Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Duhesme'

My research will focus on some specific features of Duhem’s physics: • The new conceptual link between mechanics and thermodynamics, • The attempt at explaining the complexity of the physical world. I have tried to follow the intellectual pathway which led Duhem from an original interpretation of thermodynamics to a great plan for building up a physics of “qualities”. Two reasons have led me to focus on the decade 1886-1896. In the first place, I have found that the main and most ingenious concepts of Duhem’s physics were accomplished before the turn of the century. In the second place, I would like to stress that those remarks were put forward before the best known transformations experienced by the physical sciences around the turn of the century. The study of his physics is demanding, because quite sophisticated are both conceptual and mathematical components of his theories. Some issues he raised, in particular the complexity of the physical world, did not attracted his contemporaries; only after some decades, in the second half of the twentieth century, complexity would have met the interest of physicists. Moreover, he dignified the tradition of Aristotle’s physics, a tradition which had been looked upon as regressive with regard Galileo’s new science. He revived the ancient Greek meaning of the word “physics”: not only science of local motion, but a general theory of material transformations, encompassing contemporary physics, chemistry and perhaps some aspects of sciences of life. Galileo’s science had to fight against the old physics of qualities, in order to establish itself: the complexity of the physical world had to be neglected in favour of a simplified world. Duhem believed that, at the end of the nineteenth century, he could go back to that neglected world and carry it into the wider boundaries of a generalized Mechanics-Thermodynamics.

En confrontant les premiers articles philosophiques avec la théorie physique, nous avons constaté que Duhem a évolué sur un point fondamental : il commence par prôner la méthode inductive qu'il rejettera sans ambiguïté par la suite. Nous croyons que le rôle de l'histoire des sciences est déterminant ici. En outre, l'étude des premiers articles éclaire l'origine de la conception philosophique qui réside dans la tentative de formuler une thermodynamique générale, en rupture avec le mécanisme classique. A partir des origines de la statique en 1903, Duhem s'engage dans un projet historique d'envergure, qui aboutira au système du monde. Il modifie la vision classique de la naissance de la science moderne et propose l'idée du continuisme historique. La comparaison des résultats historiques et des thèses méthodologiques montre que les points de vue statique et dynamique interviennent ensemble dans la théorie physique. Nous avons pu alors évaluer l'impact philosophique de l'histoire des sciences chez Duhem
Comparing the first philosophical articles with the aim and structure of physical theory, we noted that Duhem varied on a fundamental point: he began by recommending the inductive method which he will later reject unambiguously. We believe that the role of history of science is determinant here. A survey of the first articles also reveals the origin of the philosophical conception, which lies in an attempt to formulate a general thermodynamics as opposed to classical mechanism. With the origin of statics in 1903, Duhem undertakes a large historical projects, which culminates in the system of the world. He modifies the traditionnal view of the birth of modern science and suggests the idea of historical continuism. The comparison of his historical results and his methodological theses shows that the static and dynamic points of view occur together in the aim and structure of physical theory. We were thus able to determine the philosophical impact of Duhem's history of science

