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Published: 10 March 2023

Last updated: 11 March 2023

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1

Wiese, Richard. "On default rules and other rules." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22, no. 6 (December 1999): 1043–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x99532226.

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This commentary concentrates on the nature of irregularity in morphology. What is called “irregular” in the target article by Clahsen is not a homogeneous class. Rather, there are areas of strong subregularities in the domains both of German participle formation and of German plural information that need to be distinguished from the irregular domain.

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2

ANTOY, SERGIO, and MICHAEL HANUS. "Default rules for Curry." Theory and Practice of Logic Programming 17, no. 2 (July 1, 2016): 121–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1471068416000168.

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AbstractIn functional logic programs, rules are applicable independently of textual order, i.e., any rule can potentially be used to evaluate an expression. This is similar to logic languages and contrary to functional languages, e.g., Haskell enforces a strict sequential interpretation of rules. However, in some situations it is convenient to express alternatives by means of compact default rules. Although default rules are often used in functional programs, the non-deterministic nature of functional logic programs does not allow to directly transfer this concept from functional to functional logic languages in a meaningful way. In this paper, we propose a new concept of default rules for Curry that supports a programming style similar to functional programming while preserving the core properties of functional logic programming, i.e., completeness, non-determinism, and logic-oriented use of functions. We discuss the basic concept and propose an implementation which exploits advanced features of functional logic languages.

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3

Deakin, Simon. "Understanding Corporate Governance Default Rules." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 166, no. 1 (2010): 54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245610790711465.

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4

Elhauge, Einer. "Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules." Columbia Law Review 102, no. 8 (December 2002): 2027. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1123726.

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5

Elhauge, Einer. "Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules." Columbia Law Review 102, no. 8 (December 2002): 2162. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1123727.

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6

PARSONS, SIMON, and RACHEL A. BOURNE. "ON PROOFS IN SYSTEM P." International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems 08, no. 02 (April 2000): 203–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218488500000149.

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This paper investigates how the rules of System P might be used in order to construct proofs for default consequences which take into account the bounds on the probabilities of the consequents of the defaults. Using a knowledge base of default rules which are considered to be constraints on a probability distribution, the result of applying the rules of P gives us new constraints that were implicit in the knowledge base and their associated lower bounds. The paper defines a proof system for such constraints, shows that it is sound, and then discusses at length the completeness of the system and the kind of proofs that it can generate.

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7

Bender, Philip M. "Limits of Personalization of Default Rules." European Review of Contract Law 16, no. 3 (September 8, 2020): 366–409. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ercl-2020-0021.

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AbstractThe ‘personalization of the law,’ based on new technological possibilities such as algorithmic analysis of Big Data, is said to be the wave of the future. Especially default rules seem to be particularly apt for personalization, because they are – at first glance – supposed to mirror what the parties would have wanted. This article aims to unveil the limits of preference-based personalization of default rules. In the first part, I attack default rule personalization on theoretical grounds. I analyze the theoretical underpinnings of default rule personalization, which I describe as ‘empirical subjectivism,’ and I challenge this position with arguments from classical and behavioral law and economics. I thereby develop the opposite explanatory model: ‘normative objectivism.’ The arguments presented also provide new insights of default rule analysis which are valid well beyond the personalization debate. The ‘default rule paradox,’ ‘pushing vs pulling default rules,’ or the analysis of default rules as ‘property rules’ and as ‘rules of civility’ are some examples. In the second part, I attack default rule personalization on constitutional grounds with particular focus on the Constitutions of the United States and Germany, as well as the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. So far, neither default rules nor personalization have received a detailed analysis based on constitutional principles. My article provides this analysis with regard to the principles of freedom and equality. I show how personalization reduces freedom in the private and public sphere, because the so-called choice- or agency-dimension of freedom will be significantly limited. In broader terms, the paternalistic tendencies of personalization will trigger the replacement of the ‘entrepreneur’ and ‘citizen’ by the ‘consumer’ as role-model of societal organization. Economically, this development will be accompanied by a shift from capitalism to what I call ‘micro-socialism.’ With regard to the principle of equality, I analyze how personalization leads to inequality by distinguishing ‘intra-preference-classifications’ and ‘inter-preference-classifications.’ I then present justification problems, especially with regard to discriminations that trigger strict and intermediate scrutiny. Finally, I sketch out how personalization would dissolve the essence of the principle of equality and thereby trigger a shift ‘from contract to contact’ or ‘from association to accumulation,’ which is no less important than the previous societal shift ‘from status to contract’ or ‘from community to association.’ In sum, the article combines different discourses around default rules, personalization, and constitutional law, and thereby provides new insights in each of them.

