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Journal articles on the topic 'Court politics'

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Author: Grafiati

Published: 10 December 2022

Last updated: 29 January 2023

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1

Crouch, Melissa. "The Challenges for Court Reform after Authoritarian Rule: The Role of Specialized Courts in Indonesia." Constitutional Review 7, no. 1 (May 31, 2021): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.31078/consrev711.

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Political transitions from authoritarian rule may lead to a process of court reform. Indeed, court reform has been a central pillar of the law and development movement since the 1960s. What challenges do court reform efforts face after authoritarian rule in Indonesia and to what extent can specialized courts address these challenges? In this article, I examine court reform and the establishment of specialized courts in Indonesia post-1998. I argue that we need to pay attention to the politics of court reform after authoritarian rule. Specialized courts as a type of institutional reform need to be considered together with judicial culture in order to address fundamental challenges in the courts.

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2

Travers, Max. "Business as Usual? Bail Decision Making and “Micro Politics” in an Australian Magistrates Court." Law & Social Inquiry 42, no. 02 (2017): 325–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12264.

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Between the 1970s and 1990s, political scientists in the United States pursued a distinctive research program that employed ethnographic methods to study micro politics in criminal courts. This article considers the relevance of this concept for court researchers today through a case study about bail decision making in a lower criminal court in Australia. It describes business as usual in how decisions are made and the provision of pretrial services. It also looks at how traditionalists and reformers understood business as usual, and uses this as a critical concept to make visible micro politics in this court. The case study raises issues about organizational change in criminal courts since the 1990s, since there are fewer studies about plea bargaining and more about specialist or problem-solving courts. It is suggested that we need a new international agenda that can address change and continuity in criminal courts.

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3

Voßkuhle, Andreas. "Constitutional Court: The Dilemma of Law and Politics." osteuropa recht 64, no. 4 (2018): 480–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0030-6444-2018-4-480.

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This article raises questions in the context of the tension between the activities of parliament and government on the one hand and constitutional courts on the other hand. As to this tension, it concludes that the manner and method of decision-making on the part of government or parliament differs fundamentally from the manner in which constitutional courts operate. The article further elaborates, in particular, on the acceptance of decisions rendered by the constitutional court, as well as on questions in the context of the election process of constitutional court justices.

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4

Buana, Mirza Satria. "Legal-Political Paradigm of Indonesian Constitutional Court: Defending a Principled Instrumentalist Court." Constitutional Review 6, no. 1 (June 2, 2020): 36. http://dx.doi.org/10.31078/consrev612.

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The establishment of the Indonesian Constitutional Court in 2003 signified the formation of a bridge between the judiciary and politics. Through its judicial review process, there is a more tangible presence of the judiciary and court in the political arena. The Court helps with addressing moral predicaments and influencing the products of the legislature. This paper discusses the shifting of the legal-politico paradigm, particularly relating to judicial leadership of the Court because this significantly affects the role of the Court in the political arena. The history of the establishment of the Court’s authority in judicial review is explored through a stylised analysis of the actions of two early Chief Justices. This paper also examines two Court decisions which illustrated the Court’s authority on judicial review because they demonstrated the importance of policy-driven decisions and judicial restraint. The main argument of this work is that it is hard to categorize the legal-politico actions of the Indonesian Court into either legalism or instrumentalism. Often, the Court synthesises the two. The legal-politico paradigm is a dynamic one. The most feasible model of the Indonesian Constitutional Court is that of a Principled Instrumentalist Court, where policy decisions guide the formation of legislation according to constitutional values, but the judges maintain prudential self-restraint.

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5

Hall, Matthew E. K. "Rethinking Regime Politics." Law & Social Inquiry 37, no. 04 (2012): 878–907. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.2012.01290.x.

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Many recent studies of “regime politics” argue that judicial review is ultimately used to promote the interests of the dominant governing regime. I explore this claim by evaluating whether the invalidation of federal laws by the US Supreme Court fits the empirical expectations of the regime politics approach. I find that the Court frequently invalidates statutes when (1) the ideology of the Court diverges from that of the sitting elected branches (suggesting that the Court does not fear sanctions or nonimplementation), and (2) the ideology of the sitting elected branches converges with that of the elected branches that enacted the statute (suggesting that the Court is defying the sitting elected branches). My findings suggest that the Court does not primarily use judicial review to promote the interests of the dominant governing regime.