Orientador: José Carlos Pinto de Oliveira
Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-20T22:43:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Oliveira_AmeliadeJesus_D.pdf: 1526573 bytes, checksum: 35175fb8e24d12c518f965da0659e2db (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012
Resumo: Pierre Duhem e Thomas Kuhn aparecem como personagens privilegiados nas discussões historiográficas acerca de como a ciência se desenvolve e são classificados, respectivamente, como continuísta e descontinuísta. Este trabalho resulta de uma análise comparativa entre as visões desses dois filósofos e historiadores da ciência. Nosso propósito inicial foi compreender como eles poderiam ter visões tão díspares acerca do desenvolvimento científico, já que ambos são vistos também como participantes do mesmo grupo de filósofos para quem a estreiteza entre a história e a filosofia da ciência é admitida de maneira consensual. A pesquisa inicialmente orientada pela questão ?Como a ciência se desenvolve?' em suas obras nos levou a questionar a própria classificação da qual partimos. Na ausência de elementos corroboradores da difundida oposição entre as duas visões históricas, exploramos em suas obras dois eventos tidos comumente como revolucionários na história da ciência - os que levam o nome de Copérnico e Newton. Esse exame possibilitou a descoberta de uma insuspeitada semelhança entre a visão de Duhem e Kuhn acerca do desenvolvimento científico que neutraliza o antagonismo entre continuísmo e descontinuísmo em suas obras. Sustentamos que esse antagonismo resulta de uma abordagem bastante parcial de seus trabalhos em filosofia e história da ciência, uma abordagem que não leva em consideração os contextos diferentes de suas obras. O que observamos é que, em momentos distintos da história da ciência, Duhem e Kuhn acreditaram no rompimento com uma tradição histórica responsável por uma imagem enganadora do modo da ciência se desenvolver e que, portanto, precisava ser ultrapassada. Na tradição criticada por Duhem, os historiadores relatavam o surgimento repentino de grandes teorias, sem nenhum vínculo com a tradição; só viam revoluções. Na tradição criticada por Kuhn, os historiadores, ao reescreverem a história da ciência a partir da visão e do aparato conceitual de seu momento presente, acabaram tornando ocultas as revoluções. O resultado do trabalho reflete, sim, a tentativa inicial de compreender como se dá o desenvolvimento da ciência em Duhem e Kuhn, mas essa tentativa nos conduziu à necessidade de abandonar as usuais classificações conferidas às suas visões
Abstract: Pierre Duhem and Thomas Kuhn appear as privileged characters in the historiographical discussions about how science develops and are classified, respectively, as continuist and discontinuist. This thesis is the result of a comparative analysis between the views of these philosophers and historians of science. Our initial purpose was to understand how they could have such different views about the scientific development, since both are seen also as participants of the same group of philosophers that admit the necessary intimate connection between the history and the philosophy of science. The research, initially conducted by the question ?how does science develop?' in their works, led us to question the proper classification from which we started. In the absence of elements which corroborate the widespread opposition between the two historical views, we explore in their works two events usually regarded as revolutionary in the history of science - those that bear the names of Copernicus and Newton. This examination made possible the discovery of an unsuspected similarity between Duhem's and Kuhn's views about the scientific development that neutralizes the antagonism between continuism and discontinuism in their works. We maintain that this antagonism results from a very much partial approach of their works in philosophy and history of science, an approach that does not consider the different contexts of their works. What we observe is that Duhem and Kuhn in different times of history of science had believed in the rupture with a historical tradition which was responsible for a misleading image of scientific development, and therefore had to be overcome. In the tradition that is criticized by Duhem, historians related the sudden emergence of great theories, without any connections with the tradition; they just saw revolutions. In the tradition that is criticized by Kuhn, historians, by rewriting the history of science from a perspective of their contemporary moment, ended up turning the revolutions hidden. The result of this work does reflect the initial attempt of understanding how the scientific development occurs in Duhem and Kuhn, but this attempt has led us to the need of abandoning the usual classifications that are attributed to their views
Doutorado
Filosofia
Doutor em Filosofia

Submitted by Marlene Santos (marlene.bc.ufg@gmail.com) on 2016-08-12T21:02:23Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertaçao - Marcus Renato Alves Araújo - 2005.pdf: 1005611 bytes, checksum: 6433fcaab30afbca145ab9b78e615f14 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5)
Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2016-08-15T13:21:00Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertaçao - Marcus Renato Alves Araújo - 2005.pdf: 1005611 bytes, checksum: 6433fcaab30afbca145ab9b78e615f14 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5)
Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-15T13:21:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertaçao - Marcus Renato Alves Araújo - 2005.pdf: 1005611 bytes, checksum: 6433fcaab30afbca145ab9b78e615f14 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005-10-28
Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES
This is a study on Duhem-Quine thesis. Its purpose was to investigate epistemological differences and affinities between the holistic positions of Willard Quine and Pierre Duhem. This analysis showed that two quite different interpretations of Duhem-Quine thesis are possible: a weak version, argued by Duhem, and a strong version, more radical, argued by Quine in his article Two dogmas of empiricism. The study of holism, in this perspective, highlighted the importance of this subject to the Philosophy of Science and Language and how this approach can shed light on important philosophical issues, such as the relationship between scientific observations and theories; the thesis of the empirical underdetermination of theories; the theory-ladenness of observation sentences; the theory choice process; the inscrutability of reference; the theory of linguistic learning; among others.
O presente trabalho tem por objeto a tese Duhem-Quine. O que procuramos, durante o desenvolvimento da nossa dissertação, foi investigar as diferenças e afinidades epistemológicas existentes entre as posições holistas de Willard Quine e Pierre Duhem. Ao longo desse estudo, por meio da análise da obra destes dois autores, buscamos mostrar que se pode ter duas interpretações bastante diferentes da tese Duhem-Quine: uma fraca, defendida por Duhem, e uma forte, mais radical, defendida por Quine em seu artigo Dois dogmas do empirismo. Ao investigar o holismo, nessa perspectiva, tentamos destacar a importância desse tema no âmbito da Filosofia da Ciência e da Linguagem e de que forma esta abordagem pode lançar luz sobre importantes problemas filosóficos, tais como a relação entre observações e teorias científicas, a tese da subdeterminação empírica de teorias, a impregnação teórica dos enunciados observacionais, o processo de escolha de teorias, a inescrutabilidade da referência, a teoria do aprendizado linguístico, entre outros.

