along the thesis can be summarized as follows. The description of the Stretching Along the Paths method and suitable variants of it can be found in Chapter 1. In Chapter 2 we discuss which are the chaotic features that can be obtained for a given map when our technique applies. In particular, we are able to prove semi-conjugacy to the Bernoulli shift and thus positivity of the topological entropy, the presence of topological transitivity and sensitivity with respect to initial conditions, density of periodic points. Moreover we show the mutual relationships among various classical notions of chaos (such as those by Devaney, Li-Yorke, etc.). We also introduce an alternative geometrical framework related to the so-called "Linked Twist Maps" [3,4,22], where it is possible to employ our method in order to detect complex dynamics. The theoretical results obtained so far find an application to discrete and continuous-time systems in Chapters 3 and 4. As regards the former, in Chapter 3 we deal with some one-dimensional and planar discrete economic models, both of the Overlapping Generation and of the Duopoly Game classes. The bidimensional models are taken from [8,19] and [1], respectively. On the other hand, in Chapter 4, with respect to continuous-time models, we study some nonlinear ODEs with periodic coefficients through a combination of a careful but elementary phase-plane analysis with the results on chaotic dynamics for Linked Twist Maps from Chapter 2. In more details, we consider a modified version of the Volterra predator-prey model, in which a periodic harvesting is included, as well as a simplification of the Lazer-McKenna suspension bridges model [6,7] from [13,14]. When dealing with ODEs with periodic coefficients, our method is applied to the associated Poincaré map. The contents of the present thesis are based on the papers [9,13,16,17,18] and partially on [14], where maps expansive along several directions were considered. [1] H.N. Agiza and A.A. Elsadany, Chaotic dynamics in nonlinear duopoly game with heterogeneous players, Appl. Math. Comput. 149 (2004), 843-860. [2] K. Burns and H. Weiss, A geometric criterion for positive topological entropy, Comm. Math. Phys. 172 (1995), 95-118. [3] R. Burton and R.W. Easton, Ergodicity of linked twist maps, In: Global theory of dynamical systems (Proc. Internat. Conf., Northwestern Univ., Evanston, Ill., 1979), pp. 35-49, Lecture Notes in Math., 819, Springer, Berlin, 1980. [4] R.L. Devaney, Subshifts of finite type in linked twist mappings, Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 71 (1978), 334-338. [5] J. Kennedy and J.A. Yorke, Topological horseshoes, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 353 (2001), 2513-2530. [6] A.C. Lazer and P.J. McKenna, Large scale oscillatory behaviour in loaded asymmetric systems, Ann. Inst. Henry Poincar e, Analyse non lineaire 4 (1987), 244-274. [7] A.C. Lazer and P.J. McKenna, Large-amplitude periodic oscillations in suspension bridges: some new connections with nonlinear analysis, SIAM Review 32 (1990), 537-578. [8] A. Medio, Chaotic dynamics. Theory and applications to economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992. [9] A. Medio, M. Pireddu and F. Zanolin, Chaotic dynamics for maps in one and two dimensions. A geometrical method and applications to economics, Internat. J. Bifur. Chaos Appl. Sci. Engrg. 19 (2009), 3283-3309. [10] K. Mischaikow and M. Mrozek, Isolating neighborhoods and chaos, Japan J. Indust. Appl. Math. 12 (1995), 205-236. [11] D. Papini and F. Zanolin, On the periodic boundary value problem and chaotic-like dynamics for nonlinear Hill's equations, Adv. Nonlinear Stud. 4 (2004), 71-91. [12] D. Papini and F. Zanolin, Fixed points, periodic points, and coin-tossing sequences for mappings defined on two-dimensional cells, Fixed Point Theory Appl. 2004 (2004), 113-134. [13] A. Pascoletti, M. Pireddu and F. Zanolin, Multiple periodic solutions and complex dynamics for second order ODEs via linked twist maps, Electron. J. Qual. Theory Differ. Equ., Proc. 8'th Coll. Qualitative Theory of Diff. Equ. 14 (2008), 1-32. [14] A. Pascoletti and F. Zanolin, Example of a suspension bridge ODE model exhibiting chaotic dynamics: a topological approach, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 339 (2008), 1179-1198. [15] M. Pireddu and F. Zanolin, Fixed points for dissipative-repulsive systems and topological dynamics of mappings defined on N-dimensional cells, Adv. Nonlinear Stud. 5 (2005), 411-440. [16] M. Pireddu and F. Zanolin, Cutting surfaces and applications to periodic points and chaotic-like dynamics, Topol. Methods Nonlinear Anal. 30 (2007), 279-319. [17] M. Pireddu and F. Zanolin, Some remarks on fixed points for maps which are expansive along one direction, Rend. Istit. Mat. Univ. Trieste 39 (2007), 245-274. [18] M. Pireddu and F. Zanolin, Chaotic dynamics in the Volterra predator-prey model via linked twist maps, Opuscula Math. 28/4 (2008), 567-592. [19] P. Reichlin, Equilibrium cycles in an overlapping generations economy with production, J. Econom. Theory 40 (1986), 89-102. [20] R. Srzednicki, A generalization of the Lefschetz fixed point theorem and detection of chaos, Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 128 (2000), 1231-1239. [21] R. Srzednicki and K. Wojcik, A geometric method for detecting chaotic dynamics, J. Differential Equations 135 (1997), 66-82. [22] S. Wiggins, Chaos in the dynamics generated by sequence of maps, with application to chaotic advection in flows with aperiodic time dependence, Z. angew. Math. Phys. 50 (1999), 585-616. [23] P. Zgliczy nski and M. Gidea, Covering relations for multidimensional dynamical systems, J. Differential Equations 202 (2004), 32-58.

