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Arseneault, Madeleine. "What metaphors are, situating Donald Davidson." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ57647.pdf.
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Quintanilla, Pablo. "Metáfora e interpretación en Donald Davidson." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2013. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/113008.
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La concepción davidsoniana de la metáfora representa un quiebre radicalrespecto de la visión aristotélica tradicional, que ha sido la más influyentehasta nuestros días. Mientras para Aristóteles lo metafórico es un fenómeno semántico, para Davidson lo metafórico pertenece al campo de la pragmática. En este artículo el A. desea presentar la concepción davidsoniana de la metáfora para desde allí desarrollar algunas consecuencias en torno al significado y la interpretación. La metáfora es el trabajo de sueño dellenguaje, dice Davidson, y es esto lo que gobierna tanto la adquisición comoel crecimiento del lenguaje. La metáfora puede ser entendida como elparadigma del cambio conceptual y la creación de significado.
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Arseneault, Madeleine (Madeleine Louise) Carleton University Dissertation Psychology. "What metaphors are: situating Donald Davidson." Ottawa, 2000.
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Cobo, Gonzalo. "Donald Davidson. La objetividad de los valores." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2012. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/119228.
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Schimmenti, Andrea. "Mente e mundo natural em Donald Davidson." Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da UFBA, 2008. http://www.repositorio.ufba.br/ri/handle/ri/11484.
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O objetivo desta dissertação é compreender as teses de Donald Davidson acerca do lugar do mental no âmbito de uma visão fisicalista do mundo. Com seu conceito de mental, que é parte de uma teoria explicativa da vida ordinária e da ação intencional, Davidson critica a tradição reducionista. Ele afirma que a eficácia causal dos eventos mentais no mundo físico, e a autonomia destes mesmos eventos em relação às leis estritas da física, são idéias que não estão necessariamente em contradição. Neste sentido, Davidson acredita que a eficácia do pensamento e da intenção no mundo material pode conviver com a liberdade da razão em relação às leis naturais. Há causalidade mental sem reducionismo, pois a eficácia causal do mental não precisa ser suportada por leis estritas, ou por identidades entre tipos ou propriedades mentais e físicas. A visão davidsoniana do mental foi definida por alguns críticos como sendo dualista, por considerar que a irredutibilidade da intencionalidade às leis que governam o mundo natural torna o mental como um domínio autônomo. Outros críticos, ainda, sugerem que o conceito davidsoniano de mental leva ao epifenomenalismo ou ao eliminativismo, pois caracterizaria o mental como ineficaz causalmente no mundo físico. A grande contribuição de Davidson foi a sua refinada tentativa de oferecer uma teoria holística da mente e da ação, no interior da qual pensar a relação entre as nossas crenças, desejos, intenções, e as nossas ações. Neste sentido, a sua obra mostrou que a causalidade é um conceito que não pode ser excluído do conjunto dos conceitos que usamos para tentar oferecer descrições e explicações da relação entre os nossos estados mentais e nossas ações.
Salvador
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Sousa, Daniel Grandinetti Rodrigues de. "A teoria das ações de Donald Davidson." Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUBD-89LPGP.
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Davidson adopts the principle that actions can be explained by the desire to reach a certain goal and the belief that one is doing what is necessary to satisfy this desire, and that this couple desire-belief constitutes a reason for the agent to act. In the analysis of an action, many reasons can be given, but only one can count as the one by which the agent acted. And if the reason by which the agent acted explains his action, this primary reason is the cause of his acting. Nevertheless, there are cases in which the reason given by the agent himself in the explanation of his action does not count, according to his own best judgment, as his best reason to act, and the cause of the action is not anymore the reason itself, but the desire that led the agent to deny what he considered the best to be done. This desire, denying his best judgment, can not be justified by the agents reasons, and must be called irrational and considered as the cause of an irrational action. In the explanation of this kind of actions, Davidson is forced to elaborate the principles of a philosophy of mind in which he takes three principles he attributes to Freud.Davidson adota a premissa de que ações podem ser explicadas pelo desejo de atingir um objetivo e pela crença de se estar fazendo o necessário para satisfazê-lo, e que a dupla desejo-crença em questão constitui uma razão para que o agente coloque a ação em execução. Na análise de uma ação, podem ser dadas muitas razões, mas apenas uma delas conta como a razão pela qual o agente a executou. E se a razão pela qual o sujeito agiu é aquela que explica sua ação, então esta sua razão primária é a causa de seu agir. Entretanto, há casos em que a razão primária fornecida pelo próprio agente na explicação de uma ação não representa, de acordo com seu próprio melhor julgamento, a melhor de suas razões para agir, e a causa da ação não é mais a própria razão, mas o desejo que levou o agente a contrariar aquilo que ele próprio considerava o melhor a ser feito. Este desejo, contrariando o melhor julgamento do agente e não podendo ser justificado pelas razões dele, é irracional, e a causa de uma ação igualmente irracional. E na explicação de ações deste tipo, Davidson se vê obrigado a esboçar uma filosofia damente tomando de empréstimo algumas premissas que ele atribui a Freud.
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Fischer, Martin. "Davidsons semantisches Programm und deflationäre Wahrheitskonzeptionen /." Frankfurt, M. [i.e.] Heusenstamm ;Paris ;Lancaster ;New Brunswick, NJ : Ontos-Verl, 2008. http://d-nb.info/988916665/04.
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Yung, Ching-shek. "A theory of understanding first meaning : a critical study of Davidson's theory of radical interpretation /." [Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong], 1993. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B1347876X.
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Sink, Damon W. "Sanctuary for orchestra after the poem by Donald Davidson /." Cincinnati, Ohio : University of Cincinnati, 2007. http://www.ohiolink.edu/etd/view.cgi?ucin1187279880.
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Thesis (Dr. of Musical Arts)--University of Cincinnati, 2007.Advisor: Dr. Joel Hoffman. Title from electronic thesis title page (viewed Nov. 15, 2007). Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references.
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Caorsi, Carlos. "Verdad y justificación en la filosofía de Donald Davidson." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2011. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/112853.
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Truth and Justification in Donald Davidson’s Philosophy”. In this paper, I attempt to discuss the tensions that exist in Davidson’s work between hisconception of beliefs as veridical by nature and its radical opposition to epistemictheories of truth. With this purpose, I introduce two modalities of philosophicalelucidation: analytic non-reductive elucidation and connective elucidation. I alsoclaim that these two modalities are characteristic of two periods of Davidson’sway of dealing with the concept of truth. I attempt to show that the considerationof these two types of elucidation allows shedding light on the way in whichDavidson’s work deals with the problem of truth and on the particular abovementionedtension.En este artículo me propongo tratar la tensión existente en la obra deDavidson entre su concepción de las creencias como verídicas por naturaleza ysu radical oposición a las teorías epistémicas de la verdad. Para ello introduzcodos modalidades de elucidación filosófica, elucidación analítica no reductiva yelucidación conectiva y sostengo que caracterizan dos periodos en el tratamientode Davidson del concepto de verdad. Me propongo mostrar que la consideraciónde estos dos tipos de elucidación permite echar luz sobre el tratamientodel problema de la verdad en la obra de Davidson y sobre la particular tensiónanteriormente mencionada.
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Harnay, Pôl-Vincent. "La décision de l'expérimentation à l'interprétation : l'apport de Donald Davidson." Phd thesis, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, 2008. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00363905.
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Cette thèse s'intéresse à la théorie de la décision telle que la propose le philosophe américain Donald Davidson. Après avoir lu et discuté les théories de Ramsey (1926), von Neumann et Morgenstern (1954), Savage (1954), Davidson propose es propres axiomatiques et procédures de test en introduisant, à la différence des expériences antérieures de la théorie de l'utilité espérée, des probabilités subjectives. Les résultats de ces expériences qu'il mène entr 1957 et 1959 le conduisent toutefois à critiquer, voire à rejeter ses premières analyses de la décision. Il se tourne alors vers la philosophie de l'action et du langage et étaye ses critiques dont la plus importante est celle qui consiste pour l'expérimentateur à faire l'impasse sur les significations que les sujets attribuent aux issues. Pourtant, fort de son expérience philosophique, il propose dans les années 1980 une nouvelle théorie de la décision qui intègre une théorie de l'interprétation du langage. S'appuyant sur le modèle Bolker-Jeffrey (1965), Davidson propose d'analyser simultanément les désirs (utilités), les croyances (probabilités) et les significations. Nous cherchons à montrer si cette seconde version enrichie de la théorie de la décision, pour le moins originale, répond aux différentes critiques que l'on pouvait adresser à la première. Et, d'une manière plus générale, nous mettons en lumière l'apport d'une théorie de la décision au carrefour de l'économie et de la philosophie.
