Relevant bibliographies by topics / Deterrenza nucleare

Academic literature on the topic 'Deterrenza nucleare'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 11 March 2023

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Contents

Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Deterrenza nucleare.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Journal articles on the topic "Deterrenza nucleare"

1

Parsi, Vittorio Emanuele. "La bomba e noi." EDUCAZIONE SENTIMENTALE, no. 14 (September 2010): 34–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/eds2010-014003.

Full text
Abstract:
Durante la Guerra Fredda le armi nucleari hanno segnato il panorama delle Relazioni Internazionali rendendo il conflitto tra le superpotenze di fatto improbabile. Sulla scia di tale esperienza, nella memoria attuale l'effetto stabilizzante della bomba atomica sembra quasi occultare gli aspetti piů nefasti e tuttora incompresi del delicato equilibrio del terrore. Tuttavia, la fine del bipolarismo e la frammentazione del sistema internazionale hanno minato il potenziale di stabilizzazione dell'ordigno nucleare, rendendolo al contrario un pericoloso fattore di disordine. Le recenti ambizioni nucleari (piů o meno coronate da successo) di Stati quali Pakistan, Corea del Nord e Iran impongono quindi un ripensamento non solo della teoria della deterrenza, ma dell'intera architettura istituzionale volta a prevenire la proliferazione nucleare.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Andreatta, Filippo. "Effetti sistemici e politica internazionale." Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica 29, no. 1 (April 1999): 157–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0048840200026526.

Full text
Abstract:
Questi due recenti lavori di importanti studiosi statunitensi dimostrano ancora una volta la vitalità e la creatività della disciplina delle relazioni internazionali. Si tratta infatti di opere di grande respiro e rigore teorico che introducono nel dibattito accademico ipotesi ed analisi alquanto avvincenti. Il libro di Snyder si concentra su uno degli aspetti essenziali della politica internazionale – le alleanze – e riesce nell'intento di affrontare approfonditamente un argomento che, paradossalmente, è invece rimasto piuttosto trascurato nella letteratura specializzata. A parte la letteratura politologica sulle coalizioni ed i beni pubblici, e la letteratura più classica sulle relazioni internazionali, non ci sono infatti analisi recenti in materia. Il volume di Jervis è invece meno ambizioso in quanto non si presenta come un'analisi compiuta su uno degli aspetti principali della disciplina. Ciò nonostante, l'autore cerca di proporre una chiave di lettura sistemica di tutta la politica internazionale risultando così non meno rilevante del libro di Snyder. La ricchezza del background culturale di Jervis e la sua capacità di sintesi – che già si erano espresse in campi diversi quali la teoria della deterrenza nucleare, l'importanza delle variabili tecnologiche, l'analisi psicologica delle decisioni e le grandi metafore strategiche della diplomazia contemporanea – assumono in questo caso una forma matura che permette all'autore di attingere proficuamente da altre discipline quali la biologia e l'ingegneria ambientale senza mai perdere di vista l'intento di spiegare fenomeni sociali complessi.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Vuori, Juha A. "Deterring Things with Words: Deterrence as a Speech Act1." New Perspectives 24, no. 2 (September 2016): 23–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2336825x1602400203.

Full text
Abstract:
As Cold War historians and fans of the film Doctor Strangelove know, deterrence can be a tricky business. The complexity of deterrence and the lack of attention that has been paid to its social effects have too often left one of its forms – nuclear deterrence – depoliticized, uncontested, and thus a danger to us all. I argue in this article that speech act theory can provide insights into deterrence and its concomitant political effects. It can be used to philosophically explain the communicative difficulties involved in deterrent relationships, and to form a basis for a critical stance on deterrence as politics. This entails a shift of focus from deterrence as a state of mind to the politics of deterrence and the deontic powers it wields – a shift from the causative aspects of deterrence to the deontology of deterrents. The analysis of such political functions is aided by the neologism of deterrentification, which refers to assertive and declarative acts that alter the status functions of things so that they are thought to act as deterrents and bring about determent in someone or something. It also aids in conceptualizing how the status of deterrents can be cancelled, and how nuclear weapons can be drawn away from the exceptional sphere of deterrence and back into the sphere of politics. Such a status transformation is required to achieve a sustained nuclear disarmament.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Sankaran, Jaganath, and Steve Fetter. "Defending the United States: Revisiting National Missile Defense against North Korea." International Security 46, no. 3 (February 25, 2022): 51–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00426.