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8

Lahiri, Somdeb. "Default Bias in Extended Choice Rules." Studies in Microeconomics 7, no. 1 (April 25, 2019): 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2321022219830187.

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In this paper we provide a reader friendly axiomatic characterization of the default bias extended choice rule, in the framework available in lecture 3 of Rubinstein (2016) . As noted there “experimental evidence and introspection tell us that a default option is often viewed positively by a decision maker, a phenomenon known as the status quo bias”. A different axiomatic characterization of the extended choice rule is available in that lecture. Our proof makes use of the Szpilrajn's extension which for finite sets (as in our case) has a very simple proof. JEL Classification: D01, D03

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9

Stockman, David R. "Default, reputation, and balanced-budget rules." Review of Economic Dynamics 7, no. 2 (April 2004): 382–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2003.09.002.

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10

Wennberg, Mikko. "On Barnett's Theory of Default Rules." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 16, no. 1 (January 2003): 147–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900006664.

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This discussion is a critique of Professor Randy E. Barnett's solution to the problem of filling in gaps in incomplete contracts. The articles discussed are “The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent” (1992) and “Rational Bargaining Theory and Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud” (1992).

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Dančák, Michal, and Michal Peliš. "Normal default rules as epistemic actions." AUC PHILOSOPHICA ET HISTORICA 2015, no. 1 (August 8, 2016): 23–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.14712/24647055.2016.7.

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12

Goldford, Zackary. "Penalty Default Rules in French, German and Louisianan Contract Law." European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 9, no. 4 (October 6, 2022): 358–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22134514-bja10043.

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Abstract Some American law and economics scholars have used the term “penalty default rules” to describe default rules that are undesirable to at least one party to a contract. Parties have incentives to depart from these default rules and to share information in doing so. In a recent article, I brought this concept outside of the United States, the common law tradition and the law and economics literature by using it to describe a selection of rules in Québec contract law. In this article, I build on that work by identifying a selection of penalty default rules in three other civilian jurisdictions – France, Germany and Louisiana – that apply to contract formation, contract interpretation, changed circumstances and remedies for breach. Then, I argue that the penalty default rules that I have identified serve two valuable functions. First, they enhance at least some parties’ freedom of contract by better equipping them to make informed decisions. Second, they complement the duty of good faith by incentivizing the sharing of information, including information that might not always need to be shared in order to comply with the duty of good faith. Although these functions are somewhat different than those that law and economics scholars have attributed to American penalty default rules, my analysis reveals that penalty default rules both exist and have value in the civilian world.

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13

GALITSKY, BORIS. "DISAMBIGUATION VIA DEFAULT RULES UNDER ANSWERING COMPLEX QUESTIONS." International Journal on Artificial Intelligence Tools 14, no. 01n02 (February 2005): 157–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218213005002041.

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We develop the default logic for pragmatic analysis of natural language queries. Ambiguous sentences are considered so that each set of meanings is assigned an extension of default system. The approach is applied to natural language question answering, where even a correct semantic representation needs to be modified in accordance to the set of default rules to better match a knowledge domain.

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Grüner, Hans Peter, and Thomas Tröger. "Linear Voting Rules." Econometrica 87, no. 6 (2019): 2037–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta16004.

