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Journal articles on the topic 'Corporate incentives'

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Author: Grafiati

Published: 10 December 2022

Last updated: 28 January 2023

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1

Tang, Lu, Shihan Zhang, Chenhui Ding, and Jinyao Huan. "How Can the Sustainable Motivational Effect of Equity Incentives on Corporate Performance Be Exploited?—A Study Based on the Moderating Effect of Aspiration Level." Sustainability 14, no. 24 (December 9, 2022): 16485. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su142416485.

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How equity incentives affect corporate performance has become a consensus. However, the question of how to maximize the sustainable incentive effect of equity incentives on corporate performance and avoid “short-sighted” behavior under equity incentives has not yet been resolved. This research re-examines the sustainable incentive of equity incentives and examines the moderating role of aspiration levels based on the behavioral theory of the firm and the prospect theory. Applying panel data comprised 9588 observations from Chinese A-share listed companies spanning the period from 2011 to 2019, this study found that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between equity incentives and corporate performance. Aspiration surplus negatively moderates the curvilinear inverted U-shaped relationship. As the level of aspiration surplus changes from low to high, the curvilinear relationship between equity incentives and corporate performance is weakened. Aspiration loss positively moderates the curvilinear inverted U-shaped relationship. As the level of aspiration loss changes from low to high, the curvilinear relationship between equity incentives and corporate performance is enhanced. This study demonstrates the importance of aspiration level between equity incentives and corporate performance, guiding firms to focus on the implementation scenario as an influencing factor in order to improve the sustainable incentive effect of equity incentives.

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2

Mulia, Rahmi Putri, Herlina Helmy, and Mia Angelina Setiawan. "Equity Risk Incentives dan Corporate Tax Aggresiveness." Wahana Riset Akuntansi 7, no. 1 (June 25, 2019): 1437. http://dx.doi.org/10.24036/wra.v7i1.104567.

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This study aims to examine the equity risk incentives relationship with corporate tax aggressiveness. This study uses four proxies to measure corporate tax aggressiveness variables, namely Cash Effectives Tax Rate (CETR), Tax Shelter, Unrecognized Tax Benefits (UTB), and Discretionary Book Tax Differences (DTAX). The equity risk incentives variable is measured using the annual natural total log of compensation of the key management. The study population was manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2017. The study samples were determined by purposive sampling method so that samples for each CETR, Shelter, UTB and DTAX were obtained were 235, 180, 210 and 205 companies. Based on panel data regression analysis, the results show that 1) Equity Risk Incentive is negatively related to Cash Effectives Tax Rate but not significant, 2) Equity Risk Incentive is positively related to Tax Shelter but not significant, 3) Equity Risk Incentive is negatively related to Unrecognized Tax Benefits not significant, and 4) Equity Risk Incentive is positively related to the Discretionary Book Tax Differences but not significant. The conclusion of this study is that equity risk incentives are not positively related significantly with corporate tax aggressiveness so the hypothesis is rejected.Keywords: Equity Risk Incentives; Tax Aggressiveness

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3

Liu, Baohua, Wan Huang, and Lei Wang. "Performance-based equity incentives, vesting restrictions, and corporate innovation." Nankai Business Review International 10, no. 1 (February 21, 2019): 138–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/nbri-10-2018-0061.

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Purpose Based on the institutional background of mandatory requirement of performance-based executive equity incentives, this paper aims to investigate the impacts of executive equity incentives, vesting periods and vesting performance conditions on corporate innovation. Design/methodology/approach The empirical analysis is based on the detailed data of equity incentives in China’s listed companies from 2006 to 2014, the Tobit method is implemented to estimate the regression coefficients, and the instrumental variable (IV) approach, Heckman two stage regression, propensity score matching and difference-in-difference models are adopted to solve the problem of endogeneity in several robust tests. Findings This paper documents that equity incentives and vesting periods are significantly and positively related to corporate innovation measured by R&D investment and patent applications, yet requirements on vesting performance impede corporate innovative activities. Specifically, compared with non-equity incentive companies, the R&D investment and the number of patent applications of equity incentive companies are 40 and 46.2 per cent higher, respectively. A one year increase in equity incentive duration can correspondingly increase the R&D investment by 15 per cent and the patent applications by 18.3 per cent. However, a one standard deviation increase in industry-adjusted ROE target reduces corporate R&D investment by 5 per cent and the patent applications by 8.39 per cent. The main empirical findings still hold after several robust tests. Research limitations/implications This paper confirms that the impact of performance-based compensation system on corporate innovation depends on its structure. Specifically, the empirical findings suggest that equity incentive plans being correctly designed can enhance corporate innovative activities, but myopic managers will damage the corporate innovation. Originality/value This paper investigates the influence of equity incentive structure on equity incentive effect based on the institutional background of mandatory requirement of performance-based executive equity incentives. It provides an opportunity to understand the mystery of equity incentives, which helps to enrich the structure of equity incentive theoretically. The empirical evidence confirms the importance of tolerating short-term failure and extending the horizon of managerial decision-making on promoting innovation. Overall, the research indicates that only well-designed equity incentive plans can promote innovation, which contributes to regulators and practitioners to form a rational understanding of the premise of equity incentives in promoting innovation and provides a reference for their decision-making.