Full text
Abstract:
Abstract North Korea has made significant strides in its attempt to acquire a strategic nuclear deterrent. In 2017, it tested intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and completed a series of nuclear test explosions. These may provide North Korea with the technical foundation to deploy a nuclear-armed ICBM capable of striking the United States. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) missile defense system is intended to deter North Korean nuclear coercion and, if deterrence fails, to defeat a limited North Korean attack. Despite two decades of dedicated and costly efforts, however, the GMD system remains unproven and unreliable. It has not demonstrated an ability to defeat the relatively simple and inexpensive countermeasures that North Korea can field. The GMD system has suffered persistent delays, substantial cost increases, and repeated program failures because of the politically motivated rush to deploy in the 1990s. But GMD and other U.S. missile defense efforts have provoked serious concerns in Russia and China, who fear it may threaten their nuclear deterrents. Diplomacy and deterrence may reassure Russia and China while constraining North Korea's nuclear program. An alternate airborne boost-phase intercept system may offer meaningful defense against North Korean missiles without threatening the Russian or Chinese deterrents.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Russett, Bruce Martin. "Extended Deterrence with Nuclear Weapons: How Necessary, How Acceptable?" Review of Politics 50, no. 2 (1988): 282–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500015680.

Full text
Abstract:
Most policy and normative problems with nuclear weaponry arise in the context of extended deterrence; that is, deterrence of attacks on friends or allies of a nuclear power. This article reviews the history and contradictions of post-World War II Western extended deterrent strategy, considers the sources of differences and similarities in the perspectives of the American and West German Catholic bishops on these matters, presents a logical schema of types of deterrent situations, discusses some systematic historical evidence that suggests the utility of nuclear weapons for many of these situations is often exaggerated, and, after reviewing alternative strategies, suggests a role for a very limited “countercombatant” nuclear strategy.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Kehler, C. Robert. "Nuclear Weapons & Nuclear Use." Daedalus 145, no. 4 (September 2016): 50–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_00411.

Full text
Abstract:
While nuclear weapons were conceived to end a war, in the aftermath of their operational use at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they became the central (and controversial) means to prevent a war. Nuclear deterrence formed the foundation of U.S. Cold War doctrine and the basis of an extended security guarantee to our allies. But the Cold War ended one-quarter century ago, and questions about the efficacy of deterrence, the need for nuclear weapons, and the ethics surrounding them have resurfaced as some call for further major reductions in inventory or the complete elimination of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Discussed from the perspective of a military practitioner, this essay highlights the continuing need for U.S. nuclear weapons in a global security environment that is highly complex and uncertain, and describes the means by which the credibility of the nuclear portion of the strategic deterrent is being preserved even as the role and prominence of these weapons have been reduced.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Talbot, Brent. "Getting Deterrence Right: The Case for Stratified Deterrence." Journal of Strategic Security 13, no. 1 (April 2020): 26–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.1.1748.

Full text
Abstract:
The potential for hostilities in the 21st Century is not likely to be deterred by a Cold War deterrence strategy. And while nuclear deterrence remains important, regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and accompanying long-range delivery capabilities are a rising concern. New technological breakthroughs in the space, cyber, and unforeseen realms could also provide asymmetric means of undermining deterrence. Moreover, the effort to achieve strategic stability in this day and age has become increasingly complicated in light of the changing relationship among the great powers. Today’s world has become one of “security trilemmas.” Actions one state takes to defend against another can, in-turn, make a third state feel insecure. There is great need for both nuclear diversity (theater and low-yield weapons) and increased conventional capabilities in the U.S. deterrent force to provide strategic stability in the decades ahead. In sum, we need a deterrence construct that both deters nuclear use by the great powers and terminates nuclear use by both regional powers and so called rogue states initiating nuclear wars on neighbors. I propose herein a policy of stratified deterrence which addresses deterrence needs at each potential level of conflict.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Akhtar, Nasreen. "Emerging Challenges to Deterrence Stability in South Asia: A Theoretical Analysis." Journal of Security & Strategic Analyses 8, no. 2 (January 2, 2023): 145–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.57169/jssa.008.02.0156.

