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1
Ritter, A. R. M. "The Cuban Economy in the 1990s: External Challenges and Policy Imperatives." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 32, no. 3 (1990): 117–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/166090.
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Cuba has entered the decade of the 1990s in a state of profound existential crisis. The countries of Eastern Europe, whose economic and political institutions and ideologies were adopted by Cuba, albeit with some modifications, were abandoning those same institutions and ideologies. Cuba's place in the international system had become one of growing isolation: Cuba had become a curiosity from the 1960s rather than the wave of the future, as it once perceived itself. By mid-1990, it appeared almost certain that the generous subsidization of the Cuban economy by the Soviet Union was about to end. Moreover, the Cuban economy was in serious difficulty as a result of some external factors, namely the convertible currency debt crisis and the problems and uncertainties in its relationship with the Soviet Union since 1985, but also as a result of internal institutional incapacities and deformities.
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Zhiltsov, S. S. "Coronavirus hits former-Soviet countries." Post-Soviet Issues 7, no. 1 (April 15, 2020): 8–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.24975/2313-8920-2020-7-1-8-17.
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The year of 2020 started a new chapter in the development of former-Soviet countries. The coronavirus epidemic, which began in the Chinese city of Wuhan, has spread to affect all countries throughout the world, including the countries of the former Soviet Union. Its influence has already affected the economic and social development of the countries in the post-Soviet space. Closing borders, stopping tourism, and imposing severe restrictions on transport services were the first measures that contributed to reducing the incidence rates. At the same time, these measures affected bilateral and multilateral trade and economic relations among the countries of the post-Soviet space.All countries of the post-Soviet space have taken steps to allocate additional funds to combat coronavirus. Ad hoc funds were formed, the review of budget expenditures and revenues began. However, in fact in the first few months the countries faced economic distress, the overcoming of which could take considerable time.The coronavirus epidemic is taking place against the backdrop of global economic crisis and a sharp drop in oil prices. Economic development models based on increasing consumption without economic growth, increasing the level of external and internal debt have shown their insolvency. In these conditions, the countries of the post-Soviet space, which are highly dependent on the external factor, have also experienced significant economic hardships.Finally, the «price warfare» in the oil market has a strong influence. The United States and Saudi Arabia’s attempts to achieve dominance in the oil market, by displacing Russia from it, as well, have had a destabilizing impact on the world oil market. This factor has had a direct impact on those former-Soviet countries that produce and export hydrocarbon resources.In general, the coronavirus epidemic, taking place against the backdrop of global economic challenges and oil competition, will have a negative impact on the economic and political development of former-Soviet countries. The impact of the epidemic, its consequences, will affect the former-Soviet countries for many years to come.
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Romanchuk, E. S. "View at the Reform of the Economy of Uzbekistan through the Prism of the Republic’s Cooperation with International Development Institutions." Post-Soviet Issues 9, no. 1 (June 2, 2022): 44–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.24975/2313-8920-2022-9-1-44-57.
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The reforms carried out recently in the Republic of Uzbekistan have caused a wide discussion. For many, the speed with which the liberalization of the economy is carried out, as well as the scale of transformations, came as a surprise. Being one of the most closed economies in the post-Soviet space five years ago, Uzbekistan managed not only to catch up with the progressive countries of the former Soviet Union, but also to do so with relatively small social consequences. As shown in the article, the “Uzbek miracle” was caused by three factors. Firstly, the reforms were prepared in advance. Secondly, after the change in the policy of multilateral development banks in terms of the conditions they set for issuing loans to governments, recapitalizing (in some cases) these organizations and optimizing their balance sheets, their ability to provide loans has expanded. In addition, criticism from the international community has stimulated multilateral development banks to take a more careful approach to the choice of tools used when working with borrowing states and literally “create” stories of successful transformation of national economies. Thirdly, the national development Institutes of the People’s Republic of China and Japan have been active in working with the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan to implement projects aimed at modernizing the old and building new infrastructure. They have invested significant resources to transform certain sectors of the Uzbek economy. Financial institutions of European and Arab states also cooperate with the Uzbek government.Based on the matrix of projects compiled with the volumes of planned investments in the context of institutions and spheres of economic activity, the author pointed out sectors of the Uzbek economy that are the most attractive for individual foreign economic partners of the republic. The rapid growth of the state external debt of the republic has caused a discussion in the country about the effectiveness of the use of foreign loans, as well as the establishment of an upper limit on international borrowing. At the current stage, the Republic of Uzbekistan does not intend to reduce the amount of assistance it attracts from international financial organizations (at the same time, the public debt ceiling will still be set), since, together with loans, these institutions, as a rule, allocate funds free of charge for the preparation of projects and advisory assistance to the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
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Klimiuk, Zbigniew. "Stosunki gospodarcze i handlowe ZSRR – Niemcy w latach 1918–1940 (część 1)." Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski 9, no. 1 (June 1, 2018): 49–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/pw.3364.
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The author analyzes in his paper the economic and trade relations between Germanyand the Soviet Union in the period of 1918–1944. During this period trade relations withGermany constituted a continuation of relations between Tsarist Russia and Germany beforeWorld War I. The German-Soviet Economic Agreement of October 12, 1925, formed specialconditions for the mutual trade relations between the two countries. In addition to the normalexchange of goods, German exports to the Soviet Union were based from the very beginningon a system negotiated by the Soviet Trade Mission to Berlin under which the Soviet Union wasgranted loans for financing additional orders from Germany. Trade with Soviet Union, promotedby the first credit-based operations, led to a dynamic exchange of goods, which reached itshighest point in 1931. In the early 1930s, however, Soviet imports decreased as regime assertedpower and its weakened adherence to the disarmament requirements of the Treaty of Versaillesdecreased Germany’s reliance on Soviet imports. In addition, the Nazi Party’s ascent to powerincreased tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union. In the mid-1930s, the Soviet Unionmade repeated efforts at reestablishing closer contacts with Germany. The Soviets chieflysought to repay, with raw materials, the debts which arose from earlier trade exchange, whileGermany sought to rearm, therefore both countries signed a credit agreement in 1935. The saidagreement placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union until June 30, 1937, the loans amountingto 200 million Reichsmarks, to be repaid in the period 1940–1943. The Soviet Union used183 million Reichsmarks from this credit. The preceding credit operations were, in principle,liquidated. Economic reconciliation was hampered by political tensions after the Anschluss inmid-1938 and Hitler’s increasing hesitance to deal with the Soviet Union. However, a new periodin the development of Soviet–German economic relations began after the Ribbetrop–MolotovAgreement, which was concluded in August of 1939.
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Klimiuk, Zbigniew. "Stosunki gospodarcze i handlowe ZSRR – Niemcy w latach 1918–1940 (część 2)." Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski 9, no. 2 (November 30, 2019): 27–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/pw.2999.