Par quoi peut-on expliquer actuellement ce retour considérable de la philosophie des sciences à la conception de la théorie physique chez Pierre Duhem. Une conception qui est née au sein d’un projet scientifique et qui est destinée à préparer théoriquement la théorie physique de Duhem à savoir la théorie énergétique. L’énergétique ou l’expression effective de la théorie physique idéale, n’a pas pu convaincre par le projet qu’elle apporte à la science physique, toutefois, la conception théorique qui le prépare à réussi à conserver son intérêt et son actualité malgré tous les changements conceptuels dans la philosophie des sciences contemporaine. Par quoi donc, pouvons-nous expliquer la réussite de la conception de la théorie physique malgré l’échec de la théorie physique de Duhem ? Notre thèse est la suivante : la conception théorique de la théorie physique survécue et conserve sa pertinence grâce à la méthodologie qu’elle prépare, au travail conceptuel qu’elle comporte et grâce aux thèses qu’elle défend. Elle est neuve par rapport aux conceptions précédentes et elle est distincte en comparaison avec ses contemporaines. La nouvelle méthodologie présentée par Duhem, nous donne l’occasion de réfléchir de nouveau un problème toujours était liée à la science, mais qui semble insistant plus que jamais à l’époque de Duhem ; c’est le problème de la certitude scientifique. Entre une raison qui défont sa capacité de tout connaitre et tout expliquer en dessinant un schéma exact des lois qui guident la nature, et une raison qui connait ses propres limites et accepte toutes les possibilités de connaissance, ou qui recourt à l’imagination pour faire appel à des modèles qui l’aident à connaitre, la raison se trouve chez Duhem dans la quête d’une méthodologie qui conserve à la science son stature et la protège contre tout dogmatisme et tout scepticisme. L’intersection du travail du savant, de l’historien des sciences et du philosophe chez Pierre Duhem résulte, une conception qui, non seulement persévère dans le temps par son originalité, mais aussi elle est devenue par le travail conceptuelle qu’elle contient une source de nouvelles réflexions et discussions dans la philosophie des sciences contemporaine
How can we currently explain the important return of the philosophy of science to the concept of physical theory by Pierre Duhem? This concept is born into a science project and prepare theoretically the physical theory of Duhem named energetic theory. The energetic or the effective expression of the ideal physical theory could not convince with the project that she brings to physical science, however, the theoretical concept that prepares them to successfully retain his interest and despite news all conceptual changes in the contemporary philosophy of science. For what, then, can we explain the success of the concept of physical theory despite the failure of the physical theory of Duhem? Our thesis is as follows: the theoretical conception of physical theory survived and remains relevant for favor to the methodology it prepares, the conceptual work involved and the ideas it promotes. It is new compared to previous designs and it is distinct in comparison with its contemporaries. The new methodology presented by Duhem, gives us an opportunity to reflect back to a problem which was always related to science, but that seems more insistent than ever at the time of Duhem, that is the problem of scientific certainty. Between one reason that undo its ability to know everything and explain everything by drawing a diagram of exact laws that guide the nature and reason who knows his own limitations and accepts all the possibilities of knowledge, or that uses the imagination to use templates that help to know, according to Duhem, the reason is in the quest for a methodology that retains its stature in science and protects against dogmatism and skepticism. The intersection of the work of the scientist, the science historian and philosopher Pierre Duhem result in a design that not only perseveres in time for its originality, but also became the conceptual work that contains a source of new ideas and discussions in contemporary philosophy of science

L’épistémologie explicite professée dans La théorie physique (1906) n’épuise pas l’œuvre de Pierre Duhem (1861-1916). Son projet scientifique, largement oublié aujourd’hui, tant par les épistémologues que par les historiens des sciences, mérite d’être revisité à raison de sa portée philosophique. L’énergétique vise la constitution d’une théorie globale des changements d’état physiques et chimiques, sur la base des principes de la thermodynamique et dans un cadre formel hérité de Lagrange. Cette aspiration à l’unité est tempérée par le souci d’accueillir la diversité et l’hétérogénéité du réel, qui résiste aux tentatives de réduction d’inspiration mécaniste. La confrontation avec les phénomènes chimiques et électromagnétiques pousse alors Duhem à proposer une théorie non pas monolithique mais ramifiée, pour faire droit aux différentes formes d’irréversibilité. L’énergétique montre ainsi la voie d’une unification non-réductionniste des sciences physiques
The work of Pierre Duhem (1861-1916) does not boil down to the explicit epistemology to be found in The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (1906). The philosophical meaning of his scientific project, now well forgotten by philosophers and historians of science alike, should be reappraised. Energetics aims at building a global theory encompassing all changes of physical or chemical state, on the basis of the two principles of thermodynamics and within the mathematical frame inherited from Lagrange. The aspiration for unity is balanced by a concern for welcoming the diversity and heterogeneity of reality, which resists mechanical reduction. Facing electromagnetic and chemical phenomena, Duhem chooses to develop a ramified theory in order to account for different kinds of irreversibility. Thus, energetics paves the way for a non-reductionnist unification of physical sciences

