Academic literature on the topic 'Customary law – Yugoslavia'

This case note focuses on two key aspects of the Vasiljević Judgement. The first one is the accused's acquittal of the charge of ‘violence to life and person’ under common Article 3 for the reason that the trial chamber was not satisfied that it constituted a crime under customary international law. The second aspect is the trial chamber's analysis of state practice to identify the definition under customary law of extermination as a crime against humanity.

AbstractThis article explores the development of "joint criminal enterprise" form of responsibility in the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter "Yugoslav Tribunal"). Although "joint criminal enterprise" does not appear in the Yugoslav Tribunal Statute, this form of responsibility was read into the Statute by the tribunal judges and is repeatedly relied on in finding individuals guilty in cases before the tribunal. In particular, ever since the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadic held that "joint criminal enterprise", as a form of accomplice liability, is "firmly established in customary international law", other Trial and Appeals Chamber decisions continue to follow this holding. This article takes a critical look at some of the fundamental issues associated with the development of "joint criminal enterprise" at the Yugoslav Tribunal, in particular the methodology employed by the Appeals Chamber in Tadic. In addition, the article also examines the similarities between "joint criminal enterprise" and U.S. conspiracy law, and whether the use of "joint criminal enterprise" at the Yugoslav Tribunal violates the "principles of legality".

AbstractInternational human rights law (IHRL), international humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law (ICL) have trouble staying faithful to the two pillars of customary international law – state practice andopinio juris. In ICL, theTadićInterlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction and theKupreškićTrial Judgement have even gone as far as enunciating new models to identify customs. In this article, I show that the approaches to customs’ identification postulated in these two cases were conflict-avoidance techniques used by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to bring together IHRL and IHL. The crux of the matter in theTadićandKupreškićcases was that the human rights of the victims of war crimes committed in internal conflicts required that a new approach to customary international law be adopted. Thus, the criminal aspect of IHL (i.e., ICL) was updated, and conceptual conflicts between IHL and IHRL were avoided.

AbstractThis article is a review of the jurisprudence on provisional release and an analysis of how such a mechanism operates under the Statute of the International Criminal Court. It examines how pretrial release is dealt with in international human rights law while focusing on the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. It goes on to evaluate the position of the ad hoc tribunals regarding the issue of pre-trial release and seeks to articulate how and why the ad hoc tribunals have moved away from customary international law. It also seeks to evaluate the actual reach of the presumption of innocence in provisional release cases at the European Court of Human Rights and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Formen Yugoslavia. Finally, the article considers the recent jurisprudence of the ICC regarding interim release.

The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia lists certain offences that might constitute a war crime or a crime against humanity. It does not, however, define any of these offences, among which are torture, inhuman treatment and wilfully causing great suffering or serious bodily harm. Although their meaning is clear in plain language, their legal definition is not. This article attempts to find the customary international law definition of these crimes.

RESUMEN: La labor del Tribunal Penal Internacional para la Ex-Yugoslavia tuvo un momento importante en la compresión del principio de legalidad, como principio básico en la garantía de los derechos humanos, al enfrentar no sólo el derecho consuetudinario como fuente de derecho sino también diferentes modos o enfoques en la identificación de este derecho consuetudinario. Esta relación debe ser analizada a la luz de las limitaciones que tiene el derecho internacional y, sobre todo, de los procedimientos de creación de normas. No resulta fácil exigir responsabilidad en el cumplimiento del derecho internacional humanitario y de los derechos humanos. La práctica de este Tribunal abre una vía para la reflexión con la finalidad de asegurar el respeto de los derechos humanos en cualquier circunstancia, incluso de aquellos que llevaron a cabo la comisión de graves crímenes contra la comunidad internacional.ABSTRACT: The work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was important for understanding the principle of legality as a key principle on the guarantee of Human Rights. The former was due to the Tribunal’s work on having faced the customary law as a source of law using different perspectives for its identification. The link between customary law, principle of legality and human rights has to be analyzed taking in account the limits of International law and the procedures for creating legal norms. It is not easy to invoke responsibility in the fulfillment of international humanitarian law and international law of human rights. The practice developed by this Tribunal provides an avenue for thinking about ensuring the respect of the human rights in any case including the commission of grave crimes against international community. PALABRAS CLAVE: derecho internacional de los derechos humanos, principio de legalidad, derecho internacional humanitario, costumbre internacionalKEYWORDS: international law of human rights, principle of legality, international humanitarian law, international custom

