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Published: 10 December 2022

Last updated: 28 January 2023

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1

Grimaldi, Nicolás. "Esperanza y desesperanza de la razón en Kant." Anuario Filosófico 26, no. 1 (October 4, 2018): 79–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.15581/009.26.29935.

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The author seeks to establish the strict validity of the composition of the Critique of Judgement and how the analysis of the aesthetic judgement pre-pares for the understanding of the teleological judgement. He shows how the Critique of Judgement, specially the statutes on art, resolves the opposition between nature and the spirit, the need of liberty, mechanical causality and finality that the first two Critiques had left unsolved.

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2

Teufel, Thomas. "What Does Kant Mean by ‘Power of Judgement’ in his Critique of the Power of Judgement?" Kantian Review 17, no. 2 (June 8, 2012): 297–326. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415412000076.

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AbstractThe notion of ‘power of judgement’ in the title of Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgement is commonly taken to refer to a cognitive power inclusive of both determining judgement and reflecting judgement. I argue, first, that this seemingly innocuous view is in conflict both with the textual fact that Kant attempts a Critical justification of the reflecting power of judgement – only – and with the systematic impossibility of a transcendentally grounded determining power of judgement. The conventional response to these difficulties is to point out that, Kant's systematic ambitions in the third Critique notwithstanding, reflection, qua concept-forming synthesis, is too closely tied to determination to be a cognitive power in its own right. I argue, second, that this response is question-begging, since the notion of reflection it employs is not only not one central to the third Critique but one antecedently tied to the understanding. I argue, third, that Kant's discussion, in the pivotal § § 76–7, of our cognitive relation to sensible particularity addresses an epistemic problem present (but not raised) in the Critique of Pure Reason. This is the problem of the synthesizability, qua absolute unity, of unsynthesized intuitions. Solving this problem requires Critical justification of a principle of reflection. It follows that Kant's systematic ambitions in the third Critique are appropriate. Given the problem Kant seeks to address, he must offer what he takes himself to be offering: a Critique of the (Reflecting) Power of Judgement.

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3

Patnaik, Justice A. K. "A Critique of the NJAC Judgement." Journal of National Law University Delhi 3, no. 1 (August 2015): 17–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2277401720150102.

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4

Sweet, Kristi. "Reflection: Its Structure and Meaning in Kant's Judgements of Taste." Kantian Review 14, no. 1 (March 2009): 53–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400001345.

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When Kant announces in a letter to Reinhold that he has discovered a new domain of a priori principles, he situates these principles in a ‘faculty of feeling pleasure and displeasure’ (Zammito 1992: 47). And it is indeed in his Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, named in this letter the Critique of Taste, that we find his elucidation of the relation of the principle of purposiveness to the feeling of pleasure. The kinds of judgements in which our feelings are evaluated in accordance with a principle are what Kant names reflective judgements. And while reflective judgements emerge in the third Critique to include not only judgements of taste, but also judgements of the sublime and teleological judgements of nature, in this paper I will focus on the first, as the question of the relatedness of reflection to pleasure is most pronounced in this context. There is no consensus in Kant scholarship as to what the structure of reflective judgements is, as evidenced by the widely disparate views of those such as Guyer, Allison, Pippin, Ginsborg, Lyotard, and others.

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5

Gabás, Raúl. "Communicability of aesthetic judgement in the Critique of Judgement. Art and society." Enrahonar. Quaderns de filosofia 19 (October 1, 1992): 21. http://dx.doi.org/10.5565/rev/enrahonar.700.

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6

Cho, Youngtae. "Educational Implications of Critique of Judgement : An Examination of Judgement of Taste." Journal of Moral Education 23, no. 2 (December 31, 2011): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.17715/jme.2011.12.23.2.1.

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7

Wicks, Robert, and John H. Zammito. "The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgement." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51, no. 4 (1993): 643. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/431905.

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8

Escalante, Evodio. "Problemas de la recepción de la tercera Crítica de Kant." Theoría. Revista del Colegio de Filosofía, no. 18 (July 1, 2007): 95–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/ffyl.16656415p.2007.18.341.

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The history of reception of Kant’s Critique of Judgement is surrounded by equivocal and oblique readings that at the end result fruitful and can’t be denied by simply declaring them “erroneous”. This article analyzes some of these “misunderstandings” originated by the rigor of this book, which effects can be acquainted even in some branches of contemporary art as well as of the “posmodern” thought. It is also pointed the way in which the writing of The Critique of Judgement supposes a significant change in Kant’s original conceptions in the way they were exposed in The Critique of Pure Reason.

