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Journal articles on the topic 'Dualism'
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Balogun, Babalola Joseph, and Richard Taye Oyelakin. "An African Perspective on the Nature of Mind: Reflections on Yoruba Contextual Dualism." Culture and Dialogue 10, no. 2 (November 29, 2022): 102–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24683949-12340116.
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Abstract The problem of the nature of mind has lingered for a long time. Generated by the question of whether the mind is an independently existing entity or merely an aspect of bodily events and processes, the problem of the nature of mind has divided Western philosophers into two opposing camps, namely dualism and physicalism. Contemporary discourse of the nature of minds, within the Western philosophical tradition, continues to privilege physicalism over dualism, because it avoids the theoretical impasse engendered by the dualist inability to account for how two radically different entities manage to interact with each other. Although physicalism avoids the dualist pitfalls, it, however, encounters the problem of plausibly accounting for the possibility of conscious experience without commitment to the dualist ontology of a realm different from the body. In this article, we provide an African (Yoruba) perspective to the question of the nature of mind as an alternative to the Western perspective represented by dualist and physicalist theories. We develop a variant of dualism called “contextual dualism,” which accepts the dualist basic tenet of the duality of body and mind but diverges from it by permitting that some physical organs of the body also function in the capacity of the mind. Using ethnological analysis and the Yoruba linguistic hermeneutics as theoretical frameworks, the paper argues that the difference between when a physical organ functions as body and when it functions as mind is revealed in Yoruba language through their contexts of use. The paper concludes that contextual dualism drives a reconciliatory wedge between mainstream dualism and physicalism.
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Berent, Iris, and Alexzander Sansiveri. "Davinci the Dualist: The Mind–Body Divide in Large Language Models and in Human Learners." Open Mind 8 (2024): 84–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/opmi_a_00120.
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Abstract A large literature suggests that people are intuitive Dualists—they consider the mind ethereal, distinct from the body. Furthermore, Dualism emerges, in part, via learning (e.g., Barlev & Shtulman, 2021). Human learners, however, are also endowed with innate systems of core knowledge, and recent results suggest that core knowledge begets Dualism (Berent, 2023a; Berent et al., 2022). The resulting question, then, is whether the acquisition of Dualism requires core knowledge, or whether Dualism is learnable from experience alone, via domain-general mechanism. Since human learners are equipped with both systems, the evidence from humans cannot decide this question. Accordingly, here, we probe for a mind–body divide in Davinci—a large language model (LLM) that is devoid of core knowledge. We show that Davinci still leans towards Dualism, and that this bias increases systematically with the learner’s inductive potential. Thus, davinci (which forms part of the GPT-3 suite) exhibits mild Dualist tendencies, whereas its descendent, text-davinci-003 (a GPT-3.5 model), shows a stronger bias. It selectively considers thoughts (epistemic states) as disembodied—as unlikely to show up in the body (in the brain). Unlike humans, GPT 3.5 categorically rejected the persistence of the psyche after death. Still, when probed about life, GPT 3.5 showed robust Dualist tendencies. These results demonstrate that the mind–body divide is partly learnable from experience. While results from LLMs cannot fully determine how humans acquire Dualism, they do place a higher burden of proof on nativist theories that trace Dualism to innate core cognition (Berent, 2023a; Berent et al., 2022).
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Seager, William. "Concessionary Dualism and Physicalism." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67 (July 7, 2010): 217–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246110000147.
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AbstractModern physicalists frequently offer the generous concession that although dualism is false, it is not a metaphysical impossibility. And it appears that the proper formulation of physicalism allows for this concessionary position. It would be expected that dualists also could accept that while physicalism is false, it too is a metaphysical possibility. I will argue that a careful analysis of physicalism and dualism shows that in fact these concessionary positions cannot be maintained. In particular, the nature of the metaphysical determination relation which holds between matter and mind on both physicalist and dualist views precludes either from allowing that the other is a metaphysical possibility.
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Ispriyarso, Budi. "Penyatuan Pembinaan Pengadilan Pajak." Administrative Law and Governance Journal 2, no. 4 (November 4, 2019): 650–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/alj.v2i4.650-660.
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AbstractTax Courts in Indonesia based on Law Number 14 of 2002 concerning Tax Courts. Tax Court contains many weaknesses. One of its weaknesses is the dualism of building the Tax Court, namely the Ministry of Finance and the Supreme Court. This dualism of formation must be eliminated. The problem is how to eliminate the dualism of coaching. The dualism of coaching the Tax Court can be removed by uniting the coaching of the Tax Court in both the technical coaching of the judiciary and the coaching of the organization, administration, and finance under the Supreme Court. The dualism provisions of coaching the tax court in the Tax Court Law must be immediately amended. Keywords: Coaching Dualism, Tax Court, Integration. AbstrakPengadilan Pajak di Indonesia berdasarkan Undang-undang Nomor 14 Tahun 2002 tentang Pengadilan Pajak. Pengadilan Pajak, banyak mengandung kelemahan. Salah satu kelemahannya adalah adanya dualisme pembinaan Pengadilan Pajak, yaitu oleh Kementerian Keuangan dan Mahkamah Agung. Dualisme pembinaan ini harus dihilangkan. Permasahannya adalah bagaimana cara menghilangkan dualisme pembinaan tersebut. Dualisme pembinaan Pengadilan Pajak, dapat dihilangkan dengan cara menyatukan pembinaan Pengadilan Pajak baik pembinaan teknis peradilan maupun pembinaan organisasi, administrasi dan keuangan di bawah Mahkamah Agung. Ketentuan dualisme pembinaan pengadilan pajak dalam UU Pengadilan Pajak harus segera diubah. Kata Kunci : Dualisme Pembinaan, Pengadilan Pajak, Penyatuan.
