Journal articles: 'Donald Davidson'

1

Hanks, Peter. "Donald Davidson." International Philosophical Quarterly 46, no. 2 (2006): 245–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq200646210.

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Callaway, H. G., and Simon Evnine. "Donald Davidson." Philosophical Quarterly 43, no. 173 (October 1993): 555. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2220008.

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Delaney, C. F. "Donald Davidson." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 66, no. 4 (1992): 510–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq199266412.

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4

LEPORE, ERNEST, and KIRK LUDWIG. "Donald Davidson." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28, no. 1 (September 2004): 309–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.2004.00098.x.

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5

Goldberg, Nathaniel. "The Principle of Charity." Dialogue 43, no. 4 (2004): 671–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s001221730000398x.

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AbstractThe recent publication of a third anthology of Donald Davidson's articles, and anticipated publication of two more, encourages a consideration of themes binding together Davidson's lifetime of research. One such theme is the principle of charity (PC). In light of the mileage Davidson gets out of PC, I propose a careful examination of PC itself. In Part 1, 1 consider some ways in which Davidson articulates PC. In Part 2, 1 show that the articulation that Davidson requires in his work on epistemology is untenable given what Davidson says in his work on semantics. I conclude that Davidson can use PC only in his work on semantics or not at all.

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6

HURLEY, PAUL. "Davidson's Debt to Anscombe." Dialogue 59, no. 2 (June 2020): 219–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217320000050.

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ABSTRACTRobert Myers’ interpretation of Donald Davidson's practical philosophy gets Davidson right in many fundamental respects. Myers rightly argues that Davidson avoids inconsistencies among internalism, ethical objectivity, and the belief-desire theory by modifying central elements of the Humean belief-desire theory, and that Davidson's alternative legitimizes the extension of his interpretation and triangulation arguments into the practical sphere. But at a crucial fork in the interpretive road Myers loses his way. Davidson follows G.E.M. Anscombe down a different path, one that takes individual desires to be constituted in part by evaluative judgements.

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7

Bar-On, Dorit, and Mark Risjord. "Is There Such a Thing as a Language?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22, no. 2 (June 1992): 163–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1992.10717276.

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‘There is no such thing as a language,’ Donald Davidson tells us (‘A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs,’ in Ernest LePore, ed., Truth and Interpretation [Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1986] 433-46, 446). Though this is a startling claim in its own right, it seems especially puzzling coming from a leading theorizer about language. Over the years, Davidson’s important essays have sparked the hope that there is a route to a positive, nonskeptical theory of meaning for natural languages. This hope would seem to be dashed if there are no natural languages. Unless Davidson’s radical claim is a departure from his developed views, the Davidsonian program appears to have undermined itself.In a recent book, Donald Davidson’s Philosophy of Language: An Introduction (which Davidson has enthusiastically endorsed), Bjorn Ramberg promises to establish that Davidson's startling claim is not an aberration. Rather, it 'emerges as a natural development of his theory of meaning' (2). He reads the claim that there is no such thing as a language as the claim that the concept of a language has no useful theoretical role. Like the concepts of meaning and reference, it is a 'ghost of reification' which Davidson attempts to 'exorcise' from our philosophical thinking about linguistic communication. All three concepts can be seen as mere ladders to be kicked away once the edifice of a Davidsonian theory of linguistic communication is properly erected on the sole foundation of the concept of truth. The result, he assures us, ‘is not a theory which undercuts itself, but a comprehensive, coherent account of the phenomenon of linguistic communication’ (3).

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8

Schilbrack, Kevin. "The Study of Religious Belief after Donald Davidson." Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 14, no. 3-4 (2002): 334–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157006802320909756.

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AbstractScholars in religious studies are increasingly drawing important insights from Davidson's philosophy of language. Unfortunately, the most prominent of Davidson's interpreters in religious studies have been Rortian neopragmatists who, I argue, have read into Davidson views which are not his own. This essay seeks to disentangle Davidson's stance from its neopragmatist interpretations. The goal is to understand his stance in order to see how one might approach the study of religious beliefs, and in particular religious metaphysical beliefs, from a Davidsonian perspective.