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9

Franks, Paul. "Reform and/or Revolution? Comments on Karin de Boer, Kant’s Reform of Metaphysics." Kantian Review 27, no. 1 (February 21, 2022): 127–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415421000546.

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AbstractKarin de Boer has given the best account so far of the reform of Wolffian metaphysics that Kant promised. But does such a reform cohere with the revolutionary goal that Kant also affirmed? Standpoint is singled out as the central meta-concept of Kant’s revolutionary goal, and it is argued that, in the second and third critiques, Kant himself developed his revolutionary insight into the perspectival character of both concept and judgement in ways that he did not anticipate at the time of the first critique, when his promise to reform metaphysics was made. The question is raised what room Kant’s revolution leaves for doctrinal and not merely disciplinary judgements in both general and special metaphysics, and also whether the opening of new vistas may have drained metaphysical reform of its interest.

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10

McDONOUGH, RICHARD. "Religious fundamentalism: a conceptual critique." Religious Studies 49, no. 4 (February 7, 2013): 561–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412512000479.

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AbstractThe article argues that religious fundamentalism, understood, roughly, as the view that people must obey God's commands unconditionally, is conceptually incoherent because such religious fundamentalists inevitably must substitute human judgement for God's judgement. The article argues, first, that fundamentalism, founded upon the normal sort of indirect communications from God, is indefensible. Second, the article considers the crucial case in which God is said to communicate directly to human beings, and argues that the fundamentalist interpretation of such communications is also incoherent, and, on this basis, argues that religious fundamentalism is actually an extreme form of irreligiousness. Finally, the article considers Kierkegaard's prima facie defence of unconditional religious faith, and argues that, despite some similarity with the fundamentalists, Kierkegaard's appreciation of human finitude leads him to a profoundly anti-fundamentalist stance.

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11

Allison, Henry E. "Beauty and Duty in Kant's Critique of Judgement." Kantian Review 1 (March 1997): 53–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400000066.

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At the end of §40 of the Critique of Judgement, after a discussion of the sensus communis and its connection with taste, Kant writes:If we could assume that the mere universal communicability as such of our feeling must already carry with it an interest for us (something we are, however, not justified in inferring from the character of a merely reflective power of judgment), then we could explain how it is that we require from everyone as a duty, as it were (gleichsam), the feeling in a judgment of taste. (5: 296; 162)

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12

Whitlock, Matthew G. "The Wrong Side Out With(out) God: An Autopsy of the Body Without Organs." Deleuze and Guattari Studies 14, no. 3 (August 2020): 507–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/dlgs.2020.0414.

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While the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of ‘body without organs’ (BwO) is developed alongside their critique of Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, it is also developed alongside their critique of Christianity, most poignantly in the sixth plateau of A Thousand Plateaus. Here Deleuze and Guattari quote Antonin Artaud in order to show how ‘the judgment of God weighs upon and is exercised against the BwO’. In order to understand this relationship between judgement of God and the BwO, this essay explores Deleuze's critiques of Christianity in his earlier works and concludes that the BwO, much like Artaud's own poetry, is developed in contrast to an internalised form of Christianity.

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13

McClymont, Katie. "Articulating virtue: Planning ethics within and beyond post politics." Planning Theory 18, no. 3 (May 4, 2018): 282–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1473095218773119.

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Post-foundationalist political theories have provided some of the most radical tools of critique in recent years. As well as challenging the dominant orthodoxy of achieving consensus in decision-making, they give voice to claims that the world can be conceived differently than how it is expressed in contemporary neoliberal hegemony by the reassertion of disagreement as fundamental to democratic politics. However, this conflict itself is a means not an end: it provides the intellectual tools to dissemble the dominant qua hegemonic version of contemporary society and its concomitant framing of values, but it does not provide a way in which to assess the validity of any counterclaims to the contemporary hegemony. Post-foundationalist approaches can critique the status quo for its practice and ontology, but do not offer substantive grounds for an alternative. This is of particular importance for planning as an outcome-based activity; engaging daily with ideas of better or worse developments. If planning is to be conceived as ‘the art of situated ethical judgement’, questions of value judgement are central to any theoretical conceptualisation or critique. The article develops this argument by considering the contribution that Alasdair MacIntyre’s ethical and political thought could make to this debate. MacIntyre’s notion of virtue ethics demonstrates how ethical judgement can be made without the need for an enlightenment foundationalist ontology to underpin its claims. The article demonstrates how this approach allows for new ways of thinking through the ethical questions implicit in much of the post-foundationalist critiques of planning practice and, in turn, offers a situated way of judging outcomes, which is not constrained by the post-political condition.

