Academic literature on the topic 'Duopoly games'

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Duopoly games.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Journal articles on the topic "Duopoly games"

1

Li, Risong, Hongqing Wang, and Yu Zhao. "Kato’s chaos in duopoly games." Chaos, Solitons & Fractals 84 (March 2016): 69–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2016.01.006.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Dana, Rose-Anne, and Luigi Montrucchio. "Dynamic complexity in duopoly games." Journal of Economic Theory 40, no. 1 (October 1986): 40–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90006-2.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Li, Risong, Yu Zhao, Tianxiu Lu, Ru Jiang, Hongqing Wang, and Haihua Liang. "Spatio-temporal chaos in duopoly games." Journal of Nonlinear Sciences and Applications 10, no. 07 (July 23, 2017): 3784–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.22436/jnsa.010.07.33.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Askar, S. S., and A. Al-khedhairi. "Cournot Duopoly Games: Models and Investigations." Mathematics 7, no. 11 (November 8, 2019): 1079. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math7111079.

Full text
Abstract:
This paper analyzes Cournot duopoly games that are constructed based on Cobb–Douglas preferences. We introduce here two models whose dynamic adjustments depend on bounded rationality, dynamic adjustment, and tit-for-tat mechanism. In the first model, we have two firms with limited information and due to that they adopt the bounded rationality mechanism. They update their productions based on the changing occurred in the marginal profit. For this model, its fixed point is obtained and its stability condition is calculated. In addition, we provide conditions by which this fixed point loses its stability due to flip and Neimark–Sacker bifurcations. Furthermore, numerical simulation shows that this model possesses some chaotic behaviors which are recovered due to corridor stability. In the second model, we handle two different mechanisms of cooperation. These mechanisms are dynamic adjustment process and tit-for-tat strategy. The players who use the dynamic adjustment increase their productions based on the cooperative output while, in tit-for-tat mechanism, they increase the productions based on the cooperative profit. The local stability analysis shows that adopting tit-for-tat makes the model unstable and then the system becomes chaotic for any values of the system’s parameters. The obtained results show that the dynamic adjustment makes the system’s fixed point stable for a certain interval of the adjustment parameter.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Cánovas, José S., and Antonio Linero. "Topological dynamic classification of duopoly games." Chaos, Solitons & Fractals 12, no. 7 (June 2001): 1259–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0960-0779(00)00098-9.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

MATSUMOTO, AKIO, and FERENC SZIDAROVSZKY. "NONLINEAR DUOPOLY GAMES WITH ADVERTISEMENT REVISITED." International Game Theory Review 12, no. 04 (December 2010): 363–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198910002726.

Full text
Abstract:
This study reconsiders a duopoly model with advertisement introduced earlier by Ahmed, Agiza and Hassan [1999]. It demonstrates three major findings. The first is that the model can be destabilized via either flip bifurcation or Hopf bifurcation. The second is that a half-pitchfork bifurcation of the output occurs when the advertisement dynamics is periodic and the nonlinearity of the output dynamics becomes stronger. Finally the third is that the existence of attractor and the coexistence of attracting sets are the main features of the model when it is locally unstable.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

von Stengel, Bernhard. "Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games." Games and Economic Behavior 69, no. 2 (July 2010): 512–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.012.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Stanford, William. "Prestable strategies in discounted duopoly games." Games and Economic Behavior 3, no. 1 (February 1991): 129–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90009-4.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Lambertini, Luca. "Prisoners' Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)Games." Journal of Economic Theory 77, no. 1 (November 1997): 181–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2328.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Frąckiewicz, Piotr, and Jakub Bilski. "Quantum Games with Unawareness with Duopoly Problems in View." Entropy 21, no. 11 (November 10, 2019): 1097. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e21111097.

Full text
Abstract:
Playing the Cournot duopoly in the quantum domain can lead to the optimal strategy profile in the case of maximally correlated actions of the players. However, that result can be obtained if the fact that the players play the quantum game is common knowledge among the players. Our purpose is to determine reasonable game outcomes when players’ perceptions about what game is actually played are limited. To this end, we consider a collection consisting of the classical and quantum games that specifies how each player views the game and how each player views the other players’ perceptions of the game. We show that a slight change in how the players perceive the game may considerably affect the result of the game and, in the case of maximally correlated strategies, may vary from the inefficient Nash equilibrium outcome in the classical Cournot duopoly to the Pareto optimal outcome. We complete our work by investigating in the same way the Bertrand duopoly model.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Duopoly games"

1

Sen, Gupta Sonali. "Coarse correlated equilibria in duopoly games." Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2014. http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/5102/.