L’objet de ce travail est l’analyse des travaux théoriques de Pierre Duhem dans le domaine du magnétisme et de l’électromagnétisme, très peu étudiés jusqu’ici et souvent éclipsés par ses contributions à la philosophie et à l’histoire des sciences. Ces travaux correspondent toutefois à une production scientifique abondante (plus de 3500 pages), s’étalant sur toute sa carrière. Mon travail permet de mettre en évidence la richesse de son œuvre en sciences physiques, ainsi que les tâtonnements accompagnant l’élaboration de sa thermodynamique générale, un programme ambitieux et original dans le contexte scientifique de l’époque. De sa thèse sur la théorie de l’aimantation par influence fondée sur la thermodynamique (1888) à son article Sur le diamagnétisme (1913), en passant par ses Leçons sur l’électricité et le magnétisme (1892), ses idées théoriques sont en constante évolution. Concernant le problème du diamagnétisme, mon travail permet de mettre en évidence plusieurs facteurs décisifs dans le processus de construction de sa théorie (un article de Parker sur le principe de Carnot (1889), une lettre envoyée par Curie (1902) ou encore les réflexions de Duhem sur la stabilité de l’équilibre électrique menées à partir de 1896). La thèse aborde également l’approche originale de Duhem dans l’étude des systèmes renfermant des courants électriques, étude qui le conduit à considérer l’électromagnétisme comme une branche se détachant très tôt du tronc commun formé par l’essentiel de l’énergétique, tout en prolongeant la théorie de Helmholtz. Duhem échouera dans sa tentative de convaincre ses contemporains de la supériorité de cette théorie logique par rapport à celle de Maxwell
The object of this work is the analysis of Pierre Duhem's theoretical works in the field of magnetism and electromagnetism, very little studied up to now and often overshadowed by his contributions to philosophy and history of science. These works, however, correspond to an abundant scientific production (over 3500 pages), spread out over his whole career. My work allows to highlight the richness of his work in physics, as well as the trial-and-error process accompanying the development of his general thermodynamics, an ambitious and original program in the scientific context of time. From his thesis on the theory of magnetization by induction based on thermodynamics (1888) through his Lessons on electricity and magnetism (1892) to his article On diamagnetism (1913), his theoretical ideas are in constant evolution. Concerning the problem of diamagnetism, my work can highlight several decisive factors in the process of elaborating his theory (an article by Parker on the principle of Carnot (1889), a letter sent by Curie (1902) or Duhem’s thoughts on the stability of electrical equilibrium (1896, 1903)). The thesis also discusses Duhem's original approach to the study of systems containing electric currents, study that led to consider electromagnetism as a branch breaking away very early from the common core formed by the bulk of his energetics, while extending the theory of Helmholtz. Duhem will fail in his attempt to convince his contemporaries of the superiority of this logical theory compared to that of Maxwell

A presente Tese compreende uma análise de três componentes estreitamente relacionados do pensamento de Pierre Duhem (1861-1916), a saber, a historiografia da ciência, a filosofia da história e o método histórico. Na primeira parte, examinamos as relações essenciais estabelecidas entre o método histórico e a filosofia da história duhemianas. Na segunda, nossa atenção volta-se para o estudo de alguns aspectos da historiografia de nosso autor que têm sido negligenciados pela literatura secundária, em especial, a sua concepção das revoluções científicas. Acreditamos ser possível compor uma interpretação sintética que harmonize, sem incoerências, as afirmações que conduzem os comentadores a vê-lo como um continuísta estrito e, por outro lado, algumas passagens esquecidas que tendem a reforçar uma interpretação descontinuísta.
The present Thesis encompasses an analysis of three closely related components of Pierre Duhems thought, namely, the historiography of science, the philosophy of history and the historical method. In the first part, we examine the essential relationships established between the Duhemian historical method and his philosophy of history. In the second part, our attention turns to the study of some aspects of Duhems historiography that have been neglected by the secondary literature, particularly, the Duhemian conception of scientific revolutions. We believe that it is possible to compose a synthetic interpretation that harmonizes, without inconsistencies, on the one hand, the assertions of the French historian that led the commentators to see him as a strict continuist and, on the other hand, some other forgotten passages that tend to reinforce a discontinuist interpretation.