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6

Sandalow, Terrance, and Ethan Bronner. "The Supreme Court in Politics." Michigan Law Review 88, no. 6 (May 1990): 1300. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1289314.

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7

Saunders, Cheryl, and Brian Galligan. "Politics of the High Court." CrossRef Listing of Deleted DOIs 18, no. 4 (1988): 133. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3330340.

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8

WILLIAMS, P. M. "THE SUPREME COURT AND POLITICS." Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 5, no. 1 (1985): 91–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/5.1.91.

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9

Whittington, Keith E. "The Supreme Court in Politics." Reviews in American History 39, no. 4 (2011): 631–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/rah.2011.0127.

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10

Violante, Teresa. "Bring Back the Politics: The PSPP Ruling in Its Institutional Context." German Law Journal 21, no. 5 (July 2020): 1045–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/glj.2020.63.

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AbstractIn this paper, I argue that the conflict between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union is the story of a clash foretold, if one takes seriously constitutional courts as institutions designed to be “dogs that bite.” The German Court consistently developed a doctrinal tool to guide its role as guardian of the national constitutional order and the democratic principle, and enforced it when the constitutional control of monetary policy measures so required. I analyze the PSPP ruling, focusing on where the Court concluded that the lack of a satisfactory statement of reasons by the European Central Bank prevented it from reviewing the proportionality of the program. I argue that the Court, after conducting a substantive assessment, applied a weak remedy, thereby deferring the last word on the constitutionality of the PSPP to the political branches. In doing so, the Court opens space for the political assessment of a controversial monetary policy, enhancing the politicization of the Economic and Monetary Union, and provides a doctrinal toolbox for national constitutional courts that face competence creep of EU law in their jurisdictions. I conclude that, ultimately, the main merit of constitutional courts’ interventions in the EU integration is that they are in a privileged position to allow for the politicization of technocratic processes.

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11

Pickerill, J. Mitchell. "Law, Politics, and Democracy in the Twenty-first Century." Perspectives on Politics 9, no. 2 (June 2011): 357–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592711000612.

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Political scientists have long rejected the old law and politics dichotomy and recognize instead that law and court decisions are inherently political in numerous ways. Still, courts are not the same as executive and legislative institutions, and law is not simply a synonym for politics or policy. Law and courts are distinct and yet connected to political processes and policy outcomes in complex and nuanced ways. The question for law and courts scholars, then, is how and why do political actors (with seemingly increasing frequency) turn to law and the judiciary to influence public policy, and what are the impacts of infusing law and courts into the US political process? The three recent books under review help to answer these questions.

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12

Kapiszewski, Diana. "Economic Governance on Trial: High Courts and Elected Leaders in Argentina and Brazil." Latin American Politics and Society 55, no. 04 (2013): 47–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2013.00214.x.

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Abstract Beginning in the 1980s, social and political actors across Latin America turned to courts in unprecedented numbers to contest economic policies. Very different patterns of high court–elected branch interaction over economic governance emerged across the region, with crucial implications for economic development, democratic governance, and the rule of law. Building on both institutional and strategic accounts of judicial politics, this article argues that high court “character,” a relatively stable congeries of informal institutional features, channels interbranch struggles into persistent patterns. Two case studies illustrate the argument. In Argentina, the high court's political character encouraged a pattern of court submission to elected leaders marked by periodic bouts of interbranch confrontation over economic governance. In Brazil, the high court's statesmanlike character induced interbranch accommodation. This study demonstrates that even in politically unstable settings, institutional features can shape law and politics.

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13

Perwira, Indra. "Refleksi Fenomena Judicialization of Politics pada Politik Hukum Pembentukan Mahkamah Konstitusi dan Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi." Jurnal Konstitusi 13, no. 1 (May 20, 2016): 25. http://dx.doi.org/10.31078/jk1312.

