Relevant bibliographies by topics / Corporate Ownership

Academic literature on the topic 'Corporate Ownership'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 25 January 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Corporate Ownership"

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Makhdalena, Makhdalena. "PENGARUH OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE DAN CORPORATE PERFORMANCE TERHADAP FIRM VALUE." EKUITAS (Jurnal Ekonomi dan Keuangan) 20, no. 3 (September 4, 2018): 388–412. http://dx.doi.org/10.24034/j25485024.y2016.v20.i3.71.

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Penelitian mengenai ownership structure (foreign ownership, government ownership dan public ownership), corporate performance dan firm value telah banyak dilakukan oleh peneliti, tetapi hasilnya belum konsisten, yaitu ada yang berpengaruh positif dan ada pula yang berpengaruh negatif. Dengan demikian peneliti tertarik untuk meneliti ulang mengenai ownership structure (foreign ownership, government ownership dan public ownershihp) dan corporate performance serta pengaruhnya terhadap firm value. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menguji dan menganalisis pengaruh ownership structure (foreign ownership, government ownership dan public ownershihp) dan corporate performance terhadap firm value. Populasi dari penelitian ini adalah perusahaan yang listing di Bursa Efek Indonesia yang memiliki data yang lengkap tentang foreign ownership, government ownership, public ownership dan corporate performance serta firm value untuk enam tahun berturut-turut (2008-2013). Jenis data dari variabel penelitian ini adalah data sekunder yang diperoleh dengan teknik dokumentasi yang bersumber dari ICMD. Metode analisis data menggunakan regresi. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa foreign ownership, government ownership dan public ownership tidak berpengaruh terhadap firm value dan corporate performance berpengaruh positif terhadap firm value.
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Sass, Emma M., Marla Markowski-Lindsay, Brett J. Butler, Jesse Caputo, Andrew Hartsell, Emily Huff, and Amanda Robillard. "Dynamics of Large Corporate Forestland Ownerships in the United States." Journal of Forestry 119, no. 4 (April 3, 2021): 363–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jofore/fvab013.

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Abstract Ownership of forestland in the United States has changed in recent decades, including the proliferation of timber investment management organizations (TIMOs) and real estate investment trusts (REITs), with the potential to alter forest management and timber supply. This article quantifies forest ownership transitions among ownership categories between 2007 and 2017 and investigates how and why large corporate ownerships own and manage their forestlands. Ownership transitions were determined from refined USDA Forest Service, Forest Inventory and Analysis data; we also conducted a survey of large corporate forestland ownerships. Corporate forestland acreage increased between 2007 and 2017, while family and public forestland decreased. Large corporate landowners report multidimensional, financially focused land management, although industry, timber investment management organizations, real estate investment trusts, and other owners report some different motivations and income streams. This work provides a baseline to track future ownership transitions and the behaviors of large corporate forestland owners.
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Musallam, Sami R. M., Hasan Fauzi, and Nadhirah Nagu. "Family, institutional investors ownerships and corporate performance: the case of Indonesia." Social Responsibility Journal 15, no. 1 (February 4, 2019): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/srj-08-2017-0155.

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Purpose This paper aims to investigate the relationship between family and institutional ownerships and corporate performance. Design/methodology/approach Using a panel data of 139 nonfinancial companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2013, this study used generalized least square model. Findings The results show that family ownership has a significant and positive impact on corporate performance, while institutional ownership has significantly and negatively influenced corporate performance. These results imply that family ownership leads to better corporate performance, while institutional ownership leads to lower corporate performance. Research limitations/implications Future research would extend to examine different ownership variables, e.g. domestic, foreign and black shareholders ownerships with different performance measures such as profit margin and return on investments (ROI). Then, their results could be compared to the result of this paper. Practical implications For shareholders and managers, the result of this study provides a base for shareholder on the importance to have the same understanding as management to improve return of capital invested by them (family capital) through firm’s long- and short-term business decision-making. It is possible for management for doing so because their interest is same. Therefore, this can be an interesting incentive for management. This result of this study also provides practical implication for investors (including international investors) with respect to their funds in the firm with family ownership share. By doing so, they will get better and stable ROI compared to nonfamily-owned business. Originality/value This study is original as studies on institutional and family ownerships and corporate performance are limited in the Indonesian context. The use of nonlinearity effect of family ownership and corporate performance in Indonesian case is the first attempt. Therefore, this study contributes to corporate governance literatures by investigating the relationship between family and institutional ownerships and market performance in Indonesian context using the improved methodology.
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ALWI, HAPIDZ. "PENGARUH KARAKTERISTIK PERUSAHAAN DAN GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TERHADAP PENGUNGKAPAN CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY." AKUNTANSI DEWANTARA 3, no. 2 (October 28, 2019): 119–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.26460/ad.v3i2.3676.

