Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Corporate Ownership'
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Stagliano, Raffaele. "Corporate governance, corporate diversification and ownership structure." Thesis, Toulouse 1, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011TOU10056.
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Cette thèse a pour objectif d'étudier le rôle que la diversification des entreprises et la structure de propriété jouent dans le processus de création de valeur. Le deuxième chapitre est consacré à une revue de littérature portant sur les travaux théoriques et empiriques qui analysent l’impact de la structure d’actionnariat et de la diversification des entreprises sur leur valeur de marché. Le troisième chapitre approfondit l'analyse de la diversification des entreprises en étudiant l'effet d'interaction entre diversification des produits et diversification internationale. Ce chapitre considère la relation entre diversification et structure du capital sur un échantillon d’entreprises manufacturières italiennes. Nos conclusions nous permettent de soutenir que cet effet d’interaction a un impact négatif sur la capacité d'endettement. Enfin, le quatrième chapitre étudie l'impact d’une structure d’actionnaires multiples sur la prise de risque des entreprises. L’analyse est menée sur les firmes cotées sur le marché financier américain. La plupart des études antérieures sur la structure de propriété se concentre sur les différences entre les entreprises avec au moins un actionnaire de référence par rapport aux entreprises à l’actionnariat éparpillé, sans tenir compte de l'effet potentiel de l'existence de multiples détenteurs de blocs d’actions sur la volatilité et la performance des titres boursiers. Nous montrons que les détenteurs de blocs jouent un rôle important dans l'atténuation des conflits d'intérêts entre actionnaire majoritaire et actionnaires minoritairesThe purpose of this thesis is to examine how corporate diversification and ownership structure affect value creation for firms. In Chapter 2, we review the relevant theoretical models in the field of corporate finance. The chapter also summarizes the empirical results found regarding the relationship between corporate diversification, ownership concentration and the firm’s value. In Chapter 3, we extend the analysis of corporate diversification and consider the effects of the interaction of both product and international diversification on a firm. Empirically, this chapter considers the impact of diversification decisions on the capital structure for a sample of Italian manufacturing firms. We find that the interaction of both international and product diversification has a negative impact on debt capacity. Finally, in Chapter 4, we empirically examine the impact of complex ownership structures on the risk choices of U.S. firms. Most previous studies on ownership structure focus on the differences between firms with at least one blockholder and widely held firms, without considering the potential effect that the existence of other blockholders might have on the financial variables. We find that the blockholders with intermediate holdings play a mitigating role in the conflicts of interest between the largest blockholder and the minority shareholders
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Perera, Shalini. "Corporate Ownership and Corporate Governance in Sri Lanka." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.517315.
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Desender, Kurt A. "Essays on Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/3980.
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La mayoría de los estudios de gobierno corporativo se centran en empresas cotizadas en E.E.U.U o el Reino Unido donde existe una clara separación entre propiedad y control. Sin embargo, en Europa continental la estructura de propiedad de las empresas es muy diversa, pudiendo diferenciar desde empresas con una propiedad difusa y un gran número de accionistas relativamente pequeños hasta empresas concentradas con uno o más accionistas mayoritarios. El objetivo de esta tesis es investigar el efecto que ejerce la estructura de propiedad en la eficacia de otros mecanismos del gobierno corporativo y en el funcionamiento de la empresa. En el primer capítulo se desarrolla un modelo teórico para entender la influencia que la estructura de propiedad ejerce sobre las funciones del consejo de administración y sobre la eficacia del consejo. Una pregunta importante tratada en esta investigación es si todas las empresas, independientemente de su estructura de propiedad, se deben someter a las mismas recomendaciones de gobierno corporativo. La revisión de la investigación empírica sobre las características del consejo de administración demuestra que los resultados no son concluyentes. Una posible explicación a la gran variedad de resultados empíricos puede ser la omisión en al análisis del contexto externo e interno de las empresas (Filatotchev, 2008). Un resultado importante de nuestro estudio es que la estructura de propiedad afecta a la eficacia del consejo. Es decir, la eficacia de ciertas prácticas particulares ejercidas por el consejo y las ventajas comparativas que a nivel institucional derivan de ellas dependen de la manera en que estas se combinen en función de la estructura de propiedad de las empresas.
El objetivo del segundo capítulo es profundizar en el entendimiento de cómo los mecanismos de gobierno corporativo dependen de la estructura de propiedad de las empresas. Sostenemos que la estructura de propiedad influencia el comportamiento del consejo de administración. Los resultados demuestran que la relación entre los honorarios de auditoría externa y la independencia del consejo dependen del grado de concentración de la propiedad. Para las empresas con propiedad dispersa, encontramos que los honorarios de auditoría se encuentran relacionados con la independencia del consejo y con la separación del presidente y máximo ejecutivo. Esto coincide con la literatura anterior que típicamente se centra en las compañías cotizadas en E.E.U.U. o el Reino Unido. En cambio, para las empresas con propiedad concentrada, la relación entre las características del consejo y la demanda para la auditoría externa es insignificante.
El tercer capítulo investiga la relación entre la estructura de propiedad de las empresas y la valoración de sus acciones durante periodos de turbulencia. Los resultados demuestran la importancia que tiene (a) la concentración de la propiedad, (b) la presencia de múltiples accionistas significativos y (c) el tipo de accionista que controla, sobre la cotización de la acción en periodos de inestabilidad financiera. Además, los resultados para los mercados bajistas y alcistas difieren sustancialmente. Mientras que la concentración de la propiedad se valora positivamente durante períodos de perdidas, se valora negativamente en mercados alcistas. Los resultados sostienen la hipótesis de que los inversores confían en accionistas mayoritarios durante períodos de crisis para supervisar a la gerencia. Además, combinando los efectos que la concentración accionarial tienes sobre la cotización en los extremos alcistas y bajistas del mercado, nuestros resultados indican que la concentración de la propiedad fomenta una mayor estabilidad en la valoración de las empresas durante periodos de inestabilidad financiera.
Recent corporate governance research suggests that a large proportion of public companies worldwide are characterized by controlling stockholders who are more often families, usually the founder(s) or their descendants. Thus far, most corporate governance research has focused on stylized US (and to a less extent UK) firms which separate ownership and control. The objective of this thesis is to further investigate the role of ownership structure on the effectiveness of other corporate governance mechanisms and the firm's performance.
The objective of the first chapter is to understand how the role (control versus direction) of the board of directors is influenced by the ownership structure and a how a different role influences the board effectiveness. While shareholders in firms with dispersed ownership have a great need to use the board of directors to control the management, large controlling shareholders have both the incentive and the power to hold management accountable. The control role of the board is therefore considered to be less important in the presence of concentrated ownership (La Porta et al., 1998; Aguilera, 2005). An important result of this study is that board effectiveness does not result from a universal 'one best way', but suggests that particular practices will be effective only in certain combinations and furthermore may give different patterns of comparative institutional advantages given the contingencies of different environments.