Cyber attacks against companies are becoming more common as technology advances and digitalization is increasing exponentially. All Swedish insurance companies that sell cyber insurance encounter the same problem, there is not enough data to do good actuarial work. In order for the pricing procedure to improve and general knowledge of cyber insurance to increase, it has been proposed that insurance companies should share their data with each other. The goal of the thesis is to do mathematical calculations to explore data quality consequences of such a sharing regime. This thesis is based on some important assumptions and three scenarios. The most important assumptions are that there are two insurance companies forced to share all their data with each other and that they can reduce the uncertainty about their own product by investing in better data quality. In the first scenario, we assume a game between two players where they can choose how much to invest in reducing the uncertainty. In the second scenario, we assume that there is not a game, but the two insurance companies are forced to equal investments and thus have the same knowledge of their products. In the third scenario, we assume that the players are risk averse, that is, they are not willing to take high risk. The results will show how much, if any, the insurance companies should invest in the different scenarios to maximize their profits (if risk neutral) or utility (if risk averse). The results of this thesis show that in the first and second scenario, the optimal profit is reached when the insurance companies do not invest anything. In the third scenario though, the optimal investment is greater than zero, given that the companies are enough risk averse.

This diploma thesis deals with conict economic situations based on game theory. In the beginning, basic models of conict situations and current popular software tools are dened not only for the general support of student education or for science, but also for solving economic problems in game theory. Based on this analysis, the conicting situation of two competing rms is being solved. Gradually, work goes deeper into areas of delay dierential equations that better show the behavior of two players on the market. Subsequently, these delayed dierential equations are projected into the Cournot model, for which a critical value is identied that switches the stability of two rms on the market due to the delayed realization of their outputs.