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Gillespie, Susan D., Rudolf van Zantwijk, Rob de Ridder, and Edwin Braakhuis. "Mesoamerican Dualism/Dualismo Mesoamericano." Ethnohistory 39, no. 1 (1992): 83. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/482575.
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Deutscher, Max. "Simulacra, Enactment and Feeling." Philosophy 63, no. 246 (October 1988): 515–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100043837.
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The general context of this writing is that of finding exits both from dualism and from reductive physicalism. Dualism—the attitude of seeing and taking things according to a fixed absolute distinction, with mind as invisible, conscious ‘containing’ the thought, feeling and sensation ‘hidden’ by body. Reductive physicalism—the attempt to grasp and be satisfied with body as left over by dualism's rape of its mentality, dualism's refusal to recognize the distinctiveness of point of view, as requiring a bodily mentality. Physicalism finally supplants an ‘inner life’ within the bodily vacancy after all, as in traditional dualist image, but now understands that ‘inner’, ‘conscious’ life in the terms pertaining to processes in the brain, rather than as deeds, passions, thoughts, reasoning as within the general ‘imaginary’ of our several minds.
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Aaron, David. "Reconsidering Dualism: The Caribbean Court of Justice and the Growing Influence of Unincorporated Treaties in Domestic Law." Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 6, no. 2 (2007): 233–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156918507x217594.
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AbstractIn dualist states, international and domestic legal commitments have traditionally existed on entirely separate planes. Despite the evolution of international legal norms since the end of the Second World War, courts in dualist states have continually opposed using international law to interpret domestic legislation. The author suggests that the traditional dualist view, in which international treaty commitments have no domestic effect until incorporated through the dualist state's domestic legislative process, is weakening.This paper begins with an overview of the monist-dualist distinction in international law and explains dualism's approach to the relationship between domestic and international law. The next section of the paper explores traditional dualist jurisprudence on the role of unincorporated treaties in domestic law and explains why judges have clung to a rigid application of dualism. The weakening of this inflexible approach is then examined, culminating in an analysis of the pivotal recent judgment of the Caribbean Court of Justice in Boyce. This paper concludes that dualism is waning, particularly in cases where domestic law falls short of international human rights standards, as courts demonstrate an increased willingness to use unincorporated treaties as interpretive aids when construing and applying domestic law.
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Nathan, N. M. L. "Substance Dualism Fortified." Philosophy 86, no. 2 (March 25, 2011): 201–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819111000039.
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You have a body, but you are a soul or self. Without your body, you could still exist. Your body could be and perhaps is outlasted by the immaterial substance which is your soul or self. Thus the substance dualist. Most substance dualists are Cartesians. The self, they suppose, is essentially conscious: it cannot exist unless it thinks or wills or has experiences. In this paper I sketch out a different form of substance dualism. I suggest that it is not consciousness but another immaterial feature which is essential to the self, a feature in one way analogous to a non-dispositional taste. Each self has moreover a different feature of this general kind. If this is right then simple and straightforward answers are available to some questions which prove troublesome to the Cartesian, consciousness-requiring type of substance dualist. I mean the questions, How can the self exist in dreamless sleep?, What distinguishes two simultaneously existing selves, and What makes a self the same self as a self which exists at some other time?
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Aprianto, Ary. "Relevansi Monisme dan Dualisme Bagi Pemberlakuan Perjanjian Internasional di Indonesia." Jurnal Konstitusi 19, no. 3 (August 30, 2022): 580. http://dx.doi.org/10.31078/jk1934.
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The application of treaty is still influenced by different views on the approach chosen by Indonesia, whether monism or dualism. By using normative method, this study questions the relevance of monism-incorporation and dualism-transformation approaches in determining the application of treaty. Two key aspects will be reviewed, namely parliamentary approval and the drafting of national regulations to implement treaty. It concludes that the dichotomy of monism and dualism has various limitations, and is irrelevant for determining the application of treaty. Parliamentary approval is required for treaty application, both in monist and dualist countries. Several dualist countries have even sought parliamentary approval before ratification can take place. The formulation of national regulations is common in monist and dualist countries. Not to fulfill theoretical demands in line with the monism and dualism approaches, but to ensure harmonization and the ability of state to carry out its obligations.
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Murray, Samuel, Elise Murray, and Thomas Nadelhoffer. "Piercing the Smoke Screen: Dualism, Free Will, and Christianity." Journal of Cognition and Culture 21, no. 1-2 (June 1, 2021): 94–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685373-12340098.
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Abstract Research on the folk psychology of free will suggests that people believe free will is incompatible with determinism and that human decision-making cannot be exhaustively characterized by physical processes. Some suggest that certain elements of Western cultural history, especially Christianity, have helped to entrench these beliefs in the folk conceptual economy. Thus, on the basis of this explanation, one should expect to find three things: (1) a significant correlation between belief in dualism and belief in free will, (2) that people with predominantly incompatibilist commitments are likely to exhibit stronger dualist beliefs than people with predominantly compatibilist commitments, and (3) people who self-identify as Christians are more likely to be dualists and incompatibilists than people who do not self-identify as Christians. We present the results of two studies (n = 378) that challenge two of these expectations. While we do find a significant correlation between belief in dualism and belief in free will, we found no significant difference in dualist tendencies between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Moreover, we found that self-identifying as Christian did not significantly predict preference for a particular metaphysical conception of free will. This calls into question assumptions about the relationship between beliefs about free will, dualism, and Christianity.
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Chlup, Radek. "Plutarch's Dualism and the Delphic Cult." Phronesis 45, no. 2 (2000): 138–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852800510153.