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14

Rogerson, Kenneth F. "Pleasure and Fit in Kant's Aesthetics." Kantian Review 2 (March 1998): 117–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400000236.

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In the third Critique Kant shifts the focus in his enquiry from the status of factual statements in the Critique of Pure Reason and the grounding of moral imperatives in the Critique of Practical Reason to investigating two methods of considering the world which go beyond the strictly verifiable. This is a move from evaluating the interplay of a ‘determinate’ set of facts and intellectual preconditions to forming what Kant calls ‘reflective’ judgements on these facts. There are two major questions which the Critique of Judgement tackles. On the one hand Kant ambitiously considers how we might properly interpret a set of facts as comprising a larger teleological system and, on the other hand, he is interested in the seemingly quite separate issue of the appreciation of objects as beautiful. It is this latter issue which shall concern us here. Consistent with the reflective stand in the third Critique, Kant argues from the very outset that beauty is not an empirical concept with which we might describe the world. Beauty is not objective in the sense that size, colour or weight might be. Objective properties of this kind belong to the world of scientific understanding. Instead, he holds that judgements of aesthetic merit should be based upon the subjective pleasure we take in experiencing works of art and natural objects.

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15

Brewer, Kimberly. "Alternate Possibilities, Divine Omniscience and Critique of Judgement §76." Kantian Review 26, no. 3 (June 22, 2021): 393–412. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415421000194.

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AbstractA philosophically and historically influential section of the Critique of Judgement presents an ‘intuitive intellect’ as a mind whose representation is limited to what actually exists, and does not extend to mere possibilities. Kant’s paradigmatic instance of such an intellect is however also the divine mind. This combination threatens to rule out the reality of the mere possibilities presupposed by Kant’s theory of human freedom. Through an analysis of the relevant issues in metaphysical cosmology, modal metaphysics and philosophical theology, I show that Kant in fact possesses the resources to reconcile the philosophical claims of §76 of the Critique of Judgement with his keystone commitment to the reality of human freedom.

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16

Klemme, Heiner F. "Is the Categorical Imperative the Highest Principle of Both Pure Practical and Theoretical Reason?" Kantian Review 19, no. 1 (January 31, 2014): 119–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415413000332.

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AbstractIn her new book, Patricia Kitcher supports Onora O'Neill's view that the categorical imperative is the highest principle of both practical and theoretical reason. I claim that neither O'Neill's original interpretation nor Kitcher's additional evidence in favour of it are convincing. At its core, this misconception of Kant's position consists in the identification of self-referential critique of reason with the concept of autonomy. It will be shown that the ‘common principle’ (Kant) of both practical and theoretical reason is not the categorical imperative, but the reflective power of judgement, as Kant claims in the Critique of the Power of Judgement.

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17

Longhurst, Brian, Pierre Bourdieu, and Barrington Moore. "Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste." British Journal of Sociology 37, no. 3 (September 1986): 453. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/590650.

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18

Warner, Michael, Pierre Bourdieu, and Richard Nice. "Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste." MLN 100, no. 5 (December 1985): 1133. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2905454.

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19

Boghian, Ioana. "Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste." European Legacy 18, no. 3 (June 2013): 374–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2013.772046.

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20

Bourdieu, Pierre. "Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste." Journal of Economic Sociology 6, no. 3 (2005): 25–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.17323/1726-3247-2005-3-25-48.

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21

GRETTON, T. "Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste." Oxford Art Journal 8, no. 2 (January 1, 1985): 63–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxartj/8.2.63.

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22

Burke, Peter. "Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste." History of European Ideas 10, no. 1 (January 1989): 98–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0191-6599(89)90306-9.

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23

Zangwill, Nick. "Kant on Pleasure in the Good." Disputatio 13, no. 62 (December 1, 2021): 181–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2021-0010.

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24

Boyd, Steven R. "The Critique of the Articles of Confederation Reconsidered." Journal of Early American History 8, no. 3 (December 18, 2018): 183–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18770703-00803001.