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The author analyzes in his paper the economic and trade relations between Germany and the Soviet Union in the period of 1918–1944. During this period trade relations with Germany constituted a continuation of relations between Tsarist Russia and Germany before World War I. The German-Soviet Economic Agreement of October 12, 1925, formed special conditions for the mutual trade relations between the two countries. In addition to the normal exchange of goods, German exports to the Soviet Union were based, from the very beginning, on a system negotiated by the Soviet Trade Mission in Berlin under which the Soviet Union was granted loans for financing additional orders from Germany. Trade with the Soviet Union, promoted by the first credit-based operations, led to a dynamic exchange of goods, which reached its highest point in 1931. In the early 1930s, however, Soviet imports decreased as the regime asserted power and its weakened adherence to the disarmament requirements of the Treaty of Versailles decreased Germany’s reliance on Soviet imports. In addition, the Nazi Party’s rise to power increased tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union. In the mid-1930s, the Soviet Union made repeated efforts at reestablishing closer contacts with Germany. The Soviets chiefly sought to repay, with raw materials the debts which arose from earlier trade exchange, while Germany sought to rearm, therefore both countries signed a credit agreement in 1935. That agreement placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union until June 30, 1937 the loans amounting to 200 million Reichsmarks which were to be repaid in the period 1940–1943. The Soviet Union used 183 million Reichsmarks from this credit. The preceding credit operations were, in principle, liquidated. Economic reconciliation was hampered by political tensions after the Anschluss in the mid-1938 and Hitler’s increasing hesitance to deal with the Soviet Union. However, a new period in the development of Soviet-German economic relations began after the Ribbetrop–Molotov Agreement, which was concluded in August of 1939.
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Shinar, Chaim. "The Role of the National Problem in the Disintegration of the Soviet Union." European Review 21, no. 1 (January 31, 2013): 56–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1062798712000257.
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‘The Soviet Union, like the United States, was a country established to serve and promote a political idea, not to be a state for nations. The United States was founded in order to be a modern democratic polity; the Soviet Union in order to promote Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet Union thus began as a ‘modern,’ post-imperialist state. The cement holding the state together was a compound of ideology, a hierarchical, disciplinary party, charismatic leadership, and external treats. [In the 80s] this cement was crumbling… [The Soviet] state had lost its raison d’être and the people turned to the traditional and conventional basis of the state – that is, the nation. But since this was a multinational state – and unlike the multiethnic United States, most peoples in the USSR have distinct languages and territories of their own – [they returned to them to establish independent states.]’1
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Sinitsyn, Fedor. "External Challenges to Soviet Ideology in the Second Half of the 1960s and in the 1970s." ISTORIYA 12, no. 11 (109) (2021): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s207987840017638-0.
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The Soviet Union's foreign policy challenges of the 1960s and 1970s had an ideological aspect to them. Contradictions between Soviet Communism and Eastern European socialist models of development became more pronounced. Eastern European socialist countries began to emphasize the variety of models for “building socialism” and offered their own theories, not sanctioned by Moscow, of the construction of socialism in other European countries. Certain “ideological dangers” for the USSR also came from the Communist parties of capitalist countries. Authority of the Soviet Union and the CPSU among Western communists had declined. The weakening of the influence of Soviet ideology in the world had become evident. As a result, Western communists began to distance themselves from the USSR and the “Socialist Bloc” countries. In the post-war years, the authorities and the elites of the “Capitalist Bloc” countries took additional measures to reduce the popularity of the Communist ideology by promoting the idea of “social compromise instead of social revolution”. One of the most significant challenges to Soviet ideology was also the “convergence theory”. The socio-economic models developed in capitalist countries — especially the concept of the “welfare state” — presented another serious challenge. As a result of these trends and an increase in the standard of living in capitalist countries, there was a “de-ideologization” as well as a decrease in mass revolutionism of the population. The external challenges to Soviet ideology were regarded in Moscow with dismay. New ideological and socio-political concepts in capitalist countries were perceived negatively by the Kremlin. The external challenges had a negative impact on the mass consciousness of Soviet citizens. The article concludes that during the period under review, the challenges posed to Soviet ideology from abroad began to be complex. This article also gives classification of these challenges and reveals main ways of their manifestation.
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Kramer, Mark. "The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 3)." Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 1 (January 2005): 3–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/1520397053326185.
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This is the concluding part of a three-part article that discusses the transformation of Soviet-East European relations in the late 1980s and the impact of the sweeping changes in Eastern Europe on the Soviet Union. This final segment is divided into two main parts: First, it provides an extended analysis of the bitter public debate that erupted in the Soviet Union in 1990 and 1991 about the “loss” of Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. The debate roiled the Soviet political system and fueled the hardline backlash against Mikhail Gorbachev. Second, this part of the article offers a concluding section that highlights the theoretical implications of the article as a whole. The article, as the conclusion shows, sheds light on recent literature concerning the diffusion of political innovations and the external context of democratization and political change.
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Tsedilin, L. "Russian Protectionism: Problems of Institutional Heritage." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 1 (January 20, 2012): 96–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2012-1-96-114.
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The article analyzes the pre-revolutionary and the Soviet experience of the protectionist policies. Special attention is paid to the external economic policy during the times of NEP (New Economic Policy), socialist industrialization and the years of 1970-1980s. The results of the state monopoly on foreign trade and currency transactions in the Soviet Union are summarized; the economic integration in the frames of Comecon is assessed.
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Rosser, Marina Vcherashnaya. "The External Dimension of Systemic Transformation: The Case of the Former Soviet Union." Journal of Economic Issues 27, no. 3 (September 1993): 813–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00213624.1993.11505456.
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Lukin, A. G. "The Soviet and Western theories of financial management – The competition or the partnership?" Finance and Credit 26, no. 5 (May 28, 2020): 991–1016. http://dx.doi.org/10.24891/fc.26.5.991.
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Subject. This article explores the main points of the theory of financial management, developed within the framework of the Western general theory of finance, and the theory of financial management developed in the Soviet Union. Objectives. The article aims to substantiate an idea that these theories are complementary, and their harmonious application can help build the most effective system of financial relations management at both the macro-and microeconomic levels. Methods. For the study, I used a dialectical approach and the methods of comparison, analysis and synthesis, and historical analysis. Results. The article substantiates the point that the methodology of Western financial management theory is aimed at managing external financial flows and combating external financial risks. It notes that the Soviet theory regulates methods and techniques of financial management within the business entity or the State. Conclusions. Theoretical updating of the Soviet practices of financial management combined with the modern achievements of financial management theory will create conditions for the formation of an optimal financial management structure at both the micro-and macroeconomic levels. This can improve the efficiency of financial management, in general. Renewed interest in the theoretical developments of the Soviet Union will contribute to the development of financial science at the present stage.
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Rusina, Yulia A. "“THE PARTY’S COMMANDS OR THE HEART’S DESIRE…”: SEVERAL PAGES FROM THE HISTORY OF THE SVERDLOVSK BRANCH OF THE UNION OF SOVIET WRITERS (1946)." Ural Historical Journal 71, no. 2 (2021): 169–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.30759/1728-9718-2021-2(71)-169-176.
