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1

Beall, Jeffrey C., and Bradley Armour-Garb. Deflationism and paradox. Oxford: Clarendon-Oxford university press, 2008.

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2

Between deflationism & correspondence theory. New York: Garland Pub., 2000.

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3

Horsten, Leon. The Tarskian turn: Deflationism and axiomatic truth. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2011.

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4

The Tarskian turn: Deflationism and axiomatic truth. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2011.

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5

A study on existence: Two approaches and a deflationist compromise. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017.

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6

Bar-On, Dorit, and Keith Simmons. Deflationism. Edited by Ernest Lepore and Barry C. Smith. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.003.0025.

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There is a core metaphysical claim shared by all deflationists: truth is not a genuine, substantive property. But anyone who denies that truth is a genuine property must still make sense of our pervasive truth talk. In addressing questions about the meaning and function of ‘true’, deflationists engage in a linguistic or semantic project, a project that typically goes hand-in-hand with a deflationary account of the concept of truth. A thoroughgoing deflationary account of truth will go beyond the negative metaphysical claim about truth and the positive linguistic account of the word ‘true’: it will also maintain that the concept of truth is a ‘thin’ concept that bears no substantive conceptual connections to other concepts to which it is traditionally tied.
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7

Edwards, Douglas. Deflationism Revealed. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758693.003.0004.

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Deflationism threatens the metaphysics of truth in two ways. Firstly, by offering an austere view of truth, it is a view that, if correct, renders the majority of metaphysical issues with respect to truth obsolete. Secondly, it has inspired a certain methodological approach to the study of truth, sometimes referred to as ‘methodological deflationism’. The idea here is that, since deflationism is the most neutral and innocuous of all truth theories, it ought to enjoy the position of the ‘default’ theory of truth, with the onus being on other theories of truth to demonstrate why deflationism is wrong prior to taking up their more substantial metaphysical projects. This chapter responds to both of these threats. The main focus will be deflationism about truth itself, and to reveal the true nature and commitments of the view. Once these are exposed, methodological deflationism is addressed.
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8

Beall, J. C., and Bradley Armour-Garb. Deflationism and Paradox. Oxford University Press, 2006.

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9

Simmons, Keith. Consequences for Deflationism. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791546.003.0010.

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Chapter 10 investigates the consequences of the singularity theory for deflationary theories in general and disquotational theories in particular. The chapter argues that if we accept the singularity theory, we must reject deflationary theories of truth, denotation, and extension. The phenomena of repetition and rehabilitation (introduced in Chapter 2, and discussed throughout the book) show that pathological expressions, such as Liar sentences, may be successfully assigned semantic values. As a consequence, there are truths from which ‘true’ cannot be disquoted away (and similarly with ‘denotes’ and ‘extension’). The chapter argues that one leading motivation for the deflationist-namely, the role that ‘true’ plays in expressing generalizations-is fully captured by the singularity theory.
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10

Horwich, Paul. Wittgenstein’s Global Deflationism. Edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.35.

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This article explores Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ideas about the nature of philosophy, with particular emphasis on his rejection of “T-philosophy”—a traditionally dominant form of philosophy that, although self-consciosly a priori, is shaped by theoretical goals and methods of reasoning that closely resemble those of the sciences. After discussing the goals and methods that characterize T-philosophy, the article presents a formidable Wittgensteinian argument against that practice. It proceeds to describe the sort of treatment of particular philosophical problems that is called for by this argument; and it assesses the common complaint against Wittgenstein that his overall position is self-undermining—an anti-theoretical theory. It goes on to consider whether Wittgenstein’s perspective involves an objectionable prioritization of language over reality, that is, an objectionable “linguistic turn”. Finally, it compares Wittgenstein’s arguments with the Oxonian “ordinary language philosophy” of philosophers such as Austin, Ryle, and Strawson.
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11

(Editor), J. C. Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb (Editor), eds. Deflationism and Paradox. Oxford University Press, USA, 2005.

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12

Azzouni, Jody. Deflationist Truth. Edited by Michael Glanzberg. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199557929.013.18.