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Agoglu, Eser. "Appropriateness Of A Cognitive Approach To Donald Davidson'." Master's thesis, METU, 2008. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/2/12610178/index.pdf.
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The purpose of this study is to discuss the appropriateness of a cognitive approach to Donald Davidson's meaning theory. Davidson makes the bold proposal that a truth theory, modified for a natural language, may be treated as a meaning theory for that language. According to Davidson, a meaning theory is an empirical theory. Radical Interpretation is at the center of such an empirical inquiry which places restrictions on the truth theory to make it suitable as a meaning theory without appeal to semantic notions. Davidson&lsquo
s aim in presenting this bold proposal and radical interpretation is to shed light on the concept of meaning, not to define the actual semantic competence of language users. But what Davidson&lsquo
s project does not aim to define is the main thing that a cognitive approach must account for. Whether a truth theory can represent the semantic competence of language users is discussed in this work. It is concluded that, although there is no a priori reason for such a representation claim, the cognitive approach&mdash
with the right assumptions to make the claim testable&mdash
can lead to an empirical research programme.
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Melogno, Pablo. "Two Senses of Massive Truth in Donald Davidson's Philosophy." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2012. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/113090.
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The present paper proposes a critical revision of the massive truth notion, in the context of Donald Davidson’s criticism to skepticism. It´s distinguished in Davidson’s work a cuantitative sense and a cualitative sense of the massive truth, asserting that the first one has been more frequently used and has had just an intuitive level of elucidation. The main problems associated to the cuantitative notion of massive truth are revised in relation to the quantification of beliefs, the detection of error on a background of truth and the application of the Davidsonian methodology to non perceptual beliefs. Over this revision it is proposed the substitution of the cuantitative notion of massive truth for a cualitative notion, and are analized its advantages over eventual skeptical objections.El presente trabajo propone una revisión crítica de la noción de verdad masiva, en el contexto de la crítica de Donald Davidson al escepticismo. Se distingue en la obra de Davidson un sentido cuantitativo y uno cualitativo de verdad masiva, afirmando que el primero ha sido de uso más frecuente y ha contado con un nivel de elucidación solamente intuitivo. Se revisan los principales problemas asociados a la noción cuantitativa de verdad masiva, en relación con la cuantificación de las creencias, la detección del error sobre un trasfondo de verdad y la aplicación de la metodología davidsoniana a creencias no perceptuales. Sobre esta revisión se propone la sustitución de la noción cuantitativa de verdad masiva por una noción cualitativa, y se analizan sus ventajas frentea eventuales objeciones escépticas.
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Kotze, H. B. (Hendrik Benjamin). "Davidson on metaphor and conceptual schemes." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/51670.
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Compilation of two papers, the first of which was accepted for publication in the South African Journal of Philosophy in the second half of 2001.Why metaphors have no meaning : considering metaphoric meaning in Davidson. -- Bare idea of a conceptual scheme : relativism, intercultural communication and Davidson.
Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2000.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: WHY METAPHORS HAVE NO MEANING: CONSIDERING METAPHORIC MEANING IN DAVIDSON Since the publication of Donald Davidson's essay 'What Metaphors Mean' (1984c) - in which he famously asserts that metaphor has no meaning - the views expressed in it have mostly met with criticism: prominently from Mary Hesse and Max Black. This article attempts to explain Davidson's surprise-move regarding metaphor by relating it to elements in the rest of his work in semantics, such as the principle of compositionality, radical interpretation and the principle of charity. I conclude that Davidson's views on metaphor are not only consistent with his semantic theory generally, but that his semantics also depend on these insights. Eventually, the debate regarding Davidson's views on metaphor should be conducted on the level of his views on the nature of semantics, the relationship between language and the world and the possibility of there existing something like conceptual schemes.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: THE BARE IDEA OF A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME: RELATIVISM, INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND DAVIDSON Donald Davidson's paper 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' ('OVICS') has become famous for the refutation accomplished in it of conceptual relativism. Via an argument that, essentially, all languages are intertranslatable, Davidson rejects the notion that different conceptual schemes can inhere in the supposed 'un-translatable' languages said to exist by, for instance, Whorf and Kuhn. Critics of Davidson's position have mainly focussed on practical issues, with many holding that his arguments in 'OVICS' ignore the realities of the real intercultural communication situation. In the present paper, I address criticisms of this sort. Davidson's arguments are reconstructed, with attention being paid to their dependence on the idea of practical application in the real intercommunication situation. With the aid of practical examples, the implications of elements of Davidson's philsophy of interpretation for intercultural communication are evaluated. Finally, radical interpretation is presented as a better model for intercultural dialogue than linguistically relativist ones.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: WHY METAPHORS HAVE NO MEANING: CONSIDERING METAPHORIC MEANING IN DAVIDSON Sedert die publikasie van Donald Davidson se opstel 'What Metaphors Mean' (1984c) - waarin hy die berugte stelling maak dat metafoor geen betekenis het nie - is sy sieninge meestal begroet met kritiek, ook van prominente figure soos Mary Hesse en Max Black. Hierdie artikel poog om 'n verduideliking te vind vir Davidson se verassende skuif aangaande metafoor, deur sy sieninge hieroor te kontekstualiseer teen die agtergrond van elemente uit die res van sy werk in semantiek, soos die beginsel van komposisionaliteit, radikale interpretasie en die beginsel van rasionele akkomodasie ('charity'). Ek kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat Davidson se sieninge aangaande metafoor nie slegs naatloos aansluit by sy algemene sieninge aangaande semantiek nie, maar dat die res van sy semantiese teorie ook afhang van sy sieninge aangaande metafoor. Uiteindelik behoort die debat rakende Davidson se sieninge aangaande metafoor gevoer te word op die vlak van die aard van semantiek, die verhouding tussen taal en die werklikheid en die moontlike bestaan van konseptueie skemas.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: THE BARE IDEA OF A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME: RELATIVISM, INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND DAVIDSON Donald Davidson se artikel 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' het beroemdheid verwerf as teenargument vir die idee van konseptuele relativisme. By wyse van 'n argument dat alle tale in beginsel vertaalbaar is, verwerp Davidson die idee dat verskillende konseptueie skemas kan skuilgaan in die veronderstelde 'onvertaalbare' tale waarvan daar sprake is by byvoorbeeld Whorf en Kuhn. Kritici van Davidson se posisie beperk hul hoofsaaklik tot praktiese besware en 'n vername aanklag teen Davidson is dat hy die realiteite misken van werklike interkulturele gesprek. In hierdie artikel spreek ek sodanige kritiek aan. Ek herkonstrueer Davidson se argumente en voer aan dat dit deurgaans afhanklik is van die idee van toepassing in 'n praktiese situasie van interkulturele dialoog. By wyse van praktiese voorbeelde evalueer ek die implikasies van Davidson se filosofie van interpretasie vir interkulturele kommunikasie. Laastens bied ek radikale interpretasie aan as 'n beter model vir interkulturele dialoog as linguisties relativistiese modelle.
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Ruesga, G. Alberto (Glauco Alberto). "What can be meant--evaluating a skeptical argument by Donald Davidson." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/14142.
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Navarro, Michel P. Assis. "O projeto davidsoniano de uma semântica composicional para as línguas naturais." Universidade de São Paulo, 2017. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-30112017-125627/.