Studien går ut på att analysera marknadsstrukturen för två industriföretag(Holmen och SCA) under antagandet att båda konkurrerar mot varandragenom att köpa rå material samt genom att sälja förädlade produkter.Produktmarknaden som undersöks är pappersmarknaden och antas varakoncentrerad. Rå materialmknaden som undersöks ärmassavedmarknaden och antas karaktäriseras som en duopsony. Detvisade sig att Holmen och SCA köper massaved från en stor mängdskogsägare. Varje företag skapar varje månad en prislista där de bestämmerbud priset föassaved. Priset varierar beroende på region. Både SCA ochHolmen väljer mellan två strategiska beslut, antigen att buda högt pris ellerlågt pris. Genom spelteori så visade det sig att båda industriföretagenanvänder mixade strategier då de i vissa tillfällen budar högt och i andratillfällen budar lågt. Nash jämviktslägen för mixade strategier räknades utmatematiskt och analyserades genom dynamisk spelteori.Marknadskoncentrationen för pappersmarknaden undersöktes viaHerfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). Porters femkraftsmodell användes föratt analysera industri konkurrensen. Resultatet visade attproduktmarknaden är koncentrerad då HHI testerna gav höga indexvärdenmellan 3100 och 1700. Det existerade dessutom ett Nash jämviktsläge fö mixade strategier som gav SCA förväntad lönsamhet 1651 miljoner kronoroch Holmen 1295 miljoner kronor. Dynamisk spelteori visade att SCA ochHolmens budgivning följer ett mönster och att högt/lågt bud beror påavvikelser från Nash jämviktslägets sannolikhetsdistribution. Nashjämviktslägets råder ifall sannolikhetsdistributionerna vid låg budgivningär 68,6 procent för SCA och 66,7 procent för Holmen. Detta gav indikatore för icke samarbetsvilliga spel. Slutsatsen är att om två spelare (kvarnar) når
The research aims to analyze the market structure of two companies in th forest industry (Holmen and SCA) with the assumption that thes companies compete at buying raw materials and selling products. Theproduct market in this study is the paper market under the assumption thatboth companies operate in a concentrated product market. The rawmatial market that one investigates in this study is the pulpwood marketunder the assumption that it is a duopsony. What this study has concludedis that Holmen and SCA buy pulpwood from lots of different self-managingforest owners. Each company creates a monthly pricelist where they decidethe bid price of pulpwood. The amount varies depending on the region. Bot SCA and Holmen chooses between two strategic decisions, either to bid highor to bid low. Through game theory, it has been clear that each company usesmixed strategies as they sometimes give high bids and sometimes give lowbids. The Nash equilibrium for mixed strategies have been calculatedmathematically and analyzed through the dynamics of game theory. As fore market concentration, the product market has been investigatedthrough the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). Porter's five-force modelwas used to analyze the industry competition. The results showed that theproduct market is concentrated as the HHI tests gave High index scoresbetween 3100 and 1700. In addition, there existed a Nash equilibrium in amixed strategy that gave SCA expected payoff 1651 million SEK and Holmen1295 million SEK. The dynamic game theory showed that SCA and Holmen'sbidding follows a repeating trajectory and that the high/low bidding is dueto deviations from Nash equilibrium probability distribution. The Nashequilibrium situation prevails if the probability distribution at low biddingis 68.6 percent for SCA and 66,7 percent for Holmen. This providedindicators for a non-cooperative game. The conclusion is that if two players

碩士
國立中山大學
高階經營碩士班
98
Cross-sided network effect is critical to platform based business models. In general, across a platform there’re two types of users, each sitting on one side of the platform. And the platform’s utility to any user in one side depends on the number of users (or the volume of usage generated by the users) in the other side. Under the discipline of micro-economy, cross-sided network effect is modeled and analyzed in the literature of “two-sided markets”. In this article, taking eWallet (electronically stored-value payment card) service as an example, we build a model of two-sided market, define and derive the utility functions for the platforms, and design a simulation to examine the price competition games in a duopoly market. We observe that, cross-sided network effect triggers variations in duopoly price games. By elaborating the business implication of these price game variants, we provide business intelligence for competing platforms in two-sided markets. Following the practice of game theory analysis, with our simulation we identify some famous game patterns such as prisoner’s dilemma, race-around, and varies boxed-pigs games. Depending on the game pattern presented, managers can develop their own co-opetition strategy by leveraging the existing business intelligence provided in the literature of game theory. By factoring price elasticity, churn rate, strength of network effect and market share distribution in our algebraic model, we also derive the optimized prices with which incumbents and entrants can maximize their revenue in cooperative and competitive business environments. There’s a growing interest in platform based business models, in which cross-sided network effect plays an important role. Our work helps to provide strategic suggestion for fixed–transaction–fee platforms (such as eWallet), provide an systematic analysis methodology for platform based business models, and also provide a theoretic basics for further study in this critical area.

This thesis deals both with non-cooperative and cooperative games in order to apply the mathematical theory to competitive dynamics arising from economics, particularly quantity competition in oligopolies and pollution reduction models in IEA (International Environmental Agreements).