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How should a society choose between two social alternatives if participation in the decision process is voluntary and costly, and monetary transfers are not feasible? Assuming symmetric independent private values, we show that it is utilitarian‐optimal to use a linear voting rule: votes get alternative‐dependent weights, and a default obtains if the weighted sum of votes stays below some threshold. Any combination of weights and threshold can be optimal. A standard quorum rule can be optimal only when it yields the same outcome as a linear rule. A linear rule is called upper linear if the default is upset at every election result that meets the threshold exactly. We develop a perturbation method to characterize equilibria of voting rules in the case of small participation costs and show that leaving participation voluntary increases welfare for any two‐sided upper linear rule that is optimal under compulsory participation.

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15

Gábriš, Tomáš. "Mandatory and Default Rules in Private Law." Bratislava Law Review 4, no. 1 (August 31, 2020): 61–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.46282/blr.2020.4.1.163.

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The paper summarizes philosophical, historical and doctrinal background of the differentiation between mandatory and default rules in private law in general and in company law in particular. The conclusion of the author is the plea to provide for a clear guidance in the respective doctrine and legislation as to the criteria and principles applicable to distinguishing between the two types of regulations.

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16

Hatchondo, Juan Carlos, Leonardo Martinez, and Francisco Roch. "Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium." American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 14, no. 4 (October 1, 2022): 244–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mac.20170479.

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We study fiscal rules using a sovereign default model. A debt-brake (spread-brake) rule imposes a ceiling on the fiscal deficit when the sovereign debt (spread) is above a threshold. For our benchmark calibration, similar gains can be achieved with the optimal debt or spread brake. However, for a “Union” of heterogeneous economies, a common spread brake generates larger gains than a common debt brake. Furthermore, gains from abandoning a common debt brake may be significant for economies that are unnecessarily constrained by the rule. In contrast, abandoning a common spread brake would generate losses for any economy in the Union. (JEL E62, F34, F41, H61, H63)

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Hatchondo, Juan Carlos, Francisco Roch, and Leonardo Martinez. "Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium." IMF Working Papers 12, no. 30 (2012): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781463933159.001.

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18

Robinson, Peter. "Rules and similarity processes in artificial grammar and natural second language learning: What is the “default”?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28, no. 1 (February 2005): 32–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x05420014.

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Are rules processes or similarity processes the default for acquisition of grammatical knowledge during natural second language acquisition? Whereas Pothos argues similarity processes are the default in the many areas he reviews, including artificial grammar learning and first language development, I suggest, citing evidence, that in second language acquisition of grammatical morphology “rules processes” may be the default.

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19

Schreuder, Robert, Nivja de Jong, Andrea Krott, and Harald Baayen. "Rules and rote: Beyond the linguistic either-or fallacy." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22, no. 6 (December 1999): 1038–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x9947222x.

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We report an experiment that unambiguously shows an effect of full-form frequency for fully regular Dutch inflected verbs falling into Clahsen's “default” category, negating Clahsen's claim that regular complex words in the default category are not stored.

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20

Wallis, John Joseph. "An Alternative Institutional Approach to Rules, Organizations, and Development." Journal of Economic History 82, no. 2 (May 19, 2022): 335–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022050722000122.

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In the middle of the nineteenth century, a handful of societies began creating and enforcing impersonal rules, rules that treat everyone the same, on a broad scale. The existing institutional literatures, while appreciating the importance of impersonal rules for the rule of law, have not understood how they contribute to economic and political development through rules that are enforced but not followed: default rules. The conceptual importance of impersonal default rules is drawn out and then applied to better understand both economic and political development in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

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21

Horn, Henrik, and Petros C. Mavroidis. "The Permissible Reach of National Environmental Policies." Journal of World Trade 42, Issue 6 (December 1, 2008): 1107–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2008045.