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AbstractThe article interprets Plutarch's dualism in the light of the Apollo-Dionysus opposition as presented in De E 388e-389c, arguing that Plutarch is no dualist in the strict sense of the word. A comparison of De E 393f-394a with De Iside 369b-d shows that it is only in the sublunary realm of Nature that Plutarch assumes a duality of two distinct Powers; at the higher levels of reality the divine is unified and harmonious. If Plutarch fails to emphasize this point clearly enough, it is because his primary philosophical interests were ethical, not metaphysical.
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McKay, Noah. "Problems with the “Problems” with Psychophysical Causation." Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal 12 (2019): 32–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/stance2019123.
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In this essay, I defend a mind-body dualism, according to which human minds are immaterial substances that exercise non-redundant causal powers over bodies, against the notorious problem of psychophysical causation. I explicate and reply to three formulations of the problem: (i) the claim that, on dualism, psychophysical causation is inconsistent with physical causal closure, (ii) the claim that psychophysical causation on the dualist view is intolerably mysterious, and (iii) Jaegwon Kim’s claim that dualism fails to account for causal pairings. Ultimately, I conclude that these objections fail and that dualist interactionism is no more problematic or mysterious than physical causation.
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McKay, Noah. "Problems with the "Problems" with Psychophysical Causation." Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal 12, no. 1 (September 25, 2019): 32–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.33043/s.12.1.32-43.
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In this essay, I defend a mind-body dualism, according to which human minds are immaterial substances that exercise non-redundant causal powers over bodies, against the notorious problem of psychophysical causation. I explicate and reply to three formulations of the problem: (i) the claim that, on dualism, psychophysical causation is inconsistent with physical causal closure, (ii) the claim that psychophysical causation on the dualist view is intolerably mysterious, and (iii) Jaegwon Kim’s claim that dualism fails to account for causal pairings. Ultimately, I conclude that these objections fail and that dualist interactionism is no more problematic or mysterious than physical causation.
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Kebede, Messay. "Beyond Dualism and Monism: Bergson's Slanted Being." Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 24, no. 2 (December 21, 2016): 106–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2016.773.
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There is an old but still unresolved debate pertaining to the question of Bergsonian monism or dualism. Scholars who think that Bergson is ultimately monist clash with those who claim that he has consistently maintained a dualist position. Others speak of contradiction and point out his failure to reconcile dualism with monism. What feeds on the debate is Bergson’s undeniable change of direction: while his first book is flagrantly dualist, his second book takes a sharp turn toward monism. Without denying the intricacy generated by the change of direction, this paper argues that the originality of his position is overlooked every time that the problem is presented in terms of Bergson being dualist or monist. Notably, it contends that Bergson’s third book, Creative Evolution, overcomes both dualism and monism by removing their contradiction through a durational or slanted approach to Being.
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Moyer, Jeanna. "Why Kant and Ecofeminism Don't Mix." Hypatia 16, no. 3 (2001): 79–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2001.tb00925.x.
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This paper consists of two sections. In section one, I explore Val Plumwood's description of the features of normative dualism, and briefly discuss how these features are manifest in Immanuel Kant's view of nature. In section two, I evaluate the claims of Holly L. Wilson, who argues that Kant is not a normative dualist. Against Wilson, I will argue that Kant maintains normative dualisms between humans/nature, humans/animals, humans I culture, and men/women. As such, Kant's philosophy is antithetical to the aims of ecofeminism, which seeks to expose and dismantle such dualistic thinking.
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Rodrigues, José Gusmão. "There are no good objections to substance dualism." Philosophy 89, no. 2 (March 24, 2014): 199–222. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819114000060.
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AbstractThis article aims to review the standard objections to dualism and to argue that either they will fail to convince someone committed to dualism or are flawed on independent grounds. I begin by presenting the taxonomy of metaphysical positions on concrete particulars as they relate to the dispute between materialists and dualists, and in particular substance dualism is defined. In the first section, several kinds of substance dualism are distinguished and the relevant varieties of this kind of dualism are selected. The remaining sections are analyses of the standard objections to substance dualism: It is uninformative, has troubles accounting for soul individuation, causal pairing and interaction, violates laws of physics, is made implausible by the development of neuroscience and it postulates entities beyond necessity. I conclude that none of these objections is successful.
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Oderberg, David S. "HYLEMORPHIC DUALISM." Social Philosophy and Policy 22, no. 2 (June 15, 2005): 70–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052505052040.
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To the extent that dualism is even taken to be a serious option in contemporary discussions of personal identity and the philosophy of mind, it is almost exclusively either Cartesian dualism or property dualism that is considered. The more traditional dualism defended by Aristotelians and Thomists, what I call hylemorphic dualism, has only received scattered attention. In this essay I set out the main lines of the hylemorphic dualist position, with particular reference to personal identity. First I argue that overemphasis of the problem of consciousness has had an unhealthy effect on recent debate, claiming instead that we should emphasize the concept of form. Then I bring in the concept of identity by means of the notion of substantial form. I continue by analyzing the relation between form and matter, defending the traditional theses of prime matter and of the unicity of substantial form. I then argue for the immateriality of the substantial form of the human person, viz. the soul, from an account of the human intellect. From this follows the soul's essential independence of matter. Finally, although the soul is the immaterial bearer of personal identity, that identity is still the identity of an essentially embodied being. I explain how these ideas are to be reconciled.
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Bermúdez, José Luis. "Locke, metaphysical dualism and property dualism1." British Journal for the History of Philosophy 4, no. 2 (September 1996): 223–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608789608570940.
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Olson, Eric T. "The Dualist Project and the Remote-Control Objection." Roczniki Filozoficzne 69, no. 1 (March 18, 2021): 89–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.18290/rf21691-9.
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Substance dualism says that all thinking beings are immaterial. This sits awkwardly with the fact that thinking requires an intact brain. Many dualists say that bodily activity is causally necessary for thinking. But if a material thing can cause thinking, why can’t it think? No argument for dualism, however convincing, answers this question, leaving dualists with more to explain than their opponents.