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This paper aims to introduce the phenomenon of judicialization of politics in the treasury of legal thought in Indonesia. In addition, this paper also aims to reflect the presence of judicialization of politics in the Constitutional Court, either through legal policy on establishment of constitutional court or through its decisions. Theoretically, the phenomenon of judicialization of politics began to be known at the beginning of the 21st century characterized by the dependence of society to the court to resolve the issues related to morality, public policy, and political controversies. The presence of judicialization of politics can be reflected from the shift in the political settlement of the case which was originally made through political mechanisms to the settlement through a judicial mechanism. To see the phenomenon, this paper will explore the legal policy on establishment of the Constitutional Court. Through a historical perspective on the establishment, this paper would like to indicate that, in nature, the Constitutional Court is a political institution. In addition, this paper also analyzes the Constitutional Court decision in the case of judicial review on “Perpu” of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the decision regarding the dispute Election East Java province in 2008, to show that the phenomenon of judicialization of politics has lived and practiced in the Constitutional Court as well.

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14

Barwick, Corey, and Ryan Dawkins. "Public Perceptions of State Court Impartiality and Court Legitimacy in an Era of Partisan Politics." State Politics & Policy Quarterly 20, no. 1 (December 24, 2019): 54–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532440019883979.

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Why do some people evaluate state supreme courts as more legitimate than others? Conventional academic wisdom suggests that people evaluate courts in nonpartisan ways, and that people make a distinction between how they evaluate individual court decisions and how they evaluate the court’s legitimacy more broadly. We challenge this idea by arguing that people’s partisan identities have a strong influence on how people evaluate the impartiality of courts, just as they do other aspects of the political world. Using original survey experiments, validated by existing observational survey data, we show that people perceive state supreme courts as being more impartial when courts issue decisions that match the ideological preferences of their preferred political party, while court decisions at odds with their party’s policy goals diminish people’s belief that courts are impartial arbiters of the law. We also show that the effects of citizen perceptions of impartiality erode evaluations of state court legitimacy, which makes them want to limit the independence of judicial institutions.

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15

Lindquist, Stefanie A. "The Courts of International Trade: Judicial Specialization, Expertise, and Bureaucratic Policymaking. By Isaac Unah. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998. 233p. $47.50." American Political Science Review 96, no. 1 (March 2002): 219–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055402414323.

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In The Courts of International Trade: Judicial Specialization, Expertise, and Bureaucratic Policymaking, Isaac Unah has ventured into territory that has remained largely uncharted by scholars of judicial politics. With the prominent exception of Lawrence Baum's work on specialized courts, few researchers in political science have chosen to explore courts that fall outside the federal judiciary's core hierarchy. Yet as Unah points out, these specialized courts, including the U.S. Tax Court, Claims Court, Court of International Trade, Bankruptcy Courts, and the Federal Circuit, perform critical functions that have the potential to affect business interests and shape bureaucratic performance in highly complex regulatory and economic areas. In this book, and in his previous published research, Unah has initiated an important expedition into unfamiliar but promising terrain.

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16

Bisariyadi, Bisariyadi. "KETERLIBATAN MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI DALAM POLITIK LEGISLASI NASIONAL." Jurnal Rechts Vinding: Media Pembinaan Hukum Nasional 4, no. 3 (December 31, 2015): 345. http://dx.doi.org/10.33331/rechtsvinding.v4i3.10.

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<p>Politik legislasi tidak semata berkutat di parlemen, prinsip pemisahan kekuasaan tidak lagi dimaknai secara kaku. Kecenderungan lembaga peradilan untuk terlibat dalam politik legislasi semakin besar dengan diadopsinya kewenangan judicial review. Beragam produk legislasi yang menyangkut hajat hidup orang banyak diuji oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi. Penelitian ini bermaksud mencari bagaimana legitimasi konseptual atas keterlibatan lembaga peradilan dalam politik legislasi dengan melihat pada konsep judicialisation of politics melalui putusan-putusan peradilan di MK. Oleh sebab itu, penting untuk menganalisa putusan-putusan MK yang bernuansa politis dan mampu mempengaruhi politik legislasi nasional. Dengan menggunakan pendekatan nornatif, penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa dengan diadopsinya kewenangan pengujian UU terhadap UUD, MK telah menembus batas prinsip pemisahan kekuasaan. MK juga menjalankan fungsi legislasi dengan bertindak sebagai positive legislator . Legitimasi konseptual juga telah ditawarkan oleh para ahli hukum dan politik dengan merumuskan konsep judicialisation of politics . Dimasa mendatang, lembaga peradilan akan semakin cenderung terlibat dalam perkara-perkara menyangkut proses pengambilan kebijakan yang menyangkut kepentingan orang banyak dimana awalnya proses itu merupakan kewenangan eksklusif dari legislatif.</p><p>Political process of legislation is not only struggling in the parliament, the principle of separation of powers is no longer interpreted rigidly. The tendency of courts to engage political process of legislation are increasing with the adoption of a judicial review authority. Several different product of legislation concerning the lives of many people had been tested by the Constitutional Court. This study intends to find out how the conceptual legitimacy of the judiciary is involved in political process of legislation set out from the judicialisation of politics concept through decision of the Constitutional court. Therefore, it is important to analyze decisions made by The Constitutional Court with some political issues and able to influence political process of the legislation. Using normative approach, this study shows with adopting the power to examine Law against the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has been through the boundaries the principle of separation of powers. The Court also carry out its legislative function by acting as a positive legislator. Conceptual legitimacy has been offered by the legal and political experts to formulate the judicialisation of politics concept. In the future, the judiciary will be more likely to engage in policy making concerning the interests of the people which initially is exclusive authority of the legislative</p>

