Academic literature on the topic 'Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB)'

The Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act 1991 established the Code of Conduct Bureau and the Code of Conduct Tribunal, primarily for the purpose of tracking assets owned by public officers as a mechanism against corrupt enrichment. Section 15 of the Act mandates public officers to declare their assets at various times in the course of employment. Though the Act criminalises failure to declare assets, the proviso to section 3 thereof however restrains the Bureau from referring cases of non-compliance to the Tribunal if a public officer admits his breach in writing. This makes such infraction a mere technical offence for which no blame can be ascribed to an ‘offender’ who admits his breach. Therefore, initiating criminal proceedings where the law absolves public officers from liability seems to violate the object of the law. It also undermines the right not to be tried for offences that are unknown to law. To give effect to the object of the Act, this paper proposes that the proper order the Tribunal should make, where cases covered by the proviso to section 3 of the Act are referred to it, is to dismiss the action in limine or strike out same for lack of jurisdiction.

The purpose of this study is to determine a model of international cooperation so that the assets recovery cross-border resulting from corruption in ASEAN can be more effective. Therefore, the questions in this study are: (1) how is the implementation of assets recovery cross-border as a result of corruption based on UNCAC in ASEAN including the obstacles faced and the success of assets recovery cross-border? (2) What is the solution for assets recovery cross-border resulting from corruption? This study using normative legal research methods with written studies using secondary data such as laws and regulations, legal theory, legal principles and scientific works of scholars (doctrine). The results of the study (1) The implementation of assets recovery cross-border resulting from Indonesian corruption in ASEAN was only successful for the first time in 2019 with a return of SGD 200,000 by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in collaboration with the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) Singapore. Obstacles in the implementation of assets recovery cross-border resulting from corruption: a. Structured abuse of power, b. the principle of sovereignty, c. national interest of a country and d. the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (MLA ASEAN) as an international agreement is not sufficiently binding (soft law) and requires further processes such as ratification and adjustment to national criminal law. (2) Even though there is a legal umbrella for eradicating corruption related to the assets recovery cross-border resulting from corruption in the form of UNCAC and MLA ASEAN, in order to maximize the implementation of assets recovery cross-border in ASEAN, a special (bilateral) implementing agreement for assets recovery cross-border is needed in order to have more binding power. The implementation agreement is not enough, then it is also necessary to adjust and align the tools of Indonesian national law related to the asset recovery cross-border from corruption and the provision of appropriate authority for law enforcement.

Various alterations to the Irish legal system have been effected in a bid to counter organised crime, the most radical of which was the introduction of civil forfeiture in 1996. This article examines the forfeiture process carried out by the Criminal Assets Bureau and seeks to analyse it from a theoretical perspective. Civil forfeiture may be regarded as embodying a move away from due process towards crime control, given the avoidance of traditional protections in the criminal process by its location in the civil realm. Moreover, the process may be characterised as an ‘apersonal means of tackling crime’, in which emphasis is laid on the non-moral and regulatory aspects of the law. This article further contends that civil forfeiture represents an adaptation to reality in which the State reconfigures the legislative framework so as to facilitate more readily the suppression of organised crime.