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Journal articles on the topic 'Deflationism'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 9 March 2023

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1

Veluwenkamp, Herman. "Inferentialist Truth Pluralism." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24, no. 1 (February 3, 2021): 107–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-020-10145-5.

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AbstractMetasemantic inferentialism has gained popularity in the last few decades. Traditionally, inferentialism is combined with a deflationary attitude towards semantic terms such as truth and reference, i.e., many inferentialists hold that when we use these semantic terms we do not purport to refer to substantive properties. This combination makes inferentialism attractive for philosophers who see themselves as antirealists. Although the attractions of combining inferentialism and deflationism are easy to see, deflationism is also a controversial position. For one, deflationists maintain that truth is an insubstantive property, but it is not altogether clear what an insubstantive property is. Secondly, as deflationists maintain that truth does not play an explanatory role, it is incompatible with the position that truth can explain the normativity of truth talk. Given that deflationism faces these objections, it would be preferable if the success of inferentialism did not depend on the deflationist’s ability to respond to these objections. I argue that someone attracted to inferentialism for its ability to accommodate antirealist intuitions about a domain (e.g. morality) is not committed to deflationism about truth. More specifically, I will show that inferentialism combined with a straightforward account of inferentialist truth-conditions is compatible with a version of truth pluralism. I call this position Inferentialist Truth Pluralism.

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2

Marques, Teresa. "Pode o Deflacionismo Negar o Princípio de Bivalência?" Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy 14, no. 28 (2006): 227–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philosophica2006142831.

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The simplest and most widely endorsed elucidation of the notions of truth and falsehood is given in Aristotle’s dictum: “to say of what is not that it is, and of what is that it is not, is false; while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true”. Nowadays, while some take the dictum as the first Statement of truth as correspondence, the dictum may also be seen as a first Statement of deflationism. Deflationism holds that the essential about truth is captured in equivalence schemas for truth. Similar schemas are usually put forward for falsity. Can deflationism coherently deny bivalence? I will argue that it cannot since the putative counterexamples to bivalence also falsify the relevant truth-schemas. The attempts made to render the supposition of counter examples to bivalence compatible with the truth-schemas usually take two steps: in the first place, they try to deal with the way we can reject that a relevant item is bivalent without self-contradiction, and, in the second place, they try to explain how, although there are gaps, the schemas for truth and falsehood are still correct. I will argue that these attempts fail, since they are ad hoc or generally ungrounded. So, either deflationism is in adequate as an account of truth, or there cannot be counterexamples to bivalence. I conclude that it is not only deflationism that faces this dilemma; anyone who defends that some version or other of the truth-schemas is correct faces the same difficulties as the deflationist. This would corne as no surprise for Aristotle. His dictum about truth was followed by a Statement of bivalence: “so that he who says of anything that it is, or that it is not, will say either what is true or what is false”.

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3

Marschall, Benjamin, and Thomas Schindler. "Semantic Deflationism and Meta-Ontological Deflationism." Philosophical Quarterly 71, no. 1 (May 29, 2020): 99–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa019.

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Abstract Deflationary positions have been defended in many areas of philosophy. Most prominent are semantic deflationism about truth and reference, and meta-ontological deflationism, according to which existence has no deep nature and the standard neo-Quinean approach to ontology is misguided. Although both kinds of views have generated much discussion, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the question of how they relate to each other. Are they independent, is it advisable to hold them all at once, or do they even entail each other? One exception is Amie Thomasson, who has argued that semantic deflationism actually entails meta-ontological deflationism. This is unexpected, since semantic deflationism is usually regarded as much less controversial than meta-ontological deflationism. In our paper, we will argue that Thomasson’s argument fails though, and that the connection between the views is in fact weaker than she makes them out to be.

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4

Kraut, Robert. "Robust Deflationism." Philosophical Review 102, no. 2 (April 1993): 247. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2186039.

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5

Pritchard, Duncan. "Epistemic Deflationism." Southern Journal of Philosophy 42, no. 1 (March 2004): 103–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2004.tb00992.x.

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6

Soames, Scott. "Understanding Deflationism." Philosophical Perspectives 17, no. 1 (February 2003): 369–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2003.00015.x.

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7

Murzi, Julien, and Lorenzo Rossi. "Conservative deflationism?" Philosophical Studies 177, no. 2 (November 14, 2018): 535–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1193-5.

