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Academic literature on the topic 'Deflationism'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 9 March 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Deflationism"

1

Veluwenkamp, Herman. "Inferentialist Truth Pluralism." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24, no. 1 (February 3, 2021): 107–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-020-10145-5.

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AbstractMetasemantic inferentialism has gained popularity in the last few decades. Traditionally, inferentialism is combined with a deflationary attitude towards semantic terms such as truth and reference, i.e., many inferentialists hold that when we use these semantic terms we do not purport to refer to substantive properties. This combination makes inferentialism attractive for philosophers who see themselves as antirealists. Although the attractions of combining inferentialism and deflationism are easy to see, deflationism is also a controversial position. For one, deflationists maintain that truth is an insubstantive property, but it is not altogether clear what an insubstantive property is. Secondly, as deflationists maintain that truth does not play an explanatory role, it is incompatible with the position that truth can explain the normativity of truth talk. Given that deflationism faces these objections, it would be preferable if the success of inferentialism did not depend on the deflationist’s ability to respond to these objections. I argue that someone attracted to inferentialism for its ability to accommodate antirealist intuitions about a domain (e.g. morality) is not committed to deflationism about truth. More specifically, I will show that inferentialism combined with a straightforward account of inferentialist truth-conditions is compatible with a version of truth pluralism. I call this position Inferentialist Truth Pluralism.

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Marques, Teresa. "Pode o Deflacionismo Negar o Princípio de Bivalência?" Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy 14, no. 28 (2006): 227–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philosophica2006142831.

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The simplest and most widely endorsed elucidation of the notions of truth and falsehood is given in Aristotle’s dictum: “to say of what is not that it is, and of what is that it is not, is false; while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true”. Nowadays, while some take the dictum as the first Statement of truth as correspondence, the dictum may also be seen as a first Statement of deflationism. Deflationism holds that the essential about truth is captured in equivalence schemas for truth. Similar schemas are usually put forward for falsity. Can deflationism coherently deny bivalence? I will argue that it cannot since the putative counterexamples to bivalence also falsify the relevant truth-schemas. The attempts made to render the supposition of counter examples to bivalence compatible with the truth-schemas usually take two steps: in the first place, they try to deal with the way we can reject that a relevant item is bivalent without self-contradiction, and, in the second place, they try to explain how, although there are gaps, the schemas for truth and falsehood are still correct. I will argue that these attempts fail, since they are ad hoc or generally ungrounded. So, either deflationism is in adequate as an account of truth, or there cannot be counterexamples to bivalence. I conclude that it is not only deflationism that faces this dilemma; anyone who defends that some version or other of the truth-schemas is correct faces the same difficulties as the deflationist. This would corne as no surprise for Aristotle. His dictum about truth was followed by a Statement of bivalence: “so that he who says of anything that it is, or that it is not, will say either what is true or what is false”.

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Marschall, Benjamin, and Thomas Schindler. "Semantic Deflationism and Meta-Ontological Deflationism." Philosophical Quarterly 71, no. 1 (May 29, 2020): 99–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa019.

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Abstract Deflationary positions have been defended in many areas of philosophy. Most prominent are semantic deflationism about truth and reference, and meta-ontological deflationism, according to which existence has no deep nature and the standard neo-Quinean approach to ontology is misguided. Although both kinds of views have generated much discussion, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the question of how they relate to each other. Are they independent, is it advisable to hold them all at once, or do they even entail each other? One exception is Amie Thomasson, who has argued that semantic deflationism actually entails meta-ontological deflationism. This is unexpected, since semantic deflationism is usually regarded as much less controversial than meta-ontological deflationism. In our paper, we will argue that Thomasson’s argument fails though, and that the connection between the views is in fact weaker than she makes them out to be.

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Kraut, Robert. "Robust Deflationism." Philosophical Review 102, no. 2 (April 1993): 247. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2186039.

