Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Descriptivity'

In my dissertation I argue that prominent descriptivist metaethical views face a serious semantic problem. According to standard descriptivism, moral thought and discourse purports to describe some ontology of moral properties and/or relations: e.g., the term `good' purports to refer to some property or cluster of properties. Central to any such theory, then, is the recognition of certain items of ontology which, should they actually exist, would count as the referents of moral terms and concepts. And since one commonly accepted feature of moral thought and discourse is a supervenience constraint, descriptivists hold that any ontology suitable for morality would have to supervene upon non-moral ontology. But this lands descriptivists with the task of providing a semantic account capable of relating this ontology to moral terms and concepts. That is, they must explain why it is that certain items of ontology and not others would count as the referents of moral terms and concepts, in a way that is consistent with the supervenience constraint. I argue that this important explanatory task cannot be carried out. And because the problem generalizes from metaethics to all normativity, we are left with good reason to pursue alternatives to descriptivist accounts of normative semantics.

Part I presents a systematic presentation of what is termed 'the Wittgensteinian position', broken down into eight theses, each of which is thought of as intrinsic to self-renouncing faith. Part II consists of three case-studies examining the conception of self-renouncing faith found in the works of Francois Mauriac, Georges Bernanos, and Patrick White. Distinct divergencies from many of the Wittgensteinian theses are unearthed. Part III traces the roots of each of the Wittgensteinian theses to their sitz im leben in a strain of neo-Romanticism centred on securing independence of the world. Connections are made to Tolstoy, Emerson, Rilke, Trakl and Von Hofmannsthal. Part IV argues that each case study in Part II runs counter to the Wittgensteinian position in one of three ways: (1) not having some theses which are proposed by the Wittgensteinian position to be intrinsic to self-renouncing faith; (2) deeming some theses which are proposed by the Wittgensteinian position to be intrinsic to self-renouncing faith as either (2.1) not inherently selfrenouncing or (2.2) actually incompatible with the understanding of selfrenunciation exemplified in the case-study; (3) having a different logical structure to its model of self-renouncing belief from that of the Wittgensteinian position. Points (1), (2) and (3), and particularly points (2.1) and (2.2), suggest that self-renouncing faith is not the unitary phenomenon assumed by the Wittgensteinian position. The casestudies represent three distinct models of self-renouncing faith. These models have no place for the self-concern that characterises the Weltbild of self-concern with which the Wittgensteinian position is impregnated. There follows a broad discussion of the implications of the above findings for the Wittgensteinian position, including Wittgenstein's status as a religious thinker, the way a descriptivist methodology should be understood, the blanket exclusion of the metaphysical from religious belief and the over-simple portrayal of religious belief as a conceptual orientation to the world.

Slurring epithets or slurs like 'Frog' and 'Boche' are derogative terms but it is unclear why they are derogatory. This work discusses several proposals to answer this question. One commonality with the discussed views is that they all hold that derogation has something to do with semantics, broadly with the meaning of slurs. I disagree with this. I go on to introduce generic descriptivism. It is a novel view to handle slurs and it has two distinctive features. First, generic descriptivism holds that the nature of derogation is epistemic. derogation is due to the information which slurs contain. This is specied with the notion of stereotype. I claim that negative and unwarranted stereotypes are responsible for derogation. This information is not semantic. That is, it is to be distinguished from the meaning of slurs. Secondly, the eponymous feature of generic descriptivism is that it holds that the information which slurs contain is generic. I argue that generic beliefs are produced with a psychological mechanism of generalisation. In relation to social kinds, the mechanism can produce xenophobic generalisations and the use of slurs display these negative beliefs. Derogation is due to this negative information which the slurs contain.

In his account of the intellectual cognition of singulars, Aquinas claims that the intellect cognizes singulars by way of mental images. Some recent commentators have claimed that Aquinas' appeal to mental images is inadequate to account for the intellectual cognition of singulars because mental images considered in terms of their qualitative character alone have content that is general and are, therefore, insufficient to determine reference to a singular. That is, if Aquinas takes mental images to refer to singulars because those singulars perfectly resemble the mental images, then his account is deficient. In my paper, I argue that the critical interpretation above is predicated on a misunderstanding of Aquinas regarding the intentionality of images. I investigate Aquinas' account of the intentionality of images in order to show that Aquinas understands the reference of mental images to be determined not by their qualitative character alone but also by the causal relation that obtains between the cognizer and a singular.
Master of Arts

Passions flare up around the use and “misuse” of prescriptive rules. Where there is variation in language use, language judgment usually follows—attaching value judgment to linguistic variants forms the foundation of prescriptive ideology in English. Prescriptive attitudes prevail among speakers and writers of English, who feel some pressure to use these forms to avoid a negative judgment. This study surveyed American English speakers using Mechanical Turk to determine which types of rules—spelling, syntactic, morphological, and lexical—bother people the most and inspire the harshest judgments when violated. The surveys asked participants to identify a violated prescriptive rule in a sentence, found using the magazine and newspaper registers of the Corpus of Contemporary American English, and then to indicate how much they were bothered by the violation. Results indicated that lexical rules separating subtle semantic differences—i.e. farther vs. further, comprise vs. compose—tend to be less bothersome and less recognizable than other types of rules. However, the type of category that a prescriptive rules falls under does not seem to explain why some rules are more bothersome or recognizable than others. It may be possible to generalize by assuming that lexical prescriptive rules will be less important to a general educated American audience than spelling or grammar rules, and that nonstandard dialectal forms will be even more bothersome. However, the ability to generalize these results is limited: there is some evidence for a “pet-peeve” effect. Individuals seem to simply be bothered by different rules, without strong patterns showing some types of rules sharply more important than others. Additionally other prescriptive rules, including those regarding nauseous and dove as the past tense of dive, were more recognizable and bothersome in their prescribed form than their proscribed, providing evidence for semantic shifts.

2013/2014
L’interpretazione ha spesso luogo in situazioni argomentative, vale a dire eventi comunicativi miranti alla “soluzione” di una divergenza di opinioni in merito a una specifica questione. Nel tentativo di difendere o delegittimare determinate posizioni, gli oratori fanno solitamente ricorso a tecniche argomentative che determinano la forza pragmatica del discorso. In questo senso, l’argomentazione è essenzialmente relativa, poiché dipende da convenzioni culturali, vincoli contestuali e fattori soggettivi. La relatività delle tecniche argomentative complica il compito interpretativo, soprattutto considerando che, nelle situazioni argomentative, la qualità dell’interpretazione è determinata dall’abilità dell’interprete di trasmettere lo scopo argomentativo del testo di partenza. L’equivalenza passa, cioè, per il rispetto delle convinzioni dell’oratore, senza il quale l’interpretazione è destinata a produrre un testo non equivalente all’originale a livello pragmatico. Guidato anche dall’intenzione di sopperire, seppur in misura minima, alla scarsa considerazione che le teorie dell’argomentazione godono nella ricerca in interpretazione, il presente progetto di ricerca circoscrive lo studio delle situazioni argomentative all’analisi dell’argomentazione in ambito politico, perseguendo due obiettivi principali: la definizione di una metodologia appropriata per l’analisi descrittiva dell’argomentazione nei testi di partenza e la valutazione empirica della relatività delle tecniche argomentative, mirante alla formulazione di indicazioni per l’interpretazione di discorsi politici. Lo studio si basa su un corpus comparabile multilingue denominato ARGO. Il corpus contiene trecentotredici discorsi politici sull’attuale crisi economico-finanziaria, pronunciati da Barack Obama, David Cameron, Nicolas Sarkozy e François Hollande. L’analisi di ARGO è mirata all’individuazione e alla descrizione di schemi argomentativi, “ragionamenti” stereotipati che vengono spesso usati in ambito politico per legittimare o screditare determinate posizioni. Alla luce della natura relativa dell’argomentazione, la presenza di schemi argomentativi estremamente eterogenei è stata ipotizzata sin dall’inizio del progetto. I risultati dell’analisi contrastiva confermano l’ipotesi iniziale, poiché Obama, Cameron, Sarkozy e Hollande fanno ricorso a diversi schemi argomentativi che richiedono l’utilizzo di diverse strategie interpretative a seconda dell’oratore in questione, del destinatario del discorso e del contesto in cui il discorso viene pronunciato. I risultati trovano pertanto utile applicazione in ambito didattico, poiché, insieme ad ARGO, forniscono materiale e indicazioni teoriche per sensibilizzare gli studenti a concetti argomentativi pertinenti all’interpretazione nella prospettiva di un graduale sviluppo della competenza argomentativa, intesa come l’abilità di anticipare le argomentazioni degli oratori. In maniera più generale, i risultati confermano la natura relativamente prevedibile dei discorsi politici; di conseguenza, avvalorano le implicazioni positive dell’analisi argomentativa dei testi di partenza in ambito interpretativo, il cui utilizzo sistematico è destinato a fornire risultati sempre più consistenti, affidabili e utili per promuovere la ricerca dell’equivalenza argomentativa nei testi interpretati.
Interpreting activity is frequently performed in argumentative situations, i.e. communicative events whose purpose is the discursive “solution” of a conflict between different standpoints regarding one specific question. In their attempts at defending and attacking standpoints, speakers generally resort to argumentative techniques which determine the pragmatic force of speeches. In this respect, argumentation is essentially relative, as it depends on cultural conventions, contextual constraints and subjective factors. The relativity of argumentation compounds the interpreting task, as the quality of the interpreter’s performance within argumentative situations is determined by his/her ability to convey the argumentative purpose of the source text by reproducing the speaker’s convictions. Failure to do so is bound to lead to the production of pragmatically inequivalent interpreted texts. Guided also by the intention partially to cater for the marked neglect of argumentation theories in interpreting research, the present research project focuses on political argumentation and pursues two main objectives: streamlining a suitable analytical methodology for the descriptive study of source-text argumentation in interpreting research and empirically assessing the relative nature of argumentation techniques with a view to providing suggestions for the interpretation of political speeches. The study is based on a multilingual comparable corpus named ARGO. It is composed of three hundred and thirteen political speeches on the current financial and economic crisis, delivered by Barack Obama, David Cameron, Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande. The analysis focuses on the identification and description of content-related argumentation schemes, i.e. stereotypical patterns of reasoning recurrently exploited by politicians to legitimise or delegitimise given courses of action. In the light of the relative nature of argumentation, the presence in the corpus of significantly different argumentation schemes was hypothesised at the outset. The findings of the contrastive analysis corroborate the initial hypothesis, as Obama, Cameron, Sarkozy and Hollande generally resort to extremely different argument schemes, which call for the adoption of specific interpreting strategies according to the speaker in question, the communicative context of speech delivery and the relevant audience. The results, thus, find useful application in interpreter training, in that, together with ARGO, they provide material and theoretical indications to sensitise students to relevant argumentation concepts with a view gradually to enhance their argumentative competence, understood as the ability to anticipate speakers’ arguments. More broadly, the results shed light on the predictability of political speeches and, consequently, foster the systematic adoption of argumentation analysis as a source-text research methodology, which could yield increasingly substantial findings paving the way for argumentative equivalence in interpreted argumentative situations.
XXVII Ciclo
1985

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Em janeiro de 1970, Saul Kripke proferiu três conferências na Universidade Princeton. A transcrição dessas conferências foi publicada em 1980 como Naming and Necessity. Nessa obra, Kripke critica o descritivismo, explicação então mais aceita para a função referencial dos nomes próprios, e apresenta a sua própria visão sobre o assunto. Em Naming and Necessity, Kripke também sustenta uma concepção que ficou conhecida como “essencialismo científico”, a qual afirma a existência de verdades necessárias a posteriori. Esta dissertação procura investigar de que maneira se relacionam as idéias sobre a referência e sobre o essencialismo científico no interior do pensamento kripkeano. Assim, no primeiro capítulo, procura-se apresentar as principais características do descritivismo. Em linhas gerais, a concepção descritivista, cujas origens remontam a certas idéias de Frege e Russell, estabelece que a explicação para a referência de um nome próprio passa pelas descrições associadas ao termo, as quais seriam satisfeitas univocamente pelo objeto designado. O segundo capítulo se ocupa dos argumentos kripkeanos contrários ao descritivismo. Esses argumentos são de três tipos: modal, epistêmico e semântico. A adequada compreensão desses argumentos, bem como do modelo explicativo alternativo proposto por Kripke, exige certos conceitos fundamentais, como o de mundos possíveis, a distinção entre modalidades epistêmicas e modalidades metafísicas, e o de designação rígida. Por isso, esse capítulo também busca expor tais noções. Finalmente, o terceiro capítulo é dedicado ao essencialismo científico desenvolvido por Kripke. Grosso modo, uma posição essencialista sustenta que os objetos possuem propriedades essenciais; isto é, propriedades que são exemplificadas em todos os mundos possíveis nos quais os objetos existem. O essencialismo científico afirma que cabe à ciência revelar essas propriedades essenciais, as quais seriam verdades necessárias a posteriori. O capítulo 3 examina o essencialismo quanto à origem biológica e aquele sobre a origem e composição material dos artefatos, além de outros aspectos relacionados ao tema discutidos por Kripke.
In January 1970, Saul Kripke delivered three lectures at Princeton University. A transcript of these lectures was published in 1980 as Naming and Necessity. In this work, Kripke criticizes descriptivism, then most accepted account for referential function of proper names, and presents his own view on the matter. In Naming and Necessity, Kripke also advocates a view that became known as “scientific essentialism”, which states that there are necessary a posteriori truths. This dissertation aims at understanding the relationship between Kripke’s view about reference and the scientific essentialism. Thus, in the first chapter, we expose the main features of descriptivism. In general, the descriptivist conception, whose origins go back to certain ideais of Frege and Russell, states that the explanation for the reference of a proper name is based on the descriptions associated with the name, which should be fulfilled only by designated object. The second chapter is concerned with Kripkean arguments against descriptivism. These arguments are of three types: modal, semantic and epistemic. A proper understanding of the arguments, as well as the alternative model proposed by Kripke, requires certain fundamental concepts, such as possible worlds, the distinction between epistemic modalities and metaphysical modalities, and the rigid designation. Therefore, the second chapter also intends to examine such notions. Finally, the third chapter turns to the scientific essentialism developed by Kripke. Roughly, an essentialist viewpoint holds that objects have essential properties. That is, properties that are exemplified in all possible worlds in which the objects exist. The scientific essentialism maintains that it is up to science to reveal the essential properties, which would be necessary a posteriori truths. The chapter 3 analyses the essentialism about biological origins and essentialism about the origin and composition of material artifacts, and other aspects related to the topic discussed by Kripke.
TEDE

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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES
This dissertation research aims to discuss about the role of proper names in the contemporary philosophy of language. The bias that we will adopt is an internalist. To perform our research will begin by contextualizing what was the meaning that the pragmatic-linguistic turn had the philosophical field. It will try to expose some of the most important elements which characterize the importance of discussions of proper names within the philosophy of language. Given our internalist bias, seek to demonstrate two basic functions of proper names, the informational function and operational function. Possession that present two distinct streams of theories of appointment, the descritivimo and causation theory. With this route we intend to show the reader get the meaning and the role that proper names take within contemporary discussions of analytic philosophy of language imprint.
A presente pesquisa de dissertação tem como objetivo discorrer acerca do papel dos nomes próprios dentro da filosofia da linguagem contemporânea. O viés que adotaremos é o de um internalista. Para realizar nossa pesquisa iniciaremos por contextualizar qual foi o significado que a virada pragmático-linguística teve no campo filosófico. Disso tentaremos expor alguns dos elementos mais importantes que caracterizam a importância das discussões dos nomes próprios dentro da filosofia da linguagem. Tendo em vista nosso viés internalista, buscaremos demonstrar duas funções básicas dos nomes próprios, a função informacional e a função operacional. De posse disso apresentaremos duas correntes distintas das teorias da nomeação, o descritivimo e a teoria da causalidade. Com esse percurso pretendemos conseguir mostrar ao leitor o significado e o papel que os nomes próprios assumem dentro das discussões contemporâneas da filosofia da linguagem de cunho analítica.

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Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos
Radical behaviorism was presented as the philosophy of science of human behavior. This has important consequences. One of them has to do with questions regarding scientific explanation. The present essay essentially deals with the following question: what is the model of explanation of radical behaviorism? Some characteristics of the explanation model of behavior are examined, based on a discussion of the ideas of Skinner and two others philosophers of science, to wit, David Hume and Ernst Mach. Hume offers a logical-empirical critique of the concept of causality as necessary connection, by arguing that causal relations can not be demonstrated on the basis of statements of fact. Moreover, experience does not furnish the necessary causal link between cause and effect. He concludes the human knowledge deals solely with constant relations. This critique was taken over by Skinner by way of Mach s functional descriptivism . Mach s substitution of the concept of cause by that of functional relations, and its consequent distinction between scientific explanation and causal explanation is based on Hume s critique. One might also argue that Mach advances on Hume s critique by asserting that the world is, in principle, probabilistic. Skinner, from the beginning, offered an interpretation of behavioral theory as description in accordance with Mach s philosophy of science. Accordingly, he limited himself to explaining behavior in terms of functional relationships. However, it is argued that the explanation of behavior is not only the discovery of functional relations. Skinner does not comply with the restrictions of descriptivism when he offers an interpretation, beyond the bounds of mere functional relations, of the origin of behavior, as is the case with philogenetic behavior and with cultural practices. Accordingly, interpretation is included in radical behaviorism s explanatory system. In this way, the theory of behavior, without rejecting descriptivism, may be associated with a version of scientific instrumentalism. This is done via Mach in a somewhat surprising way. Mach s emphasis on the notions of scientific concept and hypothesis leads us to a kind of reticent instrumentalism which emerges as a reaction to the realist view of theories. As a version of scientific instrumentalism, the theory of behaviorism can be seen as pragmatic, and so radical behaviorism enters the field of ethics. The alliance of descriptivism and instrumentalism rule out realist interpretations of the theory of behavior. A reading of Skinner s theory from the perspective of the philosophical works of Hume and Mach also weaken the association of radical behaviorism with the metaphysical determinism. It is concluded that the model of selection by consequences is a functional, instrumental and probabilistic, rather than causal, way of explaining behavior.
O behaviorismo radical se apresenta como a filosofia da ciência do comportamento humano. Essa asserção tem decorrências importantes. Uma delas esbarra, imediatamente, em questões concernentes à explicação científica. O presente trabalho trata essencialmente desta questão: qual o modelo de explicação do comportamento defendido pelo behaviorismo radical? Todavia, seu escopo é limitado. Foram examinadas algumas características do modelo explicativo comportamental através de um debate travado entre Skinner e outros dois filósofos da ciência, a saber: David Hume e Ernst Mach. Hume faz uma crítica lógicaempírica do conceito de causalidade como conexão necessária, afirmando que as relações causais, com respeito ao campo das questões de fato, não são passíveis de demonstração. Somado a isso, a experiência não fornece os elos causais que conectam inelutavelmente a causa ao efeito. Ao final, podemos tratar do conhecimento humano, apenas, em termos de relações constantes. Essa crítica foi legada a Skinner através de suas relações com o descritivismo funcional machiano. Mach incorporou a crítica de Hume ao substituir a noção de causa pela de relações funcionais, operando uma desvinculação entre explicação científica e explicação causal. É possível também argumentar que Mach avança a crítica de Hume afirmando que o mundo é, em princípio, probabilístico. Skinner, desde o início de sua obra, anunciou sua interpretação da teoria do comportamento como descrição nos moldes machianos. Com isso, confinou-se a explicar o comportamento em termos de relações funcionais. Entretanto, é possível identificar que a explicação do comportamento não se resume à descoberta de relações funcionais. Skinner rompe os limites do descritivismo interpretando a origem de comportamentos que ultrapassam descrições meramente funcionais, como é o caso do comportamento filogenético e das práticas culturais. O behaviorismo radical inclui no seu sistema explicativo a interpretação. Nesse sentido, a teoria do comportamento, sem renegar o descritivismo, conjuga-se como uma versão do instrumentalismo científico. A novidade está que o faz via relações com Mach. A ênfase dada por Mach com respeito às noções de conceito e hipótese científicas, nos leva a encontrar uma espécie de instrumentalismo reticente que emerge como uma reação à interpretação realista das teorias. Como uma versão do instrumentalismo científico, a teoria do comportamento também se afirma como um pragmatismo, que acaba inserindo o behaviorismo radical no campo da ética. A conjugação das versões descritivistas e instrumentalistas impede interpretações realistas da teoria do comportamento. Ademais, uma leitura da teoria de Skinner através dos textos filosóficos de Hume e Mach afasta o behaviorismo radical de laços com o determinismo metafísico. Conclui-se que o modelo de seleção por conseqüências se apresenta não como um modo causal, mas como um modo funcional, instrumental e probabilista de explicação do comportamento.

A glass couldn't contain water unless it contained H2O-molecules. Likewise, a man couldn't be a bachelor unless he was unmarried. Now, the latter is what we would call a conceptual or analytical truth. It's also what we would call a priori. But it's hardly a conceptual or analytical truth that if a glass contains water, then it contains H2O-molecules. Neither is it a priori. The fact that water is composed of H2O-molecules was an empirical discovery made in the eighteenth century. The fact that all bachelors are unmarried was not. But neither is a logical truth, so how do we explain the difference? Two-dimensional semantics is a framework that promises to shed light on these issues. The main purpose of this thesis is to understand and evaluate this framework in relation to various alternatives, to see whether some version of it can be defended. I argue that it fares better than the alternatives. However, much criticism of two-dimensionalism has focused on its alleged inability to provide a proper semantics for certain epistemic operators, in particular the belief operator and the a priori operator. In response to this criticism, a two-dimensional semantics for belief ascriptions is developed using structured propositions. In connection with this, a number of other issues in the semantics of belief ascriptions are addressed, concerning indexicals, beliefs de se, beliefs de re, and the problem of logical omniscience.

Constant references to literal meaning and its relevance in order to preserve the rule of law (predictability, in particular) do not reflect the complexity of our language. In this paper I analyze the descriptivist conception that seems to underlie these references and I present an alternative conception, new theories of reference, that allows us to account for our language in general, and for legal interpretation in particular. Once a semantic conception is assumed, in the last part of the work I reflect on what arguments are relevant to adopt a certain interpretation when difficult cases arise.
Las constantes apelaciones al tenor literal y a su relevancia para preservar el principio de legalidad (especialmente la previsibilidad) no reflejan la complejidad de cómo opera nuestro lenguaje. En este trabajo analizo la concepción descriptivista que parece subyacer a esas apelaciones y presento una concepción alternativa, las nuevas teorías de la referencia, que nos permiten dar cuenta de nuestro lenguaje en general, y la interpretación jurídica, en particular. Una vez se asume una determinada posición semántica, en la última parte del trabajo reflexiono acerca de qué argumentos son relevantes para adoptar una determinada interpretación cuando se producen casos difíciles.

An important problem in lexical semantics is the explanation of how verbal meaning interacts with the syntactic realization of arguments. Levin (1993) recognizes the relation between syntax and semantics in her classification of English verbs, in which similar syntactic behavior among verbs is assumed to reflect shared meaning components. However, her classes do not accurately predict the verbs’ semantic and syntactic properties. Other researchers (Taylor 1996, Boas 2008) argue for the inclusion of detailed encyclopedic meaning in explanations of syntactic behavior. Frame Semantics provides the necessary tools for fine-grained analyses of the syntax-semantics interface because it offers a rigorous method for the description of meaning and documents syntactic information about argument realization from corpus data. This report uses concepts from Frame Semantics and data from its practical application, FrameNet (http://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu), to assess the importance of fine-grained verbal meaning for argument realization by comparing the verbs embezzle, pilfer, shoplift, snatch and steal. Each verb construes the general semantics of the Theft frame differently, emphasizing or specifying individual participants in the event (frame elements). They also exhibit subtle differences in whether and how these frame elements are syntactically realized. In linking their syntax to their semantics, I show that the verbs’ syntactic distribution may be influenced by aspects of meaning such as their degree of descriptivity, the detailed specification of certain frame elements, and their occurrence as LUs in different frames.
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