Academic literature on the topic 'Delegate judge'

The paper is a short contribution to the history of papal delegated jurisdiction in Hungary in the first half of 13th century. The main aim of the study is to analyse the participation of the monasteries of religious orders in the diocese of Veszprém at the practical work of the system of papal judge-delegation. The connection could be formed in two quite separated ways: their officials, or as legal persons the convents themselves could function either as papal judges-delegate in foreign litigations, or they could be contestants of their own cases. The paper introduces the known cases of the second group from the selected era, since the main characteristics of the activities as papal judges-delegate are presented as well.

The purpose of this study is to examine and analyze the juridical implications of the role of the Prosecutor's Office in the eradication of narcotics. In this paper, the writer uses the normative juridical method with the specifications of analytical descriptive writing. Article 1 paragraph (3) of Act No. 16 of 2004 concerning the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Indonesia states that the action of the public prosecutor is to delegate the case to the competent district court in matters and according to the method stipulated in the criminal procedure law with a request to be examined and decided by a judge at court. The public prosecutor is a prosecutor who is authorized by law to carry out prosecutions and carry out judges' decisions. A prosecutor at the High Prosecutor's Office or at the Attorney General's Office can sue a person if he or she is first appointed to the District Attorney's Office in whose jurisdiction the offense is committed.

The present paper gives a short summary about the course of life of Egidius, a papal chaplain and subdeacon, who spent ca. three years in the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary in the late 1220’s as a judge delegate. The investigation focuses not on the litigations handled by the papal chaplain, but on one particular task of his, the establishment of the bishopric of Syrmia (Srem) and in connection with that on one main question: what kind of authority Egidius received from Pope Gregory IX for the planned measure. While analysing certain historical situations it is of great importance to establish whether a papal envoy was entrusted as a legate with full power or if he had to fulfil his obligation as a nuncio, with limited authorization. In the Hungarian historiography Egidius is handled traditionally as a legate, but his entire mission in Hungary seems to be of a more complex nature, therefore the question itself requires a new analysis.

Dissolution of a limited liability company consists of some methods pursuant to Article 142 of Law No. 40/2007 On Limited Liability Companies, one of which is by a court ruling. According to explanation of Article 146 of the Law on Limited Liability Companies, dissolution of a limited liability company with an excuse that it no longer operates has to be proved with a letter submitted to tax agency. However, the law does not mention who is authorized to submit the letter to tax agency. This research analyses the position of directors and stockholders in the process of dissolution of a limited liability company that no longer operates, the consideration and ruling handed down by the judge in the Verdict of the Supreme Court Number 1618 K/PDT/2016 and the Verdict of the Constitutional Court No. 63/PUU-XVI/2018 concerning legal certainty of position of director and stockholders related to the process of dissolution of a limited liability company that no longer operates, and the legal protection for stockholders in case the director fail to perform their duties and report to related institutions in the process of dissolution of a limited liability company. This research employs normative juridical method and is juridical analytical. The data are collected through library research conducted by document study. The data analysed qualitatively and the conclusion is drawn deductively. The juridical analysis demonstrate that concerning the dissolution of a limited liability company that no longer operates in the Verdict Number 1618 K/PDT/2016, the Panel of Judges state that the director is rightful to submit a letter related tax agency regarding that the limited liability company no longer operates. In relation with the explanation of article 146 paragraph 1 letter C o the Law on Limited Liability Companies in the Verdict No. 63/PUU-XVI/2018, the Panel of Judges state that the explanation is not unconstitutional an has provuded adequate explanation that although director is not mentioned as the organ of a limited liability company that shall submit the letter to tax agency concerning its non-operating company, it has to be clearly understood that the Law on Limited Liability Companies delegate the responsibility of organization of the company only to the director. With this anlysis, it is suggested that more assertive and clear regulations be made in order to prevent various interpretations patricularly in understanding the explanation of the Law No. 40/2007 on Limited Liability Companies.

The paper discusses a special aspect of the papal-Hungarian relations, namely the operation of the delegated jurisdiction in the second half of the 13th century, from the Mongol invasion of 1241–42 to the death of the last Árpádian king, Andrew III in 1301. The focus of the study is on the cases, in which the judges-delegate appointed by the pontiffs had to face questions of ecclesiastical hierarchy or church-discipline. It is to be determined, when (and partially: why) members of the Hungarian Church turned to the Holy See to make use of the delegation of papal judges. Furthermore, it is to be examined, what was the effect of the authorizations, and if so, under which circumstances did the popes want to intervene in Hungarian matters by using one of their universal tool to shape the regions of Western Christianity, their delegated jurisdiction. The issue of the Bosnian bishopric, the quarrel over the borders between the dioceses of Kalocsa and Pécs, or the allegations and the procedure against Bishop Job of Pécs are all helping to fi nd answers to those questions.

