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Journal articles on the topic 'Corporate power'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 29 July 2024

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1

Farnsworth, Kevin, and Gary Fooks. "Corporate Taxation, Corporate Power, and Corporate Harm." Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 54, no. 1 (January 5, 2015): 25–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hojo.12112.

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2

Boggio, Andrea. "Linking Corporate Power to Corporate Structures." Social & Legal Studies 22, no. 1 (September 25, 2012): 107–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0964663912458447.

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3

Veltmeyer, Henry. "Canadian Corporate Power." Labour / Le Travail 24 (1989): 345. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/25143303.

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4

Johnson, Douglas A. "Confronting Corporate Power." Journal of Human Lactation 36, no. 4 (October 9, 2020): 756–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0890334420964752.

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5

Raynor, Bruce. "What about Corporate Power?" Industrial and Labor Relations Review 55, no. 4 (July 2002): 736. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3270636.

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6

Hathaway, Terry. "Neoliberalism as Corporate Power." Competition & Change 24, no. 3-4 (March 8, 2020): 315–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1024529420910382.

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Accounts of neoliberalism have noted, but not fully explored, the neoliberal empowerment of corporations. The corporate power literature, similarly, rarely makes the connection between corporate agents and neoliberalism as a power structure. This article fills the gap between these literatures with a dual contribution. It develops these contributions by first reviewing the neoliberalism literature and in so doing, developing the idea of neoliberalism as a bricolage of practice and ideas. It then discusses the mischaracterization of the corporation within neoliberalism before deconstructing four core policy areas of neoliberalism – deregulation, non-intervention, free markets and free trade. In each policy area it is shown how the practice of these policies has enhanced the social and economic power of major corporations – thereby deepening practice-based accounts of neoliberalism – and how the discourse of these policies has empowered corporations in the political arena – thereby deepening the corporate power literature’s account of how corporations operate powerfully. More generally this article offers a much fuller account of how 40 years of ‘free market’ policies have resulted in the creation of oligopolistic corporate economies.

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7

Cowling, Keith, and Philip R. Tomlinson. "GLOBALISATION AND CORPORATE POWER." Contributions to Political Economy 24, no. 1 (August 1, 2005): 33–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cpe/bzi002.

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8

Cuneo, Carl J. "Corporate Power in Canada." Studies in Political Economy 27, no. 1 (January 1988): 149–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19187033.1988.11675538.

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9

Griffiths, Andrew. "Brands and corporate power." Journal of Corporate Law Studies 18, no. 1 (July 3, 2017): 75–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14735970.2017.1317131.

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10

Quinn, Dennis P. "Corporate Taxation and Corporate Economic Power: Testing Class-Power and Business-Confidence Models." American Journal of Sociology 94, no. 6 (May 1989): 1419–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/229160.

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11

Gusni, Darwis Agustriyana, Didi Tarmidi, and Anderson Butar Butar D.J. "CEO Power, Corporate Governance, Auditors’ Reputation, and its Effects on Corporate Islamic Bonds Rating." International Journal of Psychosocial Rehabilitation 24, no. 02 (February 13, 2020): 3339–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.37200/ijpr/v24i2/pr200647.

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12

Montgomery, Cynthia A. "Corporate Diversification." Journal of Economic Perspectives 8, no. 3 (August 1, 1994): 163–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.8.3.163.

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This paper documents the significant presence of diversified firms in the U.S. economy and presents three views on why firms diversify. The market power view argues that firms diversify to wield conglomerate power across markets. The agency view argues that diversification is undertaken by managers pursuing their own interests at the expense of the firm's owners. The resource view argues that firms diversify in response to excess capacity in productive factors. A review of recent empirical research finds little support for the market-power view and a substantial amount of evidence that is consistent with the agency and resource views.

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13

Fryzel, Barbara. "Governance of Corporate Power Networks." Finance & Bien Commun 23, no. 3 (2005): 28. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/fbc.023.0028.

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14

Brum, Robert J., and William K. Carroll. "Corporate Power and Canadian Capitalism." Contemporary Sociology 17, no. 3 (May 1988): 297. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2069600.

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15

Sinclair, Peter R., and William K. Carroll. "Corporate Power and Canadian Capitalism." Labour / Le Travail 21 (1988): 271. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/25142964.