The objective of the second chapter is to offer greater insight into how corporate governance mechanisms are contingent on the ownership structure of the company. We empirically examine the relationship between board characteristics and the demand for external audit in firm with dispersed and concentrated ownership. The results show that the influence of board independence and single leadership on the external audit demand is contingent on the concentration of ownership. For firms with dispersed ownership, we find that both board independence and single leadership are significantly related to the total audit fees. This is in line with previous literature which typically considers large US or UK companies. In contrast, for firms with concentrated ownership, the relationship between board characteristics and the demand for external audit is insignificant. These results are consistent with the argument that the ownership structure has an important influence on the board behavior.
The third chapter deals with the relationship between the ownership structure and stock price performance. Since ownership control can have both positive and negative properties, empirical evidence is of paramount importance. The results show the importance of ownership concentration, the presence of multiple blockholders and the type of controlling owner to explain stock market performance. In addition, the results for extreme down markets are fundamentally different from the up market results. While ownership concentration is valued positively during down market periods, it is valued negatively during up markets. Furthermore, the analysis shows that presence of multiple blockholders only influences the stock price during down market periods and firms controlled by a financial institution lose significantly less value during down markets and gain less easily value during extreme up markets. Furthermore, combining the findings from extreme up and down markets, there is an indication that ownership concentration is associated with more stable stock valuation during periods of market turmoil; especially firms controlled by a financial institution tend to lose less value during down markets and gain less value during up markets.
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Verma, Savita. "Ownership structure and corporate dividend policy." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/31375.
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This study investigates the potential role of ownership structure as a determinant of the corporate dividend policy.
A firm's dividend policy is modelled as the outcome of a voting game among groups of asymmetrically informed shareholders, who also have different marginal tax rates for dividend income. The outcome of the voting game is determined by the relative voting powers of these shareholder groups. Voting power is denned as the probability that a particular block of shares will be pivotal in determining the outcome of the voting game.
Using Shapley values as instruments for shareholder groups' voting powers, data on firms which traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange during the 1976-88 period are employed
to test the model's predictions.Business, Sauder School of
Graduate
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Chai, Dominic Heesang. "Three essays on foreign corporate ownership." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2009. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2359/.
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The dissertation examines foreign ownership in Korea during 1998-2003. The capital market opening in Korea following the 1997 Asian financial crisis provides a unique opportunity to investigate the changes in corporate ownership structure. The abolition of investment ceilings and various restrictions for the foreign investment allow us to document the greater influences of foreign institutional ownership in the Korean stock market. I empirically investigate (1) the role of foreign ownership in dividend policy, (2) the link between foreign investors and labour cost, and (3) the relationship between the foreign ownership and the level of corporate donations. Using a large firm level dataset, the panel data techniques are used to examine the effects of foreign equity ownership. The analysis shows that foreign ownership is significantly related to higher dividends, labour costs, and corporate donations. These findings highlight the role of foreign ownership in influencing management practices.
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Islas, Rojas Gonzalo Andres. "Essays on corporate ownership and governance." Diss., Restricted to subscribing institutions, 2007. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1495960821&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=1564&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
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Chernykh, Lyudmila Szewczyk Samuel Garner Jacqueline L. "Ultimate ownership and corporate performance in Russia /." [Philadelphia, Pa.] : Drexel University, 2005. http://dspace.library.drexel.edu/handle/1860/548.
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Moldenhauer, Benjamin. "Insider ownership, shareholder structures and corporate governance /." Sternenfels : Verl. Wissenschaft & Praxis, 2007. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2882441&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.
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Moldenhauer, Benjamin. "Insider ownership, shareholder structures and corporate governance." Sternenfels Verl. Wiss. & Praxis, 2006. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2882441&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.
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Wölfer, Katinka [Verfasser]. "Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance / Katinka Wölfer." Frankfurt : Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2016. http://d-nb.info/1099858038/34.
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Tong, Guanqun. "Ownership, control and firm performance in Europe." Thesis, Loughborough University, 2010. https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/7003.
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This study is motivated by one of the most prevalent properties of modern corporations: separation of ownership and control. Ownership concentration has been one of the corporate governance mechanisms to solve the agency problem between shareholders and management. Existing literature is mainly concerned with the impact of managerial ownership on firm performance. Little evidence is provided on the impact of general ownership concentration, including multiple large shareholders, on firm performance. This study aims to examine the efficiency of ownership concentration as a corporate governance mechanism, and to explore relevant policy implications to improve firm performance. Based on the company ownership data across a sample of 1291 European companies in the year of 2004, this study shows that European companies' ownership are highly concentrated with the largest three shareholders own more than 60% ownership of company. Industrial companies hold direct controls of European non-subsidiary companies, while private shareholders turn out to be the ultimate owners. On average, there is more than one large shareholder who owns more than 10% of the shares in a European company. A further sample of 655 European companies is used to investigate the relationship between ownership, control and firm performance. A significant non-linear impact of ownership concentration on firm performance with multiple turning points is confirmed. Specifically, Tobin's Q is highest when the Herfindahl index, which incorporates the degree of dispersion of shareholdings other than the largest one, reaches a value of 0.08. The largest shareholding of 10% might also be able to deliver relatively strong performance. Restructuring owner identities could be another efficient governance approach. Direct control from founder owners, ultimate control from insurance companies, and management ownership are beneficial for firm performance, while government, financial institutions except insurance companies and ultimate control of non-financial corporate owners are found to be detrimental for firm performance. Firm performance can also be improved by strengthening the contestability of the controlling coalition's power. The impacts of ownership and control on firm performance are found conditioned by country and industry. Therefore policies should be adjusted according to the companies' institutional environments. Although the endogeneity of ownership concentration and current firm performance is rejected in this study, past firm performance seems to affect current ownership concentration level. Higher accounting rates of return four years ago could result in lower current ownership concentration, while higher last year's Tobin's Q could result in higher current ownership concentration. Capital structure is found to be a significant substitute mechanism for ownership. These elements should be taken into account when the ownership governance mechanism is implemented.
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Mathiesen, Henrik. "Managerial ownership and financial performance /." København, 2002. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/360389503.pdf.
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Harmes, David. "Corporate news, the issue of newspaper ownership revisited." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ47773.pdf.
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Jackson, Marcia Karen. "Ownership, corporate governance and liquidity in Caribbean firms." Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2013. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/63853/4/63853.pdf.
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This thesis provides the first evidence on how ownership structure and corporate governance relate to stock liquidity in the Caribbean. Based on panel data of 71 firms from three selected Caribbean markets − Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago − results show that firms with concentrated ownership are associated with lower liquidity. The identity of the largest shareholder also matters: family firms and firms with foreign holding companies are more liquid than government firms. Although the second largest shareholding does not appear to matter to liquidity, there is some evidence showing that firms with foreign holding companies as the second largest shareholder are less liquid. Caribbean firms suffer from poor corporate governance but this study is unable to establish a significant relationship between corporate governance and liquidity.