Upon making an optimal timing decision, a player takes into consideration not only the actions of the other players, but also the uncertainty of the environment. I use the real options approach to study the strategic timing decisions of asymmetric firms in an environment with uncertainty. When firms make timing decisions, they take into account the opportunity cost of immediate action today. The second chapter studies the identification in an asymmetric duopoly. The two potential entrants contemplate entering a new market where the demand follows a geometric Brownian motion. I show that under certain parameter conditions there will be an equilibrium triggered by preemption, and both firms could preempt. Moreover, the equilibrium may no longer be only triggered by preemption. I identify the joint distribution of the unobserved investment costs and find the probability of the first entry being triggered by preemption. Given the observation of the first entrant, I can predict the probability of observing the second entrant. The third chapter studies the spillover effect of exit in a vertical relationship. I extend the methodology of irreversible investment under uncertainty to consider exits in a vertical market structure. When the exogenous demand shock is low, one party of the supply chain wants to exit first and will thus lead to the exit of the remaining party. The firm which wants to exit later strategically acts to delay the exit of its counterpart and therefore prevents its own exit. When the state level drops below the unique equilibrium exit threshold, both firms will exit simultaneously. The expected delay in exit timing is derived. The fourth chapter studies the strategic optimal timing of entry in the competition between one-way essential complements under demand uncertainty. The value of a new add-on to its consumers is uncertain. While the rational essential good producing firm recognizes the value of waiting under uncertainty when it contemplates entering the add-on market and endogenously self-selects between the two entry options- to produce or to acquire, the add-on producing firm strategically decides when to agree on acquisition. The impact of profit sharing in the case of acquisition and relative fixed costs of entry on the size and form of the waiting region and the responses of both firms are analyzed.
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碩士
國立高雄第一科技大學
運籌管理所
95
As of today, a number of national governments provide a set of economics incentive policiesin order to encourage producers to implement policy of Extended Production Responsibility (EPR).However, among the literature on the effectiveness of economics incentive policies,the research results are inconclusive; besides, they all have discussed the impacts of economics policies in static way. Indeed, with static model considered, the researchers could know even less about the impacts of time lag in cause-and-effect chain which could lead to incorrect information and analysis than viewing the dynamics of the system. So, with both economics incentive and regulation policy tools considered, what are the optimal strategies that the enterprises seek to push themselves toward the successful structures in which they would maximize their profits? This paper utilizes an optimal control theory to formulate a Duopoly Differential Game in which the reaction to competitors is considered, long-term performance of the policy is analyzed, producers'' involvement in EPR stimulated by what kind of government policy is discussed, as well as the optimal strategy in business is identified. Our results indicate that, given the driving force for increaing target recycling rate over time, most companies have chosen getting the higher level of Environment Friendly Design to achieve EPR goals in spite of fact that what the optimal pricing strategies are. On the other hand,without setting target recycling rate or with fixed target recycling rate, the producers have little interest in getting the higher level of Environment Friendly Design.

碩士
佛光大學
經濟學系
100
In the modern world, information is passed very fast, vendors use a variety of advertising publicity for their products has become the norm, manufacturers can use advertising to attract consumers, comparative advertising can also be used, by comparing other manufacturersproducts, consumers are more inclined to choose their own products, many comparative law studies in the previous studies, comparative advertising laws and regulations, and research in consumer behavior, there are many experiments to explore the cognition of the consumer to compare adthe impact on the use of game theory to deal with such problems are relatively rare, this article will use game theory to explore the vendors comparative advertising strategy. This article uses game theory to explore the manufacturer's advertising strategy, literature and design a game model, the model does not exist a pure strategy equilibrium mixed strategy to strike a mixed strategy equilibrium, for manufacturers not to use advertising, the use of general advertising. the lower the use of comparative advertising three strategies to seek mixed strategy equilibrium solution, and finally to four conclusions: The net return on a higher net remuneration of the manufacturers do not use advertising, manufacturers do not use advertising strategies, the probability of decline, and manufacturers to use comparative advertising or general advertising, one of them with the manufacturers do not use ad net return to growththe net remuneration of the vendor will be formed: comparative advertising than advertising than general advertising or general advertising is greater than the use of advertising is greater than the relationship between comparative advertising. , Manufacturers use advertising to make the loss of competitors rise, manufacturers use general advertising increased rates, manufacturers use advertising to make the loss of the competitors rise, manufacturers increased rate of use of comparative advertising, but vendors use the probability of other strategies will not necessarily decline. Three vendors use the face of increased net returns when competitors do not use advertising to the general advertising strategy, the probability of the manufacturers use general advertising will rise, manufacturers use advertising strategies in the face of increased net returns when competitors do not use advertising, manufacturers the increase in the probability of the use of comparative advertising strategy, advertising strategy, the probability will increase. Manufacturers are using the higher net remuneration for general advertising competition, the manufacturers more have an incentive to the use of general advertising, and manufacturers to use the probability of comparative advertising will decline. Four, manufacturers use advertising and general advertising competition, vendors use comparative advertising net remuneration increase, will increase the chances of manufacturers to use comparative advertising, the chances will drop the use of general advertising. The probability of manufacturers net remuneration for the use of general advertising to improve under the same conditions, the probability of the use of general advertising will decline the chance to rise without the use of advertising, the use of comparative advertising strategy yet, display manufacturers to avoid such competition in this case mode and turn to advertising strategy.