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17

Lima, Flavia Danielle Santiago. "PROTECTING POLITICAL RIGHTS OR INTERFERING IN THE POLITICAL ARENA?" HUMANITIES AND RIGHTS GLOBAL NETWORK JOURNAL 2, no. 2 (December 31, 2020): 164–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.24861/2675-1038.v2i2.24.

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The interactions between legal and political system has been strengthened in recent years, especially through judicial review, with the transference to Courts of themes that define and divide a political system. In brazilian case, in the absence of legislative deliberation some of these discussions are forwarded Brazilian courts, who gave controversial decisions about “mega politics”. So, the research´s question “” is the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (re) building electoral legislation, as a manifestation of judicial activism, interfering in mega politics?The study starts from a theoretical approach, with the deductive method, combined with a qualitative case analysis about courts´s decisions regarding party loyalty, coalition verticalizations, threshold clauses and the rights of legislative minorities, and political donations. Therefore, the research is supported by a bibliographical and documentary survey. Based on the methodological approach of Judicial Politcs, the legal protection of fundamental political rights and the structure of the Brazilian strong judicial system are described (Normative Theory), and evaluated the motivations of legal decisions, taking into account judicialization as exercise of a political activity (Positive Theory).

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18

Patapan, Haig. "High Court Review 2001: Politics, Legalism and the Gleeson Court." Australian Journal of Political Science 37, no. 2 (July 2002): 241–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10361140220148124.

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19

Satrio, Abdurrachman. "Kewenangan Mahkamah Konstitusi Memutus Perselisihan Hasil Pemilu Sebagai Bentuk Judicialization 0f Politics." Jurnal Konstitusi 12, no. 1 (May 20, 2016): 117. http://dx.doi.org/10.31078/jk1217.

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Judicialization of politics are the phenomenon which usually happen in a democratic constitutional state, which cause power movement to resolve problems which related to public policy making and political nature, from the political institution to judicial institution. In Indonesia this phenomenon arise in the authority of the Constitutional Court, especially in the authority of the Constitutional Court when they adjudicate electoral result dispute, whichs so far, most widely submitted cases to the Constitutional Court. But, as a independent and impartial judicial institution the Constitutional Court must restrict to adjudicate the political cases such as electoral result dispute so that this institution would not be politicking object of another branch of government, however judicialization of politics phenomenon is something that Constitutional Court would not avoid, so that this article will examine how important the Constitutional Court to priority judicial restraint principle in order to adjudicate electoral result dispute, so that Constitutional Court would not be politicking object of another branch of government.

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20

López Anguita, José Antonio. "Surviving Dynastic Change: The High Nobility during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–15)." Renaissance and Reformation 43, no. 4 (April 15, 2021): 125–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.33137/rr.v43i4.36385.