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Domestic instruments affect public order but are negotiable, and, consequently, is scheduled. Public order is unilaterally defi ned, but must respect the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction that are common to all WTO Members and bind them by virtue of their appurtenance to the international community. In this article, we focus on the interaction between trade and environment. The purpose of this study is to highlight how these rules and the GATT/WTO jointly determine the scope for unilateral environmental policies for WTO Members. In the study we examine the relevant multilateral framework dealing with this issue, as well as the relevant GATT and WTO case law. We also briefly present the jurisdictional default rules in public international law. We consider a series of scenarios, partly building on factual aspects of cases that have already been brought before the WTO. These scenarios are intended to isolate issues of specifi c interest from a policy point of view. For each scenario we then seek to determine what would the outcome be, in case WTO adjudicating bodies were to explicitly take account of the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction, something that has not been done to date. Our main conclusions are twofold: on occasion, the outcome would be different had WTO panels observed the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction; more generally, the default rules can help us understand the limits of some key obligations assumed under the WTO. Crucially, absent recourse to the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction, one risks understanding non-discrimination (the key GATT obligation) as an instrument aimed to harmonize conditions of competition across markets, and not within markets, as the intent of negotiators has always been.

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22

Gliniecki, Bartłomiej. "Mandatory and Default Rules in Polish Company Law." Bratislava Law Review 4, no. 1 (August 31, 2020): 71–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.46282/blr.2020.4.1.164.

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Company law regulations provide opportunity of individual shaping some of companies’ and partnerships’ rules of operation. Proper determination of those regulations which may be modified by adopting different rules in articles of association (company statues, partnership agreement) is important as far as legal safety of corporate regulations is concerned. Abusing or misunderstanding of company law regulations may lead to invalidity of contractual arrangements that would infringe mandatory regulation of company law. The article provides a general view on the principle of freedom of shaping company articles of association in Polish company law as well as ways of distinguishing between mandatory, semi-mandatory and default rules in Polish company law. Apart from general remarks and indications helpful in understanding Polish law, it also provides specific examples of company regulations in Poland and references to company law rules in other European countries.

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23

Malagurski, Branislav. "Mandatory and Default Rules in Serbian Company Law." Bratislava Law Review 4, no. 1 (August 31, 2020): 79–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.46282/blr.2020.4.1.172.

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The matter of company law in Serbia is regulated by the Law on Companies, which does not contain the general provision defining whether it is based on the freedom of will, unlike the Law on Obligations, which defines so. Even therefrom, it can be concluded that the rules of the Law on Companies are in general mandatory. Such conclusion only confirms the exception-provision which defines that founders of the LLC their mutual relations and their relations with the Company regulate freely, unless by this Law otherwise defined. So, only the rules regulating mutual relations of founders and their relations with the LLC are default, unless otherwise provided in particular case. Other rules of the company law in Serbia are in general mandatory. However, even when the provisions regulating certain matter being mandatory, it does not mean that there is absolutely no space for deviations, like in below described cases of special duties, for example. But such deviations do not necessarily mean that the rules from which it is deviated are default ones.

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24

Sunstein, Cass R. "Active choosing or default rules?: The policymaker’s dilemma." Behavioral Science & Policy 1, no. 1 (2015): 29–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/bsp.2015.0009.

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25

Sunstein, Cass R. "Default Rules Are Better Than Active Choosing (Often)." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 21, no. 8 (August 2017): 600–606. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2017.05.003.

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26

Hviid, Morten. "Default rules and equilibrium selection of contract terms." International Review of Law and Economics 16, no. 2 (June 1996): 233–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(95)00023-2.

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27

BENFERHAT, SALEM, DIDIER DUBOIS, SYLVAIN LAGRUE, and HENRI PRADE. "A BIG-STEPPED PROBABILITY APPROACH FOR DISCOVERING DEFAULT RULES." International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems 11, supp01 (September 2003): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218488503002235.