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A taxonomy of theories of truth is provided. Two versions of deflationist theories of “true” are distinguished, T-schema deflationism and semantic-descent deflationism. These are distinguished from a deflationist theory of truth-ascription, and distinguished in turn from a deflationist theory of truths—a view that the various truths share no significant property. Opposed to these deflationist positions are various substantivalist truth theories. It is suggested that the semantic-descent deflationist theory of “true” and the deflationist theory of truths are correct, although the considerations that support or attack these different deflationist theories are largely independent of one another. A deflationist theory of truth-ascription is denied, however. Sometimes statements do attribute a truth-property to a set of statements. The chapter ends with an evaluation of the cases where supplementing a formal language with a truth predicate is not conservative. It is argued that these cases do not bear on debates about truth deflationism.
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13

Mcgrath, Matthew. Between Deflationism and Correspondence Theory. Routledge, 2015.

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14

McGrath, Matthew. Between Deflationism and Correspondence Theory. Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.

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15

McGrath, Matthew. Between Deflationism and Correspondence Theory. Routledge, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315054568.

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16

McGrath, Matthew. Between Deflationism and Correspondence Theory. Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.

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17

McGrath, Matthew. Between Deflationism and Correspondence Theory. Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.

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18

McGrath, Matthew. Between Deflationism and Correspondence Theory. Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.

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19

Between Deflationism and Correspondence Theory. Routledge, 2014.

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20

Horsten, Leon. Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth. MIT Press, 2011.

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21

Butler, Michael K. Deflationism and Semantic Theories of Truth. Pendlebury Press Limited, 2017.

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22

Horsten, Leon. Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth. MIT Press, 2011.

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23

Cieśliński, Cezary. Epistemic Lightness of Truth: Deflationism and Its Logic. Cambridge University Press, 2017.

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24

Cieśliński, Cezary. Epistemic Lightness of Truth: Deflationism and Its Logic. Cambridge University Press, 2019.

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25

The Epistemic Lightness of Truth: Deflationism and its Logic. Cambridge University Press, 2018.

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26

Deflationism: A Use-theoretic Analysis of the Truth-predicate (Stockholm Studies in Philosophy). Stockholm Universitet, 2006.

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27

McGrath, Matthew. Between Deflationism and Correspondence Theory (Studies in Philosophy (New York, N.Y.).). Routledge, 2000.

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28

Jago, Mark. Truth: Substantial or Insubstantial? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823810.003.0002.

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One of the biggest questions in the metaphysics of truth is whether truth is a substantial property. Does truth have a metaphysical nature, in virtue of which we can characterise what truth is? I say so. But deflationists say not: they claim truth is insubstantial. So I’ll begin with deflationism: what the theory says (§1.1), how it needs to be formulated (§1.2), and why it doesn’t work (§1.3 and §1.4). I’ll then discuss pluralism about truth, which holds that truth is substantial in some cases, but insubstantial in others (§1.5). This approach too has its problems (§1.6) and, I claim, we’re better off with a univocal account of truth (§1.7).
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29

Edwards, Douglas. From Truth to Being. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758693.003.0007.

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This chapter explores the connections between truth pluralism and ontological pluralism, and develops the features of a global pluralism, which includes pluralism about truth and existence. It begins by noting that some motivations for truth pluralism can also be applied to ontological pluralism, before demonstrating how a method similar to the argument in Chapter 5 for truth pluralism can also be used to give an argument for ontological pluralism. It then discusses how the views complement each other, and how ontological pluralism can add to our understanding of domains by highlighting differences between the ways things exist. Once the pluralist metaphysical picture is up and running, its explanatory power is demonstrated by comparing it to global deflationism. In doing so, further problems for global deflationism are exposed.
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30

Glanzberg, Michael, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199557929.001.0001.