L’un des mérites de la Physique, au cours de son histoire, est d’avoir progressivement montré que la complexité de la connaissance scientifique n’est pas essentiellement due aux limites de l’intelligence humaine ni à la faillibilité des outils conceptuels et techniques de la science, elle pourrait être constitutive de la nature même des phénomènes de l’univers. C’est dans cet ordre de considération que la pensée de Duhem interpelle l’épistémologie contemporaine, lorsqu’elle investit la méthode classificatoire à la fois comme révélatrice de cette complexité et vecteur de dynamisme scientifique. Si la conscience de la part que représente la notion de classification dans la pensée scientifique n’est pas un débat nouveau, en revanche, ce qui l’est dans l’épistémologie duhémienne tient essentiellement dans les effets induits de l’application de la classification à la théorie physique. En quel sens peut-on dire que l’idée duhémienne de classification, en tant que traduction d’une méthodologie de type représentationniste, fournit une nouvelle grille de lecture des phénomènes de la nature dans le cadre des sciences physico-chimiques, en même temps qu’elle se détermine comme une interface entre l’épistémologie classique et l’épistémologie contemporaine ? La présente étude n’examine pas seulement la nature, les mécanismes internes et les apports de la méthode classificatoire en termes d’objectivité, de productivité théorique et de prédictibilité ; les propositions qu’elle formule montrent que les implications épistémologiques de la notion de classification reposent incontestablement le problème de l’objectivité du discours philosophique sur la science
One of the merits of Physics, during its history, is to have gradually shown that the complexity of scientific knowledge is not essentially due to the limits of human intelligence nor to the fallibility of the conceptual and technical tools of science. This complexity could simply result from the inherent nature of the universe. It is in this context that Duhem’s thought challenges contemporary epistemology by analysing the classificatory method as it both reveals this complexity and is a vector of scientific dynamism. While the contribution of the notion of classification to scientific thought is not a new question, what is new in the “Duhemian” epistemology lies essentially in the effects induced by the application of classification in physical theory. In what sense can we say that the “Duhemian” idea of classification, as the translation of a representationist methodology, provides a new interpretation of the phenomena of nature within the framework of the physical and chemical sciences, at the same time as it is constructed as an interface between classical and contemporary epistemology? The present study not only examines the nature, the internal mechanisms and the contributions of the classificatory method in terms of objectivity, of theoretical productivity and of predictability but it also formulates propositions that show that the epistemological implications of the notion of classification indisputably reconfigure the problem of the objectivity of philosophical discourse about science

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
Nesse trabalho apresentamos a função e determinamos a natureza das convenções e hipóteses para os fundamentos científicos segundo a corrente convencionalista que surgiu na França na virada do século XIX para o XX, composta por Henri Poincaré, Pierre Duhem e Édouard Le Roy. Além disso, analisamos a relação que as convenções e hipóteses podem estabelecer com teses metafísicas através dos critérios utilizados pelos cientistas para determinar a preferência por certas teorias. Para isso, promovemos uma interpretação imanente das obras publicadas entre 1891 e 1905. Como resultado, revelamos que os autores, apesar de serem classificados como pertencentes a uma mesma corrente, não possuem apenas posições comuns, mas também divergências. Poincaré e Le Roy concordam que as convenções geométricas são escolhidas de acordo com o critério de conveniência. Contudo, eles discordam sobre o valor que a conveniência agrega ao conhecimento científico. Em relação aos fenômenos naturais, os três autores concordam que a realidade não pode ser descrita univocamente por um mesmo conjunto de convenções e hipóteses. Porém, Poincaré e Duhem acreditam que há critérios que tornam umas teorias mais satisfatórias que outras. Analisamos os critérios experimentais, racionais e axiológicos que justificam a satisfação dos cientistas com certas teorias e apontamos como estes critérios se relacionam com a metafísica. Concluímos que os convencionalistas, mesmo que cautelosamente e de modo implícito, buscaram se aproximar da metafísica com o intuito de justificar a própria atividade científica.
In this work, we present the function and we determine the nature of conventions and hypotheses for the scientific foundations according with the conventionalist doctrine that arose in France during the turning of the XIX century to the XX. The doctrine was composed by Henri Poincaré, Pierre Duhem and Édouard Le Roy. Moreover, we analyze the relation that conventions and hypotheses can establish with metaphysical thesis through criteria used by scientists in order to determine the preference for certain theories. Thereunto, we promote an immanent interpretation of published works between 1891 and 1905. As result, we reveal that the authors, though being classified as belonging to the same doctrine, don't have only common grounds, but also divergences. Poincaré and Le Roy agree that geometrical conventions are chosen in accordance with convenience criteria. However, they disagree about the value convenience aggregate to scientific knowledge. In regards to natural phenomena, the three authors agree that reality can't be described univocally by the same set of conventions and hypotheses. Yet, Poincaré and Duhem both believe that there are experimental, rational and axiological criteria that justify scientists satisfaction with certain theories and we indicate how those criteria are related with metaphysics. We conclude that conventionalists, even if warily and implicitly, searched to approach metaphysics in order to justify scientific activity.