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Nesta tese realizo uma exposição e exame sistemáticos do projeto semântico do filósofo estadunidense Donald Davidson de construir uma teoria composicional do significado para as línguas naturais explorando a estrutura recursiva de uma teoria interpretativa da verdade de tipo tarskiana. Nesta estratégia, uma teoria do significado deve ser capaz de capturar a capacidade linguística geral que qualquer falante de uma língua possui de produzir e interpretar novas sentenças. O requerimento de que a teoria seja composicional constitui o critério fundamental que orienta o empreendimento de Davidson e está na base do projeto de elucidar o aspecto composicional do significado via o emprego de uma teoria da verdade do tipo tarskiana. Defendo que o projeto de Davidson intenta lançar as bases de um programa de pesquisa em semântica das línguas naturais que, embora não hegemônico no campo e visto com ceticismo por alguns, é o único exemplo até o momento de uma tentativa de iluminar de forma sistemática o aspecto composicional do significado de amplos fragmentos das línguas naturais sem um apelo direto a entidades abstratas associadas às expressões de uma linguagem, como propriedades, proposições sentidos, intensões etc. Dois tópicos acerca do projeto recebem uma investigação detalhada. Em primeiro lugar, questões filosóficas fundacionais que a proposta suscita. Abordamos as objeções de Davidson a teorias que quantificam sobre significados, discutindo os problemas que ele identifica em análises que reificam a camada intensional dos significados das expressões de uma língua, em especial sistemas neo-fregeanos, tais como os propostos por Rudolf Carnap e Alonzo Church. Baseado em parte nesta crítica de Davidson, pouco examinada na literatura, e sem a qual se corre o risco de uma interpretação equivocada das ambições do projeto, sustento, em consonância com os semanticistas neo-davidsonianos Ernie Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (2005; 2007), que Davidson não intenta fornecer uma semântica que se caracteriza por substituir ou reduzir uma teoria do significado a uma teoria da verdade. A ideia é que uma teoria composicional do significado pode ser apresentada como um corpo de conhecimento sobre uma teoria interpretativa da verdade. Davidson tampouco intenta eliminar a camada intensional do significado; o que se busca é evitar a sua reificação. Uma outra parte da tese se debruça sobre o esforço de acomodar na teoria um conjunto de fenômenos linguísticos próprios das línguas naturais: expressões sensíveis ao contexto, como pronomes pessoais e demonstrativos, que forçam a relativização do predicado de verdade às situações de uso das sentenças; quantificação restrita; sentenças com verbos de ação e que descrevem relações causais entre eventos; contextos opacos criados por sentenças com verbos de atitude proposicional, e a dificuldade de tratar esses contextos sem introduzir entidades intensionais. Examino também aspectos fundacionais da semântica de Lepore & Ludwig, que, sem dúvida, amplia significativamente o escopo de fenômenos linguísticos que podem ser explicados por uma teoria motivada pelo projeto de Davidson. No método dos autores, é estabelecida, entre outras condições, seguindo Davidson, que não basta saber o conteúdo informacional expresso pelos axiomas de uma teoria da verdade. É preciso saber também quais conteúdos os axiomas veiculam. Isto é, tem-se que saber os sentidos dos axiomas. Ao sistematizarem na forma de uma teoria esse conhecimento, eles associam, por meio de uma lista, um sentido/intensão a cada axioma. Para cada expressão da linguagem objeto deve haver um axioma na teoria, e o sentido desse axioma deve ser conteúdo de conhecimento do semanticista/intérprete para que ele seja capaz de empregar a teoria-T para interpretar as expressões subsentenciais e as sentenças da linguagem objeto. Se minha observação estiver correta, na estrutura da teoria dos autores acaba por ocorrer a reificação dos sentidos dos axiomas, o que seria forte indicação de que a semântica que constroem não cumpre o propósito de ser uma teoria imune à introdução de entidades intensionais. Além disso, esta associação de um conteúdo semântico a cada axioma via quantificação, parece implicar uma questão mais grave: o assinalamento de objetos intensionais às expressões da linguagem objeto. Desse modo, se minhas ponderações estiverem corretas, a semântica dos autores parece não se configurar como uma alternativa às teorias neo-fregeanas, no sentido de cumprir o que estas fazem, sem que, na sua estrutura, tenha que postular entidades intensionais.In this dissertation I carry out a sistematic exposition and examination of Donald Davidsons semantic project to construct a compositional theory of meaning for natural languages by exploring the recursive structure of an interpretative truth theory à lá Tarski. In this strategy, a theory of meaning must be able to capture the general linguistic ability of any speaker of a language to produce and interpret new sentences. The requirement that the theory be compositional is the fundamental criterion that guides Davidson\'s enterprise and ii is at the basis of the project of elucidating the compositional aspect of meaning via the use of a theory of truth of the Tarskian type. I argue that Davidson\'s project attempts to lay the groundwork for a research program on natural language semantics which, while not hegemonic in the field and viewed with skepticism by some, is the only example so far of an attempt to systematically illuminate the compositional aspect of the meanings of broad fragments of natural languages without a direct appeal to abstract entities associated with the expressions of a language, such as properties, senses, propositions, intensions, etc. Two topics about the project received detailed attention. Firstly, I focus on issues of philosophical foundations raised by the proposal. I approach Davidson\'s objections to theories that quantify over meanings by discussing the problems he identifies in analyzes that reify the intensional layer of the meanings of the expressions of a language, especially neo-Fregean systems, such as those proposed by Rudolf Carnap and Alonzo Church. Based partly on Davidson\'s criticism, which is scarcely examined in the literature, and without which there is a risk of a misinterpretation of the ambitions of the project, I maintain, along with the neo-Davidsonian semanticists Ernie Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (2005; 2007), that Davidson does not attempt to provide a semantics which is characterized by substituting or reducing a theory of meaning to a truth theory. The idea is that a compositional theory of meaning can be presented as a body of knowledge about an interpretive truth theory. Davidson does not seek to eliminate the intensional layer of the expressions. What is sought is to avoid its reification. Another part of the thesis focuses on the effort to accommodate in the theory a set of linguistic phenomena proper to natural languages: context-sensitive expressions such as personal and demonstrative pronouns, which force the relativization of the truth predicate of to the contexts of use; Restricted quantification; Sentences with action verbs that describe causal relationships between events; Opaque contexts created by sentences with propositional attitude verbs, and the difficulty of dealing with these contexts without introducing intensional entities. I also examine the foundational aspects of Lepore & Ludwig\'s semantics, which undoubtedly widens the scope of linguistic phenomena that can be explained by a theory motivated by Davidson\'s project. In the authors\' method, it is established, among other conditions - following Davidsons approach - that it is not enough to know the informational content expressed by the axioms of a theory of truth. It is also necessary to know what content the axioms convey. That is, one has to know the meanings of the axioms. By systematizing this knowledge in the form of a theory, they associate, through a list, a sense/intension to each axiom. For each expression of the object language there must be an axiom in the theory, and the meaning of this axiom must be the content of the semanticist / interpreter\'s knowledge so that he is able to employ a truth theory to interpret the subsentential expressions and the sentences of the object language. If my observation is correct, in the structure of the authors theory the reification of the meanings of the axioms occurs, which would be a strong indication that the semantics they construct does not fulfill the purpose of being a theory immune to the introduction of intensional entities. Moreover, this association of a semantic content to each axiom via quantification seems to imply a more serious question: the signaling of intensional objects to the expressions of the object language. Thus, if my considerations are correct, the semantics of the authors seems not to be configured as an alternative to neo-Fregean theories, in the sense of fulfilling what they do, without in the structure of the theory having to postulate intensional entities.
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SINK, DAMON W. "SANCTUARY FOR ORCHESTRA (2007) AFTER THE POEM BY DONALD DAVIDSON." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2007. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1187279880.
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Lafrance, Jean-David. "L'aspect public de la signification chez Quine et Davidson." Master's thesis, Université Laval, 2004. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=885679731&sid=9&Fmt=2&clientId=9268&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
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James, Steven Michael. "Triangulation and the Problem of Objectivity." The Ohio State University, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1316500581.
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Fischer, Martin. "Davidsons semantisches Programm und deflationäre Wahrheitskonzeptionen." Frankfurt, M. [i.e.] Heusenstamm Paris Lancaster New Brunswick, NJ Ontos-Verl, 2007. http://d-nb.info/988916665/04.
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Arruda, Laura Patrício de. "Interpretação radical e princípio de caridade: conceitos-chave da filosofia de Donald Davidson." Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10923/3533.
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Previous issue date: 2007This research will discuss important aspects of Donald Davidson´s Philosophy. He was one of the most influent philosophers of analytic tradition in the second half of twenty century. For this, we focus on two key concepts of his writings: Radical Interpretation and Principle of Charity. Through these concepts, Davidson defends the possibility to talk about objectivity. Since the communication between people occurs, so a considerable part that we share is common. The first person looses his ontological and epistemological priviledge and is seen as a topic in relation with world and other people, because man is inserted in a social and natural world, interacting with that. His writings offer a coherent image of mind, language and human rationality, adding a rigorous argumentation with an alive dialogue.
