Journal articles on the topic 'Despotism – Europe – History'

RESUMO Este estudo descreve o constitucionalismo, do berço à sua dimensão moderna com alguns momentos relevantes para a compreensão na atualidade, com evidência na Europa e no Brasil. Uma trajetória histórica com diversidade geográfica, cultural, social e política tem marcado a evolução do constitucionalismo em diferentes épocas da existência humana desde o período da barbárie, do despotismo marcado pela monarquia até chegar ao surgimento do Estado Moderno e do Neoconstitucionalismo nos dias atuais.Palavras-chave: História do Constitucionalismo. Brasil. Europa. ABSTRACTThis study describes the constitutionalism, the cradle of the scale with some modern times relevant to understanding today, with evidence in Europe and Brazil. A historical trajectory with geographic diversity, cultural, social and political has marked the evolution of constitutionalism in different epochs of human existence from the terror periods, marked by monarch despotism until the emergence of the modern state and neoconstitutionalism today.Keywords: History of Constitucionalism. Brazil. Europe.

Abstract The term “oriental despotism” was used to describe all larger Asian empires in eighteenth century Europe. It was meaningful to use about the Ottoman, Mughal and Chinese empires. However, this did not mean that all Europeans writing on Asian empires implied that they were all tyrannies with no political qualities. The Chinese system of government received great interest among early modern political thinkers in Europe ever since it was described in the reports that Jesuit missionaries had sent back from China in the beginning of the seventeenth century. The descriptions of an ethical and political bond between emperor and administrators in China and of specific administrative organs in which age-old principles were managed made a great impression on many European readers of these reports. Although it did not remain an undisputed belief in Europe, many intellectuals held China to be a model of how the power of a sovereign could be limited or curbed within an absolutist system of government. This article investigates three cases of how the models of China were conceived by theorists reading Jesuit reports and how they subsequently strategically communicated this model to the courts of Prussia, Austria, and Russia. These three ambitious European monarchies have been regarded to give rise to a form of “enlightened absolutism” that formed a tradition different from those of England and France, the states whose administrative systems formed the most powerful models in this period. Rather than describing the early modern theories about China’s despotism as a narrative parallel, but unrelated to the development of policy programs of the respective states, this article documents how certain elements of the model of China were integrated in the political writings of Frederick II of Prussia, Joseph II of Austria, and Catherine II of Russia. Thus, in addition to the history of political thought on China, the article adds a new perspective to how these monarchs argued for fiscal reforms and a centralization and professionalization of their administrations.

This study aims to examine the way in which European writers of the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries represented Ottoman government. The Ottoman Empire had a special place in European experience and thought. The Ottomans were geographically close to Western Europe, yet they were quite apart in culture and religion, a combination that triggered interest in Turkish affairs.1 Particularly important were political affairs. The Ottoman government inspired a variety of opinions among European travelers and thinkers. During the 18th century, the Ottomans lost their image as formidable and eventually ceased to provoke curiosity in the European public. They were no longer dreaded as the “public calamity”; nor were they greatly respected as the “most modern government” on earth. Rather, they were regarded as a dull and backward sort of people. From the 16th century to the 19th century, the European observers employed two similar, yet different, concepts to characterize the government of the Ottoman Empire. The concept of tyranny was widely used during the 16th and 17th centuries, whereas the concept of despotism was used to depict the regime of the Ottomans in the 18th century. The transition from the term “tyranny” to that of “despotism” in the 18th century indicates a radical change in the European images of the Ottoman Empire. Although both of these terms designate corrupt and perverse regimes in Western political thought, a distinction was made between tyranny and despotism, and it mattered crucially which term was applied to the Ottoman state. European observers of the empire gave special meanings to these key concepts over time. “Tyranny” allowed for both positive and negative features, whereas “despotism” had no redeeming features. Early modern Europeans emphasized both admirable and frightening aspects of Ottoman greatness. On the other hand, the concept of despotism was redefined as inherently Oriental in the 18th century and employed to depict the corruption and backwardness of the Ottoman government. This transformation was profoundly reflected in the beliefs of Europeans about the East. That is, 18th century thought on Ottoman politics contains a Eurocentric analysis of Oriental despotism that is absent from the discussions of Ottoman tyranny in earlier centuries.

In this article the author proposes a new approach to understanding the period of the reign of the Emperor Paul I. The author draws parallels between the history of Russian and Swedish constitutionalism of the second half of the XVIII century, and argues for the typological similarity of the "Gustavian era" in Sweden and the reign period of the Paul I in Russia. At the same time, the politics of Paul I was based on the identification model of Russian “northernism” prevailing in the last third of the 18th century, within which the special role of Russia in the region of northern Europe was designated. Giving the necessary historical and political context, the author reconstructs the internal logic of the evolution of the political worldview of Paul I, who consistently developed from a constitutional to an absolute monarchy. It is suggested that solving of the problematic notion of Paul as a liberal and enlightened heir apparent and, at the same time, a despotic autocrat, can be interpreted within the framework of the transition from «enlightened absolutism» to «enlightened despotism».