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Generations of scholars have declared the Articles of Confederation to be inadequate to the needs of the nation of necessity replaced by the Constitution of 1787. This interpretation rests on three methodological flaws. First, it is anachronistic by which I mean that scholars use as a standard of judgement answers to questions of constitutional policy embedded in the Constitution. They then judge the alternative answers of the Articles to be wrong. Secondly, they compare the Articles in practice to the words of the Constitution incorrectly assuming the “promises” of the latter became effective public policy during the Early National period. Thirdly, they interpret comparable events in accordance with their preconceived judgement. Events like Shays’ Rebellion during the Confederation era are interpreted as signs of weakness. Comparable events in the Constitution era, like the Whiskey Rebellion and its aftermath, are judged signs of strength.

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25

Thomas, Alan. "Rawls and political realism: Realistic utopianism or judgement in bad faith?" European Journal of Political Theory 16, no. 3 (April 15, 2015): 304–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1474885115578970.

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Political realism criticises the putative abstraction, foundationalism and neglect of the agonistic dimension of political practice in the work of John Rawls. This paper argues that had Rawls not fully specified the implementation of his theory of justice in one particular form of political economy then he would be vulnerable to a realist critique. But he did present such an implementation: a property-owning democracy. An appreciation of Rawls s specificationist method undercuts the realist critique of his conception of justice as fairness.

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26

Verhaegh, M. "The Truth of the Beautiful in the Critique of Judgement." British Journal of Aesthetics 41, no. 4 (October 1, 2001): 371–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjaesthetics/41.4.371.

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27

WICKS, ROBERT. "JOHN H. ZAMMITO, The Genesis of Kant'S Critique of Judgement." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51, no. 4 (September 1, 1993): 643. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540_6245.jaac51.4.0643.

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28

Matherne, Samantha. "The Normativity of Nature: Essays on Kant's “Critique of Judgement.”." Philosophical Review 126, no. 2 (April 2017): 281–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-3771948.

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29

Quinlan-Gagnon, Wendy. "Book Review: Pragmatism, Critique, Judgement: Essays for Richard J. Bernstein." Theory, Culture & Society 23, no. 1 (January 2006): 147–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/026327640602300110.

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30

Molina, Eduardo A. "Juicio, ley y aplicación en Kant. Un problema central de la "Crítica de la facultad de juzgar"." Anuario Filosófico 40, no. 3 (September 18, 2018): 673–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.15581/009.40.29253.

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In this article I study Kant's doctrine of the power of judgement (aesthetic and theological). I focus on its main function of rendering possible the transition from the lawfulness of nature to the realization of practical ends. In order to do so, I analyze the concept of “spontaneity” and the principle of “purposiveness of nature”, understood as a “principle of contingency”, according to Kant's explanation in the Critique of the Power of Judgement.

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31

Janaway, Christopher. "Aesthetic Autonomies: A Discussion of Paul Guyer, Kant and the Experience of Freedom." Kantian Review 1 (March 1997): 151–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400000108.

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There are two familiar strategic approaches to Kant's Critique of Judgement which commentators have not always found easy to combine. One would regard the work as fitting snugly into Kant's enterprise as the keystone that absorbs the forces of his theoretical and practical philosophies, uniting them and itself into a single sound structure. That Kant saw it this way is obvious from his Introduction to the Critique. But the other approach has sometimes seemed more fruitful: start with the Analytic of the Beautiful and take it not as the completion but as the beginning of something, a treatise which, in offering possibly the fullest and most rigorous account of the autonomy of aesthetic judgement, plays a foundational role in the discipline now known as aesthetics. On this approach questions concerning morality and the unity of Kant's philosophy can be set aside for attention later, if ever.

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32

Sharpe, Matthew. "A just judgement? Considerations on Ronald Srigley’s Camus’ Critique of Modernity." Thesis Eleven 120, no. 1 (February 2014): 43–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0725513613519587.

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33

ROSE, DAN. "Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. PIERRE BOURDIEU." American Ethnologist 13, no. 1 (February 1986): 163–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/ae.1986.13.1.02a00180.

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34

Esterik, Penny Van. ": Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste . Pierre Bourdieu." American Anthropologist 88, no. 2 (June 1986): 456–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/aa.1986.88.2.02a00180.

