Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Directors of corporations'
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Horner, Stephen V. "Director ties, board experience, and firm strategic outcomes board experience effects on post-acquisition performance /." Diss., Columbia, Mo. : University of Missouri-Columbia, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10355/4489.
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Thesis (Ph. D.) University of Missouri-Columbia, 2006.The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on August 1, 2007) Includes bibliographical references.
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Lipman, Trevor. "The role of the independent non-executive director in Australia." Doctoral thesis, Australia : Macquarie University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1959.14/28880.
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Thesis (DBA)--Macquarie University, Graduate School of Management, 2008.Bibliography: p. 275-289.
Company directors have been in existence for more than four hundred years. In the past, they were considered to be a necessary part of corporate existence, and were usually appointed to a board by the CEO or chairman. However, they were usually mates from the 'boys club' and gained their position from whom they knew, and not from what they were capable of contributing. The appointment of independent directors became more normal, as shareholders looked for a way to wrest control back from management. But what independent directors really do and why they are there is not widely understood. A review of the literature relative to independent directors has identified a gap in the knowledge. This gap is the role of the independent director when considered from a commercial aspect; that is, those who observe or write about independent directors. --This thesis has attempted to generate a theory of the role of the independent director through a review of the literature and a subsequent series of interviews. Grounded theory was the chosen methodology for analysing the data and formulating a theory of the role because it allows the researcher to ground the theory in the data instead of establishing a hypothesis and testing it. --The resulting theory is more complex than it first appears. It was found that the primary role of the independent director is to improve the performance of the board and the company. This role is impacted by a number of factors, the two most influential being the information that is available to the independent directors, and the position of the company. This second factor is defined as the size of the company, where it is in its life cycle, and whether it is experiencing any significant change. --These findings enable a number of recommendations to be made to improve policy and practice, recognising the impact of information and company position on the ability of independent directors to contribute positively. It also raises several areas of further study to continue to refine the understanding of the role of the independent nonexecutive director in Australia. These include, among others, investigating the role from other viewpoints such as the board chair or company secretary, or researching the link between company position and information available to independent directors.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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Alford, Wayne Stanley. "The firm, take-overs, and directors' duties : a theory of the firm and the duties imposed by law and the directors of an offeree corporation /." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.nlc-bnc.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp05/mq22699.pdf.
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Mnzava, Bernard Elieza. "Directors and firm performance : evidence from British soccer corporations." Thesis, University of Leeds, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.545706.
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Jain, Ravi. "Essays on boards of directors /." free to MU campus, to others for purchase, 2004. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/mo/fullcit?p3144425.
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Shan, Liwei. "Board independence, excess cash and corporate payout policy /." view abstract or download file of text, 2006. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=1196409441&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=2&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1176828116&clientId=11238.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2006.Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 104-109). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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Saulgrain, Julien. "Minimizing the expectation gap through an independent board of directors." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ50963.pdf.
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Siladi, Biserka. "The role of non-executive directors in corporate governance an evaluation /." Swinburne Research Bank, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1959.3/25900.
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Thesis (MBus) - Faculty of Business and Enterprise, Swinburne University of Technology, 2006.This thesis is submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Business in the Faculty of Business and Enterprise, Swinburne University of Technology - 2006. Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (p. 113-125).
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Deacon, Nicola. "Board Member development: Board Member learning and attributes of experienced Board Members." Click here to access this resource online, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10292/750.
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This research uses a grounded theory approach to explore the term ‘experienced Board Member’ with research into the learning experiences which bridge the gap between an inexperienced Board Member and an experienced Board Member. The purpose of this research is to identify repeatable/reportable patterns which could be utilised and developed to improve Board Member learning. Data is derived from interviews with nine (current and past) New Zealand Board Members. A common set of attributes of an experienced Board Member emerged from the study. The linking theme of the attributes is that they support the process of reaching a quality agreement or decision. The results of this study suggest that an experienced Board Member is perceived to be a Board Member who contributes to achieving a quality agreement and decision, using attributes associated with: • Contribution to Board processes • Understanding and Knowledge (governance and business acumen) • Internal Drivers • Making Hard Decisions. Formative Board Member learning is associated with developing self confidence, understanding what content is perceived to be (or not to be) relevant, understanding the Boardroom protocols and processes, and understanding the responsibility of the role. The primary mechanism in Board Member learning is observation. Board Member learning was most often the development of tacit understanding through observing events internal to the Board. Learning events for Board Members are likely to arise as part of the dismissal/departure of the CEO or from internal Board dissension. The results also indicate that current NZ Board Members are unlikely to have had any formal preparation for the Board Member role, and learning for the role is likely to be ad-hoc and vicarious. This research suggests that the successful development of experienced Board Members will require a fundamental change in the perception and practice of Board Member development within organisations and at Board level. A Capability and Maturity Model is presented as a framework for assessing an organisation’s capability and maturity in terms of the development of its Board Members. This study builds on corporate governance theory by identifying attributes considered indicative of an experienced Board Member. This study adds to Learning Organisation and Knowledge theories by providing examples and comment on the place of Communities of Practice, and knowledge development within the development of Board Member experience.
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Tomkoria, Amita. "Parallel networks and opportunities for women directors." Diss., Connect to the thesis, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10066/589.
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Jodwana, Thembinkosi Anthony Vincent. "Corporate governance for sustainable development : implications for non-executive directors and the management accounting function." Thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10948/807.
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This paper will discuss the role that corporate governance can play in promoting sustainable development. Sustainable development is discussed in relation to three things: • Current development which does not result in the damage and destruction of the environment to the detriment of future inhabitants of this planet. This paper will discuss the role that corporate governance can play in promoting sustainable development. Sustainable development is discussed in relation to three things: • Current development which does not result in the damage and destruction of the environment to the detriment of future inhabitants of this planet.
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Lewchalermwongse, Niruncha. "The role of independent non-executive directors in Thailand : their own perception." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2010. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk:80/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=131547.
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This research offers the perceptions of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) in Thailand of their roles and the way they cope with constraints such as family-concentrated ownership structures and asymmetric information problems. There has been scant prior research in this area. The researcher applied qualitative research techniques to understand what was in the interviewees’ minds. The semi-structured interview was employed because it allowed some flexibility while also providing some guidelines. The fieldwork data reveals that interviewed INEDs were aware of a board’s control role which, in theory, can be realised by nominating and remunerating top management; however, in practice they had no authority to do so due to the family-concentrated ownership of Thai firms. Ensuring compliance with laws and regulations was the actual controlling activity which they undertook. Another role perceived was a service role concerned with giving advice and counsel to management. Although the interviewees rarely got involved with planning and directing, they contributed their expertise to the board. Their service function also helped them to better fulfil a control role because an INED’s service role builds his credibility in the eyes of management. This allows them to gain access to better information about a company – a critical input of a control role. Therefore, a good relationship between executives and non-executives is an essential factor for INED’s effectiveness. i A proportion of outside directors on the board and a director’s independent background were not considered guarantees of board independence. Only an INED’s independence of mind matters. Such independence can be exercised by resigning in order to send a signal to the market and protect minority shareholders. The competencies and personal characteristics of INEDs and their motivations are other elements contributing to their effectiveness.
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Crafford, Wessel Lourens. "The relationship between directors' remuneration and financial performance : an investigation into South African JSE-listed industrial firms." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/97769.