<!-- /* Style Definitions */ p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal {mso-style-parent:""; margin:0cm; margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; mso-layout-grid-align:none; punctuation-wrap:simple; text-autospace:none; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";} @page Section1 {size:612.0pt 792.0pt; margin:72.0pt 90.0pt 72.0pt 90.0pt; mso-header-margin:36.0pt; mso-footer-margin:36.0pt; mso-paper-source:0;} div.Section1 {page:Section1;} --><p style="text-align: center; text-indent: 17pt" class="MsoNormal" align="center"><!-- /* Style Definitions */ p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal {mso-style-parent:""; margin:0cm; margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; mso-layout-grid-align:none; punctuation-wrap:simple; text-autospace:none; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";} p.MsoFootnoteText, li.MsoFootnoteText, div.MsoFootnoteText {mso-style-noshow:yes; margin:0cm; margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; mso-layout-grid-align:none; punctuation-wrap:simple; text-autospace:none; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";} p.MsoHeader, li.MsoHeader, div.MsoHeader {margin:0cm; margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; tab-stops:center 207.65pt right 415.3pt; mso-layout-grid-align:none; punctuation-wrap:simple; text-autospace:none; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";} p.MsoBodyText, li.MsoBodyText, div.MsoBodyText {margin:0cm; margin-bottom:.0001pt; text-align:justify; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; font-style:italic;} p.BodyText2, li.BodyText2, div.BodyText2 {mso-style-name:"Body Text 2"; margin:0cm; margin-bottom:.0001pt; text-align:justify; text-indent:17.0pt; line-height:13.0pt; mso-line-height-rule:exactly; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; mso-hyphenate:none; mso-layout-grid-align:none; punctuation-wrap:simple; text-autospace:none; font-size:10.5pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";} @page Section1 {size:595.3pt 841.9pt; margin:72.0pt 90.0pt 72.0pt 90.0pt; mso-header-margin:35.4pt; mso-footer-margin:35.4pt; mso-paper-source:0;} div.Section1 {page:Section1; mso-footnote-position:beneath-text;} --></p><p class="MsoBodyText"><span style="font-style: normal">The present study focuses on judicial officers coming from </span><span style="font-style: normal">Constantinople</span><span style="font-style: normal"> to Thessalonike in the 11^th century. The </span><span>judge of the theme of Thessalonike</span><span style="font-style: normal"> was in charge of trying cases in the region. From the second fifth of the 11^th century, however, his jurisdiction was extended to the greater financial and judicial unit of </span><span>Boleron, Strymon and Thessalonike </span><span style="font-style: normal">as well. Lead seals and documents from the archives of the monasteries of Athos prove that many of the </span><span>krites of Boleron, Strymon and Thessalonike</span><span style="font-style: normal"> had been previously </span><span>krites of the velum </span><span style="font-style: normal">and </span><span>judges of the hippodrome</span><span style="font-style: normal"> who performed their duties in the capital and belonged to the ranks of the “small judges”. These judicial officers tried cases that were referred to them, while they could also function as assessors of the “great” or superior judges of </span><span style="font-style: normal">Constantinople</span><span style="font-style: normal">, i.e. the </span><span>droungarios of the vigla</span><span style="font-style: normal">, the </span><span>dikaiodotes</span><span style="font-style: normal">, the </span><span>protoasecretis</span><span style="font-style: normal">, the </span><span>eparchos of the city</span><span style="font-style: normal">, the </span><span>koiaistor</span><span style="font-style: normal"> and the </span><span>epi ton kriseon</span><span style="font-style: normal">. The latter could delegate the authority to try cases to the “small” or inferior judges. Consequently, the </span><span>judges of the velum</span><span style="font-style: normal"> and the </span><span>judges of the hippodrome</span><span style="font-style: normal"> could also be sent from </span><span style="font-style: normal">Constantinople</span><span style="font-style: normal"> to the </span><span>themes </span><span style="font-style: normal">by the emperor or other officials, in order to examine some cases and then return to the capital. This is confirmed by the primary sources, which mention for example the case of </span><span>judge of the hippodrome</span><span style="font-style: normal"> Michael Rhodios, who was sent by Alexios I Komnenos in 1084 from </span><span style="font-style: normal">Constantinople</span><span style="font-style: normal"> to the region of Thessalonike, in order to examine a dispute between the Lavra monastery and the brother of the emperor, Adrian. Some years later Michael Rhodios was sent again to try cases in Thessalonike, but this time as </span><span>krites of Boleron, Strymon and Thessalonike</span><span style="font-style: normal">. Consequently, apart from the </span><span>judge of Boleron, Strymon and Thessalonike</span><span style="font-style: normal">, other judges delegated by the emperor or by high officers could also examine cases there, as happened in other </span><span>themes</span><span style="font-style: normal">. F</span><span style="font-style: normal">rom the 14^th century on, as </span><span style="font-style: normal">Macedonia</span><span style="font-style: normal"> developed its own law schools, a person who had acquired legal training and judicial experience in Thessalonike could continue his judicial career in </span><span style="font-style: normal">Constantinople</span><span style="font-style: normal">.</span></p><p style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 17pt" class="MsoFootnoteText"> </p><p style="line-height: normal; text-indent: 0cm" class="BodyText2"> </p><p style="line-height: normal" class="BodyText2"> </p><br /><p> </p>