Esta pesquisa visa discutir aspectos importantes da filosofia de Donald Davidson, um dos mais influentes filósofos da tradição analítica da segunda metade do século XX. Para tanto, foram escolhidos dois conceitos-chave de sua obra: Interpretação Radical e Princípio de Caridade. Por meio desses conceitos, Davidson defende a possibilidade de falar em objetividade, uma vez que, se a comunicação entre pessoas ocorre, então é porque uma parte considerável do que partilhamos é comum. A primeira pessoa perde seu privilégio ontológico e epistemológico e passa a ser vista como um pólo em relação com o mundo e com as outras pessoas, pois o homem está inserido em um mundo social e natural, interagindo com ele. Sua obra oferece uma imagem coerente da mente, linguagem e racionalidade humana, aliando uma argumentação rigorosa com um diálogo vivo.
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Morais, Eduardo José de Azevedo Charters Fuentes. "Identidade, diferenciação e metafísica de eventos." Universidade Federal da Paraíba, 2015. http://tede.biblioteca.ufpb.br:8080/handle/tede/8439.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES
The metaphysical discussion over causality and identity of events, in the aim of the physicalism, emerges in the context of the collapse of behaviorism. Whilst the paradigms of logical positivism dominated philosophy, the behaviorism dominated psychology. The rupture with the positivism was marked by the work of Willard V. O. Quine. The critics from the two dogmas of empiricism and the proposal of a radical translation allowed emergence of the theses of indetermination of meaning and inscrutability of reference. As alternative to empiricism, Quine recurs to ontological simplification and holism about theory, but considering the primacy of experience, he proposes a shift towards pragmatism. However, Quine’s pragmatism was founded in a behavioristic perspective on the acquisition of linguistic competences, and behaviorism didn’t stood as paradigm for the explanation of mentalist vocabulary. Quine had a great influence in the work and life of Donald Davidson. The ontological economy and the holism of theory marked Davidson’s work in his choice of events as basic entities and his approach to meaning in Truth and Meaning through a theory of truth. While in articles as Action, Reason and Causes Davidson develops an approach to the causal role of events in intention and action, stating that reasons are causes, in The Logical Form of Action Sentences and Causal Relations, he searches for the adequate logical forms of describing events and singular causal statements in order to establish an identity of events. The following metaphysical positions support, in Individuation of Events, a causal individuation criterion for events, and in Events as Particulars and Eternal vs Ephemeral Events, Davidson defends that events are spatiotemporal and unrepeatable particulars, finalizing a metaphysical discussion over of events that will enable him to approach the problem of the mind-body relation, in the anomalous monism argument. Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism presented in Mental Events proposes the thesis of monism – identity between physical events and mental events –, and anomalism of the mental – events do not fall under strict causal laws. To support these theses Davidson formulates three principles, whose conjunction gives us a non-reductionist version of token physicalism and, therefore, permits us to conciliate the mentalist vocabulary with the structure of physicalist language. In this sense, anomalous monism supports a supervenience theory of the mental. Despite the critics made to anomalous monism, as the epiphenomenalism accusation, the theory only crumbles in its initial presuppositions that is that of a priori causality and identity. Thus, the frailest aspects of the argument consist in the difficulty of tracking and identify in experience neural events with mental events, and in the formulation of strict laws. Those questions depend, respectively, on the advancement of neurosciences and physics. The present work, by the name of “Identity, Differentiation and Metaphysics of Events”, consists on an approach to metaphysics of events, in the context of the physicalism of tokens, more specifically to the Donald Davidson’s argument of the anomalous monism that argues for the identity of physical events and mental events and the causal role of mental events. It pretends, therefore, to coordinate the metaphysical discussion of events with Davidson’s anomalous monism.
A discussão metafísica sobre a causalidade e a identidade de eventos, no âmbito do fisicalismo, surge no contexto do colapso do behaviorismo. Porquanto os paradigmas do positivismo-lógico dominaram a filosofia, o behaviorismo dominou a psicologia. A ruptura com o positivismo é marcada pela obra de Willard V. O. Quine: a crítica aos dois dogmas do empirismo e a proposta de uma tradução radical, permitiu erguer as teses da indetermi-nação do significado e inescrutabilidade da referência. Como alternativa ao empirismo, Quine recorre à simplificação ontológica e ao holismo da teoria, mas com a primazia da experiência, propondo assim uma guinada rumo ao pragmatismo. Contudo, o pragmatismo de Quine era fundamentado numa perspectiva behaviorista para a aquisição de competên-cias linguísticas, e o behaviorismo não se firmou como paradigma para a explicação da vocabulário mentalista. Quine teve grande influência no trabalho e vida de Donald Davidson. A economia ontológica e o holismo da teoria marcam a obra de Davidson através da escolha de eventos como entidades básicas e da proposta de problematização do significado, em Verdade e Significado, através de uma teoria da verdade. Enquanto que em artigos como Action, Reasons and Causes Davidson desenvolve uma abordagem ao papel causal de eventos na intenção e na ação, afirmando que razões são causas, em The Logical Form of Action Sentences e Causal Relations, ele explora as formas lógicas adequadas para descrever eventos e para declarações causais singulares e para estabelecer uma identidade de eventos. As posições metafísicas daqui decorrentes sustentam, em Individuation of Events, um critério de individuação causal de eventos e em Events as Particulars e Eternal vs Ephemeral Events, Davidson sustenta que eventos são particulares espaciotemporais irrepetíveis, finalizando uma discussão metafísica de eventos que lhe permitirá abordar o problema da relação corpo-mente, no argumento do monismo anômalo. O monismo anômalo de Davidson, apresentado em Mental Events propõe as teses do monismo – identidade entre eventos físicos e eventos mentais –, e do anomalismo do mental – eventos mentais falham em cair sob leis causais estritas. Para suportar essas teses, Davidson formula três princípios cuja conjunção nos dá uma versão não reducionista do fisicalismo de ocorrências, que, portanto, permite conciliar o vocabulário mentalista com a estrutura linguística fisicalista. Assim, o monismo anômalo suporta uma teoria da superveniência do mental. Apesar do monismo anômalo sofrer algumas críticas, como a acusação de epifenomenalismo, a teoria só sucumbe nos seus pressupostos iniciais, ou seja, a causalidade e a identidade a priori. Os aspetos mais frágeis do argumento consistem na dificuldade de rastrear e identificar, na experiência, eventos neurais com eventos mentais, e na formulação de leis estritas. Questões estas que dependem, respetivamente, do avanço das neurociências e desenvolvimento da física. O presente trabalho, pelo nome de “Identidade, Diferenciação e Metafísica de Eventos”, consiste numa abordagem à metafísica de eventos, no contexto do fisicalismo de ocorrências, mais especificamente do argumento do monismo anômalo de Davidson, que afirma a identidade entre eventos físicos e eventos mentais, assim como o papel causal de eventos mentais. Pretende, portanto, coordenar a discussão metafísica de eventos com o monismo anômalo de Davidson.
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Bonfim, Jonatan Henrique Pinho. "A semântica de Davidson: verdade, referência e mundo." www.teses.ufc.br, 2015. http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/14483.
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BONFIM, Jonatan Henrique Pinho. A semântica de Davidson: verdade, referência e mundo. 2015. 100f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2015.Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2015-12-14T15:25:22Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2015_dis_jhpbonfim.pdf: 570430 bytes, checksum: dd1853860ade8efbe993a541f0e4a9fc (MD5)
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É possível elaborar uma teoria do significado sem levar em conta o mundo como referência? Por meio dessa inquietação propormos analisar as críticas de Donald Davidson a teoria da verdade como correspondência e a semântica clássica, cujas entidades extralinguísticas e o mundo “desnudo” são determinantes para compor a significação. Por meio da investigação do seu programa – Programa de Davidson – indicaremos a) as possíveis soluções e dissoluções de problemas gerados por tais teorias, muitas vezes, provenientes da concepção de linguagem subjacente a elas e b) a construção de uma teoria adequada do significado que tem como ponto nevrálgico mostrar que na comunicação entre falantes competentes há uma construção de uma teoria da verdade para a linguagem do outro. Davidson convida-nos a trilhar outro percurso teórico que pensam os conteúdos, dentre eles a referência, sendo construído dentro da linguagem e não mais fora dela, sem, contudo, cair no problema da vacuidade da linguagem, portanto, de uma explicação da significação completamente desconectada do mundo.