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Thesis (MComm)--Stellenbosch University, 2015.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: For the past few decades the remuneration of directors has been in the spotlight, especially in view of the corporate scandals that occurred around the turn of the 20th century. Generally, managers need to manage firms in such a way that shareholders’ value is maximised. Unfortunately, shareholders of firms and the general public have the perception that directors are over-compensated, and that there is no relationship between the remuneration of directors and the financial performance of the firms to enhance shareholders’ value. A lack of transparency, inadequate disclosure by firms and remuneration committees’ conflict of interest are reasons cited for these perceptions. Although South Africa is ranked as a global leader in terms of its corporate governance practices, many firms still do not adhere to the King reports’ principles. This research study investigated whether a relationship exists between the remuneration of directors and the financial performance of firms. The firms selected for the study included both listed and delisted firms from the Industrial Sector of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) for the time period 2002 until 2010. Ninety-three firms complied with the requirements to be included in the study. All these firms had effective remuneration strategies in place to promote financial performance and growth of the firms. Secondary data were collected for the nine consecutive years of the study period, representing a period prior to substantial changes in accounting and disclosure regulation that influenced the comparability of financial reporting of the firms. It is important to note that directors’ remuneration is not the only motivating factor for firm performance, but one of many. Directors’ remuneration and incentives should be optimally utilised to increase performance and growth in the firms, and it should not merely be a case of directors being overcompensated for services rendered. In order to operationalize directors’ remuneration, it was converted and subcategorised into four variables. These dependent variables for directors’ remuneration consisted of basic salary, bonuses (performance), gains on share purchases or share options and what was termed as “other” remuneration. “Other” remuneration included pension, medical, motor, and telephone allowances. To measure the financial performance of the firms, the following market and accounting measures were employed: turnover, earnings per share (EPS), total share return (TSR) and market value added (MVA). Analysing these variables’ data by means of selected descriptive statistical measures and inferential regression analysis, it appeared that the data were significantly skewed, but that financial performance of the firms was a strong determinant of the change in directors’ remuneration. Additional regression analyses were performed to investigate whether a lagged relationship existed between the dependent variable, namely directors’ remuneration, and the independent variables, as reflected by the various financial performance measures. Results from these regression analyses strengthened the findings of the study to show that a relationship existed between directors’ remuneration and the financial performance of the firms investigated.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Direkteursvergoeding trek vir die afgelope paar dekades gereeld aandag, veral weens die korporatiewe skandale wat aan die lig gekom het rondom ongeveer die eeuwisseling. Normaalweg stel firmas direkteure aan om aandeelhouerswelvaart te verhoog. Daar bestaan ongelukkig ʼn opvatting onder talle aandeelhouers asook die algemene publiek dat direkteure oorbetaal word, en dat daar geen verwantskap bestaan tussen direkteursvergoeding en die finansiële prestasie van firmas om aandeelhouerswelvaart te verhoog nie. Redes wat aangevoer word vir hierdie sienings sluit in die tekort aan deursigtigheid, onvoldoende openbaarmaking deur firmas en vergoedingskomitees se botsende belange. Alhoewel Suid-Afrika geklassifiseer word as ’n wêreldleier op die gebied van korporatiewe bestuur, is daar steeds firmas wat nie voldoen aan die beginsels van die King-verslae nie. Hierdie navorsingstudie ondersoek die moontlike verwantskap tussen direkteursvergoeding en die finansiële prestasie van firmas. Die geselekteerde firmas vir die studie was genoteerde en voorheen-genoteerde firmas in die nywerheidsektor op die Johannesburgse Aandelebeurs (JSE), vir die periode 2002 tot en met 2010. Drie-en-negentig firmas het voldoen aan die vereistes om ingesluit te word in die steekproef van die studie. Al die geselekteerde firmas het doeltreffende vergoedingstrategieë in plek gehad om finansiële prestasie en groei in die firmas aan te spoor. Sekondêre data is vir die nege agtereenvolgende jare van die studie ingesamel. Veranderinge in regulasies voor en na die studieperiode het dit moeilik gemaak om periodes buite hierdie tydgleuf vir vergelykingsdoeleindes in te sluit. Dit is belangrik om daarop te let dat direkteursvergoeding nie die enigste faktor is wat ʼn firma se finansiële prestasie kan beïnvloed nie, maar slegs een van vele. In die lig hiervan, moet direkteursvergoeding en ander aansporingsmaatstawwe optimaal gebruik word om finansiële prestasie in firmas aan te moedig. Om ʼn duideliker skets rakende direkteursvergoeding te verkry, is vergoeding onderverdeel in vier sub-kategorieë veranderlikes. Die afhanklike veranderlikes van direkteursvergoeding is soos volg geklassifiseer: basiese salaris, bonusse (prestasie), opbrengste uit aandeelaankope en aandeleopsies en ʼn laaste kategorie wat as “ander” vergoeding geklassifiseer is. Hierdie “ander” vergoedingskomponent het grootliks bestaan uit pensioen- en mediese bydraes asook motor-, en telefoonvoordele. Ten einde die onafhanklike veranderlike, naamlik die finansiële prestasie van firmas, te meet, is die volgende mark- en rekeningkundige maatstawwe gebruik: omset, verdienste per aandeel (VPA), markwaarde toevoeging (MWT) en aandeelopbrengs. Met die ontleding van al die veranderlikes het beskrywende statistiek en inferensiële regressietoetse aangedui dat die data ʼn merkbare skewe verspreiding het, maar dat finansiële prestasie in die firmas ʼn beduidende faktor was wanneer direkteursvergoeding aangepas is. Bykomende regressietoetse is gedoen om te ondersoek of daar vertragingstydperke was tussen die afhanklike veranderlike, naamlik direkteursvergoeding, en die onafhanklike veranderlike, finansiële prestasie van firmas. Hierdie toetse het die studie se bevindinge bevestig dat daar inderdaad ʼn verwantskap bestaan tussen direkteursvergoeding en die finansiële prestasie van firmas.
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Seehawer, Thorsten. "Social networks in boardrooms patterns and performance implications of interlocking directorates in Germany." Köln Kölner Wiss.-Verl, 2009. http://d-nb.info/991727800/04.
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Yue, Jihong. "Common interests, rewards and shareholdings in the top 20 New Zealand companies this dissertation [thesis] is submitted to Auckland University of Technology in partial fulfilment of the degree of Master of Business, 2004." Full thesis. Abstract, 2004.
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Wang, Yi. "Board independence and firm performance evidence from ASX-listed companies /." Swinburne Research Bank, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1959.3/66774.
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Thesis (PhD) - Faculty of Business and Enterprise, Swinburne University of Technology, 2009.A thesis is submitted for the degree Doctor of Philosophy, Faculty of Business and Enterprise, Swinburne University of Technology - 2009. Typescript. "August 2009". Includes bibliographical references (p. 161-189)
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Hao, Can. "Borad characteristics and accounting conservatism :evidence from Chinese firms." Thesis, University of Macau, 2018. http://umaclib3.umac.mo/record=b3959236.
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Yatim, Puan. "Internal governance, structures, board ethnicity, and external audit fees of Malaysian listed firms /." [St. Lucia, Qld.], 2006. http://www.library.uq.edu.au/pdfserve.php?image=thesisabs/absthe19343.pdf.