The influence of papal mandates on the charters of Hungarian papal judge-delegates in the first half of the thirteenth century The paper is a short contribution to the research on the influence that papal literacy exerted on the charters of Hungarian papal judge-delegates in the first half of the 13th century. The main aim of this topic is to identify how and to what extent the characteristics of papal mandates were reflected in the phrases of the relevant Hungarian documents. Furthermore, is it also important to examine how the delegates expressed the importance of their papal authorisation.

Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England is arguably the single most influential work of jurisprudence in American history. Written in the late eighteenth century, it regularly appeared in American law school classrooms up until the early part of the twentieth century, when ridiculing Blackstone and the Commentaries became a part of legal academic orthodoxy and the influence of the Commentaries waned. Blackstone eventually became the poster child for everything that the realists and their descendants thought was wrong with American law—formalism, natural rights and plutocracy.Both Blackstone's admirers and his detractors have devoted significant attention to his famous account of judging, which holds that judges find (or declare) law rather than make law. In the introduction to the Commentaries, Blackstone states that the judge's job is to determine the law “not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land;” the judge is “not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one.” One reason Blackstone's account has been attractive in some quarters is because it supplies apparent answers to a number of problems raised by the idea of judge-made law. If judges merely find and apply authoritative law, their decisions presumptively carry the authority of the law they are applying. Because the law pre-exists the decision, the specter of retroactive liability disappears.

Civil Law codices are analytic, abstract and removed from the specific influence of particular cases. When rules are codified In Common Law systems they reflect a collection of rulings and not a collection of analytic principles. These differences stem from the nature and the motivations of the legislative enterprise. Civil-continental legislation originates in a legislative initiative “from above”. It is driven by the aspiration for legal harmony and completeness, and was originally formulated by academics. Legislation in the common-law countries results from a "bottom up" effect in which reality dictates the nature of the developing rules, step by step. Civil law systems like Common Law systems accept the supremacy of the statutory law over judge-made law. Yet when the judiciary has the authority or the power to influence the legislative agenda there is a veritable role switch. In a manner resembling continental-style legislation, the court reviewing existing legislation determines an abstract principle, usually in reliance on a particular constitutional text, and it is the legislature that is required to distill the principles into specific legislative norms, a function normally fulfilled by the common law court. The question forming the basis of this paper is the nature of the legislative process and the legislation produced by this kind of relationship. The paper addresses this question through the narrow prism of a detailed examination of a particular Israeli test case in which the Israeli Supreme Court handed down a ruling on a fundamental principle but on its own initiative delegated to the legislature the task of implementing it and providing a specific legislative enactment of this principle, on the basis of which the Court would then rule on the concrete case. The result in this particular case was that the traditional roles of the respective branches were reversed. The practical result of the move to delegate the implementation of a far-reaching and fundamental ruling to the legislature was a subversion of the fundamental ruling and delayed justice for the parties who sought a resolution of the matter. The paper claims that this mechanism leads to the creation of a new variety of a "mixed-system". The judiciary abandoned its primary obligation, namely to serve as an instance for resolving disputes, while the legislature became an executor of judicially enunciated principles. The law thus enacted resembles, in its detailed and complex language, a common law text while the principle formulated in the judgment of the court resembles a section of an analytical "civil law" statute. When the motivation for legislation stems from the court's directives, rather than the governmental or legislative interests, the legislature or the executive branch has an interest in thwarting the court’s intention through the use of various tactics readily at its disposal. This process also affects the vague and detailed formulation of the legislation, which has a character rather different from the abstract nature of civil law legislation. The lesson that this episode teach us, which the court itself internalized, is that a court cannot really dictate a legislative agenda and that it should instead focus on its designated role – the resolving of concrete disputes.