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4

Chee, Seungmin, Wooseok Choi, and Jae Eun Shin. "The Non-Linear Relationship Between CEO Compensation Incentives And Corporate Tax Avoidance." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 33, no. 3 (April 28, 2017): 439–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v33i3.9935.

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This study examines the effect of CEO compensation incentives on corporate tax avoidance. Unlike prior literature that assumes a monotonic relation between executive compensation incentives and tax avoidance, we find a non-linear relation between the two. Specifically, we find that CEO compensation incentives exhibit a positive relation with corporate tax avoidance at low levels of compensation incentives, whereas they show a negative relation at high levels of compensation incentives. We further find that the non-linear relationship between CEO compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance does not exist for the subsample of S&P500 firms. Collectively, we provide evidence of the two counter effective forces, namely, - the incentive alignment effect and the risk-reducing effect, - that help explain the effect of CEO compensation incentives on tax avoidance.

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5

Li, Shujia. "Research on the impact of equity incentives on corporate tax avoidance." BCP Business & Management 21 (July 20, 2022): 14–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v21i.1169.

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Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper selects the data of China's A - share listed companies from 2008 to 2021 as the research sample, to empirically explore the impact of equity incentives on corporate tax avoidance. The result shows that equity incentives can promote corporate tax avoidance, agency cost is an important way for equity incentives to influence on corporate tax avoidance, overseas business significantly promotes the tax avoidance effect of equity incentive, and considering the nature of property rights , equity incentives promote tax avoidance of state-owned enterprises, the role is weaker than that of non-state-owned enterprises .Based on the regression results, it is necessary to grasp the focus of tax inspection, improve the tax law and develop mixed ownership economy.

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6

Huang, Yizhe, and Yaning Xing. "Equity Incentive and Firm Value: Evidence from the Chinese Stock Market based on Panel Regression Model." BCP Business & Management 26 (September 19, 2022): 761–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v26i.2036.

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Nowadays, more and more firms use equity incentives to encourage executives to improve firm value. In order to have a better understanding of it, this article analyzes the relationship between the equity incentives and the firm value. Based on agency theory and management incentive plan, we explore the influence of corporate equity incentives on corporate value. We download data of A-share listed companies in China’s two big Exchanges. In our process, panel regression model is set to prove our point. Our financial data come from CSMAR database and relevant data from the Wind financial terminal. After using Stata and calculating, we get 15,556 firm -year observation value, and our results show that in those companies, the implementation of corporate equity incentives will significantly promote corporate value improvement, and this relationship is still significantly established after experiencing A series of robustness. Further, there also provides us data to analyze four different types of companies. The result shows that the positive effect of equity incentives is greater in state-owned enterprises, enterprises audited by the Big Four auditors, enterprises with a high proportion of shares held by institutional investors, and companies with high growth. This paper provides support for the positive effect of the current equity incentive. At the same time, our analysis of different types of companies provides a basis for future research on a particular type.

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7

Zhang, Weiying. "China’s SOE reform: A corporate governance perspective." Corporate Ownership and Control 3, no. 4 (2006): 132–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i4p14.

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This paper argues that Chinese state enterprise reform has been relatively successful in solving the short-term managerial incentive problem through both its formal, explicit incentive mechanism and its informal, implicit incentive mechanism. However, it has failed to solve the long-term managerial incentive problem and the management selection problem. An incumbent manager may have incentives to make short-term (but hidden) profits, but at present there is no mechanism to ensure that only qualified people will be selected for management. The fundamental reason is that managers of SOEs are selected by bureaucrats rather than capitalists. Since bureaucrats have the authority to select managers but do not need bear the consequences of their selection, they have no proper incentives to find and appoint high ability people. Since good performance does not guarantee that the incumbent manager will stay long, the manager does not have long-term incentives. The paper also argues that these built-in problems of state ownership cannot be solved by state-dominated corporatization. Bankruptcy has not played a role in disciplining managers because the state-owned banks have neither the incentive nor the ability to enforce debt contracts. To ensure that only high ability people will be professional managers and that managers can be well disciplined, the authority of selecting management must be transferred from bureaucrats to capitalists. This calls for privatization of both state enterprises and state banks. China is well on its way to privatization of state enterprises, but privatization of state banks is yet to come

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8

Addison, Prue F. E., and Joseph W. Bull. "Conservation accord: Corporate incentives." Science 360, no. 6394 (June 14, 2018): 1195.3–1196. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.aau0788.