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Pedace, Karina. "La normatividad de lo mental y el rol de la segunda persona. Tras las huellas de Donald Davidson." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2012. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/112802.
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The Normativity of the Mental and the Role of the Second Person’s Standpoint. On Davidson’s Footsteps”. I offer in this paper an elucidation of the normativity of the mental in terms of the second person’s standpoint, with the hope of opening a conceptual horizon that will allow us to go beyond Donald Davidson. Aiming at this, the paper is structured as follows. In the first part I present Davidson’s original response to the mind/body problem and reconstruct his argument in favour of the irreducibility of mental concepts thesis. In the second part I deal with the feature that the peculiarity of the mental bears in his system, that is, normativity. In the third section I explore and assess the davidsonian treatment of the first, second and third person standpoints with the aim of finally narrowing down my proposal.En este trabajo ofrezco una elucidación de la normatividad de lo mental en términos de la perspectiva de segunda persona, con la esperanza de abrir un horizonte conceptual que nos permita ir más allá de Donald Davidson. A tal efecto, el artículo tiene la siguiente estructura. En la primera parte presento su original respuesta al problema mente/cuerpo y reconstruyo su argumentación a favor de la tesis de la irreducibilidad de los conceptos mentales. En la segunda parte me ocupo del rasgo que, en su sistema, porta la peculiaridad de lo mental, a saber: la normatividad. En la tercera sección exploro y evalúo el tratamiento davidsoniano de las perspectivas de primera, segunda y tercera persona con vistas a precisar, finalmente, mi propuesta.
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Burg, Floris G. van der. "We all live in a single conceptual scheme : perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.340986.
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Arruda, Laura Patr?cio de. "Interpreta??o radical e princ?pio de caridade : conceitos-chave da filosofia de Donald Davidson." Pontif?cia Universidade Cat?lica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2008. http://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/handle/tede/2977.
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Previous issue date: 2008-01-07Esta pesquisa visa discutir aspectos importantes da filosofia de Donald Davidson, um dos mais influentes fil?sofos da tradi??o anal?tica da segunda metade do s?culo XX. Para tanto, foram escolhidos dois conceitos-chave de sua obra: Interpreta??o Radical e Princ?pio de Caridade. Por meio desses conceitos, Davidson defende a possibilidade de falar em objetividade, uma vez que, se a comunica??o entre pessoas ocorre, ent?o ? porque uma parte consider?vel do que partilhamos ? comum. A primeira pessoa perde seu privil?gio ontol?gico e epistemol?gico e passa a ser vista como um p?lo em rela??o com o mundo e com as outras pessoas, pois o homem est? inserido em um mundo social e natural, interagindo com ele. Sua obra oferece uma imagem coerente da mente, linguagem e racionalidade humana, aliando uma argumenta??o rigorosa com um di?logo vivo
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Alves, Marco Aurelio Sousa. "Sobre a possibilidade de pensarmos o mundo: o debate entre John McDowell e Donald Davidson." Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1843/ARBZ-842LKE.
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This thesis evaluates a contemporary debate concerning the very possibility of thinking about the world. In the first chapter, McDowell's critique of Davidson is presented, focusing on the coherentism defended by the latter. The critique of the myth of the given (as it appears in
Sellars and Wittgenstein), as well as the necessity of a minimal empiricism (which McDowell finds in Quine and Kant), lead to an oscillation in contemporary thinking between two equally unsatisfactory ways of understanding the empirical content of thought. In the second chapter, I defend Davidson's approach, focusing on his theory of interpretation and semantic externalism, as well as on the relation between causes and reasons. In the third chapter, the debate is analyzed in more detail. I criticize the anomalous monism, the way in which the boundaries between the conceptual and the non-conceptual are understood by Davidson, as well as the naturalized Platonism defended by McDowell. This thesis is mainly negative, and it concludes by revealing problems in both positions under evaluation.O trabalho avalia um debate contemporâneo acerca da possibilidade mesma de pensarmos sobre o mundo. No primeiro capítulo, é apresentada a crítica de McDowell a Davidson, que enfatiza o coerentismo adotado pelo segundo. A crítica ao mito do dado (tal como aparece em Sellars e Wittgenstein), bem como a necessidade de um empirismo mínimo (que McDowell detecta em Quine e Kant), apontam para uma oscilação no pensamento contemporâneo entre duas formas insatisfatórias de compreender o conteúdo empírico do pensamento. No segundo capítulo, apresento uma defesa de Davidson, enfatizando sua teoria da interpretação e do externismo semântico, bem como a relação entre causas e razões. No terceiro capítulo, avalio mais detidamente o debate, criticando o monismo anômalo, a forma como a fronteira entre conceitual e não-conceitual é entendida em Davidson, bem como o platonismo naturalizado defendido por McDowell. O trabalho apresenta uma natureza negativa, e termina constatando as deficiências de ambas as posições avaliadas.
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Fischborn, Marcelo. "POR QUE (E POR QUE NÃO) REJEITAR O MONISMO ANÔMALO." Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, 2014. http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9128.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível SuperiorAnomalous monism is a theory in the philosophy of mind put forth by Donald Davidson in the 1970s. Although influential at the time, it received numerous criticisms, and it is now widely rejected. The present Master s Dissertation argues for a revision of the reasons for which anomalous monism should be rejected. According to a well known objection in the literature, anomalous monism entails the thesis of property epiphenomenalism, and should be rejected because this consequence is unacceptable. It is proposed that this objection is inadequate in its two crucial steps. First, property epiphenomenalism does not seem to follow from anomalous monism, and, second, there seems to be no sufficient reason for a decisive rejection of property epiphenomenalism. Despite this, there are alternative reasons for rejecting anomalous monism, which concern the justification of the monist thesis. At least one of the premises Davidson takes to support it appears to be false, and, additionally, the very possibility of the monism at issue is threatened by problems in the ontology of events it assumes.
O monismo anômalo é uma teoria em filosofia da mente proposta por Donald Davidson na década de 1970. Embora influente na época, essa teoria recebeu inúmeras críticas e é atualmente amplamente rejeitada. A presente dissertação argumenta em favor de uma revisão das razões pelas quais o monismo anômalo deve ser rejeitado. De acordo com uma objeção bem conhecida na literatura, o monismo anômalo implica a tese do epifenomenismo de propriedades e deve ser rejeitado porque essa consequência é inaceitável. Propõe-se que essa objeção é inadequada em seus dois passos cruciais. Em primeiro lugar, o epifenomenismo de propriedades não parece se seguir do monismo anômalo, e, em segundo, não parece haver razões suficientes para uma rejeição decisiva do epifenomenismo de propriedades. Apesar disso, há razões alternativas para se rejeitar o monismo anômalo, que dizem respeito à justificação da tese monista. Pelo menos uma das premissas que Davidson empregou em sua defesa parece falsa, e, adicionalmente, a própria possibilidade do monismo em questão é ameaçada por dificuldades na ontologia de eventos que pressupõe.
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Ogien, Ruwen. "La faiblesse de la volonté : (Aristote, Davidson)." Paris 1, 1991. http://www.theses.fr/1991PA010648.
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Trois types d'explication de l'action humaine sont soumis au test aristolecien de l'acrasia (faiblesse de la volonté ou action intentionnelle contraire au meilleur jugement de l'agent) : causal, logique (le syllogisme pratique) et mixte (la théorie aristotélicienne de la phorésies et la théorie davidsonnienne du raisonnement pratique). La conclusion est sceptique ou négative nous ne disposons d'aucune explication convaincante ou d'aucune justification rationnelle de nos façons ordinaires de parler du pouvoir de nos croyances et de nos désirs dans la production et l'orientation de nos actionsThree types of esplanation of human action are submitted to the aristotelician test of acrasia (weakness of will, intentional action aginst one's own better judgement) : the causal, the logical (the so-called practical syllogism) and the mixed (the aristotelician theory of phronesis or the davidsonian theory of practical reasoning). The conclusion is sceptical or negative. We don't have any convincing explantation or any good rational justification for our ordinary talk about the power of our desires and beliefs in the production and orientation of our actions
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Beckman, Emma. "Superveniens och dess plats inom anomal monism : En analys av debatten mellan Donald Davidson och Jaegwon Kim." Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Religion and Culture, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-8770.