Full text
Abstract:
We consider the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) in various contexts; games with quadratic payoff functions (which include Cournot duopoly, public good provision and emission abatement) and a linear duopoly game. For the games with quadratic payoffs we compute the largest feasible total utility in any CCE and show that it is achieved by a CCE involving only two strategy profiles. The improvement over and above the Nash equilibrium payoff is substantial in the various economic examples considered for this class of games. In case of the linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric CCE, and any unilateral perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Pinto, Maria Helena Ferreira. "Real competiton games in duopoly setting with two stochastic factors." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.632543.

Full text
Abstract:
This thesis analyses real options in competitive settings. We develop four real option models for competitive settings and one model for a monopolist's decision to invest. In the first model, the profits per unit and the number of units follow two different stochastic paths. In the second model, the profits and the investment cost pursue different paths. In the third model a monopolistic investor has the option to invest in a market where the number of units sold follows a stochastic birth and death process. The fourth and the fifth model are, similarly to the first two models, developed for competitive settings. In the fourth model the profits follow a stochastic process and there is a random time delay between the moment that the second firm enters the market (invests) and the moment that the firm starts its sales. In the fifth model there is also a time delay between the moment of entry and the moment of the first sales, but two stochastic factors are considered: the profits and the investment cost. For the competition models we analyse dissimilar games considering that the roles of the players are endogenous and also exogenous to the models, assuming that the first mover has a competitive advantage over the second mover. Closed form solutions are obtained for the value functions of the first and second mover and for their trigger functions, and numerical solutions are given for the trigger of the first mover in pre-emption settings. A numerical solution is presented for the monopolist's decision to invest. The introduction of third generation mobile technology in Portugal is analysed as an application of the competition models.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Tichá, Michaela. "Aplikace teorie her dvou hráčů v ekonomii." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2011. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-165050.

Full text
Abstract:
The concern of this thesis is to discuss different applications of two-player game theory in economics. It is divided into two main chapters - the theoretical part and the practical part. The theoretical part is composed of the classical game theory and the game theory with vector payoffs. In the first instance basic ideas of the classical game theory is introduced. Elaboration of the duopoly model follows. Subsequently basic ideas of the theory with vector payoffs and one of the solution concepts of game theory with vector payo s are included. The practical part follows. This part contains two examples which are the real application of the concept described in the theoretical part.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Moura, Rui Jorge Caruço Barroso de. "Opções e jogos: intersecção das opções reais com a teoria de jogos na modelação dinâmica de investimentos em ambiente de incerteza e competitividade." Doctoral thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/10401.

Full text
Abstract:
Doutoramento em Gestão.
A teoria de finanças empresariais estabelece que urn investimento deve ser realizado quando o seu Valor Actualizado Liquido for positivo. Ao considerar a decisão de investimento em termos de agora ou nunca, esta regra ignora a opção de adiar o investimento. Entretanto, a análise de opções reais - baseada na analogia entre a oportunidade de investimento em activos reais e os instrumentos financeiros derivados - melhorou, consideravelmente, o nosso entendimento sobre as decisões de investimento em ambiente de incerteza. Contudo, a maioria dos modelos de opções reais assume que as oportunidades se desenvolvem em ambientes monopolistas. 0 nosso trabalho analisa o efeito quer do valor da opção de espera quer do valor estratégico do investimento nos timings de investimento num cenário de duopólio - com empresas idênticas e inicialmente inactivas -, combinando a análise de opções reais com a teoria de jogos, "Opções e Jogos". Na presente tese, estabelecemos as funções-valor e as regras óptimas de investimento de urn novo modelo que incorpora, atraves de urn Movimento Geométrico Browniano, a incerteza associada à evolução do valor do projecto bern como a incerteza associada à chegada de novas oportunidades - recorrendo a urn processo de Poisson - e ainda interacções estratégicas.
Traditional corporate finance theory states that an investment project should be undertaken whenever its Net Present Value is greater than zero. This is generally incorrect since it considers only a now-or-never decision and ignores the value of the "option" to delay the investment. The real options literature has improved our understanding of investment problems under uncertainty. This literature stresses the similarity between a financial call option and the opportunity to invest in a real asset. However, most of the real options models assume implicitly a monopoly setting. One of our concerns consists in working out the joint effects of the value of the option to wait and the strategic value of investment, on the firms' timing on investment, in a duopoly setting, by combining game-theoretic and real options methods, Option Games. In our work we derive the strategic value functions and optimal investment rules of a new model, focused on specific and innovative settings regarding the evolution of the opportunity value, through a Geometric Brownian Motion, and the uncertainty related to the arrival of new opportunities - through a Poisson process - and the incorporation of strategic interactions.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Thurow, John. "The maverick firm in duopoly markets." Laramie, Wyo. : University of Wyoming, 2008. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1801280821&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=18949&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Davis, Owen B. "Antitrust punishments in experimental duopoly markets." Laramie, Wyo. : University of Wyoming, 2008. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1654492701&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=18949&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Hughes, Matthew. "Price Signaling in a Two-Market Duopoly." University of Akron / OhioLINK, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=akron1458311593.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

PIREDDU, MARINA. "Fixed points and chaotic dynamics for expansive-contractive maps in Euclidean spaces, with some applications." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Udine, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10281/46084.