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Zhu, Junheng. "Ownership, corporate governance and IPO post-listing liquidity." Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2014. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/67427/1/Junheng_Zhu_Thesis.pdf.
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This thesis investigates how ownership structure and corporate governance relate to the post-listing liquidity of IPO firms. Using a sample of 1,049 Chinese IPOs from 2001 to 2010, the results show firms with a broader shareholder base and higher ownership concentration have greater post-listing liquidity. So do firms with higher state ownership and lower institution ownership. Corporate governance is also important; post-listing liquidity is higher for firms with CEO duality, a larger and more independent board, and more frequent board meetings. The 2005 Split Share Structure Reform, which increased the proportion of tradable shares, has a positive impact on liquidity.
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Klasa, Sandy J. "The evolution of ownership structures in publicly traded firms : evidence from controlling family ownership exits /." view abstract or download file of text, 2002. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p3055696.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2002.Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 96-101). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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Tsai, Hua-Hsin. "TWO ESSAYS ON CORPORATE INNOVATION." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1605610188752338.
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Meisner, Nielsen Kasper. "Corporate governance and performance in firms with concentrated ownership /." Copenhagen, 2005. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/510443214.pdf.
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Lotto, Josephat. "Complex corporate ownership and control in UK listed companies." Thesis, University of Strathclyde, 2012. http://oleg.lib.strath.ac.uk:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=17208.
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This thesis sets out the empirical evidence on complex ownership and control using data for UK listed firms adapted from Faccio and Lang (2002) for the period 1996-1999. Using OLS estimation method, the thesis links corporate financial policies and performance with ownership and control. It reports a negative relationship between control concentration of the largest shareholder and dividend pay- out ratios in companies which separate ownership from control, and a positive relationship between ownership concentration of the largest shareholder and dividend payout ratios, in companies which do not. I show that higher control-rights grant larger shareholders incentives (lower cash-flow rights) and ability (higher control-rights) to extract private benefits, for companies which separate ownership from control. Supportive evidence emerges of a positive relationship between the largest shareholder's ownership concentration and debt ratio; when ownership concentration of the largest block holder increases, so does the possibility of collusion with management. It is further reported that, family companies employ more debt in their capital structures to prevent dilution of control and have significantly higher debt ratios and lower pay-out ratios than companies controlled by financial institutions. It may be argued that, the absence of strong external monitors makes it easy for family companies to pass control between generations. Finally, I test the relationship between voting rights of the largest shareholder and firm performance and report a negative relationship, suggesting reduction of corporate values. I demonstrate that firms whose control is shared among two family block holders accumulate more debt and perform worse than firms where the largest family block holder shares control with the second largest financial institution. This suggests that the incentives to collude with the largest shareholder or to monitor the largest shareholder are significantly affected by the type of block holder. It is also shown that firms with control coalition having more than two block holders perform better than those with only two block holders, especially those of the same type.
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Owolabi, Oluwarotimi Ayokunnu. "Corporate financing in transition : implications for institutions and ownership." Thesis, Brunel University, 2012. http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/6154.
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The present thesis examines the implications of ownership and institutions for corporate financing in Central and Eastern Europe. There are three empirical chapters (chapters 2, 3 and 4). Chapter two examines the role of business networks for firm external financing. Our central hypothesis here is that firms’ affiliation to business association is likely to be beneficial in securing external finance (especially bank finance) in countries with weak legal and judicial institutions, as it helps banks and financial institutions to minimize the underlying agency costs of lending. Using recent EBRD-World Bank BEEPS data, we find some support to this central hypothesis in our sample. Importance of foreign banks for economic development of CEE countries has been emphasized in the literature though there is wide dispersion in foreign investment in the region. In this context, chapter three (i.e., the second empirical chapter) focuses on the implications of corruption for foreign bank entry and ownership structure in Central and Eastern European countries. The chapter argues that the presence and persistence of corruption (both absolute and relative) may adversely affect costs of setting up as well as running day-to-day operations of foreign banks in host emerging economies. Using primarily Bankscope bank-level data we find that greater absolute and relative corruption may lower foreign bank entry, greater relative corruption may encourage foreign greenfield entry in our sample; while relative corruption is not significant for foreign takeover. The latter highlights the importance of encouraging foreign investors from countries with similar institutions. Finally, considering the implications of ownership for bank capital and performance in chapter four (the final empirical chapter) in light of the focus on bank capital and capital regulation in discussions after the recent banking crisis, we argue that the relationship between bank capital and bank performance crucially depends on bank ownership structure. Using Osiris data we examine foreign greenfield and other joint venture (JV) differential effect of high bank capital on bank performance. A significant positive effect of foreign Greenfield (as opposed to JV) bank capital on bank performance, after controlling for all other factors is found. We attribute this to better governance compared to varied ownership arrangement in other joint venture banks. Thus wide dispersion in the quality of institutions and ownership explains a great deal of variation in the economic performance of countries in the region. We hope findings of this thesis would inform policies and will also influence future research.
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Dević, Aleksandar. "Essays on corporate finance and ownership in Eastern Europe." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.614699.
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Moldenhauer, Benjamin [Verfasser]. "Insider Ownership, Shareholder Structures and Corporate Governance. / Benjamin Moldenhauer." Berlin : Duncker & Humblot GmbH, 2020. http://d-nb.info/1238494609/34.
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Abdullah, Zaimah. "Corporate governance and foreign equity ownership in Malaysian companies." Thesis, Loughborough University, 2015. https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/18430.
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In the aftermath of the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis, there are signs that in Malaysia, corporate governance practices are gradually converging towards the Anglo-American model. Drawing on three key theoretical lenses, namely agency theory, institutional theory and resource dependence theory, this study investigates an unexplored phenomenon in corporate governance reformation, at least in the context of Malaysia. The study examines the relationship between corporate governance elements and the level of foreign equity ownership (FEO) in Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs). More specifically, the aim of this study is to answer the following research question - Does corporate governance influence the level of FEO in Malaysian companies? In the context of this study, corporate governance is taken to be the aggregate of board of directors characteristics, directors attributes and ownership structure. On the other side of the equation is FEO, which is taken to be the proportion of equity owned by foreigners. The majority of foreign investors who are making investments in Malaysia originate from Western countries, and are accustomed to the Anglo-American corporate governance system. Thus, this study examines the influence of governance mechanisms in attracting foreign investors in a unique governance context following a major economic event i.e. the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. Accompanied by institutional theory and resource dependence theory, agency theory is used as the key lens to explain the hypothesised relationships. The study's hypotheses are tested using the panel data derived from 1,836 observations over a 12 year period, from 2000 through 2011. By considering the existence of heteroscedasticity and the serial correlation problems, the generalised least square (GLS) method was employed to estimate the model. To enrich the findings, logistic regression analysis was further applied and the potential endogeneity issue was resolved with a GMM test. The findings indicate that the level of FEO in Malaysian PLCs is significantly related to foreign directorships, the Western educational background of directors, professional directors, and multiple-directorships. However, the results defy the significant relationships of board size and outside directors, as generally proposed in the extant literature. In addition, the role of ownership structure is important in foreign investors behaviour, since it is found that foreign investors avoid investing in family-controlled companies and in companies with high institutional ownership. Therefore, from the overall results of this study, it can be concluded that there is evidence that corporate governance mechanisms do influence foreign investors decision making, at least in Malaysian PLCs. The implications of this study are discussed in terms of the relevant literature, theory, methodology and practice. In brief, this study has great potential impact in many respects including its relevance for policymakers in setting up new policies, designing new rules and strengthening existing regulations, both at country and firm levels.