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Supriyanto, Supriyanto. "HUMAN DUALISM OF ZAKI NAQUIB MAHMUD: Philosophical Arguments of Religious Moderation." Al-Tahrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam 21, no. 2 (November 12, 2021): 415–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.21154/altahrir.v21i2.3328.
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Abstract: Human dualism is a debatable philosophical concept in various schools of philosophy. Through their leading thinkers, Greek philosophy, Western philosophy, and Islamic philosophy have contributed to the debate in the discourse of human dualism. Zaki Naquib Mahmud, an Egyptian rationalist philosopher, opposed the previous philosophers' dichotomous concept of human dualism. This article describes the conceptual correlation of Zaki Naquib Mahmud's dualism with religious moderation. Through a literature review of Zaki Naquib Mahmud's work, the results showed that (1) Zaki tended to reject the dichotomous thought of human dualism; (2) the implication of the rejection was the conceptual distinction between religion, being religious and religious knowledge; and (3) the inclusive awareness of the three concepts could extend a more moderate understanding in strengthening the concept of religious moderation philosophically.الملخص: مازالت الثنائية الفلسفية حول البشرية موضوع نقاش حار لدى المدارس الفلسفية المختلفة. قد ساهمت الفلسفة اليونانية والغربية والاسلامية على ايدي مفكريهم الرائدين اسهامات كبيرة في هذا البحث. قد عارض زكي نجيب محمود ، الفيلسوف العقلاني المصري ، مفهوم الثنائية البشرية الكلاسيكية من الفلاسفة القدماء. يجد هذا المقال العلاقة الفعالة بين ثنائية زكي نجيب محمود ومفهوم الوسطية الدينية. من خلال القراءة لاعمال زكي نجيب محمود نستنتج من هذه الدراسة ما يلي : (1) يميل زكي إلى رفض فكرة الثنائية المقسمة للازدواجية البشرية. (2) يؤدي هذا الرفض من زكي الى التفرقة بين مفهوم الدين والتدين والعلم الديني. (3) ويتولد من الوعي الصحيح بمعاني هذه الثلاثة الاعتدال والتوسط في إدراك المفاهيم الدينية، ويقوي فلسفيًا الوسطية الدينية الاسلامية.Abstrak: Dualisme manusia menjadi konsep filosofis yang terus menjadi bahan perdebatan dalam berbagai aliran filsafat. Filsafat Yunani, Filsafat Barat dan Filsafat Islam turut serta menyumbang perdebatan dan berkontribusi dalam diskursus dualisme manusia melalui para pemikir unggulannya. Zaki Naquib Mahmud, seorang filsuf rasionalis Mesir menentang konsep dualisme manusia yang dikotomis dari para filosof terdahulu. Artikel ini mendeskripsikan korelasi konseptual dualism manusia Zaki Naquib Mahmud dengan moderasi beragama. Melalui kajian kepustakaan terhadap karya Zaki Naquib Mahmud, hasil penelitian ini adalah (1) Zaki cenderung menolak pemikiran dualisme manusia yang dikotomis; (2) implikasi dari penolakan tersebut adalah pembedaan konseptual antara agama, beragama dan ilmu agama; dan (3) kesadaran terhadap pembedaan makna dari ketiga konsep tersebut dapat melahirkan pemahaman yang cenderung moderat karena adanya kesadaran inklusif sehingga memperkuat secara filosofis terkait dengan konsep moderasi beragama.
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Ferreira, Gerrit, and Anel Ferreira-Snyman. "The Incorporation of Public International Law into Municipal Law and Regional Law against the Background of the Dichotomy between Monism and Dualism." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 17, no. 4 (April 11, 2017): 1496. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2014/v17i4a2171.
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Monism and dualism represent two different approaches towards the relationship between public international law and municipal law. While the former views public international law and municipal law as a single legal system, the latter regards these two areas of law as separate and distinct legal systems that exist alongside each other. However, not all legal systems are clearly either monist or dualist. The dichotomy between monism and dualism no longer only concerns the relationship between public international law and municipal law, but also increasingly affects the relationship between public international law and regional law. This contribution discusses the application of the monist and dualist approaches by the South African Constitutional Court in the Glenister case and the European Court of Justice in the Kadi and Hungary cases in order to illustrate the practical application of the dichotomy between monism and dualism in a municipal system and on a regional level.
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Markov, Alexander. "The Content-Making Heavens of Dualism: Review of a New Book by A. Safronov." Philosophy. Journal of the Higher School of Economics V, no. 4 (December 31, 2021): 337–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.17323/2587-8719-2021-4-337-346.
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Prystash, Justin. "“THE GRAND STILL MIRROR OF ETERNITY”: TEMPORAL DUALISM AND SUBJECTIFICATION IN CARLYLE AND DICKENS." Victorian Literature and Culture 38, no. 1 (February 23, 2010): 89–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1060150309990337.