Full text
Abstract:
In this work we introduce a topological method for the search of fixed points and periodic points for continuous maps defined on generalized rectangles in finite dimensional Euclidean spaces. We name our technique "Stretching Along the Paths" method, since we deal with maps that expand the arcs along one direction. Such theory was developed in the planar case by Papini and Zanolin in [11,12] and it has been extended to the N-dimensional framework by the author and Zanolin in [16]. In the bidimensional setting, elementary theorems from plane topology suffice, while in the higher dimension some results from degree theory are needed, leading to the study of the so-called "Cutting Surfaces" [16]. Our method is also significant from a dynamical point of view, as it allows to detect complex dynamics. As it is well-known, a prototypical example of chaotic system is represented by the Smale horseshoe. However, in order to prove conjugacy with the shift map, it requires the verification of hyperbolicity conditions, which are difficult or impossible to prove in practical cases. For such reason more general and less stringent definitions of horseshoe have been suggested so as to reproduce some geometrical features typical of the Smale horseshoe while discarding the hyperbolicity hypotheses. This led to the study of the so-called "topological (or geometrical) horseshoes" [2,5]. In particular, different characterizations have been proposed by various authors in order to establish the presence of complex dynamics for continuous maps defined on subsets of the N-dimensional Euclidean space (see, for instance, [10,21,23] and the references therein). The tools employed in these and related works range from the Conley index [10] to the Lefschetz fixed point theory [20]. On the other hand, our approach, although mathematically rigorous, avoids the use of more advanced topological theories and it is relatively easy to apply to specific models arising in applications. For example we have employed such method to study discrete and continuous-time models arising from economics and biology [9,18]. In more details, the topics considered along the thesis can be summarized as follows. The description of the Stretching Along the Paths method and suitable variants of it can be found in Chapter 1. In Chapter 2 we discuss which are the chaotic features that can be obtained for a given map when our technique applies. In particular, we are able to prove semi-conjugacy to the Bernoulli shift and thus positivity of the topological entropy, the presence of topological transitivity and sensitivity with respect to initial conditions, density of periodic points. Moreover we show the mutual relationships among various classical notions of chaos (such as those by Devaney, Li-Yorke, etc.). We also introduce an alternative geometrical framework related to the so-called "Linked Twist Maps" [3,4,22], where it is possible to employ our method in order to detect complex dynamics. The theoretical results obtained so far find an application to discrete and continuous-time systems in Chapters 3 and 4. As regards the former, in Chapter 3 we deal with some one-dimensional and planar discrete economic models, both of the Overlapping Generation and of the Duopoly Game classes. The bidimensional models are taken from [8,19] and [1], respectively. On the other hand, in Chapter 4, with respect to continuous-time models, we study some nonlinear ODEs with periodic coefficients through a combination of a careful but elementary phase-plane analysis with the results on chaotic dynamics for Linked Twist Maps from Chapter 2. In more details, we consider a modified version of the Volterra predator-prey model, in which a periodic harvesting is included, as well as a simplification of the Lazer-McKenna suspension bridges model [6,7] from [13,14]. When dealing with ODEs with periodic coefficients, our method is applied to the associated Poincaré map. The contents of the present thesis are based on the papers [9,13,16,17,18] and partially on [14], where maps expansive along several directions were considered. [1] H.N. Agiza and A.A. Elsadany, Chaotic dynamics in nonlinear duopoly game with heterogeneous players, Appl. Math. Comput. 