碩士
國立屏東科技大學
工業管理系
90
This article attempts to reveal the competition relationship between two corporations by using game-theory with Cournot and Stackelberg models while optimizing total profit as an objective function. Both linear cost structures and non-linear designated demand functions are build to formulate an optimal strategy for the competitive use. The implementation results provide an analytical methodology to deal with duopoly competitiveness while considering various scenarios.

Revenue Management (RM) is the practice of managing perishable assets by control-ling their availability and/or prices with an objective to maximize the total revenue. Seat inventory allocation falls in the purview of quantity-based RM. The liberalization of the aviation sector and the subsequent entrance of the low-cost carriers saw an ever-increasing customer base for the airline industry. Given the large number of buyers, firms were free to decide the price at which they would sell tickets. The low-cost carriers started to follow a third degree price discrimination and segmentation of the market, charging a higher price to the market with a relatively inelastic demand. Although a lot of work has been done in the area of seat inventory allocation under a monopolistic market scenario, we realized that not a lot of work had been done in a competitive market scenario. This thesis considers the problem of seat inventory allocation and pricing in a duopoly where each of the competing airlines have two fare-classes. We consider the possibility that the same fare-class may be priced differently by the two competing airlines and allow for the over flow of passengers between the airlines in the same fare-class. In the first part of our work, we develop a non-linear mathematical model for setting the booking limits for one of the two competing air-lines such that the revenue earned is maximized. We consider over flow of passengers from one airline to another in the same fare-class in response to a price differential and compare the results obtained from our model with the standard Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) model under a monopolistic scenario. The results show that our model gives higher revenues than that obtained from the EMSR model. In the second part of our work, we consider a non-cooperative game between two competing airlines with price cutting as the strategy to increase their demand. Through numerical computations, we identify the pure strategy Nash equilibrium. From the results, we conclude that Nash equilibrium is achieved only when both the airlines follow the same pricing strategy indicating that individual price cutting will not be beneficial. This also indicates that unless the competitors enter into a cooperative coalition with each other, they would not benefit from deep discount offers. In the third and final part, we prove theoretically the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a two airline, two fare-class problem with price sensitive over flow of customers in the same fare-class that was computationally analysed earlier. The strategy / strategies at which Nash equilibrium is achieved are identified. We show that Nash equilibrium is only achieved when both the airlines price identically. Hence, our thesis concludes that differential pricing does not hold any significance for the competing airlines from an operational perspective.

碩士
國立屏東科技大學
工業管理系所
95
How to use the firm’s own ascendancy creating more benefit is a goal of the firm to achieve sustainable. Beside the ascendant production, the ascendancy in channel is a key factor to earn profits. Channel power will affect to the price negotiation and then influence the firm’s profit. Therefore, if the firms get wise to their rules and influence, moreover using these advantages to choose better price and production quantity, it will bring more profit to firms. Over the years, the problems of channel power being studied are usually dealt with the terms of manufacturer-dominant or retailer -dominant marketing channel, but just few study on asymmetrical-dominant marketing channel. Consequently, this study intended to apply the sub-game perfect equilibrium concept through two side duopoly within asymmetrical -dominant channel. On two conditions of the productions with substitute or complementary property, we hope to find the equilibriums. Given two manufacturers with the different cost structures, we hope to discuss the relations among manufacturers' wholesale price, the retailers' selling price and market demand. Then we find that when a manufacturer has a higher production costs than the other, it's wholesale price will be getting higher. Therefore, the retailer's selling price will be getting higher and market demand will become less as well. After analyzing and contrasting these, we derive best solution of pricing and production quantities for manufacturers and retailers. Furthermore, we provide an example to explain and analyze the relations of five Channel power and vertical integration conditions. Finally ten conclusions are drawn for future studies and practical applications.