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Denna uppsats analyserar den medvetandefilosofiska debatten mellan Donald Davidson och Jaegwon Kim rörande Davidsons tes om det mentalas superveniens på det fysiska. Tesen utgör ett element i Davidsons generella teori om relationen mellan det mentala och det fysiska; anomal monism. Författaren frågar sig om Kim har rätt i att tesen om mental superveniens inte är tillräcklig för att garantera det mentala kausal kraft. I uppsatsen analyseras de båda filosofernas ståndpunkter i debatten med speciell tonvikt på deras respektive definitioner av superveniensbegreppet. Med utgångspunkt i detta argumenterar författarinnan att Kim i viss utsträckning kan sägas ha missförstått Davidsons superveniens-begrepp. Kim har definierat "svag" respektive "stark" och velat tolka Davidsons superveniens som tillhörande den sistnämnda sorten. Uppsatsförfattaren intar en ståndpunkt motsatt Kims och menar att Davidsons superveniensbegrepp snarare bör förstås som en variant av svag superveniens, men konstaterar samtidigt att det inte är helt säkert att dennes superveniens alls kan inordnas i någon av dessa kategorier; dessa refererar till "möjliga världar", vilka Davidson vägrar acceptera.
This paper analyses the debate between Donald Davidson and Jaegwon Kim concerning Davidsons idea of the supervenience of the mental upon the physical. This thought is part of Davidson's general theory of the relation between mind and body; anomalous monism. The author asks wherther Kim is right that mental supervenience is insufficient to gurantee the mental causal power. The paper analyses the standpoints of both philosophers, especially regarding their definitions of "supervenience" and argues that Kim, to some extent, can be said to have misunderstood Davidson's notion of supervenience. Kim has offered definitons of "weak" and "strong" supervenience and interpreted Davidsons supervenience as being of the kind last mentioned. The author takes a standpoint opposite of Kim's and argues that Davidson's notion of supervenience is better understood as weak supervenience, but at the same time notes that it is by no means obvious that Davidsons supervenience can be said to belong to either of these categories since these refer to "possible worlds", which Davidson refuses to accept.
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Daigle, Jean-François. "Le monisme anomal et l'épiphénoménisme." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ49007.pdf.
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Cook, John R. "The relation between world and language in the philosophy of Donald Davidson : the critique of conceptual relativism /." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp04/mq25834.pdf.
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Engel, Pascal. "Recherches sur les conditions d'une sémantique formelle du langage naturel : (la philosophie du langage de Donald Davidson)." Aix-Marseille 1, 1990. http://www.theses.fr/1990AIX10047.
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Analyse de la philosophie du langage de davidson. L'auteur montre que le projet de davidson d'appliquer les concepts d'une theorie de la verite pour les langues formelles aux langues naturelles ne peut qu'etre interprete a la lumiere de la theorie de l'interpretation de davidson. Il analyse les concepts de formel logique et de structure semantique, en particulier au sujet dela semantique des adverbes. Il montre que le programme de davidson est compatible avec l'analyse de la signification en termes d'intentions de grice. La seconde partie du travail est consacree au debat realisme anti-realisme. L'auteur montre que ou bien la critique de dummett echoue, ou bien qu'elle n'introduit pas de veritable desaccord avec davidson. Finalement le travail examine la notion de connaissance tacite d'un langage, en particulier a la lumiere des critiques de gareth evans, qui prolongent la pensee de davidson.
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Thorpe, Joshua. "A response to external world scepticism." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/9502.
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In this thesis I give a response to external world scepticism. I first argue that scepticism arises when we accept that it is an empirical question whether I am in a sceptical scenario, that is, a scenario in which my beliefs are coherent, and yet my empirical beliefs are false. The idea that it is an empirical question whether I am in a sceptical scenario gets its plausibility from the realist claim that our empirical beliefs have an objective subject matter. I then attempt to give a response to scepticism that is compatible with this realist claim. Three promising responses to scepticism are considered, but are found to be inadequate. Seeing why these responses are inadequate helps us to appreciate some of the conditions on an adequate response to scepticism. By drawing on the work of Donald Davidson I develop a response to scepticism that is compatible with the realist claim, and that meets these conditions. According to this response, when we get clear about the concept of belief we see that sceptical scenarios are a conceptual impossibility. Thus, just as it is not an empirical question whether I am a married bachelor, it is not an empirical question whether I am in a sceptical scenario, and the argument for scepticism breaks down.
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Vilatta, Emilia. "Un enfoque davidsoniano de los delirios: el caso del delirio de Capgras." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2017. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/113129.
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Recientemente, algunos críticos del enfoque davidsoniano de la atribución intencional han señalado que el mismo no puede ser aplicado para el caso de los delirios psiquiátricos, dado que las creencias delirantes no satisfacen los requisitos de racionalidad que este impone. En este trabajo: i) reconstruyo, a partir del análisis del caso del delirio de Capgras, la crítica a la idea de que solo podemos interpretar a un agente con creencias irracionales si mantiene aún un trasfondo de racionalidad; ii) objeto la misma y argumento que este delirio no representa un verdadero contraejemplo ya que un examen adecuado del mismo muestra que los sujetos con delirio de Capgras conservan un trasfondo de racionalidad. Señalaré así, que las condiciones mínimas para que la atribución de estados intencionales tenga lugar se encuentran garantizadas.
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Jaworski, Michael Dean. "Thought Without Language: an Interpretationist Approach to the Thinking Mind." The Ohio State University, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1276576639.
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Drunkenmölle, Tomas Rodolfo. "O significado das metáforas segundo Searle e Davidson / Tomas Rodolfo Drunkenmölle ; orientador, Kleber B. B. Candiotto." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da PUC_PR, 2011. http://www.biblioteca.pucpr.br/pergamum/biblioteca/img.php?arquivo=/000051/0000513d.pdf.
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Dissertação (mestrado) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná, Curitiba, 2011Bibliografia: f. 108-110
As abordagens da metáfora de Donald Davidson e John Searle são consistentes com as respectivas teorias do significado nas quais estão baseadas. Enquanto ambos os filósofos concordam que a falsidade patente geralmente se evidencia nos casos em que a metáf
Donald Davidson's and John Searle's approach to metaphor is consistent with their respective theory of meaning on which it is based. While both philosophers agree that patent falsity is the usual case with metaphor in their literal interpretation, they di
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Medlow, Sharon Denise. "Mechanisms of mental causation: An examination of the theories of Anomalous Monism and Direct Realism with regard to their proposals concerning the causal role of human mentality in the natural world." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/678.
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One of the most interesting developments in recent psychological theorising has been a growing appreciation of the need for a viable theory of mental causation. Hitherto, the prospects for reconciling what seems to be the uniquely rational character of human thought and action with the non-rational mechanistic workings of the natural world have appeared to be limited or even illusory, and the pursuit of reconciliation of this sort has therefore formerly been dismissed as being either impossible of completion or inappropriate for contemplation. Much of the scepticism concerning the role of causal processes in human thought and action was dispelled, however, by the philosopher Donald Davidson, who argues that not only is human action capable of being caused by the actor's thoughts and desires, but that only when such action is so caused, can it be rational. Davidson's proposal for the reconciliation of human rationality with causal necessitation is articulated in his theory of Anomalous Monism. According to this theory, there exists what may be termed an ontological-conceptual distinction between events themselves and the characters or properties that are attributed to events by human observers, and it is through recognition of this distinction that one discovers how mental events, that is, events that are amenable to description in the psychological vocabulary, are causally efficacious yet free from the constraints typically associated with the necessity and sufficiency of causal laws. Anomalous Monism, if it were workable, would therefore resolve the paradox according to which human mentality is at once integrated in, and yet unconstrained by, the mechanistic natural world, by demonstrating the compatibility of the facts of causation with the intuitions of folk psychology. However, close examination of Anomalous Monism reveals it to rely on logically flawed anti-realist principles concerning the characters of events, properties and causation. It follows from this that the theory itself must be rejected, but the task that it was devised to undertake, the formulation of a viable theory of mental causation, need not be similarly discarded. Rather, what remains is the challenge of delineating an alternative theory, one that withstands logical scrutiny whilst addressing what is characteristic of human mental processes, and thereby what is characteristic of mental causation. The theory of Direct Realism that is derived from the broader philosophical realism of John Anderson provides the materials for meeting this challenge. According to Direct Realism, mental phenomena are relational situations obtaining between certain organisms (including humans) and their environments. As such, mental phenomena are included in the range of phenomena occurring in the natural world and they are therefore subject to all of its ways of working, including its deterministic mechanisms. The particular challenge that a Direct Realist theory of mental causation faces, that of demonstrating that relational situations can be causal, is revealed upon examination of the character of causation to be unproblematic. Furthermore, the seeming incompatibility between human rationality and natural necessitation is resolved when it is acknowledged that, rather than be an inherent feature of thought and action, logical structure is a characteristic of the natural environment that organisms are at times sensitive to, as revealed by its effects on the characters of their thoughts and actions. Far from being remote or illusory, the prospects for reconciling human mentality with the causal mechanisms of the natural world are discovered in the present thesis to be favourable when a realist approach to the characters of both mental events and causation is adopted.