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When Carlyle praises “wondrous Dualism” in Past and Present, he invokes a model for conceptualizing man's role in the world that held widespread, even hegemonic currency in mid-Victorian culture. The centrality of dualist discourse during the mid-Victorian period, thanks in part to Carlyle's translations of German literature and philosophy in the 1830s, cannot be overstated. Carlyle argues that dualism transhistorically frames all human activity: “In wondrous Dualism, then [in the year 1200] as now, lived nations of breathing men; alternating, in all ways, between Light and Dark; between joy and sorrow, between rest and toil” (50; bk. 2, ch. 1). The subject “man” – I use the masculine advisedly – endlessly oscillates between the opposing elements that constitute the universe. This, for Carlyle, is the position of all men. To be heroic, however, one must recognize and negotiate the most wondrous dualism of all, time and eternity: “this Earthly life, and its riches and possessions, and good and evil hap, are not intrinsically a reality at all, but are a shadow of realities eternal, infinite; that this Time-world, as an air-image, fearfully emblematic, plays and flickers in the grand still mirror of Eternity; and man's little Life has Duties that are great, that are alone great, and go up to Heaven and down to Hell” (72; bk. 2, ch. 6). Minor dualisms are subsumed in the opposition between “Time-world” and “Eternity,” and in the “mirror” of the latter, man discerns himself: his ultimate insignificance, yet the greatness of his “Duties.” Carlyle emphasizes that these duties demand the payment of obedience to one's temporal and eternal superiors – heroic ancestors, captains of industry, colonial governors, and God. Only then can heroic men once again be born, like the laboring Hercules or the humble Christ, from temporal-eternal intercourse.
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Dziemianowicz, Wojciech, Jan Goliński, and Jacek Szlachta. "Dualizm ekonomiczny i megatrendy – przyczynek do dyskusji o rozwoju terytorialnym." Prace i Studia Geograficzne 67, no. 1 (July 11, 2022): 75–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.48128/pisg/2022-67.1-05.
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The article deals with the issue of economic dualism in the context of territorial development and is a review of the literature on this subject. The aim of the review article was to systematize the concepts related to the issues of economic dualism and megatrends in the context of their coexistence. An attempt was made to respond to the relationship between dualisms and megatrends occurring in the socio-economic system.
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Yablo, Stephen. "The Real Distinction Between Mind and Body." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 16 (1990): 149–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1990.10717225.
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….it [is] wholly irrational to regard as doubtful matters that are perceived clearly and distinctly by the understanding in its purity, on account of mere prejudices of the senses and hypotheses in which there is an element of the unknown.Descartes, Geometrical Exposition of the MeditationsSubstance dualism, once a main preoccupation of Western metaphysics, has fallen strangely out of view; today’s mental/physical dualisms are dualisms of fact, property, or event. So if someone claims to find a difference between minds and bodies per se, it is not initially clear what he is maintaining. Maybe this is because one no longer recognizes ‘minds’ as entities in their own right, or ‘substances.’ However, selves - the things we refer to by use of ‘I’ - are surely substances, and it does little violence to the intention behind mind/body dualism to interpret it as a dualism of bodies and selves. If the substance dualist’s meaning remains obscure, that is because it can mean several different things to say that selves are not bodies.
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Sosa, David. "Two Forms of Dualism." Dialogue 50, no. 2 (June 2011): 307–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217311000369.
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ABSTRACT: I distinguish two sorts of motivation for dualism. One motivation is driven by the distinctive character of conscious phenomenology. The other is driven by the special character of normativity: Is rationality an even “harder” problem than consciousness? There is no dramatic climax in which I show that these two dualist currents have a common source; in fact, I think they are relatively independent.
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Arnaudo, Elisa. "Pain and dualism: Which dualism?" Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 23, no. 5 (August 4, 2017): 1081–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jep.12804.
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Wee, Cecilia, and Michael Pelczar. "Descartes' Dualism and Contemporary Dualism." Southern Journal of Philosophy 46, no. 1 (March 2008): 145–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2008.tb00073.x.
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Francescotti, Robert. "Property Dualism without Substance Dualism?" Philosophical Papers 30, no. 2 (July 2001): 93–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568640109485079.
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Mackie, Penelope. "Property Dualism and Substance Dualism." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 111, no. 1pt1 (April 2011): 181–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00305.x.
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Czarnecki, Piotr. "If not Bogomilism than What? The Origins of Catharism in the Light of the Sources." Studia Ceranea 11 (December 30, 2021): 51–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/2084-140x.11.03.
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Since the end of the twentieth Century the traditional interpretation of Catharism, assuming it’s Eastern roots and dualist character is the object of a harsh criticism, formulated by the deconstructionist scholars. The moderated version of their new interpretation assumes that dualism didn’t play an important role in Catharism, and that the Cathar “dissidence” was not influenced by the Eastern dualist heresies (especially Bogomilism), but appeared independently in the West. According to the radical version Catharism didn’t exist at all and contemporary scholars should accept a new paradigm – Middle-Ages without Catharism.The aim of this article is to examine the source arguments, which stand behind both interpretations – on one side the arguments concerning the contacts of the Cahars with the Eastern dualists, with special attention paid to the time of their emergence and character of these relations, and on the other the arguments concerning Cathar dualist doctrines, which according to the deconstructionists were constructed arbitrarily by the Catholic polemists, basing on the ancient anti-heretical works, especially anti-Manichaean writings of St. Augustine. The article will try to find the answer to the question if the Cathar doctrines described in the Catholic sources are indeed so closely similar to the Manichaean teachings known from St. Augustine and at the same time so different from the Bogomil dualism. The analysis of the sources will show if the new interpretation is based on the arguments that are strong enough to overthrow the traditional one and if it the theory assuming lack of Bogomil influence can be considered as a serious alternative.
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Hornsby, Jennifer. "Dualism in Action." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43 (March 1998): 377–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100004446.
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We know what one dualist account of human action looks like, because Descartes gave us one. I want to explore the extent ot which presnet-day accounts of physical action are vulnerable to the charges that may be made against Descartes's dualist account. I once put forward an account of human action, and I have always maintained that my view about the basic shape of a correct ‘theory of aciton’ can be combined with a thoroughgoing opposition to dualism. But the possibility of the combination has been doubted and it will remain doubtful until we have a better understanding of what makes an account objectionably dualistic. In this paper, I hope to deflect some of the criticims aimed what I shall call my account, and to show that when they are turned onto their proper path their actual target is some physicalist accounts.