Proper understanding of the constitutive elements of the command responsibility is the key to its proper application in practice, and the relationship between superior and subordinate as well as effective control is certainly one of the more complex issues that is insufficiently elaborated in the professional public and the public at large. The constitutive elements of the superior's command responsibility have their roots in the customary international law. One of these elements, without which there is no command responsibility of the superior, is the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship, which at its core implies existence of the effective control of the superior over the subordinate. The ad hoc tribunals of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda paid particular attention to interpretation of this element of command responsibility in their jurisprudence. The goal of the authors is to show the context in which this first element of command responsibility gained "its place" in the international customary law and international conventional law as well as to show how the first element has been interpreted in jurisprudence. Therefore, in the context of this first element, the paper deals with the analysis of customary international law, international agreements and individual decisions of international ad hoc tribunals.

This article follows on an earlier study of the topic of command responsibility. When that previous analysis was made, the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) in this area was nascent. A number of issues have since been considered and decided upon by the two Tribunals in several judgements, which have already attracted some scholarly attention. It is proposed to examine herein the doctrine of command responsibility in the light of the evolving case law of the Tribunals and other evidence of practice outside these judicial fora. The aim is to discover whether customary law has progressed or developed, and what questions recent practice has raised.

This article examines the doctrine of extended joint criminal enterprise (‘JCE’) as a mode of liability within international criminal law (‘ICL’). The article first provides an overview of extended JCE based on its current expression in international customary law by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Tadić case. Consideration will then turn to the problems associated with the application of extended JCE. In particular, recent developments in the United Kingdom in the case of R v Jogee will be discussed, and the implications for the future of extended JCE in ICL as a matter of international custom. Next, the viability of the JCE doctrine will be considered for the purposes of proceedings before the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’). Ultimately, it is concluded that extended JCE has a limited jurisprudential basis before the ICC. However, it is suggested that extended JCE may live on through art 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute.

A. Racke GMBH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz. Case C-l 62/96.Court of Justice of the European Communities, June 16, 1998.The German Bundesfinanzhof (Federal Finance Court) asked the Court of Justice of the European Communities whether an EEC Council regulation suspending the trade concessions provided for by the 1980 Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was valid. The Court answered in the affirmative, holding that, in adopting the regulation, the Council had not acted contrary to the rules of customary international law concerning termination and suspension of treaty relations because of a fundamental change of circumstances.

Magister Legum - LLM
Even though sexual violence has always been a part and parcel of conflicts and atrocities throughout the ages, it never found any interpretation by subsequent tribunals who were responsible for prosecuting offenders.The case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu was the first of its kind to give jurisprudential recognition and interpretation to sexual violence as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide respectively. This case was important for the following reasons:1. It acknowledged that sexual violence can amount to an act of genocide; 2. It acknowledged that sexual violence can amount to a crime against humanity; and 3. It was the first case to define rape within an international context.Following the case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu many tribunals gave recognition to the extent of which sexual violence takes place during atrocities by correctly convicting accused for either participating in sexual violence or aiding and abetting to sexual violence. Amidst the various interpretations on what constitutes sexual violence and how it is defined, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone all either conceptualised sexual violence as genocide, war crimes or/ and crimes against humanity.At the same time, the development of sexual violence as either a crime against humanity or a war crime did not end with the courts. The case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu sparked a fire in the international community, which led to it paying more attention to the place of sexual violence in treaty law. Taking into account that rape is listed as a crime against humanity in both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda statutes, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court statutes both list more than one form of sexual violence as a crime against humanity. It is interesting to note that the latter two treaty developments took place only after the International Criminal Tribunal conceptualised sexual violence as a crime against humanity.Thus apart from merely listing rape as a crime against humanity, the Statute establishing the Special Court for Sierra Leone, states in article 2(g) that sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence constitutes a crime against humanity. The Statute establishing the International Criminal Court states in article 7(1)(g) that rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity constitutes a crime against humanity. The interpretation of these acts is further guided by the ‘Elements of Crimes’ which are annexed to the International Criminal Court statute.Once again it is interesting to note that the ‘Elements of Crimes’ for these acts are similar to how the International Criminal Tribunals (both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals) conceptualised various acts of sexual violence.On the other hand, the definition of genocide remained the same as it was defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. This definition does not expressly mention any form of sexual violence as a form of genocide.However, once again, the trial chamber in the case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu set the benchmark for sexual violence to constitute a form of genocide by way of interpretation. The definition of genocide did not subsequently change in the Statute establishing the International Criminal Court.Based on these premises, this thesis attempts to investigate the similarities and differences in sexual violence as a form of both genocide and a crime against humanity,by addressing the following question:What are the essential and practical differences between sexual violence as crimes against humanity and genocide and what is the legal effect of the differences, should there be any? Chapter 1 highlights the historical overview and developments of sexual violence as genocide and crimes against humanity, while chapter 2 investigates how sexual violence can amount to a form of genocide. Chapter 3 assesses the advances made in sexual violence as a crime against humanity, while chapter 4 importantly draws a comparative analysis between sexual violence as genocide and a crime against humanity. Chapter 4 draws this comparison by weighing up four differences and four similarities in sexual violence as genocide and a crime against humanity.Chapter 5 highlights the conclusion and provides an answer for the research question that is posed above. Here it is concluded that even though there exist multiple differences in sexual violence as crimes against humanity and genocide, there are also multiple similarities which could possibly amount to a better chance for conviction of an accused under a crime against humanity than genocide. Chapter 5 also provide possible recommendations for the consequences that might flow should sexual violence as a crime against humanity be fairly similar to sexual violence as genocide.