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The accession of the House of Bourbon to the Spanish throne after the death of the last Habsburg king, Carlos II, in 1700 brought important changes for the court high nobility. Historians have seen Philip V’s reign as the beginning of the titled nobility’s withdrawal from the front line of politics. The process, encouraged by the Bourbon’s reformism during the War of the Spanish Succession, was carried out by the nobility in several ways. This article will analyze the careers of aristocrats such as Pedro Manuel Colón de Portugal and José Solís y Valderrábano, dukes of Veragua and Montellano, and Rodrigo Fernández Manrique de Lara, Count of Frigiliana, who adapted their actions to the new regime’s politics in order to enjoy the patronage of new political actors. They took part in royal court circles to achieve important political positions without renouncing their right to oppose change through strategies linked to the political culture of the previous dynasty: for example, their involvement in political gatherings and their absence in important court celebrations. My article posits that, although the relations between the House of Bourbon and these nobles were undoubtedly complex and ambivalent, as their career at court shows, they were far more nuanced and fluid than has previously been revealed.

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21

Yarbrouch, Tinsley E., and Lucas A. Powe. "The Warren Court and American Politics." American Journal of Legal History 44, no. 3 (July 2000): 331. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3113878.

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22

Karst, Kenneth L., and Lucas A. Powe. "The Warren Court and American Politics." American Historical Review 106, no. 3 (June 2001): 1021. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2692439.

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23

Strum, Philippa, and Lucas A. Powe Jr. "The Warren Court and American Politics." Journal of American History 87, no. 4 (March 2001): 1567. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2674875.

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24

Mariner, Wendy K., and George J. Annas. "Health Insurance Politics in Federal Court." New England Journal of Medicine 363, no. 14 (September 30, 2010): 1300–1301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/nejmp1009054.

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25

Taub, Gadi. "GOD'S POLITICS IN ISRAEL'S SUPREME COURT." Journal of Modern Jewish Studies 6, no. 3 (November 2007): 289–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14725880701655045.

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26

Rhodes, R. A. W., and Anne Tiernan. "Court politics in a federal polity." Australian Journal of Political Science 51, no. 2 (February 5, 2016): 338–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2015.1127890.

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27

Chemillier‐Cendreau, Monique. "Law, politics and the international court." Peace Review 9, no. 3 (September 1997): 345–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10402659708426075.

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28

Furlong, Paul. "The constitutional court in Italian politics." West European Politics 11, no. 3 (July 1988): 7–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402388808424691.

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29

Schabas, William A. "Politics and the International Criminal Court." International Studies Review 9, no. 4 (December 10, 2007): 751–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2007.00743.x.

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30

Cole, Mary Hill. "Katherine Butler.Music in Elizabethan Court Politics." American Historical Review 121, no. 3 (June 2016): 1018–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ahr/121.3.1018.

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31

Bushkovitch, Paul. "Patrick Gordon and Russian Court Politics." Journal of Irish and Scottish Studies 3, no. 2 (January 1, 2010): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.57132/jiss.123.

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32

Sterett, Susan. "Politics and Jurisprudence in the British Courts." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 1, no. 2 (July 1988): 173–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900000709.

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One thing seems clear in British politics today: many of the old truths no longer hold. Voters no longer vote according to class. The current government has made some effort to shake up the civil service and bring in outsiders. And a third political party is struggling along. Faced with all this, scholars have had to rethink their approach to British politics and governance. Appellate courts have long been considered Britain’s least interesting governing institution, but they have also benefited from the shake-up. Studies published in recent years mean to examine the politics of the British courts, primarily the Law Lords, the members of the House of Lords who comprise the final court of appeal in Britain. And, congruent with other changes in politics, studies find that courts have become interesting enough that they ought at least be considered in discussing British politics.

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33

Madsen, Mikael Rask. "Two-level politics and the backlash against international courts: Evidence from the politicisation of the European court of human rights." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 22, no. 4 (September 9, 2020): 728–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1369148120948180.

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Are international institutions more prone to face backlash politics than domestic ones? Are international institutions easy targets for satisfying domestic political interests? Using the case of the recent criticism of the European Court of Human Rights, the article explores whether international institutions are more susceptible to face backlash politics than domestic ones due to the dual nature of international politics. The empirical study, focusing on the reform of the European Court of Human Rights through the 2018 Copenhagen Declaration, suggests that pre-existing commitments to international institutions might be given up rapidly when significant domestic interests collide with international institutions and their practices. The analysis, however, also shows that backlash politics against international institutions is transformed when seeking institutional reform. Entering a collective bargaining process, backlash objectives are changed by the logic of diplomatic negotiation, academic scrutiny and the interests of the other member states and civil society. This suggests that the two-level logic of ordinary international politics has a mediating effect on domestically fuelled backlash campaigns.