Full text
Abstract:
The nuclear deterrent and conventional capabilities of both Pakistan and India contribute extensively towards maintaining peace and strategic stability in the region. In South Asia, both states have significantly increased their nuclear and conventional capabilities. The recent new trends, at regional as well as global levels, such as growing conventional asymmetry, changing policies of the non-proliferation regime, and the introduction of more sophisticated weapon capabilities pose a direct pernicious challenge to deterrence stability of Pakistan and India - as both nuclear states are immensely increasing their defence system. Through the lens of structural deterrence theory, this paper examines the strategic threats posed to deterrence stability in South Asia. Complete deterrence has become a mirage in South Asia. This paper examines the strategic imbalance in South Asia as the most pertinent threat - the two nuclear adversaries, India and Pakistan, are accumulating military power. This paper argues that strategic imbalance has serious implications for the South Asian region. In this paper, we employ the interpretative methodology.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Cooke, Steve, and Andrew Futter. "Democracy versus deterrence: Nuclear weapons and political integrity." Politics 38, no. 4 (October 5, 2017): 500–513. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263395717733978.

Full text
Abstract:
This article argues that the practice and performance of nuclear deterrence can never be fully representative or democratic due to the particular pressures placed on leaders by the nuclear condition. For nuclear deterrence to be effective – and for nuclear weapons to have any political value – a leader must always convince both their electorate as well as any possible foe, that they are willing to use nuclear weapons in extremis, irrespective of whether this is their true position. In any nuclear-armed state, where politicians privately believe that using nuclear weapons is always wrong, but publicly stress that possessing nuclear weapons to use as a deterrent is right, they are forced to act dishonestly. These tensions are particularly acute in the UK context given the reliance on just one form of nuclear weapons system for deterrence and the concurrent requirement to pre-delegate secret orders through a ‘letter of last resort’. The consequences for democratic nuclear-armed states are troubling; for public morality, the personal integrity of democratic leaders, and for true democratic accountability. This article concludes that public criticism of political leaders, and citizen voting choices, ought to take account of the problem of transparency posed by policies of nuclear deterrence.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Betts, Richard K. "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence." World Politics 37, no. 2 (January 1985): 153–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2010141.

Full text
Abstract:
For over three decades the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has based its deterrent on the principle that the United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons if a Soviet conventional attack against Western Europe succeeded. This notion has long troubled most strategic analysts. It remained generally acceptable to political elites, however, when U.S. nuclear superiority appeared massive enough to make the doctrine credible (as in the 1950s); when the conventional military balance in Europe improved markedly (as in the 1960s); or when détente appeared to be making the credibility of deterrence a less pressing concern (as in the 1970s). None of these conditions exists in the 1980s, and anxiety over the danger of nuclear war has prompted renewed attention to the possibility of replacing NATO's Flexible Response doctrine (a mixture of nuclear and conventional deterrence) with a reliable conventional deterrence posture that might justify a nuclear no-first-use (NFU) doctrine.1
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Deterrenza nucleare"

1

Park, Jusik. "Rationality in nuclear deterrence /." The Ohio State University, 1991. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu148775905515793.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Rasmussen, David C. "Credible nuclear deterrence for Japan." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2000. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA378257.

Full text
Abstract:
Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs) Naval Postgraduate School, March 2000.
Thesis advisor(s): Wirtz, James J. ; Olsen, Edward A. "March 2000." Includes bibliographical references (p. 73-80). Also available in print.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Estoch, Christopher. "Nuclear deterrence : insecurity and the proliferation of nuclear weapons." Honors in the Major Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2009. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETH/id/1258.

Full text
Abstract:
This item is only available in print in the UCF Libraries. If this is your Honors Thesis, you can help us make it available online for use by researchers around the world by following the instructions on the distribution consent form at http://library.ucf.edu/Systems/DigitalInitiatives/DigitalCollections/InternetDistributionConsentAgreementForm.pdf You may also contact the project coordinator, Kerri Bottorff, at kerri.bottorff@ucf.edu for more information.
Bachelors
Sciences
Political Science
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Eckford, James. "Nuclear Proliferation And The Nuclear Deterrent: Will The Non-Proliferation Treaty Ever Achieve Total Nuclear Disarmament? Is The Nuclear Deterrent Worth Keeping?" Thesis, Högskolan i Halmstad, Centrum för studier av politik, kommunikation och medier (CPKM), 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hh:diva-16926.