149 (2004), 843-860. [2] K. Burns and H. Weiss, A geometric criterion for positive topological entropy, Comm. Math. Phys. 172 (1995), 95-118. [3] R. Burton and R.W. Easton, Ergodicity of linked twist maps, In: Global theory of dynamical systems (Proc. Internat. Conf., Northwestern Univ., Evanston, Ill., 1979), pp. 35-49, Lecture Notes in Math., 819, Springer, Berlin, 1980. [4] R.L. Devaney, Subshifts of finite type in linked twist mappings, Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 71 (1978), 334-338. [5] J. Kennedy and J.A. Yorke, Topological horseshoes, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 353 (2001), 2513-2530. [6] A.C. Lazer and P.J. McKenna, Large scale oscillatory behaviour in loaded asymmetric systems, Ann. Inst. Henry Poincar e, Analyse non lineaire 4 (1987), 244-274. [7] A.C. Lazer and P.J. McKenna, Large-amplitude periodic oscillations in suspension bridges: some new connections with nonlinear analysis, SIAM Review 32 (1990), 537-578. [8] A. Medio, Chaotic dynamics. Theory and applications to economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992. [9] A. Medio, M. Pireddu and F. Zanolin, Chaotic dynamics for maps in one and two dimensions. A geometrical method and applications to economics, Internat. J. Bifur. Chaos Appl. Sci. Engrg. 19 (2009), 3283-3309. [10] K. Mischaikow and M. Mrozek, Isolating neighborhoods and chaos, Japan J. Indust. Appl. Math. 12 (1995), 205-236. [11] D. Papini and F. Zanolin, On the periodic boundary value problem and chaotic-like dynamics for nonlinear Hill's equations, Adv. Nonlinear Stud. 4 (2004), 71-91. [12] D. Papini and F. Zanolin, Fixed points, periodic points, and coin-tossing sequences for mappings defined on two-dimensional cells, Fixed Point Theory Appl. 2004 (2004), 113-134. [13] A. Pascoletti, M. Pireddu and F. Zanolin, Multiple periodic solutions and complex dynamics for second order ODEs via linked twist maps, Electron. J. Qual. Theory Differ. Equ., Proc. 8'th Coll. Qualitative Theory of Diff. Equ. 14 (2008), 1-32. [14] A. Pascoletti and F. Zanolin, Example of a suspension bridge ODE model exhibiting chaotic dynamics: a topological approach, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 339 (2008), 1179-1198. [15] M. Pireddu and F. Zanolin, Fixed points for dissipative-repulsive systems and topological dynamics of mappings defined on N-dimensional cells, Adv. Nonlinear Stud. 5 (2005), 411-440. [16] M. Pireddu and F. Zanolin, Cutting surfaces and applications to periodic points and chaotic-like dynamics, Topol. Methods Nonlinear Anal. 30 (2007), 279-319. [17] M. Pireddu and F. Zanolin, Some remarks on fixed points for maps which are expansive along one direction, Rend. Istit. Mat. Univ. Trieste 39 (2007), 245-274. [18] M. Pireddu and F. Zanolin, Chaotic dynamics in the Volterra predator-prey model via linked twist maps, Opuscula Math. 28/4 (2008), 567-592. [19] P. Reichlin, Equilibrium cycles in an overlapping generations economy with production, J. Econom. Theory 40 (1986), 89-102. [20] R. Srzednicki, A generalization of the Lefschetz fixed point theorem and detection of chaos, Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 128 (2000), 1231-1239. [21] R. Srzednicki and K. Wojcik, A geometric method for detecting chaotic dynamics, J. Differential Equations 135 (1997), 66-82. [22] S. Wiggins, Chaos in the dynamics generated by sequence of maps, with application to chaotic advection in flows with aperiodic time dependence, Z. angew. Math. Phys. 50 (1999), 585-616. [23] P. Zgliczy nski and M. Gidea, Covering relations for multidimensional dynamical systems, J. Differential Equations 202 (2004), 32-58.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Andersson, Ola. "Bargaining and communication in games /." Lund: Univ., Dep. of Economics, 2008. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/56139136X.pdf.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Reinert, Olof, and Tobias Wiesinger. "DATA QUALITY CONSEQUENCES OF MANDATORY CYBER DATA SHARING BETWEEN DUOPOLY INSURERS." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Institutionen för matematik och matematisk statistik, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-175180.