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34

Frymer, Paul. "Law and American Political Development." Law & Social Inquiry 33, no. 03 (2008): 779–803. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.2008.00121.x.

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This essay reviews the recent volume edited by Ronald Kahn and Ken I. Kersch, The Supreme Court and American Political Development(2006), as well as the broader literature by law scholars interested in American Political Development (APD). The Law and APD literature has advanced our knowledge about courts by placing attention on the importance of executive and legislative actors, and by providing political context to our understanding of judicial decision making. But this knowledge would be more powerful if it would embrace the broader APD field's orientation toward the importance of state and institutional autonomy for understanding politics and political change. Law and APD scholars could go further in examining the ways in which courts and judges act institutionally, and how the legal branch as an institution impacts American politics and state-building. In doing so, Law and APD scholars would contribute not only to our understanding of judicial decision making but also to our understanding of the place and importance of courts in American politics.

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35

Morone, James A. "Diminishing Democracy in Health Policy: Partisanship, the Courts, and the End of Health Politics as We Knew It." Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 45, no. 5 (June 19, 2020): 757–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/03616878-8543234.

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Abstract Despite unprecedented partisanship, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) traced a familiar political arc: a loud debate full of dramatic symbols, a messy legislative process, clashes over implementation, a slow rise in popularity, entrenchment as part of the health care system, and growing support that blocked Congress from repealing. The politics of the ACA looked, from one angle, like a louder version of health politics as usual. But something new was stirring. Opponents pushed the debate outside the elected branches of government and into the courts—a move that reflects past eras of highly racialized conflict. A federal court marked the ACA's tenth anniversary by doing what Congress could not: it struck down the law, although the litigation continues to wend its way through the court system. The ongoing challenge to the ACA rests on a fundamental critique of the entire New Deal dispensation in jurisprudence. The consequence could be a new era in health care politics.

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36

Ward, Damen. "Civil Jurisdiction, Settler Politics, and the Colonial Constitution, circa 1840-58." Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 39, no. 3 (November 3, 2008): 497. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v39i3.5473.

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In early colonial politics, decisions about lower court jurisdiction often reflected competing ideas about the relationship between different parts and functions of government. In particular, court structure and jurisdiction could be seen as having important implications for the role and power of the governor. Appreciating the importance of jurisdiction as a way of defining, and arguing about, the distribution and exercise of political and legal authority in the colonial constitution allows connections to be drawn between different elements of settler politics in the 1840s and 1850s. The closing of the Court of Requests by Governor Grey in 1848, and the decisions of the Supreme Court judges in subsequent litigation, provide examples of this. Debate over the role of the governor in emerging systems of representative and responsible government after 1852 contributed to lower court jurisdiction remaining politically significant, particularly in relation to Māori. This is shown by considering parliamentary debates about the Stafford ministry's 1858 proposals for resident magistrates' jurisdiction over "native districts". The politics of jurisdiction were part of wider contests about the establishment and consolidation of particular political and institutional relationships within the colonial constitution. This multi-faceted construction of government authority suggests a need to reconsider elements of Pākehā colonial politics and law.

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37

Ansolabehere, Stephen D., and Ariel White. "Policy, Politics, and Public Attitudes Toward the Supreme Court." American Politics Research 48, no. 3 (April 2, 2018): 365–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532673x18765189.

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We assess the importance of the public’s policy agreement with the Supreme Court on public approval of the court. Using survey data on a range of recent court cases, we measure respondents’ perceived ideological closeness to the court. Then, we test various theories of court approval (doctrinal, functional, attitudinal). People who believe the court has decided recent cases as they themselves would have done, or that judges share their partisanship, report higher court approval than those who perceive the court as ideologically distant from them. We compare these findings with similar effects of policy agreement on Congressional and Presidential approval.

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38

KOMMERS, DONALD P. "The Federal Constitutional Court in the German Political System." Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 4 (January 1994): 470–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414094026004004.