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Masconale, Saura. "The law of directors' fiduciary duties in U.S. corporations: an economic or ideological paradigm?" Doctoral thesis, Luiss Guido Carli, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/11385/200831.
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Dimke, Andreas W. "Neutralitätspflicht und Übernahmegesetz : eine vergleichende Untersuchung von Abwehmassnahmen bei feindlichen Übernahmen nach deutschem und US-amerikanischem Recht unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des deutschen Übernahmegesetzes /." Frankfurt am Main ; Berlin ; Bern ; Bruxelles ; New York ; Oxford ; Wien : Lang, 2007. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=015448749&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Abdul, Kadir Syed Muhamad. "A study on board of directors and organizational performance." Diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1985. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/52329.
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This dissertation reports an investigation of the relationship between board strategic management functions and organizational performance. This dissertation provides a framework for understanding the influence of boards of directors in decision making, planning, control and operation, and financial performance of the firms. Based on the conceptual framework, it is argued that an effective board of directors will have a positive relationship with performance. Four hypotheses stemming from the conceptual framework were used to relate boards' strategic management functions and organizational performance.
The research was conducted in Malaysia, and the organizations used for the study were public enterprises. Forty-two firms in three industries of the manufacturing sector were selected for the study. These firms were building materials, food, and wood-based. industries. Boards' strategic management functions, the independent variables, consisted of the boards’ role in decision making, planning, control, and board operation. Organizational performance, the dependent variable, was operationalized by using financial indicators: return on assets, profit margin, average rate of growth in profit, average rate of growth in assets, and average rate of growth in sales. Correlation, multiple regression, and t-test analyses were used to confirm or reject the four research hypotheses. Besides these analyses, the dissertation provided information on the profile of the boards of directors of the three industries in six different areas: size, age, occupation, educational level, specialization, and business experience of the directors.
The findings showed that there was no consistent pattern in the relationship between board strategic management functions and organizational performance for all the three industries. The data analysis failed to support the conceptual framework which indicated that there should be a positive relationship between an effective board and organizational performance.
The results of the dissertation were discussed with respect to major findings and significance to management theory and practice. The dissertation concluded with a discussion on the limitations of the study and suggestions for future research.Ph. D.
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Schlag, Jenny Melanie. "Tort law liability of directors and officers towards third party creditors : a comparative study of common and civil law with special focus on Canada and Germany." Thesis, McGill University, 2003. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=81234.
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Where individuals standing outside of the corporation have been harmed by the acts of one of its directors or officers, the question becomes whether they have only a claim against the corporation or whether they may have also a personal claim against the executive inflicting the harm on them.The issue of how far it should be possible to hold directors and officers personally liable for tort has been a contested one and even courts within one and the same jurisdiction provide different solutions. On the one hand, there is the general basic principle that individuals causing harm to others should be held responsible. On the other hand, the fact that directors and officers act as agents on behalf of the corporation might call for an exception to this basic tort law principle.
This thesis will compare the solutions proposed by Common law (with focus on the law of Ontario) and German law as an example of a Civil law jurisdiction. An attempt will be made to see in how far the proposed solutions are consistent with legal principles like the separate legal entity of the corporation and the concept of limited liability as well as with arguments related to economic efficiency.
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Clatterbuck, Byron James. "Corporate governance in P.R.C. equity joint ventures : the activities and roles of boards and their directors in Sino-Western equity joint ventures /." Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 1995. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B19669021.
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Scholtz, Louise. "Good corporate governance : can it be ensured through structures only : a critical evaluation of the role of the board and in particular the independent director." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/49978.
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Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2004.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The main problem area this dissertation studied is whether there the appointment of independent directors to the board, is firstly an adequate way to ensure good corporate governance, and secondly, if it is not the case, what must companies do to amend the situation. As result of various factors, amongst them the spectacular corporate failures worldwide that demonstrated the flaws in the shareholder democratic model, shareholder activism and global competitiveness corporate governance has taken centre stage. Pivotal to good corporate governance is the board of the company, as postulated not only by the majority of corporate governance models, but also by all the corporate governance codes. Furthermore, the perception of shareholders that independent directors are the most effective way to ensure that shareholder interests are protected has also been entrenched in the directives of corporate governance codes, with the inclusion of the South African King Code. As a result of the foregoing the role of independent directors has come under the spotlight, especially their failure to act in some of the instances of governance abuse by management. In this regard strong responses and possible prosecution has now alerted non-executive directors to the fact that there is no difference in liability between them and the executive brothers. Non-executive directors or independent directors have primarily two functions, they must monitor the performance of management and provide strategic input. As a result of the aforesaid corporate collapses non-executive directors are of the opinion that their monitoring role is being emphasis at the cost of their strategic role, which might be to the detriment of the company. Independent directors as the solution to all governance problems are however not flawless. Independence interpreted restricts access to possible suitable candidates. Furthermore, ineffective selection processes curtail the optimal functioning of boards, manipulation of information by management, lack of director training, and the increasing cost attendant to ensure adequate independent representation on the board. There are also "soft issues" that are even mere pervasive and destructive, the boardroom atmosphere that precludes open and honest discussion, the powerful chief executive and the failure of some directors to distinguish between managing and directing. In view of the problems highlighted above, this study project proposes that there has, firstly been an over-emphasis of the role that the independent director can play in ensuring good corporate governance at the cost of other measures that can be implemented. A more optimal situation can be created through a combination of a strong independent presence coupled with ongoing training and evaluation of boards and directors. There are two prerequisites for such training and evaluation to be successful. Firstly, the process must be actively driven by the chairman of the board and, secondly, directors must be made aware of the fact that shareholders have become more demanding and critical of their performance. Unless they are perceived to add value to the company they may find that they are without a job. In today's demanding environment companies and boards that do not actively encourage a learning culture will not survive.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die kern-probleemgebied wat in die verhandeling bestudeer is is tweeledig, eerstens, of die aanstelling van onafhanklike direkteure op die direksie voldoende is om goeie korporatiewe bestuur te verseker, en tweedens, indien dit nie die geval is nie, wat maatskappye te doen staan om die situasie reg te stel. As gevolg van verskeie faklore, onder andere die skouspelagtige korporatiewe mislukkings wereldwyd, wat die gebreke in die aandeelhouer demokratiese model aan die kaak gestel het, aandeelhouer aktivisme en globale mededinging, het korporatiewe bestuur 'n sentrale rol aangeneem. Die kern tot goeie korporatiewe bestuur is die direksie van die maatskappy, soos daargestel deur beide die meerderheid van koperatiewe bestuursmodelle en al die kodes ten opsigte van korporatiewe bestuur. Voorts, word die aanname van aandeelhouers dat onafhanklike direkteure die mees doeltreffendste wyse is om hulle belange te beskerm, verder ingeburger in die voorskrifte van korporatiewe bestuurskodes, wat die Suid-Afrikaanse King Kode 2 insluit. As gevolg van voormelde het die rol van onafhanklike direkteure in die spervuur beland, veral as gevolg van hulle versuim om op te tree in sommige gevalle van korporatiewe vergrepe deur die bestuur van die maatskappy. In die verband, het die sterk reaksie en die sprake van vervolging, 'n waarskuwing aan nie-uitvoerende direkteure gerig dat hulle net so aanspreeklik gehou kan word as hulle uitvoerende broers. Nie-uitvoerende direkteure or onafhanklike direkteure het primer twee funksies, hulle moet die prestasie van die bestuur monitor and hulle moet strategiese insette lewer. As gevolg van gesegde korporatiewe mislukkings is nie-uitvoerende direkteure nou van mening dat hulle moniteringsrol beklemtoon word ten koste van hulle strategiese rol, wat tot die nadeel van die maatskappy mag strek. Onafhanklike direkteure as die oplossing tot alle bestuursprobleme is egter nie volmaak nie. 'n Streng interpretasie van onafhanklikheid beperk die keuse van moontlike geskikte kandidate. Voorts word die optimale funktionering van direksies ingeperk deur ondoeltreffende keuringsprosesse, die manipulering van inligting deur die bestuur, gebrek aan direkteursopleiding and die stygende koste verbonde aan 'n voldoende onafhanklike teenwoordigheid op die direksie. Daar is ook "sagte" aspekte wat selfs meer vernietigend inwerk, naamlik die atmosfeer wat heers in die direksiesaal, die magtige hoof uitvoerende direkteur en die gebrek aan insig by direkteure rakende die verskil tussen die pligte van 'n direkteur en 'n bestuurder. Gegewe die voorafgaande probleme, is die verhandeling van mening dat die rol wat die onafhanklike direkteur kan speel om goeie korporatiewe bestuur te verseker oorbeklemtoon word. Hierdie klem is ten koste van ander maatreels, wat ingestel kan word. 'n Meer optimale klimaat kan geskep word deur 'n kombinasie van 'n sterk onafhanklike teenwoordigheid op die direksie, gekoppel aan deurlopende opleiding en evaluering van direksies en direkteure. Ten einde te verseker dat sodanige opleiding en evaluasie suksesvol is, is daar twee voorvereistes. Eerstens, moet die proses aktief deur die voorsitter bestuur word, en tweedens, moet 'n bewustheid by direkteure gekweek word aangaande die verwagtinge van aandeelhouers, wat meer veeleisend en krities staan teenoor hulle prestasie. Tensy hulle geag word waarde toe te voeg, mag direkteure hulle sonder 'n werk bevind. In vandag se veeleisende omgewing kan maatskappye en direksies, wat nie 'n leerkultuur aanmoedig nie, nie verwag om te oorleef nie.