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9

Arshad, Roshayani, Faizah Darus, and Dennis Taylor. "Board composition, mimetic behaviour and corporate voluntary disclosures." Corporate Board role duties and composition 4, no. 3 (2008): 16–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv4i3art2.

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This study examines the effects of board composition and mimetic behaviour on the extent and credibility of corporate voluntary disclosure. The investigation is based on the annual reports of 155 Malaysian listed companies during the period when these companies faced new corporate governance regulation. This study provides evidence that under the influence of dominant owners on board, management voluntary disclosure decisions are driven by incentives to conform when their company is structured to meet expectations of good corporate governance. Such incentive seems to override incentives to disclose credible information to outside investors.

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10

Deden Tarmidi, Agustin Fadjarenie, and Lin Oktris. "Corporate Tax Policy: Impact Tunnelling Incentive, Debt Covenant, And Transfer Pricing." Jurnal Akuntansi 27, no. 1 (January 12, 2023): 157–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.24912/ja.v27i1.1249.

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Transfer pricing is considered one of the corporate policies for minimizing the tax burden. This study aims to analyze the role of transfer pricing in the influence of tunnelling incentives and debt covenants on corporate tax policy. Manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange are unit analyses in this study. Their 398-panel data after purposive sampling. Using STATA, this study found that tunnelling incentives are used in transfer pricing activities, while debt covenant and transfer pricing are used in management in tax policies. Meanwhile, debt covenant is not widely used in the transfer pricing scheme, and tunnelling incentive also does not affect management on corporate tax policy. The mediating role of transfer pricing is not found in the indirect effect of tunnelling incentives and debt covenants on corporate tax policy. This result explains that transfer pricing and debt covenants are commonly used by companies in their tax policy.

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11

Wang, Qian, Heshan Guan, and Rongrong Deng. "An Empirical Study on the Relationship between Enterprise Risk Management and Corporate Value—From the Perspective of Top Executives Incentives." International Journal of Business and Management 12, no. 1 (December 28, 2016): 228. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v12n1p228.

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Top executives incentives and risk management are important contents of corporate governance research. However, few empirical data studies of risk management take top level manager incentives economic benefit into account, and the executive incentives effectiveness is unclear in most studies, the paper collected empirical data of listed companies in financial industry in 2008-2013, and we found a inverted “U” shaped non-linear curve exists from the relationship between ERM and corporate value, when it exceeds a certain level, ERM will come into being an significantly diminishing marginal effect. Secondly, when the degree of top executives incentives become weak, on the contrary, the risk management behaviors will happen with increasing frequency and improve reflected coefficients between enterprise value and ERM, and it’s contributive to raise enterprise value. However, this influence is weak and not significant for executive equity incentive. The empirical results provide some references for the financial enterprise risk management application and the practice of executive incentive.

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12

Akinina, Ksenia O., and Olga A. Rasskazova. "Features of Personnel Motivation and Incentivization in the Electric Power Industry." Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Ekonomika, no. 55 (2021): 89–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/19988648/55/6.

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The article discusses the role of human resources in the efficiency of an organization. Employees influence the result of the company’s activities and make the company competitive in the market. The authors consider incentives as part of the HR management system and analyze the relationships between an incentive scheme and labor productivity, an incentive scheme and staff turnover, an incentive scheme and competitiveness. The authors note the importance of the electric power industry in the economy of the Russian Federation, investigate the labor market in electrical engineering in St. Petersburg, and determine a range of problems. Incentives are classified into types. The incentive system of the enterprise includes material incentives and non-material incentives. Material incentives are divided into material monetary incentives and material non-monetary incentives. Material monetary incentives consist of basic wages and additional wages. Material non-monetary incentives are material benefits and rights, as well as non-monetary forms of remuneration. Features of material incentives in the industry are noted. Enterprises in the industry use a lot of material incentives. The study shows that the majority of workers in the electric power industry are satisfied with the material incentives. Non-material incentives consist of moral incentives, organizational incentives, and work time incentives. Systematic informing of staff, organization of corporate events, official recognition of achievements, and regulation of relationships in the team are moral incentives. Improving the quality of employees’ working life, managing an employee’s career, involving the team in the management process, and organizing labor competitions are organizational incentives. Provision of additional rest time, establishment of flexible working hours, and use of flexible forms of employment are work time incentives. Features of non-material incentives for personnel in the electric power industry are analyzed. Leading enterprises of the electric power industry use company websites to inform staff. Organization of corporate events is a common incentivization method at Russian enterprises. Sports activities are most effective for increasing productivity. Enterprises of the industry do not organize creative competitions, but such competitions are necessary for satisfying the need in the implementation of employees’ creative abilities. Official recognition of merit in the power industry is manifested in the placement of the best employees’ photos on the honor board and in the granting of awards. Relationships in the team are regulated by codes of corporate ethics. The results of a special assessment of jobs at enterprises of the industry demonstrate that there are no optimal working conditions in the electric power industry. Practice shows that the opportunity of career advancement depends on the scale of the enterprise: the larger the number of staff, the more ramified the management structure and the more opportunities for career advancement. Involvement of teams in the management is difficult due the large number of enterprises in the industry. Labor competitions for teams are organized, and they are very efficient for the industry. Enterprises do not give work time incentives. The authors make recommendations on how to use various incentives at enterprises of the energy industry and name the factors influencing the incentive system.