Full text
Abstract:
In 2009 President Obama outlined his utopic vision of a nuclear-free world, admitting that this would not be possible within his lifetime he claimed that while the US will continue to reduce its stockpile it would implement the missile defence shield as long as Iran, North Korea and terrorists pose a nuclear threat. Such a pledge...
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Wieninger, William A. "Nuclear deterrence : neither necessary nor sufficient for peace." Thesis, McGill University, 2004. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=85030.

Full text
Abstract:
This thesis carefully examines the question of the effect of nuclear weapons possession on international relations through a detailed examination of all international crises between nuclear powers, as identified by the International Crisis Behavior Project (ICB). It distinguishes itself from similar studies in four key areas. First, by including the recent dyadic nuclear crises between India and Pakistan, this study significantly expands the number of cases under consideration. Next, the India-Pakistan crises provide an opportunity for a novel comparison to the US-USSR crises of the Cold War.
Third, this work is unique among studies of nuclear deterrence in its combined use of qualitative and quantitative methodology. The quantitative analysis uses ordered logit with the ICB data set on a variety of variables, discussed below, that do not lend themselves to standard regression techniques. The qualitative analysis examines whether or not nuclear weapons caused decision-makers on both sides of each crises to refrain from escalation due to fear of nuclear catastrophe. Finally, this study compares the effect of mutual nuclear weapons capability with the effects of democracy and interdependence on the level of violence in crises.
Ultimately, this thesis finds that nuclear proliferation is far less successful at preventing war among states in dyadic nuclear crises than is commonly believed. In only one of 17 crises (the Cuban Missile Crisis) is it clear that mutual possession of nuclear weapons caused leaders on both sides to eschew war. Relative to nuclear weapons possession, democracy and trade were found to be significantly more effective at limiting violence in crises and preventing war. Moreover, regimes suffering a lack of legitimacy in either the international community or among their neighbors had a significantly higher level of violence in crises.
Taken together, these findings have significant implications for public policy regarding nuclear proliferation, suggesting that the international community should work even more diligently to prevent nuclear proliferation, while working to strengthen democratic regimes, increase interstate trade, and reduce the international isolation of states such as North Korea and Iran.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Corbett, Andrew Scott. "The British Government, the public, and nuclear deterrence." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2017. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/the-british-government-the-public-and-nuclear-deterrence(165940d4-2781-4df2-acf9-eac2e939495c).html.

Full text
Abstract:
This thesis offers a novel insight into the relationship between British government engagement with the public on nuclear deterrence policy, and the factors which influence that policy development. It considers the evolution of a complex, and largely unacknowledged aversion to the implications of total war, in particular the notion of inflicting non-combatant casualties as a deliberate, if not intentional, aspect of national strategy. This aversion was evident in the reluctance to engage in reprisals for bombing raids on London during the First World War, and the tensions it caused between operational strategy and public policy during the bombing campaign of the Second World War. The same aversion influenced early British understanding of nuclear deterrence, and public government engagement on nuclear deterrence policy tends to have been limited to technical detail such as performance or cost ever since. This is symptomatic of a reluctance to engage in complex moral debates in public, and modern media have exacerbated the problems by a tendency to reduce such issues to polarised arguments inhibiting genuine discussion while producing eye-catching studio drama. The public messaging implications of the challenging relationship between contemporary ‘rights-based’ ethical concepts and the more consequentialist ‘just war’ ethics that tend to dominate government policy have not been satisfactorily examined before. This thesis considers that relationship and its impact. It concludes that only government must face all aspects of moral choices: while antinuclear opposition can afford selective deontological absolutes, governments must have recourse to consequentialist moral concepts to provide for national defence, and this is difficult to portray in public, particularly through modern media. Government must engage in more than technical arguments if the strategic requirement for retention of the nuclear deterrent is to be perceived as legitimate and not rendered vulnerable to public misapprehension driven by vocal minorities.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Griffin, Gail Alane. "Nuclear winter and nuclear policy: implications for U.S. and Soviet deterrence strategies." Thesis, Monterey, California: U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 1987. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/22385.