In contemporary discussions of the new, post-Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, Hungary is often given pride of place as the most “liberalized” society in the region. Although this perception is based on undeniable political and economic facts, it is also nourished by long-established historical traditions and myths. During the revolutions of 1848–49, Hungarians were also hailed by European opinion as the champions of liberty and heroic resistance to oppression. Over half a century later, in the wake of the political and military collapse of the Habsburg monarchy, Hungary once again staged a series of dramatic revolutions which earned it the reputation of being part of a political avant-garde. And in 1956, Hungarians yet again assumed the mantle of political idealism and revolutionary self-sacrifice in the face of foreign despotism.

Did population policy under Stalin differ, in any fundamental respect, from those of inter-war France or other Western countries? In a radical rethinking of the Soviet experience, Stephen Kotkin said no.Magnetic Mountainmoved the field of Soviet history past an increasingly sterile cold war standoff between the so-called new social history and the totalitarian school. With the social history generation, Kotkin insisted on seeing the Soviet project from the perspective of ordinary people, subject to the same kind of forces that applied throughout Europe. He had no truck with ideas like oriental despotism or Russian exceptionalism, but, with the totalitarian school, he took ideology seriously, presenting everyday life and high politics within a single analytical frame. To do so, he drew eclectically on a range of theoretical perspectives, above all on the work of the late Michel Foucault. Foucault often implied that Auschwitz and the Gulag were the logical outcome of the Enlightenment project, but his primary goal was to illuminate the corrosive, coercive nature of liberal reform efforts in Western Europe, to puncture their claims to universality. The vast bulk of his corpus avoided the twentieth century. Kotkin, by contrast, used Foucault's perspective directly on the Soviet system itself.

Comparative analyses traditionally have done Russian history no favors. Invidious comparisons have situated Russia firmly in a context of backwardness relative to the West. The term ‘medieval’ customarily applies to Russia until the era of Peter the Great, that is, until the early eighteenth century, and even the least condemnatory scholars point out similarities between Muscovite Russia of the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries and early medieval tribal formations of northern Europe. Along with ‘backwardness,’ comparative history has customarily found in Russia an example of extraordinarily oppressive autocratic despotism, while at the same time, and omewhat contradictorily, decrying the incompetence and rampant corruption of the central state apparatus. These and other unflattering comparative generalizations arose in the observations of Western travellers who recorded their impressions of Russia in the early modern period and have continued in the writings of scholars and journalists to this day.

Etienne Dumont became famous in the early nineteenth century for taking Jeremy Bentham's incoherent manuscripts and editing them into readable books which he translated into French. This article focuses on Dumont's earlier life, and specifically his Genevan background, to explain his work for Mirabeau in the first years of the French Revolution and his ultimate sense of the importance of Bentham's system of legislation. The article explains why Dumont's Genevan origins caused him to promote reforms in France intended to establish domestic stability and international peace. Dumont believed that states across Europe needed to combine free government with moral reform, in order to stifle the growth of democracy. The extent of the danger posed by popular government to modern societies was, in Dumont's view, the major lesson of the French Revolution. An alternative reform project to democracy was necessary, but one that did not entail a return to monarchical or aristocratic despotism. The characteristics of Dumont's planned reform became clear by adopting a comparative perspective on events in France. In developing a comparative perspective, Dumont argued that the history of Britain since 1688 needed to be in the foreground. He was perplexed by the French rejection of Britain's political and constitutional model, and explained many major developments at Paris in 1789 by reference to what he considered to be this peculiar fact. After the Terror, Dumont lost his faith in experiments in constitution building as a means of securing the independence of free states like Geneva. Bentham's great achievement was to have provided an alternative system of legislation that would transform national character gradually, making reform politics compatible with domestic and international peace. For Dumont, Bentham established a bulwark against the enthusiasm and democratic excess, and this was the key to utilitarianism as a moral reform project.

The article focuses on clarifying the role of names of Roman emperors in Dostoevsky’s calligraphic records in his notebooks of the late 1860s (Russian State Archive of Literature and Art. Funds 212.1.6 and 212.1.7). One of the reasons for Fedor Dostoevsky’s invocation of images and themes from Roman history was the idea characteristic of the educated class of the mid-19th century, namely, that the history of Rome is a model of virtues and example of vices and atrocities, and is therefore essential to everyone who is not indifferent to the fate of humankind. Since the writer’s creative reflections mainly refer to Gaius Julius Caesar and the rulers of the first two centuries (and the first three dynasties) of the Imperial Period, the writer’s interest in the Roman Caesars must be correlated with his assessment of Imperial Rome in the I—II centuries as the time of strengthening the sole nature of the Emperor’s power and the spread of the Imperial cult, on the one hand, and the formation of Christianity, on the other. At the same time, Dostoevsky’s attention was drawn to Attila and Romulus Augustulus, whose names are associated with the final pages of the history of the Western Roman Empire. For Dostoevsky, Not only texts authored by ancient and Christian authors, but also images of Imperial Rome in contemporary literature and journalism became the sources of associations and motifs associated with the Roman Caesars for Dostoevsky. The most important nuances of meaning were born from the comparison of ancient Roman history with the new history of Western Europe and Russia. The evolution of the subject of calligraphic notes in The Idiot is significant: in the initial drafts of the novel the emphasis was placed on the despotism and monstrosity of the Roman rulers, while the notes for the final version concentrated on the reflection of the history of Imperial Rome and its fate in the Apocalypse.

