Relevant bibliographies by topics / Disquotationalism

Academic literature on the topic 'Disquotationalism'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 20 February 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Disquotationalism"

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Freedman, Karyn L. "Disquotationalism, Truth and Justification: The Pragmatist's Wrong Turn." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36, no. 3 (September 2006): 371–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2006.0016.

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A view of truth that gained prominence among early logical positivists, what A.J. Ayer called the ‘redundancy theory of truth,’ has had a renaissance over the last few decades. The fundamental thought behind this theory is that the truth predicate is a device of disquotation. Redundancy, or disquotationalism, is seen by its advocates as providing a definitive answer to the perennial question ‘what is the nature of truth?’ The answer, says the disquotationalist, is to reject the idea that truth has some underlying nature. The terms true and false, as Ayer put it, connote nothing (Ayer, 1936/1946,88). They do not correspond or refer to some elusive ingredient of reality. Truth, he argued, must be deflated from its exalted metaphysical Status — but the notion should not be dispensed with altogether. Disquotationalists like Ayer think that the truth predicate has an essential role to play in logic. Indeed, disquotationalism, in its purest form, sees the sole function of the truth predicate as fulfilling this logical need, that is, as a device that aids generalization by permitting infinite conjunction and disjunction.
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Newhard, Jay. "Disquotationalism, Minimalism, and the Finite Minimal Theory." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34, no. 1 (March 2004): 61–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2004.10716559.

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Recently, Paul Horwich has developed the minimalist theory of truth, according to which the truth predicate does not express a Substantive property, though it may be used as a grammatical expedient. Minimalism shares these Claims with Quine's disquotationalism; it differs from disquotationalism primarily in holding that truth-bearers are propositions, rather than sentences. Despite potential ontological worries, allowing that propositions bear truth gives Horwich a prima facie response to several important objections to disquotationalism. In section I of this paper, disquotationalism is given a careful exegesis, in which seven known objections are traced to the disquotational Schema, and two new objections are raised. A version of disquotationalism which avoids two of the seven known objections is recommended. In section II, an examination of minimalism shows that it faces eight of the nine objections facing disquotationalism, plus a new objection.
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Bacon, Andrew. "RADICAL ANTI‐DISQUOTATIONALISM." Philosophical Perspectives 32, no. 1 (December 2018): 41–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12109.

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Kemp, Gary. "Disquotationalism and Expressiveness." Journal of Philosophical Logic 34, no. 3 (June 2005): 327–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-005-1529-4.

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PATTERSON, Douglas. "Two Arguments Against Disquotationalism." Dialectica 56, no. 2 (June 23, 2005): 99–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2002.tb00233.x.

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David, Marian A. "Truth, Eliminativism, and Disquotationalism." Noûs 23, no. 5 (December 1989): 599. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2216003.

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Sanchez-Miguel, Manuel Garcia-Carpintero. "Two Varieties of Disquotationalism." Philosophical Issues 5 (1994): 177. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1522879.

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Halbach, V. "Disquotationalism and infinite conjunctions." Mind 108, no. 429 (January 1, 1999): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/108.429.1.

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Everett, Anthony. "Disquotationalism, reference, and object dependence." Philosophical Studies 165, no. 3 (August 2, 2012): 939–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9961-0.

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Bo, Chen. "Quine’s Disquotationalism: A Variant of Correspondence Theory." Philosophical Forum 51, no. 2 (May 25, 2020): 93–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phil.12248.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Disquotationalism"

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Hou, Richard Wei Tzu. "Between Quine's Disquotationalism and Horwich's Minimalism." University of Sydney, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/1131.

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Doctor of Philosophy
Many criticisms of the prevalent deflationary theories of truth stem from some misunderstanding. Clarification can be found from considering Quine's reasoning on the disquotational feature of the truth predicate. Quine's disquotationalism and Horwich's minimalism are similar theses with respect to the concept of truth, though the difference between the choices of the primary truth bearers and the divergence in their accounts of meaning and reference are striking. Chapter Two is devoted to making plain Quine's reasoning regarding the disquotational concept of truth, and to constructing a disquotational theory of truth. Also in this chapter, the topic of how to enhance the deductive power of this theory is discussed. The following chapter aims to square Quine's theses of inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity, with an account of the disquotational schema of reference. Whether or not a disquotational schema of reference and all its instances can be seen as providing a genuine reference scheme, as claimed by Horwich and most deflationists, is also discussed. In Chapter Four, after an introduction of Horwich's minimalist conception of truth, there are a number of issues considered, in particular Horwich’s use-theoretic account of meaning and compositionality, along with the divergence between his account of meaning and Quine's. The final chapter, Chapter Five, provides a thorough analysis of three important factors regarding the disquotational theory and the minimal theory of truth. Among them, the first factor discussed is what sort of equivalence relation occurs within each instance of the disquotational schema or each axiom of the equivalence schema. Following this, there is an analysis of in what way the disquotationalist and the minimalist can explain all general facts involving truth. The last factor involves considering the proper ascription of the disquotational or the minimal truth predicate. Along with the analysis of these three factors, the issue regarding which theory of truth is preferable is elaborated.
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Hou, Richard Wei Tzu. "Between Quine's Disquotationalism and Horwich's Minimalism." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/1131.