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ABSTRACTÂ The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of profitability, firm size, and leverage proxied into corporate characteristics, managerial ownership and institutional ownership proxied into good corporate governance towards corporate social responsibility disclosure. The dependent variable is disclosure of corporate social responsibility. Independent variables are profitability, company size, leverage, managerial ownership and institutional ownership. This study uses secondary data from annual reports and sustainability reports on Listed Companies in KOMPAS 100 on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2014-2017. Samples are 100 companies. This study uses a purposive sampling method and multiple linear regression as an analysis method. Before the regression test, it was tested using the classic assumption test. The results of this study indicate that company size and institutions do not have a significant effect on CSR disclosure while profitability, leverage, and managerial ownershipÂ
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Sanjaya, I. Putu Sugiartha, Rayenda Khresna Brahmana, and Wimpie Yustino Setiawan. "Family Ownership and Corporate Performance." Jurnal Akuntansi dan Pajak 22, no. 2 (January 13, 2022): 636. http://dx.doi.org/10.29040/jap.v22i2.3202.

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The paper aims to investigate whether family ownership as controlling shareholder effect on firm performance. This paper uses ultimate (direct and indirect) ownership to identify a listed firm owned by family or non-family. Family ownership is majority shareholder for listed companies in Indonesia. Family ownership will be good impact (competitive advantage) or bad impact (private benefit) on companies. The study also motivates to study this topic because investigating on family ownership as controlling shareholder is limited in Indonesia. The study uses panel data or pooled data. The method for collecting data is archival. Unit of analysis of the study is organization. Sample of this study is 604 observations during 2001-2007. This study uses purposive sampling to collect data from the Indonesian Stock Exchange. This study collects and searches ultimate ownership on chain of ownership structure in manufacturing companies listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange. This study uses ultimate ownership to identify family ownership or non-family ownership because the reality of ownership structure in public companies in Indonesia is concentrated. This study identifies direct and indirect ownerships on chain of ownership. Based on direct and indirect, this study can identify ultimate ownership whether are family or non-family ownership. This study uses return on assets to proxy firm performance. The return is operating income. To analysis data, this study uses multiple reggresion model. Dependend variable is firm performance and independen variable is family ownership. The results of this study are family ownership negatively affect to firm performance. It indicates that ownership by family reduce firm performance. These results suggest that entrenchment effect is more dominant than alignment effect on the family ownership. The research focus only for manufacturing industry and data is only from 2001-2007. The results of the study will impact for regulation to lead listed companies have to disclosure the ultimate owner because it is a potential agency problem in Indonesia. The results also give information for potential and existing investor to give more pay attention on financial statements because it is potential to mislead on the statements. Keywords : Ultimate Ownership, Family, Firm Performance, Entrenchment Effect
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Azoury, Nehme, Andre Azouri, Elie Bouri, and Danielle Khalife. "Ownership concentration, ownership identity, and bank performance." Banks and Bank Systems 13, no. 1 (February 15, 2018): 60–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/bbs.13(1).2018.06.

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This paper examines whether ownership concentration and certain type of ownership can affect the financial performance of Lebanese banks. It uses longitudinal data from the largest 35 Lebanese banks over the period 2009–2014 and employs the panel regression model. The empirical results show that ownership concentration and certain type of shareholders play an important role in the area of corporate governance in Lebanese banks. In particular, bank financial performance is positively associated with ownership concentration, managerial ownership, and foreign and institutional ownerships; however, family ownership is not related to bank performance. Also, this paper shows that both ownership concentration and managerial ownership have a U-shaped relationship with bank performance. Several robustness tests largely confirm the findings, with important implications for policy-makers. The findings are crucial to policy-makers and bankers who are interested in tailoring good corporate governance principles for the Lebanese banking sector.
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Nguyen, Tran Thai Ha, and Wing-Keung Wong. "Do State Ownership and Business Environment Explain Corporate Cash Holdings? Empirical Evidence from an Emerging Country." Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance 17, no. 1 (June 30, 2021): 1–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.21315/aamjaf2021.17.1.1.