The author raises in the article an important question of human civilization development: what contribution the East has made to the centuries-long evolution of society. The author emphasizes that, despite the low attention to the countries of the East in the World History books, it was the “Eastern” way that laid down by the great despotisms: Ancient Mesopotamia, Ancient Egypt, Ancient India, Ancient China, and was the main way of human development. Indeed the “Western path” did not appear immediately in Europe itself: both Minoan and Mycenaean Greece developed along the Eastern path, and only in Homeric Greece did the features of “Western” development begin to emerge, more clearly manifested in archaic Greece. The author concludes that such a “Western” emerged as a result of historical coincidence. The author turns to the similarities between the Eastern and Western paths of development, reinforcing them with examples from the history of Ancient Mesopotamia, Ancient Egypt, and Ancient China. The author pays special attention to the ancient Chinese model of statehood as a special kind of transformation of the supreme power. Many scholars record the presence in Ancient China in the 8th–7th centuries B.C. of the socio-political and political-administrative system typologically like the one that existed in Western Europe in the 11th–13th centuries. Ryabinin asks the question: “Why did this socio-political and politico-administrative system in Ancient China cease to exist?”. By the 8th–7th centuries, the Chinese state practice during the time of confrontation with the barbarians developed a new model of the political system and mobilization economy which did not allow the Chinese society to rebuild and avoid the format of a despotic regime. According to the author, the concept of “feudalism” in terms of relations within the ruling stratum does not belong exclusively to Western Europe. “Feudalism” as a system of vassal-loyal relations, for example, can also be observed in certain areas of India. Accordingly, the uniqueness of the European way of developing political systems lies not in democracy but something else. The paper emphasizes that this peculiarity is the priority of the wealthy people associated primarily with the market. It was those people who determined the main direction of the development of ancient society both in Classical Greece and in Republican Rome.

The article examines the dynamics and features of the revival of Ukrainian national traditions, mainly languages and their institutionalization, which are accompanied by the formation of an intellectual national-patriotic elite, whose representatives were examples of moral behavior and political leadership in the struggle for national liberation. It is noted that having formed relatively separately in the four main parts of the Ukrainian lands (Dnieper, Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia), the Ukrainian scientific, cultural, educational and political elite began to unite efforts in organizing joint Ukrainian national revival institutions and actively participated in political life. It is argued that Ukrainian nation-genesis does not represent in political history a perfectly uniform movement towards progress. Perhaps this is the contradiction that causes either the decline of national life and the restriction of political freedoms of the masses, or the rapid rise of national and patriotic feelings and the mass awakening of national identity and the struggle for political freedoms. The middle of the XIX century, which became a period of national revival for the peoples of Europe, has been studied. This was preceded by important socio-political events of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in particular the bourgeois-democratic revolutions, which largely implemented the ideas of freedom, equality, and justice. It is outlined that the bourgeois-democratic revolutions and the national liberation struggle of the European peoples gave prospects for the Ukrainian nation to be reborn and developed. However, the Ukrainian lands were part of the imperial states with different levels of development of political culture, law, public morality, education and more. Thus, the Austrian monarchy of “enlightened absolutism” and the Russian monarchical despotism treated the Ukrainian people differently. Political events of the late XIX – early XX centuries. analyzed through the prism of the then dominant imperial spirit and the rise of the national consciousness of the peoples who were colonized by the imperial states. This means that Ukrainian national genesis and its institutionalized political freedoms are understood only in the closest connection with the imperial spirit of the European geopolitical space and national liberation movements. It is proved that the concept of political freedom for the peoples whose territories were seized by the imperial states, arose as a scientific philosophical and political thought in the first half of the XVIII century. and already in the works of J. Locke, J. Vico, N. R. J. Turgot, J. N. Condorcet and I. Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, and many other thinkers, it acquired a general civilizational worldview significance.

Although Ideological Origins was published before ‘globalization’ had entered the historical lexicon, Bernard Bailyn recovered the global perspectives of eighteenth-century Britons, who were keenly aware of parallels with ancient Rome, alert to the character of contemporary empires across Eurasia, and anxious about the recent Europe-wide decline of limited monarchies into despotisms.