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13

Lokman, Norziana, Julie Cotter, and Joseph Mula. "Corporate governance quality, incentive factors and voluntary corporate governance disclosures in annual reports of Malaysian publicly listed companies." Corporate Ownership and Control 10, no. 1 (2012): 329–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv10i1c3art3.

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This paper investigates the relationship between corporate governance quality and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information for listed companies in Malaysia. The moderating impacts of incentive factors (capital market transactions and stock-based incentives) on this relationship are also examined. Corporate governance quality is measured using a comprehensive index. The empirical evidence of this study is broadly consistent with the notion that high corporate governance quality is positively related to a greater extent of voluntary disclosure. Stock-based compensation significantly influences the relationship between corporate governance quality and voluntary disclosures; however the other incentive factors examined do not appear to influence the relationship

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14

Jones, Peter T. "Sanctions, Incentives, and Corporate Behavior." California Management Review 27, no. 3 (April 1985): 119–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/41165146.

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15

Noe, Thomas H. "Corporate Finance, Incentives, and Strategy." Financial Review 35, no. 4 (November 2000): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6288.2000.tb01426.x.

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16

Nguyen, Tu. "CEO Incentives and Corporate Innovation." Financial Review 53, no. 2 (April 2, 2018): 255–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/fire.12144.

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17

Hausman, Catherine. "Corporate Incentives and Nuclear Safety." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 6, no. 3 (August 1, 2014): 178–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.6.3.178.

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Following electricity market restructuring, approximately half of all commercial US nuclear power reactors were sold by price-regulated public utilities to independent power producers. At the time of the sales, some policymakers raised concerns that these corporations would ignore safety. Others claimed that the sales would bring improved reactor management, with positive effects on safety. Using data on various safety measures and a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, I find that safety improved following ownership transfers and the removal of price regulations. Generation increased, and this does not appear to have come at the cost of public safety. (JEL D24, L51, L94, L98, Q42, Q48)

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18

Sung, Jaeyoung. "Corporate Insurance and Managerial Incentives." Journal of Economic Theory 74, no. 2 (June 1997): 297–332. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2260.

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19

Haß, Lars Helge, Maximilian A. Müller, and Skrålan Vergauwe. "Tournament incentives and corporate fraud." Journal of Corporate Finance 34 (October 2015): 251–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.07.008.

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20

Yan, Qian, and Hong Yan Liu. "Design Mechanism on Dynamic Incentive Machnism Considering Special Talents of the Manager." Advanced Materials Research 664 (February 2013): 1191–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.664.1191.

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Suppose the firm's output is influenced by the agent’s effort level observable and the ability unobservable, researching the optimal level of incentives under the two levels of incentives associated. Study found that corporate client based on the first period of corporate performance, the agents ability to judge the case, risk aversion, the variance of the degree of capacity, the degree of attention of the principal agents the ability have an impact on the agents first and second of the optimal incentive level. In addition, of the optimal incentive level in first period is correlated with the contribution of the efforts with the manager of the firm's output, the agent's incentive level in the second period as well as the effort cost associated of the first period; while the second period of the optimal the incentive level is a decreasing function of the current cost of effort.

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21

Huston, G. Ryan, and Thomas J. Smith. "The Impact of Tax Incentives on the Choice to Hold Shares Acquired from Employee Stock Option Exercises." Journal of the American Taxation Association 34, no. 2 (March 1, 2012): 67–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/atax-50173.

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ABSTRACT This paper extends prior stock option literature by examining the impact of individual and corporate tax incentives on the decision to hold or sell shares acquired through the exercises of incentive stock options (ISOs) and non-qualified stock options (NQSOs). We focus on factors found in prior literature to be associated with the choice to hold or sell in the context of the type of stock option exercised. Specifically, we find that the positive (negative) relation found in prior literature between the decision to hold shares following exercise and future returns (depth) is associated more with NQSOs than ISOs, consistent with individual tax incentives. Examining corporate tax incentives, we find that corporate tax benefits mitigate insiders' likelihood to hold shares obtained from ISO exercise. Furthermore, we find evidence that firms compensate employees to forgo individual tax benefits associated with holding shares from ISO exercise, and as this compensation increases, insiders are more likely to sell following exercise. JEL Classifications: H24; H25; J33.

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22

Kuria, John Njoroge, Dr Bernard Omboi, and Dr George Achoki. "THE EFFECT OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX INCENTIVE ON THE PERFORMANCE OF EPZ FIRMS IN KENYA." International Journal of Finance and Accounting 2, no. 5 (August 29, 2017): 43. http://dx.doi.org/10.47604/ijfa.447.