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Tambini-Monge, Ruth-Natalia, and Ruth-Natalia Tambini-Monge. "La caducidad de la responsabilidad civil de los directores de una sociedad anónima." Master's thesis, Universidad de Lima, 2016. http://repositorio.ulima.edu.pe/handle/ulima/3129.
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Hirt, Hans C. "The enforcement of directors' duties in Britain and Germany : a comparative study with particular reference to large companies /." Oxford [u.a.] : Lang, 2004. http://www.gbv.de/dms/spk/sbb/recht/toc/383089581.pdf.
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King, Roger. "Two essays on corporate finance : the impact of independent non-executive directors and the longevity of family control /." View abstract or full-text, 2006. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?FINA%202006%20KING.
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Yu, Lei. "Two essays on initial public offerings." Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 2008. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B4129063X.
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Rogers, Meredith Australian Graduate School of Management Australian School of Business UNSW. "Contingent corporate governance: a challenge to universal theories of board structure." Awarded by:University of New South Wales. Australian Graduate School of Management, 2006. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/23024.
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Agency theory proposes that the role of the board of directors is to control management (Fama & Jensen 1983). A structurally independent board, one with a high percentage of non-executive directors and a chairperson who is not the CEO, has been used as a proxy for the control role. Therefore, agency theory predicts a positive relationship between independent board structure and firm performance. These predictions have not been confirmed by meta-analytic reviews (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson 1998; Rhoades, Rechner, & Sundaramurthy 2000). This thesis applies structural contingency theory to provide an alternative explanation for the relationship between board structure and firm performance. Structural contingency theory (Donaldson 2001) proposes that the relationship between an organization???s structure and its performance is moderated by contingencies. In this study the contingency is the salience of the board???s control role. I argue that structural independence of the board has a beneficial effect on performance only if it is in fit with control salience. For example, a firm with an independently structured board that gives high prominence to the control role will perform well. On the other hand, another firm with a less independently structured board that does not see its main role as controlling management will also prosper. Survey data were analyzed to measure the control salience for 98 Australian listed companies. Archival data provided measures of board structure and firm performance. Consistent with the meta-analytic reviews, there was no association between independent board structure and firm performance. There was some evidence that high control salience resulted in high performance, but this effect was evident chiefly when performance was measured by total shareholder returns. This may indicate that the share market was responding to the symbolism of high control salience. In contrast to the symbolic main effect of control salience, the fit between the control salience and the independent structure of the board caused increased return on equity. This reflects the board???s objective effect on profit when its structure is in fit with control salience.
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Faghani, Mahdi. "Chief Executive Officer Remuneration and the ‘Two-Strikes’ Rule of Australia." Thesis, Griffith University, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10072/365255.
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Over the past two decades, executive remuneration has been a topic of considerable controversy. The perceived inability of boards of directors to set optimal executive pay, together with the revelation of corporate scandals and subsequent collapse of high-profile companies, has fuelled intense public debates about executive pay. Regulators here and abroad have been forced to address these growing concerns. With the view to improving the accountability of executive pay and to restraining ‘excessive’ executive pay, Australia introduced the Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive Remuneration) Act 2011, with effect from 1 July 2011. Unlike previous legislation, under which shareholders’ votes on remuneration reports were non-binding, this new ‘say on pay’ (SOP) legislation, widely known as the ‘two-strikes’ rule in Australia, has specific and predictable consequences. Under this new rule, the board of directors (except the chief executive officer) of a firm listed on the Australian Securities Exchange may potentially face re-election if the remuneration report receives 25% or more ‘no’ votes at the Annual General Meeting in two consecutive years.Thesis (PhD Doctorate)
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Griffith Business School
Griffith Business School
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Zhao, Annie, and Claudia Riber. "The Effects of Internationalization on the Composition of Board of Directors : A Quantitative Study of Swedish Multinational Corporations." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-217820.
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The number of multinational corporations (MNCs) has increased tremendously since the 1990s, as companies have started to act in a more global environment. This has resulted in more integration between economies, where companies have to adjust to this changing environment. In this paper, we study the impact of internationalization on nationality diversity in boards of Swedish MNCs during the period 1994-2012. Our propositions suggest that board size, a company’s degree of internationalization and country of origin are contributing factors that affect how a board is composed. Our findings concluded that companies with a high degree of internationalization often are more nationality diverse and that Swedish companies have gradually increased the number of non-Swedes in their boards over time.
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Yu, Lei, and 于雷. "Two essays on initial public offerings." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2008. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B4129063X.
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Giani, Anton Louis. "Corporate governance : power, duties, responsibilities and functions of the board : practical guidelines for Agricol Beherend Limited." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/49896.