-Bill Maurer, Mimi Sheller, Consuming the Caribbean: From Arawaks to Zombies. New York: Routledge, 2003. ix + 252 pp.-Norman E. Whitten, Jr., Richard Price ,The root of roots: Or, how Afro-American anthropology got its start. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press/University of Chicago Press, 2003. 91 pp., Sally Price (eds)-Holly Snyder, Paolo Bernardini ,The Jews and the expansion of Europe to the West, 1450-1800. New York: Berghahn Books, 2001. xv + 567 pp., Norman Fiering (eds)-Bridget Brereton, Seymour Drescher, The mighty experiment: Free labor versus slavery in British emancipation. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 307 pp.-Jean Besson, Kathleen E.A. Monteith ,Jamaica in slavery and freedom: History, heritage and culture. Kingston; University of the West Indies Press, 2002. xx + 391 pp., Glen Richards (eds)-Michaeline A. Crichlow, Jean Besson, Martha Brae's two histories: European expansion and Caribbean culture-building in Jamaica. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002. xxxi + 393 pp.-Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, Joseph C. Dorsey, Slave traffic in the age of abolition: Puerto Rico, West Africa, and the Non-Hispanic Caribbean, 1815-1859. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003. xvii + 311 pp.-Arnold R. Highfield, Erik Gobel, A guide to sources for the history of the Danish West Indies (U.S. Virgin Islands), 1671-1917. Denmark: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2002. 350 pp.-Sue Peabody, David Patrick Geggus, Haitian revolutionary studies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002. xii + 334 pp.-Gerdès Fleurant, Elizabeth McAlister, Rara! Vodou, power, and performance in Haiti and its Diaspora. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. xviii + 259 pp. and CD demo.-Michiel Baud, Ernesto Sagás ,The Dominican people: A documentary history. Princeton NJ: Marcus Wiener, 2003. xiii + 278 pp., Orlando Inoa (eds)-Samuel Martínez, Richard Lee Turits, Foundations of despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo regime, and modernity in Dominican history. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2003. x + 384 pp.-Eric Paul Roorda, Bernardo Vega, Almoina, Galíndez y otros crímenes de Trujillo en el extranjero. Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 2001. 147 pp.''Diario de una misión en Washington. Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 2002. 526 pp.-Gerben Nooteboom, Aspha Bijnaar, Kasmoni: Een spaartraditie in Suriname en Nederland. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bert Bakker, 2002. 378 pp.-Dirk H.A. Kolff, Chan E.S. Choenni ,Hindostanen: Van Brits-Indische emigranten via Suriname tot burgers van Nederland. The Hague: Communicatiebureau Sampreshan, 2003. 224 pp., Kanta Sh. Adhin (eds)-Dirk H.A. Kolff, Sandew Hira, Het dagboek van Munshi Rahman Khan. The Hague: Amrit/Paramaribo: NSHI, 2003. x + 370 pp.-William H. Fisher, Neil L. Whitehead, Dark Shamans: Kanaimà and the poetics of violent death. Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2002. 309 pp.-David Scott, A.J. Simoes da Silva, The luxury of nationalist despair: George Lamming's fiction as decolonizing project. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000. 217 pp.-Lyn Innes, Maria Cristina Fumagalli, The flight of the vernacular. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001. xvi + 303 pp.-Maria Cristina Fumagalli, Tobias Döring, Caribbean-English passages: Intertextuality in a postcolonial tradition. London: Routledge, 2002. xii + 236 pp.-A. James Arnold, Celia Britton, Race and the unconscious: Freudianism in French Caribbean thought. Oxford: Legenda, 2002. 115 pp.-Nicole Roberts, Dorothy E. Mosby, Place, language, and identity in Afro-Costa Rican literature. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2003. xiii + 248 pp.-Stephen Steumpfle, Philip W. Scher, Carnival and the formation of a Caribbean transnation. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003. xvi + 215 pp.-Peter Manuel, Frances R. Aparicho ,Musical migrations: transnationalism and cultural hybridity in Latin/o America, Volume 1. With Maria Elena Cepeda. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 216 pp., Candida F. Jaquez (eds)-Jorge Pérez Rolón, Maya Roy, Cuban Music. London: Latin America Bureau/Princeton NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2002. ix + 246 pp.-Bettina M. Migge, Gary C. Fouse, The story of Papiamentu: A study in slavery and language. Lanham MD: University Press of America, 2002. x + 261 pp.-John M. McWhorter, Bettina Migge, Creole formation as language contact: the case of the Suriname creoles. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2003. xii + 151 pp.

Scholars of Russian-American relations in the late nineteenth century have long been concerned with the personalities and writings of university-based experts, journalists, diplomats, and political activists. We are well acquainted with the observations of various American commentators on the backward state of Russian state, society, economy, and politics. While the activities of prominent men such as George Kennan have effortlessly dominated the historical agenda, the negative discourses that they produced about Russia have subsumed other important American representations of the country. Since the period of early modern history, European travelers had seen Russia as a barbarous land of slave-like people, responsive only to the persuasions of the whip and the knout wielded by an autocratic tsar. Subsequently, Larry Wolff has shown that Voltaire and other Enlightenment philosophers created images of a despotic and backward Eastern Europe in order to validate the idea of a progressive, enlightened, and civilized Western Europe.

Since the breakdown of the Soviet Union and Swedish socialism the Baltic region has attracted more attention, although not perhaps as much as it might deserve, than since the 1930s. English-speaking readers have been presented with a magisterial survey of the northern world over a five hundred years' period. However, many of the old stereotypes of war, pestilence, and the rise of Sweden under Gustav Adolphus, the lion of the north, and of Russia under the delusively attractive despots, Peter I and Catherine II (both of whom were essentially Baltic animals), remain unchallenged. Over the past decade much new work has appeared in northern Europe to open a more intriguing and understandable vista – of Baroque vibrancy in art, literature, and architecture; remarkably resilient small towns and efficient manor economies; and powerful interacting religious and political mythologies that combine in a vision of ‘Gotho-Sarmatian’ unity.