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Pritchard, Duncan. "Epistemic Deflationism." Southern Journal of Philosophy 42, no. 1 (March 2004): 103–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2004.tb00992.x.

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Soames, Scott. "Understanding Deflationism." Philosophical Perspectives 17, no. 1 (February 2003): 369–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2003.00015.x.

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Murzi, Julien, and Lorenzo Rossi. "Conservative deflationism?" Philosophical Studies 177, no. 2 (November 14, 2018): 535–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1193-5.

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McGrath, M. "Weak deflationism." Mind 106, no. 421 (January 1, 1997): 69–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/106.421.69.

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Båve, Arvid. "Formulating deflationism." Synthese 190, no. 15 (August 8, 2012): 3287–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0163-2.

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Gauker, Christopher. "Deflationism and Logic." Facta Philosophica 1, no. 1 (1999): 167–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/factaphil1999119.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Deflationism"

1

Thomas, Andrew Stephen. "Truthmaking and Deflationism." Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2008. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.500896.

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Walton, Sean Thomas. "Deflationism : a critical study." Thesis, University of Leeds, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.438602.

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Rami, Adolf. "Die Grenzen des Wahrheitsdeflationismus." Doctoral thesis, Saechsische Landesbibliothek- Staats- und Universitaetsbibliothek Dresden, 2006. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:swb:14-1153322363333-86419.

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Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit werden zwei allgemeine Ziele verfolgt: ein negatives und ein positives. Das negative Ziel besteht darin, den Nachweis zu liefern, daß auf der Grundlage einer deflationistischen Konzeption der Wahrheit keine angemessene philosophische Analyse der Wahrheit gegeben werden kann. Meine kritische Aufmerksamkeit galt dabei vor allem den Varianten dieser Art von Wahrheitskonzeption, die gegenwärtig auch tatsächlich (noch) vertreten werden. Das positive Ziel besteht darin, eine plausible und alternative Konzeption der Wahrheit zu entwickeln, die manche richtigen Beobachtungen deflationistischer Konzeptionen der Wahrheit in sich aufnimmt, aber vor allem die Fehler und Schwächen dieser Konzeptionen vermeidet und ausräumt.

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Collins, John Patrick. "The meaning of truth : Tarski, deflationism, and interpretation." Thesis, Birkbeck (University of London), 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.298277.

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The aim of my thesis is to develop a third way to truth, between traditional substantive theories, and deflationist accounts which seek to show that truth has no content. I begin with Tarski's definition of truth, and show that the definition enables the elimination of 'is true' in terms of the concepts expressible in the object-language (+logic/set theory). The definition, therefore, appears to provide a basis for deflationism. I consider a variety of deflationisms. Their common denominator is the thought that the content of truth is exhausted by the content of the sentences to which truth is applied: truth has no independent content; it has a mere grammatical convenience. While I admit the deflationist hue of Tarski's definition, I show that the definition contains resources to account for ". substantive features of our semantic competence. Extrapolating from these resources, I claim that a suitably constrained truth theory is an interpretive theory (ITT). The significance of the notion of an ITT is that it provides an interpretive conception of truth. I show that such a conception is neither reductionist nor deflationary. Further, I argue that an adequate ITT, although extensional, does capture the distinctions taken to be constitutive of our concept of meaning. From the perspective of an ITT, I argue that none of the deflationist theories can account for central features of truth: principally, the semantic paradoxes and heterophonic ascriptions. I conclude that deflationism is, at best, an etiolated account of truth.

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David, Marian Alexander. "Substantivism and deflationism in the theory of truth." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/185084.