Full text
Abstract:
Cyber attacks against companies are becoming more common as technology advances and digitalization is increasing exponentially. All Swedish insurance companies that sell cyber insurance encounter the same problem, there is not enough data to do good actuarial work. In order for the pricing procedure to improve and general knowledge of cyber insurance to increase, it has been proposed that insurance companies should share their data with each other. The goal of the thesis is to do mathematical calculations to explore data quality consequences of such a sharing regime. This thesis is based on some important assumptions and three scenarios. The most important assumptions are that there are two insurance companies forced to share all their data with each other and that they can reduce the uncertainty about their own product by investing in better data quality. In the first scenario, we assume a game between two players where they can choose how much to invest in reducing the uncertainty. In the second scenario, we assume that there is not a game, but the two insurance companies are forced to equal investments and thus have the same knowledge of their products. In the third scenario, we assume that the players are risk averse, that is, they are not willing to take high risk. The results will show how much, if any, the insurance companies should invest in the different scenarios to maximize their profits (if risk neutral) or utility (if risk averse). The results of this thesis show that in the first and second scenario, the optimal profit is reached when the insurance companies do not invest anything. In the third scenario though, the optimal investment is greater than zero, given that the companies are enough risk averse.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Books on the topic "Duopoly games"

1

Experimental duopoly markets with demand inertia: Game-playing experiments and the strategy method. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1992.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Murata, Shozo. Keizai no gemu bunseki =: Duopoly and the theory of games (Keizai no joho to suri). Hatsubaijo Seiunsha, 1992.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Book chapters on the topic "Duopoly games"

1

Masuda, Takeshi, and Shigeo Muto. "Farsighted Stability in Duopoly Markets with Product Differentiation." In ICM Millennium Lectures on Games, 305–18. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05219-8_19.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Suzuki, Akihiro, and Shigeo Muto. "Farsighted Behavior Leads to Efficiency in Duopoly Markets." In Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, 379–95. Boston, MA: Birkhäuser Boston, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/0-8176-4501-2_20.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Bischi, Gian Italo, and Ahmad Naimzada. "Global Analysis of a Dynamic Duopoly Game with Bounded Rationality." In Advances in Dynamic Games and Applications, 361–85. Boston, MA: Birkhäuser Boston, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1336-9_20.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Lambertini, Luca. "On the Coordination of Static and Dynamic Marketing Channels in a Duopoly with Advertising." In Games in Management Science, 57–73. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_4.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Friedman, James W. "Duopoly." In Game Theory, 133–38. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20181-5_12.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Keser, Claudia. "Results of the Game-Playing Experiments." In Experimental Duopoly Markets with Demand Inertia, 22–37. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48144-4_4.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Keser, Claudia. "Comparison of Game-Playing Experiments and Strategy Tournaments." In Experimental Duopoly Markets with Demand Inertia, 111–24. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48144-4_6.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Negishi, Takashi. "Bertrand’s Duopoly as an Edgeworth Exchange Game." In Public and International Economics, 74–84. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23029-7_7.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Citci, Sadettin Haluk, and Kubra Uge. "Information Exchange in Price Setting Mixed Duopoly." In Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications, 13–23. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51941-4_2.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

García-Meza, Mario Alberto, and José Daniel López-Barrientos. "A Differential Game of a Duopoly with Network Externalities." In Recent Advances in Game Theory and Applications, 49–66. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43838-2_3.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Conference papers on the topic "Duopoly games"

1

Stahl, Ingolf. "Simulation Models Of Two Duopoly Games." In 31st Conference on Modelling and Simulation. ECMS, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.7148/2017-0027.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Pražák, Pavel. "Nonlinear Cournot Duopoly Game." In Hradec Economic Days 2018, edited by Petra Maresova, Pavel Jedlicka, and Ivan Soukal. University of Hradec Kralove, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.36689/uhk/hed/2018-02-018.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Inaltekin, Hazer, Tom Wexler, and Stephen B. Wicker. "A Duopoly Pricing Game for Wireless IP Services." In 2007 4th Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/sahcn.2007.4292872.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Deng, Feng. "Delayed duopoly game with adaptive and naive players." In 2011 2nd IEEE International Conference on Emergency Management and Management Sciences (ICEMMS). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icemms.2011.6015735.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Lu, Z. F., and G. J. Xing. "The method for solving the duopoly game model." In International Conference on Advances in Management Engineering and Information Technology. Southampton, UK: WIT Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.2495/ameit140431.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Shengli Chen, Xiaohua Yang, and Kang Ping. "Analysis of the duopoly game based on endogenous timing." In 2010 Chinese Control and Decision Conference (CCDC). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ccdc.2010.5499037.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Luo, Jian, and Min Shi. "Game Analysis of Duopoly and Regulator in Regulated Market." In 2009 International Conference on Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering. IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iciii.2009.243.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Zhang-sheng, Jiang, and Hu Long-ying. "Enterprise Cooperative Innovation Game Analysis on Duopoly Market Structure." In 2007 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2007.4422153.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Fazeli, Arastoo, and Ali Jadbabaie. "Duopoly pricing game in networks with local coordination effects." In 2012 IEEE 51st Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cdc.2012.6426205.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Deng, Feng, and Yali Lu. "Duopoly game model and its stability with heterogeneous players." In 2011 2nd IEEE International Conference on Emergency Management and Management Sciences (ICEMMS). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icemms.2011.6015699.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography