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Journal articles on the topic 'Deterrenza nucleare'

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Author: Grafiati

Published: 11 March 2023

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1

Parsi, Vittorio Emanuele. "La bomba e noi." EDUCAZIONE SENTIMENTALE, no. 14 (September 2010): 34–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/eds2010-014003.

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Durante la Guerra Fredda le armi nucleari hanno segnato il panorama delle Relazioni Internazionali rendendo il conflitto tra le superpotenze di fatto improbabile. Sulla scia di tale esperienza, nella memoria attuale l'effetto stabilizzante della bomba atomica sembra quasi occultare gli aspetti piů nefasti e tuttora incompresi del delicato equilibrio del terrore. Tuttavia, la fine del bipolarismo e la frammentazione del sistema internazionale hanno minato il potenziale di stabilizzazione dell'ordigno nucleare, rendendolo al contrario un pericoloso fattore di disordine. Le recenti ambizioni nucleari (piů o meno coronate da successo) di Stati quali Pakistan, Corea del Nord e Iran impongono quindi un ripensamento non solo della teoria della deterrenza, ma dell'intera architettura istituzionale volta a prevenire la proliferazione nucleare.

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2

Andreatta, Filippo. "Effetti sistemici e politica internazionale." Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica 29, no. 1 (April 1999): 157–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0048840200026526.

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Questi due recenti lavori di importanti studiosi statunitensi dimostrano ancora una volta la vitalità e la creatività della disciplina delle relazioni internazionali. Si tratta infatti di opere di grande respiro e rigore teorico che introducono nel dibattito accademico ipotesi ed analisi alquanto avvincenti. Il libro di Snyder si concentra su uno degli aspetti essenziali della politica internazionale – le alleanze – e riesce nell'intento di affrontare approfonditamente un argomento che, paradossalmente, è invece rimasto piuttosto trascurato nella letteratura specializzata. A parte la letteratura politologica sulle coalizioni ed i beni pubblici, e la letteratura più classica sulle relazioni internazionali, non ci sono infatti analisi recenti in materia. Il volume di Jervis è invece meno ambizioso in quanto non si presenta come un'analisi compiuta su uno degli aspetti principali della disciplina. Ciò nonostante, l'autore cerca di proporre una chiave di lettura sistemica di tutta la politica internazionale risultando così non meno rilevante del libro di Snyder. La ricchezza del background culturale di Jervis e la sua capacità di sintesi – che già si erano espresse in campi diversi quali la teoria della deterrenza nucleare, l'importanza delle variabili tecnologiche, l'analisi psicologica delle decisioni e le grandi metafore strategiche della diplomazia contemporanea – assumono in questo caso una forma matura che permette all'autore di attingere proficuamente da altre discipline quali la biologia e l'ingegneria ambientale senza mai perdere di vista l'intento di spiegare fenomeni sociali complessi.

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3

Vuori, Juha A. "Deterring Things with Words: Deterrence as a Speech Act1." New Perspectives 24, no. 2 (September 2016): 23–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2336825x1602400203.

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As Cold War historians and fans of the film Doctor Strangelove know, deterrence can be a tricky business. The complexity of deterrence and the lack of attention that has been paid to its social effects have too often left one of its forms – nuclear deterrence – depoliticized, uncontested, and thus a danger to us all. I argue in this article that speech act theory can provide insights into deterrence and its concomitant political effects. It can be used to philosophically explain the communicative difficulties involved in deterrent relationships, and to form a basis for a critical stance on deterrence as politics. This entails a shift of focus from deterrence as a state of mind to the politics of deterrence and the deontic powers it wields – a shift from the causative aspects of deterrence to the deontology of deterrents. The analysis of such political functions is aided by the neologism of deterrentification, which refers to assertive and declarative acts that alter the status functions of things so that they are thought to act as deterrents and bring about determent in someone or something. It also aids in conceptualizing how the status of deterrents can be cancelled, and how nuclear weapons can be drawn away from the exceptional sphere of deterrence and back into the sphere of politics. Such a status transformation is required to achieve a sustained nuclear disarmament.

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4

Sankaran, Jaganath, and Steve Fetter. "Defending the United States: Revisiting National Missile Defense against North Korea." International Security 46, no. 3 (February 25, 2022): 51–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00426.

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Abstract North Korea has made significant strides in its attempt to acquire a strategic nuclear deterrent. In 2017, it tested intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and completed a series of nuclear test explosions. These may provide North Korea with the technical foundation to deploy a nuclear-armed ICBM capable of striking the United States. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) missile defense system is intended to deter North Korean nuclear coercion and, if deterrence fails, to defeat a limited North Korean attack. Despite two decades of dedicated and costly efforts, however, the GMD system remains unproven and unreliable. It has not demonstrated an ability to defeat the relatively simple and inexpensive countermeasures that North Korea can field. The GMD system has suffered persistent delays, substantial cost increases, and repeated program failures because of the politically motivated rush to deploy in the 1990s. But GMD and other U.S. missile defense efforts have provoked serious concerns in Russia and China, who fear it may threaten their nuclear deterrents. Diplomacy and deterrence may reassure Russia and China while constraining North Korea's nuclear program. An alternate airborne boost-phase intercept system may offer meaningful defense against North Korean missiles without threatening the Russian or Chinese deterrents.

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5

Russett, Bruce Martin. "Extended Deterrence with Nuclear Weapons: How Necessary, How Acceptable?" Review of Politics 50, no. 2 (1988): 282–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500015680.

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Most policy and normative problems with nuclear weaponry arise in the context of extended deterrence; that is, deterrence of attacks on friends or allies of a nuclear power. This article reviews the history and contradictions of post-World War II Western extended deterrent strategy, considers the sources of differences and similarities in the perspectives of the American and West German Catholic bishops on these matters, presents a logical schema of types of deterrent situations, discusses some systematic historical evidence that suggests the utility of nuclear weapons for many of these situations is often exaggerated, and, after reviewing alternative strategies, suggests a role for a very limited “countercombatant” nuclear strategy.

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6

Kehler, C. Robert. "Nuclear Weapons & Nuclear Use." Daedalus 145, no. 4 (September 2016): 50–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_00411.

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While nuclear weapons were conceived to end a war, in the aftermath of their operational use at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they became the central (and controversial) means to prevent a war. Nuclear deterrence formed the foundation of U.S. Cold War doctrine and the basis of an extended security guarantee to our allies. But the Cold War ended one-quarter century ago, and questions about the efficacy of deterrence, the need for nuclear weapons, and the ethics surrounding them have resurfaced as some call for further major reductions in inventory or the complete elimination of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Discussed from the perspective of a military practitioner, this essay highlights the continuing need for U.S. nuclear weapons in a global security environment that is highly complex and uncertain, and describes the means by which the credibility of the nuclear portion of the strategic deterrent is being preserved even as the role and prominence of these weapons have been reduced.

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7

Talbot, Brent. "Getting Deterrence Right: The Case for Stratified Deterrence." Journal of Strategic Security 13, no. 1 (April 2020): 26–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.1.1748.

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The potential for hostilities in the 21st Century is not likely to be deterred by a Cold War deterrence strategy. And while nuclear deterrence remains important, regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and accompanying long-range delivery capabilities are a rising concern. New technological breakthroughs in the space, cyber, and unforeseen realms could also provide asymmetric means of undermining deterrence. Moreover, the effort to achieve strategic stability in this day and age has become increasingly complicated in light of the changing relationship among the great powers. Today’s world has become one of “security trilemmas.” Actions one state takes to defend against another can, in-turn, make a third state feel insecure. There is great need for both nuclear diversity (theater and low-yield weapons) and increased conventional capabilities in the U.S. deterrent force to provide strategic stability in the decades ahead. In sum, we need a deterrence construct that both deters nuclear use by the great powers and terminates nuclear use by both regional powers and so called rogue states initiating nuclear wars on neighbors. I propose herein a policy of stratified deterrence which addresses deterrence needs at each potential level of conflict.

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8

Akhtar, Nasreen. "Emerging Challenges to Deterrence Stability in South Asia: A Theoretical Analysis." Journal of Security & Strategic Analyses 8, no. 2 (January 2, 2023): 145–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.57169/jssa.008.02.0156.

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The nuclear deterrent and conventional capabilities of both Pakistan and India contribute extensively towards maintaining peace and strategic stability in the region. In South Asia, both states have significantly increased their nuclear and conventional capabilities. The recent new trends, at regional as well as global levels, such as growing conventional asymmetry, changing policies of the non-proliferation regime, and the introduction of more sophisticated weapon capabilities pose a direct pernicious challenge to deterrence stability of Pakistan and India - as both nuclear states are immensely increasing their defence system. Through the lens of structural deterrence theory, this paper examines the strategic threats posed to deterrence stability in South Asia. Complete deterrence has become a mirage in South Asia. This paper examines the strategic imbalance in South Asia as the most pertinent threat - the two nuclear adversaries, India and Pakistan, are accumulating military power. This paper argues that strategic imbalance has serious implications for the South Asian region. In this paper, we employ the interpretative methodology.

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9

Cooke, Steve, and Andrew Futter. "Democracy versus deterrence: Nuclear weapons and political integrity." Politics 38, no. 4 (October 5, 2017): 500–513. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263395717733978.

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This article argues that the practice and performance of nuclear deterrence can never be fully representative or democratic due to the particular pressures placed on leaders by the nuclear condition. For nuclear deterrence to be effective – and for nuclear weapons to have any political value – a leader must always convince both their electorate as well as any possible foe, that they are willing to use nuclear weapons in extremis, irrespective of whether this is their true position. In any nuclear-armed state, where politicians privately believe that using nuclear weapons is always wrong, but publicly stress that possessing nuclear weapons to use as a deterrent is right, they are forced to act dishonestly. These tensions are particularly acute in the UK context given the reliance on just one form of nuclear weapons system for deterrence and the concurrent requirement to pre-delegate secret orders through a ‘letter of last resort’. The consequences for democratic nuclear-armed states are troubling; for public morality, the personal integrity of democratic leaders, and for true democratic accountability. This article concludes that public criticism of political leaders, and citizen voting choices, ought to take account of the problem of transparency posed by policies of nuclear deterrence.

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10

Betts, Richard K. "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence." World Politics 37, no. 2 (January 1985): 153–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2010141.

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For over three decades the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has based its deterrent on the principle that the United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons if a Soviet conventional attack against Western Europe succeeded. This notion has long troubled most strategic analysts. It remained generally acceptable to political elites, however, when U.S. nuclear superiority appeared massive enough to make the doctrine credible (as in the 1950s); when the conventional military balance in Europe improved markedly (as in the 1960s); or when détente appeared to be making the credibility of deterrence a less pressing concern (as in the 1970s). None of these conditions exists in the 1980s, and anxiety over the danger of nuclear war has prompted renewed attention to the possibility of replacing NATO's Flexible Response doctrine (a mixture of nuclear and conventional deterrence) with a reliable conventional deterrence posture that might justify a nuclear no-first-use (NFU) doctrine.1

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11

Karim, Asia, Amna Mahmood, Muhammad Wajeeh Shahrukh, and Abdul Jabbar. "Transformation of Pakistan’s nuclear posture from minimum credible to full spectrum deterrence." Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal (LASSIJ) 6, no. 1 (July 4, 2022): 89–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.47264/idea.lassij/6.1.7.

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After becoming a nuclear power in 1998, Pakistan pursued a policy of Minimum Credible Deterrence. The country transformed its policy from Credible Minimum to Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) in 2013. It is important to understand the reasons for this change. The study addressed questions: What were the factors which pressed Pakistan towards the transformation of its nuclear posture? Keeping in view FSD, is there any development in the nuclear force structure of Pakistan? How far FSD would ensure the credibility of the deterrent value of Pakistan’s nuclear forces? Transformation in the nuclear posture of Pakistan would be studied under the Theory of Nuclear Deterrence, which postulates that the sole purpose of a nuclear weapon is to stop an adversary from taking aggressive moves. The paper is aimed at evaluating the impact of the change in Pakistan’s nuclear posture on the overall strategic environment of South Asia. The study gives an objective analysis of the impact of FSD on Indo-Pak strategic interaction. The study concludes that FSD has successfully deterred the Indian Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) but remained unsuccessful in ensuring strategic stability. With the “New Normal,” India will continue to utilise its conventional superiority in its favour.

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12

Santos Vieira de Jesus, Diego. "Os herdeiros de todos os medos: a dissuasão nuclear para os EUA e a Rússia (2000-2005) / The heirs of all fears: nuclear deterrence for the U.S. and Russia (2000-2005)." Brazilian Journal of International Relations 1, no. 2 (July 27, 2012): 309–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.36311/2237-7743.2012.v1n2.p309-339.

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O objetivo deste artigo é examinar as perspectivas para a dissuasão nuclear para as duas principais potências nuclearmente armadas - EUA e Rússia - durante os cinco primeiros anos da década de 2000. O argumento central aponta que as duas potências preocuparam-se com a dissuasão de ameaças advindas das principais potências, mas se mostraram mais preocupadas com as ameaças de potências regionais com armas de destruição em massa. Elas reduziram suas forças nucleares desde o fim da Guerra Fria, manifestaram um maior interesse em capacidades não-nucleares para a dissuasão e tentaram definir opções para o uso limitado de armas nucleares. The aim of this paper is to examine the approaches for nuclear deterrence for the two greatest nuclear-weapon states - the U.S. and Russia - in the first half of the 2000s. The central argument shows that the two powers were concerned with deterrence of threats stemming from major powers, but were more concerned about the threats from regional powers with weapons of mass destruction. They have reduced their nuclear forces since the end of the Cold War, showed a greater interest in non-nuclear capabilities for deterrence and tried to define options for the limited use of nuclear weapons.

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13

McDonough, David S. "Nuclear Superiority or Mutually Assured Deterrence: The Development of the US Nuclear Deterrent." International Journal 60, no. 3 (2005): 811. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/40204064.

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14

Keinonen, Maria. "Using Military Cyber Operations as a Deterrent." International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security 18, no. 1 (February 28, 2023): 489–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.34190/iccws.18.1.1025.

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The Deterrence theory was formed after the World War II to describe the tensions between nuclear-armed states. Because of its origins, deterrence is mainly researched from the point of view of powerful states. However, deterrence nowadays is essential for any state to include in their strategies. The ever-increasing dependence on technology forces states to protect their sovereignty in cyberspace as well as in other domains. Cyber operations should be considered not just as a means to protect the cyber domain, but as means of deterrence. Cross domain deterrence (CDD) is a theory that includes all the warfighting domains in creating deterrence, including cyberspace. Despite these new perspectives, the use of military cyber operations as a deterrent has been studied mainly in terms of offensive strategies. Incorporating all types of military cyber operations into deterrence strategies is understudied. This study focuses on the possibilities of a small state to use cyber operations to create deterrence. The research question is: “How can a small state use cyber operations as a deterrent?” According to the Finnish understanding, cyber operations can be divided into three types: offensive, defensive and supportive operations. Using Finland as a case study, this paper argues that using military cyber operations is noteworthy for any state dependent on cyberspace, not only for military purposes, but for building CDD. The CDD theory and characteristics of cyber operations are studied in order to form better understanding of the topic and provide ideas for academic discussion. The research methods are content and SWOT analysis. The key observation presented is that each type of cyber operation has a role in forming CDD. For a small state, it´s profitable to use every type of cyber operations and thus expand the tool box for deterrence.

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15

Nye, Joseph S. "Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace." International Security 41, no. 3 (January 2017): 44–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00266.

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Understanding deterrence and dissuasion in cyberspace is often difficult because our minds are captured by Cold War images of massive retaliation to a nuclear attack by nuclear means. The analogy to nuclear deterrence is misleading, however, because many aspects of cyber behavior are more like other behaviors, such as crime, that states try (imperfectly) to deter. Preventing harm in cyberspace involves four complex mechanisms: threats of punishment, denial, entanglement, and norms. Even when punishment is used, deterrent threats need not be limited to cyber responses, and they may address general behavior as well as specific acts. Cyber threats are plentiful, often ambiguous, and difficult to attribute. Problems of attribution are said to limit deterrence and dissuasion in the cyber domain, but three of the major means—denial by defense, entanglement, and normative taboos—are not strongly hindered by the attribution problem. The effectiveness of different mechanisms depends on context, and the question of whether deterrence works in cyberspace depends on “who and what.” Not all cyberattacks are of equal importance; not all can be deterred; and not all rise to the level of significant national security threats. The lesson for policymakers is to focus on the most important attacks and to understand the context in which such attacks may occur and the full range of mechanisms available to prevent them.

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16

Anderson, Matthew P. "NATO Nuclear Deterrence: The Warsaw Summit and Beyond." Connections: The Quarterly Journal 15, no. 4 (2016): 5–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.11610/connections.15.4.01.

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17

Андерсон, Мэттью П. "Политика ядерного сдерживания НАТО: Варшавский саммит и после него." Connections: The Quarterly Journal 15, no. 4 (2016): 5–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.11610/connections.15.rus.4.01.

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18

KROON, FREDERICK. "Imaginative Motivation." Utilitas 21, no. 2 (June 2009): 181–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s095382080900346x.

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This article argues for a certain picture of the rational formation of conditional intentions, in particular deterrent intentions, that stands in sharp contrast to accounts on which rational agents are often not able to form such intentions because of what these enjoin should their conditions be realized. By considering the case of worthwhile but hard-to-form ‘non-apocalyptic’ deterrent intentions (the threat to leave a cheating partner, say), the article argues that rational agents may be able to form such intentions by first simulating psychological states in which they have successfully formed them and then bootstrapping themselves into actually forming them. The article also discusses certain limits imposed by this model. In particular, given the special nature of ‘apocalyptic’ deterrent intentions (e.g. the ones supposedly involved in nuclear deterrence), there is good reason to think that these must remain inaccessible to fully rational and moral agents.

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19

Ishan Mukherjee. "Will cyberweapons deter war?" International Journal for Modern Trends in Science and Technology 8, no. 12 (January 24, 2023): 137–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.46501/ijmtst0812021.

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The recent surge in the destructiveness of cyberweapons raises the question: will cyberweapons merely be among the most potent weapons in a country’s arsenal? Or, will they behave like nuclear weapons do in the present world order: as deterrents against interstate conflict? To answer this question, this paper first clarified exactly what gives nuclear weapons deterring ability. A list of three necessary criteria for conflict-deterring technology was generated: extreme destructiveness, ease of delivery, and resilience against a disarming first strike. Since cyberweapons fulfill these criteria, they can, in principle, deter war. Finally, the challenges to cyber deterrence were evaluated, along with recommendations for policymakers and charitable foundations concerned about international security

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20

Albadawi, Jihad Aldeen. "The Strategic Obstacles Preventing Israel's Attack on Iran's Nuclear Reactors." European Scientific Journal, ESJ 17, no. 33 (September 30, 2021): 107. http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2021.v17n33p107.

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The study analyzes the reasons that prevent "Israel" from launching a comprehensive military strike against the nuclear sites and other vital sites of a military nature in Iran, in light of the escalation of the indirect military confrontation between them in many conflicts in the Middle East. The study summarizes the "Israeli" risks to implementing "preventive war" on the Iranian scene in four obstacles, which are: the operational, the legal, the military, and the armed non-state actors. The study concluded that: despite the blockade imposed on Iran, especially with regard to the import of advanced military equipment, Iran was able to build a relative deterrent force consisting of three pillars, which rest on its ability to (1) threaten navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, (2) undertake terrorist attacks on multiple continents, and (3) conduct long-range strikes, primarily by missiles (or with rockets owned by proxies deployed in many countries of the Middle East, and its ability to target "Israel" with short and medium-range ballistic missiles. The Iranian deterrent force, or what has come to be called the Iran’s deterrence triad, was the real obstacle to Israel from launching a preventive war against Iran.

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21

Diener, Paul W. "Nuclear Deterrence." Journal for Peace and Justice Studies 1, no. 1 (1988): 47–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/peacejustice1988114.

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22

Drummond, Brian. "Nuclear deterrents." Physics World 25, no. 11 (November 2012): 21–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/2058-7058/25/11/27.

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23

Stocker, Jeremy. "Nuclear Deterrence." Adelphi Papers 46, no. 386 (January 2007): 43–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05679320701266356.

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PAUL, T. V. "Taboo or tradition? The non-use of nuclear weapons in world politics." Review of International Studies 36, no. 04 (October 2010): 853–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210510001336.

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AbstractThe non-use of nuclear weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 has emerged as a major puzzle in international politics. Traditional International Relations scholarship views this largely as a function of the deterrent relationship that emerged between the nuclear powers, especially during the Cold War era. The fact that nuclear weapons have not been used against non-nuclear states, despite temptations to use them, remains a challenge to the deterrence-only explanation. More normatively oriented scholars have argued that a taboo has emerged against the non-use of nuclear weapons. Nina Tannenwald's book,The Nuclear Taboois the most comprehensive study on this subject which relies on constructivist logic of inter-subjective taboo-like prohibition in accounting for the puzzle. While I see much merit in Tannenwald's empirical case studies, it is far-fetched to call the non-use largely a function of a taboo-like prohibition. For, taboos by their very nature forbid discussions of their breaking, whereas nuclear states have national military strategies that call for nuclear use under certain circumstances. They have also in many crises situations considered the use of nuclear weapons. I have argued in my book,The Tradition of Non-use of Nuclear Weapons(Stanford University Press, 2009), that a more modest tradition can be given partial credit for the absence of nuclear attacks on non-nuclear states. The tradition emerged because of a realisation of the horrendous effects of nuclear attack (a material fact) which generated reputation costs for a potential user. These reputation costs in turn generated self-deterrence which has helped to create a tradition which is partially restraining nuclear states from using their weapons for anything other than existential deterrence. Unlike Tannenwald, I contend that the tradition is not a strict taboo and hence it can be altered if material and political circumstances compel nuclear states to do so. The recent policy changes that have taken place in nuclear powers such as the US, Russia, UK, and France do not augur well for the tradition as the conditions for atomic use have been expanded to include prevention, pre-emption and other non-proliferation objectives involving rogue states and terrorist groups.

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Glaser, Charles L., and Steve Fetter. "Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China." International Security 41, no. 1 (July 2016): 49–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00248.

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As China invests in its nuclear forces and U.S.-China relations become increasingly strained, questions of U.S. nuclear doctrine require greater attention. The key strategic nuclear question facing the United States is whether to attempt to maintain and enhance its damage-limitation capability against China. The answer is less straightforward than it was during the Cold War, because China's nuclear force is orders of magnitude smaller than the Soviet force was. Part of the answer depends on the military-technical feasibility of the United States achieving a significant damage-limitation capability: What would be the outcome of military competition over the survivability of China's intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and command and control, and over the effectiveness of U.S. ballistic missile defenses? The answer also depends on the benefits that a damage-limitation capability would provide; these could include contributions to homeland deterrence, extended deterrence, and reassurance of U.S. regional allies. The final piece of the analysis concerns the potential costs of a damage-limitation capability, which could include increased escalatory pressures during crises and growing political tension between the United States and China. A thorough analysis demonstrates that the United States should forgo such a capability because the prospects for preserving a significant damage-limitation capability are poor; the deterrent benefits would be small; and the escalatory and political costs would be relatively large.

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26

Hoyt, Timothy. "Nuclear Rivalry, Nuclear Deterrence." India Review 6, no. 2 (May 14, 2007): 116–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14736480701331981.

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27

Herzog, Stephen. "Beyond nuclear deterrence." Science 378, no. 6616 (October 14, 2022): 115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.adf2194.

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In October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union squared off in what game theorist and Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling described as a nuclear game of “chicken” that threatened humanity’s survival. The Cuban Missile Crisis spurred six decades of efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and inspired a generation of scientists to think critically about reducing atomic risks. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent nuclear threats during the war in Ukraine are an unambiguous reminder that such dangers have outlived the Cold War. A new wave of scientific research is urgently needed to understand conditions for making global nuclear disarmament desirable and feasible.

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28

Nalebuff, Barry. "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence." Journal of Conflict Resolution 32, no. 3 (September 1988): 411–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002788032003001.

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29

Churchill, R. Paul. "Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Paternalism." Social Philosophy Today 2 (1989): 191–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/socphiltoday1989225.

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30

Moon, Sungjoon. "A study on the development and implications of low-yield nuclear weapons, focusing on deterrence theory." Journal of Advances in Military Studies 4, no. 3 (December 31, 2021): 113–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.37944/jams.v4i3.132.

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This study aims to examine the development status and technical characteristics of low-yield nuclear weapons initiated by the Trump administration, predict the development trend in the Biden administration, analyze strategic implications that have affected the R.O.K.-U.S. Tailored Deterrence Strategy, and seek future countermeasures. Regarding deterrence theory, low-power nuclear weapons are evaluated as a means of simultaneously expanding deterrence by denial and by retaliation. Additionally, low-yield nuclear weapons can be evaluated as having the capability, communication of nuclear retaliation wills and possibilities, and credibility for these wills and capabilities, which are 3C elements of deterrence in that they are “possible-use nuclear weapons.” Hence, they can be evaluated as highly-applicable deterrence means. As North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities have advanced and the U.S. is developing and deploying low-yield nuclear weapons, this article intends to make several suggestions regarding deterrence and response. First, because North Korea's policy to strengthen its tactical nuclear capabilities in 2021 is inevitably closely related to the technical characteristics of the development of low-yield nuclear weapons, it should be evaluated and prepared in connection with this. Second, it is necessary to understand the Biden administration's nuclear strategy regarding the extended deterrence strategy of the U.S. and discuss it closely based on the 5th NPR unveiled in early 2022. Third, to ensure the credibility of the R.O.K.-U.S. tailored deterrence strategy, “multilateral deterrence measures” must be considered at the regional level, including low-yield nuclear weapons.

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Roberts, Brad. "On Adapting Nuclear Deterrence to Reduce Nuclear Risk." Daedalus 149, no. 2 (April 2020): 69–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_01790.

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Since the end of the Cold War, changes to the practice of nuclear deterrence by the United States have been pursued as part of a comprehensive approach aimed at reducing nuclear risks. These changes have included steps to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons in U.S. defense and deterrence strategies. Looking to the future, the United States can do more, but only if the conditions are right. Policy-makers must avoid steps that have superficial appeal but would actually result in a net increase in nuclear risk. These include steps that make U.S. nuclear deterrence unreliable for the problems for which it remains relevant.

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Lee, Steven. "Morality and Paradoxical Deterrence." Social Philosophy and Policy 3, no. 1 (1985): 136–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500000200.

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Nuclear deterrence is paradoxical. One paradox of nuclear deterrence we may call the rationality paradox:(RP) (1) While it is a rational policy to threaten nuclear retaliation against an opponent armed with nuclear weapons, it would not be rational to carry out the retaliation should the threat fail to deter; and (2) what would not be rational to do is not, in the circumstances characteristic of nuclear deterrence, rational to threaten to do.This is a paradox in the standard sense that it involves contradictory claims, for it implies that adopting a policy of nuclear deterrence is both rational and not rational, yet we have strong reason to believe that each of the claims is true. Claim (1) is a recognition that, though we believe nuclear deterrence works, there would seem to be no reason to carry out the threat if it were to fail. Claim (2) is part of the logic of all forms of deterrence, military and nonmilitary, and it relates to the important notion of credibility: if an opponent knows that one has no reason to carry out a threat, the threat would not be credible and so one would have no reason to make it. Further, it is characteristic of a state of nuclear deterrence that the opponent would recognize that one would have no reason to carry out the threat.The rationality paradox is but one of the paradoxes raised by nuclear deterrence. Some other of the paradoxes of nuclear deterrence have the same form as the rationality paradox: for a certain set of predicates x,(PND) (1) the act of threatening nuclear retaliation (against an opponent with nuclear weapons) is x, while the act of carrying out the threat would be not-x; and (2) if it is not-x to perform some action, then, in the circumstances generally characteristic of a situation of nuclear deterrence, it is not-x to threaten to perform that action.

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Dupuy, Jean-Pierre. "On the Rationality and Ethics of Nuclear Deterrence." Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence 5, no. 1 (May 20, 2021): 129–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.22618/tp.pjcv.20215.1.139008.

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Beginning with a brief outline of the ethical contradictions inherent to nuclear deterrence, this paper highlights the flaws of commonly acknowledged theories regarding the efficiency of nuclear threats. The paper concludes that a theory of “existential deterrence” is the only way to somewhat safeguard the rationality of nuclear deterrence. The backbone of this contention is a metaphysics of time according to which the actual and the potential coincide, and future events necessarily occur. In that framework nuclear deterrence appears to be an ethical abomination.

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Brams, Steven J., and D. Marc Kilgour. "Optimal Deterrence." Social Philosophy and Policy 3, no. 1 (1985): 118–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500000194.

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1. IntroductionThe policy of deterrence, at least to avert nuclear war between the superpowers, has been a controversial one. The main controversy arises from the threat of each side to visit destruction on the other in response to an initial attack. This threat would seem irrational if carrying it out would lead to a nuclear holocaust – the worst outcome for both sides. Instead, it would seem better for the side attacked to suffer some destruction rather than to retaliate in kind and, in the process of devastating the other side, seal its own doom in an all-out nuclear exchange.Yet, the superpowers persist in their adherence to deterrence, by which we mean a policy of threatening to retaliate to an attack by the other side in order to deter such an attack in the first place. To be sure, nuclear doctrine for implementing deterrence has evolved over the years, with such appellations as “massive retaliation,” “flexible response,” “mutual assured destruction” (MAD), and “counterforce” giving some flavor of the changes in United States strategic thinking.All such doctrines, however, entail some kind of response to a Soviet nuclear attack. They are operationalized in terms of preselected targets to be hit, depending on the perceived nature and magnitude of the attack. Thus, whether U.S. strategic policy at any time stresses a retaliatory attack on cities and industrial centers (countervalue) or on weapons systems and armed forces (counterforce), the certainty of a response of some kind to an attack is not the issue.

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Rautenbach, Peter. "The Subtle Knife." Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare 2, no. 1 (December 6, 2019): 25. http://dx.doi.org/10.21810/jicw.v2i1.951.

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This article looks to tie together the polar opposite of hybrid warfare and nuclear deterrence. The reason for this is that hybrid warfare and its effects on nuclear deterrence need to be explored as there appears to be substantial increases in hybrid warfare’s usage. This article found that hybrid warfare has an erosion like effect on nuclear deterrence because it increases the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used. This may be due to both the fact that hybrid warfare can ignore conventional redlines, but also because the cyber aspect of hybrid warfare has unintended psychological effects on how deterrence functions. how does this relate to nuclear war? In short, cyber warfare attacks key concepts which make nuclear deterrence a viable strategy including the concepts of stability, clarity, and rationality. Therefore, hybrid warfare increases the chance of nuclear use.

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Shah, Akash. "Deterrence under Surveillance: Indian Space-based ISR Capabilities and Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrence." Journal of Security & Strategic Analyses 8, no. 2 (January 2, 2023): 07–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.57169/jssa.008.02.0201.

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India is rapidly building up its space-based Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Although Indian military assets in space are in contention to Chinese space program, they are expected to make Pakistan apprehensive about the future of its nuclear deterrence. Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons to deter its much larger and stronger archnemesis India from violating its territorial integrity. Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence and strategy is aligned with the Perfect Deterrence Theory, a diversion from Classical Deterrence Theory used in the understanding of deterrence relationship between the USA and USSR during the Cold War. The study addresses the impact of India’s space-based ISR capabilities on Pakistan nuclear deterrence and posture. The growth of Indian military space program along with its great interest and investment in supersonic cruise missiles and ballistic missile defense program indicates that India is building up its First Strike potential against Pakistan’s strategic assets and installations. The developments will have a tremendous impact on deterrence stability in South Asia as it will increase the likelihood of a nuclear escalation in future.

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Merlini, Cesare. "Nuclear non‐proliferation and nuclear deterrence." International Spectator 25, no. 1 (January 1990): 26–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03932729008456690.

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38

Govier, Trudy. "Nuclear Hardware and Power: The War of Perceptions." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 4 (December 1987): 749–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1987.10715917.

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Nations possessing nuclear weapons have seen them as useful for many purposes. These include classic nuclear deterrence (preventing a nuclear attack), extended nuclear deterrence (preventing a conventional attack on the nuclear nation or allied countries), the fighting of a nuclear war ‘if deterrence fails,’ and a ‘diplomatic’ use in which the weapons are seen as implements of coercive political power. Concerning all these uses profound ethical questions arise. It is the last use which will be the focus of attention in this paper.I have chosen this subject partly because I believe that it has received insufficient attention from those reflecting on nuclear policies from an ethical point of view. Discussions tend to focus on the use, threat to use, or intention to use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack or threat of nuclear attack. The retention of nuclear weapons for such a purpose is far easier to rationalize than is the development of such weapons for extended deterrence, nuclear ‘diplomacy,’ or the actual waging of a nuclear war. Historically, nuclear weapons have been held by nuclear states for all these purposes. In fact, there are natural relations between the functions. When a power possesses nuclear weapons, the ultimate token of military power in the modern world, it is natural that it will seek to use them for purposes less restricted than the sole one of deterring nuclear war. Hence there is a natural development from classic deterrence to extended deterrence and the coercive use of nuclear weapons in the pursuit of national interest. There is also a natural connection between classic deterrence and the development and deployment of nuclear weapons for the purpose of fighting and ‘prevailing’ in a nuclear war. An opposing state is to be prevented from attacking by the belief that an attack would be followed by retaliation. That requires that a nuclear state indicate the will and capacity to retaliate-that is, to use these weapons in a real war if necessary.

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ARBATOV, A. "TRANSFORMATION OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE." World Economy and International Relations 62, no. 7 (July 2018): 5–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2018-62-7-5-16.

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40

Brams, Steven J., and D. Marc Kilgour. "Is Nuclear Deterrence Rational?" PS 19, no. 3 (1986): 645. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/419188.

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HANSEN, LENE. "Nuclear Weapons after Deterrence." Cooperation and Conflict 27, no. 3 (September 1992): 301–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010836792027003004.

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McNally, J. H. "Confidence in Nuclear Deterrence." Science 283, no. 5408 (March 12, 1999): 1641b—1641. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.283.5408.1641b.

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43

Attwood, David. "Threats and Nuclear Deterrence." Studies in Christian Ethics 4, no. 1 (April 1991): 40–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/095394689100400103.

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44

Frost, Robin M. "Terrorism and nuclear deterrence." Adelphi Papers 45, no. 378 (December 2005): 63–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05679320500519047.

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45

Boyd, Dallas, and James Scouras. "ESCAPE FROM NUCLEAR DETERRENCE." Nonproliferation Review 20, no. 2 (June 27, 2013): 339–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2013.799822.

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46

Corr, Anders. "Deterrence of Nuclear Terror." Nonproliferation Review 12, no. 1 (March 2005): 127–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700500208876.

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47

Miller, Michael. "NUCLEAR ATTRIBUTION AS DETERRENCE." Nonproliferation Review 14, no. 1 (March 2007): 33–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700601178465.

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Brams, Steven J., and D. Marc Kilgour. "Is Nuclear Deterrence Rational?" PS: Political Science & Politics 19, no. 03 (1986): 645–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049096500018229.

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49

Stevenson, Leslie. "Is Nuclear Deterrence Ethical?" Philosophy 61, no. 236 (April 1986): 193–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100021069.

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We are morally perplexed about nuclear weapons. Popular debate oscillates tediously between an apparently impractical idealism which would have nothing to do with the things, and a military and political realism which insists that we have to use such means to attain our legitimate ends. The choice, it too often seems, is between laying down our nuclear arms–thus avoiding the moral odium of resting our defence policies on threats to vaporize millions of civilians–but leaving ourselves open to domination by those who do not feel such scruples, and on the other hand, retaining such weapons as long as our potential enemies possess them, constantly maintaining parity with the other side–in other words, proceeding with the arms race. The respective proponents of principle and of prudence typically fail to understand how others can possibly neglect the considerations which loom so large in their own minds. Each has at bottom a deeply held ethical view–that certain means (deployment of nuclear weapons) may not be used for any end, or that certain ends (defending our freedom and national sovereignty) are so important that they justify the use of almost any means. The disagreement is so irreconcilable that it spills out from TV studios and newspaper editorial pages on to the streets and the missile bases, and into the courts and the prisons.

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Adeney, Bernard T. "Is Nuclear Deterrence Acceptable?" Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies 5, no. 1 (January 1988): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/026537888800500101.

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