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The contemporary world is characterized with intergovernmental competition for the sole purpose of attracting multinational companies and this has made fiscal incentives to become a global phenomenon. Poor African countries rely on tax holidays and import duty exemptions, while industrial western European countries allow investment allowances or accelerated depreciation. It is for this reason that this study intended to investigate the influence of effect of corporate income tax incentive on the performance of EPZ firms in Kenya. The research design was correlation research design. Correlation research design was best suited since panel data was used. Census survey was adopted because the population of interest was small. A sample size of all the 86 registered EPZs firms was used in this study. Primary data was obtained using questionnaires. Secondary data from the registered firms was collected on; ROA, number and value of jobs and the length of stay of the firms. The study used both descriptive and inferential statistics to conduct data analysis. The results of study revealed that at 5% significance level, corporate income tax incentives had a positive and significant relationship with performance of EPZ firms measured using ROA. The results further revealed that at 5% significance level corporate income tax incentives were found to have positive and significant effect on number of jobs by EPZ firms and length of stay. The study concluded that increase in corporate income incentive led to an increase in the ROA, number of jobs and length of stay of the EPZ firms in Kenya. The study recommended that stakeholders in tax policy should reconsider the economic value of corporate tax incentive.

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23

Ding, Lili, Zhongchao Zhao, and Lei Wang. "Executive Incentives Matter for Corporate Social Responsibility under Earnings Pressure and Institutional Investors Supervision." Sustainability 12, no. 6 (March 22, 2020): 2492. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12062492.

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This paper theoretically explores the impact of the incentive preferences of executives (i.e., short-term incentives and long-term incentives) on corporate social responsibility (CSR) decisions (i.e., institutional CSR and technical CSR). Further, the paper presents the mechanism through which executives influence CSR activities by the pressures from financial analysts and institutional investors supervision. Using a large sample of China-listed firms over 2007–2017, we achieve some helpful empirical results. The executives with short-term incentives tend to implement technical CSR strategy, while those with long-term incentives tend to implement institutional CSR strategy. Executives with short-term incentives, compared with those with long-term incentives, show stronger inter-temporal tradeoffs behaviors in the earnings pressure context. Furthermore, dedicated institutional investors can effectively attenuate the hypocritical behaviors of executives, and the effectiveness of governance shows a positive relationship with investors’ horizon. Our findings enrich the understanding on the relationship between the executives and CSR decisions in the earnings pressure context and further helps to perfect the institutional design in China’s listed companies.

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24

Thom, Michael. "Do State Corporate Tax Incentives Create Jobs? Quasi-experimental Evidence from the Entertainment Industry." State and Local Government Review 51, no. 2 (June 2019): 92–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0160323x19877232.

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Policy makers allocate billions of dollars each year to tax incentives that increasingly favor creative industries. This study scrutinizes that approach by examining motion picture incentive programs used in over thirty states to encourage film and television production. It uses a quasi-experimental strategy to determine whether those programs have contributed to employment growth. Results mostly show no statistically significant effects. Results also indicate that domestic employment is unaffected by competing incentives offered outside the United States. These findings are robust to several alternative models and should lead policy makers to question the wisdom of targeted incentives conferred on creative industries.

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25

Ermasova, N. B. "Tax Reform of Corporate Income Tax on State Level in the USA." Izvestiya of Saratov University. Economics. Management. Law 13, no. 2 (2013): 127–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.18500/1994-2540-2013-13-2-127-132.

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Introduction. In proposing reforms for the corporate income taxation, it is necessary to consider the incentives generated by the current system of taxation and the effects that changing those incentives would have the significant impact on the economic behavior. Analysis. This paper proves that economic development policies and reform of income corporate taxation can significantly affects the growth of a state area, that increases in the growth of a local economy can benefits the overall national economy. Corporate income taxation can hinder the competitiveness of domestic industry by discouraging local investment in favor of investment in areas where corporate income tax rates are lower or where the tax is not levied. There are the examples of tax reforms of corporate income tax in States of Kansas, North Caroline, Michigan. Conclusion. This paper shows that R&D tax credits and State Business Tax Incentive Programs have significant and positive impacts on the growth of high-technology sector in the states.

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Chen, Jiahao, Zhelin Fan, and Yinhan Guo. "The Impact of Equity Incentives on Idiosyncratic Risk: Evidence from the Panel Regression Analysis." BCP Business & Management 27 (September 6, 2022): 69–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v27i.1953.