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Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2004.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Corporate governance has become the latest business "buzz-word" during the last number of years. It is almost being used as an excuse for too many things that go wrong with, or within, companies. However, the word is not going to disappear from business lexicon, it has come to stay. Too many companies and investors have suffered due to the greed of individuals, appointed to lead and manage the business that have misused their position of trust and enriched themselves in many ways. This could have been brought about by many reasons: • Directors who have not been trained properly for their fiduciary duties and other duties and responsibilities. • Directors who have not been evaluated on their performance as a board or individually. • No formal governance structures within the organisation. • No culture of accountability within the organisation. • Simple greed. This study concentrates on some of the literature, ranging from the Cadbury report released in 1992, the OECD principles and international trends, to the South African King II Report, released in 2002. From the literature, and the recommendations from it, there can be no doubt that the pressure to improve governance structures will become fiercer around the globe. Investors are taking it seriously and are willing to pay a premium for shares in a properly governed enterprise. Directors will have to sharpen their skills in being the primary instrument in preventing further corporate scandals. The importance of their accountability towards the company will be measured when board evaluation no longer is an exception, but the rule, in creating effective boards. Agricol Beherend Limited should be no exception. Although not required to formally comply with the recommendations of the King II Code, it can only be advantageous in striving to long-term sustainability. It is further concluded that entrepreneurship is at the heart of capitalistic society, the sphere in which businesses operate in creating wealth for their investors. This is where the influence and leadership abilities of non-executives play a vital role in creating the environment and culture for enterprises to flourish in. They have to determine the equilibrium between conformance and performance in keeping the entrepreneurial spirit alive, yet complying with best practice principles of corporate governance.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Korporatiewe bestuur, of beheer, het oor die laaste aantal jare die nuutste gebruikswoorde in die besigheidsomgewing geword. Dit word feitlik as verskoning gebruik vir alles wat met, of binne-in, organisasies verkeerd loop. Desnieteenstaande, die woorde gaan nie van die algemene besigheidsspreektaal verdwyn nie, dit het gekom om te bly. Te veel maatskappye en beleggers het gely onder die hebsug van individue wat aangestel is om maatskappye te lei en te bestuur, maar wat hulle vertrouensposisie misbruik het om hulself op verskeie maniere te verryk. Dit kon deur 'n verskeidenheid van redes teweeggebring gewees het: • Direkteure wat nie behoorlik opgelei is in hulle fudisiëre pligte, asook ander pligte en verantwoordelikhede nie. • Direkteure wat nie behoorlik geëvalueer is op hulle prestasie as 'n raad of op individuele basis nie. • Geen behoorlike formele korporatiewe bestuursstrukture binne die maatskappy nie. • Geen kultuur van verantwoording binne die maatskappy nie. • Eenvoudige hebsug. Die studie konsentreer op sekere gedeeltes van die literatuur wat strek van die Cadbury verslag wat in1992 vrygestel is, die OECD beginsels en internasionale tendense, tot by die Suid-Afrikaanse King II verslag wat in 2002 verskyn het. Uit die literatuur, en die aanbevelings daarin vervat, kan daar geen twyfel wees dat die druk om korporatiewe beheerstrukture te verbeter in die toekoms, wêreldwyd, slegs groter sal word nie. Beleggers is besig om ernstig daarna op te let en is selfs bereid om 'n premie te betaal vir aandele in 'n organisasie wat behoorlike korporatiewe bestuur toepas. Direkteure sal hulle vaardighede moet opknap, aangesien hulle die primêre instrument is om verdere korporatiewe skandale te voorkom. Die belangrikheid van hulle verantwoording teenoor die maatskappy sal gemeet word wanneer die evaluering van direksies nie meer die uitsondering is nie, maar die reël, in die samestelling van effektiewe direksies. Agricol Beherend Beperk behoort geen uitsondering te wees nie. Alhoewel dit nie verlang word om formeel aan die aanbevelings van die King II Kode te voldoen nie, kan dit slegs tot voordeel wees in die strewe na langtermyn volhoubaarheid. Die verdere gevolgtrekking is dat entrepreneurskap die kern vorm van 'n kapitalistiese bestel, die ruimte waarin besighede opereer om welvaart vir beleggers te skep. Dit is waar die invloed en leierskapsvaardighede van nie-uitvoerende direkteure 'n belangrike rol speel in die skepping van 'n omgewing en kultuur waarbinne besighede kan floreer. Hulle moet die ekwilibrium bepaal tussen voldoening en prestasie, deur 'n gees van entrepreneurskap, terwyl daar voldoen word aan beste korporatiewe bestuursbeginsels.
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Fortuna, Marianne G. "Boardroom Cultural Governance: An Examination of the Beliefs and Values of Board Directors and Executive Management in U.S. Based Multinational Corporations (MNCs)." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/bus_admin_diss/11.
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In the evolving global economy, boardroom governance has forged an increasing influence on what transpires in corporations today. Within the boardroom, expectations of board directors and executive management (key actors) have shifted dramatically due to the financial failures (i.e., Enron and WorldCom, etc.) and the ensuing global financial crisis in the 2000s. The belief is that these directors and managers contributed greatly to these crises (Boerner, 2011). Consequently, there is a growing appeal to study boardroom governance and the roles of board directors and executive managers, not from a structural description, but rather from a behavioral perspective. In the literature, corporate governance structural framework is well informed while the behavioral framework is lacking. Often referred to as a black box, board behavior is not well understood because board processes are not easily observed nor are researchers readily invited to do so (Barratt & Korac-Kakabadse, 2002). There is therefore a clear call for studies to examine the black box of boardroom governance (Erakovic & Overall, 2010; Lockhart, 2010; Huse et al, 2011). Recognizing this demand, an examination of the beliefs and values of the board directors and executive managers in their boardroom culture, was undertaken as the starting point to open the black box of boardroom governance.
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Dröge, Henner. "Haftung für Gremienentscheidungen /." Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 2008. http://swbplus.bsz-bw.de/bsz289526167inh.htm.
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Isenberg, Gunnar. "Die Geschäftsordnung für die Organe der Aktiengesellschaft /." Frankfurt am Main ; New York : P. Lang, 2005. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=014586001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Webb, Sidney August. "Predictors of understanding of the duties of care among Georgia released time program governing board members." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 2007. http://www.tren.com/search.cfm?p001-1189.
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Ng, Johnny Sai Chun. "Independent non-executive directors in family-controlled listed companies in Hong Kong : a qualitative study." HKBU Institutional Repository, 2018. https://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_oa/578.
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Following the growing emphasis on the monitoring role of independent directors in the board of directors in the stock exchanges of Western developed countries, companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange are required to appoint independent non-executive directors (INEDs) representing at least one-third of their boards under the Listing Rules. Unlike those Western developed capital markets where listed companies are widely held, most listed companies in Hong Kong are controlled and managed by families. This means realistically, INEDs of those family-controlled listed companies can only be appointed to the boards with the support from the controlling owners. Under such circumstances, the INEDs' ability to monitor the performance of the management of those companies independently is put in doubt. This thesis intends to conduct a qualitative study using phenomenological approach to explore and understand the role and effectiveness of INEDs in family-controlled listed companies in Hong Kong based on the INEDs' lived experiences. The study is the first of its kind in the Hong Kong corporate governance research arena, as research studies on corporate boards and directors have often adopted a quantitative approach, using only publicly available archival data without in-depth discussions with the subjects on their real experience and views on their jobs. Accordingly, issues related to directors in family-controlled listed companies that require in-depth discussions with these directors are impossible to be addressed by such research approach. Through semi-structured interviews with INEDs of companies listed in Hong Kong, this thesis has contributed to the existing knowledge and literature in the research on INEDs and corporate governance in family businesses and provide useful hints and ideas to practitioners, listed companies, investors, regulators and policy-makers.