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This study evaluates the relationship between state ownership and corporate cash holdings by taking into account the role of the business environment in the context of an emerging economy. Both linear and non-linear models are employed for listed enterprises’ financial data during the period from 2011 to 2019 in Vietnam. The empirical results show that state ownership reduces the corporate cash holdings in the linear model, and there is a U-shaped relation between corporate cash holdings and state ownership in a non-linear manner. By using the extended models, this study obtains consistent evidence to show that corporates reduce their cash holdings when the business environment becomes better and vice versa. Specifically, we find that the speed of cash adjustment in Vietnam is smaller than that in the developed countries, implying that corporates can shelter their liquid assets in order to avoid the negative effects stemming from agency problems between managers and state-shareholders. However, they are willing to hold more cash because of the mitigated agency problems in the case of the dominant state ownership. Ultimately, the business environment’s quality will have more power in determining the behaviour of corporates’ cash holding to meet market risks than state ownership. This study contributes to financial literature by determining the business environment’s critical role in the relationship between state ownership and corporate cash holdings.
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Santana-Martin, Domingo Javier, and Inmaculada Aguiar-Diaz. "Corporate ownership in Spain." Corporate Ownership and Control 5, no. 1 (2007): 322–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i1c4p1.

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In this paper we analyse the structure of ownership in non-financial Spanish listed companies in the period 1996-2002, focussing on the control chain methodology. The results obtained show that the main shareholder’s control threshold stands at about 29% of the voting rights and that in 2002 families were the ultimate owners in 52.7% of the firms. On the other hand, the use of pyramid structures continues to increase. In 2002, 29.1% of the companies were controlled in this way, which means that the ratio of voting rights to cash flow rights for this year was 0.89
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Lafontaine, Francine. "Franchising versus corporate ownership." Journal of Business Venturing 14, no. 1 (January 1999): 17–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0883-9026(97)00102-x.

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Tanui, Peninah Jepkogei, Josephat Cheboi Yegon, and Ronald Bonuke. "Effect of Ownership Structure on Corporate Diversification of Listed Firms in Kenya." SEISENSE Journal of Management 2, no. 5 (August 21, 2019): 29–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.33215/sjom.v2i5.194.

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Purpose - This paper aimed to examine the moderating role of capital structure in the relationship between institutional and foreign ownerships on corporate diversification of listed firms at the Nairobi Securities Exchange, Kenya. Design/Methodology - The target population comprised of all the 65 listed firms at Nairobi Securities Exchange in Kenya. However, the inclusion criteria were based on all firms listed at the NSE from 2003 to 2017. Findings - Capital structure significantly moderated the relationship between institutional ownership and corporate diversification. However, there was a statistically insignificant moderating effect of capital structure in the relationship between foreign ownership and corporate diversification. Practical Implications - As to increase diversification, listed firms are suggested to have low levels of capital structure and institutional ownership. Furthermore, low levels of foreign ownership and high capital structure is vital in attaining high diversification levels. Originality - The study contribution is the moderating effect of capital structure in institutional ownership - corporate diversification linkage.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Corporate Ownership"

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Stagliano, Raffaele. "Corporate governance, corporate diversification and ownership structure." Thesis, Toulouse 1, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011TOU10056.