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This paper deals with the extraction of default rules from a database of examples. The proposed approach is based on a special kind of probability distributions, called "big-stepped probabilities", which are known to provide a semantics for non-monotonic reasoning. The rules which are learnt are genuine default rules, which could be used (under some conditions) in a non-monotonic reasoning system and can be encoded in possibilistic logic.

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28

Rintanen, J. "Complexity of Prioritized Default Logics." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 9 (December 1, 1998): 423–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.554.

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In default reasoning, usually not all possible ways of resolving conflicts between default rules are acceptable. Criteria expressing acceptable ways of resolving the conflicts may be hardwired in the inference mechanism, for example specificity in inheritance reasoning can be handled this way, or they may be given abstractly as an ordering on the default rules. In this article we investigate formalizations of the latter approach in Reiter's default logic. Our goal is to analyze and compare the computational properties of three such formalizations in terms of their computational complexity: the prioritized default logics of Baader and Hollunder, and Brewka, and a prioritized default logic that is based on lexicographic comparison. The analysis locates the propositional variants of these logics on the second and third levels of the polynomial hierarchy, and identifies the boundary between tractable and intractable inference for restricted classes of prioritized default theories.

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29

Cahyono, Akhmad Budi. "Default and Termination of Contract: A comparative Study between Indonesia and The United Kingdom." Yuridika 35, no. 3 (September 1, 2020): 469. http://dx.doi.org/10.20473/ydk.v35i3.17679.

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Default is something that often occurs in contractual relationship. It can be not perform its obligations in the contract in all or in a part, performing its obligations but not in accordance with was agreed, performing its obligations but not in time, and performing something that is prohibited in the contract. Due to default, the injured party may claim compensation and / or terminate the contract. The problem is, the Indonesian Civil Code does not specify how a contract can be terminated in case of default. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a comparative study in other countries in terms of how a default can terminate the contract. The British which adopt common law tradition where jurisprudence is the main source of law is the right choice for conducting comparative studies. Countries with common law traditions have detailed legal rules based on jurisprudence. As in Indonesia, according to British contract law, defaults also can terminate the contract. However, unlike in Indonesia, according to British contract law, termination due to a default is only allowed in the event that the default is very serious. The very serious forms of default will be elaborated and become a part of the discussion in this paper.

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30

Zhang, Aidong, and Wiktor Marek. "On the Classification and Existence of Structures in Default Logic1." Fundamenta Informaticae 13, no. 4 (October 1, 1990): 485–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/fi-1990-13406.

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We investigate possible belief sets of an agent reasoning with default rules. Besides of Reiter’s extensions which are based on a proof-theoretic paradigm (similar to Logic Programming), other structures for default theories, based on weaker or different methods of constructing belief sets are considered, in particular, weak extensions and minimal sets. The first of these concepts is known to be closely connected to autoepistemic expansions of Moore, the other to minimal stable autoepistemic theories containing the initial assumptions. We introduce the concept of stratifed collection of default rules and investigate the properties of the largest stratified subset of the family D, determined by W. We find a necessary and sufficient condition for a weak extension to be an extension in terms of stratification. We prove that for theories (D, W) without extension, the least fixed point of the associated operator (with weak extension or minimal set as a context) is an extension of suitably chosen (D’, W) with D’ ⊆ D. We investigate conditions for existence of extensions and introduce the notion of perfectly-stratified set of default rules and its variant of maximally perfectly-stratified set. Existence of such set of default rules turns out to be equivalent to the existence of extension. Finally, we investigate convergence of algorithm for computing extensions.

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31

Lodge, Ken. "Assimilation, deletion paths and underspecification." Journal of Linguistics 28, no. 1 (March 1992): 13–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022226700014985.

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The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that underspecification of lexical-entry forms enables us to restrict phonological theory to declarative statements about the structure of lexical items, and to avoid having recourse to feature-changing and deletion rules. The realizations of lexical items are mapped onto their underlying forms by means of filling-in, redundancy rules of two basic types, predictive and default. Predictive rules derive (at least) one feature from (at least) one other feature, given in the lexical entry form, and default rules provide a feature, if no other rule has applied. Rules are both universal and language-specific. Since all filling-in is accounted for by these redundancy rules, there is no need for a post-lexical component of the phonology.

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32

Eichlerová, Kateřina. "Mandatory and Default Regulation in Company Law in the Czech Republic." Bratislava Law Review 4, no. 1 (August 31, 2020): 47–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.46282/blr.2020.4.1.161.

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The distinction between mandatory and default rules is very important. If default rules are considered mandatory, this leads to a restriction of freedom. Conversely, if mandatory rules are considered default, this leads to a violation of the law and undesirable interference in the sphere of persons who should be protected by law. The article focuses on the development of the nature of company law in the Czech Republic and show the current state of discussion and case law in this area. The author concludes that the scope for private autonomy has increased considerably with the recodification of private law. This is caused not only by a more liberal regulation of companies contrary to pre-recodification, but also by the intense discussion that the new regulation has provoked. Thanks to the new legislation, the institutes of company law can be rethought. This then allows the start of a teleological interpretation of rules in searching their natures.

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33

ANTONIOU, GRIGORIS. "A tutorial on default reasoning." Knowledge Engineering Review 13, no. 3 (October 1998): 225–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0269888998002136.

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Default reasoning is concerned with making inferences in cases where the information at hand is incomplete. In such cases it is necessary to make plausible assumptions, which in default reasoning are based on default rules. This paper gives an introduction to the field. It discusses in depth one particular approach, default logic, including properties, semantics and computational models. It also gives an overview of other ideas and approaches.

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34

Craswell, Richard. "Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising." Michigan Law Review 88, no. 3 (December 1989): 489. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1289110.

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35

Barnett, Randy E. "The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent." Virginia Law Review 78, no. 4 (May 1992): 821. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1073344.

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36

Scott, Robert E. "A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts." Journal of Legal Studies 19, S2 (June 1990): 597–616. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467863.

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37

De Rossi, Giulia, and Tiziano Vargiolu. "Optimal prepayment and default rules for mortgage-backed securities." Decisions in Economics and Finance 33, no. 1 (October 31, 2009): 23–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10203-009-0098-3.

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38

KYBURG, HENRY E., and CHOH MAN TENG. "STATISTICAL INFERENCE AS DEFAULT REASONING." International Journal of Pattern Recognition and Artificial Intelligence 13, no. 02 (March 1999): 267–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021800149900015x.

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Classical statistical inference is nonmonotonic in nature. We show how it can be formalized in the default logic framework. The structure of statistical inference is the same as that represented by default rules. In particular, the prerequisite corresponds to the sample statistics, the justifications require that we do not have any reason to believe that the sample is misleading, and the consequence corresponds to the conclusion sanctioned by the statistical test.

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39

Saito, Nagayuki. "Dissemination of Family Internet Rules by Libertarian Paternalism." International Journal of Social Media and Online Communities 11, no. 2 (July 2019): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijsmoc.2019070101.

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To examine the future direction of policy making for protecting young people online, this paper discusses the effectiveness of protection policies based on libertarian paternalism from the standpoint of behavioral economics by referring to the efforts of the Kariya authorities, Aichi Prefecture. This paper discusses the effects of setting a default rule as a countermeasure to the human heuristic decision making process with a fear that making irrational decisions causes parents and young people to adopt a passive stance towards policy. The paper specifically analyzes whether the efforts function as libertarian paternalism, and whether the cut-off time of “9 p.m.” was reasonable for parents as a default time. Furthermore, in the case where child protection has been carried out from the perspective of paternalism, this study considers whether young people and parents adjust their behavior.

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40

Goda, Gopi Shah, and Colleen Flaherty Manchester. "Incorporating Employee Heterogeneity into Default Rules for Retirement Plan Selection." Journal of Human Resources 48, no. 1 (2013): 198–235. http://dx.doi.org/10.3368/jhr.48.1.198.