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Roubi, Raafat Ramadan. "The Association Between the Establishment of Audit Committees Composed of Outside Directors and a Change in the Objectivity of the Management Results-Reporting Function: an Empirical Investigation Into Income Smoothing Patterns." Thesis, North Texas State University, 1985. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc331852/.
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The purpose of this research was to empirically examine the effect of the establishment of outside audit committees on the objectivity of the management results-reporting practices of those companies that established such committees in response to the New York Stock Exchange mandate effective June 30, 1978. Management income smoothing behavior is taken as a measurable surrogate for the objectivity of the management results-reporting practices. This research involved the testing of one research problem. The research question asks, "Will the establishment of outside audit committees by companies that had no such committees prior to the New York Stock Exchange mandate effective June 30, 1978, be associated with a decrease in the degree of smoothing in the net income series for the period after that date relative to the degree of smoothing prior to that date?" The answer to this question required the selection of an experimental and a control group. Each group was composed of fifty New York Stock Exchange listed firms.
Linear and semi-log regression models were used to measure each firm's degree of income smoothing (defined as reducing the variability of a net income series about its trend line). The change in mean square errors of the experimental and control groups was compared using the chisquare and median tests. Neither the chi-square or the median test found a statistically significant increase in the objectivity of the management results-reporting function for the firms that established outside audit committees in response to the NYSE mandate effective June 30, 1978.
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Clatterbuck, Byron James. "Corporate governance in P.R.C. equity joint ventures: the activities and roles of boards and their directors inSino-Western equity joint ventures." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1995. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31266460.
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Du, Toit Philip Jean. "Corporate governance : the board and the role of the independent director." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/52748.
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Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2002.What, if any, is the relation between Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility? "Corporate Governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals. The corporate governance framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society" (Cadbury, 2000). The World Bank notes, that there is no single model of corporate governance with systems varying by country, sector and even in the same corporation over time. Among the most prominent systems are the US and UK models, which focus on dispersed controls; and the German and Japanese models which reflect a more concentrated ownership structure. Recently, South Africa's own King Report II on corporate governance is getting more and more international acclaim. Corporate social responsibility is concerned with treating the stakeholders of the firm ethically or in a socially responsible manner. Stakeholders exist both within a firm and outside. Consequently, behaving socially responsibly will increase the human development of stakeholders both within and outside the corporation. For instance the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) principles imply that a key role for stakeholders is concerned with ensuring the flow of external capital to firms and that stakeholders are protected by law and have access to disclosure (OECD,1998:15). While the World Bank have been intrigued by a June 2000 Investor Opinion Survey of McKinsey (World Bank, 2000) that finds that investors say that board governance is as important as financial performance in their investment decisions and that across Latin America, Europe, the USA and Asia investors (over 80% of those interviewed) would be willing to pay more for a company with good board governance practices. "Poor governance" was defined by McKinsey as a company that has: • Minority of outside directors; • Outside directors have financial ties with management; • Directors own little or no stock; • Directors compensated only with cash; • No formal director evaluation process; • Very unresponsive to investor requests for information on governance issues. "Good governance" was defined by McKinsey as: • Majority of outside directors; • Outside directors are truly independent, no management ties; Directors have significant stockholdings; • Large proportion of director pay is stock / options; • Formal director evaluation in place; • Very responsive to investor requests for information on governance issues. In view of the new thinking regarding the function of boards of directors, this mini-thesis will focus particularly on the role of the independent director in corporate governance, with a specific review of the approach in the USA, Europe and South Africa. A proposed role for the independent director will be given, as well as some final conclusions and recommendations on the topic. Without a more complete study it would be immature to think that this paper could have a final say on the role of the independent director in corporate governance, rather it is intended as a stimulus for further research in this very contemporary area.
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Bascue, Dale W. "Leading with excellence an orientation for the executive board of the Wyoming Southern Baptist Convention /." Online full text .pdf document, available to Fuller patrons only, 2001. http://www.tren.com.
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Pavasant, Nopnuanparn. "Director's responsibilities : a study of Thai corporate governance and ethics." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10722/197107.
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Corporate governance of Thailand has been developed and reformed, particularly after 1997 Asian financial crisis. However, problems regarding director’s responsibilities are still entrenched in company law and corporate practices. The challenges of Thai corporate governance on director’s responsibilities are found in the areas of director’s accountability and minority shareholders protection. Legal provisions on director’s fiduciary duties and director’s duty of care and skill are unable to regulate director’s misbehaviors. Directors are not fully aware of their proper responsibilities to the company. They tend to act for their own interest or interest of their group, the controlling shareholders. In addition, legal enforcement on director’s responsibilities is not effective in practice. Shareholders litigation or other actions against directors who are in breach of their duties is rare, though there is derivative action provided as remedy for minority shareholders. In finding solutions for those problems, all relevant aspects should be brought into consideration. Corporate governance on director’s responsibilities is related to law, business and ethics. Director’s responsibilities are matters concerning human conducts, actions, behaviors as well as practices. They are related to ethics of each company director and ethics of the board members as a whole. In addition to legal and business aspects, ethical aspect should also be considered in the reform of corporate governance on director’s responsibilities of Thailand. This thesis is the study of Thai corporate governance on director’s responsibilities and ethics in order to find appropriate ethical theory where good corporate governance principles will be built on. Among relevant ethical theories i.e. utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, virtue ethics and contractualism, virtue ethics of Aristotle is the most appropriate ethical theory to be applied to corporate governance on director’s responsibilities of Thailand. It is suitable for the nature of corporate governance on director’s responsibilities, the conditions underlying its problems, and the understanding and practices of people in Thai society. Virtues and means of virtue ethics should be applied as complements to fiduciary principles for enhancing director’s accountability. The doctrine of mean of virtue ethics should be applied as complement to derivative action for enforceability and effectiveness of minority shareholders protection. In this regard, some related regulations and codes of best practices will be prescribed by adopting appropriate virtues or means, and the relevant regulators i.e. the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) and the Stock Exchange of Thailand (the SET) will be given authority to interpret and apply such regulations and codes of best practices on a case by case basis.published_or_final_version
Law
Master
Doctor of Legal Studies
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Hou, Qingchuan. "Two essays on empirical accounting research /." View abstract or full-text, 2007. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?ACCT%202007%20HOU.
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McInterney-Lacombe, Nancy E. "Payoffs of Championing "Tough Issues": Why Corporations Need to Nurture Quixotic Champions at the Board and Within Senior Management Teams." Case Western Reserve University Doctor of Management / OhioLINK, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=casedm1568731826883409.
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Schmitz, Rainer. "Die Haftung des Vorstands gegenüber den Aktionären : eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung nach deutschem und US-amerikanischem Recht /." Frankfurt am Main [u.a.] : Lang, 2004. http://www.gbv.de/dms/spk/sbb/recht/toc/390313742.pdf.
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Holland, Björn. "Das amerikanische "board of directors" und die Führungsorganisation einer monistischen SE in Deutschland : Amerikanische Erfahrungen in Fragen der Corporate Governance als Beitrag zur Ausgestaltung der Unternehmensführung und Unternehmenskontrolle in einer Deutschen SE /." Frankfurt am Main [u.a.] : Lang, 2006. http://www.gbv.de/dms/spk/sbb/recht/toc/504593102.pdf.
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Roux, Carmen. "Corporate governance in the banking environment : the obligations of the Board of Directors in view of the failures of Unifer, Regal and Saambou." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/53336.
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Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2003.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Corporate governance can be defined as the system by which corporations are directed and controlled. It looks at the institutional and policy framework for corporations - from their very beginnings, in entrepreneurship, through their governance structures, company law, privatisation, to market exit and insolvency. King II places the board of directors at the heart of a company's business and holds them responsible for everything the business did or failed to do. Ultimately corporate governance is about leadership with integrity. A company directorship should not be viewed as belonging to the right club, knowing the right people and collecting a nice cheque every year. Their duties and responsibilities require them to act with the utmost integrity and morality at all times. Failure to do so can result in the demise of a company, a bank or even ... a country. The main objective of this short dissertation is to describe the importance of the role of Corporate Governance within the South African framework, with a focused look at the principles of King I and II. Specific focus is placed on the strength of the fiduciary responsibilities of the board of directors (King II) within the banking environment based on three case studies namely Unifer, Regal and Saambou.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Korporatiewe bestuur kan gedefinieer word as die sisteem waarmee organisasies beheer, bestuur en gekontroleer word. Daar word gekyk na die institutionele en beleids raamwerk van organisasies - van die begin, in entrepreneurskap, deur hul korporatiewe strukture, korporatiewe reg, privatisering, tot mark ontrekking en bankrotskap. King 2002 beskou die raad van direkteure as die hartklop van enige organisasie en hou hulle kollektief verantwoordelik vir alles wat die besigheid doen of nie doen nie. Korporatiewe bestuur gaan in beginsel oor leierskap met integriteit. Om die regte mense te ken, aan die regte klub te behoort en elke maand 'n lekker tjekkie te ontvang is nie waaroor direkteurskap gaan nie. As gevolg van hul verantwoordelikhede en verpligtinge word daar verwag dat hulle altyd met integriteit en moraliteit optree. As dit nie gedoen word nie kan dit lei tot die verval van die organisasie, 'n bank of selfs .... 'n land. Die doel van hierdie kort mini-werkstuk is om te verduidelik hoekom korporatiewe bestuur belangrik is in die konteks van Suid Afrika. Daar sal verwys word na die beginsels van King 1994 en King 2002. Spesifieke fokus sal geplaas word op die trustee rol van direkteure in die bank omgewing en word geevalueer aan die hand van drie gevallestudies naamlik Unifer, Regal en Saambou.
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Mehlomakulu, M. (Mandla). "The role of the board in the sustainability agenda." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/53683.
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Study project (MBA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2003.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study examines the role of the board of directors of private and public companies. The focus is on "directing" (and not managing) - in view of the policy and strategic dimensions of boardroom activities. The second step focuses on the sustainability issue - the what and why of this important core governance value. A modem board is responsible for business strategy development and ensuring that a strategic planning process is in place, is used, and produces sound choices. The board must monitor the implementation of current strategic initiatives to assess whether they are on schedule, on budget, and producing effective results. Second King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (King II) has lately amended these responsibilities to include recommendations on minimum practices that should be adopted by corporations in relation to their corporate governance practices, as well as sustainability management and reporting. King II follows the worldwide trend of "triple-bottom-line", whose approach is recognising that the company has to consider stakeholders when formulating strategies. As part of building a case for the consideration of sustainability, cost savings could be the primary motivator (if nothing else) for making a business case for sustainable development. Businesses can reduce costs by making environmental improvements that deliver an immediate impact on the financial bottom line. They can also reduce financial, reputation and political risks by engaging with stakeholders. Understanding the concerns and interests of employees, customers, Non-governmental organisations (NGO's), politicians and business partners helps a company to manage environmental and social expectations better, resulting in reduced risk of civil action or brand assassination, improved access to capital and insurance, cost savings and reduced vulnerability to regulatory changes. Another view is that of avoiding a strategic disadvantage, where if firms do not respond to environmental opportunities, and their competitors do, they risk placing themselves at a competitive disadvantage. Governance, simply defined, is "the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented. If governance is about transparency and looking after shareholder value, and sustainability is about ensuring long-term success, then sustainability is the core part of governance. Managing this equilibrium is an integral aspect of good governance and a major challenge for any board. It will be achieved only where there is active engagement with all stakeholders and where proper attention is paid to health, safety and environmental issues - board of directors is accountable for addressing these challenges. The board should also ensure that its sustainability responsibilities are properly delegated and that strategies and policies are implemented through the effective use of a board representative for sustainability, a dedicated board committee for sustainability, and senior management. The consideration of sustainability issues by directors can reveal new opportunities for the company. Ignoring these opportunities could weaken its competitive position. In addition, if sustain ability issues are not considered, both the company and its directors may be held liable for failing to act with due diligence. The board must be aware of the corporation's liabilities caused by its sustainability obligations over the life cycle of its activities, products and services, and the necessary financial provision for such liabilities must be made and communicated to stakeholders. Directors must be aware of the sustainability threats, and take steps to safeguard the organisation - it is a matter of risk management. It is also a matter of investment, not cost. Like any investment, companies must find the resources and assess the paybacks. But there are many cases where the paybacks have been swift and substantial, and it has been shown that addressing these issues is more likely to help companies identify cost reductions than add to their costs. A number of leading South African companies, for example Anglo American, BlIP Billiton, Eskom, Sasol, and South African Breweries - have begun to drive the sustainability agenda within the local business community. Two case studies (Sasol and Nestle) of companies that are making sustainable development a core part of their governance role are presented. Recommendations naturally do not guarantee safety against failure, but a board can begin with changes that, taken together, will provide a better early-warning system against failure: 1. Reengineer the board. 2. Monitoring and evaluation by the board. 3. Introduce a Sustainability Board Committee This work has illustrated that by having appropriate standards of governance the long-term performance is raised and total shareholder return is enhanced.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie ondersoek die rol van die direksie van publieke en private maatskappye. Dit fokus op die "leiding" (en nie die bestuur) - in die lig van die beleid en strategie aspekte van die raadsaal aktiviteite. Die tweede deel fokus op die volhoubaarheid kwessie - die wat en waarom van hierdie belangrike bestuurswaarde. 