碩士
東海大學
工業工程與經營資訊學系
93
In Taiwan, Industries consist mainly in computer peripheral equipments, fashion clothing and electronic products. These kinds of goods share similar characteristics, for example uncertainty, sales season and etc. While the product functions or attributes have not been changed, however due to changes in demand, these products will have to be sold for lower prices as a result. These kinds of variety product’s supply and competence, in general, have following two conditions：(1) Product competence in the same industries；(2) Product competence from different industries. A new emerging product is not intended to achieve a high sales volume; in fact it is intended for a diffusion process. Newer generation products with enhanced applications and functions will utilize market’s full potential, hence replacing the older generation products. Our research searches industry’s competitive information and utilizes relevant historical data to infer the market demand function of each generation. According to experiences of enterprise knowledge management system, we utilize multi-generation model to decide the fittest volume and to confer the speculated quantity model of oligopoly market for the Game Theory. On the basis of the Stackelberg duopoly model, we consider the enterprise dynamic competitive behaviors to setup the mutual reaction function and to decide the fittest competitive price, comparing with the predictive supply price to choose the fittest pricing strategy. In order to conform to the practical market situation, we combine with the industry’s cost structure and revise the market linear demand function to non-linear one. Furthermore, utilizing the Multi-Generation Diffusion Model of the Norton and Bass to explain the technological products take the place of multi-generation models of spreading. We not only fix the product price and the advertisement budget values but also view both of them as variables to solve the both situations by means of genetic algorithms, comparing the multi-generation product’s total revenue, the best evolutionary generations, and the time to market. By way of controlling the timing of product to market and considering the profit, the findings will not only facilitate a better understanding on corporation’s strategies and the relationship between multi-generation product’s spreading process and its life cycle but also maximize its overall profit.

博士
國立中山大學
企業管理學系研究所
93
Prior research on the strength of embeddedness ties in strategic networks in influencing innovation performance has produced inconsistent conclusions. In this paper, drawing on an investment perspective on firms’ decision behavior, we argue that the “control benefits”—another characteristics of strategic networks—also affects firms’ innovation performance. According to previous research, we adopt the speed of “patent application” and “market introduction of a new product” to measure innovation performance. Furthermore, we divide firms’ innovation strategies into “apply for a patent and introduce the new product to market later”, “patent the innovation and market introduction immediately” as well as “introduce the new product to market and apply for a patent later”. We examine the relationship between the strength of enbeddedness ties and firms’ innovation performance using the theoretical frames of game theory and real options. After the analysis of Cournot duopoly game model and real options approach, several findings are acquired as follows: (a) the higher the strength of embeddedness ties, the more likely the firm is to abandon the innovation strategy “apply for a patent and introduce the new product to market later” and adopt innovation strategies “patent the innovation and market introduction immediately” or “introduce the new product to market and apply for a patent later”; (b) if the firm adopts the innovation strategy “apply for a patent and introduce the new product to market later”, then the strength of embeddedness ties has a positive effect on the speed of market introduction of the new product, but the relationship between the strength of embeddedness ties and the speed of patent application is not sure; (c) if the firm adopts innovation strategies “patent the innovation and market introduction immediately” or “introduce the new product to market and apply for a patent later”, then the strength of embeddedness ties has both positive and negative impact on the speed of “patent application” and “market introduction of a new product”, and therefore the relationship between the strength of embeddedness ties and the innovator’s innovation performance is indeterminable. The research findings indicate that the innovator may delay the application for patent or postpone the launching of a new product because of the “control benefits” derived from different strength of embeddedness ties. These results have broad implications for future research on strategic networks and innovation.

This dissertation explores several aspects of the theory in industrial organization. The first chapter builds a model with two cost asymmetric firms who not only have Cournot competition in the spot market but also have the opportunity to trade forward contracts. It is shown that with forward trading, low cost firm not always produces more than high cost firm. In an interior equilibrium, both total output and consumer welfare increase compared to the case without forward trading. When cost function is linear, forward trading is socially beneficial in that low cost firm has higher market share as well as profit share, and that total output, consumer welfare and social welfare increase. The second chapter analyzes duopoly firms' choices among ad-free and ad-supported service with different advertising displays: mandatory advertising where ads are integrated with the main content and cannot be dismissed by users; or optional advertising where users are allowed to dismiss ads at will. The model also takes into account the effect of consumers' heterogeneous ad tastes on their contribution to ad revenues. The results reveal that ad revenues intensify competition, suppress equilibrium prices and profits, and diminish the differentiation effect. The third chapter studies firms' business model choices and pricing decisions when they can choose to provide ad-free service, ad-supported service with cost-per-click (CPC) revenue model or cost-per-mille (CPM) revenue model, or a combination of them in monopoly or duopoly environment. It's shown that offering both types of ad-supported services is not an optimal strategy for a monopolist and that its optimal strategy is to vertically differentiate by providing an ad-supported service and an ad-free service. Furthermore, when the monopolist adopts the CPM-based ad revenue model, the price of the ad-supported service is more sensitive to increases in the marginal ad revenue than the case with the CPC-based model. In the equilibrium of competitive setting, exactly one firm offers an ad-supported service alone while the other firm offers the ad-free service with or without the same type of ad-supported service depending on the ad revenues.
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