Full text
Abstract:
Nuclear weapons were rapidly incorporated into the policies for maintaining the national security objectives of both the Soviet Union and the United States--in spite of poorly understood nuclear weapons effects. The nuclear winter hypothesis, the basis of which was first proposed in 1982, directed scientific research into the consequences of massive amounts of dust and smoke, from nuclear detonations, on the earth's climate and subsequently on the ecology of the earth. This thesis presents the evolution of the nuclear winter hypothesis in order to elucidate its unique aspects for global devastation and the consensus of plausibility which the hypothesis holds in the scientific community. The hypothesis has aroused a flurry of debate on its implications for nuclear policy. With the historical aspects of the nuclear era as a backdrop, the question of incorporating new scientific information on the consequences of nuclear war into policy is discussed. The observed responses of the U.S. and Soviet Union and the implications for future actions in response to the nuclear winter hypothesis are examined-- leading to the conclusion that the hypothesis will have little or no impact on U.S. and Soviet nuclear policy. Theses. (JHD)
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Laderman, Sarah (Sarah Jane). "Minimal nuclear deterrence : a nuclear arsenal reduction plan for the United States." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/76953.

Full text
Abstract:
Thesis (S.B.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Nuclear Science and Engineering, 2012.
"June 2012." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 39-40).
The global political climate has called for reductions to nuclear arsenals around the world. This thesis researches how potential deep cuts to the United States' large strategic nuclear arsenal would affect its current nuclear deterrence goals. First, case studies on pre-1960 United States, 1964-2012 France, and 1964-2012 China are conducted to understand how a small nuclear arsenal should be constructed in order to prevent nuclear attack from countries with large nuclear arsenals. The lessons learned from these case studies, the current United States deterrence requirements, and the destructive effects from different warheads are then used to propose a potential composition of a small nuclear arsenal for the United States. The proposal consists of only around 500 warheads (in comparison to the current 2,000 the US has on deployment) and achieves United States deterrence goals through its vast destructive capability, variability, and survivability if targeted against in a first nuclear strike.
by Sarah Laderman.
S.B.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Funtanilla, Neil E. "Nuclear deterrent cooperation involving Britain, France, and Germany." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 1998. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA359133.

Full text
Abstract:
Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs) Naval Postgraduate School, December 1998.
"December 1998." Thesis advisor(s): Michael W. Boudreau. Includes bibliographical references (p. 91-97). Also available online.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Arbuckle, Larry J. "The deterrence of nuclear terrorism through an attribution capability." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Naval Postgraduate School, 2008. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA483633.

Full text
Abstract:
Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2008.
Thesis Advisor(s): O'Connell, Robert. "June 2008." Description based on title screen as viewed on August 26, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 45-47). Also available in print.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Books on the topic "Deterrenza nucleare"

1

Vincenzo, Tornetta, ed. Deterrenza nucleare e morale cristiana. Bari: Flli Laterza, 1987.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Hans, Binnendijk, Goodby James E, and National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies., eds. Transforming nuclear deterrence. Washington, D.C: National Defense University Press, 1997.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Healey, Denis. Beyond nuclear deterrence. London: Fabian Society, 1986.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Britain), Fabian Society (Great, ed. Beyond nuclear deterrence. London: Fabian Society, 1986.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Adhikari, Shekhar. Deterrence. Allahabad: Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Allahabad, 2002.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Centre for Security Analysis (Madras, India), ed. Nuclear deterrence and disarmament. Chennai: Centre for Security Analysis, 2009.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Centre for Security Analysis (Madras, India), ed. Nuclear deterrence and disarmament. Chennai: Centre for Security Analysis, 2009.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

1940-, Hardin Russell, ed. Nuclear deterrence: Ethics and strategy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

1942-, Boyle Joseph M., and Grisez Germain Gabriel 1929-, eds. Nuclear deterrence, morality, and realism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Nikolayev, K. Nuclear deterrence: past and future. Moscow: Novosti press agency, 1989.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Book chapters on the topic "Deterrenza nucleare"

1

Lindelauf, Roy. "Nuclear Deterrence in the Algorithmic Age: Game Theory Revisited." In NL ARMS, 421–36. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_22.