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The article considers the traces of external influences on the works of Soviet (including Ural) writers in the first post-war year, which marked the end of the so-called first thaw period (1943–1946), a brief spiritual upsurge in the society recovering from the global catastrophe. In this article, the term external influence refers to the ideological pressure coming from the literary critics, colleagues, and other similar phenomena of Soviet culture expressed in ideological discourse. Addressing historical materials that preserved such evidence makes it possible to see the goals of the authorities aiming to control creative processes and, to a certain extent, intellectual and moral level of the authorities themselves as well. The protocols of general and party meetings of the Sverdlovsk branch of the Union of Soviet Writers for 1946 used in this study can be attributed to this kind of documentary sources. Theoretically, the analysis builds on E. A. Dobrenko’s ideas about “formation of the Soviet writer” and on the concept of “ideal type of social realism writer” proposed by T. A. Kruglova, as well as on the understanding of socialist realism as a method of structuring a literary work within the framework of socialist ideology. It was impossible to ignore the impact that the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on the journals “Zvezda” and “Leningrad” (August 14, 1946) had made on the Soviet writers. It provoked numerous discussions on “insufficiently high ideological level” of fiction in the regional branches of the Union of Soviet Writers, and restricted the course of national literature that impeded its development for years. Much attention is paid to the discussion of the unpublished short story “Meeting” (1946) by the Ural writer Nina Popova that took place in the Sverdlovsk regional organization of the Union of Soviet Writers and at the Moscow regional seminar of prose writers, as well as to the analysis of the text of the story.
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Novoselova, E. V., N. I. Chernova, and N. V. Katakhova. "Axiological aspects of teaching Spanish in the Soviet Union." Russian Technological Journal 10, no. 5 (October 21, 2022): 111–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.32362/2500-316x-2022-10-5-111-120.
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Objectives. The paper analyzes core axiological aspects of Spanish teaching in higher educational institutions of the Soviet Union from the 1930s to the early 1980s based on various sources including textbooks, tutorials, etc. Methods. The study is based on textual-analytic, historical-comparative, and structural methods.Results. Scientific-pedagogical and sociological aspects of the subject are distinguished. The former are limited to the internal developmental logic of Spanish studies, while the latter refers to external circumstances, including ideological factors. The literature review shows that Spanish teaching in the USSR progressed topically from simple manuals aimed at consolidating linguistic basics to a more rigorous pedagogical development of Spanish language studies (grammar, phonetics, vocabulary, etc.) The authors identify two significant periods in the development of Soviet Spanish studies, with the first phase extending from the 1930s to the early 1960s, and the second—from the 1960s to the early 1980s.Conclusions. The analysis showed that the formation and development of each period is associated with such events as the Spanish Civil War and the victory of the Cuban Revolution, which are not directly related to Spanish teaching. The first event coincided with the beginning of systematic Spanish teaching at the USSR universities, while the second redirected this process from Castilian to Latin American Spanish. However, the analysis of textbook and tutorial materials convincingly demonstrates that this process of redirection, which mainly concerns the selection of textual materials, remains incomplete. This supports a conclusion concerning the limited impact of ideology on the internal logic of the Spanish studies development in the USSR.
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Kramer, Mark. "The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe: Internal-External Linkages in Soviet Policy Making (Part 3)." Journal of Cold War Studies 1, no. 3 (September 1999): 3–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/152039799316976805.
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The East German uprising and the downfall of Lavrentii Beria had profound short- and long-term effects on Soviet policy toward Germany and on the political configuration of the Eastern bloc. This article, the final segment of a three-part analysis of Soviet—East European relations in the early post-Stalin era, discusses the changes in the Soviet bloc at some length. It then ties together the three parts of the analysis by exploring the theoretical implications of the linkages between internal and external events in the Soviet Union and East-Central Europe in 1953, drawing on recent theoretical literature about the connection between domestic and international politics.
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YEŞILBURSA BEHÇET, KEMAL. "FROM FRIENDSHIP TO ENMITY SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS (1945-1965)." History and Modern Perspectives 2, no. 1 (March 30, 2020): 92–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.33693/2658-4654-2020-2-1-92-105.
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On 26 February 1921, the Soviet Union signed a «Treaty of Friendship» with Iran which was to pave the way for future relations between the two states. Although the Russians renounced various commercial and territorial concessions which the Tsarist government had exacted from Iran, they secured the insertion of two articles which prohibited the formation or residence in either country of individuals, groups, military forces which were hostile to the other party, and gave the Soviet Union the right to send forces into Iran in the event that a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation there, use Iran as a base for operations against Russia, or otherwise threaten Soviet frontiers. Furthermore, in 1927, the Soviet Union signed a «Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality» with Iran which required the contracting parties to refrain from aggression against each other and not to join blocs or alliances directed against each other’s sovereignty. However, the treaty was violated by the Soviet Union’s wartime occupation of Iran, together with Britain and the United States. The violation was subsequently condoned by the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 29 January 1942, which permitted the Soviet Union to maintain troops in Iran for a limited period. Requiring restraint from propaganda, subversion and hostile political groups, the treaty would also appear to have been persistently violated by the Soviet Union: for example, the various radio campaigns of «Radio Moscow» and the «National Voice of Iran»; the financing and control of the Tudeh party; and espionage and rumour-mongering by Soviet officials in Iran. Whatever the Soviet’s original conception of this treaty may have been, they had since used it one-sidedly as a treaty in which both countries would be neutral, with one being «more neutral than the other». In effect, both the 1921 and 1927 treaties had been used as «a stick to beat the Iranians» whenever it suited the Soviets to do so, in propaganda and in inter-governmental dealings. During the Second World War, the treaty between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Iran, dated 29 January 1942 - and concluded some 5 months after the occupation of parts of Iran by allied forces, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were entitled to maintain troops in Iran, but the presence of such troops was not to constitute a military occupation. Nonetheless, Soviet forces in the Northern provinces used their authority to prevent both the entry of officials of the Iranian Government and the export of agricultural products to other provinces. The treaty also required military forces to be withdrawn not later than six months after «all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or on the conclusion of peace, whichever is the earlier». This entailed that the Soviet Union should have withdrawn its forces by March 1946, six months after the defeat of Japan. Meanwhile, however, there emerged in Iranian Azerbaijan, under Soviet tutelage, a movement for advanced provincial autonomy which developed into a separatist movement under a Communist-led «National Government of Azerbaijan». In 1945, Soviet forces prevented the Iranian army from moving troops into Azerbaijan, and also confined the Iranian garrison to barracks while the dissidents took forcible possession of key points. At the same time, Soviet troops prevented the entry of Iranian troops into the Kurdistan area, where, under Soviet protection, a Kurdish Republic had been set up by Qazi Mohammad. In 1946, after Iran had appealed to the Security Council, the Russians secured from the Iranian Prime Minister, Qavam es Saltaneh, a promise to introduce a bill providing for the formation of a Soviet-Iranian Oil Company to exploit the Northern oil reserves. In return, the Soviet Union agreed to negotiate over Azerbaijan: the Iranians thereupon withdrew their complaint to the