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Idiosyncratic risk of listed firms has attracted the attention of a series of researchers. Using the data of A-share listed firms in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, we examine the impact of equity incentives on listed firms’ idiosyncratic risks. Based on the panel regression model and fixed effects model, we find that the degree of equity incentives is positively correlated with idiosyncratic risk. This correlation is robust to a series of robustness checks including the use of alternative samples and the inclusion of some possibly omitted variables. Further analysis shows that equity incentives would not infect the idiosyncratic risk of SOE companies, but have a significant and positive impact on the idiosyncratic risk of non-SOE companies; the impact of equity incentives is more pronounced to the firms with better corporate governance, which have Big-4 auditors and more analysts. These findings provide support to the notion that equity incentive is positively associated with corporate idiosyncratic risk.

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27

Ahn, Ji-Young. "Top Executives’ Pay For Long-Run Performance And Corporate Governance." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 32, no. 2 (March 1, 2016): 661. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v32i2.9602.

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This study examines the possibility that the quality of corporate governance has effects on the dynamic relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. Building on the dynamic view of CEO pay and firm performance and corporate governance literature, we find that firms with weak corporate governance are more likely to provide high powered long-run incentives to CEOs, indicating CEO incentive contracts can be replaced by the role of external corporate control when the external control mechanism is not functioning effectively from the optimal contracting view. Overall, the findings imply that firm’s governance mechanism can generate cross-sectional variations in CEO long-term incentive contracts.

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28

Johnson, Derek W. "Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter." CFA Digest 39, no. 3 (August 2009): 16–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/dig.v39.n3.39.

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29

Johnson, Shane A., Harley E. Ryan, and Yisong S. Tian. "Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter*." Review of Finance 13, no. 1 (May 9, 2008): 115–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfn014.

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30

Bolton, Brian. "Incentives vs. entrenchment: a comparison of competing governance mechanisms." Corporate Ownership and Control 7, no. 1 (2009): 204–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv7i1c1p5.

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This study explores the relationships between firm performance and the incentive and entrenchment effects of corporate governance structures. It analyzes whether the benefits of providing stock ownership to directors are greater than the potential costs of entrenching officers and directors. Using the dollar amount of stock owned by various classes of directors, the results suggest that the incentive effect dominates any costs related to entrenchment: firms with greater stock ownership outperform other firms, regardless of the degree of managerial entrenchment that may be present. This result is robust to firm size, growth opportunities, time period, and other controls. The implication for policy-makers is that providing directors with incentives through stock ownership remains a very effective corporate governance mechanism.

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31

Webb, Natalie J. "Tax Incentives for Corporate Giving Programs:." Administration in Social Work 20, no. 3 (July 29, 1996): 39–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/j147v20n03_03.

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Denis, David J., Diane K. Denis, and Atulya Sarin. "MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES." Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 10, no. 2 (June 1997): 72–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.1997.tb00137.x.

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O'Byrne, Stephen, and David Young. "Top Management Incentives and Corporate Performance." Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 17, no. 4 (September 2005): 105–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2005.00064.x.

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Agha, Mahmoud. "Leverage, executive incentives and corporate governance." Accounting & Finance 53, no. 1 (October 25, 2011): 1–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-629x.2011.00450.x.

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Col, Burcin, Rose Liao, and Stefan Zeume. "Corporate Inversions: Going beyond Tax Incentives." Review of Corporate Finance Studies 9, no. 1 (October 10, 2019): 165–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfz007.

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Abstract We study tax and nontax incentives for corporate inversions in a hand-collected data set of 691 inversions out of 11 home countries into 45 host destinations over the 1996–2013 period. Even though lower tax rates generally attract inversions, only 2 of 5 firms invert into tax havens, and two-thirds of firms invert into host destinations with lower statutory tax rates than those faced at home. Moreover, firms invert to geographically close destinations with similar governance standards. Using staggered country-pair-level policy changes as experiments, we find that host-country governance may explain why not all firms invert. Received December 6, 2018; Editorial decision August 12, 2019 by Editor Andrew Ellul.

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Edgerton, Jesse. "Investment incentives and corporate tax asymmetries." Journal of Public Economics 94, no. 11-12 (December 2010): 936–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.08.010.

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Koethenbuerger, Marko, and Michael Stimmelmayr. "Corporate deductibility provisions and managerial incentives." Journal of Public Economics 111 (March 2014): 120–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.002.

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Brown, Keith C., Amy Dittmar, and Henri Servaes. "Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Industry Consolidations." Review of Financial Studies 18, no. 1 (April 2, 2004): 241–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhh009.

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Armstrong, Christopher S., Jennifer L. Blouin, Alan D. Jagolinzer, and David F. Larcker. "Corporate governance, incentives, and tax avoidance." Journal of Accounting and Economics 60, no. 1 (August 2015): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.02.003.

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Banerjee, Ajeyo, and James E. Owers. "Managerial incentives and corporate control auctions." Managerial and Decision Economics 14, no. 4 (July 1993): 295–309. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.4090140403.

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Johnston, Andrew. "Reforming English Company Law to Promote Sustainable Companies." European Company Law 11, Issue 2 (April 1, 2014): 63–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eucl2014011.