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9

Ramberg, Bjørn. "Donald Davidson (06.03.1917–31.08.2003)." Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift 39, no. 01-02 (April 26, 2004): 7–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.18261/issn1504-2901-2004-01-02-02.

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10

Ramberg, Bjørn T. "Interpreting Davidson." Dialogue 32, no. 3 (1993): 565–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300012336.

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To approach the philosophical anthropology (p. 4) of Donald Davidson is to get ready for an unusually high number of laps around the hermeneutic circle. Apparently a problem-oriented philosopher, Davidson presents his views in a continuing series of dense, tightly focussed papers on narrowly circumscribed topics. The lines of the big picture are mostly implicit. Yet it is the scope and the power of this picture that has made Davidson one of the most significant philosophers of this century. Naturally, this makes Davidson's work an extremely tempting—and extremely treacherous—target for the exegete with synthesizing tendencies. Until now, the sense of danger seems to have won out; secondary expositions have largely confined themselves to particular aspects of his thought. For those seeking to appreciate the cohesion and comprehensiveness of Davidson's vision, there has been no alternative but, as Ted Honderich says, to “struggle and learn,” working their way through Davidson's papers, continually calibrating and recalibrating interpretations of Davidson's detailed philosophical proposals with the emerging pattern of their interrelationships.

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Silcox, Mark. "On the Conceivability of an Omniscient Interpreter." Dialogue 46, no. 4 (2007): 627–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300002146.

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ABSTRACTI examine the “omniscient interpreter” (OI) argument against scepticism that Donald Davidson published in 1977 only to retract it twenty-two years later. I argue that the argument's persuasiveness has been underestimated. I defend it against the charges that Davidson assumes the actual existence of an OI and that Davidson's other philosophical commitments are incompatible with the very conceivability of an OI. The argument's surface implausibility derives from Davidson's suggestion that an OI would attribute beliefs using the same methods as a fallible human interpreter. But this problem can be remedied via the adoption of an ambiguity theory of belief.

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12

Pinto, Sílvio. "Donald Davidson, Truth and Predication." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 38, no. 113 (December 6, 2006): 77–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2006.484.

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Ripmeester, J. "Donald W. Davidson (1925?1986)." Journal of Inclusion Phenomena and Molecular Recognition in Chemistry 8, no. 1-2 (1990): 1–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01131282.

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14

Quintanilla, Pablo. "Davidson después de Davidson." Análisis Filosófico 39, no. 2 (November 1, 2019): 221–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.36446/af.2019.324.

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Los veinte años que van desde fines de los setenta hasta fines de los noventa del siglo pasado, presenciaron la influencia del pensamiento de Donald Davidson en casi todas las áreas de la filosofía. Aunque el propio autor no se propuso construir un sistema, el proyecto que comenzó con algunas anotaciones técnicas en semántica formal y teoría de la acción fue ampliándose progresivamente para incorporar intuiciones en muchas otras áreas. Si bien los detalles técnicos del proyecto han recibido severos cuestionamientos, muchas de esas intuiciones siguen siendo válidas. En este texto me propongo reseñar y discutir las tesis centrales del libro de Karina Pedace con el objetivo de evaluar esas intuiciones, más allá de si algunos de sus críticos se han concentrado en detalles que podrían ser poco relevantes para entender los objetivos principales del proyecto.

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15

Rossi, Paula. "Davidson and classical pragmatism." Areté 19, no. 1 (March 12, 2007): 119–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.18800/arete.200701.006.

