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1
Avanesyan, Galina. "Decision making in Ultimatum Game." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2013. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-197616.
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The aim of this work is to show that even people who outwardly demonstrate irrational behaviour are actually rational. The only reason why their actions deviate from theoretical rational behaviour is given by different utility functions. Ultimatum game with its easy rules represents a great way to show deviations between human and rational behaviours. The model described in the thesis focuses on Responder's decision making, which is influenced not only by maximization of pure economical profit but also by many other factors, which are summed in the model in one variable -- attitude to fairness. It is shown how this variable can be predicted using decisions obtained from a multi-round Ultimatum game. To prove that humans behave in accordance with their own preferences, the modelled game does not only estimate players' attitudes to fairness but also predicts players' following actions using knowledge of estimated values.
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BAZ, ABDULLAH. "AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE DECISION MAKING AT INTERSECTION USING GAME THEORY." University of Akron / OhioLINK, 2018. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=akron1530541445631072.
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Cardella, Eric. "An Investigation of Behavioral Influences in Strategic Decision Making." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/222632.
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In this dissertation, I study the impact of behavioral influences on strategic economic decision making in three essays.The first essay explores the interpersonal implications of guilt aversion in strategic settings. In doing so, I first introduce a stylized 2-player game where one players has an opportunity to induce guilt upon the other player in a manner derived from findings in the psychology literature. I then develop an experimental design, centered around this game, that allows me to test (i) whether agents attempt to induce guilt upon others in self-serving ways, (ii) whether agents are susceptible to the guilt induction of others, and (iii) whether agents are more trusting when they have an opportunity to induce guilt upon others. Furthermore, I theoretically show, via an application of the Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) model of simple guilt, that effective guilt induction can be supported as an equilibrium of the game considered.In the second essay, I explore the influence of posted price fairness concerns in bilateral negotiation settings. In doing so, I propose a price fairness model where, in addition to their material payoff, buyers receive disutility from engaging in negotiations, and aggressively negotiating, when the price is fair. As a result, the model predicts that buyers will negotiate less aggressively and possibly even forgo profitable negotiations when the posted price is fair, which is consistent with prior survey evidence on negotiation behavior. I also include a thorough discussion of the differences between the price fairness model and main alternative approaches to modeling fairness that exists in the literature.In the third essay, I experimentally investigate how the decision making quality of an agent's opponent influences learning in strategic games. In particular, I test whether learning-by-doing and learning-by-observing become more effective in games when agents face an optimal decision making opponent. To test these hypotheses, I propose a novel experimental design that enables me to measure strategic decision making quality and control the decision making quality of the opponent.
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Stauffer, Griffin K. "Design-build vs design-bid-build a procurement method selection framework." Thesis, (8 MB), 2006. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA471905.
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Thesis (M.S. in Civil Engineering)--Purdue University, 2006."August 2006." Description based on title screen as viewed on June 9, 2010. DTIC Descriptor(s): Decision Making, Construction, Game Theory, Procurement, Models, Facilities, Standards, Selection. DTIC Identifier(s): Construction Projects, Utility Theory, Thresholds, Frameworks, Procurement Criteria, Project Delivery, Procurement Methods, DB (Design-Build), DBB (Design-Bid-Build) Includes bibliographical references (leaves 31-32). Also available in print.
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Briceño, Simón Ignacio. "A game-based decision support methodology for competitive systems design." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/26671.
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This dissertation describes the development of a game-based methodology that facilitates the exploration and selection of research and development (R&D) projects under uncertain competitive scenarios. The proposed method provides an approach that analyzes competitor positioning and formulates response strategies to forecast the impact of technical design choices on a project's market performance. A critical decision in the conceptual design phase of propulsion systems is the selection of the best architecture, centerline, core size, and technology portfolio. A key objective of this research is to examine how firm characteristics such as their relative differences in completing R&D projects, differences in the degree of substitutability between different project types, and first/second-mover advantages affect their product development strategies. Several quantitative methods are investigated that analyze business and engineering strategies concurrently. In particular, formulations based on the well-established mathematical field of game theory are introduced to obtain insights into the project selection problem. The use of game theory is explored in this research as a method to assist the selection process of R&D projects in the presence of imperfect market information. The proposed methodology focuses on two influential factors: the schedule uncertainty of project completion times and the uncertainty associated with competitive reactions. A normal-form matrix is created to enumerate players, their moves and payoffs, and to formulate a process by which an optimal decision can be achieved. The non-cooperative model is tested using the concept of a Nash equilibrium to identify potential strategies that are robust to uncertain market fluctuations (e.g: uncertainty in airline demand, airframe requirements and competitor positioning). A first/second-mover advantage parameter is used as a scenario dial to adjust market rewards and firms' payoffs. The methodology is applied to a commercial aircraft engine selection study where engine firms must select an optimal engine project for development. An engine modeling and simulation framework is developed to generate a broad engine project portfolio. The proposed study demonstrates that within a technical design environment, a rational and analytical means of modeling project development strategies is beneficial in high market risk situations.
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Costa-Gomes, Miguel A. "Essays on behavior and cognition in experimental game theory /." Diss., Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC campuses, 1998. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p9907666.
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Cook, Edward. "Group Decision-Making." VCU Scholars Compass, 2019. https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/5928.
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The present work explores improvements in group decision-making. It begins with a practical example using state-of-the-art techniques for a complex, high-risk decision. We show how these techniques can reveal a better alternative. Although we created an improved decision process, decision-makers were apt to protect their own organizations instead of the project. This tendency was reduced over the course of the decision-making process but inspired the first conceptual component of this work.
The first concept describes the “Cost of Conflict” that can arise in a group decision, using game theory to represent the non-cooperative approach and comparing the outcome to the cooperative approach. We demonstrate that it is possible for the group to settle on a non-Paretto Nash equilibrium. The sensitivity of the decision-maker weights is revealed which led to the second conceptual portion of this work.
The second concept applies social network theory to study the influence between decision-makers in a group decision. By examining the number and strength of connections between decision-makers, we build from intrinsically derived weights to extrinsically derived weights by adding the network influences from other decision-makers. The two conceptual approaches provide a descriptive view of non-cooperative decisions where decision-makers still influence each other. These concepts suggest a prescriptive approach to achieving a higher group utility.
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Iriberri, Nagore. "Essays in behavioral game theory : auctions, hide and seek, and coordination /." Diss., Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF formate. Access restricted to UC campuses, 2006. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3244177.
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Briceñ̃o, Simón Ignacio. "A game-based decision support methodology for competitive systems design." Atlanta, Ga. : Georgia Institute of Technology, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/26671.
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Thesis (Ph.D)--Aerospace Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2009.Committee Chair: Mavris, Dimitri; Committee Member: Hollingsworth, Peter; Committee Member: Kavadias, Stylianos; Committee Member: Schrage, Daniel; Committee Member: Volovoi, Vitali. Part of the SMARTech Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Collection.
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Johansson, Alexander. "Strategic Decision-Making in Platoon Coordination." Licentiate thesis, KTH, Reglerteknik, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-275670.
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The need for sustainable transportation solutions is urgent as the demand for mobility of goods and people is expected to multiply in the upcoming decades. One promising solution is truck platooning, which shows great potential in reducing the fuel consumption and operational costs of trucks. In order to utilize the benefits of truck platooning to the fullest, trucks with different routes in a transportation network need coordination to efficiently meet and form platoons. This thesis addresses platoon coordination when trucks form platoons at hubs, where some trucks need to wait for others in order to meet, and there is a reward for platooning and a cost for waiting. Three contributions on the topic platoon coordination are presented in this thesis. In the first contribution, we consider platoon coordination among trucks that have pre-defined routes in a network of hubs, and the travel times are either deterministic or stochastic. The trucks are owned by competing transportation companies, and each truck decides on its waiting times at hubs in order to optimize its own operational cost. We consider a group of trucks to form a platoon if it departs from a hub and enters the road at the same time. The strategic interaction among trucks when they coordinate for platooning is modeled by non-cooperative game theory, and the Nash equilibrium is considered as the solution concept when the trucks make their decisions at the beginning of their journeys. In case of stochastic travel times, we also develop feedback-based solutions wherein trucks repeatedly update their decisions. We show in a simulation study of the Swedish transportation network that the feedback-based solutions achieve platooning rates up to 60 %. In the second contribution, we propose models for sharing the platooning profit among platoon members. The platooning benefit is not equal for all trucks in a platoon; typically, the lead truck benefits less than its followers. The incentive for transportation companies to cooperate in platooning may be low unless the profit is shared. We formulate platoon coordination games based on profit-sharing models, and in a simulation of a single hub, the outcomes of the platoon coordination games are evaluated. The evaluation shows that the total profit achieved when the trucks aim to maximize their own profits, but the platooning benefit is evened out among platoon members, is nearly as high as when each truck aims to maximize the total profit in the platooning system. In the last contribution, we study a problem where trucks arrive to a hub according to a stochastic arrival process. The trucks do not share a priori information about their arrivals; this may be sensitive information to share with others. A coordinator decides, based on the statistical distribution of arrivals, when to release the trucks at the hub in the form of a platoon. Under the assumption that the arrivals are independent and identically distributed, we show that it is optimal to release the trucks at the hub when the number of trucks exceeds a certain threshold. This contribution shows that simple and dynamic coordination approaches can obtain a high profit from platooning, even under high uncertainty and limited a priori information.Under de kommande decennierna förväntas efterfrågan på transport av varor och passagerare mångfaldigas, vilket innebär att behovet av hållbara transportlösningar är brådskande. En lovande lösning är konvojkörning, som visar stor potential att minska bränsleförbrukningen och driftskostnaderna för lastbilar. För att utnyttja fördelarna med konvojkörning till fullo behöver lastbilar koordineras för att effektivt mötas och bilda konvojer. Den här avhandlingen behandlar koordinering av lastbilar som kan bilda konvojer på transporthubbar, där vissa lastbilar måste vänta på andra lastbilar för att bilda konvojer, och det finns en belöning för konvojkörning och en kostnad för att vänta. Tre bidrag som behandlar konvojkoordinering presenteras i den här avhandlingen. Det första bidraget behandlar koordinering av lastbilar med förutbestämda rutter i ett transportnätverk med deterministiska eller stokastiska restider. Lastbilarna ägs av konkurrerande transportföretag, och varje lastbil beslutar om sina väntetider på hubbarna längs med sin rutt för att optimera sin driftskostnad. Vi antar att lastbilar bildar en konvoj om de avgår från en hubb och kör in på vägen samtidigt. Den strategiska interaktionen mellan lastbilar när de koordinerar för konvojbildning modelleras med icke-kooperativ spelteori, och vi betraktar Nashjämvikt som lösningskoncept när lastbilarna beslutar om sina väntetider i början av sina resor. I fallet med stokastiska restider utvecklar vi även lösningar där lastbilarna tillåts uppdatera sina väntetider längs med sina resor. I en simuleringsstudie över det svenska transportnätverket visas att när lastbilarna tillåts uppdatera sina väntetider uppnås en konjovkörningsgrad på 60%. I det andra bidraget utreds modeller för att dela på vinsten från konvojkörning. Fördelarna med konvojkörning är inte lika för alla lastbilar i en konvoj; vanligtvis är fördelen större för följarlastbilarna än för ledarlastbilen. Således kan incitamenten för transportföretag att samarbeta i form av konvojkörning vara låga om inte vinsterna från konvojkörning delas. Baserat på vinstdelningsmodeller formulerar vi konvojkoordineringsspel. I en simulering av en transporthubb utvärderar vi utfallet från konvojkoordinationsspelen. Det visar sig att den totala vinsten som uppnås när lastbilarna försöker maximera sina egna vinster, men vinsten från konvojkörning jämnas ut helt bland konvojmedlemmar, är nästan lika hög som när varje lastbil försöker att maximera den totala vinsten i systemet. I det sista bidraget studeras ett koordineringsproblem där lastbilar anländer till en transporthubb enligt en stokastisk ankomstprocess. Lastbilarna delar inte förhandsinformation om sina ankomster; detta kan vara känslig information att dela. En koordinator bestämmer, baserat på den statistiska sannolikhetsfördelningen av ankomster, när lastbilarna på transporthubben ska släppas iväg i form av en konvoj. Under antagandet att ankomsterna är statistiskt oberoende och likafördelade, visar vi att det är optimalt att släppa iväg lastbilarna från transporthubben i form av en konvoj när antalet lastbilar överskrider en viss tröskel. Detta bidrag visar att enkla och dynamiska koordineringsmetoder kan erhålla en hög vinst från konvojkörning, även under hög osäkerhet och begränsad förhandsinformation.