The records of diocesan and peculiar courts of late medieval England have received extensive academic scrutiny, generating a reasonably clear picture of a hierarchical pyramid ultimately headed by the papal curia. However, that picture is an incomplete depiction of the totality of the ecclesiastical mechanisms of dispute resolution. Existing scholarship largely ignores the use of arbitrated extra-curial settlements to avoid litigation (or, alternatively, a formal sentence). Concentration on the provincial court hierarchy also marginalizes the more directly papal courts of judges delegate and assorted local agents with judicial powers, which functioned within England between 1300 and the Reformation and bypassed the normal fora. Drawing on a wide range of scattered source material, this article introduces these neglected elements of the church's legal system, including the resident papal conservators appointed at the request of petitioners to exercise a general delegated papal judicial authority on their behalf, whose existence has been almost completely unnoticed. It suggests the significance of arbitration, delegation and conservation within the wider structure, and the need to give them much more attention if the practical importance of canon law in pre-Reformation England is to be properly understood and appreciated.

Il lavoro si propone di analizzare l’ammissibilità di impugnazioni incidentali e nova nel corso degli strumenti gravatori previsti contro il decreto del giudice delegato che rende esecutivo lo stato passivo. Sulla premessa dell’analisi in merito alla natura della fase di accertamento del passivo fallimentare e ai principali elementi connotanti l’appello civile, l’autore indaga le ragioni giustificatrici la loro ammissibilità all’interno degli strumenti di cui agli artt. 98 ss. l. fall.
The project intends to analyze the chance of incidental appeal and nova in the censore deeds against the decree of the delegate judge. After an introduction dedicated to the nature of the verification of the bankruptcy loss and to the main institutions of the civil appeal, the author examines the reasons of their admissibility during the censores expected by articles 98 ff. of Italian bankruptcy law.

La professionalització de l'esport i, en conseqüència, de totes les activitats que es desenvolupen dins d'aquest àmbit, ens ha fet qüestionar la responsabilitat que s'ha de derivar d'una errada arbitral en l'aplicació de les regles de cada modalitat esportiva en el marc d'una competició oficial. Una decisió arbitral que no s'ajusti a les regles del joc, a part del perjudici esportiu pot suposar un greu perjudici econòmic, i aquest ha d'ésser reparat. Aquesta responsabilitat serà valorada en l'àmbit civil i en l'administratiu. En el primer, l'exigència de responsabilitat es basa en el principi general del Dret alterum non laedere, la vulneració del qual duu implícita l'obligació de reparació del dany causat. La responsabilitat administrativa es planteja com a conseqüència de la publicació de la potestat disciplinària esportiva, atribuïda clarament com a funció pública a les federacions esportives i, de forma més ambigua, als àrbitres i jutges esportius.
La profesionalización del deporte y, en consecuencia, de todas las actividades que se desarrollan dentro de este ámbito, nos ha hecho cuestionar la responsabilidad que debe derivarse de un error arbitral en la aplicación de las reglas de cada modalidad deportiva en el marco de una competición oficial. Una decisión arbitral que no se ajuste a las reglas de juego, aparte del perjuicio deportivo puede suponer un grave perjuicio económico, y éste debe ser reparado. Esta responsabilidad será valorada en el ámbito civil y en el administrativo. En el primero, la exigencia de responsabilidad se basa en el principio general del Derecho alterum non laedere, la vulneración del cual lleva implícita la obligación de reparación del daño causado. La responsabilidad administrativa se plantea como consecuencia de la publicación de la potestad disciplinaria deportiva, atribuida claramente como función pública a las federaciones deportivas y, de forma más ambigua, a los árbitros y jueces deportivos.
The professionalization of sport and, consequently, of all the activities that take place within this area, including the referees and sports judges, makes us question if an arbitration error in the rules application of each sports within the framework of an official competition can carry some kind of liability. An arbitrational decision that does not apply to the rules of the game, apart from sports damage it can Also cause a serious economic loss and it must be repaired. This liability will be valued in both the civil and administrative field. In the first, the liability demand is based on the general principle of the Law of alterum non laedere, the infringement of which implies the obligation to repair the caused damage, provided that the law requirements coincide. Administrative liability arises as a result of the publication of disciplinary sport power, clearly attributed as a public function to sports federations and, more ambiguously, to referees and sports judges.