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Cette thèse a pour objectif d'étudier le rôle que la diversification des entreprises et la structure de propriété jouent dans le processus de création de valeur. Le deuxième chapitre est consacré à une revue de littérature portant sur les travaux théoriques et empiriques qui analysent l’impact de la structure d’actionnariat et de la diversification des entreprises sur leur valeur de marché. Le troisième chapitre approfondit l'analyse de la diversification des entreprises en étudiant l'effet d'interaction entre diversification des produits et diversification internationale. Ce chapitre considère la relation entre diversification et structure du capital sur un échantillon d’entreprises manufacturières italiennes. Nos conclusions nous permettent de soutenir que cet effet d’interaction a un impact négatif sur la capacité d'endettement. Enfin, le quatrième chapitre étudie l'impact d’une structure d’actionnaires multiples sur la prise de risque des entreprises. L’analyse est menée sur les firmes cotées sur le marché financier américain. La plupart des études antérieures sur la structure de propriété se concentre sur les différences entre les entreprises avec au moins un actionnaire de référence par rapport aux entreprises à l’actionnariat éparpillé, sans tenir compte de l'effet potentiel de l'existence de multiples détenteurs de blocs d’actions sur la volatilité et la performance des titres boursiers. Nous montrons que les détenteurs de blocs jouent un rôle important dans l'atténuation des conflits d'intérêts entre actionnaire majoritaire et actionnaires minoritaires
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how corporate diversification and ownership structure affect value creation for firms. In Chapter 2, we review the relevant theoretical models in the field of corporate finance. The chapter also summarizes the empirical results found regarding the relationship between corporate diversification, ownership concentration and the firm’s value. In Chapter 3, we extend the analysis of corporate diversification and consider the effects of the interaction of both product and international diversification on a firm. Empirically, this chapter considers the impact of diversification decisions on the capital structure for a sample of Italian manufacturing firms. We find that the interaction of both international and product diversification has a negative impact on debt capacity. Finally, in Chapter 4, we empirically examine the impact of complex ownership structures on the risk choices of U.S. firms. Most previous studies on ownership structure focus on the differences between firms with at least one blockholder and widely held firms, without considering the potential effect that the existence of other blockholders might have on the financial variables. We find that the blockholders with intermediate holdings play a mitigating role in the conflicts of interest between the largest blockholder and the minority shareholders
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Perera, Shalini. "Corporate Ownership and Corporate Governance in Sri Lanka." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.517315.

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Desender, Kurt A. "Essays on Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/3980.