Länk till den offentliga granskningen tillkännages via: https://www.kth.se/profile/alexjoha
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Muggy, Timothy Luke. "Quantifying and mitigating decentralized decision making in humanitarian logistics systems." Diss., Kansas State University, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2097/19794.
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Doctor of PhilosophyDepartment of Industrial & Manufacturing Systems Engineering
Jessica L. Heier Stamm
Humanitarian and public health logistics systems are often characterized by decentralized decision makers in the form of response agencies who establish supply chains and the beneficiaries who access them. While classical models assume there is a single decision maker with a global objective and authority, decentralized systems consist of multiple decision makers, each with accomplishing his own objective and scope of control. The literature demonstrates that decentralized systems often perform poorly when compared to their hypothetical centralized counterparts. However, there exist few models in the literature to quantify the impact of decentralization and mechanisms for its mitigation are deficient. This research advances knowledge of decentralized systems through new game theory and optimization models, solution methodologies and theoretical characterizations of system performance. First, the author presents a literature review that synthesizes research regarding the facets of humanitarian operations that can benefit from the application of game theory. The author finds that models of decentralized behavior lack realism, neglecting sources of uncertainty, dynamism and personal preferences that influence individuals' decisions. These findings motivate the remaining components of the thesis. Next, the author focuses on decentralization on the part of response agencies who open service facilities. Decentralization can adversely impact patient access and equity, both critical factors in humanitarian contexts. A dynamic, robust facility location model is introduced to enable a comparison between a given decentralized response and a hypothetical coordinated response using identical resources. The value of the model is demonstrated through a computational study of the response to a recent cholera epidemic. Finally, the author introduces game theory models that represent the decisions of beneficiaries seeking relief. The models account for distance, congestion, and the relative importance an individual places on the two. The author constructs an algorithm that computes a decentralized solution in polynomial time. The author quantifies decentralized system performance in comparison to centralized control, bounding the cost of decentralized decision making for the least and most costly outcomes. The author identifies coordination mechanisms encourage centrally optimal decisions within decentralized systems.
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Namuduri, Savitha. "Analysis of resource-sharing decisions in dyadic collaborative knowledge creation a game-theoretic approach /." unrestricted, 2005. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-02102006-141305/.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2005.Title from title screen. Dr. Subhashish (Sub) Samaddar, committee chair; William Bogner, Arun Rai, Thomas Whalen, committee members. Electronic text (174 p. : ill. (some col.)) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed June 29, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 164-173).
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Li, Mingfei. "Strategies in repeated games." Diss., Connect to online resource - MSU authorized users, 2008.
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Allars, M. N. "Coordination and administrative discretion." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.371505.
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Moskalenko, Anna. "Essays on Collective Decision-Making." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/666290.
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Aquesta tesi consta de quatre capítols independents relacionats amb la presa de decisions col·lectives. En primer lloc, s'analitza la dinàmica en un partit polític en presència del conflicte intern. Es mostra com la incorporació de la democràcia interna (en particular, la introducció de primàries) pot ajudar a resoldre el conflicte intern. En segon lloc, s'estudia el problema que es crea quan un grup d'agents ha de triar un guanyador entre ells. Hi ha un guanyador merescut, que tots els agents coneixen. No obstant això, cada agent és egoista: sempre vol ser el guanyador. Es construeix el mecanisme de veto, que sempre tria el guanyador merescut, independentment de les preferències egoistes dels agents. En tercer lloc, es qüestiona la hipòtesi de la nocivitat de la regla de vot dictatorial. L'anàlisi pretén allunyar-se de la regla de vot dictatorial, buscant la regla que estigui més lluny de la regla dictatorial més propera, i identificar les regles que equilibrin totes les regles dictatorials. El primer resultat troba la regla de pluralitat inversa com la més allunyada de la regla de votació dictatorial més propera. Malauradament, aquesta regla incompleix algunes propietats aparentment desitjables. El segon resultat conclou que la regla de pluralitat és la que equilibra l'acord entre totes les regles de votació dictatorials. En quart lloc, s'analitza la relació entre dues propietats incompatibles, la dictadura i la manipulabilitat, en termes de certs índexs de manipulabilitat i no dictadura. L'objectiu és donar una mica de llum sobre el problema de triar entre les regles de vot.Esta tesis consiste de cuatro capítulos independientes relacionados con la toma de decisiones colectiva. En primer lugar, se analizan la dinámica en un partido político en presencia de conflicto enterno. Se muestra cómo la incorporación de la democracia interna (en particular, la introducción de las primarias) puede ayudar a resolver el conflicto dentro del partido. En segundo lugar, se estudia el problema que se crea cuando un grupo de agentes debe elegir un ganador entre ellos. Existe un ganador merecido a quien todos los agentes conocen. Sin embargo, cada agente es egoísta: siempre quiere ser el ganador. Se construye el mecanismo de veto, que siempre elige al ganador merecido independientemente de las preferencias egoístas de los agentes. En tercer lugar, se cuestiona la suposición de la nocividad de la regla de votación dictatorial indeseable. El objetivo del análisis es alejarse de la regla de votación dictatorial, buscando la regla que está más alejada de la regla dictatorial más cercana, e identificar las reglas que equilibren todas las reglas dictatoriales. El primer resultado encuentra la regla de pluralidad inversa como la más alejada de la regla de votación dictatorial más cercana. Desafortunadamente, esta regla viola algunas propiedades aparentemente deseables. El segundo resultado concluye que la regla de pluralidad es la que equilibra el acuerdo entre todas las reglas de votación dictatoriales. En cuarto lugar, se analiza la relación entre dos propiedades incompatibles, la dictadura y la manipulabilidad, en términos de ciertos índices de manipulabilidad y no-dictadura. El objetivo es arrojar algo de luz sobre el problema de elegir entre las reglas de votación.
This thesis consists of four independent chapters related to collective decision-making. First, intra-party dynamics is analyzed in the presence of intra-party conflict. It is shown how the incorporation of intra-party democracy (in particular, the introduction of primaries) may help to resolve intra-party conflict. Second, the problem arising when a group of agents must choose a winner among themselves is studied. There exists a deserving winner, whom all agents know. Nevertheless, each agent is selfish: he always wants to be the winner. A veto mechanism is proposed that always chooses the deserving winner irrespective of the selfish preferences of the agents. Third, the assumption of the harmfulness of dictatorial voting rule is questioned. The aim is to get away from dictatorial voting rules, by searching for the rule that is the furthest away from the closest dictatorial rule, and to identify the rules balancing all dictatorial rules. The first result finds the reverse-plurality rule as the furthest from the closest dictatorial voting rule. Unfortunately, this rule violates some apparently desirable properties. The second result states that the plurality rule is the one that balances the agreement between all dictatorial voting rules. Fourth, the relationship between two incompatible properties of dictatorship and manipulability is analyzed, in terms of certain indices of manipulability and non-dictatorship. The aim is to shed some light on the problem of choosing between voting rules.
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Dauberman, Jamie. "Making decisions about screening cargo containers for nuclear threats using decision analysis and optimization." VCU Scholars Compass, 2010. http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/2240.
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One of the most pressing concerns in homeland security is the illegal passing of weapons-grade nuclear material through the borders of the United States. If terrorists can gather the materials needed to construct a nuclear bomb or radiological dispersion device (RDD, i.e., dirty bomb) while inside the United States, the consequences would be devastating. Preventing plutonium, highly enriched uranium (HEU), tritium gas or other materials that can be used to construct a nuclear weapon from illegally entering the United States is an area of vital concern. There are enormous economic consequences when our nation's port security system is compromised. Interdicting nuclear material being smuggled into the United States on cargo containers is an issue of vital national interest, since it is a critical aspect of protecting the United States from nuclear attacks. However, the efforts made to prevent nuclear material from entering the United States via cargo containers have been disjoint, piecemeal, and reactive, not the result of coordinated, systematic planning and analysis. Our economic well-being is intrinsically linked with the success and security of the international trade system. International trade accounts for more than thirty percent of the United States economy (Rooney, 2005). Ninety-five percent of international goods that enter the United States come through one of 361 ports, adding up to more than 11.4 million containers every year (Fritelli, 2005; Rooney, 2005; US DOT, 2007). Port security has emerged as a critically important yet vulnerable component in the homeland security system. Applying game theoretic methods to counterterrorism provides a structured technique for defenders to analyzing the way adversaries will interact under different circumstances and scenarios. This way of thinking is somewhat counterintuitive, but is an extremely useful tool in analyzing potential strategies for defenders. Decision analysis can handle very large and complex problems by integrating multiple perspectives and providing a structured process in evaluating preferences and values from the individuals involved. The process can still ensure that the decision still focuses on achieving the fundamental objectives. In the decision analysis process value tradeoffs are evaluated to review alternatives and attitudes to risk can be quantified to help the decision maker understand what aspects of the problem are not under their control. Most of all decision analysis provides insight that may not have been captured or fully understood if decision analysis was not incorporated into the decision making process. All of these factors make decision analysis essentially to making an informed decision. Game theory and decision analysis both play important roles in counterterrorism efforts. However, they both have their weaknesses. Decision analysis techniques such as probabilistic risk analysis can provide incorrect assessments of risk when modeling intelligent adversaries as uncertain hazards. Game theory analysis also has limitations. For example when analyzing a terrorist or terrorist group using game theory we can only take into consideration one aspect of the problem to optimize at a time. Meaning the analysis is either analyzing the problem from the defenders perspective or from the attacker’s perspective. Parnell et al. (2009) was able to develop a model that simultaneously maximizes the effects of the terrorist and minimizes the consequences for the defender. The question this thesis aims to answer is whether investing in new detector technology for screening cargo containers is a worthwhile investment for protecting our country from a terrorist attack. This thesis introduces an intelligent adversary risk analysis model for determining whether to use new radiological screening technologies at our nation’s ports. This technique provides a more realistic risk assessment of the true situation being modeled and determines whether it is cost effective for our country to invest in new cargo container screening technology. The optimal decision determined by our model is for the United States to invest in a new detector, and for the terrorists to choose agent cobalt-60, shown in Figure 18. This is mainly due to the prominence of false alarms and the high costs associated with screening all of these false alarms, and we assume for every cargo container that sounds an alarm, that container is physically inspected. With the new detector technology the prominence of false alarms decreases and the true alarm rate increases, the cost savings associated with this change in the new technology outweighs the cost of technical success or failure. Since the United States is attempting to minimize their expected cost per container, the optimal choice is to invest in the new detector. Our intelligent adversary risk analysis model can simultaneously determine the best decision for the United States, who is trying to minimize the expected cost, and the terrorist, who is trying to maximize the expected cost to the United States. Simultaneously modeling the decisions of the defender and attacker provides a more accurate picture of reality and could provide important insights to the real situation that may have been missed with other techniques. The model is extremely sensitive to certain inputs and parameters, even though the values are in line with what is available in the literature, it is important to understand the sensitivities. Two inputs that were found to be particularly important are the expected cost for physically inspecting a cargo container, and the cost of implementing the technology needed for the new screening device. Using this model the decision maker can construct more accurate judgments based on the true situation. This increase in accuracy could save lives with the decisions being made. The model can also help the decision maker understand the interdependencies of the model and visually see how his resource allocations affect the optimal decisions of the defender and the attacker.
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Justin, Cedric Y. "A quantitative real options method for aviation technology decision-making in the presence of uncertainty." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/54452.
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The developments of new technologies for commercial aviation involve significant risk for technologists as these programs are often driven by fixed assumptions regarding future airline needs, while being subject to many uncertainties at the technical and market levels. To prioritize these developments, technologists must assess their economic viability even though standard methods used for capital budgeting are not well suited to handle the overwhelming uncertainty surrounding such developments.
This research proposes a framework featuring real options to overcome this challenge. It is motivated by three observations: disregarding the value of managerial flexibility undervalues long-term research and development (R&D) programs; windows of opportunities emerge and disappear and manufacturers can derive significant value by exploiting their upside potential; integrating competitive aspects early in the design ensures that development programs are robust with respect to moves by the competition.
Real options analyses have been proposed to address some of these points but the adoption has been slow, hindered by constraining frameworks. A panel of academics and practitioners has identified a set of requirements, known as the Georgetown Challenge, that real options analyses must meet to get more traction amongst practitioners in the industry. In a bid to meet some of these requirements, this research proposes a novel methodology, cross-fertilizing techniques from financial engineering, actuarial sciences, and statistics to evaluate and study the timing of technology developments under uncertainty. It aims at substantiating decision making for R&D while having a wider domain of application and an improved ability to handle a complex reality compared to more traditional approaches.
The method named FLexible AViation Investment Analysis (FLAVIA) uses first Monte Carlo techniques to simulate the evolution of uncertainties driving the value of technology developments. A non-parametric Esscher transform is then applied to perform a change of probability measure to express these evolutions under the equivalent martingale measure. A bootstrap technique is suggested next to construct new non-weighted evolutions of the technology development value under the new measure. A regression-based technique is finally used to analyze the technology development program and to discover trigger boundaries which help define when the technology development program should be launched.
Verification of the method is performed on several canonical examples and indicates good accuracy and competitive execution time. It is applied next to the analysis of a performance improvement package (PIP) development using the Integrated Cost And Revenue Estimation method (i-CARE) developed as part of this research. The PIP can be retrofitted to currently operating turbofan engines in order to mitigate the impact of the aging process on their operating costs. The PIP is subject to market uncertainties, such as the evolution of jet-fuel prices and the possible taxation of carbon emissions. The profitability of the PIP development is investigated and the value of managerial flexibility and timing flexibility are highlighted.The developments of new technologies for commercial aviation involve significant risk for technologists as these programs are often driven by fixed assumptions regarding future airline needs, while being subject to many uncertainties at the technical and market levels. To prioritize these developments, technologists must assess their economic viability even though standard methods used for capital budgeting are not well suited to handle the overwhelming uncertainty surrounding such developments.
This research proposes a framework featuring real options to overcome this challenge. It is motivated by three observations: disregarding the value of managerial flexibility undervalues long-term research and development (R&D) programs; windows of opportunities emerge and disappear and manufacturers can derive significant value by exploiting their upside potential; integrating competitive aspects early in the design ensures that development programs are robust with respect to moves by the competition.
Real options analyses have been proposed to address some of these points but the adoption has been slow, hindered by constraining frameworks. A panel of academics and practitioners has identified a set of requirements, known as the Georgetown Challenge, that real options analyses must meet to get more traction amongst practitioners in the industry. In a bid to meet some of these requirements, this research proposes a novel methodology, cross-fertilizing techniques from financial engineering, actuarial sciences, and statistics to evaluate and study the timing of technology developments under uncertainty. It aims at substantiating decision making for R&D while having a wider domain of application and an improved ability to handle a complex reality compared to more traditional approaches.
The method named FLexible AViation Investment Analysis (FLAVIA) uses first Monte Carlo techniques to simulate the evolution of uncertainties driving the value of technology developments. A non-parametric Esscher transform is then applied to perform a change of probability measure to express these evolutions under the equivalent martingale measure. A bootstrap technique is suggested next to construct new non-weighted evolutions of the technology development value under the new measure. A regression-based technique is finally used to analyze the technology development program and to discover trigger boundaries which help define when the technology development program should be launched.
Verification of the method is performed on several canonical examples and indicates good accuracy and competitive execution time. It is applied next to the analysis of a performance improvement package (PIP) development using the Integrated Cost And Revenue Estimation method (i-CARE) developed as part of this research. The PIP can be retrofitted to currently operating turbofan engines in order to mitigate the impact of the aging process on their operating costs. The PIP is subject to market uncertainties, such as the evolution of jet-fuel prices and the possible taxation of carbon emissions. The profitability of the PIP development is investigated and the value of managerial flexibility and timing flexibility are highlighted.
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Robinson, A. Emanuel. "The Impact of Causality, Strategies, and Temporal Cues on Games of Decision." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/11488.
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Decision-making is something we do every day, and is a broad research area that impacts disciplines spanning from economics to philosophy to psychology. The question of rational behavior has been of particular interest (Colman, 2003). A specific area of decision-making where rationality has been investigated is game theory, which deals with the interactions of two or more opponents in a competitive situation (e.g., von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). The dominant theoretical perspective in this area claims individuals try to maximize expected utility when making decisions (e.g., Luce and Raiffa, 1957). An alternative theory has been put forth to better explain experimental deviations from utility theory and rationality. Causal decision theory is based on the assumption that individuals incorporate causal knowledge in decisions, while trying to maximize causal utility (e.g., Sloman, 2005). The present study delineated these theoretical approaches as strategies that can be utilized in game theoretic situations (based on a strategy choice perspective in deductive reasoning developed by Robinson and Hertzog, 2005). The role of causal models, strategy choice, and temporal assumptions were investigated. In both experiments, there was support for causal decision theory and the primary prediction that a direct causal model leads to more cooperation in competitive situations. Conversely, those individuals that were given (or assumed) a common cause model chose to cooperate less. Qualitative coding and strategy self-reports aligned with these findings and according to predictions. These differences in cooperation based on causal models also held across items for the same participant. Finally, causal information superseded temporal cues in affecting behavior.
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Luo, Yi. "DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY IN DYNAMIC MULTI-STAGE ATTACKER-DEFENDER GAMES." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/204331.
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This dissertation presents efficient, on-line, convergent methods to find defense strategies against attacks in dynamic multi-stage attacker-defender games including adaptive learning. This effort culminated in four papers submitted to high quality journals and a book and they are partially published. The first paper presents a novel fictitious play approach to describe the interactions between the attackers and network administrator along a dynamic game. Multi-objective optimization methodology is used to predict the attacker's best actions at each decision node. The administrator also keeps track of the attacker's actions and updates his knowledge on the attacker's behavior and objectives after each detected attack, and uses this information to update the prediction of the attacker's future actions to find its best response strategies. The second paper proposes a Dynamic game tree based Fictitious Play (DFP) approach to describe the repeated interactive decision processes of the players. Each player considers all possibilities in future interactions with their uncertainties, which are based on learning the opponent's decision process (including risk attitude, objectives). Instead of searching the entire game tree, appropriate future time horizons are dynamically selected for both players. The administrator keeps tracking the opponent's actions, predicts the probabilities of future possible attacks, and then chooses its best moves. The third paper introduces an optimization model to maximize the deterministic equivalent of the random payoff function of a computer network administrator in defending the system against random attacks. By introducing new variables the transformed objective function becomes concave. A special optimization algorithm is developed which requires the computation of the unique solution of a single variable monotonic equation. The fourth paper, which is an invited book chapter, proposes a discrete-time stochastic control model to capture the process of finding the best current move of the defender. The defender's payoffs at each stage of the game depend on the attacker's and the defender's accumulative efforts and are considered random variables due to their uncertainty. Their certain equivalents can be approximated based on their first and second moments which is chosen as the cost functions of the dynamic system. An on-line, convergent, Scenarios based Proactive Defense (SPD) algorithm is developed based on Differential Dynamic Programming (DDP) to solve the associated optimal control problem.
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Tong, Ching Hua. "Social networks and dynamic interaction among imperfectly rational agents /." Diss., Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC campuses, 1997. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p9812498.
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Rojas-Ferrer, Isabel. "Individual Variation In Information and Its Use." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/42105.
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Individuals within a population can vary in the way that they acquire, store, and act on information from the environment. Researchers have commonly looked at differences in genetic architecture, physical environment, or personality as possible causes of individual variation in cognition. Though cognition is defined as a suite of mechanisms involving the processing of information, we have yet to asses information (i.e. a numerical measure of the uncertainty of an outcome) as a possible cause of individual variation in cognition. This thesis seeks to understand the causes of individual variation in cognition by using approaches that allow quantifying and/or manipulating information acquisition or its use. In Chapter 1, I look at the link between information gathering and exploratory personality by testing the correlation between activity in a novel environment and attraction to novelty in wild-caught black-capped chickadees (Poecile atricapillus). My results validate exploratory personality assessed in an open field test as a measure of information gathering. Fast exploration of a novel environment was positively correlated with novelty seeking, suggesting that exploration is an information gathering strategy. In Chapter 2, I test for experience with informative vs non-informative cues as a cause for individual differences in decision making and learning performance. Here, I manipulated the informational properties (i.e. presence and number of reliable cues) of the developmental environment of juvenile captive zebra finches (Taenopygia guttata). This rare longitudinal and experimental examination of the effect of informative versus non-informative cues during development suggests that experience with informative cues can cause increased discrimination learning accuracy and decision-making speed later in life. Finally, in Chapter 3 I looked into individual variation in information use and decision making using a game theoretic approach. Using a producer-scrounger game, groups of zebra finches were exposed to varying seed distributions. Individual strategy choice in a social-foraging game was not significantly correlated with an individual’s experience with informative cues or learning performance. Still, contrary to my predictions, fear response significantly predicted strategy choice where more fearful individuals were more likely to choose a producer strategy. By addressing information as a parameter, my results suggest that information can affect individual variation depending on context.
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Yin, Jin. "Evolving game theory based decision making systems for NETA power market modelling, analysis and trading strategy development." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2005. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1514/.
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In this thesis, current work carried out on analyzing the strategic behaviours in electricity trading is first reviewed. An intelligent decision-making and support technique, game theory, is often used in the market practice. Game theory is a discipline concerned with how individuals make decisions when they are partly aware of how their action might affect each other and when each individual might take this into account. Deficiencies and limitations of traditional game theory based methods developed for decision-making in electricity trading are also investigated. This research then explores to discover the impact of intelligent systems based trading strategies in the UK power markets. To model these behaviours and the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) system of the UK, traditional competitive and cooperative game theory strategies are taken into account in the work reported in this thesis. An improved methodology, “trigger price strategy”, is introduced to simulate power generation companies’ enhanced gaming strategies. Such modelling problem is, however, intractable and hence an extra-numerical search technique, Evolutionary Computation, is employed to solve the game theory based system modelling problem. An encoded Genetic Algorithm based technique is developed to search for an effective model for the complex decision-making process and to help decision-makers evaluate their strategies and bidding parameters. A novel and effective electricity trading simulation model is thus developed, where its design features are close to the NETA. The model scale is as close as possible to NETA. A complex and more realistic two-sided transaction mechanism with demand fully incorporated is incorporated in this model. These are a world first in this research area.
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Bella, Aimee Adjoua. "Conflict analysis under climatic uncertainties: The upper Rio Grande basin." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/187489.
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Conflict analysis and game theory models are applied to a case study in the upper Rio Grande river basin. The objective is to find which theory best describes past developments in the Rio Grande river basin and the status quo of water use strategies employed by the players (decision makers). By assuming that these past properties will propagate in the future, the preferable change in the equilibrium solution is derived under climate fluctuation, coupled with future population growth scenarios. Past and future Rio Grande resource allocation conflicts are analyzed using (1) multicriterion decision making (MCDM) techniques, such as distance based approach of compromise programming and outranking technique of the ELECTRE family and (2) voting scheme approach of game theory. MCDM and game theory model cases are classified according to the following categories: 1. If decision makers consider each other payoff or if an authority above forces them to consider each other's payoffs, then the conflict analysis problem is a multiactor/ multiobjective problem. 2. If decision makers only care about their own payoff and not what other players payoff are, then the conflict analysis problem is described and solved by game theoretic models. Fifteen decision makers from the Rio Grande water allocation and water management conflict are used as an example to present the different approaches to conflict modeling. From the MCDM techniques used, namely the compromise programming of distance-based approach and the ELECTRE family of outranking relation, the former method stands out as being the most flexible and comprehensive methodology. Though these two methods are conceptually different, for this case study, both methods give approximately the same results. For the game theory analysis, the special voting scheme stands out as being the preferred approach because it better reflects the decision maker's preference and it also is easy to implement and apply. Finally, the climate change scenarios are considered, the 1XCO₂ and the 2XCO₂. Results obtained from these two scenarios indicate the Rio Grande river will face extreme water shortages that will require the development of a different set of water release rules.
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Antos, Dimitrios. "Deploying Affect-Inspired Mechanisms to Enhance Agent Decision-Making and Communication." Thesis, Harvard University, 2012. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10107.
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Computer agents are required to make appropriate decisions quickly and efficiently. As the environments in which they act become increasingly complex, efficient decision-making becomes significantly more challenging. This thesis examines the positive ways in which human emotions influence people’s ability to make good decisions in complex, uncertain contexts, and develops computational analogues of these beneficial functions, demonstrating their usefulness in agent decision-making and communication. For decision-making by a single agent in large-scale environments with stochasticity and high uncertainty, the thesis presents GRUE (Goal Re-prioritization Using Emotion), a decision-making technique that deploys emotion-inspired computational operators to dynamically re-prioritize the agent’s goals. In two complex domains, GRUE is shown to result in improved agent performance over many existing techniques. Agents working in groups benefit from communicating and sharing information that would otherwise be unobservable. The thesis defines an affective signaling mechanism, inspired by the beneficial communicative functions of human emotion, that increases coordination. In two studies, agents using the mechanism are shown to make faster and more accurate inferences than agents that do not signal, resulting in improved performance. Moreover, affective signals confer performance increases equivalent to those achieved by broadcasting agents’ entire private state information. Emotions are also useful signals in agents’ interactions with people, influencing people’s perceptions of them. A computer-human negotiation study is presented, in which virtual agents expressed emotion. Agents whose emotion expressions matched their negotiation strategy were perceived as more trustworthy, and they were more likely to be selected for future interactions. In addition, to address similar limitations in strategic environments, this thesis uses the theory of reasoning patters in complex game-theoretic settings. An algorithm is presented that speeds up equilibrium computation in certain classes of games. For Bayesian games, with and without a common prior, the thesis also discusses a novel graphical formalism that allows agents’ possibly inconsistent beliefs to be succinctly represented, and for reasoning patterns to be defined in such games. Finally, the thesis presents a technique for generating advice from a game’s reasoning patterns for human decision-makers, and demonstrates empirically that such advice helps people make better decisions in a complex game.Engineering and Applied Sciences
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servati, mohsen. "game of change; a game theoretic approach to organizational change management." Thesis, Jönköping University, JTH, Industrial Engineering and Management, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-12707.
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Organizational change and game theory were separately investigated over time. Due to lack of scientific research on the relationships of those two fields of knowledge, an investigation of the game theoretic applications in managing change was performed in this research. Game theoretic applications were structured concerning the analytical use of game theory, strategic formulation with game theory and equilibrium analysis. By a qualitative flexible research method, main problematic areas of organizational change were identified with suitable game theoretic applications. Those problem areas are: making cooperation and coalition in change, group dynamic difficulties and the problem of incentive rewards. In each problem area, game theoretic solutions were discussed to help managers to make better decisions. Four mechanisms were inferred to support the game theoretic analysis of change management problems. Those mechanisms are: sub games, practical games, specific modeling and behavioral studies of games. Finally, an instructional framework was developed to conclude findings and illuminate the game theoretic approach in organizational change.
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Sgroi, Daniel. "Theories of learning in economics." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2000. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:b8d832af-57e7-45c2-a846-b69de3d25ec0.
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How should we model learning behaviour in economic agents? This thesis addresses this question in two distinct ways. In the first set of chapters the assumption is that agents learn through the observation of others. They use Bayesian updating which together with specific informational assumptions can generate the problem known as herding with the potential for significant welfare losses. In the final set of chapters the agent is instead modelled as learning by example. Here the agent cannot learn by observing others, but has a pool of experience to fall back on. This allows us to examine how an economic agent will perform if he sees a particular economic situation (or game) for the first time, but has experience of playing related games. The tool used to capture the notion of learning through example is a neural network. Throughout the thesis the central theme is that economic agents will naturally use as much information as they can to help them make decisions. In many cases this should mean they take into consideration others' actions or their own experiences in similar but non-identical situations. Learning throughout the thesis will be rational or bounded-rational in the sense that either the best possible way to learn will be utilized (so players achieve full rational play, for example, through Bayesian updating), or a suitable local error-minimizing algorithm will be developed (for example, a rule of thumb which optimizes play in a subclass of games, but not in the overall set of possible games). Several themes permeate the whole thesis, including the scope for firms or planners to manipulate the information that is used by agents for their own ends, the role of rules of thumb, and the realism of current theories of learning in economics.
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Sprumont, Yves. "Three essays in collective choice theory." Diss., Virginia Tech, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/40872.
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Vasconcelos, Carlos Pontes de. "O Processo da Tomada de Decisão e os seus efeitos num contexto escolar." Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/12806.
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Dissertação de Mestrado em Administração Pública na especialização de Administração da EducaçãoO processo de tomada de decisão no seio das organizações e a definição das estratégias constituem desde sempre um dos maiores desafios para a Administração Pública, sobretudo se se considerar a forma cada vez mais rápida como a realidade se altera. Este processo é ainda mais exigente se for tido em conta a crescente necessidade das entidades públicas pautarem a sua atividade, por níveis de eficiência cada vez maiores. É com este pano de fundo que o presente estudo procura analisar a forma da tomada de decisão, no seio da comunidade escolar e medir o alcance dos seus efeitos. Estes efeitos não se cingem apenas à realidade educativa das escolas, na medida em que, sendo a escola uma importante parcela da comunidade é também sobre esta, que se produzem alterações. Para este enquadramento foi importante integrar a realidade Escola no meio onde existem outras instituições de ensino num contexto onde as instituições passaram a se reger segundo uma realidade concorrencial e nesta perspetiva, foi importante estuda-la com recurso à Teoria dos Jogos. Como opções metodológicas, a investigação adota o estudo caso e, nesse ambiente, recorre por um lado à análise documental no contexto escolar e, por outro, ao estudo estatístico como forma de relacionar variáveis e verificar hipóteses. O estudo aponta, como consequência da tomada de decisão, não apenas alterações sobre a realidade escolar, mas também sobre a realidade social envolvente.
One of the major challenges for Public Administration has always been the adoption within its various institutions of decision making processes that lead to optimal decision making and the design and implementation of effective strategies. Decision making in the Public Administration is perhaps more complex and demanding nowadays than it has ever been. This is not only because reality changes at a very fast pace, but also because of the increasing pressure put on public institutions to become more efficient. Having this context as background, the present study discusses decision making within schools, analyses one particular decision made by one school and carefully measures its implications. The study follows the Case Study method approach. The research done is based both on documental analysis and on statistical analysis as a way of finding associations between variables and testing hypothesis. Because the decision considered in the study is made in a situation where more than one school serves the same community and schools compete for students, Game Theory considerations are also used in the analysis of the decision. The study suggests that decisions made by one school may have unintended negative consequences for that school. It also suggests that such decisions may also have implications for the way competing schools interact and for the community that they serve.
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Green, Ellen P. "A Study of Human Decision-Making in Economic Games." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29505.
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This dissertation contains three essays on the impact of other-regarding behavior on human decision-making. Chapter II uses experimental methods to analyze the relative performance of a variety of compensation contracts. This study creates an environment in which individuals are paid via common payment mechanisms employed in the dual-principal agent relationships (Piece Rate, Flat Rate, Salary, Bonus and Socialization) and examines the effect that different incentive structures have on agent behavior. In Chapter III I explore the potential outcomes of blended payment structures in a dual-principal agent environment. I draw from the previously conducted experimental study in Chapter II and simulate agent behavior induced by blended payment mechanisms. In Chapter IV, I move away from studying payment mechanisms to investigate the impact of intentionality and responsibility on an individualâ s decision-making process. I explore the effects of direct and indirect responsibility as well as selfish and kind intentions using experimental methodology. Each of these essays provides further evidence that other-regarding behavior has a significant impact on the outcome of an economic situation; therefore, emphasizing the need to address such behavior in theoretical designs.Ph. D.
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Nwadiora, Chinedum D. "A Dual-Role Analysis of Game Form Misconception and Cognitive Bias in Financial and Economic Decision Making." ScholarWorks@UNO, 2017. http://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/2350.
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The endowment and the framing effect are widely examined cognitive biases. The experimental economics literature, using choice data gathered through an elicitation device, commonly finds evidence of these biases. Recent work by Cason & Plott (2014) shows that the interpretation of choice data as consistent with biases related non-standard preference theory could also be consistent with confusion or misconception of the game type used to elucidate preferences. I use the Cason and Plott card auction framework to analyze offers of buyers and sellers in an experimental setting with subjects from the University of New Orleans simulating 97 sellers and 90 buyers. The two games have symmetric payoffs in order to examine cognitive biases given subjects’ misconception of the game form. Subjects of both games display misconception of game form that explains both endowment and framing effects by rational confused choice; however, buyers display a much greater dispersion of offers than sellers. I estimate card implied valuation of sellers and buyers given game form misconception and find no statistical endowment effect, but I do find valuation is more uncertain in the buyer’s game. The theory of Rational Inattention predicts this lack of offer symmetry is due to the additional cognitive steps necessary in calculating buyer offers.
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Rajabi, Mohammad. "New decision support systems for Public Private Partnership projects." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/25747.
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It is well established that one of the key contributing factors to the growth of countries’ economies is the existence of appropriate economic and social infrastructures. The setup of these infrastructures and their operation or delivery of public services associated with them have proved to be a costly and often unaffordable business for most governments. Therefore, private sector participation in the delivery of public services has been opted for by governments under Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). Additional reasons for the public sector to choose a PPP framework to deliver public services include the public sector representatives’ lack of sufficient technical knowledge and specifications required by most projects; the required amount of investment to implement such projects is too high to be affordable by the public sector alone; the increasing difficulties of predicting and controlling the uncertainties that typically govern the phases of such projects including the level of actual demand for the related services by the time the project is operational; the level of bureaucracy in the public sector and its implications on the time frame of decision-making processes; the relatively low efficiency in project execution by the public sector; and most importantly the fact that, in practice, these difficulties are often better managed by the private sector who seem to possess both the financial and the executive capabilities to undertake such projects Currently, there is a gap in the game theory literature on modelling PPP related decisions and issues. This thesis contributes to reducing such gap by proposing three novel and practice-oriented game theoretical models along with algorithms for solving them, namely an ordinal game for the shortlisting of potential private sector partners; two non-cooperative dynamic games for negotiation with shortlisted private sector partners and selection of private sector partner to award the PPP contract to; and a non-cooperative dynamic game for financial renegotiation post-PPP contract award. In sum, each novel game addresses an important problem faced by the private sector during the typical stages of the life cycle of PPPs, namely private sector partner selection at the tendering stage; negotiation between the public sector and shortlisted bidders to select the candidate to whom to award a PPP contract to at the post-tendering stage; and financial re-negotiation between the public sector and the selected private sector partner at the post-contract award stage.
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Jones, Malachi G. "Asymmetric information games and cyber security." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/50284.
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A cyber-security problem is a conflict-resolution scenario that typically consists of a security system and at least two decision makers (e.g. attacker and defender) that can each have competing objectives. In this thesis, we are interested in cyber-security problems where one decision maker has superior or better information. Game theory is a well-established mathematical tool that can be used to analyze such problems and will be our tool of choice. In particular, we will formulate cyber-security problems as stochastic games with asymmetric information, where game-theoretic methods can then be applied to the problems to derive optimal policies for each decision maker. A severe limitation of considering optimal policies is that these policies are computationally prohibitive. We address the complexity issues by introducing methods, based on the ideas of model predictive control, to compute suboptimal polices. Specifically, we first prove that the methods generate suboptimal policies that have tight performance bounds. We then show that the suboptimal polices can be computed by solving a linear program online, and the complexity of the linear program remains constant with respect to the game length. Finally, we demonstrate how the suboptimal policy methods can be applied to cyber-security problems to reduce the computational complexity of forecasting cyber-attacks.
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ZEKRI, Mariem. "Mobility management and vertical handover decision making in heterogeneous wireless networks." Phd thesis, Institut National des Télécommunications, 2012. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00814578.
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Mobility management over heterogeneous wireless networks is becoming a major interest area as new technologies and services continue to proliferate within the wireless networking market. In this context, seamless mobility is considered to be crucial for ubiquitous computing. Service providers aim to increase the revenue and to improve users' satisfaction. However there are still many technical and architectural challenges to overcome before achieving the required interoperability and coexistence of heterogeneous wireless access networks. Indeed, the context of wireless networks is offering multiple and heterogeneous technologies (e.g. 2G to 4G, WiFi, Wimax, TETRA,...). On the one hand, this rich environment allows users to take profit from different capacities and coverage characteristics. Indeed, this diversity can provide users with high flexibility and allow them to seamlessly connect at any time and any where to the access technology that best fits their requirements. Additionally, cooperation between these different technologies can provide higher efficiency in the usage of the scarce wireless resources offering more economic systems for network providers. On the other hand, the heterogeneity of technologies and architectures and the multiplication of networks and service providers creates a complex environment where cooperation becomes challenging at different levels including and not limited to mobility management, radio resource provisioning, Quality of Service and security guarantees. This thesis is focusing on mobility management and mainly on decision making for Vertical handover within heterogeneous wireless network environments. After the analysis of the related state of the art, we first propose a reputation based approach that allows fast vertical handover decision making. A decision making scheme is then built on that approach. Network's reputation, is a new metric that can be gathered from previous users' experiences in the networks. We show that it is an efficient construct to speed up the vertical handover decision making thanks to anticipation functionalities. While the main objective remains guaranteeing the best Quality of Service and optimal radio resource utilization, economical aspects have also to be considered including cost minimization for users and revenue maximization for network providers. For this aim, we propose, in the second part of the thesis, a game theoretic based scheme that allows maximizing benefits for both networks and users. In this solution, each available network plays a Stackelberg game with a finite set of users, while users are playing a Nash game among themselves to share the limited radio resources. A Nash equilibrium point, that maximizes the user's utility and the service provider revenue, is found and used for admission control and vertical handover decision making. The analyses of the optimal bandwidth/prices and the revenue at the equilibrium point show that there are some possible policies to use according to user's requirements in terms of QoS and to network capacities. For instance, we pointed out that networks having same capacities and different reputation values should charge users with different prices which makes reputation management very important to attract users and maximize networks' revenue. In the third part of this thesis, we provide and discuss two different architectural and implementation solutions on which our proposed vertical handover decision mechanisms can be integrated. The first proposed architecture is a centralized one. It is based on the IEEE 802.21 standard to which some extensions are proposed. The second proposed architecture is distributed. It is based on an overlay control level composed of two virtualization layers able to make reasoning on behalf of physical entities within the system. This architecture allows higher flexibility especially for loosely coupled interconnected networks
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Collins, Michael. "Trust Discounting in the Multi-Arm Trust Game." Wright State University / OhioLINK, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1607086117161125.
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Park, Young Joon. "Essays on biased self image." Diss., [La Jolla] : University of California, San Diego, 2009. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3379204.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2009.Title from first page of PDF file (viewed November 17, 2009). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.
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Salmon, John LaNay. "A methodology for quantitative and cooperative decision making of air mobility operational solutions." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/49039.
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Many complex and interdependent systems engineering challenges involve more than one stakeholder or decision maker. These challenges, such as the definition and acquisition of future air mobility systems, are often found in situations where resources are finite, objectives are conflicting, constraints are restricting, and uncertainty in future outcomes prevail. Air mobility operational models which simulate fleet wide behavior effects over time, in various mission scenarios, and potentially over the entire design life-cycle, are always multi-dimensional, cover a large decision space, and require significant time to generate sufficient solutions to adequately describe the design space. This challenge is coupled with the fact that, in these highly integrated solutions or acquisitions, multiple stakeholders or decision makers are required to cooperate and reach agreement in selecting or defining the requirements for the design or solution and in its costly and lengthy implementation. However, since values, attitudes, and experiences are different for each decision maker, reaching consensus across the multiple criteria with different preferences and objectives is often a slow and highly convoluted process. In response to these common deficiencies and to provide quantitative analyses, this research investigates and proposes solutions to two challenges: 1) increase the speed at which operational solutions and associated requirements are generated and explored, and 2) systematize the group decision-making process, to both accelerate and improve decision making in these large operational problems requiring cooperation. The development of the Air Mobility Operations Design (AirMOD) model is proposed to address the first challenge by implementing and leveraging surrogate models of airlift capability across a wide scenario space. In addressing the second major challenge, the proposed Multi-Agent Consensus Reaching on the Objective Space (MACRO) methodology introduces a process to reduce the feasible decision space, by identifying regions of high probability of consensus reaching, using preference distributions, power relationships, and game-theoretic techniques. In a case study, the MACRO methodology is demonstrated on a large air mobility solution space generated by AirMOD to illustrate plausibility of the overall approach. AirMOD and MACRO offer considerable advantages over current methods to better define the operational design space and improve group decision-making processes requiring cooperation, respectively.
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Zekri, Mariem. "Mobility management and vertical handover decision making in heterogeneous wireless networks." Thesis, Evry, Institut national des télécommunications, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012TELE0002/document.
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L’évolution des technologies réseaux sans fil, des terminaux mobiles ainsi que des contenus et des services créent des environnements hétérogènes de plus en plus complexes. Dans ce contexte, un compromis entre la mobilité, la transparence et la performance apparaît. Des utilisateurs mobiles, ayant différents profils et préférences, voudraient être toujours connectés au meilleur réseau à tout moment, sans avoir à se soucier des différentes transitions entre réseaux hétérogènes. Face à cette complexité, il parait nécessaire de proposer de nouvelles approches afin de rendre ces systèmes plus autonomes et de rendre les décisions de handover vertical plus efficaces. Cette thèse se concentre sur la gestion de mobilité verticale, plus précisément sur la prise de décision de handover vertical dans un environnement de réseaux hétérogènes sans fil. Après l’identification des différents paramètres de prise de décision et l’analyse de l’état de l’art relié à la gestion de la mobilité verticale, nous avons proposé un système de réputation qui permet de réduire les délais de prise de décision. La réputation d’un réseau est introduite comme une nouvelle métrique de prise de décision qui peut être recueillie à partir des expériences précédentes des utilisateurs sur ce réseau. Nous montrons que la réputation est une métrique efficace qui permet l’anticipation du handover et accélère la prise de décision. Bien que l’objectif principal soit de garantir la meilleure qualité de service et l’utilisation optimale des ressources radios, les aspects économiques doivent également être considérés, y compris la minimisation des coûts pour les utilisateurs et la maximisation des revenus pour les fournisseurs de services ou les opérateurs. Nous proposons alors, dans la deuxième partie de la thèse, un mécanisme de prise de décision basé sur la théorie des jeux. Ce dernier permet la maximisation des utilités des réseaux et des utilisateurs. Dans cette solution, chaque réseau disponible joue un jeu de Stackelberg avec un ensemble d’utilisateurs, tandis que les utilisateurs jouent un jeu de Nash entre eux pour partager les ressources radios limitées. Un point d’équilibre de Nash, qui maximise l’utilité de l’utilisateur et les revenus des fournisseurs de services, est trouvé et utilisé pour le contrôle d’admission et la prise de décision de handover vertical. Dans la troisième partie de cette thèse, nous proposons et discutons deux différentes solutions architecturales sur lesquelles nos mécanismes de prise de décision proposés peuvent être intégrés. La première architecture proposée est basée sur la norme IEEE 802.21 à laquelle nous proposons certaines extensions. La seconde architecture proposée est basée sur un niveau de contrôle composé de deux couches de virtualisation. La virtualisation est assurée via des agents capables de faire un raisonnement et de prendre des décisions pour le compte d’entités physiques qu’ils représentent au sein du système. Cette architecture permet une plus grande flexibilitéMobility management over heterogeneous wireless networks is becoming a major interest area as new technologies and services continue to proliferate within the wireless networking market. In this context, seamless mobility is considered to be crucial for ubiquitous computing. Service providers aim to increase the revenue and to improve users’ satisfaction. However there are still many technical and architectural challenges to overcome before achieving the required interoperability and coexistence of heterogeneous wireless access networks. Indeed, the context of wireless networks is offering multiple and heterogeneous technologies (e.g. 2G to 4G, WiFi, Wimax, TETRA,...). On the one hand, this rich environment allows users to take profit from different capacities and coverage characteristics. Indeed, this diversity can provide users with high flexibility and allow them to seamlessly connect at any time and any where to the access technology that best fits their requirements. Additionally, cooperation between these different technologies can provide higher efficiency in the usage of the scarce wireless resources offering more economic systems for network providers. On the other hand, the heterogeneity of technologies and architectures and the multiplication of networks and service providers creates a complex environment where cooperation becomes challenging at different levels including and not limited to mobility management, radio resource provisioning, Quality of Service and security guarantees. This thesis is focusing on mobility management and mainly on decision making for Vertical handover within heterogeneous wireless network environments. After the analysis of the related state of the art, we first propose a reputation based approach that allows fast vertical handover decision making. A decision making scheme is then built on that approach. Network’s reputation, is a new metric that can be gathered from previous users’ experiences in the networks. We show that it is an efficient construct to speed up the vertical handover decision making thanks to anticipation functionalities. While the main objective remains guaranteeing the best Quality of Service and optimal radio resource utilization, economical aspects have also to be considered including cost minimization for users and revenue maximization for network providers. For this aim, we propose, in the second part of the thesis, a game theoretic based scheme that allows maximizing benefits for both networks and users. In this solution, each available network plays a Stackelberg game with a finite set of users, while users are playing a Nash game among themselves to share the limited radio resources. A Nash equilibrium point, that maximizes the user’s utility and the service provider revenue, is found and used for admission control and vertical handover decision making. The analyses of the optimal bandwidth/prices and the revenue at the equilibrium point show that there are some possible policies to use according to user’s requirements in terms of QoS and to network capacities. For instance, we pointed out that networks having same capacities and different reputation values should charge users with different prices which makes reputation management very important to attract users and maximize networks’ revenue. In the third part of this thesis, we provide and discuss two different architectural and implementation solutions on which our proposed vertical handover decision mechanisms can be integrated. The first proposed architecture is a centralized one. It is based on the IEEE 802.21 standard to which some extensions are proposed. The second proposed architecture is distributed. It is based on an overlay control level composed of two virtualization layers able to make reasoning on behalf of physical entities within the system. This architecture allows higher flexibility especially for loosely coupled interconnected networks
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Xie, Xiuye. "Effects of Situated Game Teaching through Set Plays on Secondary Students’ Tactical Knowledge and Situational Interest in Physical Education." The Ohio State University, 2018. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu152407383868956.
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Di, Teodoro Alessandro. "Teoria dei giochi e Multi-criteria decision-making per reti mobili Ad-hoc: un protocollo di routing." Master's thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2014. http://amslaurea.unibo.it/6594/.
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Nell'elaborato si analizzano aspetti della teoria dei giochi e della multi-criteria decision-making. La riflessione serve a proporre le basi per un nuovo modello di protocollo di routing in ambito Mobile Ad-hoc Networks. Questo prototipo mira a generare una rete che riesca a gestirsi in maniera ottimale grazie ad un'acuta tecnica di clusterizzazione. Allo stesso tempo si propone come obiettivo il risparmio energetico e la partecipazione collaborativa di tutti i componenti.
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Khambete, Surendra S. "MANAGING RATIONAL DIVERGENCE: TESTING THE EFFECTS OF A COGNITIVE BEHAVIORAL THERAPY (CBT) TECHNIQUE ON COLLABORATIVE VERSUS COMPETITIVE BEHAVIORS IN A GAME THEORETIC SETTING." Case Western Reserve University School of Graduate Studies / OhioLINK, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=case1606306856751918.
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Heier, Stamm Jessica L. "Design and analysis of humanitarian and public health logistics systems." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/37137.
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This thesis considers the design and analysis of humanitarian supply chains, by which we mean those systems that deliver goods and services in response to natural or man-made disasters as well as ongoing public health challenges. In the first part of the thesis, we introduce a class of problems motivated by humanitarian logistics systems with decentralized decision makers. In contrast to traditional optimization problems in which a centralized planner determines the actions of all entities in the system, decentralized systems are characterized by individual decision makers who make choices to optimize their own objectives and whose actions impact the overall system performance. Decentralized systems often perform poorly in comparison to centralized ones, but centralization is costly or impractical to implement in many circumstances. The goal of this part of the thesis is to characterize the impact of decentralized decision making and identify ways to mitigate this impact. Using concepts from optimization and game theory, we model systems in which individuals choose a facility to visit to receive service, such as during a disaster response, making their choices based on travel time, congestion, and weights on congestion. These weights represent the relative importance individuals place on congestion in their objectives. We provide an efficient algorithm for finding a stable, or equilibrium, solution from which no individual can improve her own objective value by switching unilaterally. We show that the worst- and best-case performances of decentralized solutions depend on the importance individuals place on congestion. Finally, we introduce a mechanism under which the central optimal solution is also an equilibrium. The mechanism acts by influencing the importance individuals place on congestion, and we characterize the values that this importance can and must be to achieve stability. We introduce models to find values of the mechanism that optimize particular policy objectives and show that these models can be solved efficiently.
The second part of the thesis describes the application of the ideas developed in the first part to data from a large-scale effort to deliver a limited supply of products to a large number of people in a short time. The goal of this part of the thesis is to understand the impact of decentralized decision making on local access to an actual product and quantify correlations between inequities in access and socioeconomic variables. We find that both the centralized and decentralized systems lead to inequity in access, but the impact is greater in decentralized systems with user choice. The differences in access are correlated with several socioeconomic variables, but these relationships vary across geographic space. This study integrates tools from optimization, game theory, spatial statistics, and geographic information systems in a novel way. The results confirm the importance of accounting for decentralized behavior in system design and point to opportunities to use the mechanism from the first part of the thesis in future distribution efforts of this nature. The study also leads to policy recommendations, namely that planners consider the impact on equity prior to implementing distribution plans and work to recruit additional service providers in areas that have exhibited inequities in the past.
The third part of the thesis employs empirical methods to characterize a successful humanitarian supply chain and identify practices from which other organizations can learn to improve their operations. The hurricane response process used by Waffle House Restaurants has been recognized nationally for its effectiveness. We document the process and describe the supply chain concepts that contribute to its success. Further, we place the company's practices in the context of the literature on supply chain disruption, crisis management, and humanitarian logistics. This study provides insight for other organizations that seek to improve their resilience to supply chain disruptions, whether these are caused by natural disasters or other events. The study also led to the creation of teaching materials to help business and engineering students identify the challenges faced in humanitarian supply chains, the ways that operations research methodologies can be used to improve decisions, and the opportunities for cross-learning between humanitarian organizations and the private sector.
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Ferreira, André Luíz. "Contribuição e distribuição de recursos : uma análise comportamental do Jogo dos Bens Públicos." Universidade Federal de São Carlos, 2017. https://repositorio.ufscar.br/handle/ufscar/8940.
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Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)
Corruption is an object of study in several researches, but only recently it began to be investigated experimentally. Despite the progress, some gaps remain open, particularly in regards to the variables of which the observed behaviors are function, one aspect in which behavior analysis can contribute to operationalize the phenomenon and investigate the environmental variables that control these behaviors characterized as corrupt. One way to study this phenomenon is to expose the participants to a context in which they need to contribute to producing a particular public good, and then need to make decisions about how this good will be distributed among all participants. In this context, the participant can make three decisions: distribute in an egalitarian way; Distribute in an unequal way, favoring others, or distribute in an unequal way, favoring their own gains. A participant who makes distributions unequally for his own benefit shall behaving in a manner analogous to that described in the crime of embezzlement. Through the Public Goods Game (JBP), by modifying its original protocol, allowing the participants to manage the public resource, deciding how it will be distributed, it is possible to experimentally study this type of corrupt behavior. The aim was to investigate how the participants managed public resources under a PGG. Six participants were exposed to the procedure. They had to decide how the resource produced by her/his own contribution and that of the other players would be distributed among them. Five participants made unequal distributions, i.e, allocated most of the resources to themselves. This type of distribution is in correspondence with an embezzlement definition, allowing an approximation to real contexts. From these results, we suggest changes in the contingencies that control the occurrence of this type of behavior.
A corrupção foi objeto de estudo em diversas pesquisas, mas apenas recentemente ela passou a ser investigada experimentalmente. Apesar dos avanços obtidos, algumas lacunas permanecem em aberto, principalmente no que diz respeito as variáveis das quais os comportamentos observados são função, aspecto em que a Análise do Comportamento pode contribuir ao operacionalizar o fenômeno e investigar as variáveis ambientais que controlam estes comportamentos caracterizados como corruptos. Uma maneira de estudar este fenômeno é expor os participantes a um contexto em que eles precisem contribuir para produzir um determinado bem público, e em seguida, precisem tomar decisões a respeito da maneira como este bem será distribuído entre todos. Neste contexto, o participante pode tomar três decisões: distribuir de maneira igualitária; distribuir de maneira desigual, favorecendo os demais, ou distribuir de maneira desigual, favorecendo os seus próprios ganhos. Um participante que faça distribuições desigualmente em benefício próprio estará de comportando de maneira análoga a descrita no crime de peculato. Utilizando o Jogo dos Bens Públicos (JBP), modificando o seu protocolo original, é possível permitir que os participantes façam a gestão do recurso público, decidindo como ele será distribuído entre si mesmo e os demais participantes, o que torna possível estudar experimentalmente este tipo de comportamento corrupto. O objetivo deste estudo foi investigar o comportamento de contribuir e distribuir recursos públicos sob controle da quantidade de recursos produzidos pela contribuição de todos os participantes. Ao todo, seis participantes foram recrutados. As contingências programadas no presente estudo foram o número de fichas que um participante possuía em sua “carteira” no início da tentativa (condição antecedente), a resposta de contribuir e distribuir as fichas e o ganho obtido pela contribuição e distribuição efetuada. Como resultado, todos os participantes emitiram respostas de contribuições desiguais, isto é, contribuíram menos do que os demais participantes, e cinco destes participantes emitiram respostas de distribuições desiguais, isto é, distribuíram para si mesmos a maior parte das fichas produzidas. Esse tipo de distribuição encontra correspondência na definição de peculato, o que permite aproximar este estudo de contextos reais. A partir dos resultados discute-se mudanças nas contingências em vigor para controlar a ocorrência deste tipo de comportamento.
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Kang, Kyungwon. "Enhancing Freeway Merge Section Operations via Vehicle Connectivity." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/103198.
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Driving behavior considerably affects the transportation system, especially lane-changing behavior occasionally cause conflicts between drivers and induce shock waves that propagate backward. A freeway merge section is one of locations observed a freeway bottleneck, generating freeway traffic congestion. The emerging technologies, such as autonomous vehicles (AVs) and vehicle connectivity, are expected to bring about improvement in mobility, safety, and environment. Hence the objective of this study is to enhance freeway merge section operations based on the advanced technologies. To achieve the objective, this study modeled the non-cooperative merging behavior, and then proposed the cooperative applications in consideration of a connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) environment. As a tactical process, decision-making for lane-changing behaviors is complicated as the closest following vehicle in the target lane also behaves concerning to the lane change (reaction to the lane-changing intention), i.e., there is apparent interaction between drivers. To model this decision-making properly, this study used the game theoretical approach which is the study of the ways in which interacting choices of players. The game models were developed to enhance the microscopic simulation model representing human driver's realistic lane-changing maneuvers. The stage game structure was designed and payoff functions corresponding to the action strategy sets were formulated using driver's critical decision variables. Furthermore, the repeated game concept which takes previous game results into account was introduced with the assumption that drivers want to maintain initial decision in competition if there is no significant change of situations. The validation results using empirical data provided that the developed stage game has a prediction accuracy of approximately 86%, and the superior performance of the repeated game was verified by an agent-based simulation model, especially in a competitive scenario. Specifically, it helps a simulation model to not fluctuate in decision-making. Based on the validated non-cooperative game model, in addition, this study proposed the cooperative maneuver planning avoiding the non-cooperative maneuvers with prediction of the other vehicle's desired action. If a competitive action is anticipated, in other words, a CAV changes its action to be cooperative without selfish driving. Simulation results showed that the proposed cooperative maneuver planning can improve traffic flow at a freeway merge section. Lastly, the optimal lane selection (OLS) algorithm was also proposed to assist lane selection in consideration of real-time downstream traffic data transferred via a long-range wireless communication. Simulation case study on I-66 highway proved that the proposed OLS can improve the system-wide freeway traffic flow and lane allocation. Overall, the present work addressed developing the game model for merging maneuvers in a traditional transportation system and suggesting use of efficient algorithms in a CAV environment. These findings will contribute to enhance performance of the microscopic simulator and prepare the new era of future transportation system.Doctor of Philosophy
Driving behaviors considerably affect the traffic flow; especially a lane change occasionally forces rear vehicles in a target lane to decrease speed or stop, hence it is considered as one of primary sources causing traffic congestion. U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) announced that freeway bottleneck including merge section contributes to freeway traffic congestion more than 40 percent while traffic incidents count for only 25 percent of freeway congestion. This study, therefore, selected a freeway merge section, where mandatory lane changes are required, as a target area for the study. The emerging technologies, such as autonomous vehicles (AVs) and vehicle connectivity, are expected to bring about improvement in mobility, safety, and environment. Based upon these backgrounds, the objective of this study was determined to enhance freeway merge section operations based on the advanced technologies. To achieve the objective, first this study focused on understanding driving behaviors of human drivers. Decision-making for lane-changing behaviors is complicated as the closest following vehicle in the target lane also behaves concerning to the lane change (reaction to the lane-changing intention), i.e., there is apparent interaction between drivers. For example, the vehicle sometimes interferes the merging vehicle's lane-changing by decreasing a gap. To model the decision-making properly, this study modeled the non-cooperative merging behaviors using a game theoretical approach which mathematically explains the interaction (e.g., cooperation or conflict) between intelligent decision-makers. It was modeled for two vehicles, i.e., the merging vehicle in acceleration lane and a following vehicle in freeway rightmost lane, with possible actions of each vehicle. This model includes how each vehicle chooses an action in consideration of rewards. The developed model showed prediction accuracy of approximately 86% against empirical data collected at a merge section on US 101 highway. This study additionally evaluated the proposed model's rational decision-making performance in various merging situations using an agent-based simulation model. These evaluation results indicate that the developed model can depict merging maneuvers based on practical decision-making. Since most existing lane-changing models were developed from the standpoint of the lane-changing vehicle only, this study anticipates that a lane-changing model including practical decision-making process can be used to precisely analyze traffic flow in microscopic traffic simulation. Additionally, an AV should behave as a human-driven vehicle in order to coexist in traditional transportation system, and can predict surrounding vehicle's movement. The developed model in this study can be a part of AV's driving strategy based on perception of human behaviors. In a future transportation environment, vehicle connectivity enables to identify the surrounding vehicles and transfer the data between vehicles. Also, autonomous driving behaviors can be programmed to reduce competition by predicting behaviors of surrounding human-driven vehicles. This study proposed the cooperative maneuver planning which future connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) avoid choosing the non-cooperative actions based on the game model. If a competitive action is anticipated, in other words, a CAV changes its action to be cooperative without selfish driving. Simulation results showed that the proposed cooperative maneuver planning can improve traffic flow at a freeway merge section. Lastly, the optimal lane selection (OLS) algorithm was also proposed to provide a driver the more efficient lane information in consideration of real-time downstream traffic data transferred via a long-range wireless communication. Simulation case study on I-66 highway proved that the proposed OLS can improve the system-wide freeway traffic flow and lane allocation. Overall, the present work addressed developing the game model for merging maneuvers in a traditional transportation system and suggesting use of efficient algorithms in a CAV environment. These findings will contribute to enhance performance of the microscopic simulator and prepare the new era of future transportation system.
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Mantovani, Marco. "Essays in forward looking behavior in strategic interactions." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/209492.
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The general topic of our thesis is forward looking behavior in strategic situations. Mixing theoretical and experimental analysis, we document how strategic thinking is affected by the specific features of a dynamic interaction. The overarching result is that the information regarding decisions that are close to the current one, receive a qualitatively different consideration, with respect to distant ones. That is, the actual decisions are based on reasoning over a limited number of steps, close to actual decison node. We capture this feature of behavior both in a strategic (limited backward induction) and in a non-strategic (limited farsightedness) set up, and we identify relevant consequences on the outcome of the interaction, which powerfullly explain many observed experimental regularities.In the first essay, we present a general out-of-equilibrium framework for strategic thinking in sequential games. It assumes the agents to take decisions on restricted game trees, according to their (limited) foresight level, following backward induction. Therefore we talk of limited backward induction (LBI). We test for LBI using a variant of the race game. Our design allows to identify restricted game trees and backward reasoning, thus properly disentangling LBI behavior. The results provide strong support in favor of LBI. Most players solve intermediate tasks - i.e. restricted games - without reasoning on the terminal histories. Only a small fraction of subjects play close to equilibrium, and (slow) convergence toward it appears, though only in the base game. An intermediate task keeps the subjects off the equilibrium path longer than in the base game. The results cannot be rationalized using the most popular models of strategic reasoning, let alone equilibrium analysis.
In the second essay, a subtle implication of the model is investigated: the sensitivity of the players’ foresight to the accessibility and completeness of the information they have, using a Centipede game. By manipulating the way in which information is provided to subjects, we show that reduced availability of information is sufficient to shift the distribution of take-nodes further from the equilibrium prediction. On the other hand, similar results are obtained in a treatment where reduced availability of information is combined with an attempt to elicit preferences for reciprocity, through the presentation of the centipede as a repeated trust game. Our results could be interpreted as cognitive limitations being more effective than preferences in determining (shifts in) behavior in our experimental centipede. Furthermore our results are at odds with the recent ones in Cox [2012], suggesting caution in generalizing their results. Reducing the availability of information may hamper backward induction or induce myopic behavior, depending on the strategic environment.
The third essay consists of an experimental investigation of farsighted versus myopic behavior in network formation. Pairwise stability Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] is the standard stability concept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are perfectly farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network formation experiment to test these extreme theories, but find evidence against both of them: the subjects are consistent with an intermediate rule of behavior, which we interpret as a form of limited farsightedness. On aggregate, the selection among multiple pairwise stable networks (and the performance of farsighted stability) crucially depends on the level of farsightedness needed to sustain them, and not on efficiency or cooperative considerations. Individual behavior analysis corroborates this interpretation, and suggests, in general, a low level of farsightedness (around two steps) on the part of the agents.
Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
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Silveira, Luciana Torrezan. "Procedimento para análise de decisão quanto à prevenção de doenças em animais: uma aplicacão da Teoria dos Jogos." Universidade de São Paulo, 2008. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/11/11132/tde-22072008-163512/.
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A hipótese básica do presente trabalho é que embora a ocorrência de uma determinada doença possa apresentar impactos econômicos expressivos para a pecuária de um país - onerando não apenas a atividade produtiva - alguns produtores não reconhecem, individualmente, a importância devida em adotar medidas preventivas, uma vez que a ocorrência da doença não é frequente. Ademais, a existência de externalidades faz com que a ação de um produtor em relação às medidas sanitárias de seu rebanho afete os demais produtores da mesma região, o que também pode não ser percebido por eles. Diante disso, o presente trabalho desenvolve um procedimento teórico para a análise de decisões estratégicas dos produtores quanto à prevenção contra doenças em animais, face ao risco de contaminação de seu rebanho. O desenvolvimento do modelo é baseado nos preceitos da Teoria dos Jogos, e na análise econômica de benefício/custo como suporte da tomada de decisão do produtor. Depois de modelado o problema e determinados os possíveis equilíbrios do jogo, infere-se sobre as possíveis atuações do governo, no uso de incentivos econômicos (como indenizações e multas) para que o equilíbrio seja o da prevenção. Em seguida, o modelo teórico é aplicado a um caso específico de surto de febre aftosa no Brasil. Os resultados mostram que quando não se tem um mercado diferenciado para animal não vacinado, o equilíbrio do jogo tende para a situação onde os produtores decidem vacinar seu rebanho, sugerindo que não existe a necessidade de intervenção do governo para estimular a prevenção. Na prática, no entanto, o governo brasileiro estabelece políticas de incentivo, visto que alguns produtores não vacinam seu rebanho mesmo conhecendo os riscos, o que se traduz na falta de racionalidade dos mesmos. Considerando essa irracionalidade por parte de alguns produtores, o presente estudo é importante para que estes possam delinear panoramas de decisão, de forma a identificar as melhores ações a serem tomadas de forma coletiva.The basic hypothesis of this study is that producers do not perceive, individually, the importance of adopting prevention measures, even when aware of the economic risks for them and for the local economy, because the outbreaks of some diseases are not frequent. Moreover, the presence of externalities is such that the action of one producer regarding sanitary measures of the herd affects other producers in the same region, which also cannot be perceived by them. This study aims to develop a theoretical procedure to infer about strategic decisions taken by producers to prevent animal disease in their herds, in face of the risk of contamination. The development of the model is based on the Game Theory, and the benefit cost analysis as support for producer\'s decision. After modeling the problem and determining the equilibriums, these are used to elaborate inferences about possible actions of the government through economic incentives (such as indemnities and fines) to encourage the prevention. Then, the theoretical model is applied to a specific case of a foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in Brazil. The results indicate that in the absence of a differential market for non-vaccinated animals, the game equilibrium tends to the situation where producer\'s decisions are to vaccinate their herd, suggesting that government intervention is not necessary. Even though, the Brazilian government uses incentive policies for the cattle vaccination since some producers do not vaccinate their animals, despite of their awareness of the risks, which suggests lack of rationality. Considering the irrationality of some producers, this study is important for them to delineate decisions scenes, identifying the best actions to be taken in the collective context.