Security Council, and Soviet forces left Azerbaijan by 9 May 1946. In 1955, when Iran was considering joining a regional defensive pact, which was later to manifest itself as the Baghdad Pact, the Soviet Government threatened that such a move would oblige the Soviet Union to act in accordance with Article 6 of the 1921 treaty. This was the «big stick» aspect of Soviet attempts to waylay Iranian membership of such a pact; the «carrot» being the conclusion in 1955 of a Soviet-Iranian «Financial and Frontier Agreement» by which the Soviets agreed to a mutually beneficial re-alignment of the frontier and to pay debts arising from their wartime occupation of Northern Iran. The Soviets continued their war of nerves against Iranian accession to the Pact by breaking off trade negotiations in October 1955 and by a series of minor affronts, such as the cancellation of cultural visits and minimal attendance at the Iranian National Day celebrations in Moscow. In a memorandum dated November 26, the Iranian Government openly rejected Soviet criticisms. Soviet displeasure was expressed officially, in the press and to private individuals. In the ensuing period, Soviet and Soviet-controlled radio stations continued to bombard their listeners with criticism of the Baghdad Pact, or CENTO as it later became. In early 1959, with the breakdown of the negotiations for a non-aggression pact, Iran-Soviet relations entered into a phase of propaganda warfare which intensified with the signature of the bilateral military agreement between Iran and the United States. The Soviet Union insisted that Iran should not permit the establishment of foreign military bases on its soil, and continued to threaten Iran despite the Shah’s assurance on this issue. Consequently, the Iranians denounced Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 treaty, on the basis of which the Soviet Union was making its demands. Attempts by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to improve relations met with little success until September 1959, when Russia offered massive economic support on condition that Iran renounced its military agreements with the United States. This offer was rejected, and, as relations continued to become strained, the Soviets changed their demand to one neither for a written agreement that Iran would not allow its terrain to be used as a base of aggression nor for the establishment of foreign missile bases. The publication by the Soviet Union of the so-called «CENTO documents» did nothing to relieve the strain: the Soviet Union continued to stand out for a bilateral agreement with Iran, and the Shah, in consultation with Britain and the United States, continued to offer no more than a unilateral assurance. In July 1962, with a policy of endeavouring once more to improve relations, the Shah maintained his insistence on a unilateral statement, and the Soviet Government finally agreed to this. The Iranian undertaking was accordingly given and acknowledged on 15 September. The Instruments of ratification of the 1957 Agreements on Transit and Frontier Demarcation were exchanged in Moscow on 26 October 1962 and in Tehran on 20 December, respectively.
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Nikolina, Inna, Inna Mazur, and Volodymyr Ocheretianyi. "Organizational and Legal Bases Military-Economic Cooperation of USSR, Britain and the United States at the Beginning of World War II." Scientific Papers of the Vinnytsia Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi State Pedagogical University. Series: History, no. 40 (June 2022): 124–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.31652/2411-2143-2022-40-124-130.
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. The purpose of the article is an attempt to objectively cover the organizational and legal basis of military-economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States and Great Britain at the beginning of World War II. Efforts have been made to prove that the Soviet Union was also interested in providing logistical assistance to prevent its defeat in the Soviet-Nazi war. The research methodology based on the principles of historicism, systematics, objectivity, generalization. Preference was given to such special historical methods as historical-systemic, problem-chronological, descriptive, comparative-historical. Scientific novelty of the research is that an attempt was made to comprehensively analyze historiographical narratives to develop organizational and legal foundations of military-economic cooperation of the Soviet Union with the United States and Britain at the beginning of World War II. Conclusions. At first, USA foreign policy doctrine was based on deterring Nazi Germany with British help, but after the Soviet-German conflict, the USA and Britain changed their views on the USSR and saw it as an element in the war that would help weaken and destroy the Nazis on the continent. The defeat on the Soviet front in the early stages of the war was another catalyst that forced the United States and Britain to change their position, while the Soviet state also began to form an external doctrine on other approaches to unite with the anti-Hitler coalition. As a result of the Soviet-British-American agreements, the first protocol was ratified during the Moscow Conference, which allowed the United States to extend the influence of the Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union in the future. However, the inflow of foreign "defense materials" was accompanied by many contradictions, especially in 1941-1943. The main one was the slow development of the Allies' supply process in the USSR, which at the time was a small part of Soviet needs. Towards the end of the war, the contribution of the lease to the total military potential of the USSR increased significantly
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Czyż, Anna. "Fenomen parapaństw na obszarze poradzieckim." Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej 19, no. 2 (December 2021): 197–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.36874/riesw.2021.2.10.
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One of the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union was the outbreak of several conflicts in the post-Soviet area and the emergence of the so-called para-states. Based on the systemic method of treating parastates as a system, internal and external influence factors will be indicated. The article aims to present the reasons for creating para-states and analyze internal and external determinants, i.e. attributes of their statehood as factors that guarantee their operation and ensure continued survival. In this context, the thesis was made that Russian political, economic, and military support for para-states ensures their functioning. Moreover, the article indicates the role of para-states in the Russian Federation’s foreign policy towards the post- Soviet area, with which the central thesis of the article is related. It says that supporting para-states politically, financially, and militarily is one of the instruments of Russia’s policy towards the post-Soviet area and is intended to keep it within the Russian sphere of influence.
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Moiseev, S. "Government Policy of Financial Stability." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 11 (November 20, 2008): 51–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2008-11-51-61.
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Russian government has prepared the package of measures to help the country’s financial system maintain financial stability. The paper discusses the state measures and formulates the propositions of Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP). The most important ones include coordination of regulators, unsecured refinancing and refinancing of external debts, guarantees of interbank loans, budget deposits in banks. The author analyzes subordinated loans for Russian banks from the state budget, nationalization of several banks and the future of government intervention in the stock market. Special attention is paid to the Deposit Insurance, the development of national credit rating system and the official information policy. The author believes that state measures need the following fine-tuning.
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Graziosi, Andrea. "Stalin's Antiworker “Workerism”, 1924–1931." International Review of Social History 40, no. 2 (August 1995): 223–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020859000113215.
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SummaryThis article sketches the background of the development of the “workerist myth” in the Soviet Union in the period 1924–1931. From 1924 onward workers were subjected to mounting pressure to increase productivity and tighten discipline, against the background of the great debate on how to transform the Soviet Union from an agrarian country into a country with a powerful industrial sector as rapidly as possible. Between 1928 and 1929 a vigorous antiworker campaign was launched in the Soviet Press, which in just a few months in the winter of 1929–1930 was transformed into a workerist campaign, glorifying the exemplary shock workers as “enthusiastic builders of socialism”. This myth was used on the domestic as well as on the external front, and meant the ascent to power of the Stalinist elite and the definitive breakthrough of a “national socialism”. It also marked the end of trade unionism as such.
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Odling-Smee, John, and Basil Zavoiceo. "External Borrowing in the Baltics, Russia, and Other States of the Former Soviet Union." IMF Policy Discussion Papers 1998, no. 005 (May 1998): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451972610.003.
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Zaytsev, Aleksandr V. "Yugoslavia on the pages of the journal Slavyane (1942–1958)." Slavic Almanac, no. 1-2 (2021): 100–126. http://dx.doi.org/10.31168/2073-5731.2021.1-2.1.06.
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The journal Slavyane was created by the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) as an organ of internal and external political propaganda aimed at Russian-speaking Slavs. It reflected the pullback of Soviet foreign policy from proletarian internationalism. The policy of its editorial board towards Yugoslavia repeated the one of the Party, but sensitive subjects were avoided or covered with a delay on the pages of the journal. Josip Broz Tito as spokesman for the aspirations of Yugoslav peoples was extolle since 1943 while D. Mihajlović’s activities had not been covered until his condemnation in October 1943. The journal supported the government of the People’s Federative Republic of Yugoslavia until early 1948, condemned it since late 1949 to early 1953, kept silence on Yugoslavia for several months in 1948–1949, 1953–1954, 1956, 1957 and 1958. Each time such deliberate silence had been caused by the aggravation or, on the contrary, by attempts to break ice in relations between the Soviet Union and People’s Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) / the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia / the Union of Yugoslavian Communists. The only exception from the rule seems to be Issue 5/1953 of the journal which contains anti-Tito insults but they may be due to struggle on top of the Soviet government. Overall, the policy of the editorial board was marked by more caution and desire to cover up problems than the policy of Party newspapers.
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Way, Lucan A., and Steven Levitsky. "Linkage, Leverage, and the Post-Communist Divide." East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures 21, no. 1 (February 2007): 48–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325406297134.
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An important source of the post-Communist divide between a relatively democratic Central and Southeastern Europe on one side and a highly autocratic former Soviet Union on the other is the different character of the international environments in the two regions. Post-Communist countries differ along two key dimensions of the post–cold war international environment: Western leverage, or governments' vulnerability to external pressure; and linkage to the West, or the density of a country's economic, political, organizational, social, and communication ties to the European Union and the United States. High linkage and leverage in Central and Southeastern Europe generated intense international democratizing pressures, contributing to democratization even under unfavorable domestic conditions. By contrast, weaker linkage and leverage in the former Soviet Union has produced a much more permissive international environment. As a result, democratization has failed in the absence of a strong domestic push.
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Raeva, T. "«Against the fire of war»: the practices of soviet peacekeeping in the context of the cold war." Bulletin of the South Ural State University Series «Social Sciences and the Humanities» 20, no. 04 (2020): 58–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.14529/ssh200408.
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The struggle for peace was of great importance to Soviet cultural diplomacy during the Cold War. In this article, the author analyzes the arsenal and content of the peacekeeping practices of the USSR, forms an idea of the stages of development of Soviet peacefulness, studies the dynamics of its transition from effective innovative strategies to formalized measures. The study of the peacekeeping efforts of the Soviet Union, the internal and external political context of the second half of the 20th century, makes it possible to determine the reasons for the depletion of the potential of the Soviet struggle for peace as an instrument of influencing public opinion and forming an attractive image of the country.
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Yazdani, Enayatollah. "The Impact of Post-Communist Central Asia’s Internal Dynamics on its External Relations." Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Studies 2, no. 5 (September 29, 2020): 63–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.32996/jhsss.2020.2.5.9.
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Under the Soviet Union rule, Central Asia was a closed region with no access to the outside world. Both internal and external affairs in the region was directed by the central government in Moscow. When the Central Asian republics became dependence in 1991, the situation changed.Yet, in the new era Central Asia has faced many problems and challenges. This paper aims to explore how Central Asia’s internal dynamics have influenced its external relations? The paper concludes that the region’s external relations have been greatly affected by its internal dynamics.
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Bulakh, Yevgeniy Vasilevich, and Mikhail Alekseyevich Bulygin. "FROM THE UNION OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA: PROSPECTS FOR A UNION STATE IN THE POSTSOVIET SPACE." Chronos: social sciences 7, no. 1(24) (March 3, 2022): 30–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.52013/2712-9705-24-1-5.
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The article is devoted to modern problems of the functioning of the state as part of the union. The material reveals the circumstances of possible alliances. A comparative analysis of the European Union and the Union of Belarus-Russia allows us to draw conclusions about the qualitative state of the process, about its possible prospects in the post-Soviet space. The tasks already solved to create common political institutions, further plans for integration, all this allows us to confirm the assumptions, but internal and external factors make adjustments to the unification process. The infrastructural unity of the economic systems of the two countries, a single system of collective security, and most importantly, the public expectations of the citizens of Belarus and Russia make the project of the Union State realistic.
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Nakamura, Yasushi. "The relationship between the real and financial economies in the Soviet Union: An analysis of government debts using newly available data." Explorations in Economic History 66 (October 2017): 65–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2017.06.001.
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Dabrowski, Marek. "Thirty years of economic transition in the former Soviet Union: Macroeconomic dimension." Russian Journal of Economics 8, no. 2 (July 29, 2022): 95–121. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.8.90947.
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The paper contains a retrospective analysis of macroeconomic policy and reforms in the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) from 1992 to 2021, after obtaining political and economic independence in 1991. Special attention is given to problems of macroeconomic stabilization and economic growth. As a result of structural distortions inherited from the Soviet economy and the slow pace of economic and institutional reforms, the FSU countries suffered from a long and deep output decline in the 1990s. Their post-transition growth recovery in the 2000s did not last long. Furthermore, they remain vulnerable to both domestic and external economic shocks. Given the limited predictability of post-COVID global economic trends and the damaging consequences of the war in Ukraine, this vulnerability will likely continue in the next couple of years.
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Mironov, Boris N. "Disintegration of the USSR in Historiography: Collapse or Dissolution." Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. History 66, no. 1 (2021): 132–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu02.2021.108.
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Over the period of 30 years various scientists representing different fields have been studying disintegration of the USSR with unflagging interest. As of August 1, 2020, more than 300 books, 3000 articles, and 20 dissertations have been written in Russia alone. Generalization and critical analysis of this literature requires a monograph. But this task is so complex that for the time being the case is limited to historiographical articles. The purpose of this article is to identify the most popular points of view expressed by well-known experts on the problem of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The analysis enables to draw the following conclusions. The existing explanations can be divided into two large groups. The first one includes works whose authors consider disintegration as the product of a combination of random circumstances, external causes, and mistakes of party and Soviet leaders, and therefore focus first on the study of the role of subjective and external factors, and, second, on the short period of time, 1985–1991, immediately preceding the disintegration. The second group includes works whose authors consider disintegration as a natural result of long-developed processes, search for its historical background, study trends in the development of the Soviet Union and the Union republics, and look at the disintegration systemically and comprehensively. In other words, the former consider disintegration to be a random phenomenon generated mainly by the events of 1985–1991, while the latter consider it to be a natural phenomenon with deep historical, economic, political, cultural, and social prerequisites and causes.
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Feldmann, Magnus. "The Fast Track from the Soviet Union to the World Economy: External Liberalization in Estonia and Latvia." Government and Opposition 36, no. 4 (October 2001): 537–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1477-7053.00080.
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There Exists An Extensive Literature On The Political Economy of external liberalization in emerging markets. However, the remarkable progress of Estonia and Latvia in external liberalization has not yet been addressed systematically in the academic literature from a political economy angle. This article aims not only to make a contribution to fill this gap in the literature by focusing on trade policy reform, but also to address three other issues.
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Melintei, Mihai. "Escaladarea conflictelor regionale în spațiul post-sovietic. Cazul conflictului transnistrean / Escalation of regional conflicts in the post-Soviet space. The case of the Transnistrian conflict." PLURAL. History, Culture, Society 9, no. 2 (November 20, 2021): 72–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.37710/plural.v9i2_6.
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The last decade of the twentieth century was marked by a geopolitical event with long-lasting effects - the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. One of the „poles” of the bipolar system of international relations has completely disappeared, and its fragments have begun to move in different directions - the independent states of the post-Soviet space have begun to form. Thus, the adaptation of the independent states from the post-Soviet space to the new geopolitical realities and the determination of their own political and external development vector began. At the same time, nationalist forces intensified and political tensions increased, leading to regional conflicts, especially in the vast Black Sea basin.
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Kyobutungi, Catherine, Ulrich Ronellenfitsch, Oliver Razum, and Heiko Becher. "Mortality from external causes among ethnic German immigrants from former Soviet Union countries, in Germany." European Journal of Public Health 16, no. 4 (February 14, 2006): 376–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/eurpub/ckl013.
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Golovnin, M., A. Zakharov, and D. Ushkalova. "Economic Integration: Lessons for the Post-Soviet Space." World Economy and International Relations 60, no. 4 (2016): 61–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2016-60-4-61-69.
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Authors examine economic effects of regional integration in the emerging markets, impact of globalization on economic integration and existing models of economic integration in different regions of the world in order to distinguish key characteristics of efficient model of integration at the post-Soviet space. In particular, authors distinguish the significance of various static and dynamic effects of economic integration for emerging markets and make a conclusion on the rising importance of dynamic effects. It is proved that positive economic effects of integration could be more evident for the emerging markets than for the developed ones. On the basis of a detailed analysis of specific features of economic integration projects in different regions of the world, a conclusion is drawn on key importance for emerging markets of such formats of economic integration that directly contribute to economic development (infrastructure development projects, creation of growth poles, formation of scientific and technological potential, etc.). In the context of globalization the strengthening of cooperation in investment sphere, the implementation of integration projects on financial markets, the creation of common defensive mechanisms against external shocks are of particular significance for economic integration processes. Basing on the undertaken analysis, the main principles of efficient model of integration in the Eurasian Economic Union are outlined and the key terms of realization of this model are defined. First of all, an efficient model of integration in the Eurasian Economic Union should be formed in contest of interaction between this union, at the one hand, and European and Asian integration centers, at the other hand. Then, integration mechanisms should extend beyond traditional schemes of integration and include different types of agreements (on preferential investment, financial integration and cooperation), sectoral cooperation projects, common policies, etc. Formation of single humanitarian, scientific and innovation environment should become the key element of the integration model of the Eurasian Economic Union. Acknowledgements. The article has been supported by a grant of the Russian Fund for Humanities.Project No. 13-33-11120.
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Danyliv, N. "US PRESIDENTS’ POLICY ON THE JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION (1961–1989)." Bulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. History, no. 138 (2018): 10–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/1728-2640.2018.138.2.
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In this article the author analyzed the features of the US presidents' administrations policy in the issue of Jews emigration from the Soviet Union. The pre-election promises concerning the liberalization of the emigration legislation and the degree of their actual implementation are described. The internal and external factors that influenced at the decisions of the presidents and their administrations are determined. The strength of the American-Jewish lobby influence is considered. In particular, it is tolk about replacing the conservative principles of immigration policy on a much more democratic position. In foreign policy, support Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union had become one of the strategies of the Cold War. The influence of the American-Jewish lobby, prompted politicians to make weighty decisions was considered. The conclusions refer to the conditions that influenced on the formation and development of a specific policy.
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Light, Matthew A. "What Does It Mean to Control Migration? Soviet Mobility Policies in Comparative Perspective." Law & Social Inquiry 37, no. 02 (2012): 395–429. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.2012.01308.x.
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The migration policies of the former Soviet Union (or USSR) included a virtual abolition of emigration and immigration, an effective ban on private travel abroad, and pervasive bureaucratic controls on internal migration. This article outlines this Soviet package of migration controls and assesses its historical and international distinctiveness through comparison with a liberal state, the United States, and an authoritarian capitalist state, Apartheid South Africa. Soviet limitations on external migration were more restrictive than those of contemporary capitalist states, and Soviet regulation of internal migration was unusual in its direct bureaucratic supervision of the individual. However, Soviet policy did not aim at the suppression of internal migration, but at its complete regularization. The ultimate goal was “regime adherence”: the full integration of the citizen into the Soviet political order. In contrast to the USSR, migration in the contemporary world is marked by “irregularization”: policies that lead to the proliferation of insecure and unauthorized migration.
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Roman, Alin. "Identity-building in Kazakhstan." Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Studia Europaea 65, no. 2 (December 30, 2020): 327–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/subbeuropaea.2020.2.15.
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"As a young nation that came into existence following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Kazakhstan undergoes a gradual transformation within its demographics. The issue of national identity within what was once an important and well-integrated part of the USSR continues to draw the involvement of its administrative apparatus that has to find the equilibrium between, on one hand, maintaining national integrity through various mechanisms and, on the other, managing the level of external and internal factors that may lead to the fate of its fellow Central-Asian republics. Keywords: nationalism, populism, Central Asia, statehood, post-Soviet identity"
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Josephson, Paul R. "EMPIRE-BUILDING AND FRONTIER OF SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET TIMES." Ural Historical Journal 73, no. 4 (2021): 88–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.30759/1728-9718-2021-4(73)-88-96.
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The paper deals with the strategies of colonization and assimilation of frontier in Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia in relation to, Siberia and the Far East. These frontier spaces were disturbing the Soviet leadership for they were both vulnerable for an external invasion and unsupportive of the new socialist order. Thus, countryside of Soviet Russia was also seen as frontier of its own kind. The conquest of frontier and its integration into the socialist, industrial economy was implemented by Stalinist leadership through the violent collectivization, which was accompanied by colonization in the periphery strengthened by the flow of exiles and labor camp prisoners from the collectivized western areas. From the point of view of Soviet leaders, the frontier territories were both resource pantry and “empty spaces” to settle. To stimulate colonization Soviet government was establishing the “corridors of modernization”, a network of infrastructure, connecting the newly constructed “company towns”, the outposts of frontier conquest. Such politics was simultaneously integrating indigenous peoples of frontier into the socialist economy and destroying their way of life. In spite of efforts of Soviet rulers from Stalin to Brezhnev, the assimilation of frontier did not succeed. However, in the 21st century Russian leadership continues to treat Arctic, Siberia and the Far East along the Soviet lines, as frontier spaces of economic and symbolic conquest and military-political contestation. Unlike the Soviet era, though, nowadays the concept of frontier had found its way into Russian historical and political thought.
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Brainerd, Elizabeth, and David M. Cutler. "Autopsy on an Empire: Understanding Mortality in Russia and the Former Soviet Union." Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 1 (February 1, 2005): 107–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/0895330053147921.
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Male life expectancy at birth fell by over six years in Russia between 1989 and 1994. Many other countries of the former Soviet Union saw similar declines, and female life expectancy fell as well. Using cross-country and Russian household survey data, we assess six possible explanations for this upsurge in mortality. Most find little support in the data: the deterioration of the health care system, changes in diet and obesity, and material deprivation fail to explain the increase in mortality rates. The two factors that do appear to be important are alcohol consumption, especially as it relates to external causes of death (homicide, suicide, and accidents) and stress associated with a poor outlook for the future. However, a large residual remains to be explained.
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Yakupov, Roman Aleksandrovich, and Dar'ya Viktorovna Yakupova. "“There would be no unilateral détente!”: financial sector of theCOMECON countries in the late 1970s – early 1980s as a source of Western political influence." Исторический журнал: научные исследования, no. 5 (May 2021): 138–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0609.2021.5.36127.
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The object of this research is the processes that took place in the COMECON member-states due instability of the financial sector. The subject of this research is the impact of the economic factor upon the evolution of bipolar system of international relations and sociopolitical sustainability of the Soviet Union during the 1979 – 1983. The article provides a scientific assessment of extent of awareness of the US intelligence on the financial solvency of the COMECON member-states, their ability to meet repayment schedules for both interest and debts, and the consequences of possible default of any of the countries during the financial crisis. The authors set the task to analyze the target points of foreign analytics regarding the “dependency” of Western European enterprises on their Eastern business partners, as well as clarify the extent to which a significant decline in trade between the East and the West affected the Soviet and Western European economy. The use of unpublished foreign and domestic archival documents, as well as foreign periodicals define the novelty of this research. This article is first to disclose the information on how the United States turned the severe financial problems of Eastern European countries for the purpose of political pressure on such issues as Afghanistan, crisis in Poland, and construction of the Soviet gas pipeline. Leaning on the introduced into the scientific discourse CIA documents, assessment is given to the effectiveness of trade and economic policy of the United States and its Western European allies in relation to Eastern Europe. The article also analyses the support of centrifugal tendencies in the economy of the Eastern European countries of the Soviet bloc.
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Medne, Ilze, and Kristīne Bērziņa. "Three decades of post-Soviet period: analyses of outbound tourism development patterns and environment in Latvia." Humanities and Social Sciences: Latvia 29, no. 1 (June 2021): 29–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.22364/hssl.29.1.02.
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After regaining independence, the borders were opened for Latvian residents, and they had the possibility to leave behind the travel or non-travel principles of the Soviet Union period, as well as go into the global tourism market. Post-Soviet transformation that was seen in different sectors, including the change in tourism and travel habits, which happened slowly. Since every decade of these three post-Soviet decades has its own development characteristics and is impacted by different external environment elements, the aim of this study is to analyse the tendencies of each decade and its most impactful external environment factors in Latvia. Even though the impact of the economic environment has always been meaningful in tourism, the main factor that impacted the first post-Soviet decade was without doubt the political environment. With the start of the 21st century and the improvement of the economic situation, world’s technological achievements enter Latvia’s tourism industry. Different sociocultural factors highlight different outbound tourism tendencies in each decade. Travel habits of Latvian residents have changed over time – values and expectations have changed for travelling abroad. As expectations and knowledge increase, Latvian travellers join the tendencies and travel habits of the collective European travellers.
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Czubocha, Krzysztof. "ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚĆ ZSRR ZA NARUSZENIA PRAWA MIĘDZYNARODOWEGO W STOSUNKU DO POLSKI W LATACH 1939-1945." Zeszyty Prawnicze 5, no. 1 (June 10, 2017): 213. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/zp.2005.5.1.09.
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International Responsibility of the Soviet Union for its Illegal Actions against Poland between 1939 and 1945SummaryThe author of the paper comes to a conclusion that many actions concerning Poland taken by the Soviet Union during The Second World War constituted an abuse of power. The Soviet U nion invaded Poland and illegally occupied its Eastern territories until 1945. As a result of the aggression, hundreds of thousands of Polish soldiers and citizens were killed or persecuted.At the end of The Second W orld W ar decisions concerning Poland were taken at inter-Allied conferences w ithout Poland’s participation. The Great Powers decided to deprive Poland of its Eastern territories against the will of the Polish Government-in-exile, which was legal at that time. W hat is more, Poland was not a signatory of the Jalta and Potsdam agreements. Therefore, the decisions referring to Polish Eastern border should be invalidAs far as the problem of a new Polish government is concerned, it is necessary to stress that according to international law a change of a government in a particular state should take place w ithout any external interference. Nevertheless, the Soviet U nion decided to create a new government for Poland to replace the legal government-in-exile. As a consequence, the Provisional Government of National Unity was created., It consisted mostly of communists who were dependent on the Soviet Union. Many o f them were Soviet spies. They were able to gain power only as a result of the Soviet military intervention in Poland. The government did not represent Polish society and was created against its will. The Soviet U nion did not have the right to impose this sort of government on Poland.The problem of reconciliation between Poland and Russia is also approached in the paper. During the Second World War Polish state and its citizens suffered great losses. Neither the Soviet U nion nor Russia has ever assumed responsibility for the Soviet U nion’s illegal actions against Poland and its citizens between 1939 and 1945. In such circumstances any sort of reconciliation cannot take place.
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von Steinsdorff, Silvia, and Anna Fruhstorfer. "Post-Soviet de facto states in search of internal and external legitimacy. Introduction." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45, no. 1-2 (March 2012): 117–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2012.03.009.
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The four state-like entities on the territory of the former Soviet Union that emerged about twenty years ago have successfully defended their precarious independence until today. However, we still know very little about the internal political developments in these de facto states, because so far most research has focused on the regional and international dimensions of the now “frozen” secessionist conflicts which brought them into being. The authors of this issue argue that it is high time to have a closer look at the developments inside these de facto states for several reasons. First, in order to understand whether there is mutual dependence between internal political structures and processes and the chances of international recognition. Second, the post-Soviet de facto states are model cases for internal transformation or even democratization efforts as a strategy of internal and/or external legitimacy building. Finally, the issue proves that the reluctance of academia to analyze the political systems of these entities for fear of legitimizing regimes that do not deserve it is not reasonable: the post-Soviet de facto states are fully grown states for all but international recognition – they are not supposed to disappear because we refuse to admit this fact.