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8

McGrath, M. "Weak deflationism." Mind 106, no. 421 (January 1, 1997): 69–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/106.421.69.

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9

Båve, Arvid. "Formulating deflationism." Synthese 190, no. 15 (August 8, 2012): 3287–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0163-2.

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10

Gauker, Christopher. "Deflationism and Logic." Facta Philosophica 1, no. 1 (1999): 167–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/factaphil1999119.

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11

Horwich, Paul. "Varieties of Deflationism." Philosophical Topics 36, no. 2 (2008): 29–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics200836216.

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12

Dillard, Peter S. "Radical Anti-Deflationism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56, no. 1 (March 1996): 173. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2108473.

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13

Sardans, Sergi Oms. "Deflationism and Paradox." Disputatio 4, no. 29 (November 1, 2010): 69–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2010-0011.

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14

Thomasson, A. L. "Fictionalism versus Deflationism." Mind 122, no. 488 (October 1, 2013): 1023–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzt055.

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15

Ross, Jacob. "Rejecting Ethical Deflationism." Ethics 116, no. 4 (July 2006): 742–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/505234.

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16

Beebe, James R. "Reliabilism and deflationism." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84, no. 4 (December 2006): 495–510. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048400601078971.

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17

Blake-Turner, Christopher. "Deflationism About Logic." Journal of Philosophical Logic 49, no. 3 (September 14, 2019): 551–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-019-09529-5.

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18

Fujimoto, Kentaro. "Deflationism beyond arithmetic." Synthese 196, no. 3 (August 17, 2017): 1045–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1495-8.

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19

Almotahari, Mahrad. "Semantic deflationism deflated." Synthese 196, no. 6 (September 11, 2017): 2435–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1547-0.

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20

Sumonja, Milos. "Metaethical expressivism and deflationary concept of truth." Theoria, Beograd 58, no. 4 (2015): 57–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1504059s.

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In order to solve the Frege-Geach problem, most proponents of metaethical expressivism accept deflationary concept of truth. Yet, Paul Boghossian and Ronald Dworkin argue that those two theories are incompatible because deflationism subverts expressivism by making it too easy for ethical sentences to be truth-apt. Taking the tension between expressivism and deflationism to be the indicator of their conflict in theoretical motivations - revisionist and antirevisionist - I will try to show that they indeed are incompatible, but not for reasons that Boghossian and Dworkin point out. Namely, although expressivist can use deflationism to globalise his view on the whole of language, motivational conflict breaks out anew in an unexpected way - once deflationism and expressivism are fully integrated, expressivist is no longer able to explain what sets him apart from methaethical realist.

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21

Dell'Utri, Massimo. "Alethic Deflationism and Normativity: A Critique." Veritas (Porto Alegre) 63, no. 1 (April 23, 2018): 292. http://dx.doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2018.1.29278.

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The paper starts by highlighting that virtually nobody would object to claims such as “to regard an assertion or a belief or a thought as true or false is to regard it as being right or wrong”—a claim that shows that truth is intrinsically normative. It is well known that alethic deflationists deny this. Paul Horwich, for instance, maintains that nothing shows that TRUTH is a normative concept in the way that OUGHT is. By relying on a distinction among dimensions of normativity I will try to pinpoint the weakness of Horwich’s argument in the fact that he works with a strong, uncalled-for, interpretation of normativity, whereas a weaker interpretation is more than enough. However, the impression might persist that a different understanding of the normativity of truth on the part of deflationists could eventually show the compatibility between alethic deflationism and normativity. The remaining part of the paper is devoted to contend that this is a wrong impression. Accordingly, it is stated that the normativity exerted by truth is ascribable in the final analysis to the world, and the provocative claim is defended that alethic deflationism lacks the conceptual resources to account for the relation between language and the world.***Deflacionismo Alético e Normatividade: Uma Crítica***O artigo começa destacando que praticamente ninguém se opõe a reivindicações como "considerar uma afirmação, uma crença ou um pensamento como verdadeiro ou falso é considerá-lo como correto ou errado" - uma afirmação que mostra que a verdade é intrinsecamente normativa. Sabe-se que os deflacionistas aléticos negam isso. Paul Horwich, por exemplo, sustenta que nada mostra que a verdade é um conceito normativo da maneira que deveria ser. Ao confiar em uma distinção entre as dimensões da normatividade, tentarei identificar a fraqueza do argumento de Horwich no fato de que ele trabalha com uma interpretação de normatividade forte, desnecessária, quando uma interpretação mais fraca seria mais do que suficiente. No entanto, a impressão pode persistir de que uma compreensão diferente da normatividade da verdade por parte dos deflacionistas poderia eventualmente mostrar a compatibilidade entre o deflacionismo e a normatividade alética. A parte restante do artigo dedica-se a afirmar que esta é uma impressão errada. Por conseguinte, afirma-se que a normatividade exercida pela verdade é imputável, em última análise, ao mundo, e a reivindicação provocativa é defendida de que o deflacionismo alético não possui os recursos conceituais para explicar a relação entre a linguagem e o mundo.