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Brynielsson, Joel. "A gaming perspective on command and control." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-4029.
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Kolář, Vít. "Umělá inteligence ve hře Bang!" Master's thesis, Vysoké učení technické v Brně. Fakulta informačních technologií, 2010. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-235543.
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The goal of this master's thesis is to create an artificial intelligence for the Bang! game. There is a full description of the Bang! game, it's entire rules, player's using strategy principles and game analysis from UI point of view included. The thesis also resumes methods of the artificial intelligence and summarizes basic information about the domain of game theory. Next part describes way of the implementation in C++ language and it's proceeding with use of Bayes classification and decision trees based on expert systems. Last part represent analysis of altogether positive results and the conclusion with possible further extensions.
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Cuoghi, Kaio Guilherme. "Avaliação das alternativas na construção da Usina Hidrelétrica Belo Monte pela aplicação de métodos multicritério de análise da decisão." Universidade de São Paulo, 2015. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/96/96132/tde-22022016-170746/.
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A Amazônia é a maior floresta tropical ainda existente no mundo e oferece diversos serviços ambientais. No Brasil, suas bacias hidrográficas são fontes do maior potencial de geração de energia elétrica ainda não utilizado por meio de usinas hidrelétricas. Nesse contexto, destaca-se, atualmente, a construção da Usina Hidrelétrica (UHE) Belo Monte como uma obra de escolha emblemática no país, marcada por diversos conflitos e que apresenta impactos diversificados que repercutirão em modificações permanentes na biodiversidade da Amazônia. Assim, o objetivo geral desta pesquisa foi realizar a aplicação de dois métodos MCDA - o ELECTRE III, não compensatório; e um método de abordagem em grupo baseado na Teoria de Jogos com uso do Equilíbrio de Nash nas alternativas de construção da UHE Belo Monte, visando demonstrar em que medida os métodos MCDA podem ser utilizados para a análise desse processo de tomada de decisão em grupo. Para isso, foram identificados os principais problemas envolvidos na construção da UHE Belo Monte e estruturadas duas matrizes de decisão com suas alternativas e critérios, que foram aplicadas aos dois métodos MCDA. Foi observado que a alternativa de área do reservatório de 516 km², que foi a de fato adotada na construção da UHE em questão, foi avaliada como a alternativa mais adequada na abordagem em grupo e na maioria das abordagens individuais dos jogadores para ambos os métodos. Já a alternativa de vazões muito próximas às naturais do rio, que não foi a adotada na construção da UHE Belo Monte, foi avaliada como a alternativa mais adequada na abordagem em grupo e na abordagem individual de todos os jogadores. As contribuições desta pesquisa referiram-se à realização da modelagem do problema complexo da UHE Belo Monte; à demonstração que os métodos MCDA podem consistir em uma etapa primordial na discussão de problemas complexos; a auxiliar gestores no processo decisório que, muitas vezes, têm como mecanismo de fomento de suas decisões documentos técnicos e específicos; e a possibilitar uma maior participação formal de vários tomadores de decisão.Amazon is the largest existing rainforest in the world and offers several essential ecosystem services. In Brazil, Amazon watersheds are sources of the greatest potential of electric power supply that dam complexes have not used yet. In this context, the construction of Belo Monte Dam Complex shall be highlighted as an iconic project in Brazil, although marked by several conflicts due to its generation of permanent diversified environmental impacts in Amazonian biodiversity. This way, the general objective of this research was to analyze the application of two MCDA methods to demonstrate to what extent those methods may be used to analyze the referred decision-making process. The methods used were ELECTRE III, a non-compensatory method; and a group approach Game Theory-based method that used Nash Equilibrium on the alternatives of the construction of Belo Monte Dam Complex. Therefore, the main problems involved in the construction of the facility were identified. Also, two decision matrixes were created, with its alternatives and criteria, and applied to both MCDA methods. It was observed that the alternative concerning the 516 km2 reservoir area, which was the real one adopted in the construction of the referred facility, was considered the most appropriate alternative in group approach as well as in the opinion of most players in the individual approaches for both methods. The alternative concerning flows close to the river\'s natural ones, which was not adopted on the construction of Belo Monte Dam Complex, was identified as the most appropriate alternative on group approach as well as in the opinion of all players in individual approach. The contributions provided by this study are: the provision of the modelling of Belo Monte Dam Complex problem; the demonstration that MCDA methods may consist in a primarily step in discussions concerning complex problems; the provision of help for managers on decision-making process who often underlie their fostering decision mechanisms in technical and specific documents; and the allowance of a greater formal participation of several decision makers in the decision-making processes.
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Souza, Juliete Susann Ferreira de [UNESP]. "Teoria dos Jogos aplicada à inteligência competitiva organizacional no âmbito da Ciência da Informação." Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/136224.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)
O foco desta pesquisa centra-se nos processos e atividades de cooperação e competição [coopetição] que as organizações contemporâneas desenvolvem visando estratégias de ação de curto, médio e longo prazo, no intuito de obter melhoria contínua em seus processos organizacionais, em especial o processo decisório. As ações voltadas à cooperação e à competição realizadas pelas organizações instigam o compartilhamento de informação e de conhecimento que, por sua vez, impulsionam a criação de alianças estratégias entre as organizações envolvidas. No entanto, evidencia-se que cooperar para competir ainda é um dilema para as organizações, uma vez que, ainda, não possuem a percepção de que ao criarem alianças estratégicas e estabelecerem acordos de cooperação, geram benefícios que contribuem significativamente para uma melhor atuação frente ao mercado altamente competitivo em que atuam. Nessa perspectiva, buscou-se a Teoria dos Jogos para compreender a evolução do comportamento cooperativo e competitivo entre diferentes agentes, como uma maneira de gerar benefícios para as organizações envolvidas. O objetivo geral desta pesquisa é propor um modelo baseado na Teoria dos Jogos contemplando o comportamento informacional e a competência em informação essencial para o ambiente de coopetição. No que tange aos procedimentos metodológicos, a pesquisa é de natureza qualitativa, do tipo descritivo e exploratória, cuja pesquisa de campo foi realizada no Centro Incubador “Miguel Silva”, pois vem contribuindo efetivamente para a economia local e regional. Para realização da coleta e análise dos dados da pesquisa de campo optou-se pela entrevista semiestruturada e pelo método „Análise Textual Discursiva‟. Como resultado acredita-se que houve a contribuição efetiva para o avanço dos estudos relacionados ao processo de inteligência competitiva organizacional, mais especificamente nos aspectos relativos à cultura informacional, ao comportamento informacional e à competência em informação. Foi possível evidenciar a partir da análise dos dados que, as organizações incubadas ainda não cooperam entre si para competir. Os sujeitos de pesquisa possuem a percepção da importância de tal ação para gerar compartilhamento, aprendizagem, inovação e desenvolvimento mútuo. No entanto, ainda necessitam reconhecer as próprias competências existentes, bem como as existentes nas outras empresas, para alcançar o equilíbrio entre cooperar e competir, de modo a agir coletivamente quando necessário e, assim, gerar diferenciais competitivos e obter vantagem competitiva no mercado em que atuam.
The focus of this research is centered on processes and activities of cooperation and competition [coopetition] that contemporary organizations aiming to develop action strategies the short, medium and long term in order to achieve continuous improvement in their organizational processes, particularly decision-making process. The actions aimed at cooperation and competition of the organizations instigate the information and knowledge sharing that, in turn, boost the creation of strategic alliances between the organizations involved. However, it is evident that cooperate to compete is still a dilemma for organizations, because do not yet have the perception that by creating strategic alliances and establish cooperation agreements, generate benefits that contribute significantly to a better performance front of highly competitive market in which they operate. From this perspective, we sought to Game Theory to understand the evolution of cooperative and competitive behavior between different agents, as a way to generate benefits for the organizations involved. The objective of this research is to propose a model based on game theory contemplating the information behavior and competence in essential information for coopetition environment. Regarding the methodological procedures, the research is qualitative, descriptive and exploratory, of which field research will be held at the Incubator Center „Miguel Silva‟, that has contributed effectively to the local and regional economy. As a result it is believed that there was the effective contribution to the advancement of studies related to organizational competitive intelligence process, specifically on aspects relating to information culture, the information behavior and information literacy. It became clear from the analysis of the data, the incubated organizations not cooperate to compete. Research individuals have the awareness of the importance for such action to generate sharing, learning, innovation and mutual development. However, still need to recognize their own existing skills as well as the existing in other companies to reach equilibrium between cooperation and competition in order to act collectively when needed and thus generate competitive differentiators and gain competitive advantage in the market in which act.
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Krtička, Miroslav. "Modelové řešení energetického zásobení místní dopravy a přepravy alternativními zdroji." Doctoral thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2011. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-72678.
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The Thesis are focused on the area of strategic management using the strategies selection and decision making processes, based on the Game Theory apparatus. The analyses of local energy sources potential and possible use in local transportation are the basis of the Thesis. The problems of energy maintenance and efficient utilisation have not decreasing its importance even in the situation of technology & technical improvements; there are no universally-suitable processes found in this area. One of the approaches should be in the philosophy of maximising the utilisation of local resources to minimise the expenses of the transportation of the energies itself. The Thesis are focused on the increased efficiency of local energy-resources utilisation combined with continuously increasing energy demands in the area of transportation area. The Target is to construct model, having proportionally characterised the suitable strategies to the decision -- making in the areas of local energies production and/or their utilisation in the area of the local transportation demand saturation. The Game Theory approaches creating the basis for the different interested groups; it allows to compare the advantages of different options / strategies of the progress, having respected counter-strategies of the other parties of the conflict situation. The recommendation of the most advantageous strategies for the individual interested groups of the conflict (transport companies, potential producers of energies from local resources, society) is the result of the process. The construction of the model, having the ability to compare the merits of different options -- related to the energies-utilisation (strategies) is the contribution of the thesis. There is specific approach given to allow finding the results suitable for both interested parties of the conflict situation (producers of the organic matter for the energy production, potential energy producers, local transporting companies). All the results are based mainly on the verified statistic data sources. Resulting model allow good and transparent comparison of different strategies of the different interested groups related to the energy resources. The results could work not only in the area of theoretical calculations, but also companies and interested parties strategies recommendations to their own decision-making processes.