La notion de potentiel, avant d'être une notion physique, est d'abord une appellation utilisée par des physiciens du 19e siècle pour désigner des objets mathématiques en relation avec des grandeurs physiques. La première occurrence est la fonction potentielle créée par Lagrange. La quantité qu'elle exprime trouve par la suite une expression qui lui est proche, utilisée dans la physique de l'énergie : l'énergie potentielle, ainsi nommée par Rankine. Enfin, la dernière occurrence de la notion de potentiel est développée par Duhem comme aboutissement de la thermodynamique en tant que science universelle : le potentiel thermodynamique. Pour chacune de ces trois étapes, ce travail de recherche entreprend de rendre compte du processus historique, puis d'une analyse de la notion concernée et de sa place dans la physique du moment, enfin du changement de perspective qu'elle opère dans le contenu métaphysique des sciences physiques. En effet, ce travail souhaite rendre compte de ce que la notion de potentiel n'est en réalité que la marque de la nature essentiellement mathématique de la physique, et qu'en vertu de cette essence, les connaissances et les techniques mathématiques se développant, le contenu métaphysique des sciences physiques est bouleversé. En faisant naturellement primer l'ordre logique sur l'ordre ontologique, le développement de la notion de potentiel renvoie les hypothèses inintelligibles au langage mathématique vers les extrémités de la construction axiomatique. Les illusions de causalité, de conservation et de finalité, pensées respectivement à travers l'impénétrable, l'insécable et l'affinité, viennent se réfugier dans l'idée de potentiel
The notion of potential, before being a physical concept, is primarily a term used by physicists during the 19th century to describe mathematical objects in relation to physical quantities. The first occurrence of the concept of potential is the potential function created by Lagrange. The amount that is expressed has later an expression close to it, used in the physics of energy that grows in the middle of the century: the potential energy, so named by Rankine. The last occurrence of the concept of potential is developed by Duhem as the culmination of thermodynamics as an universal science : the thermodynamic potential. For each of these three stages in this notion, this research begins to realize the historical process at first, then an analysis of the concept in question and its place in the physics of time, and finally the changing perspectives opened, most of the time implicitly, in the metaphysical content of the physics. Indeed, this work is to give a notion of what the potential is really the mark of the essentially mathematical nature of modem physics, and by virtue of this essence, dice when that mathematical knowledge and technics are developed, the metaphysical content of the physical sciences is upset. By naturally take precedence logical order on the ontological order, the development of the concept of potential returns assumptions, unintelligible for mathematical language, to the ends of the axiomatic structure suggested by the mathematical requirements. The illusions of causality, conservation and finality, thoughts respectively through the impenetrable, the indivisible and affinity, take refuge in the idea of potential

Le mérite et la gloire de Galilée sont largement reconnus par ses commentateurs. La grande majorité des historiens lui octroie la paternité de la science moderne. Mais les lieux communs s’arrêtent à ces considérations. Tout se passe comme si le physicien florentin refusait tout enfermement méthodologique préférant prendre la couleur idéologique de ses exégètes. Il constitue un sujet de premier ordre en philosophie des sciences. Le développement de cette dernière, conçue comme discipline à part entière au début du XXe Siècle, s’est accompagnée en France d’une réflexion accrue sur lascience moderne et la philosophie qui la sous-tend. La glorification rationaliste des Lumières et du positivisme avait fait de Galilée le héros qui a permis de mettre la mécanique classique en lieu et place de l’ancienne physique aristotélicienne. Il était considéré par Comte comme l’inventeur de la Science. Au début du XXe S., le temps des révisions était venu. L’empirisme des Lumières et les faits généraux d’Auguste Comte laissent place à une conception aprioriste de la physique moderne défendue par Paul Tannery. La philosophie des sciences en France telle que nous la connaissons estnée avec les travaux de Tannery et de Gaston Milhaud. Si l’image de Galilée dans la pensée de Tannery est très proche de la perception d’Alexandre Koyré de la science moderne, Pierre Duhem, lui, se met en désaccord avec ses deux compatriotes en défendant l’idée d’une continuité entre la science médiévale et la science classique
Galileo’s merit and fame are largely acknowledged by his commentators. The majority of philosophers refer to him as the father of modern science. But commonplaces stop with these considerations. Everything takes place as if the Florentine physicist refused any methodological imprisonment and did not mind taking the ideological color of his interpreters. His work constitutes a first-rate subject in philosophy of science. The development of the latter as a full-fledged discipline at the beginning of the 20th Century was accompanied in France with an intense reflection on modern science and the philosophy which underlies it. The rationalistic glorification of the Enlightenment and positivism had made Galileo the hero who allowed classical mechanics to replace astrological physics. He was considered by Comte to be the creator of Science. At the beginning of 20th Century it was time for a reevaluation. The empiricism of the Enlightenment and the general facts of Auguste Comte yielded to an aprioristic comprehension of modern physics defended by Paul Tannery. Philosophy of science as it is practiced today in France was shaped by the endeavours of Tannery and Gaston Milhaud. If the image of Galileo in Tannery closely resembles that found in Alexandre Koyré, Pierre Duhem, who defended the idea of a continuity between Medieval Science and Classic Science, stands apart