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Medlow, Sharon Denise. "Mechanisms of mental causation: An examination of the theories of Anomalous Monism and Direct Realism with regard to their proposals concerning the causal role of human mentality in the natural world." University of Sydney. Psychology, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/678.
Full textAbstract:
One of the most interesting developments in recent psychological theorising has been a growing appreciation of the need for a viable theory of mental causation. Hitherto, the prospects for reconciling what seems to be the uniquely rational character of human thought and action with the non-rational mechanistic workings of the natural world have appeared to be limited or even illusory, and the pursuit of reconciliation of this sort has therefore formerly been dismissed as being either impossible of completion or inappropriate for contemplation. Much of the scepticism concerning the role of causal processes in human thought and action was dispelled, however, by the philosopher Donald Davidson, who argues that not only is human action capable of being caused by the actor�s thoughts and desires, but that only when such action is so caused, can it be rational. Davidson�s proposal for the reconciliation of human rationality with causal necessitation is articulated in his theory of Anomalous Monism. According to this theory, there exists what may be termed an ontological-conceptual distinction between events themselves and the characters or properties that are attributed to events by human observers, and it is through recognition of this distinction that one discovers how mental events, that is, events that are amenable to description in the psychological vocabulary, are causally efficacious yet free from the constraints typically associated with the necessity and sufficiency of causal laws. Anomalous Monism, if it were workable, would therefore resolve the paradox according to which human mentality is at once integrated in, and yet unconstrained by, the mechanistic natural world, by demonstrating the compatibility of the facts of causation with the intuitions of folk psychology. However, close examination of Anomalous Monism reveals it to rely on logically flawed anti-realist principles concerning the characters of events, properties and causation. It follows from this that the theory itself must be rejected, but the task that it was devised to undertake, the formulation of a viable theory of mental causation, need not be similarly discarded. Rather, what remains is the challenge of delineating an alternative theory, one that withstands logical scrutiny whilst addressing what is characteristic of human mental processes, and thereby what is characteristic of mental causation. The theory of Direct Realism that is derived from the broader philosophical realism of John Anderson provides the materials for meeting this challenge. According to Direct Realism, mental phenomena are relational situations obtaining between certain organisms (including humans) and their environments. As such, mental phenomena are included in the range of phenomena occurring in the natural world and they are therefore subject to all of its ways of working, including its deterministic mechanisms. The particular challenge that a Direct Realist theory of mental causation faces, that of demonstrating that relational situations can be causal, is revealed upon examination of the character of causation to be unproblematic. Furthermore, the seeming incompatibility between human rationality and natural necessitation is resolved when it is acknowledged that, rather than be an inherent feature of thought and action, logical structure is a characteristic of the natural environment that organisms are at times sensitive to, as revealed by its effects on the characters of their thoughts and actions. Far from being remote or illusory, the prospects for reconciling human mentality with the causal mechanisms of the natural world are discovered in the present thesis to be favourable when a realist approach to the characters of both mental events and causation is adopted.
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Hönig, Kathrin. ""Im Spiegel der Bedeutung" : eine Studie über die Begründbarkeit des Relativismus /." Würzburg Königshausen und Neumann, 2006. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2710040&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.
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Sisk, Michael Allen. "The courage and endurance to remain in his own country and fight the battle out Donald Davidson and the South, 1893-1968 /." Connect to this title online, 2008. http://etd.lib.clemson.edu/documents/1239895487/.
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Saint, Nicholas. "The semantic role of narrow content hope for Swampman /." Diss., Connect to the thesis, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10066/690.
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Pinnegar, Ruth. "La validite de la theorie triadique de l'interpretation selon Donald Davidson, la théorie de la pertinence et le cas des Fous de bassan d'Anne Hebert." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0006/NQ41274.pdf.
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Billinge, Daniel. "Full-bloodedness, modesty and minimalist truth." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/9032.
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This thesis discusses the central ideas that surround Michael Dummett's claim that there is an incompatibility between a truth-conditional conception of meaning and a minimalist conception of truth. These ideas are brought into relation to the work of John McDowell and Donald Davidson, as all three philosophers can be better understood by locating them within Dummett's dialectic regarding the incompatibility. Dummett's argument crucially depends upon the assumption that a meaning-theory should be full-blooded in nature, against McDowell's insistence that a meaning-theory can only ever be modest. The main contention of this thesis is that neither Dummett nor McDowell is successful in establishing their strong contentions regarding the form that a meaning-theory should take. McDowell only wants to provide trivial answers to questions about the constitutive nature of the meanings and competency of particular items in a language. Dummett, on the other hand, wants to provide a reductive account of the central concepts that concern the philosophy of language. What this thesis will argue is that once both of these claims have been rejected, the position Dummett and McDowell jointly dictate is in fact the position that we should read Davidson as occupying, who lies in a conceptual space between the extremes of maximal full-bloodedness and modesty. This is an understanding of Davidson that is contrary to how McDowell reads him, who has been an influential commentator of Davidson. How Davidson should actually be interpreted is achieved by understanding how he has the resources to avoid Dummett's claim of an incompatibility between a truth-conditional conception of meaning and a minimalist conception of truth.
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Christensen, Carleton B. "Self and world from analytic philosophy to phenomenology." Berlin New York, NY de Gruyter, 2008. http://d-nb.info/988967723/04.
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Conradie, Niel Henk. "Towards a convincing account of intention." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/86698.