This chapter focuses on the evolution of systems of constitutional justice since 1787. It first provides an overview of key concepts and definitions, such as constitution, constitutionalism, and rights, before presenting a simple theory of delegation and judicial power. In particular, it explains why political elites would delegate power to constitutional judges, and how to measure the extent of power, or discretion, delegated. It then considers different kinds of constitutions, rights, models of constitutional review, and the main precepts of ‘the new constitutionalism’. It also traces the evolution of constitutional forms and suggests that as constitutional rights and review has diffused around the world, so has the capacity of constitutional judges to influence, and sometimes determine, policy outcomes.

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter discusses the development of equity. Equity tackles injustice caused by a strict application of common law rules or unconscionable behaviour. Equity was originally dispensed by the King. However, this was soon delegated to the Lord Chancellor and the Court of Chancery. Equity and the common law were originally administered by separate court systems that coexisted uneasily until the Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615), when the King held that equity prevailed over the common law in the event of a conflict. The administration of equity and the common law was unified by the Judicature Acts 1873–75, meaning that all judges could apply both equitable and common law rules and responses.

On 3 March 1193, in the episcopal palace of Piacenza, in the presence of the bishop of Piacenza and a papal legate (Cardinal Peter of S. Cecilia), Gandolfo, abbot of the Piacentine monastery of S. Sisto, presented a copy of an imperial diploma of the emperor Louis II, dated 4 November 862. The document recorded the donation of the curtes of Guastalla and Luzzara to Louis’ wife, the empress Angilberga, who subsequently left the same lands to the monastery in her will. Abbot Gandolfo stated that the lost original of the imperial diploma had been furnished with a golden seal and three monks of S. Sisto testified on oath that they had read the document and seen and touched the seal. This event marked the beginning of a bitter dispute lasting three decades between the monastery of S. Sisto and the commune of Cremona over possession of Guastalla and Luzzara. Before it was finally resolved in 1227 it attracted the attention of three popes (Innocent III, Honorius III, and Gregory IX), two emperors (Otto IV and Frederick II), three papal legates (including Ugolino da Segni, the future Pope Gregory IX) as well as a large cast of Lombard bishops and abbots employed as papal judges-delegate. It arose principally as a result of Cremona’s attempt to gain control of an area on the south-eastern periphery of its territory or contado. This was not unusual in northern Italy in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries: powerful city communes were everywhere trying to push the boundaries of their political, fiscal, and judicial authority up to, and sometimes beyond, traditionally recognized limits. The Guastalla–Luzzara case is an extremely well-documented instance of this trend: 250 documents relating to it are transcribed together, more or less in sequence, in an early thirteenth-century register of the commune of Cremona known as Codice A. This documentary record reveals in detail the various strategies adopted by the commune of Cremona to achieve its goals and allows the historian to view the dispute against the complicated background of political alliances, power relationships, and war in the Po plain during this period. Moreover, such is the richness of documentation that the case also throws up numerous vivid details of human interest.

This chapter focuses on the evolution of systems of constitutional justice since 1787. It first provides an overview of key concepts and definitions, such as constitution, constitutionalism, and rights, before presenting a simple theory of delegation and judicial power. In particular, it explains why political elites would delegate power to constitutional judges, and how to measure the extent of power, or discretion, delegated. It then considers different kinds of constitutions, rights, models of constitutional review, and the main precepts of ‘the new constitutionalism’. It also traces the evolution of constitutional forms and suggests that as constitutional rights and review has diffused around the world, so has the capacity of constitutional judges to influence, and sometimes determine, policy outcomes.

This chapter discusses the administration of the legal system and introduces its essential elements. It begins by identifying the various sources of law in England and Wales and continues with an examination of the roles played by the judiciary in interpreting and applying legislation. It demonstrates the active and important role adopted by judges in giving the full effect of the law. It considers the law-making process, along with the workings of the parliamentary system and the use of delegated legislation. It also considers the sources of the law to identify where laws may derive, and delineates the ‘hierarchy’ of laws in England. The chapter concludes by identifying and critiquing the ability of Parliament to delegate the responsibility of passing legislation.