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This Handbook contains twenty-nine entries, covering a wide range of topics related to the theory of truth, and its applications in philosophy. It surveys how the concept of truth was understood in ancient and modern philosophy and major debates about truth during the emergence of analytic philosophy. It describes the received standard theories of truth in the current literature, including the coherence, correspondence, identity, and pragmatist theories. It examines the place of truth in metaphysics, focusing on truth-makers, propositions, determinacy, objectivity, deflationism, fictionalism, relativism, and pluralism. It explores broader applications of truth in philosophy, including ethics, science, and mathematics. Finally, it reviews formal work on truth and its application to semantic paradox.
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31

Bobzien, Susanne, Bradley Armour-Garb, and Bradley Armour-Garb. Gestalt Shifts in the Liar orWhy KT4M Is the Logic of Semantic Modalities. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199896042.003.0004.

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This chapter offers a revenge-free solution to the liar paradox and presents a formal representation of truth in, or for, a natural language like English, which proposes to show both why (and how) truth is coherent and how it appears to be incoherent, while preserving classical logic and most principles that some philosophers have taken to be central to the concept of truth and our use of that notion. The chapter argues that, by using a truth operator rather than truth predicate, it is possible to provide a coherent, model-theoretic representation of truth with various desirable features. After investigating what features of liar sentences are responsible for their paradoxicality, the chapter identifies the logic as the normal modal logic KT4M. Drawing on the structure of KT4M, the author proposes that, pace deflationism, truth has content, that the content of truth is bivalence, and that the notions of both truth and bivalence are semideterminable.
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32

Edwards, Douglas. Primitivism and Truth-Making. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758693.003.0010.

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Chapters 9 and 10 explore some applications of the pluralist framework, and show how responses can be given to two different threats from primitivist approaches to truth. Primitivism distinguishes itself from deflationism by holding that truth has important explanatory roles to play, but denies that there is any informative theory of truth to be given. The first threat comes from Trenton Merricks’s claim that there are truths for which there are no truth-makers. This implies that we should be primitivists about truth, as there are truths for which there are no explanations of why they are true, threatening both theories of truth and truth-maker theories. In this chapter this threat is addressed by showing how a pluralist theory can respond to it, including discussions of modal truth, truths about the past, and negative existentials. In the process, pluralism is shown to offer useful resources to those tempted by truth-maker theory.
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33

Simmons, Keith. Semantic Singularities. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791546.001.0001.

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This book aims to provide a solution to the semantic paradoxes. It argues for a unified solution to the paradoxes generated by the concepts of reference or denotation, predicate extension, and truth. The solution makes two main claims. The first is that our semantic expressions ‘denotes’, ‘extension’, and ‘true’ are context-sensitive. The second, inspired by a brief, tantalizing remark of Gödel’s, is that these expressions are significant everywhere except for certain singularities, in analogy with division by zero. A formal theory of singularities is presented and applied to a wide variety of versions of the definability paradoxes, Russell’s paradox, and the Liar paradox. The book argues that the singularity theory satisfies the following desiderata: it recognizes that the proper setting of the semantic paradoxes is natural language, not regimented formal languages; it minimizes any revision to our semantic concepts; it respects as far as possible Tarski’s intuition that natural languages are universal; it responds adequately to the threat of revenge paradoxes; and it preserves classical logic and semantics. The book examines the consequences of the singularity theory for deflationary views of our semantic concepts, and concludes that if we accept the singularity theory, we must reject deflationism.
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34

Edwards, Douglas. Substantivity and Sparseness. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758693.003.0003.

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In Chapter 1 we discussed the reasons to take truth to be a property. This presents a challenge for deflationary approaches to truth, as, with the ultra deflationary proposals off the table, they now need to both hold that truth is a property and deny that there are interesting metaphysical things to say about truth. This is where the notion of a ‘substantive’ property comes in, as instead of denying that truth is a property, deflationists typically deny that it is a ‘substantive’ property. The main aim of this chapter is to discern the best way to distinguish between substantive and insubstantive properties, and thus to provide the best possible terms in which to conduct the debate between deflationists and their ‘inflationist’ opponents. This chapter argues that three influential accounts fail, and offers a more promising view of property substantiveness in terms of a distinction between abundant and sparse properties.
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35

Misak, Cheryl. The Pragmatist Theory of Truth. Edited by Michael Glanzberg. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199557929.013.11.

