Academic literature on the topic 'Debts, External United States'

Risk and liability change the initially stipulated terms of contracts, overruling their otherwise binding nature. Risk encourages careful assessment of debtors' abilities to service debts. Errors and negligence in assessment, and even external shocks, make creditors suffer losses. Disregarding one's duty of care or professional standards, or engaging in tortious or illegal behavior makes actors liable to compensate for any resulting damage—a necessary systemic element of the framework markets need to function well. Neither mechanism was allowed to work properly in sovereign lending.This essay analyzes why risk and liability are necessary mechanisms of well-functioning markets, and discusses how risk can be handled. In the United States, inappropriate regulatory norms hindered providing against risk in the case of sovereign debt. The absence of liability—a market imperfection—has produced debts no decent legal system would recognize as legitimate domestic debt, thus aggravating the sovereign debt problem, and giving rise to concepts such as criminal, odious, and illegal debts. Discriminating sovereign debtors and disobeying the rule of law caused market distortions, resulting in not only grave damages to debtors, but also losses to creditors that the mechanisms risk and liability would have avoided. Finally, I briefly present proposals to repair these shortcomings in order to avoid the disasters of the past.

Large current account deficits and foreign debt levels remain a source of concern for international financial markets and policymakers. Yet, exactly what an “excessive” external deficit or liability position for an advanced economy is at any time has never been adequately defined. This article addresses the question by proposing new methods for assessing the proximity of current account deficits and the associated foreign debt to their upper bounds. It contends that productive investment fundamentally sets the feasible limit for current account deficits, whereas the capital to output ratio ultimately sets the foreign debt to GDP limit. Benchmark estimates for the United States, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, advanced economies that have borrowed heavily since 1990, reveal external deficits have usually been well within limits, although recent United States experience is an exception.

This study aims to analyze the effect of imports, foreign exchange reserves, foreign debt, and interest rates on the currency exchange rates against the United States Dollar in Southeast Asia countries. The study results found that from 2010 to 2017, the currency exchange rates against the United States Dollar in Southeast Asian countries tended to weaken (depreciate). The highest growth in the exchange rate against the United States dollar was in Indonesia, while the lowest was in Singapore. Foreign exchange reserves negatively affect foreign debt, and imports positively affect countries' exchange rates in the Southeast Asia region against the United States dollar. On the other hand, interest rates do not show a significant effect.

The object of research is the policy of public debt management of the United States of America and Ukraine. The problem solved is the low level of efficiency of the policy of public external and internal debt management of Ukraine in the context of financing economic growth. The main scientific results: based on the analysis of the policy of public debt management of the United States of America, it has been proved, that the public debt and the US budget deficit should be perceived not as a problem or threat to macroeconomic stability, but as a tool to stimulate economic growth. It is substantiated, that in order to optimize the policy of internal and external public debt management of Ukraine it is expedient to introduce a debt rule, which is based on the program-targeted method of attracting public debt and provides for the use of public borrowing exclusively to finance economic development programs. In this case, Ukraine, following the example of the United States, will be able to achieve sustainable economic growth, because changing the priorities from debt financing of current state budget expenditures to financing capital expenditures will allow the Ukrainian government to develop economic infrastructure, create conditions for high value-added goods and to develop small and medium business, which will ultimately ensure macroeconomic stability and progressive economic development of the state. The scope of practical use of research results. The results of the study can be used by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and in particular by the Ministry of Finance during the formation of the Medium-Term public debt management strategy of Ukraine. Innovative technological product: The debt rule is based on the program-target method of attraction and use of the state internal and external debt that allows to use effectively the state borrowings for financing of economic growth. Scope of application of an innovative technological product: Policy of management of the state internal and external debt of Ukraine

The article contains an analysis of the dynamics and structure of the external debt of various countries and groups of countries in the context of the coronavirus pandemic. The authors conclude that at the beginning of 2021, the ratio of external debt to GDP almost reached the level that was noted on the eve of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009. A trigger for a new global crisis may be the exacerbation of problems in one or more segments of the economy of the European Union, Great Britain, the United States, or a number of large developing countries.

One of the main UN Summit 2015 outcomes is the adoption of global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) built on achievements of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to guide the path of sustainable development in the world after 2015. World leaders gathered at the United Nations to take responsibility for the implementation of 17 Sustainable Development Goals – a truly universal and transformative global development agenda. The article analyzes main common features and distinctions of SDGs and MDGs. It addresses priorities for the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development and primary SDG targets. The SDGs are intended to go beyond the MDGs and apply in general terms to all countries, including developed states, emerging economies and developing countries. At the same time, examining the main achievements of MDGs on national and international levels, the authors stress their importance. SDGs provide a framework for every country to create focused and effective implementation strategies and plans within its own domestic context. The article demonstrates the importance for Russian Federation under its UN obligations to elaborate two documents: Sustainable Development Strategy of the Russian Federation and the 2030 SDGs adapted to national priorities. The authors develop main principles of SDGs adaptation to national priorities, conditionally dividing them into two groups: "internal" (combating poverty, education, health, sustainable production and consumption) – Russia has to realize them drawing on its own potential, and "external" (combating climate change, enhancing a global partnership for sustainable development) – Russia can play an important role in the world coordinating with other countries. The article, while demonstrating the importance of climate change issues for Russia after weather and climatic anomalies caused huge social, economic and ecological damages, discusses possible economic tools, such as carbon taxes, introducing the price of carbon, Stock Exchange for carbon trading. The article investigates two large components of global partnership support in international policy of the Russian Federation: financing the assistance to the international development, and forgiveness of considerable debts to developing countries. Acknowledgements. The article was prepared within the Russian Scientific Foundation Project No. 15-17-30009.

Capital structure plays a critical role which enables manufacturing firms address the dilemma of whether or not an optimal capital structure can be achieved. The total capital of a firm is composed of both debt and equity which makes up firm’s capital structure. The capital structure of manufacturing firms is made up of a combination of internal financing and external financing of the firm. Internal financing composed of equity, preference share capital and shareholder's funds and external financing composed of long term debt and short term debt of the firm. Internal financing using profits as a source of capital for new investment rather than obtaining capital elsewhere distributed as dividends to firm's owners or other investors. External financing is the phrase used to describe funds that firms obtain from outside of the firm. The decade since the onset of the global financial crisis has brought about significant structural changes in the manufacturing sector in USA. This study thus sought to assess the first-order determinants of capital structure among listed manufacturing companies in the United States of America through literature based study methodology. The study found that the manufacturing industry in USA is an industry that dominates companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, it can be seen from the number of companies listed on NYSE increasing every period. The companies not only required to produce products, but also must be able to manage their capital structure. The study established that the first order determinants of capital structure for listed manufacturing firms in USA consist of financial situation, growth opportunities, size of the firm, product uniqueness, business risk, tax shields, dividend Policy. Furthermore, the first order determinants of capital structure consist of firm size, tangibility, growth opportunities, the non-debt tax shield, the bankruptcy risk, profitability and risk. The study concludes that listed manufacturing firms with the highest asset liquidity may increase debt capacity only when the bond covenants impose restrictions on the disposition of assets. The fact that a company possesses fixed assets to a large extent can be considered by its creditors as a guarantee that will allow them to recover their funds in the case of financial distress experienced by the borrower corporation. If a high-risk company is experiencing a decline in sales, the resulting profit will decrease due to the amount of the fixed costs. Because there is a decrease in profits, the company is not available enough funds to pay off the debt and interest so that it threatens the occurrence of bankruptcy. Keywords: First order determinants, capital structure, listed manufacturing companies, USA.

Egypt was firmly ensconced by the early 1980s in the ranks of the Third World's more dependent, financially troubled economies. The country's total foreign debt, under $3 billion in 1973, had grown to 16 billion by 1979. In 1982–83, the external debt was estimated at $20 billion, with the servicing of medium and long-term obligations absorbing more than one-third of export earnings. The terms of trade were also moving against Egypt as its major exports lost value. A trade deficit, registered largely with EEC countries and the United States, stood at the equivalent of $4.7 billion in 1982–83.

This paper examines the current path of global imbalances and the role of East Asia in addressing these issues. The roots of the problem are the exploding budget deficit and soaring current account deficit of the United States. The twin deficits are being financed by foreign savings including the placement of the massive foreign exchange reserves of East Asia in U.S. dollar–denominated debt, such as U.S. Treasury notes. Solving the imbalances will require corrections of internal and external imbalances by both the United States and its trading partners. How East Asia deploys its reserves could set off a tsunami of sales of dollar-based assets that could disrupt the U.S. and global economy. Sharp exchange rate adjustments (particularly a large fall in the U.S. dollar), and a protectionist backlash against the U.S. current account deficit, are in no one's interest as they could trigger global shocks.

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The rock lobster industry in Cearà has grown rapidly since 1955, when the United tates and Europe demand for lobster has steadily increased. During the industry evelopment process, lobster has become a major item in the export sector of CearÃ, as created several jobs and has increased state income and government revenue. evertheless, the lack of a sustainable lobster-fishing programme and recent trends in the international market for this product, the relative economic relevance of this ndustry may be at stake. This work contributes through the use of econometric echniques, cointegrating and error-correction model to explore the behavior of the xport of cearense lobster for the North merican market, the destination of pproximately 90% of exports of this crustacean. The model results indicated that the mount of lobster Cearà exported to the U.S. is more sensitive to changes in income than in the price.
O setor lagosteiro do Cearà teve seu desenvolvimento acelerado a partir de 1955, quando a lagosta passou a ser um item de crescente demanda em paÃses da Europa e nos EUA. Durante esse processo de desenvolvimento do setor, a lagosta tornouse um dos principais itens da pauta de exportaÃÃo do CearÃ, tambÃm se destacando na economia cearense em termos de geraÃÃo de emprego e renda. No entanto, por falta de um ordenamento eficiente da atividade, aliado à pesca predatÃria, observase, atualmente uma queda na produÃÃo. Este trabalho contribui por meio do emprego de tÃcnicas economÃtricas, cointegraÃÃo e modelo de correÃÃo de erros, para explorar o comportamento da exportaÃÃo de lagosta cearense para o mercado norte americano, destino de aproximadamente 90% das exportaÃÃes deste crustÃceo. Os resultados do modelo indicaram que a quantidade de lagosta exportada do Cearà para os EUA à mais sensÃvel a variaÃÃes na renda do que no preÃo.

This study examined three broad areas which related to plant level productivity in two apparel manufacturing plants. First, external factors, specifically unemployment and seasonal cycles, were examined. Second, internal organizational factors involving the size of the organization over time and the absenteeism rate within the company were studied. Finally, after holding constant the effects of the above factors, this study examined the impact of two types of positive incentive programs on employee productivity. It was hypothesized that there would be a positive relationship between unemployment and plant productivity. Partial support was found in one plant. A relationship between productivity level and seasonal cycles was also hypothesized. Generally, season was related to productivity, although the patterns for these relationships were very plant specific. The hypothesis that there would be a negative relationship between productivity rate and absenteeism rate received support in one plant only. It was further hypothesized that there would be a negative relationship between productivity level and size of the plant over time. The results for both plants were very different; however neither were in support of the hypothesis in the predicted direction. To evaluate the impact of the two productivity improvement programs, mean differences (adjusted for covariates and autocorrelation) were compared for three time periods: before, during, and after program implementation. In the Salem plant the time periods before and during the program had significantly higher productivity rates when compared to the period after the program ended. In the Jefferson plant the productivity level was slightly higher during program implementation when compared to the time period before the program. No other significant differences were found.
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The Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks held from September 1989 to July 1990 represented the first attempt by Japan and the United States to harmonise their domestic problems in international trade negotiations. These bilateral talks were also the first of their kind to delve into a comprehensive review of domestic laws and intrinsic business practices. In this sense, the SII talks may be seen as a preamble to mutual arrangements by domestic economies of their respective institutions and practices. This is likely to feature more prominently in the field of international relations, as seen recently in the European Community (EC) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In this context, as the United States and Japan are the two largest and most technologically advanced economies in the world, accounting for more than 40 per cent of the world total gross national product, it is significant that they started harmonising their domestic rules through the SII talks, which are examined in this thesis.

The complexity of spoilers in the conflict resolution and the breakdown of the peace process through violence or other method have made spoiling an interesting topic. The discussion and the research on the spoiler has contributed to understanding the nature of the issue of spoilers. However, the discussion is rolling over the perception of spoiler and the obstacle of spoiling behavior. Some researchers are focusing on spoiling behavior of internal and external spoiler who are within the country of the conflict, while some of the recent researches concentrate on the spoiling actions of states or actors who are geographically external to the conflict which can derail the peace processes. Obviously the role of external states actors especially the US  was not covered by the research with the only exceptions in which the United State has been highlighted as the external state spoiler in Colombia.  In the case of the Afghanistan there are several states involved in Afghan conflict but there is no research has been done on democratic countries, such as the US as having potential spoiling behavior in the Afghan peace process. Therefore this study is trying to see if the US has a spoiling behavior in the context of Afghanistan. The analytical framework developed in this study outline some condition to spoiling behavior and activities which is applied to case of study US in Afghanistan to find out if the US acting as potential spoiler in Afghan peace process. The role of US in Afghanistan is one of the reason that encourage looking into the US impact on the country and its long pursuit of peace. In this study, the US opinion, role, and activities towards Afghan peace process and conflict are discussed throughout this study.  The analytical framework which has been developed in this study suggests that the US has the potential to spoiling behavior.

After the global financial crisis, there have been serious increases in state debt of most countries. In addition, the debts for economic development are constantly increasing in the Eurasian Economic Union countries. As a result, the sustainability problem of government debt arises. In some countries, such as Kyrgyzstan, a significant portion of government debt is taken from a single country. This situation increases the risk even more. The aim of the study is to analyze the sustainability of state debts comparatively in the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union. To this end, the current state of government and total external debt were analyzed in light of various sustainability rates. The ratio of government debt and debt service to variables such as Gross Domestic Product and export was determined and compared. ADF and PP unit root tests and quarterly data for the period 2008-2019 was used to determine the stability of external debt. According to the empirical results, it is showed that the external debt is unsustainable in EAEU countries. Therefore, they need to implement rational policies on external debt management, in both the public and private sectors.

Abstract External interference damage is one of the main causes of pipeline failure reported in publicly available industry statistics from agencies such as the Canada Energy Regulator (CER) and the United States Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). Thus, failures due to external interference are often the most significant contributors to pipeline probability of failure in risk assessments and can play a significant role in operator decisions regarding risk-control expenditures, for example when it comes to the installation of additional impact protection, pipeline diversion or pressure restrictions. The probability of failure due to external interference damage can be estimated by combining the probability that damage occurs (i.e. that the pipeline is hit), the probability that the impact is sufficient to cause instant failure and the probability of degradation to failure, given that damage has occurred. Degradation to failure is assessed using industry standard engineering models (such as the limit state functions given in Annex O of CSA Z662-19 [1]). However, the key challenge is predicting where, when, and with what energy the external interference damage may happen. The prediction of a “hit rate,” or impact frequency, can often be subjective or based on statistics, which may not always be applicable or accurate for use on the pipeline under assessment. Top-of-line (TOL) deformation damage (dents) reported by in-line inspection (ILI) are a clear indicator of past external interference, which could have been introduced by third parties, contractors or the operator themselves. ILI data from ROSEN’s Integrity Data Warehouse (IDW) — which at the time of writing contains results from over 18,000 inspections — has been used to train machine learning models to estimate the frequency of external interference damage (per km-year). The distribution of dent sizes combined with pipe parameters is used to estimate a distribution of dent force. The following may all influence the likelihood and energy of external interference damage and may be considered as predictor variables in a machine learning model: • Local population density • Land use • Excavator types (typical bucket dimensions) • Frequency of crossings (road, rail, other services) • Pipeline burial depth • Additional impact protection • Pipeline markers and warning tape • Patrol and surveillance frequency • Operational control activities • Pipeline material properties This paper presents an approach to estimate the probability of failure due to external interface damage that use more accurate and justifiable impact frequency statistics, which are generated using worldwide ILI data and additional influencing factors based on pipeline exposure, resistance and mitigations.

Capitalism has faced the most severe and the longest crisis since 1929. Resource of the emerging financial crisis in the second half of 2007 was mortgage crisis that experienced in the United States. The collapse of housing market has caused great instability in the financial markets and then turned into the strong liquidity crisis and spread all over the world. The impact of global economic crisis on the world economies in the last quarter of 2008 was very fast and it occured in a devastating way. In this process, the asset prices declined, capital of financial institutions seriously damaged and this caused bankruptcy of many large financial organizations such as Lehman Brothers. In this context, the growth rates in the world fell down quickly, external demand contraction and global export decreased. At this point, developed countries applied large scale financial incentive packages. Especially, the Central Banks of developed countries have provided exceptional levels of liquidity that is used as a monetary policy tool by taking the risk of deterioration of their balance sheets. During this period, as a result of these policies followed by money and finance authorities have changed only the shape of global crisis and as a result the financial crisis has turned into a debt crisis. The effects of Global Economic Crisis on the Turkish economy emerged prominently in the last quarter of 2008. However, in comparison with many European countries, it is clear that all dynamics have became more favourable for Turkey after 2010.

The Kyrgyz Republic economy openness is studied within the framework of the Eurasia. Insufficient level of the financial and economic standing of Kyrgyzstan is clarified. Reasons for Governmental regulating use in the area of monetary, tax and budget policy in USA have been set up. Conditions of the development of industrial countries economy are under consideration. The necessity of financialisation of all capital of country is defined. Kyrgyzstan public budget’s permanent deficiency formation reasons are studied. A necessity of integration economic relations development within the framework of Eurasia is offered. A necessity of sustainable economic relations establishment as well as finding solution for external debt between Kyrgyzstan and Russia have been justified. It is recommended to strengthen effective fight against a scale corruption, «shadow» economy and criminalization of economy and finances. The increase of efficiency and responsibility of top managers of the public administration level have been offered. The necessity of the independent mastering of own gold-mining fields is justified. The need to attract the foreign direct investments to the area of mining and processing industry have been offered. Within the framework of acceleration of economic integration. Needs for the development of exploring and processing of hydrocarbons as well as building of large economic entities especially the hydroelectric power stations, namely Kambar-Ata-1 Hydro-Power Plants have been suggested. By this it is also suggested to Russia to develop this as strategic partner of Kyrgyzstan. Creation of integral customs system and energy cooperation suggested. It should be supported by establishment of unique equivalent among Eurasia states. By this it is to be possible to find acceptable solutions in finance and economy and to form a united economic cooperation considering a sovereignty of each state. It is necessary to develop the identical financial reporting of point-of-sale and payment balances, balance of international investments, compliable national republics and on the whole on Eurasia. To walk away from the calculation and actual use of dollar of the USA in finance and economic operations. Based on econometric prognosis of gross internal product and the public budget of Kyrgyzstan is made calculating on the per to 2025 year.

The accident at the three reactor units at Fukushima Daiichi showed weaknesses in the plant coping capability for beyond design basis accidents caused by extreme external events. The weaknesses included plant design features, accident management procedures and guidance, and offsite emergency response. As a result, significant changes to plant coping capability have been made to light water reactors worldwide to enhance the coping capabilities for beyond design basis accidents. However, the response in the United States has been significantly different from that in Europe in a number of ways. In the United States, the regulator and the industry convened separate expert panels to review the Fukushima accident and make recommendations for enhancements. On the regulatory side, a series of three Orders were issued and that required the implementation of certain enhancements (Mitigation strategies, hardened vents for certain BWRs, spent fuel pool level indication) to ensure adequate protection for the health and safety of the public. Other enhancements were subject to the “Backfit Rule” which requires that changes to regulatory requirements be shown to be cost beneficial using accepted methodologies. Simultaneously, the industry took independent steps to develop a diverse and flexible coping strategies (known as FLEX) and other enhancements. The focus in the United States was clearly on enhancements to guarantee continued core, containment and spent fuel pool cooling in the event of beyond design basis accidents, particularly those resulting from extreme external events. In Europe, the regulatory agencies ordered the development and completion of “Stress Tests” for each reactor site. These Stress Tests were focused on identifying the capability of the plant and its staff to respond to increasingly severe external events. The Stress Tests not only examined the ability to maintain core, containment and spent fuel pool cooling but also the ability to mitigate the consequences of accidents that progress to core damage (i.e., a severe accident). Regulatory requirements were then issued by the national regulators that addressed the weaknesses identified from the Stress Tests. While many of the enhancements to the plant coping capability were similar to those in the United States, significant hardware enhancements were also required to reduce the consequences of core damage accidents including hydrogen control and containment filtered venting. Finally, most European regulators also include severe accident management guidance (SAMG) as a regulatory requirement. In the United States, SAMG will be maintained as a voluntary industry commitment that is subject to regulatory oversight review.

1989 and the years following 1991 were the times in which many important economic and political turnovers had taken place in the world. That was the time when Berlin Wall fall down with scattering the Eastern block and many politically and economically independent states came into being, at the same time, ongoing about 70 years socialist system also started to spin into liberal system. The constituted 27 states in 1991 were tended to liberal economic system instead of socialist economy, and these stated were called as transition economies. With the transition period, there has have been significant decreases in the level of affluence, hyperinflation and some common properties seen at the beginning. It became inevitable to get foreign debt for reorganization and configuration of these economies. Nevertheless these foreign debts caused many serious problems in some of these economies. In the present work we tried to understand the economic structure and external loans of the transition economies, which are different with respect to their natural resources and are similar to each other in term of social, political and cultural aspects. It was under debated to investigate the relationship between indicated foreign debts and indicated domestic income and external trade so foreign trade financing problematic which thought to be the source of going into debt and economical development relations are searched.

In December 2000, a 7” long axial crack was visually identified on the compressor rear frame of an LM2500 propulsion gas turbine engine aboard the USS MITSCHER (DDG 57). This was originally thought to be a unique failure mode possibly caused by misaligned brackets external to the engine imparting undo thermal stresses onto the engine casing and flange. Since that time, 17 additional engines in the Navy fleet have been identified with either the large axial crack on the compressor casing or a small craze crack on the CRF flange, which appears to be the origination point prior to crack propagation. This paper discusses the extent of the cracking problem in the US Navy, the engineering investigation undertaken by the OEM and Navy to determine the root cause of the cracks and development of a field repair strategy to mitigate the impact of these cracks. The focus of the paper includes metallurgical analysis of failed compressor rear frame hardware, vibratory evaluation of the engine’s external piping system as a contributory failure mode and results of strain gage testing of the mid flange region.

The COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the extreme inequality in Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, and pushed millions into poverty. The economic crisis continues due to the obscene global vaccine inequality. As of end March 2022, a dismal 14% of SADC citizens had been fully vaccinated against COVID-19, compared with 65.5% in the United States and 73% in the European Union. In 2021, with infections rising in SADC, the critical health, social protection and economic programmes put in place by most governments in 2020 were rolled back and replaced with austerity, in the context of growing debt burdens and lack of external support for country budgets. Such austerity has been built into IMF programmes in the region. Recovering from the pandemic, however, offers SADC governments a once-in-a-generation opportunity to do what their citizens want: increase taxes on the wealthy and large corporations, boost public spending (especially on healthcare, education and social protection), and increase workers’ rights as well as tackling joblessness and precarious work. With external support, including through debt relief and aid, they could reduce inequality drastically and eliminate extreme poverty by 2030.

The COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the extreme inequality in Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, and pushed millions into poverty. The economic crisis continues due to the obscene global vaccine inequality. As of end March 2022, a dismal 14% of SADC citizens had been fully vaccinated against COVID-19, compared with 65.5% in the United States and 73% in the European Union. In 2021, with infections rising in SADC, the critical health, social protection and economic programmes put in place by most governments in 2020 were rolled back and replaced with austerity, in the context of growing debt burdens and lack of external support for country budgets. Such austerity has been built into IMF programmes in the region. Recovering from the pandemic, however, offers SADC governments a once-in-a-generation opportunity to do what their citizens want: increase taxes on the wealthy and large corporations, boost public spending (especially on healthcare, education and social protection), and increase workers’ rights as well as tackling joblessness and precarious work. With external support, including through debt relief and aid, they could reduce inequality drastically and eliminate extreme poverty by 2030.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.

Public transit agencies in the United States depend on external vendors to help deliver and maintain many essential services and to provide critical technologies, from ticket purchases to scheduling to email management. While the integration of new, advanced technologies into the public transit industry brings important advancements to U.S. critical transportation infrastructure, the application of digital technologies also brings with it a new assortment of digital risks. Transit agencies of all sizes are finding themselves subject to cyber incidents—most notably ransomware attacks—like those experienced by larger, more prominent companies and critical infrastructure providers. The findings in this report focus on helping all parties involved improve in three key areas: cyber literacy and procurement practices, the lifecycle of technology vis-à-vis transit hardware, and the importance of embracing risk as a road to resiliency.

Executive Summary Patient registries are important tools for advancing research, improving healthcare quality, and supporting health policy. Registries contain vast amounts of data that could be used for new purposes when linked with other sources or shared with researchers. This toolkit was developed to summarize current best practices and provide information to assist registries interested in sharing data. The contents of this toolkit were developed based on review of the literature, existing registry practices, interviews with registries, and input from key stakeholders involved in the sharing of registry data. While some information in this toolkit may be relevant in other countries, this toolkit focuses on best practices for sharing data within the United States. Considerations related to data sharing differ across registries depending on the type of registry, registry purpose, funding source(s), and other factors; as such, this toolkit describes general best practices and considerations rather than providing specific recommendations. Finally, data sharing raises complex legal, regulatory, operational, and technical questions, and none of the information contained herein should be substituted for legal advice. The toolkit is organized into three sections: “Preparing to Share Data,” “Governance,” and “Procedures for Reviewing and Responding to Data Requests.” The section on “Preparing to Share Data” discusses the role of appropriate legal rights to further share the data and the need to follow all applicable ethical regulations. Registries should also prepare for data sharing activities by ensuring data are maintained appropriately and developing policies and procedures for governance and data sharing. The “Governance” section describes the role of governance in data sharing and outlines key governance tasks, including defining and staffing relevant oversight bodies; developing a data request process; reviewing data requests; and overseeing access to data by the requesting party. Governance structures vary based on the scope of data shared and registry resources. Lastly, the section on “Procedures for Reviewing and Responding to Data Requests” discusses the operational steps involved in sharing data. Policies and procedures for sharing data may depend on what types of data are available for sharing and with whom the data can be shared. Many registries develop a data request form for external researchers interested in using registry data. When reviewing requests, registries may consider whether the request aligns with the registry’s mission/purpose, the feasibility and merit of the proposed research, the qualifications of the requestor, and the necessary ethical and regulatory approvals, as well as administrative factors such as costs and timelines. Registries may require researchers to sign a data use agreement or other such contract to clearly define the terms and conditions of data use before providing access to the data in a secure manner. The toolkit concludes with a list of resources and appendices with supporting materials that registries may find helpful.

Executive Summary Patient registries are important tools for advancing research, improving healthcare quality, and supporting health policy. Registries contain vast amounts of data that could be used for new purposes when linked with other sources or shared with researchers. This toolkit was developed to summarize current best practices and provide information to assist registries interested in sharing data. The contents of this toolkit were developed based on review of the literature, existing registry practices, interviews with registries, and input from key stakeholders involved in the sharing of registry data. While some information in this toolkit may be relevant in other countries, this toolkit focuses on best practices for sharing data within the United States. Considerations related to data sharing differ across registries depending on the type of registry, registry purpose, funding source(s), and other factors; as such, this toolkit describes general best practices and considerations rather than providing specific recommendations. Finally, data sharing raises complex legal, regulatory, operational, and technical questions, and none of the information contained herein should be substituted for legal advice. The toolkit is organized into three sections: “Preparing to Share Data,” “Governance,” and “Procedures for Reviewing and Responding to Data Requests.” The section on “Preparing to Share Data” discusses the role of appropriate legal rights to further share the data and the need to follow all applicable ethical regulations. Registries should also prepare for data sharing activities by ensuring data are maintained appropriately and developing policies and procedures for governance and data sharing. The “Governance” section describes the role of governance in data sharing and outlines key governance tasks, including defining and staffing relevant oversight bodies; developing a data request process; reviewing data requests; and overseeing access to data by the requesting party. Governance structures vary based on the scope of data shared and registry resources. Lastly, the section on “Procedures for Reviewing and Responding to Data Requests” discusses the operational steps involved in sharing data. Policies and procedures for sharing data may depend on what types of data are available for sharing and with whom the data can be shared. Many registries develop a data request form for external researchers interested in using registry data. When reviewing requests, registries may consider whether the request aligns with the registry’s mission/purpose, the feasibility and merit of the proposed research, the qualifications of the requestor, and the necessary ethical and regulatory approvals, as well as administrative factors such as costs and timelines. Registries may require researchers to sign a data use agreement or other such contract to clearly define the terms and conditions of data use before providing access to the data in a secure manner. The toolkit concludes with a list of resources and appendices with supporting materials that registries may find helpful.

Forced by the 1997 Southeast Asian crisis to recognize the external vulnerabilities that openness to volatile capital flows result in and upset over the post-crisis policy responses imposed by the IMF, countries in the sub-region saw the need for a regional financial safety net that can pre-empt or mitigate future crises. At the outset, the aim of the initiative, then led by Japan, was to create a facility or design a mechanism that was independent of the United States and the IMF, since the former was less concerned with vulnerabilities in Asia than it was in Latin America and that the latter’s recommendations proved damaging for countries in the region. But US opposition and inherited geopolitical tensions in the region blocked Japan’s initial proposal to establish an Asian Monetary Fund, a kind of regional IMF. As an alternative, the ASEAN+3 grouping (ASEAN members plus China, Japan and South Korea) opted for more flexible arrangements, at the core of which was a network of multilateral and bilateral central bank swap agreements. While central bank swap agreements have played a role in crisis management, the effort to make them the central instruments of a cooperatively established regional safety net, the Chiang Mai Initiative, failed. During the crises of 2008 and 2020 countries covered by the Initiative chose not to rely on the facility, preferring to turn to multilateral institutions such as the ADB, World Bank and IMF or enter into bilateral agreements within and outside the region for assistance. The fundamental problem was that because of an effort to appease the US and the IMF and the use of the IMF as a foil against the dominance of a regional power like Japan, the regional arrangement was not a real alternative to traditional sources of balance of payments support. In particular, access to significant financial assistance under the arrangement required a country to be supported first by an IMF program and be subject to the IMF’s conditions and surveillance. The failure of the multilateral effort meant that a specifically Asian safety net independent of the US and the IMF had to be one constructed by a regional power involving support for a network of bilateral agreements. Japan was the first regional power to seek to build such a network through it post-1997 Miyazawa Initiative. But its own complex relationship with the US meant that its intervention could not be sustained, more so because of the crisis that engulfed Japan in 1990. But the prospect of regional independence in crisis resolution has revived with the rise of China as a regional and global power. This time both economics and China’s independence from the US seem to improve prospects of successful regional cooperation to address financial vulnerability. A history of tensions between China and its neighbours and the fear of Chinese dominance may yet lead to one more failure. But, as of now, the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s support for a large number of bilateral swap arrangements and its participation in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership seem to suggest that Asian countries may finally come into their own.

This report—a national overview of domestic animal health in the United States for 2004—is a direct result of an external review of the Nation’s animal health safeguarding system. The Animal Health Safeguarding Review assessed the performance, processes, and procedures used to ensure the success of the mission of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)–Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s (APHIS) Veterinary Services (VS) program: to protect and to improve the health, quality, and marketability of our Nation’s animals, animal products, and veterinary biologics.

Macroeconomic summary Several factors contributed to an increase in projected inflation on the forecast horizon, keeping it above the target rate. These included inflation in December that surpassed expectations (5.62%), indexation to higher inflation rates for various baskets in the consumer price index (CPI), a significant real increase in the legal minimum wage, persistent external and domestic inflationary supply shocks, and heightened exchange rate pressures. The CPI for foods was affected by the persistence of external and domestic supply shocks and was the most significant contributor to unexpectedly high inflation in the fourth quarter. Price adjustments for fuels and certain utilities can explain the acceleration in inflation for regulated items, which was more significant than anticipated. Prices in the CPI for goods excluding food and regulated items also rose more than expected. This was partly due to a smaller effect on prices from the national government’s VAT-free day than anticipated by the technical staff and more persistent external pressures, including via peso depreciation. By contrast, the CPI for services excluding food and regulated items accelerated less than expected, partly reflecting strong competition in the communications sector. This was the only major CPI basket for which prices increased below the target inflation rate. The technical staff revised its inflation forecast upward in response to certain external shocks (prices, costs, and depreciation) and domestic shocks (e.g., on meat products) that were stronger and more persistent than anticipated in the previous report. Observed inflation and a real increase in the legal minimum wage also exceeded expectations, which would boost inflation by affecting price indexation, labor costs, and inflation expectations. The technical staff now expects year-end headline inflation of 4.3% in 2022 and 3.4% in 2023; core inflation is projected to be 4.5% and 3.6%, respectively. These forecasts consider the lapse of certain price relief measures associated with the COVID-19 health emergency, which would contribute to temporarily keeping inflation above the target on the forecast horizon. It is important to note that these estimates continue to contain a significant degree of uncertainty, mainly related to the development of external and domestic supply shocks and their ultimate effects on prices. Other contributing factors include high price volatility and measurement uncertainty related to the extension of Colombia’s health emergency and tax relief measures (such as the VAT-free days) associated with the Social Investment Law (Ley de Inversión Social). The as-yet uncertain magnitude of the effects of a recent real increase in the legal minimum wage (that was high by historical standards) and high observed and expected inflation, are additional factors weighing on the overall uncertainty of the estimates in this report. The size of excess productive capacity remaining in the economy and the degree to which it is closing are also uncertain, as the evolution of the pandemic continues to represent a significant forecast risk. margin, could be less dynamic than expected. And the normalization of monetary policy in the United States could come more quickly than projected in this report, which could negatively affect international financing costs. Finally, there remains a significant degree of uncertainty related to the duration of supply chocks and the degree to which macroeconomic and political conditions could negatively affect the recovery in investment. The technical staff revised its GDP growth projection for 2022 from 4.7% to 4.3% (Graph 1.3). This revision accounts for the likelihood that a larger portion of the recent positive dynamic in private consumption would be transitory than previously expected. This estimate also contemplates less dynamic investment behavior than forecast in the previous report amid less favorable financial conditions and a highly uncertain investment environment. Third-quarter GDP growth (12.9%), which was similar to projections from the October report, and the fourth-quarter growth forecast (8.7%) reflect a positive consumption trend, which has been revised upward. This dynamic has been driven by both public and private spending. Investment growth, meanwhile, has been weaker than forecast. Available fourth-quarter data suggest that consumption spending for the period would have exceeded estimates from October, thanks to three consecutive months that included VAT-free days, a relatively low COVID-19 caseload, and mobility indicators similar to their pre-pandemic levels. By contrast, the most recently available figures on new housing developments and machinery and equipment imports suggest that investment, while continuing to rise, is growing at a slower rate than anticipated in the previous report. The trade deficit is expected to have widened, as imports would have grown at a high level and outpaced exports. Given the above, the technical staff now expects fourth-quarter economic growth of 8.7%, with overall growth for 2021 of 9.9%. Several factors should continue to contribute to output recovery in 2022, though some of these may be less significant than previously forecast. International financial conditions are expected to be less favorable, though external demand should continue to recover and terms of trade continue to increase amid higher projected oil prices. Lower unemployment rates and subsequent positive effects on household income, despite increased inflation, would also boost output recovery, as would progress in the national vaccination campaign. The technical staff expects that the conditions that have favored recent high levels of consumption would be, in large part, transitory. Consumption spending is expected to grow at a slower rate in 2022. Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) would continue to recover, approaching its pre-pandemic level, though at a slower rate than anticipated in the previous report. This would be due to lower observed GFCF levels and the potential impact of political and fiscal uncertainty. Meanwhile, the policy interest rate would be less expansionary as the process of monetary policy normalization continues. Given the above, growth in 2022 is forecast to decelerate to 4.3% (previously 4.7%). In 2023, that figure (3.1%) is projected to converge to levels closer to the potential growth rate. In this case, excess productive capacity would be expected to tighten at a similar rate as projected in the previous report. The trade deficit would tighten more than previously projected on the forecast horizon, due to expectations of an improved export dynamic and moderation in imports. The growth forecast for 2022 considers a low basis of comparison from the first half of 2021. However, there remain significant downside risks to this forecast. The current projection does not, for example, account for any additional effects on economic activity resulting from further waves of COVID-19. High private consumption levels, which have already surpassed pre-pandemic levels by a large margin, could be less dynamic than expected. And the normalization of monetary policy in the United States could come more quickly than projected in this report, which could negatively affect international financing costs. Finally, there remains a significant degree of uncertainty related to the duration of supply chocks and the degree to which macroeconomic and political conditions could negatively affect the recovery in investment. External demand for Colombian goods and services should continue to recover amid significant global inflation pressures, high oil prices, and less favorable international financial conditions than those estimated in October. Economic activity among Colombia’s major trade partners recovered in 2021 amid countries reopening and ample international liquidity. However, that growth has been somewhat restricted by global supply chain disruptions and new outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff has revised its growth forecast for Colombia’s main trade partners from 6.3% to 6.9% for 2021, and from 3.4% to 3.3% for 2022; trade partner economies are expected to grow 2.6% in 2023. Colombia’s annual terms of trade increased in 2021, largely on higher oil, coffee, and coal prices. This improvement came despite increased prices for goods and services imports. The expected oil price trajectory has been revised upward, partly to supply restrictions and lagging investment in the sector that would offset reduced growth forecasts in some major economies. Elevated freight and raw materials costs and supply chain disruptions continue to affect global goods production, and have led to increases in global prices. Coupled with the recovery in global demand, this has put upward pressure on external inflation. Several emerging market economies have continued to normalize monetary policy in this context. Meanwhile, in the United States, the Federal Reserve has anticipated an end to its asset buying program. U.S. inflation in December (7.0%) was again surprisingly high and market average inflation forecasts for 2022 have increased. The Fed is expected to increase its policy rate during the first quarter of 2022, with quarterly increases anticipated over the rest of the year. For its part, Colombia’s sovereign risk premium has increased and is forecast to remain on a higher path, to levels above the 15-year-average, on the forecast horizon. This would be partly due to the effects of a less expansionary monetary policy in the United States and the accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances in Colombia. Given the above, international financial conditions are projected to be less favorable than anticipated in the October report. The increase in Colombia’s external financing costs could be more significant if upward pressures on inflation in the United States persist and monetary policy is normalized more quickly than contemplated in this report. As detailed in Section 2.3, uncertainty surrounding international financial conditions continues to be unusually high. Along with other considerations, recent concerns over the potential effects of new COVID-19 variants, the persistence of global supply chain disruptions, energy crises in certain countries, growing geopolitical tensions, and a more significant deceleration in China are all factors underlying this uncertainty. The changing macroeconomic environment toward greater inflation and unanchoring risks on inflation expectations imply a reduction in the space available for monetary policy stimulus. Recovery in domestic demand and a reduction in excess productive capacity have come in line with the technical staff’s expectations from the October report. Some upside risks to inflation have materialized, while medium-term inflation expectations have increased and are above the 3% target. Monetary policy remains expansionary. Significant global inflationary pressures and the unexpected increase in the CPI in December point to more persistent effects from recent supply shocks. Core inflation is trending upward, but remains below the 3% target. Headline and core inflation projections have increased on the forecast horizon and are above the target rate through the end of 2023. Meanwhile, the expected dynamism of domestic demand would be in line with low levels of excess productive capacity. An accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances in Colombia and the increased likelihood of a faster normalization of monetary policy in the United States would put upward pressure on sovereign risk perceptions in a more persistent manner, with implications for the exchange rate and the natural rate of interest. Persistent disruptions to international supply chains, a high real increase in the legal minimum wage, and the indexation of various baskets in the CPI to higher inflation rates could affect price expectations and push inflation above the target more persistently. These factors suggest that the space to maintain monetary stimulus has continued to diminish, though monetary policy remains expansionary. 1.2 Monetary policy decision Banco de la República’s board of directors (BDBR) in its meetings in December 2021 and January 2022 voted to continue normalizing monetary policy. The BDBR voted by a majority in these two meetings to increase the benchmark interest rate by 50 and 100 basis points, respectively, bringing the policy rate to 4.0%.