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Gurova, I., and M. Efremova. "Trade in the CIS Region: Conditions for Further Production Cooperation." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 6 (June 20, 2012): 110–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2012-6-110-126.
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The article deals with the trade in the CIS region and in the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. The methodology of the analysis is based on the UN Classification by Broad Economic Categories (1971) and B. Balassa model for detecting competitive advantages. The authors conclude that the CIS countries are interested in further integration in the post-Soviet area. The regional CIS market plays a greater role for semi-manufactured and final goods producers from the former Soviet republics. But the dynamics of the whole export shows that the CIS economies get more and more oriented on external markets in the sphere of primary goods.
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Dabrowski, M. P. "30 years of economic reforms in the post-Soviet space: Macroeconomic processes." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 2 (February 7, 2022): 5–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2022-2-5-32.
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The paper contains a retrospective analysis of macroeconomic policy and macroeconomic reforms in the post-Soviet countries in 1992—2021, that is, after obtaining political and economic independence at the end of 1991. Special attention is paid to the problems of macroeconomic stabilization and economic growth. As a result of structural distortions inherited from the Soviet economy and slow pace of economic and institutional reforms, the countries of the former Soviet Union suffered from the long and deep output decline in the 1990s, and their post-transition growth recovery in the 2000s did not last long. Furthermore, they remain vulnerable to both domestic and external economic shocks. Given a limited predictability of post-COVID global economic trends, this vulnerability will continue, most likely, in the next couple of years.
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Sinitsyn, Fedor L. "The Concept of ‘Developed Socialism’ as response of the USSR to ideological and socio-economic challenges of the time (1964–1982)." Izvestiya of Saratov University. History. International Relations 22, no. 1 (February 21, 2022): 29–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.18500/1819-4907-2022-22-1-29-39.
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In the 1960s, Soviet ideology came face to face with new challenges and threats, both internal and external. The leadership of the USSR was aware of these challenges and decided to rework the ideology on the basis of the concept of ‘Developed Socialism’ created in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. In the Soviet Union, this concept became the ideological basis of the ‘Brezhnev’s society’ and was used to respond to domestic and foreign policy challenges faced by the Soviet Union. In addition, it was based on the idea that the country had achieved a high degree of economic development sufficient for the requirements of modern times, and assumed that the completion of communism would be postponed to an indefinite future. The concept of ‘Developed Socialism’ adopted in the USSR simultaneously had progressive features (an attemptto bringthe ideology in linewiththe dictates ofthetime,taking into accountthe ideological experience of othercountries, a departure from the illusion of rapid construction of communism), conservative features (a return to the Stalinist concept of transition from socialism to communism), and ‘utopian’ features (communism remained as the goal). In general, this ideological concept had significant disadvantages that hindered its effectiveness in the long term perspective.
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Rizas, S. "Domestic and External Factors in Greece's Relations with the Soviet Union: Early Cold War to Detente." Mediterranean Quarterly 24, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 57–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/10474552-2019006.
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Kasekamp, Andres. "Survival against the Odds: The Baltic States at 100." Slavic Review 78, no. 3 (2019): 640–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/slr.2019.225.
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This essay examines how Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have managed to secure their independence and analyzes how they have dealt with the internal and external challenges to their state-building efforts. It compares the first period of statehood between the two world wars with the current period of independence beginning with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Among the critical external tasks they have faced were deterring former imperial powers, fostering regional cooperation and gaining a voice in international organizations. Internally, consolidating democratic systems and integration of ethnic minorities have been the two most significant challenges.
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Lahno, O. P. "Prerequisites and Causes for the Maturation of the Systemic Crisis in the Mid-Twentieth Century Evangelical Baptist Church." Ukrainian Religious Studies, no. 45 (March 7, 2008): 91–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.32420/2008.45.1900.
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The twentieth century was a period of prolonged crisis of spirituality in the Soviet Union. The atheist state used all possible and impossible levers of various influences on religious associations and ordinary believers. Since the assertion of the Soviet authorities, an open war has been declared against any manifestation of religion. There were real battles: with their ideological fronts, offensives and retreats, the whole system of operations developed and the tactical plan in line with the party-approved strategy. The result of such disputes between the state and its believing citizens has been the church crises, schisms, and even the elimination of entire denominations. The most violent was the struggle against religious organizations disloyal to the Soviet authorities. It should be noted that even external loyalty did not save religious associations from the onslaught of anti-Sovietism
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Rozkošová, Zuzana, and Ľubomír Čech. "Seeking a Place for Islam in Post-Soviet Russia." Przegląd Strategiczny, no. 14 (December 29, 2021): 183–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/ps.2021.1.11.
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One of the main characteristics of the post-Soviet transformation was the religious resurgence. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the post-Soviet Islamic revival in the 1990s. The awakening of Islam and seeking the place for Muslims in the society significantly influenced the formation of today’s Russian Federation. The authors examine the factors that influenced the role of Islam in newly created post-Soviet Russia and the federal government’s response to its dynamics. The paper is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the Islamic revival after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The second chapter is focused on the Kremlin’s reaction to new radical movements that emerged during the Islamic awakening and the separatist sentiments in Russia’s Muslim regions. Using the qualitative research method, the authors drew a conclusion that Islamic radicalisation in post-Soviet Russia was caused by several external and internal factors. The political developments in the Russian Federation between the second half of the 1990s and the early 21st century were characterised by restrictions on religious freedom and consolidation of federalism.
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YAKOVLEV, Petr, and Nailya YAKOVLEVA. "Portugal: Post-Revolutionary Development and Dynamics of Relationship with Russia." Perspectives and prospects. E-journal, no. 2 (18) (2019): 106–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.32726/2411-3417-2019-2-106-118.
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2019 occupies a special place in the history of the Portuguese Republic and Russian-Portuguese cooperation. The 25th of April marked the 45th anniversary of the Carnation Revolution, which abruptly changed the country's path of development and expanded the horizons of its external interactions. The Soviet Union, and then the Russian Federation became one of the most important partners of Portugal. Despite recent difficulties and problems, Russian-Portuguese relations, based on mutual interest, have been maintaining positive dynamics.
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Coricelli, Fabrizio. "Democracy in the Post-Communist World: Unfinished Business." East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures 21, no. 1 (February 2007): 82–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325406297127.
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While in Central-Eastern Europe and in the Baltics democracy and market reform have been consolidated, culminating in entry to the European Union, in the states of the former Soviet Union democracy and economic reforms are still lagging, and in some cases we observe reversals in both political and economic reforms. The article identifies the risk of a “trap” of partial reforms, both political and economic. Incentives for further reforms are weak for policy makers, and at the same time opposition to reforms by citizens increases. Lack of competition and concentration of economic power lead to opposition by wealthy people, while the lack of social safety nets leads to opposition by those adversely affected by reforms. An external anchor (e.g., entry or candidacy to entry in the European Union) seems to be crucial; lacking such an anchor, the process is much harder.