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41

Johnston, Jason Scott. "Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules." Yale Law Journal 100, no. 3 (December 1990): 615. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/796663.

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42

RILEY, C. A. "Designing Default Rules in Contract Law: Consent, Conventionalism, and Efficiency." Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 20, no. 3 (September 1, 2000): 367–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/20.3.367.

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Goda, Gopi Shah, and Colleen Flaherty Manchester. "Incorporating Employee Heterogeneity into Default Rules for Retirement Plan Selection." Journal of Human Resources 48, no. 1 (2013): 198–235. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jhr.2013.0000.

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Gilio, Angelo. "Generalizing inference rules in a coherence-based probabilistic default reasoning." International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 53, no. 3 (April 2012): 413–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2011.08.004.

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Cross, Frank B. "Statutory Default Rules: How to Interpret Unclear Legislationby Einer Elhauge." Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 4 (December 2008): 704–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165x.2008.tb01826.x.

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Campos Soares, Pedro Silveira. "Recolhimento Antecipado das Despesas da Arbitragem." Revista Brasileira de Arbitragem 16, Issue 61 (March 1, 2019): 95–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/rba2019004.

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This article deals with the advance on arbitration costs and the consequences of its default from the perspective of arbitration rules and arbitral and judicial awards. It concludes that parties shall advance amounts for payment of the arbitration costs, according to the applicable arbitration rules, and that an unjustified default of such obligation might entail a breach of the arbitration agreement. Thus, arbitral tribunals, with precedence over state courts and arbitration institutions, must decide controversies related to the unjustified lack of advance on cost, and may order the recalcitrant party to perform such obligation, in order to comply with the respective arbitration clause.

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Brensike Primus, Eve. "Federal Review of State Criminal Convictions: A Structural Approach to Adequacy Doctrine." Michigan Law Review, no. 116.1 (2017): 75. http://dx.doi.org/10.36644/mlr.116.1.federal.

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Modern state postconviction review systems feature procedural labyrinths so complicated and confusing that indigent defendants have no realistic prospect of complying with the rules. When defendants predictably fail to navigate these mazes, state and federal courts deem their claims procedurally defaulted and refuse to consider those claims on their merits. As a result, systemic violations of criminal procedure rights—like the right to effective counsel—persist without judicial correction. But the law contains a tool that, if properly adapted, could bring these systemic problems to the attention of federal courts: procedural adequacy. Procedural adequacy doctrine gives federal courts the power to ignore procedural defaults and declare state procedural rules inadequate when those rules unduly burden defendants’ abilities to assert violations of their federal rights. And unlike the more commonly invoked cause and prejudice doctrine, which excuses default on the theory that a defendant’s unusual circumstances justify an exception to the rules, procedural adequacy doctrine allows courts to question the legitimacy of the state procedural regimes themselves. Procedural adequacy doctrine can therefore catalyze reform in a way that cause and prejudice cannot. For procedural adequacy litigation to catalyze reform, however, it must be adapted to modern circumstances in one crucial respect. Historically, procedural adequacy doctrine focused on cases involving the deliberate manipulation of individual rules. Today, what is needed is a structural approach to adequacy, one that would consider how the interaction of multiple procedural rules unfairly burdens federal rights. Such a structural approach to adequacy is consistent with the doctrine’s original purposes and is the most sensible way to apply procedural adequacy under current conditions. Litigants should accordingly deploy a structural approach to procedural adequacy doctrine and use it to stop states from burying systemic constitutional violations in complicated procedural labyrinths.

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Vicente, Lécia. "Un-consented Transfers of Shares: A Comparative Perspective." European Company Law 9, Issue 6 (January 21, 2012): 300–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eucl2012050.