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In this chapter, an overview is given of the various pragmatist theories of truth, with the most compelling version outlined. That is the position that can be traced from the founder of pragmatism, C. S. Peirce, through to Frank Ramsey. It links truth to human inquiry, and is set against the more “plastic” views of William James, John Dewey, and Richard Rorty, as well as the more realist, for want of a better word, correspondence and deflationist theories. The chapter also indicates how this promising version of the pragmatist account of truth is especially suited to deal with beliefs in ethics and mathematics.
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36

Heck, Richard G., and Robert May. Truth in Frege. Edited by Michael Glanzberg. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199557929.013.7.

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A general survey of Frege’s views on truth, the chapter explores the problems in response to which Frege’s distinctive view that sentences refer to truth-values develops. Particular attention is paid to Frege’s early engagement with the work of George Boole, how the notion of truth-functionality emerges from it, and the tensions in Frege’s notion of content that this exposes. It also discusses Frege’s view that truth-values are objects and the so-called regress argument for the indefinability of truth, which has been the focus of much of the literature concerning Frege on truth. Finally, the chapter considers, very briefly, the question whether Frege was, as is so often claimed, a deflationist.
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37

Edwards, Douglas. Concluding Remarks. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758693.003.0012.

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I began this book with two main aims: first, to counter deflationary and primitivist movements to re-assert the importance of the metaphysics of truth; and, second, to develop a distinctively pluralist account of the metaphysics of truth. With regard to the first aim, I hope to have shown that there is no presumptive advantage to being a deflationist or a primitivist, and to have loosened the hold that these views tend to have on discussions of truth. Moreover, I have noted that successfully defending these views would require overcoming some significant explanatory challenges. In identifying these challenges, I hope to have demonstrated that the metaphysics of truth is a topic worthy of discussion, and that there are interesting and important issues to consider in studying it....
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38

Scharp, Kevin, Stewart Shapiro, and Bradley Armour-Garb. Revising Inconsistent Concepts. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199896042.003.0010.

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This chapter investigates the question of when it is reasonable to replace an inconsistent concept. After surveying a number of proposals for how one might understand constitutive principles, it goes on to endorse Burgess’s (2004) account of being pragmatically analytic, as a possible source of insight into constitutive principles. The chapter then raises a question: If truth is an inconsistent concept, does it need to be replaced? According to the argument in the chapter, when an inconsistent concept paralyzes valuable projects, it is time to replace it. And if we are to replace a concept, our replacement should be able to do the work that the inconsistency-yielding one did. This, of course, raises a fundamental question concerning what work the notion of truth does for us. The chapter mounts a case for the claim that inflationists, but not obvious deflationists, about truth should offer a replacement for the concept of truth.
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39

Homburg, Stefan. A Study in Monetary Macroeconomics. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198807537.001.0001.

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The Great Recession of 2008/09 and its aftermath present a major challenge to macroeconomics. Many researchers think that prevailing models fail to grasp essential aspects of recent developments, including unprecedented monetary policies and interest rates at the zero lower bound. Approaches that focus on steady states, rational expectations, and individuals planning over infinite horizons are not suitable for analyzing such abnormal situations. This text does not criticize the traditional approach but aims at improvement. The study’s distinctive feature is a rich institutional structure that includes elements such as credit money, external finance, borrowing constraints, net worth, real estate, and commercial banks. To cope with such a complex setting, the text reduces rationality requirements but adheres to the method of dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) with optimizing agents and fully specified models. Results are derived from mathematical reasoning and simulations. Starting with a simple baseline model, the argument is developed step by step in a unified framework that covers almost everything of interest for monetary macroeconomists. The topics discussed include the superneutrality of money, the Tobin effect, monetary policy under sticky prices and wages, but also liquidity traps with borrowing constraints, Fisherian debt-deflations, housing cycles, and environments with excess bank reserves. The text addresses researchers worldwide and may prove useful for teaching postgraduate and advanced graduate courses. The principle objective is to demonstrate that a “not-too-rational” DGE approach makes it possible to develop clean models that work outside steady states and are appropriate for answering macroeconomic questions of actual interest.
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