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In this paper I wish to trace some connections between Donald Davidson's work (1917-2003) and two major representatives of the classical pragmatist movement: Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) and William James (1842-1910). I will start with a basic characterization of classical pragmatism; then, I shall examine certain conceptions in Peirce's and James' pragmatism, in order to establish affinities with Davidson´s thought. Finally, and bearing in mind the previous con-nections, I will reflect briefly on the relevance –often unrecognized- of classical pragmatist ideas in the context of contemporary philosophi-cal discussions.

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MYERS, ROBERT H. "Replies to Kirk Ludwig and Paul Hurley." Dialogue 59, no. 2 (June 2020): 255–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217320000128.

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ABSTRACTIn response to Paul Hurley, I argue that Donald Davidson's triangulation argument can be applied to normative beliefs only if such beliefs are answerable to properties that are at once normative and causal. The argument thus commits Davidson to a non-reductive and strikingly non-revisionary form of naturalism. In response to Kirk Ludwig, I argue that Davidson had good reason to abandon Humean accounts of pro-attitudes because he had good reason to welcome the non-reductive and non-revisionary form of naturalism that comes into view once the triangulation argument is applied to normative beliefs.

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Šljivo, Kenan. "Against Epistemological Virus of Scepticism: Davidson on Objectivity of Knowledge." Logical Foresight-Journal for Logic and Science 1, no. 1 (December 20, 2021): 86–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.54889/issn.2744-208x.2021.1.1.86.

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This paper provides a short overview of approaches to epistemological issues as represented by Donald Davidson, an American philosopher. This is an attempt to analyse Davidson’s essential postulates, in order to construct a framework for understanding a highly authentic epistemological position and the way in which it appears as an antipode to the sceptical epistemological strategies. In other words – the goal is to identify a coordinate system, through a set of postulates, from which Davidson projects his epistemological attitudes. For that purpose, the paper presents the developmental process of Davidson’s epistemological thought that goes through triangulation of notions subjective, intersubjective, and objective. The paper places special emphasis on Davidson’s concentration on communicative practices and intersubjectivity as the only topoi in which the issue of objectivity can be raised.

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Gudalov, Nikolay. "Interpretation and Rationality." Theoria 68, no. 167 (June 1, 2021): 39–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/th.2021.6816702.

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Although influential in philosophy and relevant to international political theory’s (IPT) key concerns, Donald Davidson has not received commensurate attention in IPT. I aim here to commence filling this gap. I explore Davidson’s insights which fruitfully challenge established disciplinary views. The notions of rationality, objectivity and truth, and, on the other hand, those of intersubjectivity, language and interpretation are often needlessly separated and constricted by seemingly alternative approaches. Davidson firmly reconnects these notions. He helps rethink the realist, strong post-positivist, but also liberal, ‘thin’ constructivist and critical (not thoroughly contextualist) approaches. He bridges the normative cosmopolitan–communitarian distinction. Eventually, Davidson laid foundations for a perspective foregrounding possibilities for rational communication and agreement between very different contexts and also for the non-dogmatic, pluralist and dynamic nature of communication itself.

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MILLER, ALEXANDER. "Verheggen on Davidson and Kripke on Rule-Following and Meaning." Dialogue 59, no. 2 (June 2020): 207–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217320000049.

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ABSTRACTThis paper discusses Claudine Verheggen's account of what she takes to be Donald Davidson's response to the sceptical paradox about rule-following and meaning developed in Saul Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's ‘rule-following considerations.’ It focusses on questions about the normativity of meaning, the social character of meaning, and the role of triangulation in Davidson's account of the determination of meaning, and invites Verheggen to compare the non-reductionism she finds in Davidson with that developed in Crispin Wright's judgement-dependent account of meaning.

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20

Hansberg, Olbeth. "Sobre la filosofía de Donald Davidson." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 19, no. 55 (December 10, 1987): 97–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1987.642.

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21

Carvalho, Helder Buenos Aires de. "DAVIDSON, Donald. A emergência do pensamento." Pensando - Revista de Filosofia 1, no. 1 (August 4, 2010): 103. http://dx.doi.org/10.26694/pensando.v1i1.452.