Est-il justifié de croire que nos meilleures théories scientifiques sont vraies ? A-t-on de bonnes raisons de croire que les entités inobservables postulées dans les théories scientifiques sont réelles ? A ces questions, un réaliste en philosophie des sciences tend à donner des réponses affirmatives. Un anti-réaliste, au contraire, soutient que ni la croyance à la vérité des théories, ni la croyance à la réalité des entités postulées ne sont justifiées. Bien que le débat entre réalistes et anti-réalistes trouve son origine dans l’Antiquité, il a fait son retour dès la chute de l’empirisme logique dans les années 1960, et a atteint son apogée dans les années 1980. Cette thèse a pour but d’exposer les difficultés que les deux parties belligérantes rencontrent. Elle passe en examen les arguments incertains donnés par les deux parties belligérantes, et montre les défauts qui s’y trouvent. Ces arguments examinés sont tous glanés dans la philosophie des sciences contemporaine, en particulier dans les doctrines de quatre philosophes distingués, à savoir P. Duhem, B. Van Fraassen, N. Cartwright, et A. Fine
Are we justified in believing our best scientific theories are true? Do we have good reasons for believing those unobservable entities postulated in the scientific theories are real? To these questions, a realist in philsophy of science tends to give an affirmative reply. An anti-realist, on the contrary, holds that neither belief in the truth of theories nor belief in the reality of postulated entities is justified. Although the debate between realists and anti-realists stretches back into antiquity, it made a comeback since the collapse of the logical empiricism in the 1960s, and was brought to a climax in the 1980s. This dissertation aims to display the difficulties that both belligerent parties encounter. It examines the insecure arguments given by both belligerent parties, and shows how flawed they are. The examined arguments are all gleaned from contempory philosophy of science, in particular from the doctrines of four distinguished philosophers, namely P. Duhem, B. Van Fraassen, N. Cartwright, and A. Fine