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22

Poidevin, Robin Le. "Internal and External Questions about God." Religious Studies 31, no. 4 (December 1995): 485–500. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500023891.

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Characteristic of metaphysics are general questions of existence, such as ‘Are there numbers?’ This kind of question is the target of Carnap's argument for deflationism, to the effect that general existential questions, if taken at face value, are meaningless. This paper considers deflationism in a theological context, and argues that the question ‘Does God exist?’ can appropriately be grouped with the ‘metaphysical’ questions attacked by Carnap. Deflationism thus has the surprising consequence that the correct approach to theism is that of radical theology. The paper attempts to show why Carnap's argument fails, and why, nevertheless, enough remains of it for us to conclude that God cannot be outside time and space.

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23

Feldman, Heidi Li. "From Liability Shields to Democratic Theory: What We Need from Tort Theory Now." Journal of Tort Law 14, no. 2 (October 1, 2021): 373–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2021-0034.

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Abstract In the United States, one startling response to COVID-19 has been a push for so-called “liability shields,” laws modifying tort doctrine so as to largely eliminate tort liability for negligently causing COVID-19. Though not enacted at the federal level, such changes have been adopted in numerous states. This article excavates and articulates the tort theory that lies behind this puzzlingly response to a pandemic. I call the theory “tort deflationism.” Grounded in modern American conservatism and with a doctrinal pedigree dating back to the 1970s, tort deflationism explains and justifies only minimal tort liability, out of deference to non-governmental actors – especially family, church, and business—and suspicion of government competence and power. Other tort theories should reckon with tort deflationism, and I discuss some challenges of doing so. The contest between tort deflationism and other theories speaks to ongoing debates about the legitimacy of law in pluralist democracies. I urge tort theorists to enter these debates and to consider their implications for tort law itself.

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24

Jiang, Asher. "Against Hirsch's metaontological deflationism." Synthese 199, no. 5-6 (October 12, 2021): 14333–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03423-x.

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25

Gupta, Anil. "A Critique of Deflationism." Philosophical Topics 21, no. 2 (1993): 57–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics199321218.

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26

Hyttinen, Tapani, and Gabriel Sandu. "Deflationism and Arithmetical Truth." Dialectica 58, no. 3 (June 23, 2005): 413–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00314.x.

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27

Soames, Scott. "The Truth about Deflationism." Philosophical Issues 8 (1997): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1522992.

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28

Bays, T. "Beth's Theorem and Deflationism." Mind 118, no. 472 (October 1, 2009): 1061–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzp132.

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29

Marino, Patricia. "Expressivism, Deflationism and Correspondence." Journal of Moral Philosophy 2, no. 2 (2005): 171–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1740468105054340.

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AbstractOn an expressivist view, ethical claims are not fact stating; instead they serve the alternative function of expressing our feelings, attitudes and values. On a deflationary view, truth is not a property with a nature to be analyzed, but merely a grammatical device to aid us in endorsing sentences. Views on the relationship between expressivism and deflationism vary widely: they are compatible; they are incompatible; they are a natural pair; they doom one another. Here I explain some of these views, extract some necessary distinctions, and put these to use for understanding expressivism. I argue that contrary to the opinions of some, deflationism doesn’t help with problems of objectivity, knowledge and reasoning in ethics. I suggest alternative expressivist treatments of these problems, and show how expressivism as a metaethical view must have consequences for our ethical lives and beliefs. In particular it must affect the way we deal with ethical consistency—when norms or beliefs conflict—and ethical incompleteness—when ethical questions have no right answer.