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Capítulo 9 do livro de Donald Davidson Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford University Press, 2001. Tradução de Helder Buenos Aires de Carvalho, realizada originalmente para o Portal Brasileiro da Filosofia/CEFA.

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22

Quintanilla, Pablo. "Metáfora e interpretación en Donald Davidson." Areté 7, no. 1 (July 30, 1995): 113–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.18800/arete.199501.005.

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La concepción davidsoniana de la metáfora representa un quiebre radicalrespecto de la visión aristotélica tradicional, que ha sido la más influyentehasta nuestros días. Mientras para Aristóteles lo metafórico es un fenómeno semántico, para Davidson lo metafórico pertenece al campo de la pragmática. En este artículo el A. desea presentar la concepción davidsoniana de la metáfora para desde allí desarrollar algunas consecuencias en torno al significado y la interpretación. "La metáfora es el trabajo de sueño dellenguaje", dice Davidson, y es esto lo que gobierna tanto la adquisición comoel crecimiento del lenguaje. La metáfora puede ser entendida como elparadigma del cambio conceptual y la creación de significado.

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23

Allen, Barry. "Truth and Predication by Donald Davidson." Common Knowledge 25, no. 1-3 (April 1, 2019): 423. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/0961754x-7312321.

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Murphy, Paul V. "Donald Davidson and Modern American Conservatism." Historically Speaking 5, no. 2 (2003): 26–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hsp.2003.0009.

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Vescio, Bryan. "Donald Davidson, Pragmatism, and Literary Theory." Philosophy and Literature 22, no. 1 (1998): 200–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/phl.1998.0027.

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Saarinen, Risto. "John Buridan and Donald Davidson onakrasia." Synthese 96, no. 1 (July 1993): 133–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01063806.

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Heather, Nick, and Gabriel Segal. "Is addiction a myth? Donald Davidson’s solution to the problem of akrasia says not*." International Journal of Alcohol and Drug Research 4, no. 1 (June 22, 2015): 77–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.7895/ijadr.v4i1.195.

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Heather, N., & Segal, G. (2015). Is addiction a myth? Donald Davidson’s solution to the problem of akrasia says not*. The International Journal Of Alcohol And Drug Research, 4(1), 77-83. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.7895/ijadr.v4i1.195An obvious problem for the concept of addiction is its portrayal as involving involuntary behavior in the face of the addict’s intentional actions. This has led some writers to call addiction a myth and to describe the self-labeling of persons as addicts as an illustration of causal attribution. We argue that this position is seriously mistaken. We propose that it is possible to construct a meaningful concept of addiction without assuming it involves completely involuntary behavior and to do so within the language of agents engaging in intentional action. One way of doing so arises from the work of Donald Davidson (1917-2003), particularly his essay "How is weakness of the will possible?" (Davidson, 1969). Davidson proposes a solution to the classic philosophical problem (called the problem of akrasia or incontinence) of how it is logically possible for someone to perform an action against her better judgement, and his solution is relevant to an understanding of addiction (i.e., addiction is a class of akratic action). Thus, Davidson’s solution to this philosophical problem is also an answer to the question of how it is possible to understand addiction without assuming it entails completely involuntary behavior. At the same time, Davidson’s conclusion at the end of his essay—that the akrates cannot give a reason for preferring incontinent over continent action—suggests what addicts mean when they say they feel compelled to behave the way they do.

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Mayer, Verena. "Reflecting Davidson. Donald Davidson Responding to an International Forum of Philosophers." ProtoSociology 7 (1995): 218–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/protosociology1995719.

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SULTANESCU, OLIVIA. "Introduction." Dialogue 59, no. 2 (June 2020): 157–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217320000116.