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La mayoría de los estudios de gobierno corporativo se centran en empresas cotizadas en E.E.U.U o el Reino Unido donde existe una clara separación entre propiedad y control. Sin embargo, en Europa continental la estructura de propiedad de las empresas es muy diversa, pudiendo diferenciar desde empresas con una propiedad difusa y un gran número de accionistas relativamente pequeños hasta empresas concentradas con uno o más accionistas mayoritarios. El objetivo de esta tesis es investigar el efecto que ejerce la estructura de propiedad en la eficacia de otros mecanismos del gobierno corporativo y en el funcionamiento de la empresa.
En el primer capítulo se desarrolla un modelo teórico para entender la influencia que la estructura de propiedad ejerce sobre las funciones del consejo de administración y sobre la eficacia del consejo. Una pregunta importante tratada en esta investigación es si todas las empresas, independientemente de su estructura de propiedad, se deben someter a las mismas recomendaciones de gobierno corporativo. La revisión de la investigación empírica sobre las características del consejo de administración demuestra que los resultados no son concluyentes. Una posible explicación a la gran variedad de resultados empíricos puede ser la omisión en al análisis del contexto externo e interno de las empresas (Filatotchev, 2008). Un resultado importante de nuestro estudio es que la estructura de propiedad afecta a la eficacia del consejo. Es decir, la eficacia de ciertas prácticas particulares ejercidas por el consejo y las ventajas comparativas que a nivel institucional derivan de ellas dependen de la manera en que estas se combinen en función de la estructura de propiedad de las empresas.
El objetivo del segundo capítulo es profundizar en el entendimiento de cómo los mecanismos de gobierno corporativo dependen de la estructura de propiedad de las empresas. Sostenemos que la estructura de propiedad influencia el comportamiento del consejo de administración. Los resultados demuestran que la relación entre los honorarios de auditoría externa y la independencia del consejo dependen del grado de concentración de la propiedad. Para las empresas con propiedad dispersa, encontramos que los honorarios de auditoría se encuentran relacionados con la independencia del consejo y con la separación del presidente y máximo ejecutivo. Esto coincide con la literatura anterior que típicamente se centra en las compañías cotizadas en E.E.U.U. o el Reino Unido. En cambio, para las empresas con propiedad concentrada, la relación entre las características del consejo y la demanda para la auditoría externa es insignificante.
El tercer capítulo investiga la relación entre la estructura de propiedad de las empresas y la valoración de sus acciones durante periodos de turbulencia. Los resultados demuestran la importancia que tiene (a) la concentración de la propiedad, (b) la presencia de múltiples accionistas significativos y (c) el tipo de accionista que controla, sobre la cotización de la acción en periodos de inestabilidad financiera. Además, los resultados para los mercados bajistas y alcistas difieren sustancialmente. Mientras que la concentración de la propiedad se valora positivamente durante períodos de perdidas, se valora negativamente en mercados alcistas. Los resultados sostienen la hipótesis de que los inversores confían en accionistas mayoritarios durante períodos de crisis para supervisar a la gerencia. Además, combinando los efectos que la concentración accionarial tienes sobre la cotización en los extremos alcistas y bajistas del mercado, nuestros resultados indican que la concentración de la propiedad fomenta una mayor estabilidad en la valoración de las empresas durante periodos de inestabilidad financiera.
Recent corporate governance research suggests that a large proportion of public companies worldwide are characterized by controlling stockholders who are more often families, usually the founder(s) or their descendants. Thus far, most corporate governance research has focused on stylized US (and to a less extent UK) firms which separate ownership and control. The objective of this thesis is to further investigate the role of ownership structure on the effectiveness of other corporate governance mechanisms and the firm's performance.
The objective of the first chapter is to understand how the role (control versus direction) of the board of directors is influenced by the ownership structure and a how a different role influences the board effectiveness. While shareholders in firms with dispersed ownership have a great need to use the board of directors to control the management, large controlling shareholders have both the incentive and the power to hold management accountable. The control role of the board is therefore considered to be less important in the presence of concentrated ownership (La Porta et al., 1998; Aguilera, 2005). An important result of this study is that board effectiveness does not result from a universal 'one best way', but suggests that particular practices will be effective only in certain combinations and furthermore may give different patterns of comparative institutional advantages given the contingencies of different environments.
The objective of the second chapter is to offer greater insight into how corporate governance mechanisms are contingent on the ownership structure of the company. We empirically examine the relationship between board characteristics and the demand for external audit in firm with dispersed and concentrated ownership. The results show that the influence of board independence and single leadership on the external audit demand is contingent on the concentration of ownership. For firms with dispersed ownership, we find that both board independence and single leadership are significantly related to the total audit fees. This is in line with previous literature which typically considers large US or UK companies. In contrast, for firms with concentrated ownership, the relationship between board characteristics and the demand for external audit is insignificant. These results are consistent with the argument that the ownership structure has an important influence on the board behavior.
The third chapter deals with the relationship between the ownership structure and stock price performance. Since ownership control can have both positive and negative properties, empirical evidence is of paramount importance. The results show the importance of ownership concentration, the presence of multiple blockholders and the type of controlling owner to explain stock market performance. In addition, the results for extreme down markets are fundamentally different from the up market results. While ownership concentration is valued positively during down market periods, it is valued negatively during up markets. Furthermore, the analysis shows that presence of multiple blockholders only influences the stock price during down market periods and firms controlled by a financial institution lose significantly less value during down markets and gain less easily value during extreme up markets. Furthermore, combining the findings from extreme up and down markets, there is an indication that ownership concentration is associated with more stable stock valuation during periods of market turmoil; especially firms controlled by a financial institution tend to lose less value during down markets and gain less value during up markets.
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Verma, Savita. "Ownership structure and corporate dividend policy." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/31375.

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This study investigates the potential role of ownership structure as a determinant of the corporate dividend policy. A firm's dividend policy is modelled as the outcome of a voting game among groups of asymmetrically informed shareholders, who also have different marginal tax rates for dividend income. The outcome of the voting game is determined by the relative voting powers of these shareholder groups. Voting power is denned as the probability that a particular block of shares will be pivotal in determining the outcome of the voting game. Using Shapley values as instruments for shareholder groups' voting powers, data on firms which traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange during the 1976-88 period are employed to test the model's predictions.
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Chai, Dominic Heesang. "Three essays on foreign corporate ownership." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2009. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2359/.

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The dissertation examines foreign ownership in Korea during 1998-2003. The capital market opening in Korea following the 1997 Asian financial crisis provides a unique opportunity to investigate the changes in corporate ownership structure. The abolition of investment ceilings and various restrictions for the foreign investment allow us to document the greater influences of foreign institutional ownership in the Korean stock market. I empirically investigate (1) the role of foreign ownership in dividend policy, (2) the link between foreign investors and labour cost, and (3) the relationship between the foreign ownership and the level of corporate donations. Using a large firm level dataset, the panel data techniques are used to examine the effects of foreign equity ownership. The analysis shows that foreign ownership is significantly related to higher dividends, labour costs, and corporate donations. These findings highlight the role of foreign ownership in influencing management practices.
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Islas, Rojas Gonzalo Andres. "Essays on corporate ownership and governance." Diss., Restricted to subscribing institutions, 2007. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1495960821&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=1564&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

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Chernykh, Lyudmila Szewczyk Samuel Garner Jacqueline L. "Ultimate ownership and corporate performance in Russia /." [Philadelphia, Pa.] : Drexel University, 2005. http://dspace.library.drexel.edu/handle/1860/548.