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English company law already gives company directors scope to take account of sustainability in their decision-making, but corporate governance gives them strong incentives not to do so. This article argues that English company law should require directors to identify and internalise the company's externalities and that corporate governance, which incentivises the pursuit of short-term shareholder value, must be reformed

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Sun, Hongfeng, and Chang Liu. "Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Corporate Environmental Performance: Evidence from China." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 20, no. 2 (January 13, 2023): 1467. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20021467.

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In the context of corporate sustainability, studies on the role that managerial incentives play in improving corporate environmental performance have so far focused on incentives provided either to executives and senior managers or to plant managers. However, few studies have considered the role of employee incentives. Drawing on the opportunity provided by the China Securities Regulatory Commission in restarting employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) in 2014, this paper investigates the impact of employee incentives on environmental performance of high-polluting enterprises. The results indicate that ESOPs are significantly positively related to corporate environmental performance. The positive effect is particularly pronounced in subsamples with weak free-riding problems, high human capital quality, and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). Further analysis reveals that ESOPs improve corporate environmental performance through enhancing productivity and green technology. Overall, this paper reveals the micro-mechanisms behind the actual effects of employee incentives on corporate environmental management, thus providing timely implications for high-polluting enterprises to improve environmental performance.

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Zakharova, D. S. "TWO-WAY ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYER IN CORPORATE ACTIVITIES." Juvenis Scientia, no. 4 (2019): 21–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.32415/jscientia.2019.04.05.

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The article examines the problem of motivation at the stage of corporate training and advanced training for the development of two-way engagement between employee and employer. The author points out that involvement required from two sides: on behalf of the employee to become more successful, to obtain a result that is objectively measured criteria - the level of wages or the receipt of financial incentives. Involvement on behalf of employer is searching of specific methods and tools, which together will lead to effective motivation of the employee. As the successful operation of such models in the field of material employees' remuneration the article considers foreign experience. Objective criterion - the comparison of wages of foreign countries and Russia allows to make a conclusion that Russia occupies a low position on the level of wages and material incentives is rarely used and is not flexible. In practice, the employer focused on the minimum wage, leaving the incentive part of the wages at their discretion. Thus, developing mechanisms using a model material incentives, the employer motivates employees and potential who have trained for involvement in the work and labour efficiency.

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Ruehl, Christopher Hendrik, and Diana Ingenhoff. "Communication management 2.0." Journal of Communication Management 21, no. 2 (May 2, 2017): 170–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jcom-07-2016-0056.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate how and why individuals use corporate pages on Facebook with the aim of developing a usage-specific inventory of incentive factors which describe brand page utilization for consumption, participation and production behavior. Design/methodology/approach A combined perspective of uses-and-gratifications (U&G) and social cognitive theory (SCT) was applied to develop three models of brand page behavior. Based on a literature review, an online survey (N=215) was conducted. Exploratory factor analyses identified motivational factors based on SCT incentive dimensions, which were cross-validated using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Findings Results indicate that consumption behavior can best be explained by activity, self-reactive-novel and monetary incentives. Status incentives, practical-novel and self-reactive-idealistic incentives drive participation. Production behavior is best explained by social, self-reactive and status incentives. Practical implications The models’ strategic implications for integrated communication management are discussed. Originality/value The results suggest interconnections of incentive dimensions unique to brand page usage, which have not yet been explored in any research.

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Đurović Todorović, J. N., M. S. Đorđević, and M. B. Ristić Cakić. "Do the Effective Tax Incentives Reduce Tax Revenues? Investigating the Paradox of Corporate Income Tax in Serbia." Journal of Tax Reform 8, no. 2 (2022): 108–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/jtr.2022.8.2.111.

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The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of tax incentives as determinants of economic development on revenues from corporate income tax in Serbia. The study uses data from secondary resources of the Ministry of Finance for the period 2007–2018 by employing regression and factor analysis. The research includes 10 tax incentives that were used in Serbia in the analyzed period. The methodology of empirical verification involves the implementation of correlation analysis, regression analysis and factor analysis. We opted for the application of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) because this method extracts the important data in order to present a set of new variables called main components. The model obtained in this way formed the determined components of tax incentives as independent variables. The model considers tax incentives grouped into four components. The results of empirical research indicate that there is a positive impact of certain tax incentives on revenues from corporate income tax and proved the paradox of tax collection initiated by tax incentives. The model proved that tax incentives explaining the first component had a positive effect on revenues from corporate income tax. Namely, the incentives for investments, incentives exempting the taxpayer from paying corporate income tax for work training, professional rehabilitation and employment of disabled persons, as well as a reduction based on the elimination of double taxation have a positive effect on revenues from corporate income tax. The positive impact of tax incentives can be explained by their effectiveness. The results show that tax incentives policy must be defined in detail for the purpose of achieving the economic and social goals.

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Drymiotes, George C. "Information Precision and Manipulation Incentives." Journal of Management Accounting Research 23, no. 1 (December 1, 2011): 231–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-10067.