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35

Murdock, Graham. "Pierre Bourdieu,Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste." International Journal of Cultural Policy 16, no. 1 (February 2010): 63–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10286630902952413.

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36

Tolsma, Rintje Theoren. "Artistic Genius and Freedom of Creativity in Kant’s Critique of Judgement." Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 34, no. 1 (2022): 129–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jis2022341/28.

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This essay explores Immanuel Kant’s notion of artistic genius and how it relates to the modern conception of the interrelated ideas of nature and freedom as they appear in his Critique of Judgement. Genius works as a unique concept in Kant’s oeuvre, showing how art provides a harmony within what, in Reformational philosophy, they call the “ground-motive” “nature-freedom.” The concept of originality as it relates to genius has the potential for an alternative reading to what was held subsequent to Kant and what is still held today, one that puts the emphasis on a certain relationality. Hannah Arendt’s conception of freedom and Jacques Derrida’s reading of Kant are also relevant. This essay’s reading of Kant’s genius, defined by its multifaceted network of relational forces, shows a way out of the bind of the binary nature and freedom. By explicating Kant’s notion of artistic genius, one is able to better understand art and its function: probing the complex relationship that humans have with themselves and the rest of creation.

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37

Bourgeois, Bernard. "Lo bello y el bien en Kant." Anuario Filosófico 26, no. 1 (October 4, 2018): 139–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.15581/009.26.29936.

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Theory of beauty exposed in Kant's Critique of Judgement is neither an epilogue nor the cornerstone of kantian system. Kant's solution to the problem of delight in beauty illustrates the meaning given to practical reasoning and its absolute dominance in the life of the spirit.

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38

Larrain, Jorge. "The Postmodern Critique of Ideology." Sociological Review 42, no. 2 (May 1994): 289–314. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954x.1994.tb00091.x.

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Postmodernism is a complex cultural phenomenon which is characterised, among other things, by its distrust of totalising discourses, of reason and of universal truth. It propounds indeterminacy, the primacy of difference and the incommensurability between discourses, which are supposed to have their own regimes of truth. This is why postmodernism is suspicious about the critical concept of ideology, because according to its tenets it is impossible to pass judgement on a discourse from the perspective of another discourse. Hence the critical concept of ideology must be abandoned. However, an examination of Foucault's, Baudrillard's and Lyotard's work shows that they unwittingly end up re-introducing the concept through the back door thus contradicting themselves. While they doubt the validity of total discourses and of their ideological critique, they must assume the validity of their own critique of total discourses.

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39

Zimmermann, Stephan. "Kants metaphysische Deduktion der Ideen in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft." Philosophisches Jahrbuch 123, no. 1 (2016): 58–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0031-8183-2016-1-58.

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Abstract. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant discusses the ideas in the context of the conception of reason in terms of formal logic according to which it is the faculty of inferring mediately. By this, the impression widespread in secondary literature arises that the pure concepts of reason according to Kant have a syllogistic sense, i. e. are either based on syllogisms or stand otherwise in relation with them. This paper argues instead: that Kant derives the ideas – similar to the pure concepts of understanding – by means of a metaphysical deduction from the functions of all thinking in the so-called table of judgements; that accordingly – as the categories – they demand a consequent judgement-theoretical explanation; yet, that here the thinking functions that fall under the title of relation find a different employment; and that therefore the judgements which result from this possess the status of final principles for human experience wherein the conception of reason in terms of transcendental logic consists.

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40

van Apeldoorn, Laurens. "Reconsidering Hobbes’s Account of Practical Deliberation." Hobbes Studies 25, no. 2 (2012): 143–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18750257-02502002.

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Thomas Hobbes has been frequently criticised for his account of deliberation that purportedly consists merely of, in his own words, an ‘alternate succession of appetite and fear’ and therefore lacks the judgement and reflection commentators think is essential if he is to provide an adequate treatment of practical rationality. In this paper Hobbes’s account of deliberation is analysed in detail and it is argued that it is not vulnerable to this critique. Hobbes takes so-called ‘mental discourse’ to be partly constitutive of the process of practical deliberation, and this provides the cognitive judgement and reflection that critics have claimed it lacks.

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41

Sgarbi, Marco. "Il Cielo Stellato Sopra di Me e la Legge Morale in Me." Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy 20, no. 39 (2012): 45–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philosophica201220393.

