Academic literature on the topic 'Destroyer Flotilla'

Studies of Russian military presence in the lands of Zaporozhia during the New Sich era (1734–1775) pay relatively little attention to the uses of Russian fortresses between the RussoTurkish wars of 1735–1739 and 1768–1774. From 1739 to 1768 the military importance and defense capability of the Russian fortresses diminished, thus their main purpose shifted to information gathering on the Russian-Ottoman borderlands and the Zaporozhian Host of the Lower Dniper itself. Furthermore, another quite understudied function of these fortresses was to serve as military depots, both acting and reserve. This article concentrates on the understudied aspect of the history of Russian fortresses and the Zaporozhia lands during the New Sich era – the storage of vessels of the liquidated Dnieper flotilla after the Russo-Turkish war of 1735-1739. The primary source base for this article consists of the documents from “Kyiv Provincial Chancellery” (Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine, fund 59). The Ust’-Samara retrenchment was a main naval base of the Dnieper flotilla located at the mouth of the Samara River (present-day Dnipro). The reorganization of the Dnieper flotilla material base and fleet supplies took several years after the end of the 1735-1739 war. Subsequently, various fleet supplies (military vessels; ship equipment like ropes, blocks, oars, flags, anchors; naval artillery and related supplies; tools for ships repairs and maintenance like "konopatky"; building materials, ship nails, resin; food stocks for ship crews, etc) were stored in the special fortress warehouses. However, storage conditions were inadequate, naval depots could be destroyed, while equipment and watercraft could be stolen by the Russian officers to be resold later. Relying on documentary sources, an attempt was made to clarify the number of Dnieper flotilla vessels, that were stored in the Ust’-Samara retrenchment. To that end, the article introduces into scientific circulation a document that most fully reflects the number of military vessels, stored at the Russian fortresses in Zaporozhia as of November 1, 1742 - a report compiled by Captain I. Stepanov at the request of the Ust’-Samara retrenchment commander A. Chichagov, commander of all Russian fortresses in Zaporozhia. At that time, the total number of vessels (both suitable and unsuitable for use) amounted to 350. These vessels were stored in the Kamianskyi, Khortyts’kyi, Malyshevs’kyi and Nenasytets’kyi retrenchments. Comparison of data from several documents reveals that for unknown reasons this number (350) did not include boats stored in the Ust’-Samara retrenchment. This article further indicates that the study of exact number of the vessels is complicated by the specifics of the source base. Further elaboration of the issues outlined in the present article would allow not only to explore the functions of Russian fortresses in Zaporozhia during the New Sich era and their role as centers of the Russian military presence, but would also reveal the everyday relations of Russian soldiers with the Cossacks and the peasants (“pospolyti”). The crucial need to study original documentary sources on the history of Russian fortresses in Zaporozhia is emphasized once more.

The years 1997–1998 witnessed Britain's return of Hong Kong to China; the fiftieth anniversary of the independence of India and Pakistan; and the much less publicized 500th anniversary of the arrival of the Portuguese in Asia. So were marked the beginnings and end of European empire in the East, and so, too, a new global distribution of power was recognized. The appearance on 20 May 1498 of a Portuguese fleet commanded by Vasco da Gama at Calicut (Kerala, S. India), combined with the penetration of the Caribbean six years earlier by a Spanish flotilla under Christopher Columbus were, it has often and eloquently been urged, the prelude to a fearful saga. In next to no time Europe was enriched, non-European populations and ecologies destroyed, indigenous states and economies overthrown, a peculiarly European violence introduced into lands previously innocent of such ways, and the yoke of European colonial rule and hegemony eventually imposed. In short, as India's Independence Day Pledge (1930) pithily put it, subjection to empire meant economic, political, cultural and spiritual ruin.

The aim of the paper will be to present the process of the emergence and development of the Polish Navy in the years 1918–1939. Regaining independence by Poland after more than 120 years of partitions, allowed for the emergence of a navy. The first military flotilla was established on the Vistula River, and the first “naval” victory took place on the Pripyat River near Chernobyl. The first ship of the Polish Navy, “Pomorzanin”, was purchased with the private money of Commander Józef Unrug, and the first torpedo squadron was acquired as a result of the decisions of the Versailles Conference. In 1939, the Polish navy had 4 destroyers, 1 minelayer, 5 submarines, 5 minesweepers, 4 river monitors and many smaller units. Was its development the result of the realization of dreams about Poland at the seaside, a maritime power, or just the result of necessity and limited financial resources? An attempt will be made to answer the question of who was responsible for the plans for the development of the Polish navy. Was it the command of the navy or the ministry of military affairs. Whether the development of the navy was decided by sailors or politicians. How the development of the navy was influenced by the enemy concept in the Soviet Union and then in the Third Reich.

This chapter looks at how the new governor of Canada, Marquis de Denonville, summoned military man Henri Tonti to Quebec to discuss plans to attack the problematic Iroquois, who continued to attack French settlements. After returning to Starved Rock, Tonti dispatched agents to the Illinois, Miami, Shawnee, and other local allies telling them to “declare war against the Iroquois” and inviting them to “assemble in good season at the fort.” Later, the French and Indian army led by the governor himself marched into Iroquois territory. This campaign was indecisive. The Iroquois, who were aware that the French and their allies were coming, scattered before their enemies arrived. However, Denonville did burn several Seneca villages and destroyed their crops, cutting the tribe's winter food supply. One notable French success during this campaign, one in which Tonti was a participant, was the capture on Lake Erie of two English flotillas led by several Canadian “renegades” who were en route to Michilimackinac to trade with the Indians in lands claimed by the French. The chapter then considers the death of Sieur de La Salle. It also explores trade at Fort St. Louis.

Abstract Churchill enormously enjoyed his time at the Admiralty. (How much Clementine enjoyed it is another matter.) His pages about it in The World Crisis fizz with hyperactivity vividly recalled, giving the impression while you read them that he can have had no time for anything else—and also giving the impression that the senior admirals liked him more than most of them actually did. In fact the Royal Navy was by no means the only political problem he had to cope with at that time, and his work at the Admiralty was not as widely appreciated at the time as he thought it ought to be. These were great days. From dawn to midnight, day after day, one’s whole mind was absorbed by the fascination and novelty of the problems which came crowding forward. And all the time there was a sense of power to act, to form, to organize: all the ablest officers in the Navy standing ready, loyal and eager, with argument, guidance, information ... Saturdays, Sundays and any other spare day I spent always with the Fleets [of battleships] at Portsmouth or at Portland or Devonport, or with the Flotillas [ of destroyers and such] at Harwich. Officers of every rank came on board to lunch or dine and discussion proceeded without ceasing on every aspect of naval war and administration.