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Moldenhauer, Benjamin. "Insider ownership, shareholder structures and corporate governance /." Sternenfels : Verl. Wissenschaft & Praxis, 2007. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2882441&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.

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Moldenhauer, Benjamin. "Insider ownership, shareholder structures and corporate governance." Sternenfels Verl. Wiss. & Praxis, 2006. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2882441&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.

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Wölfer, Katinka [Verfasser]. "Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance / Katinka Wölfer." Frankfurt : Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2016. http://d-nb.info/1099858038/34.

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Books on the topic "Corporate Ownership"

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Rugman, Alan M. Foreign ownership and corporate strategy. Toronto: Ontario Centre for International Business, Research Programme, 1991.

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Porta, Rafael La. Corporate ownership around the world. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998.

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Robina, Iqbal, and Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, eds. Corporate governance in Pakistan: Corporate valuation, ownership and financing. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2010.

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Laeven, Luc. Complex ownership structures and corporate valuations. [Washington, D.C.]: International Monetary Fund, Research Dept., 2007.

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Laeven, Luc. Complex ownership structures and corporate valuations. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.

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Gillan, Stuart L. Institutional investors, corporate ownership, and corporate governance: A global perspective. Helsinki: United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2002.

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Hart, Oliver D. Cooperatives vs. outside ownership. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998.

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Corporate capital: Control, ownership, saving and crisis. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

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Lichtenberg, Frank R. Ownership structure and corporate performance in Japan. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1992.

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Knowles, Legh F. Beaulieu Vineyards from family to corporate ownership. Berkeley, Calif: University of California, 1990.

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Book chapters on the topic "Corporate Ownership"

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Padgett, Carol. "Ownership." In Corporate Governance, 17–44. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-35711-2_2.

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Mcconnell, John J., Stephen B. Mckeon, and Wei Xu. "Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure." In Corporate Governance, 303–22. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118258439.ch16.

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Gomez, Edmund Terence, Thirshalar Padmanabhan, Norfaryanti Kamaruddin, Sunil Bhalla, and Fikri Fisal. "GLICs and Corporate Ownership." In Minister of Finance Incorporated, 95–148. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-4897-5_3.

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Gillan, Stuart L., and Laura T. Starks. "Institutional Investors, Corporate Ownership and Corporate Governance: Global Perspectives." In Ownership and Governance of Enterprises, 36–68. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781403943903_2.

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Maassen, Gregory F. "Ownership Structure Metrics." In International Corporate Governance After Sarbanes-Oxley, 195–222. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119201885.ch11.

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Forbes, William, and Lynn Hodgkinson. "Nature of Ownership." In Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom, 21–25. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137451743_4.

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Clacher, Iain, David Hillier, and Patrick Mccolgan. "Agency Theory: Incomplete Contracting and Ownership Structure." In Corporate Governance, 141–56. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118258439.ch8.

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Marseguerra, Giovanni. "Ownership Concentration and Corporate Control." In Contributions to Management Science, 141–54. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag HD, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-47010-3_11.

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Sacristán-Navarro, María, and Silvia Gómez-Ansón. "Family Ownership and Corporate Governance." In International Corporate Governance After Sarbanes-Oxley, 399–421. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119201885.ch19.

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Dolgopyatova, Tatiana G. "Stock Ownership and Corporate Control." In Organization and Development of Russian Business, 39–61. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230249493_3.

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Conference papers on the topic "Corporate Ownership"

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Zhou, Mingwei, and Yupeng Huang. "Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance." In First International Conference Economic and Business Management 2016. Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/febm-16.2016.79.

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Agnese, Paolo, and Francesca Romana Arduino. "The composition of board committees in family firms: Does ownership matter?" In Corporate governance: Theory and practice. Virtus Interpress, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cgtapp1.