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«Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily reflection is occupied with them: the starry heaven above me and the moral law within me». With these famous words written on paper and inscribed in stone, Immanuel Kant concludes the Critique of Practical Reason. In this paper, I intend to show how this sentence is closely linked with: 1) the kantian doctrine on the sublime and 2) to the foundation of the logic of the irrational in the Critique of Judgement.

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42

Furner, James. "Carl Schmitt’s ‘Hegel and Marx’." Historical Materialism 22, no. 3-4 (December 2, 2014): 371–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1569206x-12341339.

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Carl Schmitt’s radio broadcast ‘Hegel and Marx’, aired on 13 November 1931, and newly translated here, recapitulates the account of Marxism that Schmitt started to develop in the 1920s. Beginning from Schmitt’s early theory of adjudication inLaw and Judgement(1912), the concepts of decision, representation and the friend/enemy distinction are analysed, connected, and shown to structure Schmitt’s critique of Marxism, both in the broadcast, and in his other writings during this period. Some concluding remarks are offered on the substantive issues Schmitt’s critique raises for Marx’s political theory.

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43

Santini, Barbara. "Teleology as a way to religion. Hölderlin and the antinomy of judgement." Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico 14, no. 2 (January 24, 2022): 93–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.36253/aisthesis-13214.

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The paper discusses Hölderlin’s reading of the Kantian antinomy of the faculty of judgement from a letter to Hegel in January 1795. Its meaning is first explored in relation to a kind of distinctiveness that Hölderlin recognizes to the solution of the antinomy, to the point of considering it the place where the entire spirit of the Kantian system comes to the fore. Secondly, the prototypical role of the antinomy of the faculty of judgement for the other antinomies is shown according to a feature they share in the way in which they are solved. The aim of the paper is to bring out the distinctive feature of Hölderlin’s theoretical confrontation with the Critique of teleological judgement as a task and orientation of Hölderlin’s philosophical commitment itself, which understands Kant’s efforts from a different perspective than the one of his contemporaries.

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Calcagno, Antonio. "Hannah Arendt and Augustine of Hippo : On the Pleasure of and Desire for Evil*." Articles spéciaux 66, no. 2 (November 2, 2010): 371–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/044846ar.

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Hannah Arendt wrote two volumes on thinking and willing in The Life of the Mind, but due to her untimely death her work devoted to judgement, especially political judgement, was never completed. We do, however, have a significant amount of writings on this theme as evidenced by her lectures on Kant’s Third Critique. Judgement and thinking are critical in order to prevent what Arendt calls the “banality of evil”. Drawing on Augustine and Arendt’s work on Augustine, this paper seeks to argue that another form of serious evil has its root in what Augustine calls the libido habendi and the libido dominandi, the desire or drive to dominate and possess. It will be argued that Arendt’s solution to the problem of evil as banal can also be applied to the very human desire and pleasure to cause or inflict evil.

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Desideri, Fabrizio, and Mariagrazia Portera. "Foreword. Finalism and Judgement." Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico 14, no. 2 (December 30, 2021): 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.36253/aisthesis-13336.

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What does it mean to “judge” something? What are the preconditions and the necessary prerequisites for the formulation of a judgement (be it a cognitive judgement, a moral judgement, or an aesthetic judgement)? Is there a special relationship between finalism and judgement and, if yes, in what sense? The relationship between finalism and judgment has been typically understood along two main lines of interpretation: on the one hand, as the finalism attributed by judging to certain objects or phenomena; on the other hand, from the point of view of the finality of judging itself, i.e., the teleological orientation of judging in the global dimension of life. This issue of Aisthesis includes a selection of highly relevant contributions to the topic “Judgement and finalism”, with the aim of bringing to the fore the circular movement that seems to characterize every judgement in itself – from nature, and from the nature of our mind, to the objects, structures, natural kinds etc. that populate the world, and reversely from the world to the mind. Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement plays, in this respect, a very fundamental role, as the papers by Stefano Velotti, Luigi Filieri, Lorenzo Sala, and Antonio Branca show brilliantly. Andrea Lanza and Barbara Santini discuss the interconnections between teleology and judgement in the frame, respectively, of Husserl’s phenomenology and Friedrich Hölderlin’s poetic philosophy. The idea that finalism and the dynamics of judgement have much to do with each other opens new links to disciplines other than philosophy and to an interdisciplinary approach to the activity of judging in research fields such as psychology, cognitive sciences, biology. This is the perspective adopted by Francesco Vitale, in his paper on Ernst Mayr’s teleonomy, and by Onerva Kiianlinna, in her a paper on epigenesis and modularity in Evolutionary Aesthetics. This present issue is further enriched by a substantial focus on images and the aesthetic experience in the digital age (Fabrizio Desideri, Francesca Perotto, Caterina Zaira) and by a multifaceted and intriguing “Varia” section, with contributions by Ricardo Ibarlucia, Mariya Veleva, David Alvaro Gonzàlez, Carmelo Colangelo.