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The main concern of this work is to understand and evaluate the debate between substantivism and deflationism in the theory of truth. According to substantive theories, truth consists in, and has to be explained in terms of, a special relation between the truth bearing item and reality. According to deflationism, such theories offer a needlessly inflated account of truth. Chapter one sketches a paradigmatic substantive theory of truth that explains the notion of truth by invoking the notions of representation and states of affairs. It says that for something to be true is for it to represent a state of affairs that obtains. Chapter two introduces physicalism, i.e., the thesis that everything there is can be explained in terms amenable to physics. For physicalism to be correct one of the following has to be the case: either the notion of representation (and the notion of a state of affairs) can be explained in physicalistic terms, or there simply are no representations (and no states of affairs). So if the relevant explanations are not to be had, the physicalist has to become an eliminativist with respect to representations (and states of affairs). Such an eliminative physicalism provides the major motivation for a deflationist attitude towards truth. It engenders the need to search for a deflationist ersatz-account of truth; an account that does not invoke substantive notions like representation. Chapter three develops the best, most prominent, and so far only serious candidate for a deflationist account: the thesis that truth is disquotation. Chapter four raises four grave problems for disquotationalism and discusses the costs of solving these problems. Chapter five concludes that the costs are too high. Disquotationalism is not an acceptable ersatz-theory of truth. As long as there is no other serious candidate for a deflationist account of truth that does not succumb to the same problems as disquotationalism, the substantive theory of truth has to be accepted. That means, if physicalism is to succeed it has to be able to provide explanations of substantive notions like representation. If no such explanations are to be had, it is more plausible to relinquish physicalism than to embrace deflationism with respect to truth.

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Båve, Arvid. "Deflationism : A Use-Theoretic Analysis of the Truth-Predicate." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-999.

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I here develop a specific version of the deflationary theory of truth. I adopt a terminology on which deflationism holds that an exhaustive account of truth is given by the equivalence between truth-ascriptions and de-nominalised (or disquoted) sentences. An adequate truth-theory, it is argued, must be finite, non-circular, and give a unified account of all occurrences of “true”. I also argue that it must descriptively capture the ordinary meaning of “true”, which is plausibly taken to be unambiguous. Ch. 2 is a critical historical survey of deflationary theories, where notably disquotationalism is found untenable as a descriptive theory of “true”. In Ch. 3, I aim to show that deflationism cannot be finitely and non-circularly formulated by using “true”, and so must only mention it. Hence, it must be a theory specifically about the word “true” (and its foreign counterparts). To capture the ordinary notion, the theory must thus be an empirical, use-theoretic, semantic account of “true”. The task of explaining facts about truth now becomes that of showing that various sentences containing “true” are (unconditionally) assertible. In Ch. 4, I defend the claim (D) that every sentence of the form “That p is true” and the corresponding “p” are intersubstitutable (in a use-theoretic sense), and show how this claim provides a unified and simple account of a wide variety of occurrences of “true”. Disquotationalism then only has the advantage of avoiding propositions. But in Ch. 5, I note that (D) is not committed to propositions. Use-theoretic semantics is then argued to serve nominalism better than truth-theoretic ditto. In particular, it can avoid propositions while sustaining a natural syntactic treatment of “that”-clauses as singular terms and of “Everything he says is true”, as any other quantification. Finally, Horwich’s problem of deriving universal truth-claims is given a solution by recourse to an assertibilist semantics of the universal quantifier.

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Nicolai, Carlo. "Truth, deflationism and the ontology of expressions : an axiomatic study." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a87eb43c-9657-4f13-b962-b18e04cff2e6.

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Philosophical enquiry on the notion of truth has traditionally involved the identification of a class of objects to which truth is ascribed. At the same time, formal investigations are often required when the notion of truth is at issue: semantic paradoxes force in fact philosophers to shape their arguments in a precise way. Objects of truth, in formal context, are always reduced to other, more manageable objects that mimic their structural properties such as numbers or sets. This form of reduction renders the distinction between linguistic or syntactic objects, to which truth is usually applied, and their mathematical counterparts opaque, at least from the point of view of the theory of truth. In informal metatheoretic discussion, in fact, they are clearly different entities. In this thesis we focus on an alternative way of constructing axiomatic theories of truth in which syntactic objects and mathematical objects belong to different universes. A brief introduction tries to situate the proposed theories in the context of different investigations on axiomatic truth. Chapter 2 is devoted to the discussion of historical and more theoretical motivations behind the proposed alternative. Chapter 3 will present the syntactic koinè spoken by our theories. Morphological categories of the object language and logical concepts concerning the object theory will be formalised in a recent axiomatisation of hereditarily finite sets. In Chapter 4 we finally introduce theories of truth with a built-in syntactic theory and examine some of their consequences. We briefly focus on disquotational truth, then consider compositional axioms for truth. Chapter 5 investigates a possible application of the setting just introduced: a realisation of the all-present interaction, in metamathematical practice, between informal metatheoretic claims and their (suitably chosen) coded counterparts. In the final chapter, after a brief characterisation of the key doctrines of the delflationary conception of truth, we evaluate the impact that the theories of truth studied in this work can have on the debate on the so-called conservativeness argument, which tries to match the alleged insubstantiality of the notion of truth, advocated by deflationists, with the deductive power of deflationary acceptable theories of truth.

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Rami, Adolf. "Die Grenzen des Wahrheitsdeflationismus." Doctoral thesis, Technische Universität Dresden, 2005. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=981342779.

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Lavers, Antony John. "Knowing what one believes : Substantialism and Deflationism in the philosophy of self-knowledge." Thesis, University of Bristol, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.393100.

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Dimech, Dominic. "A New Approach to the Coherence Theory of Truth." Thesis, Department of Philosophy, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/10245.

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This paper does not argue that the coherence theory should be the accepted theory about what truth is. It aims, rather, to present the coherence theory of truth in a new light, in a way that sheds understanding on why the theory has had such prominence in the history of the philosophy of truth. Thus, although this paper is not a defence of the theory per se, it offers a charitable interpretation of it. The coherence theory has a paradoxical status in the literature, since it is considered the chief competitor with the correspondence theory and yet critiques of it are often extremely scathing. This paper is designed to reveal a better grasp and understanding of what the coherence theory’s status should be. The first important result is that coherence is a perfectly acceptable extensional description of truth, as it simply predicates something about all the true things. The second even more interesting result is that if coherentists want their theory to achieve an analysis of the meaning of truth then they must be committed to an ontological position, specifically, some form of idealism. The conclusions of this paper therefore are informative about the theoretical space that coherentists have to move in today and also hopefully illuminative of why the coherence theory has been attached to the philosophical doctrines and positions that it has been associated with historically.

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Books on the topic "Deflationism"

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Beall, Jeffrey C., and Bradley Armour-Garb. Deflationism and paradox. Oxford: Clarendon-Oxford university press, 2008.

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Between deflationism & correspondence theory. New York: Garland Pub., 2000.

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Horsten, Leon. The Tarskian turn: Deflationism and axiomatic truth. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2011.

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The Tarskian turn: Deflationism and axiomatic truth. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2011.

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A study on existence: Two approaches and a deflationist compromise. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017.

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Bar-On, Dorit, and Keith Simmons. Deflationism. Edited by Ernest Lepore and Barry C. Smith. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.003.0025.

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There is a core metaphysical claim shared by all deflationists: truth is not a genuine, substantive property. But anyone who denies that truth is a genuine property must still make sense of our pervasive truth talk. In addressing questions about the meaning and function of ‘true’, deflationists engage in a linguistic or semantic project, a project that typically goes hand-in-hand with a deflationary account of the concept of truth. A thoroughgoing deflationary account of truth will go beyond the negative metaphysical claim about truth and the positive linguistic account of the word ‘true’: it will also maintain that the concept of truth is a ‘thin’ concept that bears no substantive conceptual connections to other concepts to which it is traditionally tied.

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Edwards, Douglas. Deflationism Revealed. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758693.003.0004.

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Deflationism threatens the metaphysics of truth in two ways. Firstly, by offering an austere view of truth, it is a view that, if correct, renders the majority of metaphysical issues with respect to truth obsolete. Secondly, it has inspired a certain methodological approach to the study of truth, sometimes referred to as ‘methodological deflationism’. The idea here is that, since deflationism is the most neutral and innocuous of all truth theories, it ought to enjoy the position of the ‘default’ theory of truth, with the onus being on other theories of truth to demonstrate why deflationism is wrong prior to taking up their more substantial metaphysical projects. This chapter responds to both of these threats. The main focus will be deflationism about truth itself, and to reveal the true nature and commitments of the view. Once these are exposed, methodological deflationism is addressed.

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Beall, J. C., and Bradley Armour-Garb. Deflationism and Paradox. Oxford University Press, 2006.

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Simmons, Keith. Consequences for Deflationism. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791546.003.0010.

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Chapter 10 investigates the consequences of the singularity theory for deflationary theories in general and disquotational theories in particular. The chapter argues that if we accept the singularity theory, we must reject deflationary theories of truth, denotation, and extension. The phenomena of repetition and rehabilitation (introduced in Chapter 2, and discussed throughout the book) show that pathological expressions, such as Liar sentences, may be successfully assigned semantic values. As a consequence, there are truths from which ‘true’ cannot be disquoted away (and similarly with ‘denotes’ and ‘extension’). The chapter argues that one leading motivation for the deflationist-namely, the role that ‘true’ plays in expressing generalizations-is fully captured by the singularity theory.

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Horwich, Paul. Wittgenstein’s Global Deflationism. Edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.35.

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This article explores Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ideas about the nature of philosophy, with particular emphasis on his rejection of “T-philosophy”—a traditionally dominant form of philosophy that, although self-consciosly a priori, is shaped by theoretical goals and methods of reasoning that closely resemble those of the sciences. After discussing the goals and methods that characterize T-philosophy, the article presents a formidable Wittgensteinian argument against that practice. It proceeds to describe the sort of treatment of particular philosophical problems that is called for by this argument; and it assesses the common complaint against Wittgenstein that his overall position is self-undermining—an anti-theoretical theory. It goes on to consider whether Wittgenstein’s perspective involves an objectionable prioritization of language over reality, that is, an objectionable “linguistic turn”. Finally, it compares Wittgenstein’s arguments with the Oxonian “ordinary language philosophy” of philosophers such as Austin, Ryle, and Strawson.

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Book chapters on the topic "Deflationism"

1

Inan, Ilhan. "Deflationism." In A Referential Theory of Truth and Falsity, 116–30. New York: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003165705-11.

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Fischer, Martin. "Deflationism and Instrumentalism." In Unifying the Philosophy of Truth, 293–306. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9673-6_14.

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Damnjanovic, Nic. "New Wave Deflationism." In New Waves in Truth, 45–58. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230296992_4.

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Liu, Chuang. "Deflationism on Scientific Representation." In EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science, 93–102. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01306-0_8.

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Dodd, Julian. "A Variety of Deflationism Defended." In An Identity Theory of Truth, 132–57. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62870-4_6.

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Greenough, Patrick. "Deflationism and Truth Value Gaps." In New Waves in Truth, 115–25. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230296992_8.

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Dodd, Julian. "A Variety of Deflationism Defended." In An Identity Theory of Truth, 132–57. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230584266_6.

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Marino, Patricia. "Representation-Friendly Deflationism versus Modest Correspondence." In New Waves in Truth, 218–31. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230296992_15.

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Engel, Pascal. "Can Deflationism Account for the Norm of Truth?" In Unifying the Philosophy of Truth, 245–60. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9673-6_11.

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Cicovacki, Predrag. "Rethinking the Concept of Truth: A Critique of Deflationism." In Truth and Its Nature (if Any), 203–21. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9233-8_15.

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