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Both Portuguese Commercial Companies Code and the Italian Civil Code provide default rules for the transfer of shares in the Portuguese sociedade por quotas and the Italian società a responsabilità limitata, respectively. The Portuguese rule Article 228(2) establishes as a restriction on transfers the requirement of consent of the company to those transfers, whilst the Italian rule Article 2469 makes shares freely transferable. An analysis of articles of association of both Italian and Portuguese companies suggests that shareholders often introduce restrictions on transfers of shares. However, a sample of disputes over un-consented transfers in Portuguese and Italian courts shows that shareholders frequently do not abide by these rules they themselves have created and that they frequently ignore the default rules they have not opted out from.

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Snyder, Franklin, and Ann Mirabito. "Consumer Preferences for Performance Defaults." Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review, no. 6.1 (2016): 35. http://dx.doi.org/10.36639/mbelr.6.1.consumer.

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Commercial law in the United States is designed to facilitate private transactions, and thus to enforce the presumed intent of the parties, who generally are free to negotiate the terms they choose. But these contracts inevitably have gaps, both because the parties cannot anticipate every situation that might arise from their relationship, and because negotiation is not costless. When courts are faced with these gaps in a litigation context, they supply default terms to fill them. These defaults usually are set to reflect what courts believe similar parties would have agreed to if they had addressed the issue. These “majoritarian” defaults are justified as being most likely to carry out the presumed intentions of the parties. Despite the frequent assertion that the defaults used by courts reflect the views of most contracting parties, there is remarkably little empirical evidence that they do. Neither the legal scholars who study contract law nor the business scholars who study business transactions seem to have examined whether important default terms really are those that parties actually prefer. Statements by judges and scholars that these defaults are those the parties would presumably have chosen do not appear to rest on anything except the personal opinions of the writers. This article attempts to remedy that situation by focusing on one very important situation in which default rules are generally relied upon—and then asking which rule the parties actually prefer. In particular, we look at how consumer purchasers of goods and services view the default rules that apply when sellers tender an imperfect performance. Do those purchasers prefer a rule that allows them to insist on getting exactly what they sought (a rule reflected in the Uniform Commercial Code’s concept of “perfect tender”), or one that requires them to accept a performance that is reasonably close to, but not exactly, what they wanted (the common law’s “substantial performance” rule)? And does purchasers’ preference depend on the goods/services nature of the product? The UCC applies a perfect tender standard for goods, and a substantial performance standard for services. To shed light on consumer preferences, we conducted three studies, reported here. These studies uncover a powerful consumer preference for perfect tender in contracts for both goods and services. Consumers reject the idea that they have any moral or legal obligation to pay for things when they did not receive exactly what was ordered, even where the failure relates to an idiosyncratic preference rather than a difference in economic value between the promised performance and what was tendered. These findings are important because they show that one very large group of contracting parties (consumer purchasers) would not choose substantial performance as a default. Because there is already ample historical evidence that commercial buyers and sellers also prefer perfect tender, courts need to reevaluate the claim that substantial performance is a standard that most parties would agree to. While there may be good reasons for courts to impose a substantial performance standard on parties, their presumed preference is not one.

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Umar Farouq, Haruna, Ahmad Arifin Sapar, and Muhammad A. Rasheed Qomoos. "Sanctifying Microstructure in the Qur’anic Discourse: A Contextual Study." Al-Dad Journal 5, no. 1 (November 8, 2021): 109–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.22452/aldad.vol5no1.9.

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This research is an analytical analysis of Surat Al-Baqarah Verse No. 214, with an explanation of its situational context. This study aims to demonstrate the aspects of contextual analysis and its continuous horizons that are provided not only by the macro-structure of discourse, which is represented by default rules and semantics of rhetorical terms, but also by the micro-structure of discourse, which is represented by default rules and semantics of rhetorical terms. We recognize the perspectives, distinctions, and elements that are employed in lighting the discourse to impair the speaker's goals in order to achieve the eloquence of persuasion, communication, and comprehension through the micro-structure of discourse.

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