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The Federal Constitutional Court is an important policy-making institution in the German political system. As the guardian of the Basic Law, the Constitutional Court has played a critical role in umpiring the federal system, resolving conflicts among branches of the national government, overseeing the process of parliamentary democracy, monitoring the financing of political parties, and reviewing restrictions on basic rights and liberties. In each of these areas, the Court's decisions have shaped the contours of German life and politics. Its influence is fully the equal of that of the Supreme Court in American politics. Despite its “activist” record of nullifying laws favored by legislative majorities, the German Court has managed to retain its institutional independence as well as the trust of the general public.

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Choudhry, Sujit, and Robert Howse. "Constitutional Theory and The Quebec Secession Reference." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 13, no. 2 (July 2000): 143–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900000370.

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The judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference has produced a torrent of public commentary. Given the fundamental issues about the relationship between law and politics raised by the judgment, what is remarkable is that that commentary has remained almost entirely in a pragmatic perspective, which asks how positive politics entered into the motivations and justifications of the Court, and looks at the results in terms of their political consequences, without deep or sustained reflection on the ultimate grounds for the role the Court took upon itself, or on the normative sources of its reasoning. In this article, we explore the Quebec Secession Reference through the lens of constitutional theory. In particular, we highlight three unconventional aspects of the Court’s reasoning: (a) the supplementation of the written constitution through an explicit process of amendment-like interpretation to craft a new legal framework governing the secession of a province from Canada, (b) the vesting by the Court of substantial, if not exclusive responsibility for interpreting the constitutional rules on secession in particular situations or contexts with political organs, not the courts, and (c) the ascent by the court to abstract normativity, in articulating a normative vision of the Canadian constitutional order, whence it derived the legal framework governing secession. In addition to drawing attention to these unusual aspects of the judgment, we articulate the theoretical justifications that both explain and justify those features of the judgment, and identify issues for future discussion.

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Freyer, Tony, and John V. Orth. "Politics, Market Relations, and the Supreme Court." Reviews in American History 16, no. 3 (September 1988): 374. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2702268.

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41

Norbrook, David, David Bevington, and Peter Holbrook. "The Politics of the Stuart Court Masque." Shakespeare Quarterly 51, no. 3 (2000): 373. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2902162.

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Mutua, Makau. "The International Criminal Court: Promise and Politics." Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting 109 (2015): 269–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.5305/procannmeetasil.109.2015.0269.

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The International Criminal Court (ICC or Court) is an institution born of necessity after a long and arduous process of many false starts. The struggle to establish a permanent international criminal tribunal stretches back to Nuremberg. The dream, which was especially poignant for the international criminal law community, for a permanent international criminal tribunal was realized with the adoption in 1998 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The treaty entered into force in 2002. Those were heady days for advocates and scholars concerned with curtailing impunity. No one was more ecstatic about the realization of the ICC than civil society actors across the globe, and particularly in Africa, where impunity has been an endemic problem. Victims who had never received justice at home saw an opportunity for vindication abroad. This optimism in the ICC was partially driven by the successes, however mixed, of two prior ad hoc international criminal tribunals—the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

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MacIntyre, Jean, David Bevington, and Peter Holbrook. "The Politics of the Stuart Court Masque." Sixteenth Century Journal 31, no. 2 (2000): 496. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2671641.

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GLOCK, JUDGE. "The Politics of Disabled Supreme Court Justices." Journal of Supreme Court History 45, no. 2 (July 2020): 151–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jsch.12239.

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Greenberg, David. "The new politics of Supreme Court appointments." Daedalus 134, no. 3 (June 2005): 5–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/0011526054622042.

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Paterson, Susanne F., David Bevington, and Peter Holbrook. "The Politics of the Stuart Court Masque." Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies 31, no. 4 (1999): 640. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4053143.

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Large, Stephen S. "Imperial princes and court politics in earlyShôwaJapan." Japan Forum 1, no. 2 (October 1989): 257–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09555808908721364.

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Basinger, Scott, and Maxwell Mak. "The Changing Politics of Supreme Court Confirmations." American Politics Research 40, no. 4 (February 8, 2012): 737–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532673x11431097.

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Rich, Wilbur C. "The Warren Court and American Politics (review)." Rhetoric & Public Affairs 4, no. 3 (2001): 578–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/rap.2001.0051.

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Brown, Peter B. "Anthropological Perspective and Early Muscovite Court Politics." Russian History 16, no. 1 (1989): 55–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187633189x00040.

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