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Nguyen, Thi My huong. "Corporate entrepreneurship, ownership and governance in post-privatisation Vietnam." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2015. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/corporate-entrepreneurship-ownership-and-governance-in-postprivatisation-vietnam(ee5cd447-0416-4241-8e6d-4146267113ba).html.
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This dissertation investigates the following questions. How does the structure of ownership, board governance, and board monitoring influence the corporate entrepreneurship behaviour of privatised firms in Vietnam? Furthermore, does uncertainty regarding the changing business and institutional environment moderate the relationships among corporate governance, ownership structure, and corporate entrepreneurship?In the dissertation, Stewardship Theory, Institutional Theory, Resource Dependence Theory, are integrated with Agency Theory to provide a framework to investigate the relationships between board composition, ownership structure and corporate entrepreneurship in post-privatisation environments. The theoretical arguments are tested using a mixed-method approach, based on a survey of privatised Vietnamese firms and data collected and collated from in-depth interviews of board and top management team members in six selected privatised firms. The study findings indicate that a reliance on any single theoretical lens is ineffective in explaining the phenomenon in the context of privatised firms in transition economies, and that the employment of multiple theories is crucial for providing a complete understanding of context-dependent phenomena, such as corporate governance. Empirically, the results show that the board composition and characteristics have little impact on corporate entrepreneurship and ownership structure almost plays no role in enhancing the entrepreneurial activities of privatised firms. In particular, the study highlights that there are no unique corporate governance practices that can be employed in every context. The practices are effective only in certain conditions and specific environments. The study provides a set of policy and managerial implications for shaping corporate governance in order to foster corporate entrepreneurship in Vietnamese privatised firms.
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Sikavica, Katarina. "Corporate ownership and control : economic, sociological and behavioral approaches." kostenfrei, 2008. http://www.biblio.unisg.ch/www/edis.nsf/wwwDisplayIdentifier/3532.
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Ng, Christina Y. M. "Corporate governance systems and ownership structures : implications for corporate performance : evidence from Hong Kong." Thesis, University of Stirling, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1893/21459.
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Corporate governance is an important variable that can serve to enhance firm performance. This dissertation focuses on a key corporate governance variable, that of managerial ownership. While Jensen and Meckling's (1976) "convergence of interest" hypothesis suggests that increases in managerial ownership can enhance firm performance, Fama and Jensen (1983) and La Porta et al. (1999) argue that at high levels of managerial ownership there are "entrenchment effects" (that is, managers will pursue their own interests). Although there are mixed results, the UK and US literature in general suggests that the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance is non-linear in nature and conforms to a cubic relationship corresponding to "alignment-entrenchment-alignment" (that is, alignment at low levels of managerial ownership, followed by entrenchment at intermediate levels of managerial ownership and alignment once again at high levels of managerial ownership). It is doubtful whether this relationship is the same under different corporate ownership structures. Claessens et al. (2000) document the fact that most of the firms in the East-Asian region are characterised by a concentrated form of family-controlled ownership, in contrast to the diffuse form of ownership in the UK and the US. Hong Kong is a prime example of an economy dominated by a family-controlled ownership structure. The thesis contributes to the academic literature on corporate governance by its examination of the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance III Hong Kong. Based on the regression results of 1406 firm-year observations of Hong Kong listed companies from 1995 to 1998, it is found that under the family-dominated ownership structure in Hong Kong, there is a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance which corresponds to a pattern of "entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment". This is in contrast to the pattern ("alignment-entrenchment-alignment") found in the UK by Short and Keasey (1999) and in the US by Morck et al. (1988). While the finding of a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in this study supports both the "convergence of interest" hypothesis over certain ranges of managerial ownership and "entrenchment effects" over other ranges of managerial ownership, the discovery of a pattern which is opposite to that found in UK and US studies indicates that managerial ownership affects firm performance in a different way in Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, the convergence of interest effect only dominates the entrenchment effect in the intermediate range of managerial ownership, leading to the conclusion that a policy of providing management with larger amounts of equity within this intermediate range of managerial ownership should enhance firm performance. In contrast, increasing managerial share ownership in cases where the existing level of managerial share ownership is either low or high will have the effect of reducing firm value. The design of an optimal managerial compensation strategy for Hong Kong firms thus has to take account of the existing level of managerial share ownership. In contrast to the finding of other studies, the results reported in this study show that board structure variables (board size, board composition and directors' remuneration) are not significantly related to firm performance. An explanation for this may be found in the different character of the board in Hong Kong. For example, the number of independent non-executive directors in Hong Kong is low and they are very often not truly independent, while the remuneration of directors is typically not subject to review by any board committees. If these aspects of Hong Kong board structures can be successfully reformed then corporate performance should be enhanced, in line with the results reported from other countries. The data concernmg managerial ownership and performance was partitioned in accordance with the East-Asian financial crisis, which began in late 1997. The findings from this further empirical analysis suggest that the macro-economic conditions in existence before and after the crisis affect the nature of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. It is found that the convergence effect is stronger in the "prosperous years" prior to the crisis, as shown by the wider alignment range from the regression results based on the data before the East-Asian financial crisis (1995-1997). The entrenchment effect is, however, more prominent during the "difficult years" as indicated by the narrower range of alignment in the regression results based on the data for the year after the crisis (1998). The importance of corporate governance in Hong Kong was brought into sharp prominence by the East-Asian financial crisis. Weaknesses in corporate governance regimes have been widely identified as an important factor leading to the fast downturn in economies within the whole East-Asian region. Enhancing corporate governance practices is thus important for corporate recovery and growth. Various international organizations, professional bodies, regulators and academics have spent a great deal of effort over the past six years in a wide range of activities to enhance corporate governance practices in the region, and these are reviewed in the thesis. Due to the different cultural backgrounds and ownership structures in different countries, it can be argued that there is no single "best" corporate governance system. A secondary aim of this thesis is the evaluation of the corporate governance initiatives of various international organizations and the identification of areas for improvement and for reform in Hong Kong. Specific policy recommendations are made for the structural improvement of the corporate governance regime in Hong Kong.
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Popov, M. (Mikhail). "Corporate governance in Russia:effects of ownership concentration on corporate governance in the Russian firms." Master's thesis, University of Oulu, 2014. http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:oulu-201402131110.