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Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2014.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis has two aims. The first is to assess the cogency of the three most influential theories of intention – namely those of Elizabeth Anscombe, Donald Davidson and Michael Bratman. I identify five requirements that a convincing account of intention must fulfil, and then assess each of these theories in light of these five requirements. In the course of this analysis, I demonstrate that, while each of these theories contributes to our understanding of intention, none of them meet all the specified requirements. This leads to the second aim of this thesis, which is to develop an account of intention capable of overcoming the problems inherent in the foregoing theories of intention and hence fulfilling the specified requirements. This account is built around the definition of intention as a complex mental entity, consisting of two components: a revisable pro-attitude and a belief that the agent will try to fulfil this pro-attitude. It must further be possible for the agent to reflexively reconstruct the belief component without external information. I begin by setting out the five requirements for a convincing account of intention. In each case, I explain why it is necessary for a theory of intention to meet the relevant requirement, and elaborate on what is needed for an account of intention to fulfil this requirement. The five requirements for a convincing account of intention are: 1) It must explain the unity of the three seemingly irreconcilable uses of intention; 2) it must explain the epistemic requirements for intention; 3) it must clarify the relationship between intention and motivation, intention and causes, and intention and reasons; 4) it must explain the relationship between intention and practical reasoning, and 5) it must clarify the relationship between intention and moral responsibility. Together, these five requirements form the yardstick against which I evaluate the different theories of intention. With this yardstick in mind, I am then able to assess each of the influential theories of intention developed by Anscombe, Davidson, and Bratman. In each case, I examine how the relevant theory of intention fares in meeting each of the five requirements. This analysis shows that, while each theory provides a number of important insights, none of them succeeds in meeting all five requirements. Such analysis further enables me to identify the specific difficulties that have stymied the attempts of all three thinkers to develop a convincing account of intention. Having identified the strengths and weaknesses of the three preceding accounts of intention, I then try to work out an alternative account of intention that would not fall prey to the same complications. Following the same modus operandi as before, I evaluate my proposed account against the five requirements for a convincing theory of intention. In each case, I show that my account not only succeeds in meeting the specified criterion, but also, crucially, that it is able to overcome the difficulties that have plagued previous attempts to fulfil this criterion. I conclude that, while this account is not necessarily conclusive, it does meet the conditions for a convincing account of intention and thereby casts some light into the conceptual darkness surrounding intention that Anscombe identified more than half a century ago.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis het twee oogmerke. Die eerste is om die oortuigingskrag van die drie mees invloedryke teorieë van intensie te beoordeel – naamlik die van Elizabeth Anscombe, Donald Davidson en Michael Bratman. Ek identifiseer vyf vereistes waaraan ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie moet voldoen en beoordeel dan elk van hierdie teorieë aan die hand van hierdie vyf vereistes. In die loop van hierdie analise wys ek dat, alhoewel elkeen van hierdie teorieë tot ons verstaan van intensie bydra, geeneen aan al die gespesifiseerde vereistes voldoen nie. Dit lei tot die tweede oogmerk van die tesis, wat die ontwikkeling van ‘n teorie van intensie behels wat daartoe in staat is om die probleme wat inherent aan die voorgenoemde teorieë is, te oorkom en wat dus aan die gespesifiseerde vereistes voldoen. Hierdie teorie berus op die definisie van intensie as ‘n komplekse mentale entiteit wat uit twee komponente bestaan: ‘n wysigbare pro-houding en ‘n oortuiging dat die agent hierdie pro-houding sal probeer vervul. Dit moet verder ook vir die agent moontlik wees om die oortuigingskomponent refleksief te rekonstrueer sonder eksterne inligting. Ek begin deur die vyf vereistes vir ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie uiteen te sit. In elke geval verduidelik ek hoekom dit nodig is vir ‘n teorie van intensie om aan die relevante vereiste te voldoen en werk ek uit wat nodig is vir ‘n verklaring van intensie om aan hierdie vereiste te voldoen. Die vyf vereistes vir ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie is: 1) Dit moet die ooreenstemming tussen die drie skynbaar onversoenbare gebruike van intensie verduidelik; 2) dit moet die epistemiese vereistes vir intensie verduidelik; 3) dit moet die verhouding tussen intensie en motivering, intensie en oorsake, en intensie en redes verhelder; 4) dit moet die verhouding tussen intensie en praktiese redenering verhelder; en 5) dit moet die verhouding tussen intensie en morele verantwoordelikheid verhelder. Gesamentlik vorm hierdie vyf vereistes die maatstaf waarvolgens ek die verskillende teorieë van intensie evalueer. Met hierdie maatstaf in gedagte is ek dan in staat daartoe om elkeen van die invloedryke teorieë van intensie, wat ontwikkel is deur Anscombe, Davidson en Bratman, te beoordeel. In elke geval ondersoek ek hoe die relevante teorie van intensie vaar in die voldoening aan elkeen van hierdie vyf vereistes. Hierdie analise wys dat, alhoewel elke teorie ‘n aantal belangrike insigte bied, geen van hul daarin slaag om aan al vyf vereistes te voldoen nie. So ‘n analise stel my verder in staat om die spesifieke probleme te identifiseer waardeur die pogings van al drie denkers om ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie te ontwikkel, gestuit is. Nadat ek die sterk en swakpunte van die drie voorafgaande verklarings van intensie geïdentifiseer het, probeer ek dan om ‘n alternatiewe teorie van intensie uit te werk wat nie aan hierdie selfde komplikasies onderhewig is nie. Deur dieselfde modus operandi as voorheen te volg, evalueer ek my voorgestelde verklaring aan die hand van die vyf vereistes vir ‘n oortuigende teorie van intensie. In elke geval wys ek dat my verklaring nie bloot daaraan slaag om aan die gespesifiseerde kriterium te voldoen nie, maar ook, van deurslaggewende belang, dat dit in staat daartoe is om die probleme te oorkom waardeur vorige pogings om die kriterium te vervul, geteister is. Ek kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat, alhoewel hierdie teorie nie noodwendig afdoende is nie, dit wel die voorwaardes vir ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie vervul en hierdeur lig werp op die konseptuele duisternis waarin intensie gehul is en wat meer as ‘n halfeeu gelede deur Anscombe geïdentifiseer is.
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王偉雄 and Wai-hung Wong. "Donald Davidson's theory of interpretation." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1993. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31211045.
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The Best MPhil Thesis in the Faculties of Architecture, Arts, Business& Economics, Education, Law and Social Sciences (University of HongKong), Li Ka Shing Prize, 1991-1993published_or_final_version
Philosophy
Master
Master of Philosophy
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Fournier, Laure. "Les problèmes de la causalité mentale." Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013AIXM3058.
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Quel type de choses sont les raisons que nous donnons pour expliquer nos comportements ? Sont-ce des entités dans nos cerveaux causalement responsables de nos actions ? Sinon, doit-on accepter le dualisme cartésien ? Faut-il croire avec Davidson que les raisons sont des entités physiques pourtant impossibles à identifier en termes physiques ? Nous proposons une réponse alternative : les raisons sont des choses dont nous ne faisons pas l’expérience. Elles peuvent être dites guider nos actions, en vertu d’une cohérence que nous acquérons à travers le temps, en même temps qu’une identité personnelle claire. On défend donc ici la thèse wittgensteinienne selon laquelle les raisons ne sont pas des causes, et l’on cherche ce qu’elles sont positivement. Car il y a bien une différence, dans la réalité physique, entre agir pour une raison ou l’autre. Mais c’est une réalité que l’on recherche et construit, et non que l’on observe et nomme. En parlant de nos raisons, on parle avant de savoir, pour faire advenir quelque chose –quelque chose de physique, comme toute chose.On soutient ainsi contre Kim qu’il est possible de croire à la pertinence propre des raisons, tout en restant moniste, sans dommage pour la rationalité humaine.Tout ceci a d’importantes conséquences éthiques : l’évaluation des raisons et intentions n’est sensée que si elle est une tentative pour bien agir ; elle sera toujours non pertinente pour définir les actions passées, et cela remet gravement en cause la notion de mérite. Ainsi proposons-nous de concevoir la morale de façon dynamique, comme étant ce que l’on cherche toujours à rendre possibleWhat kind of things are the reasons we use to explain our behavior? Are they material entities in the brain, causing actions? Are they, as Davidson says, physical entities that we cannot identify in physical terms? Are we forced to accept Cartesian dualism? This thesis proposes another answer. Reasons are not experienced. They are sought through action and conceptualization. They may be said to guide our actions, but not as events which cause actions; rather, they serve, over time, to construct coherent behavior and stable personal identity.We defend here the Wittgensteinian thesis that reasons are not causes. We show that it is consistent with monism. The difference between acting for this or that reason does exist in reality, but it is a reality that we construct and pursue, not one that we experience and name. This is because when we give reasons, we speak before knowing, in order to make something exist.Thus we argue, against Kim, that it is possible to be a monist, to defend the importance of rational explanations, and to deny the possibility of reducing reasons to causes. Indeed, the knowledge necessary to do so would be far beyond the knowledge we require to speak the language of reasons.This conception of reasons as things that we seek rather than thing that we experience has important consequences in ethics. Namely, that the evaluation of reasons or intentions only makes sense when one attempts to act appropriately; it is irrelevant in defining past actions. This means that the very idea of merit is problematic, and that morality itself is something we must constantly work to make possible
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Aucouturier, Valérie. ""En termes de langage" : l'articulation entre intention , action et langage dans l'oeuvre de G.E.M. Anscombe." Paris 1, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009PA010669.
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Ce travail aborde la philosophie de I'action d'E. Anscombe depuis la perspective du langage. Une thèse centrale de celle-ci est qu'une action est toujours envisagée sous une description dont l'action intentionnelle serait une des formes majeures. L'action serait indissociable du langage en tant que produit d'une pratique linguistique particulière consistant notamment à fournir des raisons d'agir. L'ancrage linguistique de I'action suggère I'impossibilité d'expliquer I'action en dehors des catégories de langage qui lui sont propres. Nous défendons cette approche à I'encontre des conceptions de l'action visant à sa naturalisation. Notre propos s'appuie sur I'idée de la possibilité de défendre une conception dite « extemaliste» des intentions qui ne les réduit pas a une donnée introspective invérifiable. Nous articulons deux idées: Ie caractère essentiellement linguistique de l'action et sa dépendance à une réalité extralinguistique, à laquelle on ne peut cependant la réduire.
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Volgsten, Ulrik. "Music, mind and the serious Zappa : the passions of a virtual listener." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Universitet, 1999. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb37107293k.
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