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30

Tahko, Tuomas E. "Soames’s Deflationism About Modality." Erkenntnis 78, no. 6 (December 25, 2012): 1367–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9428-x.

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31

Cieśliński, Cezary. "DEFLATIONISM, CONSERVATIVENESS AND MAXIMALITY." Journal of Philosophical Logic 36, no. 6 (May 24, 2007): 695–705. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-007-9057-z.

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32

McGee, Vann. "Thought, thoughts, and deflationism." Philosophical Studies 173, no. 12 (March 5, 2016): 3153–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0656-9.

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33

MacKenzie, Matthew. "Ontological deflationism in Madhyamaka." Contemporary Buddhism 9, no. 2 (November 2008): 197–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14639940802574126.

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34

Ketland, J. "Deflationism and Tarski's paradise." Mind 108, no. 429 (January 1, 1999): 69–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/108.429.69.

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35

Taylor, David E. "Deflationism and Referential Indeterminacy." Philosophical Review 126, no. 1 (December 22, 2016): 43–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-3683612.

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36

Poslajko, Krzysztof. "Can Deflationism Save Interpretivism?" Philosophia 48, no. 2 (December 28, 2019): 709–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00155-8.

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37

Young, James O. "Truth, correspondence and deflationism." Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4, no. 4 (November 11, 2009): 563–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11466-009-0037-y.

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38

Yaqub, Aladdin M. "Two types of deflationism." Synthese 165, no. 1 (September 27, 2007): 77–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9241-2.

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39

Akman, Varol, and M. Burak Senol. "The truth about “it is true that…”." Pragmatics and Cognition 23, no. 2 (December 31, 2016): 284–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.23.2.05akm.

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Deflationism, one of the influential philosophical doctrines of truth, holds that there is no property of truth, and that overt uses of the predicate “true” are redundant. However, the hypothetical examples used by theorists to exemplify deflationism are isolated sentences, offering little to examine what the predicate adds to meaning within context. We oppose the theory not on philosophical but on empirical grounds. We collect 7,610 occurrences of “it is true that” from 10 influential periodicals published in the United States. We classify and annotate these with respect to the positions of coordinating and subordinating conjunctions that they contain. This way we investigate the contextual relationships between the proposition following “it is true that” with its surroundings. Overall, 34 different syntactical patterns are encountered. In some occurrences of “true”, the predicate acts in the same manner as a performative verb does. These occurrences, having been observed in linguistically reliable media, constitute pragmatic counter-examples to deflationism.

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40

Patnaik, Utsa. "Agrarian Crisis and Global Deflationism." Social Scientist 30, no. 1/2 (January 2002): 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3518242.

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41

Nulty, Timothy J. "Empirical Considerations Against Alethic Deflationism." Facta Philosophica 10, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 105–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.3726/93528_105.

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42

Lamberov, Lev D. "Problems of deflationism: liar paradox." Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Filosofiya. Sotsiologiya. Politologiya, no. 4(36) (December 1, 2016): 144–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/1998863x/36/15.

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43

Rattan, Gurpreet. "The Two Worlds of Deflationism." Journal of Philosophy 104, no. 12 (2007): 609–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil20071041239.

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44

LÖWENSTEIN, David. "Davidsonian Semantics and Anaphoric Deflationism." Dialectica 66, no. 1 (February 23, 2012): 23–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01288.x.

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45

Armour-Garb, B. "Deflationism and the Meaningless Strategy." Analysis 61, no. 4 (October 1, 2001): 280–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/61.4.280.

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46

Connelly, James. "Wittgenstein, Non-Factualism, and Deflationism." International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21, no. 4 (October 2013): 559–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2013.767523.

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47

Hohwy, Jakob. "Deflationism about Truth and Meaning." Southern Journal of Philosophy 40, no. 2 (June 2002): 217–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2002.tb01898.x.

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48

Miller, Alexander. "On Wright's Argument against Deflationism." Philosophical Quarterly 51, no. 205 (October 2001): 527–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00245.

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49

Armour-Garb, Bradley. "Deflationism (About Theories of Truth)." Philosophy Compass 7, no. 4 (March 19, 2012): 267–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00464.x.

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50

Byrne, Darragh. "Critical Notices: Horwich's Semantic Deflationism." International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8, no. 3 (January 2000): 371–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/096725500750039327.

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