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This Master Thesis examines corporate governance in Russia and effects of ownership concentration on dividend policies in the Russian companies. We find that the classical agency approach is not applicable in the case of the Russian firms, but the stakeholder theory should be applied instead. We discuss effects of different stakeholders on the corporate governance. According to the existing evidence insiders (large shareholders, managers and employees) and outsiders (minority shareholders and creditors) can impose constraints on the companies in Russia. Also the State and product markets can affect corporate governance practices in the Russian companies. At the same time the role of boards of directors is very important in countries like Russia, where low legal enforcement and weak investor protection prevail. Boards should mitigate the agency problem in absence of proper investor protection and law enforcement.
The previous research suggests that a classical conflict of owners and managers is not the case in the Russian corporations. Instead the conflict of large and small shareholders should be considered. Thus, our research focuses on the analysis of ownership concentration effects on corporate governance. We use dividend payout ratios as a proxy for corporate governance practices in the Russian companies. We find extremely low dividend payouts in the Russian companies. The finding implies that the agency problem does exist in the Russian companies. However, our results suggest that it is not caused by ownership concentration. Instead ownership concentration has a significant positive effect on dividend payouts. Our findings support the prior research suggesting that a large shareholder has enough incentive and power to monitor management. The results are also in line with the substitute dividend model, according to which we can conclude that large shareholders would compensate minority shareholders for weak investor protection and also would try to establish good reputation on the capital markets.
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Silva, Domingos Luis Correia da. "Corporate control and financial policy : an empirical investigation of dividend policy in Germany." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.389744.
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Ottolenghi, Ezgi Hallioglu. "Essays On Corporate Finance." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2017. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/440584.
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Business Administration/FinancePh.D.
This dissertation, empirically examines ownership structure and its impacts on shareholder wealth. In the first chapter I examine the relation between ownership structure and M&A target selection when family firms purse acquisitions, focusing on the factors that influence family selection of targets. My results indicate that family firm acquirers select targets that are smaller and have low growth potential. I focus on short- and long-run stock market reactions to merger and acquisition announcements of family versus nonfamily bidders and their associated targets. I find that acquirers with family ownership have better cumulative average abnormal returns in the short run and higher buy-and-hold abnormal returns up to one year after the acquisition. Family firms also take a greater share of the merger synergy than do nonfamily bidders while the overall merger synergy is invariant to ownership structure. These results suggest that family firms pick different targets than nonfamily firms and benefit minority shareholders when they acquire. This chapter provides evidence that family ownership does not destroy value during M&A transactions; instead, the analysis indicates that family owners appear to choose better targets. In the second chapter I examine firms with dual class structures. Firms with limited voting shares, dual class firms, persist over time in spite of the widespread view that they embody a “corruption of the governance system” (Calpers, 2011). I find that founders and their heirs control 89% of dual class firms, making it difficult to disentangle family control and voting rights. I document that family owners hold 30% greater economic exposure in dual class firms than in single class family firms. Investors place lower values on both single and dual class family firms relative to non-family firms. In contrast, non-family dual class firms exhibit a 19% premium relative to single class firms. Further analysis shows that 8 industries contain 58% of these limited voting share firms - industries that require high brand maintenance and intangible assets. Strikingly, I find that outside shareholders of dual class firms earn excess returns of about 350 basis points per year relative to single class nonfamily firms. Additional tests reveal that institutional investors hold more of the floated equity of dual class family firms than found in single class nonfamily firms. Exploring a succession risk premium perspective, I discover these lower values and greater excess returns primarily occur in descendent-controlled firms. Overall, my analysis suggests that limited voting shares provide an important mechanism used by controlling shareholders that arise in industries with specific characteristics.
Temple University--Theses
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Truong, Thanh, and thanh truong@rmit edu au. "Corporate Ownership, Equity Agency Costs and Dividend Policy: An Empirical Analysis." RMIT University. Economics, Finance and Marketing, 2008. http://adt.lib.rmit.edu.au/adt/public/adt-VIT20080528.094747.
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Equity agency costs are important to the firm and the management of these costs is a critical element of corporate governance, yet empirical research that focuses on the magnitude and impact of agency costs is limited. This thesis sets out to furnish empirical evidence in the area of corporate ownership with a particular focus on the magnitude of equity agency costs as well as the relation that exists between the largest shareholder in a firm and equity agency costs and between the largest shareholder and the dividend policy that a firm adopts. This thesis provides an empirical analysis of the effect of corporate ownership, together with other governance mechanisms on equity agency conflicts for the largest 500 Australian listed firms. The results from this analysis provide strong support for the view that equity agency costs are related to corporate ownership. Specifically, there is evidence of a significant non-linear relation between inside ownership and the proxies for agency costs. Further, the results demonstrate that other governance mechanisms, particularly board size, board leadership and short-term debt financing, are effective in improving the use of firm assets, yet they do not seem to restrain firm management from incurring excessive discretionary operating expenses. This thesis also extends the investigation of the corporate ownership-equity agency cost relation by focusing on the largest shareholder for 9,165 listed firms drawn from 43 countries around the world. The results suggest that cross-sectional variation in equity agency costs can be partly attributable to corporate ownership. Specifically, there is evidence of a statistically significant non-linear relation between the shareholding of the largest shareholder and the agency cost proxies. The type of the largest shareholder, i.e. whether the largest shareholder is an insider or a financial institution, is also important in analysis of this relation. Further, debt financing, dividend policy and legal origin vary in their impact on the agency cost proxies. This thesis also investigates the interaction between the largest shareholder and dividend policy for 8,279 listed firms drawn from 37 countries around the world. Consistent with previous studies, the results suggest that firms are more likely to pay dividends when profitability is high, debt is low, investment opportunities are limited, or when the largest shareholder is not an insider. It is also apparent that largest shareholding and dividend payout are related and that, consistent with the extant literature, legal system does matter in dividend policy decisions. Together, the results imply that equity agency costs vary with corporate ownership though this relation remains, of course, the subject of continuing investigation in finance. A major contribution of this thesis is demonstrating that corporate ownership, particularly the largest shareholder, plays a pivotal role in controlling agency costs. Accordingly, this suggests the following policy implication: by improving the legal environment and regulatory constraints imposed on large shareholders as well as legal protection for minority shareholders, the efficiency gains generated from large shareholder control can be translated into higher firm valuation to the benefit of all shareholders in the firm.
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Wiberg, Daniel. "Institutional Ownership - the Anonymous Capital : Corporate Governance and Investment Performance." Doctoral thesis, Internationella Handelshögskolan, Högskolan i Jönköping, IHH, Nationalekonomi, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-11479.