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Board committees perform many of the board of directors’ functions, making informed decisions within the framework of delegated authority and providing specific recommendations to the board on the matters in their domain. Their composition draws significant attention from shareholders, as they represent the locus where important decisions are formally taken. The aim of this research is to investigate the role of ownership in designing the board committees in family firms, especially considering the recent quest for sustainable corporate governance that requires sustainability expertise in the board of directors. The relative importance of family owners and institutional investors may be moderated by the presence of family members in the firm management.
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Wu, Jiegang, and Xuemeng Guo. "Ownership Structure, Industry Protection and Corporate Value." In 2018 5th International Conference on Industrial Economics System and Industrial Security Engineering (IEIS). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ieis.2018.8597765.

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Lepore, Luigi Lepore, Assunta Di Vaio, Marco Sorrentino Sorrentino, and Rosa Palladino. "Ownership structures and corporate performance: A literature review." In New challenges in corporate governance: Theory and practice. Virtus Interpress, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/ncpr_35.

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Qi, Yue, Lan Hai-lin, and Jiang Luan. "Ownership Structure, Corporate Status and Corporate Performance in Chinese Business Groups." In 2008 International Conference on Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering (ICIII). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iciii.2008.151.

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Rieg, Robert, and Patrick Ulrich. "The effect of management practice on performance: The moderating role of ownership." In Corporate governance: Fundamental and challenging issues in scholarly research. Virtus Interpress, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cgfcisrp12.

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While scholars agree that ownership matters for firm performance in general, the detailed effects are still debated. We argue that ownership impacts firm performance not only directly but also through implementing different levels of management practice that impact firm performance too. We show that interactions between ownership and management practice have positive and negative effects on firm performance depending on how different owners can exploit the benefits of management practices or not. In that sense, ownership moderates the effect of management practices on performance
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Galavotti, Ilaria, and Carlotta D’Este. "Acquisition propensity in family firms: The multifaceted role of family involvement." In Corporate governance: Theory and practice. Virtus Interpress, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cgtapp17.

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Building on behavioral agency theory, we explore the role played by corporate governance characteristics of family firms in affecting their acquisition propensity. Specifically, we investigate family members’ ownership stake and their appointment to the board of directors as predictors of the likelihood to execute acquisitions. Furthermore, we explore the effect of having a family chief executive officer (CEO) and the generational step. Using a sample of 207 acquisitions executed by 93 Italian listed family firms in the 2014–2020 period, we find evidence that the extent of family ownership does not affect acquisitions propensity. Additionally, while family members on the board are negatively associated with acquisitions, the opposite emerges in case of a family CEO. Finally, the propensity to acquire does not appear to be driven by whether the firm is still in its founding generation or later generations
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Marić, Slobodan, Ozren Uzelac, and Maja Strugar Jelača. "Ownership Structure as a Measure of Corporate Performance." In 24th International Scientific Conference Strategic Management and Decision Support Systems in Strategic Management. University of Novi Sad, Faculty of Economics in Subotica, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.46541/978-86-7233-380-0_27.

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Maly, Milan, and Emil Velinov. "Ownership Structure Impact on Corporate Governance and Performance." In International Days of Statistics and Economics 2019. Libuše Macáková, MELANDRIUM, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.18267/pr.2019.los.186.105.

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Jiang, Yi, Hengrui Li, and Yan Li. "Does Institutional Investor Ownership Influence Corporate Cash Holding?" In 2021 3rd International Conference on Economic Management and Cultural Industry (ICEMCI 2021). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.211209.013.

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Reports on the topic "Corporate Ownership"

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Porta, Rafael La, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, and Andrei Shleifer. Corporate Ownership Around the World. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6625.

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Laeven, Luc, and Ross Levine. Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12675.

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Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, and Luigi Zingales. Corporate Ownership Structures: Private versus Social Optimality. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w5584.

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Lichtenberg, Frank, and George Pushner. Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance in Japan. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w4092.

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Koijen, Ralph S., and Motohiro Yogo. Understanding the Ownership Structure of Corporate Bonds. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w29679.

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Murphy, Antoin. Corporate Ownership in France: The Importance of History. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w10716.

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Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. Management Ownership and Corporate Performance: An Empirical Analysis. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w2055.

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Hogfeldt, Peter. The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in Sweden. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w10641.

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Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w7203.

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Desai, Mihir, Dhammika Dharmapala, and Winnie Fung. Taxation and the Evolution of Aggregate Corporate Ownership Concentration. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w11469.

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