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16

Seok, Woonam. "Corporate Innovation and Controlling Power." Productivity Review 34, no. 2 (June 30, 2020): 153–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.15843/kpapr.34.2.2020.6.153.

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17

Connolly, Nicholas, and Manette Kaisershot. "Corporate power and human rights." International Journal of Human Rights 19, no. 6 (August 18, 2015): 663–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2015.1074458.

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18

Zampa, Frederick P., and Albert E. McCormick. ""Proxy Power" and Corporate Democracy:." American Journal of Economics and Sociology 50, no. 1 (January 1991): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.1991.tb02479.x.

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19

Pennisi, Elizabeth. "Corporate power in universities opposed." Nature 330, no. 6149 (December 1987): 595. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/330595b0.

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20

Cronin, Bruce. "Networks of corporate power revisited." Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 10 (2011): 43–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2011.01.007.

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21

Holden, Chris, and Kelley Lee. "Corporate Power and Social Policy." Global Social Policy: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Public Policy and Social Development 9, no. 3 (November 17, 2009): 328–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1468018109343638.

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22

Brown, William S. "Industrial Policy and Corporate Power." Journal of Economic Issues 19, no. 2 (June 1985): 487–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00213624.1985.11504388.

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23

Adams, Walter, and James W. Brock. "Corporate Power and Economic Sabotage." Journal of Economic Issues 20, no. 4 (December 1986): 919–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00213624.1986.11504568.

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24

Willoughby, Tom. "Alcohol—dimensions of corporate power." Minerals & Energy - Raw Materials Report 3, no. 1 (January 1985): 52–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14041048509408481.

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25

Kurup, Anitha, S. Chandrashekar, and K. Muralidharan. "Woman Power in Corporate India." IIMB Management Review 23, no. 4 (December 2011): 195. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iimb.2011.09.008.

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26

Fayyaz, Um-E.-Roman, Raja Nabeel-Ud-Din Jalal, Gianluca Antonucci, and Michelina Venditti. "Does CEO power influence corporate risk and performance? Evidence from Greece and Hungary." Corporate Ownership and Control 18, no. 4 (2021): 77–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv18i4art6.

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We intend to investigate the impact of chief executive officers’ (CEO) powers on corporate decisions made by firms in the context of board oversight (BO) and market competition (MC). From 2007 to 2017, we applied a quantitative approach to a sample of two stressed European markets (i.e., Hungary and Greece). We found that CEO power has a negative impact on corporate risk and firm performance. Furthermore, results also reveal no sign of moderation effect for MC with corporate decisions, whereas BO moderated the CEO power and corporate decisions in the Hungarian market. However, the results of moderation for the Greek market are diametrically opposed to those of the Hungarian market. Our study indicates that in stressed markets, the CEO power is suppressed and does not increase the corporate risk and firm performance despite the good governance and high market competition. The study can help boards in the optimal delivery of power to the CEO to perform well in a stressed environment

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27

Hewa, Soma, and Jerome L. Himmelstein. "Looking Good and Doing Good, Corporate Philanthropy and Corporate Power." Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie 24, no. 2 (1999): 308. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3341738.

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28

Strine, Leo E. "Corporate power is corporate purpose I: evidence from my hometown." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33, no. 2 (2017): 176–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grx027.

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29

Galaskiewicz, Joseph, and Jerome L. Himmelstein. "Looking Good and Doing Good: Corporate Philanthropy and Corporate Power." Social Forces 77, no. 3 (March 1999): 1200. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3005978.

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30

Ostrower, Francie, and Jerome L. Himmelstein. "Looking Good and Doing Good: Corporate Philanthropy and Corporate Power." Contemporary Sociology 26, no. 6 (November 1997): 756. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2654667.

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31

Qu, Charles Zhen. "Some Reflections on the General Meeting's Power to Control Corporate Proceedings." Common Law World Review 36, no. 3 (September 2007): 231–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1350/clwr.2007.36.3.231.

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The jurisprudence on the power of the general meeting of a company to control corporate actions has been developed largely through the courts' interpretation of various versions of constitutional provisions on corporate power allocation, all of which can be traced back to the Companies Act 1862 (UK), Table A, reg. 55. This body of jurisprudence is likely to be resorted to when a need for resolving a similar question arises, regardless of how the power allocation provision is worded under the current model company constitution in the relevant jurisdiction. This article discusses two different schools of views on corporate power allocation. The mainstream view is that where the management power is vested in the directors, it is not a matter where the general meeting can intervene. However, the author feels that this view is doctrinally unsustainable. Instead, the author agrees with the view that the general meeting's power to make management, and hence corporate litigation, decisions is determined by the parties' intention manifested in the words in all forms of company regulations. This article also argues that regardless of how the relevant constitutional provision on division of corporate powers is worded, the general meeting has power to act where a board that is capable of making impartial decisions is unavailable.