The virus of violent, personal vendetta had poisoned the blood of elite society in Piedmont by the time the country was formally annexed to France in April 1802. The turbulent events of the period 1794–1801 had inflamed and then politicized a society ‘whose customs steadfastly retained something of the unruly and fiercesome’, as Sauli d'Igliano, the son of a petty count from Ceva, chose to describe it when writing of his childhood in the mid-1790s. The revolutionary process unleashed and, finally, entrenched that penchant for violence among ‘men of the second order’ that Giuseppe Baretti had informed the whole of Europe of a generation earlier in his widely read An account of the manners and customs of Italy: ‘they are withal so punctilious and so ready to draw the sword, that more duels are fought in Piedmont than in the rest of Italy taken together’. The venom of revolution mingled with the poison of personal vendettas and brought their ferocity to the centre of political life. It was a virus the French would strive to stamp out, but one that would malinger in the subalpine body politic throughout their own rule and long after they had gone. As late as 1813, a substantial landowner of Bene, in southern Piedmont complained of his patriot maire's ‘despotisme et ses actes arbitraires…sans nombre’.

The reader plunges into the whirlwind of revolution in this study of the satirical press that circulated after the Young Turks reinstated the Ottoman constitution in 1908. The brave new world depicted in the more than one hundred cartoons reprinted in this work is headed in unknown and often paradoxical directions: we see starving peasants confront fur-coated revolutionaries; dragon-headed despots leading Lady Liberty by the arm; cadaverous cholera victims patrolling the streets; and a woman steering an airplane above the revolutionary city of the future. The 1908 revolution will never look quite the same to readers familiar with the (still scant) treatment of the subject in the English language. Palmira Brummett addresses her innovative study not only to revisionist historians of the late Ottoman period, but also to a wider community of scholars interested in the history of publishing and the construction of identity in the Middle East, Europe, and elsewhere.

The nature of the pre-colonial Indian state, especially as one could see it in similarity or opposition to the state in Europe, has exercised a particular fascination since the seventeenth century, when François Bernier spelled out his theory about Oriental monarchies, with special reference to the Mughal Empire and Turkey. It may be recalled that he saw eastern states different from the European in two major particulars: (1) The king here was the owner of the soil, in other words, the exactor of rent; and (2) those who actually collected the tax-rent held only temporary tenures, as holders of jagirs or timars, unlike the hereditary European lords. The temporary tenures, which were a necessary reflex of state ownership of land led to over-exploitation of the peasantry, and, therefore, a progressive decline of the economy and polity. This was in contrast to Western Europe, where the limitation of state right of sovereignty and the dominance of private property over the land, under its protection, were the surest means to progress and prosperity. Already in Bernier we have the articulation of the contrast between the Oriental despotic state and the occidental laissez faire state.

With Pushkin's narrative poem Prisoner of the Caucasus (1822), Circassians entered the Russian imperial imaginary as exemplary personifications of the savagery and freedom of the Caucasus as a whole (Layton 1994; 1997; Grant 2005; 2007). Accordingly, the Russian imagination of Circassian polity, now as egalitarian “free societies,” now as hierarchical aristocracies, now as “noble savages,” now as ignoble brutes, Muslim “fanatics,” or “Asiatic despots,” was a microcosm of the Russian colonial engagement with the Caucasus as a whole, often as not reflecting tensions in the self-perception of imperial autocracy and its elites more than indigenous political organization of Caucasian groups like Circassians in reality (Layton 1997; Jersild 2002; Grant 2005). Inasmuch as such imperial imaginings informed the fantasies of young men, causing them to enlist in search of the poetry of warfare, or informed fantasies of conquest among agents of the Russian state, these imaginings became real in their consequences for various Caucasian groups (Layton 1994; 1997). Nor was the exemplary alterity accorded Circassians limited to Russian audiences; it exerted a considerable fascination across Europe as well (King 2007: 241–45).

Este artículo analiza una de las facetas más relevantes del pensamiento político de Lord Acton: la relación entre catolicismo y liberalismo. Se utilizan algunos de sus escritos más significativos de esa temática durante las décadas de 1850 a 1870, complementados con datos procedentes de su correspondencia y teniendo muy presente los principales estudios disponibles sobre su biografía intelectual. Aquí se sostiene que Acton planteó una simbiosis de catolicismo y liberalismo significativamente particular, deudora de la tradición liberal inglesa, pero con un componente de análisis historiográfico y ético que la singulariza de forma notable. Su forma de entrelazar cristianismo e individualismo moral, a partir de lo que denominó “the Christian notion of conscience”, enfrentaba radicalmente a la iglesia con cualquier forma de despotismo y se amparaba en una ineludible separación de esferas. Esto explica su rechazo a los decretos conciliares proclamados por Pío IX en 1870 y su incómoda y ambigua posición dentro de la iglesia tras esa fecha. Pero también su aportación singular y no exenta de contradicciones al intento de conciliación entre catolicismo y liberalismo en la Europa del último cuarto del siglo XIX.