Full text
Abstract:
AbstractCommonly used game and decision theoretic models fail to explain the empirics of deterrence. This has unjustly led many theorists to criticize the (rationality and other) assumptions underpinning of such models. No serious game theorist will contend that his theoretic model will possibly take account of all the peculiarities involved in decision making and therefore be an accurate model of such situations. Games are an aid to thinking about some of the aspects of the broader situation. Game theory models prescribe what a decision maker ought to do in a given situation, not what a decision maker actually does. To maintain nuclear strategic stability, it is of paramount importance to understand the dynamical interplay between all players involved in decision making processes with regard to nuclear strategy. History has shown some progress in understanding nuclear deterrence by the use of initial game- and decision theoretic models to alleviate the burden of human cognitive biases. Since it is highly likely that (semi-)autonomous systems will in some way participate in the future nuclear strategic landscape, combined with the fact that the nuclear deterrent decision-cycle will also be based on algorithmic analysis, rational deterrence theory is and should be an integral element of strategic thinking about nuclear deterrence. That, or it might as well be game over.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Colby, Elbridge. "Is Nuclear Deterrence Still Relevant?" In Deterrence, 49–73. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137289810_4.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Ritchie, Nick. "Deterrence." In A Nuclear Weapons-Free World?, 51–73. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137284099_5.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Arbatov, Alexey. "Nuclear Deterrence: A Guarantee for or Threat to Strategic Stability?" In NL ARMS, 65–86. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_5.

Full text
Abstract:
AbstractIn recent literature, much attention has been paid to factors that affect nuclear deterrence and stability from the outside: new missile defence systems, non-nuclear (conventional) high-precision long-range weapons, the influence of third and threshold nuclear states, space weapons, and—more recently—cyber threats. These new factors have pushed the core of nuclear deterrence—strategic relations between Russia and the United States—to the background in the public consciousness. Yet dangerous changes are taking place. This chapter examines the real and imaginary causes of the current situation and suggests potential ways to reduce tensions that could benefit international security. It concludes that nuclear deterrence can serve as a pillar of international security with one crucial reservation: namely, that it can only work in conjunction with negotiations and agreements on the limitation, reduction, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Without such checks, nuclear deterrence goes berserk. It endlessly fuels the arms race, brings the great powers to the brink of nuclear war in any serious crisis, and sometimes the very dynamics of nuclear deterrence can instigate a confrontation.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Mazarr, Michael J., and Alexander T. Lennon. "Regional Deterrence." In Toward a Nuclear Peace, 57–68. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-60793-8_5.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Sauer, Tom. "Nuclear Deterrence Revisited." In Nuclear Arms Control, 1–29. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26729-3_1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Fazzi, Dario. "Demystifying Nuclear Deterrence." In Eleanor Roosevelt and the Anti-Nuclear Movement, 79–116. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32182-0_4.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Bobbitt, Philip. "Alternative Nuclear Strategies." In Democracy and Deterrence, 134–50. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18991-5_10.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

van Hooft, Paul. "The US and Extended Deterrence." In NL ARMS, 87–107. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_6.

Full text
Abstract:
AbstractThe U.S. provides extended nuclear deterrence to allies in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. The 2018 NPR signals several potentially destabilizing policies, including lowering the threshold for use and adding low-yield capabilities, and it emphasizes the need for nuclear superiority. This chapter argues that the U.S. is changing its nuclear posture to address the growing challenge to U.S. conventional superiority. Extended nuclear deterrence is inherently dubious and the asymmetry between the U.S. on the one hand, and its allies and adversaries on the other, makes it doubly so. In the coming decades, this will continue to generate problems for the U.S. as long as it maintains its alliance commitments.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Fitzpatrick, Anne. "Is a New Focus on Nuclear Weapons Research and Development Necessary?" In Deterrence, 97–115. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137289810_6.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Conference papers on the topic "Deterrenza nucleare"

1

Soper, Braden C. "A Cyber-Nuclear Deterrence Game." In 2019 57th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/allerton.2019.8919910.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

YANG, Tiejian, Minle WANG, Song TIAN, Baoshun ZHOU, and Lan LI. "Performance evaluation study of strate-gic nuclear deterrent." In 2013 International Conference on Information, Business and Education Technology (ICIBET-2013). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icibet.2013.14.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Stumpf, Waldo. "SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME: FROM DETERRENCE TO DISMANTLEMENT." In Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. WORLD SCIENTIFIC, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789812799647_0008.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Gaertner, John P., and Grant A. Teagarden. "Development, Application, and Implementation of RAMCAP to Characterize Nuclear Power Plant Risk From Terrorism." In 14th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering. ASMEDC, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/icone14-89858.