This chapter discusses the administration of the legal system and introduces its essential elements. It begins by identifying the various sources of law in England and Wales and continues with an examination of the roles played by the judiciary in interpreting and applying legislation. It demonstrates the active and important role adopted by judges in giving the full effect of the law. It considers the law-making process, along with the workings of the parliamentary system and the use of delegated legislation. It also considers the sources of the law to identify where laws may derive, and delineates the ‘hierarchy’ of laws in England. The chapter concludes by identifying and critiquing the ability of Parliament to delegate the responsibility of passing legislation.

This chapter provides an overview of the English legal system, introducing fundamental legal concepts, such as the nature of law and parliamentary sovereignty, and the differences between criminal law and civil law legal terminology, such as terminology and the outcomes. The sources of law, legislation in the form of Acts of Parliament or statutes and delegated legislation and common law or judge-made law are outlined. An outline of the courts is given, including the judges and the jurisdiction of the courts. The relationship between the English legal system and the European Union (EU) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is explained.

David Kenny’s chapter examines a recent proposals to eliminate politics from appointments with a system based on solely on ‘merit’. Merit, however, is an ‘empty vessels for substantive norms’ – it is filled with content that is invariably political. In Part II, the chapter argues that the composition of the judiciary in Ireland lacks diversity in terms of personal and educational background, and this compounds the homogeneity of judicial viewpoints, which inevitably shape our views on what the Constitution is for, and what the Constitution means, and therefore the diversity of our judiciary matters. In Part III, the chapter advance three suggestions in light of my conclusion that there are irreducible political considerations in judicial appointments: that we abandon the language of merit, along with any aspiration to nominate judges in a manner that expresses no political viewpoint about what judging should be; that, however we might reform judicial appointments to excise political patronage, we should not delegate this function from government to an independent body; and that we should increase the diversity of our judiciary, in terms of both professional and personal background. The way forward lies in admitting, rather than concealing, the politics at play in judicial appointments.

The first state constitutions used appointments to select judges. The only debate was whether to delegate the responsibility to the legislature, as most did, or to the governor, as some did. Consistent with the state practices, the US Constitution adopted an appointment power, which vested nomination in the president and confirmation in the Senate. While the federal approach has remained intact since 1789, the state approaches have not. After the rise of Jacksonian populism, most states shifted to various forms of elections for judges. This chapter covers judicial selection, the rise of judicial elections in the states, and the impact of different selection systems on judicial review. It reveals the people’s increasing desire to retain control over the people who govern them, including their judges. Judicial review and judicial selection are inseparable. The more a court engages in the former, the more scrutiny it can expect in the latter, whether that scrutiny is tied to debates over the next election/appointment or to debates about changing the selection and tenure methods.

Without assuming prior legal knowledge, books in the Directions series introduce and guide readers through key points of law and legal debate. Questions, diagrams, and exercises help readers to engage fully with each subject and check their understanding as they progress. While tort law is largely based on case law developed by judges through the common law, the liability of occupiers for the injuries suffered by those on their premises is governed by two statutes: the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 and the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984. The chapter explains the scope of an occupier’s liability and how it relates to other aspects of negligence, considers the duty of care owed by occupiers to lawful visitors under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957, discusses the duty of care owed by occupiers to trespassers under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 and how it relates to the previous common law duty of care.

Abstract This chapter applies the theories of delegation developed earlier to problems in public law. To begin, the chapter studies judicial review of agency action. It discusses the Chevron doctrine, an important principle in administrative law, and the circumstances under which judges should defer to agencies. Next, the chapter studies legal limits on delegation. The “nondelegation doctrine” limits the power of one branch of government to delegate power to another branch of government. The chapter then turns to relationships between citizens and the state. Citizens can petition the government, seek subsidies, and even capture agencies. Officials can make public-spirited laws or hand out special favors. The chapter studies limits on these activities, including laws on lobbying, bribery, and campaign finance.

Abstract This chapter presents the economic theory of delegation. The delegation of power—from the President to administrators, from citizens to legislators, and so on—is central to public law. This chapter begins with the positive theory of delegation. It analyzes the trade-offs principals face when deciding whether to delegate authority, and it considers whether principals should guide their agents using “rules” or “standards.” Turning to normative theory, the chapter studies the conditions under which delegation benefits principals, agents, and the general public. Finally, the chapter addresses interpretation by courts. Lawyers and judges routinely ask whether a statute grants an agency the power to take a particular action. The chapter develops the “delegation canon” to help answer that question.