The dominant approach to the study of religion known as the phenomenology of religion's core assumption was that underlying the multiplicity of historical and geographically dispersed religions was an ultimately metaphysical, trans-historical substratum, called 'man', Geist, or 'consciousness'. This transhistorical substratum is an expressive agent with a uniform, essential nature. By reading the data of religion as its 'expressions', it is possible to sympathetically understand their meaning. Geist, or 'man', then, is both a philosophy of history and i hermeneutical theory. It also forms a systematic set of representations, which replicate the structure of the asymmetrical relations between Europeans and those colonized by Europeans. The metanarrative of Geist is a narrative of the supremacy - their term, not mine - of white, Christian Europe over black, 'primitive' Africal and 'despotic' Asia. Spirit moves from the South to the North; away from the East to the West. This paper locates Rudolf Otto's work within the structure and history of phenomenological discourse and argues that the science of religion as described there conforms nearly perfectly to the structures of colonial discourse as this has been discussed and analyzed by theorists such as Jaques Derrida and Edward Said.

There is a disparity between expectations that the members of a community will work together for the common good — and the stark reality that human beings form into groups, or parties, to engage in conflict with each other. This is particularly the case in so-called popular governments that include some wider political involvement by the people. In ancient Greece stasis, or endemic conflict between the democratic and oligarchic elements of a city was very common. Likewise, the late Roman Republic maintained a division between the populares and the optimates. In both cases there was violence as both sides battled for dominance. For example, in late republican Rome street gangs formed that employed intimidation and violence for political ends.In seventeenth century England there was conflict between those who favoured royal authority and those who wished to see more power devolved to parliament, which led to Civil War in the 1640s. Yet the English ideal, as expressed by The Book of Common Prayer (1549; and other editions) was that the country be quietly governed. It seemed perverse that the members of the body politic should be in conflict with each other. By the late seventeenth century England was still riven by conflict between two groups which became designated as the Whigs and the Tories. The divisions were both political and religious. Most importantly, these divisions were expressed at the local level, in such things as the struggle for the control of local corporations. They were not just political but could also be personal and often turned nasty as families contended for local control. The mid seventeenth century had been a time of considerable violence and warfare, not only in Europe and England but across Eurasia, including the fall of the Ming dynasty in China (Parker). This violence occurred in the wake of a cooler climate change, bringing in its wake crop failure followed by scarcity, hunger, disease and vicious warfare. Millions of people died.Conditions improved in the second half of the seventeenth century and countries slowly found their way to a new relative stability. The Qing created a new imperial order in China. In France, Louis XIV survived the Fronde and his answer to the rage and divisions of that time was the imposition of an autocratic and despotic state that simply prohibited the existence of divisions. Censorship and the inquisition flourished in Catholic Europe ensuring that dissidence would not evolve into violence fuelled by rage. In 1685, Louis expelled large numbers of Protestants from France.Divisions did not disappear in England at the end of the Civil War and the Restoration of Charles II. Initially, it appears that Charles sought to go down the French route. There was a regulation of ideas as new laws meant that the state licensed all printed works. There was an attempt to impose a bureaucratic authoritarian state, culminating in the short reign of James II (Pincus, Ertman). But its major effect, since the heightened fear of James’ Catholicism in Protestant England, was to stoke the ‘rage of party’ between those who supported this hierarchical model of social order and those who wanted political power less concentrated (Knights Representation, Plumb).The issue was presumed to be settled in 1688 when James was chased from the throne, and replaced by the Dutchman William and his wife Mary. In the official language of the day, liberty had triumphed over despotism and the ‘ancient constitution’ of the English had been restored to guarantee that liberty.However, three major developments were going on in England by the late seventeenth century: The first is the creation of a more bureaucratic centralised state along the lines of the France of Louis XIV. This state apparatus was needed to collect the taxes required to finance and administer the English war machine (Pincus). The second is the creation of a genuinely popular form of government in the wake of the expulsion of James and his replacement by William of Orange (Ertman). This means regular parliaments that are elected every three years, and also a free press to scrutinise political activities. The third is the development of financial institutions to enable the war to be conducted against France, which only comes to an end in 1713 (Pincus). Here, England followed the example of the Netherlands. There is the establishment of the bank of England in 1694 and the creation of a national debt. This meant that those involved in finance could make big profits out of financing a war, so a new moneyed class developed. England's TransformationIn the 1690s as England is transformed politically, religiously and economically, this develops a new type of society that unifies strong government with new financial institutions and arrangements. In this new political configuration, the big winners are the new financial elites and the large (usually Whig) aristocratic landlords, who had the financial resources to benefit from it. The losers were the smaller landed gentry who were taxed to pay for the war. They increasingly support the Tories (Plumb) who opposed both the war and the new financial elites it helped to create; leading to the 1710 election that overwhelmingly elected a Tory government led by Harley and Bolingbroke. This government then negotiated the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, with the Whigs retaining a small minority.History indicates that the post-1688 developments do not so much quell the ‘rage of party’ as encourage it and fan the fires of conflict and discontent. Parliamentary elections were held every three years and could involve costly, and potentially financially ruinous, contests between families competing for parliamentary representation. As these elections involved open voting and attempts to buy votes through such means as wining and dining, they could be occasions for riotous behaviour. Regular electoral contests, held in an electorate that was much larger than it would be one hundred years later, greatly heightened the conflicts and kept the political temperature at a high.Fig. 1: "To Him Pudel, Bite Him Peper"Moreover, there was much to fuel this conflict and to ‘maintain the rage’: First, the remodelling of the English financial system combined with the high level of taxation imposed largely on the gentry fuelled a rage amongst this group. This new world of financial investments was not part of their world. They were extremely suspicious of wealth not derived from landed property and sought to limit the power of those who held such wealth. Secondly, the events of 1688 split the Anglican Church in two (Pincus). The opponents of the new finance regimes tended also to be traditional High Church Anglicans who feared the newer, more tolerant government policy towards religion. Finally, the lapsing of the Licensing Act in 1695 meant that the English state was no longer willing to control the flow of information to the public (Kemp). The end result was that England in the 1690s became something akin to a modern public culture in which there was a relatively free flow of political information, constant elections held with a limited, but often substantial franchise, that was operating out of a very new commercial and financial environment. These political divisions were now deeply entrenched and very real passion animated each side of the political divide (Knights Devil).Under these circumstances, it was not possible simply to stamp out ‘the rage’ by the government repressing the voices of dissent. The authoritarian model for creating public conformity was not an option. A mechanism for lowering the political and religious temperature needed to arise in this new society where power and knowledge were diffused rather than centrally concentrated. Also, the English were aided by the return to a more benign physical environment. In economic terms it led to what Fischer terms the equilibrium of the Enlightenment. The wars of Louis XIV were a hangover from the earlier more desperate age; they prolonged the crisis of that age. Nevertheless, the misery of the earlier seventeenth century had passed. The grim visions of Calvinism (and Jansenism) had lost their plausibility. So the excessive violence of the 1640s was replaced by a more tepid form of political resistance, developing into the first modern expression of populism. So, the English achieved what Plumb calls ‘political stability’ were complex (1976), but relied on two things. The first was limiting the opportunity for political activity and the second was labelling political passion as a form of irrational behaviour – as an unsatisfactory or improper way of conducting oneself in the world. Emotions became an indulgence of the ignorant, the superstitious and the fanatical. This new species of humanity was the gentleman, who behaved in a reasonable and measured way, would express a person commensurate with the Enlightenment.This view would find its classic expression over a century later in Macaulay’s History of England, where the pre-1688 English squires are now portrayed in all their semi-civilised glory, “his ignorance and uncouthness, his low tastes and gross phrases, would, in our time, be considered as indicating a nature and a breeding thoroughly plebeian” (Macaulay 244). While the Revolution of 1688 is usually portrayed as a triumph of liberty, as stated, recent scholarship (Pincus, Ertman) emphasises how the attempts by both Charles and James to build a more bureaucratic state were crucial to the development of eighteenth century England. England was not really a land of liberty that kept state growth in check, but the English state development took a different path to statehood from countries such as France, because it involved popular institutions and managed to eliminate many of the corrupt practices endemic to a patrimonial regime.The English were as interested in ‘good police’, meaning the regulation of moral behaviour, as any state on the European continent, but their method of achievement was different. In the place of bureaucratic regulation, the English followed another route, later be termed in the 1760s as ‘civilisation’ (Melleuish). So, the Whigs became the party of rationality and reasonableness, and the Whig regime was Low Church, which was latitudinarian and amenable to rationalist Christianity. Also, the addition of the virtue and value of politeness and gentlemanly behaviour became the antidote to the “rage of party’”(Knights Devil 163—4) . The Whigs were also the party of science and therefore, followed Lockean philosophy. They viewed themselves as ‘reasonable men’ in opposition to their more fanatically inclined opponents. It is noted that any oligarchy, can attempt to justify itself as an ‘aristocracy’, in the sense of representing the ‘morally’ best people. The Whig aristocracy was more cosmopolitan, because its aristocrats had often served the rulers of countries other than England. In fact, the values of the Whig elite were the first expression of the liberal cosmopolitan values which are now central to the ideology of contemporary elites. One dimension of the Whig/Tory split is that while the Whig aristocracy had a cosmopolitan outlook as more proto-globalist, the Tories remained proto-nationalists. The Whigs became simultaneously the party of liberty, Enlightenment, cosmopolitanism, commerce and civilised behaviour. This is why liberty, the desire for peace and ‘sweet commerce’ came to be identified together. The Tories, on the other hand, were the party of real property (that is to say land) so their national interest could easily be construed by their opponents as the party of obscurantism and rage. One major incident illustrates how this evolved.The Trial of the High Church Divine Henry Sacheverell In 1709, the High Church Divine Henry Sacheverell preached a fiery sermon attacking the Whig revolutionary principles of resistance, and advocated obedience and unlimited submission to authority. Afterwards, for his trouble he was impeached before the House of Lords by the Whigs for high crimes and misdemeanours (Tryal 1710). As Mark Knights (6) has put it, one of his major failings was his breaching of the “Whig culture of politeness and moderation”. The Whigs also disliked Sacheverell for his charismatic appeal to women (Nicholson). He was found guilty and his sermons ordered to be burned by the hangman. But Sacheverell became simultaneously a martyr and a political celebrity leading to a mass outpouring of printed material (Knights Devil 166—186). Riots broke out in London in the wake of the trial’s verdict. For the Whigs, this stood as proof of the ‘rage’ that lurked in the irrational world of Toryism. However, as Geoffrey Holmes has demonstrated, these riots were not aimless acts of mob violence but were directed towards specific targets, in particular the meeting houses of Dissenters. History reveals that the Sacheverell riots were the last major riots in England for almost seventy years until the Lord Gordon anti-Catholic riots of 1780. In the short term they led to an overwhelming Tory victory at the 1710 elections, but that victory was pyrrhic. With the death of Queen Anne, followed by the accession of the Hanoverians to the throne, the Whigs became the party of government. Some Tories, such as Bolingbroke, panicked, and fled to France and the Court of the Pretender. The other key factor was the Treaty of Utrecht, brokered on England’s behalf by the Tory government of Harley and Bolingbroke that brought the Civil war to an end in 1713. England now entered an era of peace; there remained no longer the need to raise funds to conduct a war. The war had forced the English state to both to consolidate and to innovate.This can be viewed as the victory of the party of ‘politeness and moderation’ and the Enlightenment and hence the effective end of the ‘rage of party’. Threats did remain by the Pretender’s (James III) attempt to retake the English throne, as happened in 1715 and 1745, when was backed by the barbaric Scots.The Whig ascendancy, the ascendancy of a minority, was to last for decades but remnants of the Tory Party remained, and England became a “one-and one-half” party regime (Ertman 222). Once in power, however, the Whigs utilised a number of mechanisms to ensure that the age of the ‘rage of party’ had come to an end and would be replaced by one of politeness and moderation. As Plumb states, they gained control of the “means of patronage” (Plumb 161—88), while maintaining the ongoing trend, from the 1680s of restricting those eligible to vote in local corporations, and the Whigs supported the “narrowing of the franchise” (Plumb 102—3). Finally, the Septennial Act of 1717 changed the time between elections from three years to seven years.This lowered the political temperature but it did not eliminate the Tories or complaints about the political, social and economic path that England had taken. Rage may have declined but there was still a lot of dissent in the newspapers, in particular in the late 1720s in the Craftsman paper controlled by Viscount Bolingbroke. The Craftsman denounced the corrupt practices of the government of Sir Robert Walpole, the ‘robinocracy’, and played to the prejudices of the landed gentry. Further, the Bolingbroke circle contained some major literary figures of the age; but not a group of violent revolutionaries (Kramnick). It was true populism, from ideals of the Enlightenment and a more benign environment.The new ideal of ‘politeness and moderation’ had conquered English political culture in an era of Whig dominance. This is exemplified in the philosophy of David Hume and his disparagement of enthusiasm and superstition, and the English elite were also not fond of emotional Methodists, and Charles Wesley’s father had been a Sacheverell supporter (Cowan 43). A moderate man is rational and measured; the hoi polloi is emotional, faintly disgusting, and prone to rage.In the End: A Reduction of Rage Nevertheless, one of the great achievements of this new ideal of civility was to tame the conflict between political parties by recognising political division as a natural part of the political process, one that did not involve ‘rage’. This was the great achievement of Edmund Burke who, arguing against Bolingbroke’s position that 1688 had restored a unified political order, and hence abolished political divisions, legitimated such party divisions as an element of a civilised political process involving gentlemen (Mansfield 3). The lower orders, lacking the capacity to live up to this ideal, were prone to accede to forces other than reason, and needed to be kept in their place. This was achieved through a draconian legal code that punished crimes against property very severely (Hoppit). If ‘progress’ as later described by Macaulay leads to a polite and cultivated elite who are capable of conquering their rage – so the lower orders need to be repressed because they are still essentially barbarians. This was echoed in Macaulay’s contemporary, John Stuart Mill (192) who promulgated Orientals similarly “lacked the virtues” of an educated Briton.In contrast, the French attempt to impose order and stability through an authoritarian state fared no better in the long run. After 1789 it was the ‘rage’ of the ‘mob’ that helped to bring down the French Monarchy. At least, that is how the new cadre of the ‘polite and moderate’ came to view things.ReferencesBolingbroke, Lord. Contributions to the Craftsman. Ed. Simon Varney. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1982.Cowan, Brian. “The Spin Doctor: Sacheverell’s Trial Speech and Political Performance in the Divided Society.” Faction Displayed: Reconsidering the Impeachment of Dr Henry Sacheverell. Ed. Mark Knights. 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