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32

Junhai, Liu. "Experience of Internationalization of Chinese Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: How to Make the Hybrid of Civil Law and Common Law Work?" European Business Law Review 26, Issue 1 (February 1, 2015): 107–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eulr2015007.

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This paper focusses on the Chinese approach to corporate governance. It begins with a survey of the historical foundations of the modern corporate law of China. The unique relationship which arose between Chinese markets and foreign suppliers from the consular judiciary power enjoyed by many nations in the early twentieth century and its impact on the development of Chinese corporate law is considered first. A specific focus is the circumstances surrounding the drafting of the first Chinese Corporate Law of 1904, enacted with the goal of making China a strong commercial power. The hybrid nature of the first Chinese corporate law, being drawn from Japanese and English structures, and its impact on modern legislative approaches to corporate law form the basis of the discussion of the relationship between the facets of the modern corporation in China. The position of shareholders as the corporate power centre, their relationship with the boards of directors and supervisors, and the powers of each are noted. Another core focus is the method of enforcement of the corporate law in China. The proper plaintiff, defendant and the possibility of derivative actions under the Corporate Law of 2013 are discussed, with a particular focus on the ability of shareholders to bring actions to protect the interests of the corporation. These powers must be exercised so as to guard against possible abuses of restrictions on action by wrongdoing supervisors and directors acting in collusion. The article concludes with an analysis of the role of the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in improving corporate governance. Significantly, it is noted, that the possibility of class actions in China can be used to hold corporations, controlling shareholders, and management accountable for exercises of power which are against the public interest.

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33

Kantola, Anu. "Mediatization of Power: Corporate CEOs in Flexible Capitalism." Nordicom Review 35, no. 2 (December 18, 2014): 29–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/nor-2014-0013.

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Abstract The present article analyses the mediatization of corporate power with a special focus on the work of the CEO. A review of the literature on the role of the media in corporate management, especially in the work of corporate leaders, shows how the techniques of power in corporate management have become mediatized. Different media have become increasingly important for the work of corporate leaders. More importantly, media have become tools of power. In flexible and soft capitalism, corporate power is exercised using performative and affective techniques aimed at identity and community formation. Consequently, different media are utilized as tools of corporate management and control. With regard to the mediatization of power, the case of corporate management suggests that one should look into the societal and institutional structures of power rather than into the power of the media.

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34

Zulkafli, Abdul Hadi, and Ahmad Husni Hamzah. "Corporate contestability and corporate expropriation." Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets and Institutions 6, no. 4 (2016): 403–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/rcgv6i4c3art5.

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This paper presents evidence on the role of ownership in dealing with corporate expropriation of listed companies in Malaysia. From the perspective of expropriation, a single controlling shareholder is always associated with such behavior due to their power and control at the expense of minority shareholder. However, subsequent individual or coalition of large shareholders can be an important corporate governance tool by providing effective monitoring that would lessen the possibility of expropriation by the controlling shareholder. Relating to that, this study evaluates the role of controlling and large shareholders in dealing with corporate expropriation. It is found that there is a negative relationship between single controlling shareholders and dividend payout ratio indicating that firms with only controlling shareholder will pay a lower dividend due to possible expropriation through profit diversion by controlling shareholder. Using Herfindahl Index as a proxy for ownership contestability, the presence of large shareholders along with controlling shareholder has a positive relationship with dividend payout implying that increased contestability helps to curb the power of controlling shareholder to expropriate fund for their own benefit. In accordance with agency theory, the outcome suggests that large shareholders play a monitoring role in minimizing the Type II agency problem. It is also verifying the argument made based on the Catering Theory of Dividend that the presence of large shareholder brings benefit to all shareholders as they are able to reduce profit diversion by demanding for higher dividend.

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35

Thornton, Margaret. "Sex Discrimination, Courts and Corporate Power." Federal Law Review 36, no. 1 (March 2008): 31–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.22145/flr.36.1.2.

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36

Latham, Mark. "Corporate Monitoring: New Shareholder Power Tool." Financial Analysts Journal 54, no. 5 (September 1998): 9–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/faj.v54.n5.2207.

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37

Lundman, Richard J., and Marshall B. Clinard. "Corporate Corruption: The Abuse of Power." Contemporary Sociology 20, no. 6 (November 1991): 926. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2076203.

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38

van Fossen, Anthony. "Corporate Power in the Pacific Islands." Current Sociology 43, no. 1 (June 1995): 115–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/001139295043001006.

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39

Ben Lahouel, Béchir, Jean-Marie Peretti, and David Autissier. "Stakeholder power and corporate social performance." Corporate Governance 14, no. 3 (May 27, 2014): 363–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cg-07-2012-0056.

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Purpose – This paper aims to explore the power of one of the primary organizational stakeholders (shareholders) in the development of a corporate social performance (CSP) score. Few research works in the CSP empirical literature have studied the relationship between stakeholder power and CSP. Design/methodology/approach – Stakeholder theory is used as a theoretical framework to explain how shareholder voting power can influence the CSP level of French publicly listed companies. Stakeholder theory is tested through the operationalization of Ullmann’s (1985) three-dimensional model. Hypotheses related to shareholder voting power, strategic posture and financial performance are formulated through a literature review. A Data Envelopment Analysis approach was presented as a strong tool to measure CSP level. Multiple linear regressions were undertaken to test the hypotheses in a sample of 129 French companies between 2006 and 2007. Findings – The results indicate that companies with dispersed ownership and high proportion of institutional shareholders record a high score of CSP. Strategic posture measured by the implementation of environmental certification standard was positively and significantly related to CSP. Financial performance does not affect significantly the level of CSP. Originality/value – This paper is the first to empirically analyse the relationship between Ullmann’s three-dimensional model and CSP level in the French context. It offers to managers a better understanding of the power that certain stakeholders can use to acquire satisfaction.

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40

Brinkman, Richard L., and June E. Brinkman. "Corporate power and the globalization process." International Journal of Social Economics 29, no. 9 (September 2002): 730–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03068290210442739.

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41

Harper, Joel, and Li Sun. "CEO power and corporate social responsibility." American Journal of Business 34, no. 2 (July 15, 2019): 93–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ajb-10-2018-0058.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) power on corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. Design/methodology/approach The authors use regression analysis to investigate the research question. Findings Using a 23-year panel sample with 1,574 unique US firms and 8,575 firm-year observations, the authors find a significant and negative relation between CEO power and CSR, suggesting that firms with more powerful CEOs engage in less CSR activities. Originality/value The results reveal that more powerful CEOs become less responsive to the needs of stakeholder groups, confirming the validity of the stakeholder theory of CSR.

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42

Dugger, William M. "The Continued Evolution of Corporate Power." Review of Social Economy 43, no. 1 (April 1, 1985): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00346768500000016.

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43

Grant, Randy R. "Measuring Corporate Power: Assessing the Options." Journal of Economic Issues 31, no. 2 (June 1997): 453–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00213624.1997.11505934.

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44

Crowther, Stuart, and Philip Garrahan. "Corporate power and the local economy." Industrial Relations Journal 19, no. 1 (March 1988): 51–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2338.1988.tb00014.x.

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45

Mitchell, N. "Corporate Power, Legitimacy, and Social Policy." Political Research Quarterly 39, no. 2 (June 1, 1986): 197–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/106591298603900202.

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46

Humble, John, David Jackson, and Alan Thomson. "The strategic power of corporate values." Long Range Planning 27, no. 6 (December 1994): 28–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0024-6301(94)90162-7.

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47

Hiley, David R. "Power and values in corporate life." Journal of Business Ethics 6, no. 5 (July 1987): 343–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00382890.

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48

Dicken, Peter. "The geography of Australian corporate power." Applied Geography 6, no. 3 (July 1986): 275–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0143-6228(86)90010-x.

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49

Scherzinger, Martin Rudolph. "Music, Corporate Power, and Unending War." Cultural Critique 60, no. 1 (2005): 23–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cul.2005.0024.

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50

Mitchell, Neil. "Corporate Power, Legitimacy, and Social Policy." Western Political Quarterly 39, no. 2 (June 1986): 197. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/448294.

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