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Neville, David. "Justice and Divine Judgement: Scriptural Perspectives for Public Theology." International Journal of Public Theology 3, no. 3 (2009): 339–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156973209x438283.

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AbstractFrom Jewish and Christian Scripture this article retrieves conceptions of justice and divine judgement with the potential to contribute to the public good. Although justice is not a homogenous concept in Scripture, there is a justice-trajectory that is more restorative than retributive and, as such, has profound public import. Through the discussion of scriptural justice this article raises the question of the role of Scripture in public theology. While affirming that justice is a central scriptural concern and therefore indispensable to Christian faith and practice, in this article I also explore the nexus between justice and divine judgement, with a view to indicating by means of inner-biblical critique that divine judgement, no less than justice in the biblical tradition, leans towards restoration rather than (solely) retribution. Special attention is paid to the work of Karen Lebacqz and Dan Via, and Mt. 11:2–6 is also discussed.

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Wendland, Michał. "Epistemologia Kanta jako rozwiązanie sporu empiryzmu z racjonalizmem." Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna 1, no. 2 (July 31, 2018): 155–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/fped.2012.1.2.11.

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The article concerns some of the most important elements of I. Kant’s epistemology and its connections with earlier epistemological ideas, namely rationalism and empiricism. The history of dispute between rationalism (Descartes, Leibniz) and empiricism (Locke, Berkeley, Hume) is hereby shortly presented while Kant’s own philosophical achievements are suggested to be both alternative and synthesis of these. The main core of this paper is summary of basis of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason; some most important categories are described: apriorism, synthetic and analytical judgements, knowledge a priori and a posteriori, main ideas of transcendental esthetics (two forms of pure intuition: time and space), main ideas of transcendental logic (forms of judgement and twelve categories). Also the meaning of Kant’s „copernican revolution” is presented as a turning point for classical German philosophy as well as for whole modern epistemology.

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Detlaf, Tomasz. "Teza o sekularyzacji Karla Löwitha w świetle krytyki Hansa Blumenberga." Przegląd Humanistyczny, no. 65/2 (September 17, 2021): 20–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.31338/2657-599x.ph.2021-2.2.

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The article aims to defend Karl Löwith’s secularization thesis from the criticism made by Hans Blumenberg. Löwith’s thesis claims that modern philosophy of history is a secularized Christian eschatology. Blumenberg accuses Löwith’s thesis of substantialism. Following Sjoerd Griffioen, the article shows that this criticism fails. The article presents Blumenberg’s arguments that the idea of progress cannot be derived from eschatology. These arguments are refuted by the analysis of the work of Joachim of Fiore and providing a distinction between two kinds of progress. The article is written from the perspective of intellectual history, detaching from the dispute over the judgement of modernity.

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Gardner, Sebastian. "Kant's Third Critique: The Project of Unification." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 78 (July 2016): 161–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246116000254.

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AbstractThis paper offers a synoptic view of Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgement and its reception by the German Idealists. I begin by sketching Kant's conception of how its several parts fit together, and emphasize the way in which the specifically moral motivation of Kant's project of unification of Freedom and Nature distances it from our contemporary philosophical concerns. For the German Idealists, by contrast, the CPJ's conception of the opposition of Freedom and Nature as defining the overarching task of philosophy provides a warrant and basis for bold speculative programmes. The German Idealist development therefore presupposes Kant's failure in the CPJ to resolve the problem of the relation of Freedom and Nature. What is fundamentally at issue in the argument between Kant and his successors is the question of the correct conception of philosophical systematicity and in this context I reconstruct Kant's defence of his claim to philosophical finality.

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Illetterati, Luca, and Andrea Gambarotto. "The Realism of Purposes: Schelling and Hegel on Kant’s Critique of Teleological Judgement." Rivista di estetica, no. 74 (August 1, 2020): 106–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/estetica.7080.

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