L’esercito italiano e la conquista della Catalogna (1808-1811) Uno studio di Military Effectiveness nell’Europa napoleonica Settori scientifico-disciplinari SPS/03 – M-STO/02 La ricerca ha lo scopo di ricostruire e valutare l’effettività militare dell’esercito italiano al servizio di Napoleone I. In primo luogo attraverso un’analisi statistica e strategica della costruzione, e del successivo impiego, dell’istituzione militare del Regno d’Italia durante gli anni della sua esistenza (1805-14); successivamente, è stato scelto un caso di studi particolarmente significativo, come la campagna di Catalogna (1808-11, nel contesto della guerra di Indipendenza spagnola), per poter valutare il contributo operazionale e tattico dei corpi inviati dal governo di Milano e la loro integrazione con l’apparato militare complessivo del Primo Impero. La tesi ha voluto rispondere alla mancanza di studi sul comportamento in guerra dell’esercito italiano e, allo stesso tempo, introdurre nella storiografia militare italiana la metodologia di studi, d’origine anglosassone e ormai di tradizione trentennale, di Military Effectiveness. La ricerca si è primariamente basata, oltre che sulla copiosa memorialistica a stampa italiana e francese, sulla documentazione d’archivio della Secrétairerie d’état impériale (Archives Nationales di Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Parigi), del Ministère de la Guerre francese (Service historique de la Défence, di Vincennes, Parigi) e del Ministero della Guerra del Regno d’Italia (Archivio di Stato di Milano). Dal punto di vista dei risultati è stato possibile verificare come l’esercito italiano abbia rappresentato, per Bonaparte, uno strumento duttile e di facile impiego, pur in un contesto di sostanziale marginalità numerica complessiva di fronte alle altre (e cospicue) forze messe in campo da parte dell’Impero e dei suoi altri Stati satellite e alleati. Per quanto riguarda la campagna di conquista della Catalogna è stato invece possibile appurare il fondamentale contributo dato dal contingente italiano, sotto i punti di vista operazionale e tattico, per la buona riuscita dell’invasione; questo primariamente grazie alle elevate caratteristiche generali mostrate dallo stesso, ma anche per peculiarità disciplinari e organizzative che resero i corpi italiani adatti a operazioni particolarmente aggressive.
The Italian Army and the Conquest of Catalonia (1808-1811) A Study of Military Effectiveness in Napoleonic Europe Academic Fields and Disciplines SPS/03 – M-STO/02 The research has the purpose of reconstruct and evaluate the military effectiveness of the Italian Army existed under the reign of Napoleon I. Firstly through a statistic and strategic analysis of the development, and the following deployment, of the military institution of the Kingdom of Italy in the years of its existence (1805-14). Afterwards, a particularly significant case study was chosen, as the campaign of Catalonia (1808-11, in the context of the Peninsular War), in order to assess the operational and tactical contribution of the regiments sent by the Government of Milan and their integration in the overall military apparatus of the First Empire. The thesis wanted to respond to the lack of studies on the Italian army’s behavior in war and, at the same time, to introduce the methodology of the Military Effectiveness Studies (of British and American origin and, by now, enriched by a thirty-year old tradition) in the Italian historiography. The research is primarily based, besides the numerous memoirs of the Italian and French veterans, on the archive documentation of the Secrétairerie d’état impériale (Archives Nationales of Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris), of the French Ministère de la Guerre (Service historique de la Défence, of Vincennes, Paris) and of the Italian Ministero della Guerra (Archivio di Stato di Milano). About the results, it has been verified how the Italian army has become a flexible and suitable instrument for Bonaparte, albeit in a context of substantial overall numerical marginality in comparison to the heterogeneous forces available to the Empire and its others satellites and allied states. Regarding the campaign of Catalonia, instead, it was possible to ascertain the fundamental contribution of the Italian regiments, in an operational and tactical perspective, for the success of the invasion. This was primarily due to the excellent general characteristics shown by the expeditionary force, but also to disciplinary and organizational peculiarities that have made the Italian corps suitable for particularly aggressive operations.

Ce mémoire propose une analyse du rôle épistémologique des problèmes scientifiques complexes. En partant du holisme épistémologique hérité des positions philosophiques de Pierre Duhem et de Willard Van Orman Quine, et de la thèse voulant que la pratique scientifique s’effectue toujours à partir d’un champ théorique et conceptuel reconnu, nous développons un modèle de gestion qui propose aux chercheurs l’adoption d’une attitude pragmatique pour réagir aux problèmes complexes. Nous expliquons dans cette recherche que ces problèmes affectent l’applicabilité des théories et concepts qui forment les connaissances scientifiques. Pour les résoudre, il faut initier des recherches qui suivront les étapes d’un processus pragmatique permettant d’évaluer progressivement la situation et d’en acquérir une meilleure compréhension. Durant cette période, les conséquences négatives du problème complexe sont tolérées afin d’assurer le maintien des activités scientifiques, qu’elles visent directement ou non l’atteinte d’une solution. La thèse défendue dans cette étude veut que la gestion des problèmes complexes qu’elle propose se conclut par l’élaboration rationnelle, encadrée par des décisions pragmatiques et une conjoncture favorable, d’une hypothèse ad hoc offrant une solution au problème. Si la communauté scientifique reconnait la valeur épistémologique de cette hypothèse, elle sera intégrée au champ théorique et conceptuel ce qui aura pour effet d’enrichir les connaissances scientifiques et de redonner à la science son statut « normal ».
This thesis proposes an analysis of the epistemological role of complex scientific problems. Starting from the epistemological holism inherited from the philosophical positions of Pierre Duhem and Willard Van Orman Quine, and from the thesis that scientific practice is always based on a recognized theoretical and conceptual field, we develop a management model that proposes that researchers adopt a pragmatic attitude to react to complex problems. We explain in this research that these problems affect the applicability of theories and concepts that form scientific knowledge. To solve them, we must initiate research that will follow the steps of a pragmatic process to progressively assess the situation and gain a better understanding. During this period, the negative consequences of the complex problem are tolerated in order to ensure the maintenance of the scientific activities that it directly targets, or not, the achievement of a solution. The thesis defended in this study is that the management of the complex problems that it proposes is concluded by the rational elaboration, framed by pragmatic decisions and a favorable conjuncture, of an ad hoc hypothesis offering a solution to the problem. If the scientific community recognizes the epistemological value of this hypothesis, it will be integrated into the theoretical and conceptual field which will have the effect of enriching scientific knowledge and giving back to science its "normal" status.