This chapter discusses the revival of customary humanitarian law. It begins by considering the origins of the revival, followed by discussions of the application of customary international law by non-criminal international bodies, such as the International Court of Justice; the customary law jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); and the customary law jurisprudence of the other international criminal courts.

This chapter comments on Article 26 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 26 declares that the Court has no jurisdiction over a person under the age of eighteen at the time of the infraction. However, a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia confirmed that article 26 of the Rome Statute is ‘for jurisdictional purposes’. It also held that there is no rule in convention or customary international law against criminal liability for a war crime committed by an individual below the age of eighteen. Juveniles may be prosecuted for international crimes, just as they may be prosecuted for ordinary crimes, subject to national legislation governing the minimum age of responsibility and the applicable norms of international human rights law.

This chapter comments on Article 28 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 28 consists of two paragraphs; the first addressing superior responsibility in a military context, the second dealing with the issue with respect to civilians. Unlike the superior responsibility liability that attaches to military commanders, which was well accepted, application of the concept to civilians proved to be very controversial. Some Trial Chambers at the ad hoc tribunals have referred to article 28 as a basis for the view that the ‘distinction between military commanders and other superiors embodied in the Rome Statute is an instructive one’, although this is a rather isolated opinion. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has acknowledged that whether the liability of civilian superiors ‘contains identical elements to that of military commanders is not clear in customary law’.

This chapter covers the rules governing the targeting of persons under the Additional Protocols during the conduct of hostilities. It highlights the obligation of each armed conflict parties to distinguish military operations between civilians and combatants as the cardinal principal of distinction since attack could only be directed against combatants or civilians directly participating in hostilities. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Court appear to have conflated indiscriminate attacks with attacks directed against civilians. The chapter then explains the loss of protection from attack as a consequence of civilians’ direct participation in hostilities. The provisions in the 1977 Additional Protocol I regarding the protection of civilians and governing the loss of immunity from an attack are reflected in customary international law.

The Introduction describes the role of international attribution rules and principles in connection with the meaning of ‘State’ under international law. It addresses how this study on attribution is innovative and helpful in relation to various issues. As to public international law, it deals with attribution of the acts or omissions of ‘independent’ State organs exercising functions of a regulatory or administrative nature (such as central banks and independent authorities), the definition of ‘governmental authority’ for the purposes of attribution of conduct of parastatal entities, and the determination of the thresholds of State ‘control’ either on de facto organs, on one side, or on ‘private’ individuals, on the other side. As to international investment law and arbitration, it is notably relevant to clarify the operation of the dialectics between lex generalis (customary international law) and lex specialis (international investment treaties) in relation to attribution issues. The Introduction also clarifies that the analysis that is found in this book is based on the practice of early arbitrations, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Iran–US Claims Tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), investor–State arbitration, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system. This means that the practice of other international courts and tribunals that is relied on (as to the attribution of conduct to a State) by the International Law Commission (ILC) in its Commentaries to Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) is not dealt with in this book.