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Many criticisms of the prevalent deflationary theories of truth stem from some misunderstanding. Clarification can be found from considering Quine's reasoning on the disquotational feature of the truth predicate. Quine's disquotationalism and Horwich's minimalism are similar theses with respect to the concept of truth, though the difference between the choices of the primary truth bearers and the divergence in their accounts of meaning and reference are striking. Chapter Two is devoted to making plain Quine's reasoning regarding the disquotational concept of truth, and to constructing a disquotational theory of truth. Also in this chapter, the topic of how to enhance the deductive power of this theory is discussed. The following chapter aims to square Quine's theses of inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity, with an account of the disquotational schema of reference. Whether or not a disquotational schema of reference and all its instances can be seen as providing a genuine reference scheme, as claimed by Horwich and most deflationists, is also discussed. In Chapter Four, after an introduction of Horwich's minimalist conception of truth, there are a number of issues considered, in particular Horwich’s use-theoretic account of meaning and compositionality, along with the divergence between his account of meaning and Quine's. The final chapter, Chapter Five, provides a thorough analysis of three important factors regarding the disquotational theory and the minimal theory of truth. Among them, the first factor discussed is what sort of equivalence relation occurs within each instance of the disquotational schema or each axiom of the equivalence schema. Following this, there is an analysis of in what way the disquotationalist and the minimalist can explain all general facts involving truth. The last factor involves considering the proper ascription of the disquotational or the minimal truth predicate. Along with the analysis of these three factors, the issue regarding which theory of truth is preferable is elaborated.
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Båve, Arvid. "Deflationism : A Use-Theoretic Analysis of the Truth-Predicate." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-999.

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I here develop a specific version of the deflationary theory of truth. I adopt a terminology on which deflationism holds that an exhaustive account of truth is given by the equivalence between truth-ascriptions and de-nominalised (or disquoted) sentences. An adequate truth-theory, it is argued, must be finite, non-circular, and give a unified account of all occurrences of “true”. I also argue that it must descriptively capture the ordinary meaning of “true”, which is plausibly taken to be unambiguous. Ch. 2 is a critical historical survey of deflationary theories, where notably disquotationalism is found untenable as a descriptive theory of “true”. In Ch. 3, I aim to show that deflationism cannot be finitely and non-circularly formulated by using “true”, and so must only mention it. Hence, it must be a theory specifically about the word “true” (and its foreign counterparts). To capture the ordinary notion, the theory must thus be an empirical, use-theoretic, semantic account of “true”. The task of explaining facts about truth now becomes that of showing that various sentences containing “true” are (unconditionally) assertible. In Ch. 4, I defend the claim (D) that every sentence of the form “That p is true” and the corresponding “p” are intersubstitutable (in a use-theoretic sense), and show how this claim provides a unified and simple account of a wide variety of occurrences of “true”. Disquotationalism then only has the advantage of avoiding propositions. But in Ch. 5, I note that (D) is not committed to propositions. Use-theoretic semantics is then argued to serve nominalism better than truth-theoretic ditto. In particular, it can avoid propositions while sustaining a natural syntactic treatment of “that”-clauses as singular terms and of “Everything he says is true”, as any other quantification. Finally, Horwich’s problem of deriving universal truth-claims is given a solution by recourse to an assertibilist semantics of the universal quantifier.
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Book chapters on the topic "Disquotationalism"

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Heck, Richard Kimberly. "Disquotationalism and the Compositional Principles." In Modes of Truth, 115–50. New York, NY : Routledge, 2021. | Series: Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429030208-6.

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"Modalized Disquotationalism." In Principles of Truth, 75–102. De Gruyter, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110332667.75.

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Burgess, Alexis G., and John P. Burgess. "Deflationism." In Truth. Princeton University Press, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691144016.003.0003.

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This chapter focuses on the debate over deflationism versus inflationism regarding the question “What do the different truths about different topics all have in common, to make them all truths?” Deflationists are typically committed to three theses about the phrase “is true,” usually called the natural language truth predicate. First, applying the truth predicate to something is equivalent to just saying it. Second, the equivalence principle is a sufficient account of the meaning of the truth predicate. Third, an account of the meaning of “true” is a sufficient account of the nature of truth. The chapter first considers Frank P. Ramsey's redundancy theory before discussing other radical and moderate theories, the disquotationalism of W. V. Quine, slogans associated with deflationism, and the alethic notion of reference.
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