Full text
Abstract:
In response to increased interest in risk-informed decision making regarding terrorism, EPRI and ERIN Engineering were selected by U.S. DHS and ASME to develop and demonstrate the RAMCAP method for nuclear power plant (NPP) risk assessment. The objective is to characterize plant-specific NPP risk for risk management opportunities and to provide consistent information for DHS decision making. This paper is an update of this project presented at the American Nuclear Society (ANS) International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA05) in September, 2005. The method uses a characterization of risk as a function of Consequence, Vulnerability, and Threat. For each site, worst case scenarios are developed for each of sixteen benchmark threats. Nuclear RAMCAP hypothesizes that the intent of the perpetrator is to cause offsite radiological consequences. Specific targets are the reactor core, the spent fuel pool, and nuclear spent fuel in a dry storage facility (ISFSI). Results for each scenario are presented as conditional risk for financial loss, early fatalities and early injuries. Expected consequences for each scenario are quantified, while vulnerability is estimated on a relative likelihood scale. Insights for other societal risks are provided. Although threat frequencies are not provided, target attractiveness and threat deterrence are estimated. To assure efficiency, completeness, and consistency; results are documented using standard RAMCAP Evaluator software. Trial applications were successfully performed at four plant sites. Implementation at all other U.S. commercial sites is underway, supported by the Nuclear Sector Coordinating Council (NSCC). Insights from RAMCAP results at 23 U.S. plants completed to date have been compiled and presented to the NSCC. Results are site-specific. Physical security barriers, an armed security force, preparedness for design-basis threats, rugged design against natural hazards, multiple barriers between fuel and environment, accident mitigation capability, severe accident management procedures, and offsite emergency plans are risk-beneficial against all threat types.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Demachi, Kazuyuki, and Shi Chen. "Development of Malicious Hand Behaviors Detection Method by Movie Analysis." In 2018 26th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/icone26-81643.

Full text
Abstract:
An urgent lesson learned from Fukushima Daiichi accident is what can happen by natural disaster can also occur by human design. The accident raised a fear that terrorists could cause a similar accident by acts of sabotage against nuclear power plant (NPP) and it is noticeable that threats of terrorism for nuclear security are increased after the accident. When considering sabotage, the prime threat to nuclear power plants, due attention should be paid to sabotage by insiders. Generally, insiders are the individuals with authorized access to nuclear facilities in transport who could attempt unauthorized sabotage. They could take advantage of their access authority and knowledge, to bypass dedicated physical protection elements or other provisions [1]. Thus, we should value the catastrophic consequences of the attack or act of insider sabotage which may lead to loss of safety functions of NPP. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) indicated that the physical protection system (PPS) of a nuclear facility should be integrated and effective against both sabotage and unauthorized removal. The primary PPS functions are deterrence, detection, delay and response. It is noticeable that if detection failed, delay and response would become invalid. Thus, detection of insiders’ sabotage should be enhanced. Considering current countermeasures of PPS to insiders’ sabotage, the most significant challenge is how to distinguish ordinary maintenance behaviors and malicious behaviors since some malicious behaviors may hidden in ordinary maintenance behaviors. It appears that hand behavior has high contribution to human activity and a significant portion of maintenance behaviors and malicious behaviors. In this study, we proposed a hand behavior detection algorithm for insiders’ malicious behaviors for nuclear security [2]. We focused on the fact that the hand shape is uniquely determined by the fingertip coordinates. First, the depth image of the hand was captured with Kinect v2, and after removing the five fingers were remained by removing the palm and wrist parts, and the five fingers were identified using the K-means clustering [3], and the farthest point of each finger from wrist pixel was taken as the fingertip coordinates. The fingertip coordinates of the five fingers were combined for 60 frames to be time-series data, and this was used as the training data of the neural network. Time-series data obtained from five kinds of behaviors of five hands was used for training data. For the machine learning method, the Stacked-Auto Encoder (SAE) [4–5] which is one of popular methods was used. It extracts the feature of input data at intermediate layer of the first stage. In the second layer, the extracted feature is input and its feature is extracted to be used as the input of the softmax layer for pattern classification. Meanwhile, a real-time fingertip tracking system was developed and time-series data of each fingertip was successfully obtained with 29.8fps using MATLAB whose CPU was Intel Xeon Processor E5-2630v4 (25M Cache, 2.20 GHz). Moreover, a time-series data analysis based behavior recognition method was developed and all assumed malicious behaviors were detected with high accuracy (82.555% in overall) and speed (0.0023 seconds per frame) in the same computing environment. Also, robustness of the behavior recognition method was verified.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Reports on the topic "Deterrenza nucleare"

1

Dunn, Lewis, Andrey Baklitskiy, and Tong Zhao. Some Thoughts on the Logic of Strategic Arms Control: Three Perspectives. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, January 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.37559/wmd/21/ddac/01.