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ABSTRACTIn Donald Davidson's Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry, Robert H. Myers and Claudine Verheggen spell out, and extensively build on, the triangulation argument advanced by Donald Davidson. This paper is an introduction to a symposium devoted to their development of that argument. The symposium began in 2018 as an authors-meet-critics session at the Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Congress, and consists in the responses of three critics, Kirk Ludwig, Alexander Miller, and Paul Hurley, followed by Verheggen's and Myers's replies. I offer a brief sketch of each of the two parts of the book, and an overview of the questions raised by the critics.

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Šljivo, Kenan. "Against Epistemological Virus of Scepticism." Synthesis philosophica 35, no. 1 (September 21, 2020): 253–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.21464/sp35114.

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Ovaj rad daje kratak pregled pristupa epistemološkim pitanjima koja u svom učenju zastupa američki filozof Donald Davidson. U pitanju je pokušaj da se putem analize temeljnih Davidsonovih postavki pokuša načiniti okvir za razumijevanje jedne vrlo autentične epistemološke pozicije i načina na koji se ona pojavljuje kao antipod skeptičkim epistemološkim strategijama. Drugim riječima, želi se u formi skupa postulata identificirati koordinatni sistem iz kojeg Davidson projektira svoje epistemološke stavove. U tu je svrhu u radu prikazan razvojni proces Davidsonove epistemološke misli, koji ide kroz triangulaciju pojmova subjektivno, intersubjektivno i objektivno. Ono što je u radu posebno osvijetljeno jest Davidsonov okret prema komunikativnim praksama i intersubjektivnosti kao jedinim toposima u kojima se pitanje o objektivnosti znanja može uopće postaviti.

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Stalmaszczyk, Piotr. "Book Notices." Research in Language 5 (December 18, 2007): 293–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/v10015-007-0014-2.

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Donald Davidson The Essential Davidson (with an introduction by Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006, 282 pp. Claudia Maienborn and Angelika Wöllstein (eds), Event Arguments: Foundations and Applications (Linguistische Arbeiten 501). Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2005, vi + 368.

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Wheeler, Samuel C. "Quine, Davidson, Relative Essentialism and the Question of Being." Open Philosophy 1, no. 1 (August 25, 2018): 115–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2018-0009.

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AbstractRelative essentialism, the view that multiple objects about which there are distinct de re modal truths can occupy the same space at the same time, is a metaphysical view that dissolves a number of metaphysical issues. The present essay constructs and defends relative essentialism and argues that it is implicit in some of the ideas of W. V. Quine and Donald Davidson. Davidson’s published views about individuation and sameness can accommodate the common-sense insights about change and persistence of Aristotle and Kripke. Aristotle and Kripke have to give up unmediated direct reference resting on a unique correct articulation of reality into entities. Davidson has to acknowledge a distinction between descriptions giving accidental and those giving essential features of an object. Quine and Davidson were in a position to be a relative essentialist, but were over-impressed by supervenience. The relative essentialist view of beings developed from Quine and Davidson strongly suggests the Heideggerian distinction between beings and Being, and is the perspective from which analytic philosophy can engage that topic. Relative essentialism also connects analytic philosophy to Derrida’s thinking about differance.

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McAuliffe, Sam. "Improvisation, Ontology, and Davidson: Exploring the Improvisational Character of Language and Jazz." Context, no. 48 (January 31, 2023): 21–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.46580/cx87493.

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At least since the 1990s, the relationship between linguistic communication and jazz improvisation has been a topic of interest to both philosophers of language and theorists of jazz improvisation. Rarely, however, are the shared elements of language and jazz explored directly. This article interrogates these elements, with a particular focus on improvisation by drawing upon the work of Donald Davidson. While Davidson himself does not readily employ the term ‘improvisation’, I argue that key ideas from Davidson’s work—the principle of charity, triangulation, and his argument that there is no such thing as a language—align with the concept of improvisation. In this article I offer a reading of Davidson’s work—a reading that highlights an improvisational character of his philosophy typically not made explicit—and, on the basis of the ontology of improvisation that emerges from Davidson’s philosophy, I explore the implications of that understanding of language for the way in which we understand jazz.