'n Moderne direksie is verantwoordelik vir die ontwikkeling van die besigheidstrategie en die versekering dat 'n strategiese beplanningsproses in plek is, funksioneer en lei tot die regte besluite. Die direksie moet die implementering van die strategie monitor om te verseker dat die resultate beriek word, op skedule is en binne die begroting is. Die tweede King-verslag oor korporatiewe beheer in Suid-Afrika (King II) het die verantwoordelikhede verander deur aanbevelings in te sluit oor die minimum prosedures wat maatskaapye moet instel rakende korporatiewe beheer, asook volhoubaarheidsbestuur en verslagdoening. King (II) volg die wereld-wye tendens van "triple-bottom-line", wat beteken dat die maatskaapy sy verantwoordelikheid teenoor belanghebenes in ag neem tydens die formulering van strategie. Kostebesparings is waarskynilik die belangrikste motivering vir die inagneming van volhoubaarheid. Die maatskappy kan kostes bespaar deur omgewingsverbeterings aan te bring wat onmiddelik 'n effek op die netto wins sal he. Maatskappye kan ook finansiele-, reputasie- en politieke risiko verminder deur met die belanghebendes saam te werk. Deur die bekommernisse en belange van werknemers, kliente, nie-regerings organisasies, politiekusse en besigheidsvennote te verstaan, help 'n maatskappy om die omgewings en sosiale verwagtinge beter te bestuur. Dit sal lei tot die vermindering van die risiko vir siviele aksies, 'n verbetering in die toegang tot kapitaal en versekering, kostebesparings en 'n vermindering in die kwesbaarheid as gevolg van vernaderinge in regulasies. 'n Ander oorweging is die vermeiding van 'n strategiese nadeel. Deur nie te reageer op omgewings geleenthede nie, terwyl die kompitisie dit wel doen, kan lei tot 'n kompiterende nadeel. Korporatiewe beheer is die proses van besluitneming en die proses waardeur besluite geimplementeer word. Indien korporatiewe beheer gaan oor die deursigtigheid van besluite en die bevordering van aandeelhouerswelvaart, en volhoubaarheid gaan oor die versekering van lantermyn sukses, dan is volhoubaarheid die kern van korporatiewe beheer. Die handhawing van 'n balans tussen die twee aspekte is 'n integrale deel van korporatiewe beheer en 'n uitdaging vir die direksie. Dit sal slegs behaal word indien daar aktiewe deelname is van alle belanghebbendes en die nodige aandag gegee word aan gesondheids-, veiligheids- en omgewingsake. Die direksie is verantwoordelik vir hierdie uitdagings. Die direksie moet ook verseker dat die volhoubaarheids verantwoordelikhede behoorlik gedelegeer word en dat die strategie en beleid geimplementeer word deur die effektiewe gebruik van 'n direksie verteenwoordiger vir volhoubaarheid, 'n direksie komittee vir volhoubaarheid en senior bestuur. Die inagneming van volhoubaarheids aspekte deur direkteure kan lei tot nuwe geleenthede vir die maatskappy. Deur die geleenthede te ignoreer kan die maatskappy se kompeterende posisie beinvloed. Die maatskappy en sy direkteure kan ook verantwoordelik gehou word deur nie met die nodige sorg op te tree nie. Die direksie moet bewus wees van die maatskappy se verpligtinge, as gevolg van die volhoubaarheids verantwoordelikhede, oor die lewenstydperk van sy aktiwiteite, produkte en dienste en die nodige voorsiening maak vir die finansiele laste en dit kommunikeer aan alle belanghebbendes. Die direkteure moet ook bewus wees van dit wat volhoubaarheid kan bedreig en die nodige stappe neem om die maatskappy te beskerm - 'n kwessie van risikobestuur. Dit is ook eerder 'n belegging, as 'n koste. Soos met enige belegging, moet die maatskappy die nodige bronne vind en die opbrengs oorweeg. Daar is verskeie gevalle waar die opbrengs vinnig en wesenlik was en dit is bewys dat deur hierdie aspekte aan te spreek, dit lei tot koste besparings en nie tot additionele kostes nie. Verskeie Suid-Afrikaanse maatkappye, soos Anglo American, BBP Billiton, Eskom, Sasol en SAB het begin om die volhoubaarheidsproses uit te rol in die besigheidsgemeenskap. Twee studies (Sasol en Nestle) oor maatskappye wat volhoubaarheidsontwikkeling natreef as deel van hulle korporatiewe beheer, word aangebied. Aanbevelings is natuurlik nie 'n versekering teen ondergang nie, maar direksies kan begin met veranderinge wat tesame sal lei tot 'n vroee waarskuwing stelsel: 1. Hersamestelling van die direksie; 2. Monitering en evaluering van die direksie; 3. Samestelling van 'n Volhoubaarheids Kommitee Die studie het bewys dat, deur nodige standaarde en beheer, die langtermyn verdienstes verhoog en aandeelhouerswelvaart bevorder word.
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Van, der Walt J. C. "The effect of incentive based directors' remuneration on ethical decision making in organisations." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/49796.
Full textAbstract:
Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2003.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The historical development of the role of directors in public listed companies contains inherent tensions by reference to the fiduciary responsibility of directors and the method in which directors are remunerated. The nature of incentive based remuneration is such that it will compel directors, in certain circumstances, to weigh their interests against those towards whom they owe a duty of care and a moral responsibility to act with prudence and temperance. The modem day corporate environment is complex and calls for directors with strong ethical views. This assignment endeavours to identify some of the complexities that contribute towards directors finding it difficult to stay on the ethical "straight and narrow" and attempts to weigh the effect of those factors against the effect of incentive remuneration, both as detractors from ethical behaviour. Both the shareholder supremacy business model and the stakeholder approach are analysed to identify those factors present in each that may add to the ethical complexity that directors have to deal with. The advent of the stakeholder approach in particular, adds an enormous amount of complexity. The case studies deal with two South African financial services companies that have both ceased trading as a consequence of unethical behaviour. The incentive remuneration models of both companies have been found to have played a major contributing role in the decision making processes in the companies, and have contributed to the demise of these organisations. Lessons are taken from the case studies and applied against the backdrop of the various principles of ethical behaviour namely rights, utility, justice and the ethics of responsibility. The finding of this study is that there is a role for incentive remuneration of directors, provided that the ethical pitfalls that this causes are recognised and steps taken to address them. Some of these steps are identified.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die historiese ontwikkeling van die direkteursrol, en spesifiek van openbare genoteerde maatskappye bevat inherente teenstrydighede met verwysmg na direkteursvergoeding en die vertrouensverpligtinge wat op direkteure rus. Die aard van direkteursvergoeding met 'n aansporingskomponent is so dat dit 'n direkteur van tyd tot tyd in 'n posisie plaas waar hy tussen sy eie belange en die van die ander belanghebbendes in 'n maatskappy, aan wie hy dit verskuldig is om met verdrag en versigtig op te tree, moet kies. Die hedendaagse maatskappyomgewing is kompleks van aard, en vereis direkteure met sterk etiese oortuigings. Hierdie werkstuk poog om sommige van die komplekse faktore wat afbreuk doen aan 'n direkteur se vermoe om ten alle tye streng eties op te tree, te identifiseer en op te weeg teen die effek wat direkteursvergoeding speel - beide as items wat afbreuk doen aan etiese optrede. Hier word ondersoek ingestel na beide die sogenaamde "aandeelhouersmodel" asook die" belanghebbende" model waarvolgens besigheid bedryf word. Die ontsluimering van die belanghebbende model veroorsaak spesifiek 'n aansienlike hoeveelheid etiese kompleksiteit. Die gevallestudies behandel twee Suid Afrikaanse fmansiele instellings wat hul bedrywighede gestaak het as gevolg van onetiese optrede deur direkteure. Die aansporingskomponent van die vergoedingsrnodelle in daardie maatskappye blyk 'n groot bydraende faktor te wees in die onetiese besluitneming wat plaasgevind het, en wat uiteindelik tot die ondergang van die ondernemings gelei het. Laastens, word die lesse wat geleer is uit die gevallestudies, toegepas in gewysigde format, en getoets aan die hand van die verskillende beginsels wat etiese besluitneming onderhou, naamlik die beginsels van regte, regverdigheid, utiliteit en die beginsel van etiese verantwoordelikheid. Daar word tot die slotsom gekom dat daar wel ruimte vir aansporingskemas vir direkteure is, maar dat dit slegs eties regverdigbaar sal wees mits ag geslaan word op die lesse wat uit die gevallestudie voortspruit, tesame met die impementering van sekere korrektiewe maatstawwe.