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This thesis consists of five separate essays and an introductory chapter, The essays can be read independently from each other, but they are all in the field of corporate governance and investment performance. Specifically, the focus is on the role of institutional owners in the conflict between controlling shareholders and minority owners. The essays mainly contribute to the empirical literature on corporate governance and investment performance. In four of the five essays, panel data methods are used in the empirical investigation. The first essay investigates time and industry specific factors in the evaluation of firms’ investment performance, measured by marginal q. Significant differences in valuation is found between firms, depending on the market sentiments and industry affiliation. The second essay focuses on the role of institutional owners in relation to firms’ investment performance. Institutional owners are found to have a positive influence on firms’ investment performance. By studying a large panel of Swedish listed firms the essay also provides evidence on the relationship between control enhancing mechanism, such as vote-differentiated shares, and investment performance. The third essay looks at the role of institutional owners from the perspective of dividend policy. It is shown that institutional owners demand higher dividends to compensate for aggravated agency conflicts due to vote-differentiated shares. The fourth essay investigates the performance of European firms from a long run perspective. Firm profits converge over time, but this convergence is incomplete. Investment in R&D is put forward as an explanation for persistent profits above the norm. The fifth and last essay looks at individual mutual funds and specifically how to measure risk-adjusted performance. The results show that Swedish bond funds underperform their benchmark, even when risk-adjusted to the same level of risk.
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Neumann, Robert. "Aspects of institutional investors' ownership, portfolio decisions and corporate performance /." Frederiksberg : Samfundslitteratur, 2003. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/366068415.pdf.
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Stergiou, Vasiliki. "The complex relationship of concentrated ownership structures and corporate governance." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2011. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/464/.
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Concentrated ownership is perceived as an inefficient form of ownership because it allegedly increases the risk of minority expropriation, which is further exacerbated by the disproportionality of control and cash-flow rights of the controller. This thesis challenges the perception of concentration as a per se inefficient ownership structure. It argues that the 'inefficiency bias' is based on the oversimplified, incorrect assumption that concentration is characterised by the presence of one controlling shareholder and therefore disregards the variety of the forms of concentration. To substantiate this argument, this thesis categorises the forms of concentration based on the identity and number of the controllers and examines their impact on corporate governance. It is shown, that the distinct characteristics of the varieties of shareholders' profiles have an ambivalent impact on corporate governance: Families are strongly committed investors but also prone to extract private benefits of control; the state is inefficient in monitoring but can also be a driver of good corporate governance practices; multiple large shareholders improve internal contestability of control but shareholders' agreements can also be used for minority expropriation. In this context, the effectiveness of the legal framework to mitigate the arising corporate governance problems becomes the key factor which differentiates efficient from inefficient corporate ownership structures. The different corporate governance problems of concentration imply that adapted legal solutions and adequately flexible rules are the prerequisites of effective investor protection. Given the varieties of concentration, legal effectiveness and strong investor protection can therefore only be defined by reference to a given ownership structure. This thesis presents concrete examples of investor protection mechanisms which are adapted to the distinct characteristics of the varieties of concentration: In the case of family and state ownership, effective minority protection takes the form of special minority rights of board-representation; within multiple large blockholdings, shareholders' agreements limit the abuse of the governance rights of majority shareholders. Ultimately, the thesis deals with the implications of this complex interaction between ownership structures and corporate governance which compromise the reliability of indices as a metric of the quality of corporate governance, to the extent that the applied methodology fails to encompass the differences in shareholders' profiles and that a functional approach to the substantive legal analysis preceding the compilation of an index is not adopted.
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Cheng, Hsiao Fan, and 鄭筱凡. "Corporate Ownership and Corporate Performance." Thesis, 2001. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/61597359594280097574.
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Li, Ying. "Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance." Thesis, 2012. http://spectrum.library.concordia.ca/973960/1/Ownership_Structure_and_Corporate_Performance.pdf.
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Previous studies of ownership structure mainly focus on the relationship between insider ownership and corporate performance. However, empirical results have failed to provide consistent evidence to prove whether the type of ownership does significant affect firm performance. Our paper fills this gap by classifying different types of shareholders (individual shareholders and institutional shareholders) and observes their relationship with corporate value respectively. In addition, we examine quarterly panel data and indirect ownership to address the problem of endogeneity argued Demetz (2001).
Our results show that only institutional ownership has consistent and significant relationship with firm value in both yearly regressions and panel data regression, while the relationship between individual ownership and firm value is not significant. Institutional ownership first decreases then increases firm value as institutional shareholders hold higher stakes in the firm. However, the effect of institutional ownership is counteracted when individuals have unexpectedly high levels of ownership. We also find that if institutional shareholders acquire more shares during a quarter, the change in firm value during this period is positive. Our results support the hypothesis that firm value creation is higher if the largest shareholder is an institutional investor.
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Lin, Chun-Chien, and 林君虔. "Changes in Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/25115743184421883841.
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碩士國立雲林科技大學
企業管理系碩士班
100
In this study, we totally collected 15 years Taiwan listed companies data from 1995 to 2009 to inquiry the relationship between ownership structure and corporate governance dimensions changes; as well as those changes in corporate governance dimensions influences corporate performance. After empirical research, we found that institutional investors holding the greater, they would strengthen the board function of disclosure quality; the more shareholding of the board member, the bigger board size to guard against the managers’ interventions; but when top managements’ power are increased with shareholding, they neither want to avoid the decision-making interference from board by decreasing the tenure of board members. In the second research result, this study found that not every corporate governance changes will affect the company''s performance, and the impact of five performance indicators aren’t the same with an independent variable. In the significant result, we find out changes in board size makes ROA negative; the greater average tenure of board members the higher the market turnover.
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Shi, Fangzhou. "Essays in Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance." Thesis, 2015. https://doi.org/10.7916/D8TD9WV0.
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This dissertation delves into ownership structure and corporate governance. The first chapter investigates the causal link between business group affiliation and new firms' profitability. To overcome selection issues related to group affiliation, I focus on ownership changes at least two levels away in the ownership chain that lead to a change in group affiliation. I provide evidence suggesting that these "unintentional" changes are likely exogenous. I find that business group affiliation leads to a 12% increase in new firms' profitability during the first six years. I further present evidence consistent with two channels. First, new firms quickly increase revenues and expand market shares after joining business groups, possibly leveraging on groups' marketing networks. Second, group affiliation triggers a higher ratio of top manager turnover and leads to more experienced top managers and more productive employees. It is possible that business groups provide a talent pool of managers and better monitor new firms' labor force. Results suggest that business groups parallel the role of venture capital firms in sponsoring new firms in economies with concentrated equity ownership.
The second chapter examines the impact of input and product market competition on private benefits of control (PBC), as measured by the voting premia between shares with differential voting rights. The main findings are three. First, increases in the intensity of competition lead to lower estimates of PBC. Second, competition significantly reduces the dispersion in the voting premia, affecting especially the top of the PBC distribution. Third, competition effects are particularly prominent in weak-rule-of-law countries, in manufacturing industries and in less-profitable firms. Overall, the results show that competition leads to a meaningful reduction in the level and dispersion of PBC.
The third chapter directly examines the correlation between insider trading and executive compensation at the firm level. Using panel data on US firms from 1992 to 2011, we find that 1% decrease in cash compensation leads to a 21.7 percentage points increase in 6-month buy-and-hold excess returns, as well as a large increase in trading profits. These results indicate that insiders are using insider trading as a substitute to cash compensation, and keeping the total direct compensation level less volatile than previous research relied on. This effect is robust to exogenous shock to insider trading return, such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The result suggests the importance to take into account of insider trading profit in context of executive compensation.
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Lai, Chia-chen, and 賴珈禎. "CEO Turnover, Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/24795858753453253426.
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碩士國立高雄第一科技大學
財務管理所
97
We study the impacts of CEO turnover on corporate performance. We also try to find some other factors that also affect corporate performance, and focus on the relationship between ownership structure and post-turnover performance. Our sample includes the event companies listed on TSE and OTC during 1998-2007. The results show that CEO turnover is significantly negative related to corporate performance. Additionally, the forced CEO turnover is significantly negative announcement effect; however voluntary CEO turnover is not significant. Moreover, the results show that more manager shareholding and institution shareholding are related to lower post-turnover performance. The empirical results suggest the supervision function of institution stockholding may not so good.
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Lee, Chia-Ling, and 李佳伶. "The Relationships between Corporate Ownership and Performance." Thesis, 2003. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/56796356309802822327.
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chi-pei, Chen, and 陳綺珮. "Ownership structure and corporate performance：post SEO evidence." Thesis, 2002. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/46585946547651875442.
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碩士淡江大學
財務金融學系
90
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of controlling shareholders on corporate performance and the agency problem between the block shareholders and minority shareholders. Besides the study also investigate the effect of changes in ownership structure on corporate performance after Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO). The sample consists of 269 Taiwan listed companies from year 1996 to 1999. Using the criterion that ultimate owner have control rights exceeding 20% as a cutoff point to define each company’s ultimate control pattern, 46.5% can be classified as family-controlled. The concentration of ownership is enhanced through the use of pyramid structures and cross-holdings, which lead block shareholders’ control rights deviate from their cash flow rights, and the appointment of managers and directors who are related to the block shareholders. The large separation between cash flow rights and control rights that often arise from the use of pyramid and cross-holdings in these market suggest that insiders have both the incentive and the ability to engage in expropriation. Furthermore the results show that the separation of cash flow right and control right would be larger after SEO. The evidence indicates that the larger the separation between cash flow rights and control rights after SEO the greater the negative effect on firms value, especially for corporate groups during the Asian financial crisis.
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Peng, Wei-Chin, and 彭偉卿. "Information transparency, corporate governance,and ownership structure." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/42664363592856396566.
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碩士國立中央大學
會計研究所
104
The discussion in this study is mainly about corporate governance and ownership structure in relation to information transparency. Since information transparency has been a necessary part of the activities of corporate governance, improving information transparency helps lowering information asymmetry as well as stabilizing the development of capital markets. This study is based on Taiwan Information Disclosure and Transparency Rankings System and selected listed company for the period of 2008 to 2014 as the sample. The empirical analysis result shows that the board size, independent director and supervisors, The Audit Committee, and audit from Big Four Firms have significantly positive relations with information transparency. Reversely, the result shows the scale of supervisors and CEO duality have negative relations with information transparency. Additionally, in the aspect of the factor of shareholding structure revealed the following facts. In considering the ownership of board, outsider, government organization, and managers, the higher the shareholding ratio is, the better the information transparency is. On the contrary, in considering the ownership of supervisors and controlling shareholders, the higher the shareholding ratio is, the worse the information transparency is. As the result, this study can provide investors and government organizations with the factors which will influence the level of corporate information transparency, so as to improve the level of information disclosure and ensure investors’ equity in the future.
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Lin, Yu-Min, and 林祐民. "Ownership Structure and Corporate Excess Cash Holdings." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/50192643803757650919.
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碩士國立中正大學
企業管理研究所
99
This research aims at investigate the correlations that how a firm’s ownership structures conduct its cash holding policy and then produce the performances. By means of specific speculation of the agency problem between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, the perspectives of ownership structure can be an effective denominator to examine the situation why firms hold so much excess cash, and extend the managerial discretion issue that the possibility for controlling shareholders to transfer the liquidity resource without fully used in investing opportunity. We observe 508 independent Taiwan listed firms during the period 2001-2009 and use econometric analysis of cross sectional panel data which is verified by Redundant FE test and Hausman test to prove the fixed effect model. The empirical estimates report that cross-holdings structure may be one of the reasons that results in inefficient management of excess cash. Manager shareholdings provide the motivation to improve the future expectation of performance while board directors and supervisors will value more on current value that may imply the managerial myopic behavior. Our observations can be interpreted that cross-holdings structure can be a strategy for a firm to enhance its efficiency of management but it also enable the dominant shareholders in corporate with greater power to conduct the resource allocation where corporate governance should provide the mechanism to prevent the inappropriate resource transferring through cross-holdings structure and enhance the benefit of maintaining competitive advantage.
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LIANG, LI-HSIN, and 梁立昕. "The Relationship among Institutional Ownership, Corporate Performance and Corporate Tax Avoidance." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/9qeb8x.
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碩士國立臺北大學
會計學系
107
As there is no consistent conclusion of the relationship between institutional ownership and corporate tax avoidance, this study takes the empirical method of regression discontinuity design (RDD) to explore the relationship amoung institutional ownership, corporate performance and corporate tax avoidance. According to the empirical framework of Chen, Huang, Li and Shevlin (2018), the parameter method of the Sharp RDD was used. Taking the FTSE TWSE Taiwan 50 Index and Taiwan Mid-Cap 100 Index constituent stock as samples from 2008 to 2017, and taking the restructuring of exchange traded funds as an exogenous change to observe institutional ownership, corporate performance and corporate tax avoidance of the sample near the threshold. Indirect inference is the relationship between institutional ownership, corporate performance and corporate tax avoidance. The results suggest that the restructuring of exchange traded funds has a positive effect on institutional ownership, corporate performance, but there is no significant relationship between the extent of tax avoidance, and it can be indirectly inferred that institutional ownership has a positive relationship with the corporate performance. Further, the sample is stratified according to the level of corporate performance to explore the impact of exchange traded funds to the extent of tax avoidance, the results show better performance of tax avoidance companies are more aggressive. Therefore, this study suggests that the relationship between institutional ownership and tax avoidance is not a direct impact, but indirectly through influencing the strategy of tax avoidance, to achieve the purpose of improving corporate performance. In the sensitivity analysis, we also obtain the consistent result by using different estimation methods of sharp regression discontinuity design (nonparametric).
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Chen-Yu, Lee, and 李貞玉. "The relationship of the top management ownership, corporate ownership and firm’s default risks." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/16691399159487815777.
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碩士淡江大學
財務金融學系碩士在職專班
97
Corporate governance is one of the important subjects in the management science in recent years. Good corporate governance can protect the enterprise’s interests, reduce the agency problem and maintain both short-term profits and long-term steady operations. This study intends to investigate the relationship of the top management ownership, corporate ownership and firms’ default risks, and to provide useful references regarding enterprises’ long-term development. The sample of this study is a Taiwan stock-listed company, based on its record and history from 1995 to 2007. The result of this study reveals that, the relationship the relationship of the top manager ownership and the firms’ default risks is relatively consistent with the “Convergence-of-Interest Hypothesis” proposed by Jensen and Meckling in 1976. According to this hypothesis, the higher percentage the manager’s holding shares or the more centralized the stock ownerships, the less conflict occur between the top manager and the shareholder and the less agency problem happen. We also found that as the corporate ownership grows, the firms’ growth risks grow positively, but the firms’ operating risks reduce relatively. It could be assumed that the board members of a company tend to pay more attention to the present operational decisions and profit allocations, and tend to neglect the thoughtful planning on the company’s growth, causing the increase of the company’s growth risk.
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Alnabsha, A., H. A. Abdou, C. G. Ntim, and Ahmed A. Elamer. "Corporate boards, ownership structures and corporate disclosures: Evidence from a developing country." 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10454/15888.
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YesThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate board attributes, ownership structure and firm-level characteristics on both corporate mandatory and voluntary disclosure behaviour. Multivariate regression techniques are used to estimate the effect of corporate board and ownership structures on mandatory and voluntary disclosures of a sample of Libyan listed and non-listed firms between 2006 and 2010. First, the authors find that board size, board composition, the frequency of board meetings and the presence of an audit committee have an impact on the level of corporate disclosure. Second, results indicate that ownership structures have a non-linear effect on the level of corporate disclosure. Finally, the authors document that firm age, liquidity, listing status, industry type and auditor type are positively associated with the level of corporate disclosure. Future research could investigate disclosure practices using other channels of corporate disclosure media, such as corporate websites. Useful insights may be offered also by future studies by conducting in-depth interviews with corporate managers, directors and owners regarding these issues. The evidence relating to the important role that corporate governance mechanisms play in shaping the expectations relating to the level of corporate voluntary and/or mandatory disclosures may be useful in informing investor decisions, as well as future policy and regulatory initiatives. This paper contributes to the existing literature by examining the governance-disclosure nexus relating to both mandatory and voluntary disclosures in both listed and non-listed firms operating in a developing country setting.
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王宗瑜. "Corporate Ownership and Firm Performance in Hong Kong." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/32686437911793980373.
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Tan, Zhi-Jie, and 譚至傑. "Relationship between Ownership Structure and Corporate Social Responsibility." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/77747687492893617854.
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碩士國立中興大學
會計學研究所
104
CSR has been discussed widely in recent years, operating businesses is not only connects to economy, but also to society and environment, therefore, Taiwan progressively establishes laws and regulations to regulate listed firms to issue CSR report and enforce internal company governance, which includes board characteristics and ownership structure. This paper mainly conduct research on issues of ownership structure, investigates whether the ratio of structures is associated with the possibility of being named CSR awarded firms and scores of awarded firms. Moreover, this paper includes shareholdings of political connected (hereafter, PCs) directors to inspect the effects of political background. Our sample starts from all public firms traded on TWSE from 2006 to 2014.We obtain financial data for public firms traded on Taiwan Stock Exchange from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database, and the CSR information from Common Wealth Magazine. The empirical results show that there is a negative relationship between holding of directors and score of awarded firms, and there is a significant positive relationship between holding of institutional investors and possibility of being named CSR awarded firms as well as scores of awarded firms. Furthermore, the study also found that the higher the holding of PCs directors, the better score of CSR, especially in terms of social participation.
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Huang, Chi-Lung, and 黃啟倫. "Ownership Structure, Related Party Transaction, and Corporate Performance." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/vteqjn.
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碩士銘傳大學
會計學系碩士班
94
This study is to examine the relationship among of the debt, ownership structure, shares as collateral by the board of directors, related party transaction, and corporate performance. This model is applied to the data of the Taiwan stock market for 1995-2004. We will apply linear regression models for panel data. Furthermore, applies F-test, LM-test and Hausman test to determine the best statistic method. The empirical results are summarized as follows: Debt has a different effect on performance, it depends on different performance measures. Insider ownership has significant positive impact on performance. And, we also find a significant nonlinear relation between Insider ownership and performance in the electronic industries. Black-holders ownership has a significant positive impact on performance, but a significant negative relation in the non-electronic industries. Institutional ownership has a significant negative effect on Tobin’ s q. Ratio of mortgaged/pledged shares of directors and supervisors and related party transaction have a significant negative impact on performance as a whole.
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Chen, Hui-Ju, and 陳惠如. "A Study Of Executive Compensation,Ownership,Corporate Value." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/bahse3.
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碩士銘傳大學
會計學系碩士班
94
The main purpose of this study is to examine the Inter relationship among of the Executive compensation, ownership and corporate value, and examines the determining factors of Executive compensation. This study re-builds the simultaneous equations that impact the inter-action effects among executive compenssation、ownership and corporate value which referred but omitted in the past studies. This model was applied to the data of the Taiwan stock market for 1996 to 2004 to investigate the effect for all samples and for explained by endogenous variables, and to find the possible reasons. This study apply two-stage least squares regression for panel data model. Furthermore, applies F-test, LM-test and Hausman test to determine the best statistic method (ordinary least squares method, fix-effect mordel or random-effect method). Empirical results are summarized as follows: 1. The company scale、company performance、company value and ownership are positively associated with executive compensation. But firms with longer history、innovation ability and company risk are negative associated with executive compensation. 2. Ownership、executive compensation、debt proportion、innovation ability、assets rate of increase、rate of increase of the fixed assets are positively associated with company value. But company scale、executive tenure and paying rate of the dividend are negative associated with company value. 3. the firms with longer history、executive tenure、paying rate of the dividend are positively associated with ownership. But company scale、board size、innovation ability、debt proportion、company value negative associated with ownership.
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CHUANG, MEI-LING, and 莊美玲. "Characteristics of Board, Ownership Structure, and Corporate Performance." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/rng6aw.
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碩士長榮大學
經營管理研究所
105
Using a large sample of firms listed on Taiwan Exchange Stock and Taipei Exchange for the period 2002–2015, this study examines the effects of board characteristics and ownership structure on corporate performance. The empirical results suggest that in the board characteristics the board ownership and seats of independent board are associated positively with corporate performance; in ownership structures the managerial, institutional, and ultimate controlling owners’ shareholdings are positively related to corporate performance. Further, this study consolidate the variables in the two board character and ownership structure into two comprehensive board and ownership index and find the effect of comprehensive ownership index on corporate performance for all samples and electronics industry is greater than the effect of comprehensive board index on corporate performance. After consolidate all variables in board characteristics and ownership structure into unique corporate governance index, this study documents the unique corporate governance index and corporate performance is positively related. Finally, the empirical results show link between corporate governance index and corporate performance is less profound for family firm than the nonfamily firms. Keyword: board characteristics, ownership structure, corporate performance