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Sylla, Bernhard. "Anti-dualism in the discourse on the Anthropocene." Ethics, Politics & Society 3 (May 21, 2018): 171–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.21814/eps.3.1.107.
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18 years after its introduction into scientific vocabulary, a vast discourse on the Anthropocene has settled in very heterogeneous scientific areas, from Biology and Geology to the Arts and Humanities, including Philosophy itself. Despite its multidisciplinarity, there seems to be a common presupposition in this discourse that often becomes a demand: to abandon a false dualism allegedly responsible for the lack of answers to the challenges that the new anthropocenic age poses to us. Anti-dualism seems to be a common denominator, widely shared by the most diverse authors of the Anthropocene discourse, but what is meant by ‘dualism’ seems extremely heterogeneous to me, embracing ontological, epistemological, and political dimensions, and sometimes mixing them. Whatever the combated dualism – nature and culture, social system and terrestrial system, Man and Earth, biosphere and noosphere, subject and object, observer and observed, natural sciences and human sciences, etc. – the golden key to unravelling and developing a different way of thinking and being capable of facing the environmental challenges of the present would be by overcoming these dualisms, that is, in a perspective that can account for the intersection and overlap of the hitherto opposed elements and which presupposes, in the end, their assimilation. How both imbrication and assimilation can or should be thought of, however, can vary greatly from one author to another. Based on these assumptions, I will focus on two criticisms of anti-dualism put forward by Andrew Feenberg and Gernot Böhme. Both critics chose the theories of Haraway and Latour – authors who are today among the most cited philosophers of the Anthropocene – as distinct exponents of anti-dualism. I will argue that criticism of anti-dualism is pertinent and necessary, but that the alternatives proposed by Feenberg and Böhme are not convincing.
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Vicente, Agustín, and Adrián Sampedro León. "La perspectiva de la primera persona y el naturalismo." Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica 1, no. 1 (November 28, 2014): 161. http://dx.doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.20141975.
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Resumen En el presente artículo examinamos diversas respuestas a la cuestión de qué somos, fijándonos sobre todo en las propuestas reduccionistas y eliminativistas sobre las personas o los yoes. Concluimos que, a día de hoy, parece más razonable el dualismo que el naturalismo, si por tal cosa entendemos la reducción o eliminación de entidades psicológicas. Palabras clave: Persona, yo, naturalismo, dualismo, relación de constitución, experiencia y su unidad. Abstract In this paper we examine different answers to the question of what we are, focusing in particular on eliminative and reductivist proposals about persons or selves. We conclude that, as of today, dualism seems more reasonable than naturalism, if by naturalism we understand the thesis that psychological entities can be reduced or eliminated. Keywords: Person, self, naturalism, dualism, the constitution relation, experience and its unity.
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Farhann, Mariwan Husen, and Awat Nadir Abdulkarim. "Mystic dualism in the poetry of Mahwi." Journal of University of Raparin 10, no. 2 (June 29, 2023): 166–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.26750/vol(10).no(2).paper7.
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Dualism is the difference between the contradictions. Dualism is one of the prominent characteristics of Mahwi's mystic poems. This comes from the experience and the deep outcomes of the psycho journey of this Arif within materialism to reach the truth. In the consequence of evaluating the basics of dualism and paradox of Mahwi, the reader will achieve to the practical mystic's truth of this arif. The aim of the study is reaching the real results concern to the prove of mystic's idea and demonstrating the highest level of mystic's school of Mahwi and also focusing on the knowledge and his worldview of Mahwi in term of mystic's dualism. Then, illustrating the capability and highest level of textual language of Mahwi's poems in the dimension of art view of poetical texts in general and dualistic aesthetic in particular that he produced in his poems. The interesting point which is even a question for the researchers is that what are the prominent used dualisms in Mahwis' poems? The used method of this research is (descriptive- analysis) which is based on the used data of the research
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Nesic, Janko. "Dualism, mental explanations and explanatory exclusion." Theoria, Beograd 56, no. 1 (2013): 19–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1301017n.
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Kim?s principle of explanatory exclusion (EE) generates the problem of mental explanation for dualism. Gibb argues that Kim?s principle is metaphysically implausible, but shows that a weaker principle EE* generates a similar problem for interactive dualism. In this paper I examine a possible dualistic response to arguments from EE and EE*. It is shown that both arguments from EE and EE* rest on the premises of the argument from overdetermination - causal exclusion and causal closure. Problem of explanatory exclusion can be reduced to the problem of causal overdetermination. I will show how an interactive dualist can make a plausible response to the argument from EE by rejecting the argument from causal overdetermination.
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Sonenshein, Scott. "Routines and Creativity: From Dualism to Duality." Organization Science 27, no. 3 (June 2016): 739–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2016.1044.
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Edgar, Brian. "Biblical Anthropology and the Intermediate State: Part II." Evangelical Quarterly 74, no. 2 (April 16, 2002): 109–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/27725472-07402002.
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While there has always been a tradition of theoanthropological dualism involving a disembodied, intermediate state, this tradition is neither as widespread nor as theologically central as it is often claimed. While there is clearly evidence for the intermediate state throughout the history of the church its significance has been over-stated and it has continued as a possibility primarily because it has appeared to be a philosophically logical necessity. In Part II of this article this process of deduction is illustrated with examples from medieval and modern proponents of the intermediate state. In the modern era dualism has been challenged by monistic theoanthropologies. The contrast of monist and dualist anthropologies has been accentuated because the modern paradigm, under the influence of Cartesianism, has exaggerated the dualism which has existed and produced an even more radical dichotomy of body and soul. An examination of Cooper’s recent double defence of the intermediate state and anthropological dualism shows that his concepts are firmly bound to Newtonian notions of time and eternity. Finally, it is argued that any dualist eschatological anthropology and the intermediate state also has difficulties establishing satisfactory concepts of the nature of the radical nature of death, the totality of the resurrection and the value and place of the body in human life. It is argued that it is preferable to view post-mortem life from a non-temporal perspective with the person understood as entering ‘immediately’ into eternal life, complete and whole, with every dimension of their being resurrected and transformed. As such, the believer never exists as a divided entity or a bodiless soul.
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Point, Christophe. "La Philosophie pour enfants : une piste pour réconcilier enseignement disciplinaire et vie scolaire ?" Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia 66, no. 1 (May 30, 2021): 163–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2021.1.08.
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"Philosophy for Children: a Way to Reconcile Disciplinary Teaching and School Life? Drawing mainly on John Dewey's writings, this contribution aims to extend the dualism of a traditional conception of education at the epistemological, pedagogical and organizational levels. This conception was already criticised by this author at the beginning of the 20th century and still remains widely present today among the school community. Through this approach, we demonstrate that the dualist approach is as many obstacles to be removed in the process both to improve and rebuild a better education. The hypothesis defended here consists to demonstrate how philosophy for children, strengthened by its pragmatist heritage, can challenge these dualisms and thereby jeopardize the traditional conception of education. Keywords: John Dewey, philosophy of education, co-curriculum, school life, philosophy for children "
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Paulina Filas-Zając and Jacek Kwiatkowski. "The cyclical nature of dualistic trends in urban design. Historical analysis of the creative attitudes of selected masters over the centuries." Acta Scientiarum Polonorum. Architectura 23 (March 21, 2024): 94–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.22630/aspa.2024.23.7.
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In this article, the authors raise issues of dualistic solutions in urban design and city development. It should be noted at the outset that the very concept of duality is not obvious and is inherently ambiguous. The numerous definitions that exist are very general. We can distinguish several disciplines and scientific areas where the concept of dualism occurs or can appear. At the same time, the definition of each of these phenomena will be different, depending on the area in which it occurs. Hence, the authors have made a far-reaching reduction in the types of dualisms, narrowing the area of research to the creative attitudes of urban planners, philosophers of space, artists, and architects in historical terms. The aim of the search for dual features in spatial forms is to find the key to a better understanding of the laws governing urban planning and urbanisation processes. Verification of opposites and dual characteristics takes place on three levels: community, form, and function. The urban conditions that occur contribute to the creation of new qualities and new spatial forms, which help redefine the city and its development. The paper is based on the thesis that dualism is a permanent feature of spatial solutions (a recurring feature) across the spectrum of history.
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Rehman, Rashad. "Disintegrating Particles, Non-Local Causation and Category Mistakes: What do Conservation Laws have to do with Dualism?" Conatus 2, no. 2 (March 16, 2018): 63. http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/conatus.15963.
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The single most influential and widely accepted objection against any form of dualism, the belief that human beings are both body and soul, is the objection that dualism violates conservation laws in physics. The conservation laws objection against dualism posits that body and soul interaction is at best mysterious, and at worst impossible. While this objection has been both influential from the time of its initial formulation until present, this paper occupies itself with arguing that this objection is a fleeting one, and has successful answers from both scientific and philosophical perspectives. It is to this end that I provide three groups of responses to the conservation laws objection. First, I outline responses which take the ‘laws of nature’ as the proper entry point into the discussion. Secondly, I provide an analysis of those who argue that contemporary quantum physical data requires that the objection itself involves scientifically unjustified premises. Finally, I layout a philosophically oriented answer which argues that the objection is linguistically problematic since its demands on the dualist are categorically fallacious. From these groups of answers, I conclude that while the conservation laws objection has been arguably the most widely accepted objection against dualism, the objection is without philosophical justification.
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Taliaferro, Charles. "Dualism and the Problem of Individuation." Religious Studies 22, no. 2 (June 1986): 263–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500018254.
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H. D. Lewis once remarked he did not think ‘any case for immortality can get off the ground if we fail to make a case for dualism’. Lewis vigorously defended both mind body dualism, the theory that minds (or persons) are nonphysical, spatially unextended things in causal interaction with physical, spatially extended things, as well as the conceivability of an after life. Lewis defended the intelligibility of supposing distinct, individual persons continue existing after bodily death, possibly even after all physical objects pass out of existence. Prominent philosophers such as Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Locke, Liebniz, and Reid have subscribed to both the truth of dualism and belief in continued personal existence after bodily death. Descartes' work might even be construed as reversing the order of Lewis' dictum. For Descartes, the case for dualism ‘gets off the ground’ because of the conceivability of an afterlife. Briefly put, Descartes sought to establish that a person (or mind) is distinct from physical objects on the basis of it being metaphysically possible for a person to exist without his or her body, indeed without there being any physical objects whatever. If A can exist without B, then A is not identical with B. Thus, if it is possible for God to bring it about that I exist and there be no physical objects, I am not a physical object. The purpose of this article is not to develop a case for dualism, nor to query whether the case for immortality can get off the ground assuming nondualist theories of the self. I hope instead to assess a popular objection to dualism, and consequently to a dualist conception of the afterlife, which could be termed the problem of individuation.
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Melendez, David. "Missionaries and Borderlands: «The Mission Play» and Missionary Practices in Alta California." Pamiętnik Teatralny 70, no. 4 (December 20, 2021): 61–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.36744/pt.982.