Full text
Abstract:
Who are the proponents of strategic arms control? Why do they advocate it? What are their major assumptions? What are the important uncertainties of arms control? What is the relationship between strategic arms control and nuclear disarmament and nuclear deterrence? This paper, the fifth in UNIDIR’s nuclear dialogue series, explores these questions building on the perspectives of US, Chinese and Russian experts—Lewis A. Dunn, Andrey Baklitskiy and Tong Zhao—and drawing in the views of diverse and informed participants in UNIDIR’s Dialogue on Nuclear Disarmament, Deterrence and Strategic Arms Control.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Dunn, Lewis, Andrey Baklitskiy, and Tong Zhao. Some Thoughts on the Logic of Strategic Arms Control: Three Perspectives. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, January 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.37559/wmd/21/ddac/01.

Full text
Abstract:
Who are the proponents of strategic arms control? Why do they advocate it? What are their major assumptions? What are the important uncertainties of arms control? What is the relationship between strategic arms control and nuclear disarmament and nuclear deterrence? This paper, the fifth in UNIDIR’s nuclear dialogue series, explores these questions building on the perspectives of US, Chinese and Russian experts—Lewis A. Dunn, Andrey Baklitskiy and Tong Zhao—and drawing in the views of diverse and informed participants in UNIDIR’s Dialogue on Nuclear Disarmament, Deterrence and Strategic Arms Control.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Saalman, Lora. Multidomain Deterrence and Strategic Stability in China. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, January 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.55163/fyxq3853.

Full text
Abstract:
Over the past few years, China has displayed a wide range of advances in military capabilities and infrastructure, including its test of a hypersonic glide vehicle coupled with a fractional orbital bombardment system and evidence of new intercontinental ballistic missile silos. While China and the United States remain at political odds, there are indications that China’s strategies in space, cyberspace and nuclear domains are increasingly converging with those of the USA, as well as Russia. A key question is whether this strategic convergence is a stabilizing or destabilizing phenomenon. To answer the question, this paper explores the current state of Chinese discussions on multidomain deterrence and strategic stability, with a focus on active defence and proactive defence. It then examines how these concepts are manifesting themselves in China’s postural and technological indicators, including pre-mating of nuclear warheads to delivery platforms, expanded nuclear arsenal size, possible shifts towards launch on warning, integration of dual-capable systems, and advances in machine learning and autonomy. It concludes with a discussion of what these trends mean for future strategic stability talks.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Dunn, Lewis, Anastasia Malygina, Tanya Ogilvie-White, Brad Roberts, Dmitry Stefanovich, Amy Woolf, and Tong Zhao. The Disarmament, Arms Control, and Non-Proliferation Implications of the Invasion of Ukraine – and What Next for Reducing Global Nuclear Dangers. UNIDIR, August 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.37559/wmd/22/ddac/01.

Full text
Abstract:
In this publication, the eighth in UNIDIR’s nuclear dialogue series, former US Ambassador Lewis Dunn explores the implications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing war for nuclear disarmament, strategic arms control, and non-proliferation. It first sets out some background, it then discusses possible implications for nuclear disarmament, strategic arms control, and non-proliferation and concludes with propositions on “what next” for reducing global nuclear dangers. The publication also includes commentaries from a variety of experts that participated in the 2022 edition of the Disarmament, Deterrence and Arms Control (DDAC) Dialogue convened by UNIDIR.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Otterson, Kirk Grant. Nuclear Weapons Deterrence Concepts. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), January 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1615645.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Scarlett, Harry Alan. Nuclear Weapon Deterrence Principles. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), July 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1638615.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Barr, Alan W. Clausewitz Nuclear War and Deterrence. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada437609.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Kiser, Joshua L. Crisis Relocation and Nuclear Deterrence. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, April 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada170238.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Brock, Jason Carter. NNSA Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), October 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1329824.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Durr, Charles W., and Jr. Nuclear Deterrence in the Third Millennium. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, April 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada404669.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
You might also be interested in the extended bibliographies on the topic 'Deterrenza nucleare' for particular source types:
Journal articles Dissertations / Theses Books
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography