Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Derrida'

James Joyce remains a logocentric figure, a position confirmed in his perceived relation to Dante within a patriarchal canonical lineage and its philosophical implications. Joyce also occupies this position within the writing and thought of Jacques Derrida, for whom his work then represents both the logos and its own deconstruction. In contrast, this thesis proposes that Joyce in fact is not a logocentric author, and that his writing is explicitly directed towards a deconstruction of the idea of the logos. This claim is advanced through the suggestion that there is in Joyce a deconstruction rather than a validation of the phonocentric linguistic theory and practice of Dante, and concomitantly of a patriarchal Joyce construed through that Dante. In this interrogation of the Dantean logos by Joyce’s writing the thesis then reads the Derridean view on Joyce and examines its investments, proposing that in it there are wider implications for a critical reading of Derrida’s work and for an understanding of his grammatology. It does so in three imagined papers on Joyce and Dante, an insert, a lecture and an essay. They constitute phantom artefacts in which to read deconstructively, and to read deconstruction, by unbinding Derrida’s Joyce. The first chapter is an imagined insert from Joyce and Dante into Of Grammatology and its first chapter, ‘The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing’. In the folds of the insert it is proposed that Derrida cleaves to the idea of the book and is bound to it in Joyce. This binding initiates a retrospective reading of ‘The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing’ and of the wider grammatological opening; its implications are unfolded in the insert. By then unbinding the thread of a logocentric Dante in Joyce, the insert unbinds Joyce from the Derridean idea of the book and furthermore suggests that Joyce, read in the deconstruction of Dante, represents the closure of the book as imagined in that essay. Building upon the proposal of a Joycean closure of the book as unfolded in chapter one, the second chapter advances and outlines the shape of that closure in an imagined lecture by Joyce. The chapter follows the displaced letter a in Ulysses as it interrogates mimesis, tracing the development of a subject in différance. The lecture performs that deconstruction of mimesis and, in doing so, announces not the apotheosis but the death of the realist novel in Ulysses. The final chapter draws together the conclusions of the previous two chapters in an imagined essay that arche-writes ‘Two Words for Joyce’ as an example of its own thesis. It does so in a previously untraced Dantean connection, through a conversation between Joyce and Beckett on Dante that finds its way into Finnegans Wake and is archived in the two words Derrida extracts as the spur for his essay. The imagined essay brings together Derrida, Beckett and Joyce in Dante as a concatenation of pairs within the pair of essays; it also shadows another pair, the Derridean Joyce and his other from whom the imagined essay comes. It both performs a deconstructive reading of Derrida in ‘Two Words for Joyce’ and then, through that reading, more widely affirms a Derridean grammatology. The argument of the thesis as it has advanced through the three chapters is here brought to a conclusion, suggesting that in Joyce’s writing it can be proposed that the relationship of deconstructive reading to its own practice is mediated through literature; it also proposes what might be a relationship between deconstructive reading and literature beyond those consequences.

Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Comunicação e Expressão. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Literatura
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O cachimbo e o número quatro: dois traços, repetição infinita. Mallarmé, O Azul, do infinito-quatro à série infinita. As cinzas do cachimbo, as cinzas de Auschwitz, as cinzas de Rui Barbosa. Tabaco, planta da América: uso religioso e medicinal. Tabaco e cachimbo como dom, remédios. Colombo descobre o tabaco. O ouro de Colombo e sol de Mallarmé. Índios, primeiros homines sacri. Frei Bartolomé, Borges e a escravidão negra. Tabaco e africanos. Exu e seu charuto. Pretos Velhos e seus cachimbos. O "cachimbo" de Cuba. Mário de Andrade vê feiticeiros de Cuba no Brasil. Mário vê o vodu haitiano também. Mário fecha o corpo no catimbó: cachimbo em ação. Fernando Ortiz, açúcar versus tabaco, branco versus negro: guerra. Cachimbo, instrumento de tortura: limiar entre dom e veneno. O cachimbo da paz: Baudelaire e o faroeste. Cachimbo: do uso coletivo à sala do burguês. Mallarmé e seu cachimbo. Baudelaire e seu cachimbo. Georges Bataille e o tabaco: excesso, dispêndio. Jacques Derrida, dom e tabaco. O que é o dom? Da impossibilidade do dom. Cachimbo: do feitiço ao fetiche. O que é o transe? Subjetivação e dessubjetivação, animalização e humanização. O cavalo da makumba e o cavalo de Oswald e Clarice. O humano e o inumano. Ralatos de Métraux e Verger. Possessão e anestesia. Separação entre homem e animal. Teatro e Transe. Ator e cavalo. Transe e transgressão. Transgressão ou profanação? O cavalo da makumba e a prova de humanidade. Racismo e animalidade. Por que Exu dá medo? No transe, ator e personagem são indiscerníveis. O rito e o mito. O transe e a narração. O Eu e o Outro na possessão. Do cavalo a Cara de Cavalo. Cara de Cavalo e Cobrador. De bandido a terrorista. Violência histérica e homo sacer: o homem-pênis. Por um novo terrorismo. O hibridismo do cavalo. O hibridismo da makumba. Travestimento, o transe e o sexo: simulacro, máscara. O cavalo e o animot: animais no singular. Makumba, estado de exceção efetivo e magia negra. O sacrifício. Quem é mais sagrado: homem ou animal? Derrida, Hegel, Bataille. Derrida herdeiro de Bataille. Bataille, de Hegel. Hegel, do Haiti. Haiti: revolução e vodu. Derrida e o sacrifício. Bataille e a descontinuidade. Barravento, Glauber Rocha: dialética com macumba. Différance e dyferença. A escrita de Glauber. Firmino: Exu hegeliano. Firmino e Macunaíma. O transe de Glauber. O hibridismo do barravento. Glauber e Borges: eztetyka do sonho. Por que makumba? A guerra e o sacrifício. A guerra e a escravidão: diferimento da morte (Jean Baudrillard). Sacrifício e dom. Derrida, um batailleanismo sem reservas. As fotografias de Pierre Verger usadas por Bataille. Verger: Bataille, Caillois, Mauss, Métraux, etc. Derrida com Makumba. Phármakon, o indecidível: remédio e veneno. Obàlúayié, o phármakon africano. Obàlúayié: anjo corcunda do cemitério, como o de Klee, de Benjamin. Obàlúayié e sua máscara. Exu também é phármakon, e pharmakeús. Exu, Pombagira, a moeda falsa, o travesti: divisão binária dos sexos (Severo Sarduy, Jacques Lacan). Travestimento como falsificação de moedas. A ambigüidade de Exu. Thot, o mensageiro (dos egípcios), como Hermes e Exu. Gregos macumbeiros. Thot inventou o jogo de dados. Exu, o de búzios. Um lance de búzios jamais abolirá o acaso. Un coup de dés é uma constelação. O lance de búzios também. A eternidade das estrelas: jogo de búzios, eterno retorno e repetição (Blanqui). O pai de santo e o astrólogo de Benjamin. Jogo de búzios e imagem dialética. Jogo de Búzios e a mônada de Leibniz. Jogo de búzios e a deriva, indistinção entre o lúdico e o dia-a-dia (Guy Debord). Jogo de búzios como umbigodomundolivro (Haroldo de Campos). Leibniz, Mallarmé, africanos: o livro total. Jogo + máscara = transe. O que é a máscara? Picasso, Deleuze, Sarduy e Carl Einstein: arte primitiva. Máscara e identidade. Identidade e liberalismo. Máscara e rosto, cavernas de Lascaux: surge o ser acéfalo. A cabeça, o rosto e Francis Bacon: indiscernibilidade entre homem e animal - diferonça. A máscara e a mercadoria. A máscara e o espetáculo. Natureza morta e barroco. Trompe-l'oil e a dobra do real. William Harnett e suas still lifes: o cachimbo retorna. Cachimbo e circulação de mercadorias. Cachimbo e circulação dos escravos. Magritte e seu cachimbo-vodu-simulacro. Transculturação é um trompe-l'oil. Tabaco e racismo. Tabaco e massacre dos índios. Tabaco e tráfico de escravos. Tabaco e nazismo. Tabaco e política contemporânea. O que é racismo? Racismo e o gozo do Outro. The pipe and the number four: two marks, infinite repetition. Mallarmé, Azure, from unending four to unending series. Pipe's ashes, Auschwitz' ashes, Rui Barbosa's ashes. Tobacco, America's herb: its medicinal and its religious uses. Colombo discovers tobacco. Colombo's gold and Mallarmé's sun. Indians, the first homines sacri. Frei Bartolomé, Borges and black slavery. Tobacco and Africans. Eshu and His Cigar. Pretos Velhos and their pipes. Cuba's "pipe". Mario de Andrade sees Cuban sorcerers in Brasil. He also sees Haitian voodoo. Mario is protected in catimbó: the pipe gets into action. Fernando Ortiz: sugar against tobacco, whites against blacks: war. Pipe, an instrument of torture: in-between gift and poison. Peace pipe: Baudelaire and the western. Pipe: from collective usage to a bourgeois smoking-room. Mallarmé and his pipe. Baudelaire and his pipe. Georges Bataille and tobacco: excess, waste. Jacques Derrida, gift and tobacco. What is gift? The impossibility of giving. Pipe: from feitiço to fetish. What is trance? Subjectivation and de-subjectivation, animalization and humanization. Makumba's horse. Oswald's and Clarice's horse. Human and Inhuman. Métraux's and Vergers' dialogues. Possession and anesthesia. A separation between man and animal. Theater and Trance. Actor and Horse. Trance and Transgression. Transgression or Profanation? The horse in makumba and the test for humanity. Racism and animality. Why is Eshu fearsome? In the trance, actor and character are undistinguishable. Rite and myth. Trance and narrative. The I and the Other in possession. From Horse to Cara de Cavalo. Cara de Cavalo and Cobrador. From outlaw to terrorist. Hysterical violence and homo sacer: the penis-man. In favour of a new terrorism. The horse's hybridity. Makumba's hybridity. Cross-dressing, trance and sex: mask, simulacrum. The horse and the animot: animals in the singular. Makumba, effective state of exception and black magic. The sacrifice: what is more sacred? Man or animal? Derrida, Hegel, Bataille. Derrida, Bataille's heir. Bataille, Hegel's heir. Hegel: Haiti's heir. Haiti: revolution and voodoo. Derrida and the Sacrifice. Bataille and discontinuity. Barravento, Glauber Rocha: dialectics with macumba. Différance and dyferença. Glauber's writing. Firmino: Hegelian Eshu. Firmino and Macunaíma. Glauber's trance. Barravento's hybridity. Glauber and Borges: the eztetyka of the dream. Why makumba? War and Sacrifice. War and Slavery: postponement of death (Jean Baudrillard). Sacrifice and gift. Derrida, a Batailleanism without reserve. Pierre Verger's photos used by Bataille. Verger: Bataille, Caillois, Mauss, Métraux, etc. Derrida with Makumba. Phármakon, the undecidable: poison and cure. Obàlúaiyé, the African phármakon. Obàlúaiyé, the hunchback angel of the cemetery, like Klee's, like Benjamin's. Obàlúaiyé and the mask. Eshu is also phármakon and pharmakeús. Eshu, Pombagira, the counterfeit money, the transvestite: the binary divison of the sexes (Severo Sarduy, Jacques Lacan). Counterfeit money as transvestite. Eshu's ambiguity. Thot, the messenger (Egyptian) like Hermes and Eshu. Greek macumbeiros. Thot invented the throw of the dice. Eshu, the one of the Sixteen Cowries. A throw of cowrie shells will never abolish chance. Un Coup de Dés is a constellation. So is un coup of cowrie shells. Eternity through the stars: a throw of cowrie shells, eternal return and repetition (Blanqui). The witchdoctor and Benjamin's astrologist. A throw of cowrie shells and the dialectical image. A throw of cowrie shells and Leibniz's monad. A throw of cowrie shells and dérive, no distinction between playfulness and everyday life (Guy Debord). A throw of cowrie shells like the umbilicalcordoftheworldbook (Haroldo de Campos). Leibniz, Mallarmé, Africans: the total book. Game + mask = trance. What is a mask? Picasso, Deleuze, Sarduy and Carl Einstein: primitive art. Mask and identity. Identity and liberalism. Mask and the face. Lascaux's caves: the acephalic being is born. The head, the face and Francis Bacon: undiscernibility between man and animal - diferonça. Mask and merchandize. Mask and spectacularization. Still life and baroque. Trompe l'oeil and the folding of the real. William Harnett and his still lifes: the pipe returns. Pipe and the circulation of merchandize. Pipe and the circulation of slaves. Magritte and his pipe-voodoo-simulacrum. Transculturation is trompe-l'oeil. Tobacco and racism. Tobacco and the Indian massacre. Tobacco and the traffic of slaves. Tobacco and Nazism. Tobacco and contemporary politics. What is racism? Racism and the enjoyment of the Other.

The task of this work is to prove that the Derrida’s deconstructionism is permeated by many philosophical, ethical and political implications. In order to understand the reasons why it is possible to consider Derrida as a “political philosopher”, I firstly try to see in which sense his deconstructive thought consists in questioning the western philosophical tradition. Derrida affirms that it is characterized by “Phonologocentrism” and, from the political point of view, by “Fallogocentrism” and “Ipsocentrism”. The crucial point of our researches concerns the idea that Deconstruction does not represent a negative, nihilistic and irresponsible theoretical operation. On the contrary, it historically corresponds to the “course of things”, it assumes the shape of an “event” and it constitutes an assumption of responsibility towards that same event. Thanks to Deconstruction we can obtain many concepts (i.e. Democracy “to come”, Justice beyond Right, and Messianic without Messianism) that are able to “overcome” the global political crisis by relaunching a new political conceptuality, and the identification of a new international subject (Europe “to come”) which is able to work with this deconstructed conceptuality. Derrida also engages an interesting debate with two great thinkers of the political crisis: W. Benjamin and C. Schmitt. Finally, the deconstruction is able to give a punctual interpretation of the most representative event of our time: September 11th, 2001.
In questo lavoro di ricerca s’intende mostrare come il decostruzionismo derridiano costituisca un tentativo filosofico forte, carico d’implicazioni etico-politiche. Per capire in che senso Derrida possa essere definito un “filosofo politico”, si approfondisce il modo in cui la decostruzione opera una messa in questione della tradizione filosofica occidentale che il Nostro interpreta in termini di fonologocentrismo, nonché, dal punto di vista politico, in termini di fallogocentrismo e ipsocentrismo. Il punto cruciale dell’interpretazione verte sull’idea che la decostruzione non rappresenti un’operazione negativa, nichilistica e irresponsabile; al contrario, essa corrisponderebbe al corso delle cose, ovvero coinciderebbe con una forma di avvenimento e con un’assunzione di responsabilità nei confronti di ciò che accade. In particolare, grazie alla decostruzione, emergerebbero concetti chiave (democrazia “a venire”, giustizia al di là del diritto, e messianico senza messianismo) per il “superamento” della crisi della concettualità politica moderna, e sarebbe possibile individuare un nuovo soggetto sulla scena internazionale (l’Europa “a venire”) in grado di effettuare un rilancio del politico in dissoluzione. In questo lavoro si mostra inoltre come Derrida ingaggi un serrato confronto con alcuni dei più illustri (anche se per molti aspetti distanti) pensatori politici della crisi del politico: Carl Schmitt e Walter Benjamin, e infine come il decostruzionismo derridiano sia in grado di fornire un’efficace interpretazione di quello che è considerato l’evento capitale della contemporaneità, l’11 settembre.

This thesis is based on two readings on death. The first one is Martin Heidegger&rsquo
s Being and Time chapter two, part one and the second one is Jacques Derrida&rsquo
s Aporias. The first reading is based on the phenomenological analysis of death. The line of argument of Heidegger is figured out. The second reading is based on Derrida&rsquo
s deconstruction of Heidegger&rsquo
s account of death in Being and Time. The thesis and the conclusion part is based on the idea that, on death, these philosophers are fundamentally similar and radically different. This is shown by the comparison of these philosophers.

Evil is an excellent point of departure for exploring the relationship between Jacques Derrida's work and the philosophy of religion. This has not been the explicit focus of any published study on Derrida (1930-2004) thus far. This study explains how central themes in Derrida's writings can open new approaches to the problem of evil. In 1987, David O'Connor realized that the discourse of Anglo-American philosophy of religion had come to an impasse on the problem of evil. In 1998, O'Connor declared a détente between philosophy and theism on the topic. This much was already explained by the French philosopher Henry Duméry in 1968. The appeal to Derrida's writings does not provide the missing master key to this situation. However, the challenges Derrida sets forward for Western philosophy may also be taken as fundamental challenges resting within the structure of evil itself. The upshot not only challenges theism; it also knocks down arguments against theism. The study's first chapter reviews the debate on evil within the philosophy of religion as challenges to theism's credibility. These are the logical (Pike 1963), evidential (Rowe 1979), and probabilistic (Draper 1989) arguments from evil. Chapters two to six outline Derrida's basic concepts and then elaborate how they substantially challenge the prevailing presumptions about the problem of evil. The results from this investigation establish an original application of Derrida's thought relevant to theodicy and the problem of evil. Chapter seven finally summarizes how the problem of evil is to be reconsidered vis-à-vis Derrida's writings.
Le problème du mal est un excellent point de départ pour exposer le rapport entre Jacques Derrida et la philosophie de la religion. Jusqu'ici, pareille approche n'a été entreprise par aucune recherche sur la pensée de Derrida (1930-2004). La présente étude expose comment des thèmes au centre de l'œuvre de Derrida peuvent ouvrir de nouvelles voies dans le traitement de ce problème. En 1987, David O'Connor prenait acte que le discours utilisé dans la philosophie anglo-américaine de la religion était dans l'impasse relativement au problème du mal, et en 1998, il proposait une trève entre la philosophie et le théisme sur cette question. Tout cela avait été constaté et proposé déjà en 1978 par le philosophe français Henry Duméry. L'analyse de l'œuvre de Derrida présentée dans cette étude ne fournit aucunement la solution manquante. En revanche, les défis que représente Derrida pour la philosophie occidentale peuvent être considérés également comme des défis fondamentaux posés par la structure même du mal, avec pour résultat que non seulement le théisme est critiqué, mais tout autant les arguments opposés à celui-ci.Suite à l'exposé du débat sur la question du mal et le rejet de la crédibilité du théisme en philosophie de la religion notamment de la part des approches dites 'logique' (Pike 1963), 'évidentielle' (Rowe 1979), et 'probabiliste' (Draper 1989), les chapitres deux à six présentent des concepts de base élaborés par Derrida et expliquent dans quelle mesure ces concepts mettent en question les opinions principales sur le problème du mal présentées au chapitre premier. Le septième et dernier chapitre montre également toute l'originalité de la pensée de Derrida concernant la théodicée et la question du mal.

CONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICO
A hipótese interpretativa que utilizamos nesta tese de doutorado é a de que a compreensão que Derrida tem da ideia de (contra) é fundamental para compreendermos seu pensamento sobre a Universidade e sua relação com a filosofia. A análise caminha na direção de que o pensamento derridiano sobre a questão universitária é um desdobramento da (ética da aporia), que, para nós, é marcante em seu desenvolvimento intelectual. No primeiro capítulo, tratamos sobre a relação entre as ideias (contra-instituição) e (desconstrução). No segundo capítulo, focamos a relação entre desconstrução e ensino. No terceiro capítulo, mostramos como Derrida desenvolve certa fidelidade à ideia de Universidade, fidelidade distante da significação comum, pois essa fidelidade opera com a lógica do (com-contra). E no quarto capítulo, mostramos a Universidade contemporânea a partir de uma ótica desconstrucionista. A pesquisa se baseou nos escritos de Derrida sobre a Universidade, a disciplina Filosofia e a Faculdade de Filosofia, reunidos no famoso livro Du Droit a La Philosophie. Como o próprio filósofo pontua – em alguns textos que veremos ao longo desta tese de doutorado – , o (contra), a (oposição), insinua um movimento (com-contra), um torneamento (acerca de) e (longe de), uma medida de distância e de proximidade. Ao retirar os termos (contra) ou (oposição) de sua significação comum, compreendemos um movimento contrainstitucional, mais especificamente contra as Universidades. Chamaremos a instituição imaginada por Derrida de (contrainstituição). Tal aspecto contrainstitucional pode também ser visto como componente da (ética da aporia), de que tratamos na conclusão do trabalho.
The hypothesis used in this doctoral thesis is that the understanding of Derrida’s notion of (counter) is fundamental to understanding Derrida’s thoughts concerning the university and its relation to philosophy. The analysis asserts that the thought of Derrida on the University is an offshoot of (ethics of aporia) which for us is remarkable in Derrida’s intellectual development. In the first chapter we address the relationship between ideas (counter-institution) and (deconstruction). In the second chapter we focus on the relationship between deconstruction and teaching. The third chapter will show how Derrida develops the idea of loyalt y to the University. This definition of Fidelity is far from ordinary, because this loyalty operates in the logic of (with-against). In the fourth chapter we deal with the deconstructivist aspect of contemporary University. Our research is based on the writings of Derrida on the University, discipline philosophy and the Faculty of Philosophy, meeting in the famous book Du Droit a La Philosophie. As Derrida himself points out in some texts that we will encounter throughout this work, the (counter), the (opposition) implies a movement (with-against), a turning around and away from, a measure of distance and proximity .When Derrida drops the term (counter or opposed) of the ordinary meaning of term, we understand this to be a movement against the institutional-Derrida in relation to institutions and more specifically to the institution of the University. We call the institution imagined by Derrida the (counter-institution). This aspect of the counter-institution can also be viewed as a component of the (ethics of aporia) developed by Derrida. We address this in the conclusion of thesis.

Cette thèse porte sur l’identité réduite à sa dimension spectrale dans l’ordre culturel et politique. Le point-clé de cette recherche est dans le rapport indissociable de l’identité au concept de naissance. L’identité est comme ce fonds idéal de l’être, notamment de l’homme de qualité, qui ne se réalise pas toujours, qui ne prend corps que difficilement dans la réalité ; ce qui la constitue comme une source trompeuse et la conduit à se spectraliser. L’autre est donc la figure de cette constitution d’identité en une identité étrangère, aliénée. Une telle identité détournée, devenue l’ombre d’elle-même en vient à altérer aussi la culture et la politique, à les contaminer au point de les aliéner, plus encore sous un gouvernement lui-même spectral, fantomatique (Partie I). Cette identité dévoyée en identité spectrale est ainsi déconstruite selon l’approche de Derrida, pour en faire apparaître une nouvelle, une autre, consciente. Cette dernière est l’effet de la langue qui apparaît comme la maison de l’être, et constitue une possibilité de structure identitaire (Partie II). Pourtant, notre présupposition est que l’identité n’est jamais advenue, ou bien que l’identité n’existe pas, parce que l’existence de l’identité, renvoie à un fonds nécessairement métaphysique, à quoi nous opposons avec Bouddha la conquête du sens de la vie dans le refus de tout attachement à quelque identité (Partie III). Comment fonder l’identité propre, transitoire, dans le temps de la pratique éthique et de la pratique politique ? Il s’avère que ce qui fait la vérité de vie tient à la seule dimension spectrale de l’identité, qui dénonce comme fausse toute identité établie, en tant qu’elle ne peut être qu’une identité en devenir, une identité toujours absente. Faire justice à l’identité d’un être ou d’une culture n’est toujours qu’une perspective à venir, et leur identité les hante seulement comme un spectre
This study is focused on ghost (spectral) identity. The research is undertaken from cultural and political perspectives. The main contention of this research is to show that the main problem of personal identity is its inseparability from the concept of its birth. The normal concept of identity serves as the foundation of an ideal self, which can never be realized. The problem is that it is constructed on a mistaken foundation, which leads this personal identity to become a ghost (spectral). Therefore, when, on the basis of this faulty construction of personal identity, we obtain the Other, it is an alienated personal identity. At the same time, this construction of personal identity produces an alienated culture and politics, and even a ghost (spectral) government(Part I). Consequently, this study proposes to deconstruct (Derrida) this warped concept of personal identity, in order to open the way to construct a new ghost (spectral) personal identity. This new ghost (spectral) personal identity is shown to be an even more conscious personal identity. This new personal identity is shown to arise from language and to serve as the possibility of personal identity formation in the living house of being, (Part II). However, we still must return to the assumption that identity is never born or even that fundamentally identity does not exist at all, because the existence of identity as a metaphysically necessary supposition would make us necessarily face a sort of consciousness of the meaning of our own identity (Part III). But, how then are we to undertake ethical and political reflection and action? Mustn’t we temporarily turn back to the acceptibility of the concept of personal identity? However, on closer examination, it turns out that the ghost (spectral) personal identity that reveals the truth of life in fact is just a sort of unreal personal identity or a sort of flowing, impermanent personal identity. As to this absent personal identity, its true meaning can only come from the future. In the meantime, let us just let the identity float and haunt just like a ghost (spectre)

In my dissertation titled East-West Entanglements: Pamuk, Özdamar, Derrida, I analyze the representation of cultural, linguistic, and religious tensions chronicled by these authors who have variously inhabited Western and non-Western worlds. They all problematize the complicated relations between memory and identity within and without the borders of the modem nation state. I argue that their works address existing multicultural situations, which arise from diverging and converging histories, and remind us that we can no longer inhabit segregated states of being. In the face of multi-referential modes of living in the 2lst century, these authors suggest malleable and hybrid readings of entangled collectivities. Attention to the entanglements that overwhelm temporal, linguistic, and cultural boundaries is salutary, because it challenges the conceptual model based on mutually exclusive dichotomies, and calls into play the network of filiations that generate an ongoing interaction among conflicting singularities. I propose that Pamuk, Özdamar, and Derrida accommodate the ever-shifting ways of interaction on the levels of both content and form. They offer examples of grafted genre that accentuate the resemblances in difference across various generic forms. The grafted narratives they construct supersede and re-formulate the permeable boundaries between self and other, and call attention to the many Easts and Wests, enmeshed as they are in one another.

Notre étude vise à montrer comment Derrida pense la démocratie à travers la démarche qui lui est propre et singulière de la déconstruction. Notre philosophe présente ses idées sur la démocratie à partir du concept de l’amitié qui, selon lui, donne le modèle de la relation juste entre les humains. On peut dire qu’il cherche à repenser le fondement du politique par ce concept de l’amitié à travers un travail d’héritage, de critique, de rejet parfois, et enfin de déconstruction. Derrida commence à déconstruire le concept de l’amitié par une citation : « O mes amis, il n’y nul ami. », et à partir de là, il met en évidence et questionne une série d’apories sur l’idée de l’amitié dans l’histoire philosophique. Ensuite, on voit que l’idée de l’amitié repensée par le travail de déconstruction chez Derrida s’attache à la survivance qui dépasse la mort devant le deuil. L’amitié s’ouvre alors vers l’avenir à travers la théorie derridienne de la trace et de la différence qui est liée au déplacement de l’espacement et de la durée. En même temps, Derrida évoque la possibilité de penser l’amitié à partir de son contraire, y compris de convertir l’ami en ennemi, il scrute ainsi sur le plan éthique le rapport politique ami / ennemi pour le repenser selon l’exigence de la justice. Pour cela, il introduit l’idée de l’autre et de l’hospitalité. La thèse se termine sur l’importance du concept de l’autre chez Derrida qui est lié dans sa philosophie avec le thème de l’hospitalité, afin de développer sa théorie politique autour de la « démocratie à venir »
Our study aims to show how Derrida thinks of democracy through deconstruction which is his own and unique approach. Our philosopher presents his thinking on democracy from a concept of friendship which, according to him, gives the model of the just relationship between human. We can say that he seeks to rethink the base of politics with this concept of friendship through a work of inheritance, criticism, sometimes rejection, and finally deconstruction. Derrida begins to deconstruct the notion of friendship through a quote: “O my friends, there is no friend.”, and from there, he emphasizes and queries a series of contradictions on the idea of friendship in philosophical history. The concept of friendship rethought by the work of deconstruction in Derrida connects to the idea of surviving which goes beyond death in relation with mourning. Friendship then opens a door to the future, through the Derridian theory of the trace and the différance which is linked to the movement of spacing and duration. At the same time, Derrida evokes the possibility of thinking friendship from its opposite, including converting the friend into enemy, he thus scrutinizes the political relation friend / enemy on the ethical plan to rethink it according to the requirement of justice. For this, he introduces the idea of the other and of hospitality. The thesis ends on the importance of the concept of the other in Derrida which is linked with the theme of hospitality in his philosophy, in order to develop his political theory around the “democracy to come”

By way of a series of singular investigations, this thesis explores the problematics of discipline and disciplinarity as these appear across a range of knowledges and practices that constitute humanities research today. Operating within and contributing to the specific debates of such 'knowledges' as philosophy, cultural studies, literary criticism, legal studies, environmental ethics and education, these investigations analyse the configuration of those debates in relation to their specific 'techniques' of presentation and engagement. Recurring issues which arise include the institutional and material conditions of humanities research and writing; the possible strategies for engaging and following the work of others; the differential forms and effects of interdisciplinarity; the transformative potential of the work of discipline; and the potential justifications of humanities scholarship. As a concept receiving increasing focus within the humanities, 'discipline' is routinely employed to identify and distinguish between any number of objects, including knowledges, techniques, powers, conducts, sites and practices. In this thesis, however, the questioning of discipline approaches discipline(s) as always already divided such that the work or effects of discipline are irreducible to forms of knowledge, power and so forth. Such a disciplinary division is thus explored insofar as it manifests in undecidable divisions between materiality and ideality, transformative potential and judicial privilege, institutional positivity and incalculable excess, but also as a structural interdisciplinarity which demonstrates the significance of disciplinary specialisation and (or as) interdisciplinary dissemination. While such undecidability is often thought to challenge the formulations of disciplinary programs, this thesis affirms both the undecidability of disciplinary division(s) and the already posited disciplinary programs as the condition of possibility of new research. While the questioning of discipline is associated primarily with Foucault, this thesis turns to Derrida in order to contribute further to that questioning without denying the value of Foucault's original investigations. The possibility of conducting new research in the humanities is thus affirmed not so much on the basis of a critical imperative as by way of a necessary and general yet differential affirmation of affirmation in the form of ethico­ speculative commentary. Consequently, while Derrida marks the locus of the various speculations and transformations, the discussion as a whole remains infused with and by a certain spirit not just of Foucault but also of many Enlightenment thinkers (such as Kant, Hegel and Marx), a spirit that remains a condition of the humanities as an institution today. But if an affirmation of affirmation can be understood to forestall the certainty of the critical imperative, this is not to deny the work of transformation that may be found at the heart of humanities critique. Instead, the question of discipline may be what opens both the future and the possibility of a transformation that exceeds such ideals yet which may momentarily manifest itself within (among other things) the 'discipline(s)' of 'deconstruction' .

Depuis la fin des années 1980, un débat s’est installé, parmi les commentateurs de Jacques Derrida, sur l’existence ou non d’un « tournant éthique » dans l’œuvre de cet auteur. Les partisans de l’un et l’autre bord ne sont d’accord ni sur la signification du terme « tournant » ni sur la signification du terme « éthique » ; ils partagent pourtant un même présupposé : Derrida ne peut pas être un normativiste. Le présent travail vise à contester ce consensus de fond qui oppose la déconstruction aux normes. Tout en refusant les lectures qui privilégient des périodisations abstraites (un jeune Derrida et un Derrida tardif, par exemple), nous montrons que le problème de la normativité est, dès le départ, contigu à la déconstruction du logocentrisme. Le fait que la métaphysique occidentale ait toujours refoulé l’écriture et la logique de la trace détermine une configuration particulière du champ pratique. À l’intérieur de celui-ci, la vérité des normes fut pensée comme l’intimité d’une voix de commandement : voilà qui est le logonomocentrisme. Tout comme Derrida défend qu’une certaine archi-écriture est la condition de possibilité de la parole — et de l’apparaître en général —, nous soutenons qu’un archi-droit est la condition de possibilité de la normativité. « Écriture » et « droit » se forgent un destin commun. Les éléments traditionnellement employés pour décrire, en termes métaphysiques, leur condition secondaire et soumise seront repris, ici, pour penser un excès qui met le champ pratique en mouvement : « distance », « supplément », « représentation », mais aussi « institution », « arbitraire », « violence » et « technique »
Since the late 1980s, there has been a disagreement among Derrida scholars as to whether or not there is an « ethical turn » in his philosophy. Although the meanings of the terms « ethical » and « turn » still divide commentators, partisans of both camps presuppose one thing: Derrida cannot be a normativist.This dissertation challenges the tacit consensus among these commentators, namely, that Derrida’s philosophy is opposed to « norms ». Rejecting the distinction between a « young » and a « late » Derrida, we show that the problem of normativity has been correlated with the deconstruction of logocentrism since his earliest works. The fact that Western metaphysics has always repressed writing and the logic of the trace determines a particular configuration of the field of practical philosophy. Within this framework, normative truth is conceived as the intimacy of a commanding voice: we call this logonomocentrism. Just as Derrida argues that « archi-writing » is the condition of possibility of all speech — and appearance in general — we argue that « archi-law » is the condition of possibility of normativity. Hence, « writing » and « law » share a common destiny. The traditional elements used to describe, in metaphysical terms, the secondarity (and submission) of law and writing allow us to think an excess that puts into motion the field of practical philosophy : « distance », « supplement », « representation », but also « institution », « arbitrary », « violence » and « technique »

Derrida and Economics analyses two essays of Jacques Derrida on the Public and Democracy, alongside other essays reflecting these political works. However, Derrida's political thought will be taken seriously by emphasising Economics before Politics. Economics will be viewed as a detour, a detour inflecting every attempt to present a meaningful political position or stable political realm. For Derrida, economics has the force of an oblique ruse. Derrida ADd BconoDdcs aligns Derrida's view of economics with the Eighteenth Century realisation that a stable SOciety, analogous to the Antique ideal of the Polis, is neither a common goal nor a proper object for Political philosophy. Here, Classical economics emerges as an oblique attempt to construct the conditions for the possibility of a political body through economic relations. This epistemological 'en passant' is familiar, in Britain, as Adam Smith's' Invisible Hand'. For Derrida, the equi valent Continental ruse is distinguished by a faith in 'dialectical idealisation'; a process bent upon securing an idealised po 11 tical space, but unable to limit its more speculati ve drifts. If Classical economics represents an attempt to construct the possibility of the Body Politic, Derrida's political essays deconstruct this possibility. His emphasiS upon the 'possible' highlights the effects of risk and competition in an economy that could never comfortably be identified wi th a stable Polt tical realm. For Derrida, economics is not simply an attempt to secure or rewrite more direct Political discourses. As he argues, its every detour is haunted by the possibility of speculative failure. Derrida argues an enthusiasm for economics can also imply a preoccupation with the finitude of the Body Politic. This observation allows him to comment upon the valorisation of death or redundancy in certain poli tical discourses; i. e. those analyses that, in the throes of Depression, remain devoted to the idea of redundancy as though to the object of a renewed political will.

CONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICO
Esta dissertação acompanha a desconstrução do conceito de linguagem e o desenvolvimento de uma noção alargada de escritura pensadas por Derrida na primeira parte do livro Gramatologia. O primeiro capítulo aborda a constatação de um rebaixamento da escrita em relação à fala inerente ao conceito tradicional de linguagem que marca todo o pensamento ocidental, inscrevendo-o no que Derrida chama de uma clausura metafísica. Apontando um movimento de transbordamento do conceito de linguagem, que no século XX se deixa ver melhor do que nunca, o filósofo anuncia a possibilidade de liberação de uma noção radical de escritura que nos permite pensar diferentemente da lógica binária opositiva. O segundo capítulo é dedicado à leitura derridiana do Curso de lingüística geral, de Ferdinand de Saussure, em sua desconstrução do conceito logocêntrico do signo lingüístico e à apresentação de quase-conceitos chaves para o pensamento da desconstrução como rastro e différance. E, finalmente, o terceiro capítulo, traz à tona uma discussão sobre a condição de (im)possibilidade de todo projeto científico levando-se em conta este quase-conceito derridiano de escritura.
This dissertation follows the deconstruction of a traditional concept of language and the development of an enlarged notion of writing presented by Derrida in the first part of the book Of grammatology. The first chapter approaches the perception of a degradation of the writing in relation to speaks inherent to the traditional concept of language that marks all western thought, inscribing it in what the philosopher calls a metaphysics enclosure. Pointing a movement of overflow of the concept of language, that can be felt better than never in the XX century, Derrida announces the possibility of a radical notion of writing that allows us to think differently than the binary opposition logic. The second chapter is dedicated to Derrida’s reading of Saussure’s “Course in general linguistics” and his deconstruction of the logocentric concept of the linguistic sign and the presentation of some of his most important quasi-concepts as trace and différance. Finally, the third chapter brings the discussion about the condition of (im)possibility of every scientific project taking into account Derrida’s quasi-concept of writing.

PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO
COORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR
PROGRAMA DE SUPORTE À PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO DE INSTS. DE ENSINO
PROGRAMA DE DOUTORADO SANDUÍCHE NO EXTERIOR
Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo re-pensar o humano por meio da leitura de dois grandes pensadores, tendo em vista a existência do Dasein humano em Martin Heidegger e do rastro em Jacques Derrida. Repensar o humano se torna fundamental, na medida em que ele foi e é tomado como algo determinado ou determinável, como uma unidade que pode ser encontrada em sua essência e definida a partir de características específicas. Este modo de pensar e tomar o dito humano aparecem em diversos discursos sejam eles filosóficos, psicológicos ou do senso comum. O que resulta daí é uma relação com este suposto humano a partir de determinações pré-definidas, muitas vezes coisificadas, enclausuradas, tomadas como óbvias e, dessa forma, inquestionadas. Martin Heidegger foi um pensador de grande importância para repensar o humano, destruindo as bases que sustentavam as determinações deste e abrindo espaço para compreender outro modo de se relacionar com ele. A destruição metafísica do humano aparece em uma de suas obras capitais Ser e tempo (1927) a partir da analítica existencial do Dasein. Analítica esta fundamental para pensarmos o modo como Heidegger passa a re-pensar o humano e o lugar deste Dasein humano no início de seu pensamento. Em seguida, este Dasein humano será apresentado em obras mais tardias, onde Heidegger aborda o tema do humanismo de modo mais direto e apresenta a relação deste re-pensar junto à psicoterapia em seminários de Zollikon. Posteriormente a partir de uma desconstrução derridiana tentaremos abordar os limites desta destruição heideggeriana do humano, apontando alguns elementos de suma importância no pensamento de Jacques Derrida para que possamos alargar estes limites, re-marcando-os e transbordando-os. As obras utilizadas nesta passagem da pesquisa serão textos em que Derrida dialoga mais diretamente com Heidegger e aponta e acena para estas marcas e suas re-marcas. Por fim, será apresentado o re-pensar e o re-marcar o humano a partir de leituras derridianas em que o autor tangencia e responde às demandas e chamados de um quem, um quem humano, um quem, talvez, derridiano. Tais remarcas terão como objetivo acenar para um re-pensar o humano a partir do rastro (Trace), fazendo tremer as supostas relações em jogo deste humano na filosofia, nas ciências humanas, na experiência diária e na psicoterapia.
This research aims to re-think the human being through the reading of two major philosophers, thinking the Dasein s existence in Martin Heidegger and the trace in Jacques Derrida. Rethinking the human becomes fundamental once he was understood as something determined or determinable, as an unit that can be found in his essence and defined by specific characteristics. This way to think and understand the so called human appears in different speeches whether they are philosophical, psychological or from the common sense. Resulting in a relation with this so-called human within pre-defined determinations, often objectified, closed and taken as an obvious fact and, thus, unquestioned. Martin Heidegger was an important philosopher to the rethinking of the human on destroying the basis underlaying human determinations, making way to understand another approach on how to relate to him. The metaphysical destruction of this human appears in one of his capital works Being and Time (1927) and from the existential analytic of Dasein. This analytic is paramount to think how Heidegger starts to re-think the human and the place of this human Dasein at the beginning of his thought. Subsequently, this human Dasein will be presented in his later works, where Heidegger approaches the humanism theme more directly and presents the relation of this re-thinking with the psychotherapy in the Zollikon seminars. Furthermore, we will try to approach the limits of this heideggerian destruction of the human from a derridian deconstruction, pointing out some important elements from the thought of Jacques Derrida to be able to extend this limits, re-marking them and overflowing them. The texts used at this point of the research will be the ones in which Derrida dialogues more directly with Heidegger. Pointing out these marks and their re-marks. Finally, the human rethinking and re-marking will be presented from derridian readings, in which the author tangents and responds to the demands and calls of a who, a human who, a who, maybe derridian. These remarks will aim to re-think the human from the trace, shaking this human s supposed relations, at stake in philosophy, in human sciences, in everyday experiences also in psychotherapy.

Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of the metaphysical priority of the present simultaneously validates presence as the absolute form of meaning. In order to succeed, deconstruction is bound to offer the most robust defence of transcendental phenomenology's systematic articulation of the very constitution of experience in its absolute and irrecusably present form. Edmund Husserl's late philosophy of history accounts for the contradiction of atemporal truth—how it is created in time, and how it is possible for the historical investigation of this truth to determine its meaning with absolute certainty. Through the necessity of an ideal and phenomenologically reduced history—not only for the work of historical investigation in its own right, but as a constituent of the meaning of any truth— Derrida explains why Husserl devotes so much effort to explicating the structure and process of the formation of ideal objects in the course of what is ostensively an explanation of the origination of the geometrical science itself out of subjective experience. The purpose of this is only ever implied in Husserl's own work “The Origin of Geometry”, and the implications are subtle. The purpose of this thesis is to detail how the structures of Husserl's system serve the end clearly elucidated by Derrida. It first explains how objective truth is constituted and an ideal history made possible through Husserl's examination of their appearance in the living present, and following this it examines the problems raised by Derrida's deconstruction itself.

Chance, in the sense of the incalculable, the indeterminable, names the limit of every estimation of the truth. Whereas traditional philosophical discourses aspire to transcend this limit, deconstruction affirms on the contrary its necessity; not as a higher principle that relativizes truth and renders all our calculations futile, as is commonly suggested by flippant appropriations of Derrida's work, but as a structural property within every event and every concept, every mark. Rather than a mere impediment to the pursuit of truth then, the incalculable forms a necessary correlative of the pursuit itself. Deconstruction effectively attests to and exemplifies the dependence of every philosophical discourse on its irreducible, inherent limitation. With reference to numerous commentaries on Derrida's work, Chapter 1 shows that the unconditional indeterminability of a deconstructive, methodological identity is indissociable from deconstruction's critical import. And as Chapter 2 verifies in turn, focusing now primarily on Derrida's lecture ‘My Chances/Mes Chances' and the performative aspects of his writing, deconstruction's appeal to the accidental and the idiomatic is not a call to irresponsibility and a turning away from theory; it is what ensures its remarkable theoretical consistency. Through close readings of Aristotle, Freud, Richard Rorty and William James, Chapter 3 demonstrates that any attempt to regulate chance cannot help but put chance to work instead. Not even fiction can arrest its contaminating force. Reading Derrida alongside Edgar Allan Poe, Chapter 4 posits that the commonsensical conception of chance as a deviation from the truth is bound up with an uncritical notion of literary writing as sheer untruthfulness, and hence as the site of pure chance. The constitutive pervasiveness of chance bears out, in the first place and above all, the instability of the limit that separates fiction from non-fiction, truth from non-truth.

Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Filosofía mención Epistemología
No autorizada su publicación a texto completo, según petición de su autor
La tesis plantea un examen en torno al cuasi-concepto de «sobrevida» (survie) en Jacques Derrida. En tal examen, se propone que la “sobrevida” tiene la estructura del temprano concepto de “huella” (trace) y que se implica, políticamente, con lo que nuestro autor alrededor de los noventas llama “lógica espectral” o “fantología”. Que tal implicación sea de carácter político, quiere decir que en la obra de Derrida no habría un giro ético-político a partir de los años ochentas o noventas sino lo que él llama, en Parages, una variación de “motivos más que de temas”. Considerando esta variación derridiana de motivos, el desarrollo de la investigación involucra, por una parte, trazar líneas vinculantes entre el motivo de la “sobrevida” y la cuestión de la “escritura” y la “huella” bajo lo que se podría denominar la deconstrucción del presente viviente, a partir de sus primeros trabajos respecto de la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl. Por último, se propone cierta política de la sobrevida, que, más allá del presente viviente y con la intensidad de lo imposible, atañe a la lógica de la espectralidad o fantología (hantologie), desarrollada en sus textos más tardíos. En dicha vinculación se propone, ante la pertinencia política de la afirmación de la vida, desplegar el concepto de “sobrevida” como la operación que desconstruye la forma fenomenológico-trascendental de denominar lo vivo de la vida. Bajo el índice de la “huella” que desbarata cualquier plenitud o cualquier distinción entre presencia/ausencia, la operación que denominamos “política de la sobrevida” consistiría en un sobrevivir que, como escribe Derrida en Espectros de Marx, está “más allá de la vida o la muerte efectiva, más allá del presente vivo en general”

This thesis argues that all literature is subject to ‘afterlife,’ a continual process of translation. From this starting point, this thesis seeks to answer two questions. Firstly, how texts demonstrate this continual translation; secondly, how texts should be read if they are understood as constantly within translation. To answer these questions, this thesis seeks to develop a model of textuality that holds afterlife as central, and a model of reading based on this concept of textuality. Chapter One explores how following through the implications of Walter Benjamin’s and Jacques Derrida’s usages of the term ‘afterlife’ in their writings on translation, language and history necessarily implies a model of textuality. The model of reading that this thesis seeks to develop focuses on language and history, as Benjamin and Derrida define these as the parameters within which translation takes place. This study emphasises textuality itself as a third parameter. Chapter One also describes how, following Benjamin and Derrida, language and history are conceived as inescapable, repressive systems. This, paradoxically, allows for the concept of ‘messianicity’ – the idea that all language, and every historical event, has the potential to herald an escape from language or history. By definition, because language and history are all-encompassing, this potential cannot be enacted, and remains potential. An innovation of this thesis is to understand textuality itself as having ‘messianic potential’; all texts have the potential to escape textuality and afterlife, by reaching a point where they could no longer be translated. Understanding texts as having messianic potential, but always being subject to afterlife, is the basis of the model of reading described at the end of this chapter. Due to the ways Benjamin and Derrida suggest we recognise messianic potential, texts are read with a dual focus on their singularity and their connections to other texts. This is achieved through the ‘text-in-afterlife,’ a concept this thesis develops that understands texts as inextricable from the texts they translate and the texts that translate them. Chapters Two, Three and Four test and complicate this model of reading in response to texts by James Joyce, Aimé Césaire and Jorge Luis Borges. Concepts of textuality and reading are therefore developed throughout the thesis. The three key texts are read with focus on their individual relationships with language, history and textuality, and their connections to the texts they translate. Critics have linked Joyce’s Ulysses to multiple other texts, making it seem exceptional. However, the concept of messianicity shows that Ulysses is important precisely because it is not exceptional. Césaire’s Une Tempête demonstrates how a text can interact with several translations of ‘the same’ text simultaneously, and also that, although language and history are structured by colonialism and are inescapable, there is a huge potential for translation within these terms. Borges’ ‘Pierre Menard, Autor del Quijote’ demonstrates the form of texts’ continual translation in afterlife by describing a text that is verbally identical to the text it ‘translates,’ yet is nevertheless different in ‘meaning’ from its original. Borges’ fiction also highlights the endless potential for translation that is inherent to all texts. Through four chapters, this thesis develops a model of textuality that understands literature as defined by an almost endless potential for translation. The value of reading texts in the terms of ‘afterlife’ is to emphasise literature’s immense potential: all texts are continually translated in relation to language, history and textuality, and continually reveal further texts.

“Wittgenstein’s Ghosts. Between Deleuze and Derrida”. Both Derrida and Deleuze agree that with the advent of the moving image and the art of film, we need to articulate a new ontology or –in Wittgenstein’s terms–, a new grammar. Derrida suggests this much when he reflects on what he calls the return of ghosts, which he attributes to the advent of film and the communications media; Deleuze does the same in his studies of film, and in particular in what he calls the time-image. They both carve a grammatical space where room is opened for us to talk about an experience that fuses, paradoxically, problematically, the real and the virtual. Wittgenstein is tracing this grammar in his discussions on inner experience and in his observations about the phenomenon of aspect-seeing. Articulating a new grammar requires also a new way of seeing and this new seeing is the purpose of his methods; “clairvoyant” methods we can call them, following Deleuze’s term for what the time image propitiates in the viewer, in that they allow us to see beyond things to their aspects, beyond substances to processes; in other words, they train us to think in moving time. Philosophy is thus always a work of mourning and a commerce with ghosts. What this means is that Wittgenstein is –as Derrida and Deleuze are too–, what we might call a philosopher of becoming.
Tanto Derrida como Deleuze concuerdan en que con el advenimiento de la imagen en movimiento y el arte del cine, necesitamos articular una nueva ontología o –en palabras de Wittgenstein–, una nueva gramática. Derrida sugiere por lo menos esto, cuando reflexiona sobre lo que llama el retorno de los fantasmas, que él atribuye al advenimiento del cine y de los medios de la comunicación. Deleuze hace lo mismo en sus estudios de cine, y en particular en lo que llama la imagen-tiempo. Ambos tallan un espacio gramatical donde se abre un lugar para poder hablar de una experiencia que funde, paradójica, y problemáticamente lo real y lo virtual. Wittgenstein está rastreando esta gramática en sus discusiones sobre la experiencia interna y en sus observaciones sobre el fenómeno de ver aspectos. Articular una nueva gramática requiere también de una nueva forma de ver y esta nueva visión es el propósito desus métodos; métodos “clarividentes” podríamos llamarlos, siguiendo a Deleuzecuando describe lo que la imagen-tiempo propicia en el espectador, en la medida en que nos permite ver más allá de las cosas a sus aspectos, más allá de las substancias a los procesos. En otras palabras nos entrenan a pensar en la imagen en movimiento. La filosofía es por lo tanto siempre una labor de duelo y un comercio con fantasmas. Lo que esto significa es que Wittgenstein es –como Derrida y Deleuze lo son también– un filósofo del devenir

La déconstruction du poltique dans le travail de J. D. Est conçue comme réponse à un processus de déconstruction en cours dans les choses mêmes. Cette réponse s'articule comme déstabilisation de l'héritage conceptuel de la tradition onto-théologico-poltique qui, à partir de Platon, a pensé le politique comme espace de l'Un communautaire et souverain dans lequel la vie s'articule dans la dimension du vivre-avec. Nous avons essayé de reconstruire l'articulation de cette réponse qui touche aux concepts de loi, vie, souveraineté, démocratie, en tenant compte du corpus entier des oeuvres de J. D. En effet, nous pensons qu'on ne peut pas comprendre la portée de la déconstruction du poltique sans tenir compte du travail de déconstruction de l'héritage philosophique et de la structure logocentrique. Notre travail d'interprétation a été conçu, du point de vue méthodologique, selon trois différents niveaux: le commentaire, l'interprétation active, l'approfondissement de certains thèmes
The deconstruction of the political in the works of J. D. Is conceived of as an answer to a process of deconstruction that is going on within the things themselves. This answer is articulated as a destabilization of the conceptual legacy of the onto-theological-political tradition, which starting from Plato has thought of the political as a space of the communitarian and sovereign One. We have tried to reconstruct the articulation of this answer, which deals with the concepts of law, life, sovereignty, democracy, by taking into account the whole derridian corpus. Indeed, we think that it is not possible to understand the scope of the deconstruction of the political without analyzing the deconstructing work carried out on the philosophical legacy and the logo-centric structure. From a methodological standpoint, our task has been performed according to three different ways of reading: the commentary, the active interpretation and the scrutiny of some specific themes

Le travail présenté est une tentative pour penser ensemble dans une sorte de dialogue deux philosophies emblématiques de la différence, celles de Gilles Deleuze et de Jacques Derrida, afin de mettre à jour, conformément à l’hypothèse explorée par le mémoire de thèse, une ontologie théâtrale impliquée par la différence. Cette rencontre semble répéter une scène platonicienne, celle de la mimésis, celle justement de la proximité absolue du double. Distinguer entre la bonne et la mauvaise répétition, la répétition et la représentation, la différence et la répétition, la différence et la différance – telle est la tâche infinie, l’héritage platonicien des philosophies de la différence. Les philosophies de Deleuze et de Derrida s’inscrivent dans l’histoire des doubles inséparables, de la doublure en soi, en tant qu’elle est histoire de la mimésis, de la répétition, de la représentation, de la différence donc. On ne parviendra jamais à distinguer entre différence et différance. Tout comme on ne parviendra jamais à faire la différence entre répétition et représentation, ou bien entre parole et écriture, entre théâtre et cinéma – Deleuze et Derrida jouent dans tous ces registres la même scène platonicienne. Grâce à la déconstruction de l’héritage nietzschéen de la répétition et celui platonicien de la mimésis, la différence devient le principe actif par excellence, le sujet même de la philosophie. Penser, donc, revient à déconstruire et reconstruire le sujet de la philosophie. C’est ici que les deux philosophies de la différence se touchent : dans l’image du penseur. Mon travail dans cette thèse a consisté à repenser la différence en tenant compte du penseur qu’elle exige, de la personne pré-individuelle et impersonnelle qui la pense, qui joue le rôle principal dans le jeu de la différence. Cela revient à penser ensemble les héritages cartésien et bergsonien de Deleuze, et ceux freudien et lacanien de Derrida. Et après tant de différences, les images du penseur se mettent à coïncider chez les deux philosophes en ce point : l’origine de la pensée comme surgissement d’abord du Je qui pense depuis l’origine, c’est-à-dire depuis la limite inconsciente du sujet impersonnel et pré-individuel. Même si, pré-individuelle et impersonnelle, vide ainsi qu’elle l’est, cette ultime instance de la pensée garde les traits d’une personne qui deviendra capable de dire Je. Elle sera bien représentable, et le fou, le schizo, le mime, l’acteur, en seront l’image.

Cette these est, d'emblee, un parcours de lecture ou une traversee. Le propos n'est pas de degager des "contenus" de pensee, places sous la signature de derrida. Il s'agit bien plutot - dans la mesure ou ce serait possible - d'oeuvrer a l'interieur du texte de derrida, a la facon dont lui-meme aborde les ecrits qu'il lit, cela implique une attention minutieuse a l'ecriture et, en ce cas precis, la revendication d'une proximite mimetique parfois vertigineuse. Deux chapitres, eux-memes divises en paragraphes, faconnent a eux seuls l'architecture singuliere de la these. Le premier conduit de la "fin du livre" a l'estompement s'annoncant sous la rature; le second tente un nouveau depart, et conduit jusqu'a l'imminence de la venue de l'autre. Ces deux chapitres sont ainsi les deux versants incurves d'un parcours singulier, lequel est avant tout la marque d'une reconnaissance, le signe sans signature d'une marche reglee sur le pas de l'autre: derrida
This thesis is, first of all, a journey through or across derrida's work. Its purpose is not to untangle the "content" of the thought signed derrida. It aims rather - in so much as it is possible - to work within derrida's text in the same way he himself approaches the works that he reads. This implies a close attention to writing and in this particular case demands an approximate if at times vertiginous textual mimesis. Two chapters themselves divided into paragraphs alone form the uncommun architecture of the thesis. The first one leads from the "end of the book" to the blurring which becomes apparent under the erasure; the second one attempts a new departure under the title of the call and leads to the imminent arrival of the other. Thus, these two chapters are the two curved slopes of a single journey, which is above all the mark of a recognition, the unsigned sign of a trajectory accomplished in the pas of the other derrida

Inspired by Derridean deconstruction, contemporary translation studies hold that translation is a process of transformation that is characterized by indeterminacy. However, little attention has been given to the political aspects of that transformation. By exploring this aspect, this thesis argues that translation is a transformation within sovereignty from a divine to a more secular model that is guided by justice. By offering a comparative reading of Derrida’s and the medieval Turkish/Persian philosopher’s, al-Farabi’s, works on sovereignty and translation, it holds that the switch in the paradigms of sovereignty from a Derridean kingly cape to an al-Farabian imam implies a change in the dynamics of translating sovereignty that is aesthetic in nature. The research starts by exploring the political and theological implications implicit in the translation of sovereignty as expounded in Derrida’s ‘Des Tours de Babel’. Adopting Derrida’s image of the kingly cape turned into a wedding gown, it argues that the translation of sovereignty is an aesthetic shift from a divine-kingly model to a more secular one. The thesis, then, explores traces of this shift within al-Farabi’s model of the Virtuous City where the weeds, dissenting citizens, contest the imam’s logocentric sovereignty in an affective and imaginative medium. Both models will be shown to highlight a reverse structure within the ceremonial aspect of power, which Agamben denotes as ‘acclamation’ or ‘glory’. Acclamation’s reverse role in the translation of sovereignty, the thesis argues, best figures in the political cartoons on the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. These cartoons illustrate how contestation becomes a creative event of redefining sovereignty that is negotiated in terms of language and image. The Egyptian protestors demonstrate how language escapes the fatalism of its role in mediating meaning to acquire the role of poetic mediation in linguistic play. In poetic mediation, the thesis argues, sovereignty is translated within a collectively-shared imaginative construct that a creative form of justice guides.

El propósito de la presente tesis doctoral consiste en estudiar algunas de las relaciones entre lenguaje y fuerza a partir del análisis de la dimensión performativa de la literatura. Para ello, se recurrirá a una lectura cruzada de las obras de Søren Kierkegaard y Jacques Derrida. Mientras que en el pensamiento del primero puede hallarse una suerte de proto-performatividad que, sea como autoridad descentrada, ironía, fe o comunicación indirecta, desarticula el carácter productivo del lenguaje y lo torna un espacio de pasividad, en el segundo la literatura encarnará una performatividad que despliega su fuerza de forma incalculable, a través de un desvío o perversión estructural al funcionamiento del signo que hace, de la escritura, una fuerza de ruptura. La articulación de estas características permite esbozar una performatividad literaria que, por su carácter extraordinario, pasivo e imprevisible, se ha decidido denominar con el concepto inventado de “proliferancia”. La propuesta de este término, que confía la dimensión política de la literatura a su capacidad de destituir o deponer un orden simbólico mediante los efectos azarosos de su fuerza, constituye la tesis del presente trabajo. La proliferancia es una pasión del habla, un per- formativo diseminado, una comunicación indirecta o un exceso a la palabra: da cuenta de una prolijidad estructural en el lenguaje. De ahí que la proliferancia inaugure la posibilidad imposible del acontecimiento, y permita pensar una política literaria de la alteridad. La primera parte de este trabajo desarrolla estas cuestiones. En la segunda, se piensan tres formas de proliferancia para observar su dinámica. Cada una de estas formas destaca por deconstruir una de las instancias en que Jakobson asentó la estructura de la comunicación: de este modo, la proliferancia del preludio desarticula el mensaje como propiedad significativa de un texto, y altera la economía del sentido como circulación de la comunicación; hace del mensaje el vehículo de un deseo. En segundo lugar, la proliferancia de la confesión deconstruye la figura del autor como instancia soberana o fuente de legitimidad hermenéutica, cultiva en la palabra y en el nombre un secreto, la secreción de una herida, la paciencia o la pasión de una verdad incógnita que entra en la escritura. Por último, la proliferancia de las cartas de amor, forma eminente de la oración o la declaración, destituye la figura del destinatario como la conclusión segura de la escena comunicativa: nadie sabe a quién dice amar cuando dice que le ama; y sin embargo lo dice. De ese desfase entre hablar y decir trata la proliferancia, la insólita performatividad de la literatura que esta tesis doctoral defiende. En este desacoplamiento entre lenguaje y sentido, que coincide con el desacoplamiento entre sentido y soberanía, se instaura la política de la escritura que vindica.
The purpose of this doctoral thesis is to study some of the relationships between language and force on the basis of an analysis of the performative dimension of literature. To this end, a cross-reading of the works of Søren Kierkegaard and Jacques Derrida will be carried out. While in the thought of the former a kind of proto-performativity can be found that, whether as a decentralized authority, irony, faith or indirect communication, disarticulates the productive character of language and turns it into a space of passivity, in the latter literature will embody a performativity that unfolds its force in an incalculable way through a structural deviation or perversion to the functioning of the sign that makes writing a force of rupture. The articulation of these characteristics allows us to outline a literary performativity which, due to its extraordinary, passive and unpredictable nature, we have decided to name with the invented concept of “prolifferance”. The proposal of this term, which entrusts the political dimension of literature to its capacity to displace or depose a symbolic order through the random effects of its force, constitutes the thesis of the present work. Prolifferance is a speech passion rather than a speech act, a disseminated performative, an indirect communication or an excess to words: it gives account of a structural prolixity in language. Hence, prolifferance inaugurates the impossible possibility of the event, and allows us to think of the literary politics of otherness. The first part of this study develops these issues. In the second one, three forms of prolifferance are considered in order to observe their dynamics. Each of these forms stands out for deconstructing one of the instances in which Jakobson established the structure of communication: firstly, the prolifferance of preface thus disarticulates the message as a significant property of a text, and alters the economy of meaning as a circulation of communication; it makes the message the vehicle of a desire. Secondly, the prolifferance of confession deconstructs the figure of the author as a sovereign instance or source of hermeneutic legitimacy; it cultivates, in the word and in the name, a secret, the secretion of a wound, the patience or passion of an unknown truth that enters into writing. Finally, the prolifferance of love letters, an eminent form of the prayer or declaration, removes the figure of the receiver as the sure conclusion of the communicative scene: no one knows who they claim to love when they say they love them; and yet they say it. Prolifferance, the unusual performativity of literature that this doctoral thesis supports, is about this gap between talking and saying. In this decoupling between language and meaning, which coincides with the decoupling between meaning and sovereignty, the politics of writing that it vindicates is established.

Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Filosofía
Nuestro mundo contemporáneo pareciera cada vez más marcado por la velocidad con que se suceden los cambios sobre todo a nivel científico y técnico. Los avances en los ámbitos de la ingeniería genética y de la biotecnología, las significativas y profundas transformaciones de la actual economía, cuyas crisis proliferan ya de manera instantánea y a nivel planetario. El uso generalizado de ordenadores, los avances en materia de cibernética y robótica, los progresos en el área de las comunicaciones, en que los medios de masas se apoderan ya de los dominios más íntimos de nuestras vidas. Experimentamos una especie de aceleración del ritmo vital unido a una creciente crisis de sentido. En este contexto, pareciera que el “diagnóstico” de Heidegger sobre la época actual, que se desenvuelve bajo el sello de la esencia de la técnica moderna, cobra día a día, con mayor fuerza, una renovada vigencia. Ya en 1953, en su conferencia sobre “La Pregunta por la Técnica” (Die Frage nach der Technik), Heidegger se preguntaba si sería destruida la civilización actual. Pero a la vez extremaba su pensamiento buscando la esencia de la técnica. De tal forma que en aquella conferencia, Heidegger planteaba que la técnica no es lo mismo que la esencia de la técnica. De este modo, la esencia de la técnica tampoco es en manera alguna nada técnico. Decía Heidegger: «La técnica sería un modo de hacer salir lo oculto, esencia en la región en la que acontece el hacer salir lo oculto y el estado de desocultamiento, donde acontece la aletheia, la verdad».

En la presente tesis se realiza un recorrido que permite mostrar la recepción del concepto de huella mnémica freudiana, en el trabajo del filósofo francés Jacques Derrida. Para Derrida, la huella constituye una gran palanca estratégica de la deconstrucción. Dicha estrategia implica una constante atención por parte de Derrida a los principales hitos que consolidan a la filosofía como una episteme cerrada, capaz de rearmar sus recursos críticos y con ello, establecer jerarquías dominantes respecto a los conceptos que la metafísica mantiene como hegemónicos. Una consecuencia de este ejercicio, es el rechazo de una alteridad radical ya sea bajo la forma de la represión de la escritura o la primacía de la voz simulando el rodeo de una diferencia constitutiva. Será necesario recurrir a otros discursos contemporáneos que hayan hecho estremecer la seguridad con la que la metafísica ha contado. En este contexto, el discurso freudiano entonces, se hace pertinente. El tratamiento que Freud realiza sobre el concepto de huella mnémica para explicar la constitución de la vida anímica, vendría a cuestionar de manera radical dicha seguridad. Todo indica que el psicoanálisis inaugurado por Sigmund Freud, atendió al trabajo de una alteridad radical en el interior mismo de la conciencia que ninguna filosofía había podido radicalizar, cuestión que será analizada por Derrida. Por tanto, la presente tesis se propone examinar la recepción freudiana del concepto de huella en la obra de Jacques Derrida e indagar en sus posibles consecuencias.

In this study, I propose a reading of Derrida as a Cartesian thinker. The mode of reading is closely textual and not historical; and the analysis focuses on the methodological or dispositional affinities between a sceptical Descartes in cogitation and a deconstructive Derrida, to the exclusion of the onto-theological aspects of their arguments. I locate the source of such epistemological affinities between them in the self-reflexivity of philosophical self-doubt or self-criticism, and highlight, in the course of analysis, the formatively self-referential aspects of both Cartesian scepticism and Derridian deconstruction; The point of contention is that, in both cases, the starting point of thinking is the self that self-reflects. Standard interpretations tend to view Derrida as an anti-Cartesian thinker; Against this reading, I advance the following two points of contention. Firstly, I argue that Derrida can be read as a Cartesian thinker in that his reflexive tendency is indicative of his implicit commitment to the methodological or epistemological Cartesianism, i. e. the reflexive mode of cogitation. The claim here, limited to such an extent, is that there is a structural resemblance between the reflexive form of Descartes's cogilo and that of Derrida's deconstructive move in that both thinkers follow performatively reflexive, and reflexively repeated moves; The Derridian move is only one "step" beyond, and in this sense derivative from, the Cartesian. Secondly, I argue further that Derrida can be read as a radical Cartesian. For this, I present a reading of Derrida's reflexive hauntology as a sceptical radicalisation of Descartes's reflective ontology. By bringing to the fore a structurally Cartesian dimension which underlies the Derridian economy of writing and thinking, I argue, against Derrida's self-understanding of his (non-)project, that deconstruction is to be read as a conservative intra-metaphysical trajectory rather than as a transgressive endeavour to go beyond metaphysics. In highlighting the traditional aspects of deconstruction as opposed to the revolutionary sides of it, my aim is both to explicate the significance of Derrida's deconstructive project and, at the same time, to expose its constitutive limits, deconstruction taken as a meta-critical, reflexive endeavour to transcend the limits of philosophy by philosophy. The critical point I raise against Derrida is the following: Insofar as the logic or strategy of his deconstruction remains structurally locked in, and at the same time exploitative of, the implicit binarism of Cartesian scepticism, i. e. the logic of either-or, the deconstructive gesture that attempts to think "the Other" by reflecting critically upon its own condition of thinking, is bound to be self-reflexive or self-referential, therefore, self-corrosively ineffectual. Part I sets out to articulate the aforementioned two contentions of thesis. It aims to discover the recursively self-reflexive movements in the writings of Derrida. For this, chapter 2 offers an analysis of some of Derrida's central terms of hauntology that are descriptive of the movements and moments of meta-reflection, viz. double, mark, fold, interest, and law. Although Part I deals mainly with Derrida, the reflexive dimension of Descartes's cogito argument is also analysed in an early stage [1.31] to the extent that it can set the terms for the subsequent reading of Derrida as a Cartesian [1.32 -2.3]. Part II elaborates the key points made in Part I, first by providing a detailed account of the Cartesian economy of self-reflexivity [Chapter 4], and second, by closely reading selected passages from Den ida's essay on Descartes, 'Cogito et histoire de lafolie' [Chapter 5]. Derrida's defensive and sympathetic reading of Descartes's madmen against Foucault's, the last chapter argues, exemplifies a case of Derrida as a committed Cartesian with a mind bent on methodic meta-reflection.