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Bogdanovic, Milos. "Holistic and conceptual character of the mental in Donald Davidson’s work." Theoria, Beograd 63, no. 1 (2020): 123–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2001123b.

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In this paper we will try to confront Quine?s and Davidson?s holistic position through Davidson?s thesis of mental as a non-ontological category. In this regard, since Davidson came to this position through the thesis of mental as a decidedly conceptual category, we will try to show how this approach does not, nevertheless, rule out the possibility of its interpretation in ontological terms. However, in what follows we will draw attention to the fact that mental can be interpreted so that it proves to be immune to ontologization in Quine?s sense. This would be the evidence of different ways, which are not necessarily compatible, to argue for Davidson?s central thesis - the thesis about holistic character of mental - as well as, which is closely related, a certain difference that exists between Davidson?s view of mental as a conceptual category on the one hand, and a holistic category on the other hand.

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SULTANESCU, OLIVIA. "Introduction." Dialogue 59, no. 2 (June 2020): 165–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217320000190.

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RÉSUMÉDans Donald Davidson's Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry, Robert H. Myers et Claudine Verheggen offrent une élucidation ainsi qu'une édification de l'argument de la triangulation avancé par Donald Davidson. Cet article est une introduction à un symposium consacré à leur développement de cet argument. Le symposium a débuté en 2018 en tant que table ronde réunissant les auteurs et des critiques lors du congrès annuel de l'Association canadienne de philosophie, et comprend les réponses de trois critiques, Kirk Ludwig, Alexander Miller et Paul Hurley, suivies des répliques de Verheggen et Myers. J'offre ici un bref aperçu de chacune des deux parties du livre et une esquisse des questions posées par les critiques.

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Davidson, Donald, and Nijaz Ibrulj. "RACIONALNE ŽIVOTINJE / RATIONAL ANIMALS." SOPHOS: A Young Researchers’ Journal, no. 15 (October 3, 2022): 224–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.46352/18403867.2022.224.

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37

Smith, Plínio Junqueira. "DAVIDSON, EXTERNALISMO E CETICISMO." Revista de Filosofia Aurora 16, no. 18 (May 9, 2004): 57. http://dx.doi.org/10.7213/rfa.v16i18.1489.

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O propósito deste artigo é investigar o externalismo epistemológicoproposto por Donald Davidson e avaliar em que medida ao menos essaforma de externalismo permite uma refutação do ceticismo. Oexternalismo de Davidson permitiria reformular os problemas céticostradicionais, bem como mostrar a falsidade do ceticismo. Davidson usatrês argumentos: a maneira pela qual o intérprete atribui crenças aofalante; a hipótese de um intérprete onisciente; a relação causal entreo mundo e nossas crenças. Nenhum desses argumentos, entretanto,parece refutar o cético.

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Rumfitt, Ian, and J. E. Malpas. "Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning." Philosophical Quarterly 45, no. 178 (January 1995): 136. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219869.

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Glüer, Kathrin. "Critical Notice: Donald Davidson?s Collected Essays." dialectica 61, no. 2 (June 2007): 275–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01059.x.

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40

Bergström, Lars, and Dagfinn Føllesdal. "Interview with Donald Davidson in November 1993." Theoria 60, no. 3 (February 11, 2008): 207–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1994.tb00938.x.

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41

Capone, Alessandro. "Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality." Journal of Pragmatics 39, no. 5 (May 2007): 1039–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2006.12.002.

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42

Cobo, Gonzalo. "Donald Davidson. La objetividad de los valores." Estudios de Filosofía, no. 3 (1997): 43–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.18800/estudiosdefilosofia.199701.004.

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43

Whiting, Daniel. "Truth, Language, and History ? By Donald Davidson." Philosophical Investigations 30, no. 2 (April 2007): 179–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.2007.00317.x.

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Viau, Marcel. "La théologie après Davidson." Articles spéciaux 66, no. 3 (January 19, 2011): 565–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/045339ar.

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Dans son programme destiné à mettre en lumière les grandes questions philosophiques, comme la place de la vérité ou la relation entre le langage et le monde, Donald Davidson en est arrivé à montrer qu’il fallait prendre au sérieux la croyance en la plaçant au fondement des rapports humains. Une théologie s’inspirant de ses avancées réintroduirait la foi chrétienne, une croyance parmi d’autres, au sein des discours contemporains les plus éclairés. Cette théologie serait construite sur des énoncés qui reposent davantage sur les intentions, les désirs et les préoccupations humaines que sur une sémantique désincarnée et des vérités censément objectives.

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Cook, John. "Is Davidson a Gricean?" Dialogue 48, no. 3 (September 2009): 557–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217309990126.

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ABSTRACT: In his recent collection of essays, Language, Truth and History (2005), Donald Davidson appears to endorse a philosophy of language which gives primary importance to the notion of the speaker’s communicative intentions, a perspective on language not too dissimilar from that of Paul Grice. If that is right, then this would mark a major shift from the formal semanticist approach articulated and defended by Davidson in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984). In this paper, I argue that although there are many similarities between these two thinkers, Davidson has not abandoned his earlier views on language

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Caorsi, Carlos. "Verdad y justificación en la filosofía de Donald Davidson." Areté 23, no. 2 (December 1, 2011): 263–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.18800/arete.201102.002.

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En este artículo me propongo tratar la tensión existente en la obra deDavidson entre su concepción de las creencias como verídicas por naturaleza ysu radical oposición a las teorías epistémicas de la verdad. Para ello introduzcodos modalidades de elucidación filosófica, elucidación analítica no reductiva yelucidación conectiva y sostengo que caracterizan dos periodos en el tratamientode Davidson del concepto de verdad. Me propongo mostrar que la consideraciónde estos dos tipos de elucidación permite echar luz sobre el tratamientodel problema de la verdad en la obra de Davidson y sobre la particular tensiónanteriormente mencionada.

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Dresner, Eli. "Radical Interpretation, the primacy of communication, and the bounds of language." Empedocles: European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication 1, no. 1 (November 1, 2009): 123–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/ejpc.1.1.123/1.

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In the first section of this paper I review the notion of Radical Interpretation, introduced by Donald Davidson in order to account for linguistic meaning and propositional thought. It is then argued that this concept, as embedded in Davidson's whole philosophical system, gives rise to a view of communication as a key explanatory concept in the social sciences. In the second section of the paper it is shown how this view bears upon the question as to what the bounds of linguistic behaviour are. As opposed to major psychological and sociological perspectives on language, Davidson's communication-centred position gives rise to an inclusive, context-dependent answer to this question.

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Margolis, Joseph. "Rationality and Weakness of Will." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 41, no. 3-4 (March 2, 2014): 233–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-0410304001.

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Myers, Robert H. "Finding Value in Davidson." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34, no. 1 (March 2004): 107–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2004.10716561.

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Can an effective argument against scepticism about objective values be modelled on Donald Davidson's familiar argument against scepticism about external things?Davidson evidently thinks so. He has long been on record as maintaining that a theory of interpretation must be ‘unified’ in the sense that it cannot merely solve f or beliefs and meanings but must simultaneously solve for desires as well. And he has made it quite clear that he thinks a theory of interpretation can do this only by subjecting attributions of desires to a ‘principle of charity’ analogous to the principle that he claims must govern attributions of beliefs. Since his argument against external world scepticism is in large part powered by his claim that charity must govern attributions of beliefs, his feeling that charity must likewise govern attributions of desires might appear to commit him to a similar argument against value scepticism.

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Cling, Andrew D. "Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. By Donald Davidson." Modern Schoolman 65, no. 3 (1988): 207–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/schoolman198865329.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Donald Davidson'

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