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This essay takes up a core question of this issue of Pamiętnik Teatralny: how are we to think about historiography beyond a dualism, settled in time and reflective of the status quo? With respect to the California missions, historical treatments of colonization revolve around a dualism shaped by moral dimensions of the missionary enterprise—did the missions help California Indians or harm them? Theatrical representations, like the wildly successful early twentieth century pageant drama, The Mission Play, staged a version of mission history that argued for the former. As a representation of the mission past, the play conflated missions, as institutions, with the moral character of missionaries, thus edifying a fantasy and entrenching the dualism. However, attention to missionary practices, like keeping time using the mission bell, reveal how the missions were sites where indigenous and colonial realities were in constant conflict. Through practices, relations between missionaries and indios produced a space that was neither strictly colonial nor indigenous, and yet both—a borderland. As a mode of spatial dialectics, borderlands thinking can unsettle the duality underlying representations of the mission past to question how that dualism has come into being.
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Shinall, Myrick C., and Christopher M. Hallum. "The Betrayal of the Unreliable Narrator: Deconstruction, Dualism, and the “Other Disciple” of John 18:15–16." Biblical Interpretation 24, no. 3 (July 19, 2016): 400–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685152-00243p06.
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One of the most troubling aspects of the Gospel of John is its tendency to create rigid dualisms between insiders and outsiders. This article uses the technique of deconstruction to undermine John’s characterization of the ultimate outsider: Judas. John inadvertently gives the reader the freedom to identify the anonymous figure of the other disciple who lets Peter into the high priest’s courtyard as Judas. Such identification leads to a deconstructive reading of the Gospel of John in which dualism collapses. With its ambiguities and aporias, the Gospel of John allows for the redemption of Judas when read deconstructively. The instability John’s dualism calls into question the validity of any strict binary that labels people as insiders or outsiders.
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Asrori, Asrori. "Kajian Ma'anil Hadits Tentang Hukuman Mati Bagi Orang Murtad." Hikmah: Journal of Islamic Studies 14, no. 2 (November 25, 2018): 160. http://dx.doi.org/10.47466/hikmah.v14i2.111.
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Discourse on the law of apostasy still leaves a debate. The text of
the hadith explicitly states the execution of death for those who
migrate from Islam, man baddal dīnahu faqtulūh. On the other
hand the Qur’an gived a signal that there is no compulsion in
Islam lā ikrāha fi al-Dīn. Humans have a prerogative to decide
their choice without any intervention of other authorities. The
dualism of the understanding of Islamic law resulting from these
two contradictory above propositions requires further discussion
in order to reveal the law given to apostates. This qualitative study
attempts to expose the opinions of ulama on execution of death
for apostates as well as attempts to compromise the dualism of
understanding of religious texts above.
Keywords: apostasy, dualism of Islamic law, Hadith
Vol. XIV, No. 2, 2018 ~ 161
Abstrak
Diskursus tentang hukum pindah agama (murtad) masih
menyisakan perdebatan. Teks hadis secara tegas menyatakan
eksekusi mati bagi mereka yang migrasi dari islam, man baddal
dīnahu faqtulūh. Disisi lain al-Qur’an memberikan isyarat,
bahwa tidak ada paksaan dalam islam lā ikrāha fi al-Dīn. Manusia
memiliki hak prerogatif untuk menentukan pilihannya tanpa ada
intervensi otoritas lain. Dualisme pemahaman hukum islam yang
dihasilkan dari kedua dalil yang nampak kontradiktif diatas perlu
adanya pembahasan lebih mendalam guna mengungkap hukum
yang diberikan bagi orang murtad. Penelitian kualitatif ini
mencoba untuk memaparkan pendapat ulama tentang hukuman
mati bagi orang murtad serta usaha untuk mengkomprokikan
dualisme pemahaman teks keagamaan di atas.
Kata Kunci: Murtad, Dualisme Hukum Islam, Hadis
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Szwajgier, Krzysztof. "Arche i arte. Prymarny dualizm z ducha muzyki." Principia 66 (2019): 187–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.4467/20843887pi.19.007.11640.
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The arche–arte dualism (concrete–abstract) is fundamental and basic, due to its universality and comprehensive generative function. This duality characterizes our actions in every dimension, and is thus necessarily involved in cognitive and creative acts. The “arteic” includes the categories of consciousness, consideration, calculation, ordering, knowledge, intellect, and artificiality. On the other hand, the “archeic” refers to that which is, in us, subconscious, eternal, primordial, innate, instinctive, and natural. When this basic duality is posited at the outset, it furnishes an analytical‑interpretative‑synthesizing tool that can be applied to diverse facts. The omnipresence and explanatory potential of the arche‑arte dualism are illustrated through musical examples. The dual nature of sound is thereby revealed to be a structural model for the subconscious sensations that music evokes in us.
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de Vries, Marc J. "DUALITY OR DUALISM? A REPLY TO JOHAN STELLINGWERFF." Philosophia Reformata 70, no. 1 (December 2, 2005): 64–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22116117-90000342.
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In Philosophia Reformata, Vol. 69, No. 1, Johan Stellingwerff published a challenging article1 on the need to rethink the philosophy of technology in reformational philosophy. Stellingwerff is not only critical about the work done by Van Riessen and Schuurman, but he also criticizes the Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts program at the Delft University of Technology.2 In this reply I want to take up particularly some of the points of criticism against the latter and see if they can be upheld when taking a closer look at what has been published in this program so far. Although the article by Stellingwerff is in Dutch, I have decided to write my reply in English to enable a wider audience to take part in the debate.
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Farjoun, Moshe. "Beyond Dualism: Stability and Change As a Duality." Academy of Management Review 35, no. 2 (April 2010): 202–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amr.35.2.zok202.
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FARJOUN, MOSHE. "BEYOND DUALISM: STABILITY AND CHANGE AS A DUALITY." Academy of Management Review 35, no. 2 (April 1, 2010): 202–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amr.2010.48463331.
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Jackson, William A. "Dualism, duality and the complexity of economic institutions." International Journal of Social Economics 26, no. 4 (April 1999): 545–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03068299910215997.
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