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ABSTRACT Recent corporate governance failures have prompted regulators and legislators to introduce new rules and legislation aimed at improving corporate governance. In this paper, I highlight a potential unintended consequence of such actions by showing that increasing oversight may sometimes be the catalyst for more manipulation. The key behind this result is the managers' potential ability to undermine oversight through manipulation choices. Absent an interaction between manipulation choices and oversight efficacy, increasing oversight results in less manipulation. JEL Classifications: D80; G34; M40.

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Yan, Yaqian. "Study on the Effectiveness of Equity Incentive Models Affecting Internal Control." Highlights in Business, Economics and Management 1 (November 28, 2022): 333–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/hbem.v1i.2673.

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The article studies how the equity incentive affects the effectiveness of internal control of listed companies by taking Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2016 as a sample and using the Shenzhen Dibo internal control index of listed companies from 2011 to 2016 to measure the effectiveness of internal control of listed companies. The following three questions are discussed: (1) Whether the impact of equity incentive model on the effectiveness of internal control is positive? (2) Whether the impact of equity incentive intensity on the effectiveness of internal control is nonlinear? In other words, whether there is excess incentive? (3) Is there any difference in the impact of equity incentives between state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises? The study found: The use of equity incentives has a positive effect on the effectiveness of the internal control of the company. When the incentive is excessive, it will result in over-incentives, that is, the greater the incentive, the less effective the internal control of the company. The relationship between incentives and the effectiveness of corporate internal control is inverted U-shaped. Different from the viewpoint of the existing literature, the study found that equity incentives in state-owned enterprises can further enhance the effectiveness of internal control. The results of the study show that although most people think equity incentives are conducive to reducing agency problems and increasing the effectiveness of internal control, it is still necessary to control the strength of equity incentive and prevent it from backfiring, which helps firms to reduce the conflict of interests between principles and agents.

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Harelimana, Jean Bosco. "Effect of Corporate Income Tax Incentives on Investment in Rwanda." Management and Organizational Studies 5, no. 4 (November 30, 2018): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/mos.v5n4p1.

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The purpose of this study was to establish the effect of corporate income tax incentives on investment using privatesector manufacturing companies in Kigali special economic zone, Rwanda. The study adopted descriptive researchdesign and the study population comprised of thirty-nine manufacturing companies in free zone in Rwanda which areregistered by the private sector. The sample size comprised of 36 private companies determined from a totalpopulation of 39 companies. Only two employees that are acquainted with decision making from each manufacturingcompanies registered by the private sector were targeted hence the target population respondents was 72 respondents.The Stratified random sampling technique was used to select the respondents. Data was collected from both primaryand secondary data using questionnaires and documentation. The findings in the study revealed that tax incentiveshave significant positive effect on investment in private sector manufacturing companies in Rwanda. The p -valuesfor all the variables are lower than 5% this implies that are significant. From the study the p-values are 0.009, 0.000,0.003 and 0.000 for company income tax, capital allowance, value added tax and capital gains tax incentivesrespectively. The capital allowance incentive has the highest t value of 4.656, followed by company income taxincentives with 3.954, and next is capital gains tax incentives with 3.184, while the lowest is the value added taxincentives with 2.954. Based on the empirical evidences and results of the analysis, there is positive and statisticallysignificant relationship between the tax incentives and investments. The study recommends that Government andpolicy makers should concentrate on efforts at ensuring that more CIT incentives and strategies that are specificallyaddressing small and medium enterprises are introduced.

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Shabeeb Ali, Mohamed A., Hazem Ramadan Ismael, and Ahmed H. Ahmed. "Equity incentives, earnings management and corporate governance: Empirical evidence using UK panel data." Corporate Ownership and Control 17, no. 2 (2020): 104–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv17i2art10.

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Using a UK panel data set drawn from 1675 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) year observations and 1540 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) year observations, we examine the relationship between CEO and CFO equity incentives and earnings management. In addition, we examine the moderation effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between executives’ equity incentives and earnings management. We use multivariate regression models to test our hypotheses. We find that CEO equity incentives are related to higher absolute and income increasing earnings management. These results support the managerial power theory argument that CEOs exploit equity-linked compensation to obtain more personal benefits without causing public anger. Contrary to CEO equity incentives, we could not find any significant relationship between CFO equity incentives and any of the earnings management proxies. In addition, we find that corporate governance quality (measured by individual mechanisms and overall index) has no effect on the relationship between executives’ equity incentives and earnings management. This result indicates that whereas some corporate governance mechanisms can reduce earnings management in general, they do not affect wealth driven incentives to manipulate accruals. In total, results question the effectiveness of the corporate governance system in mitigating opportunistic behavior motivated by executives’ compensation structures

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Ortiz-Molina, Hernan. "Top Management Incentives and the Pricing of Corporate Public Debt." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41, no. 2 (June 2006): 317–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109000002088.

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AbstractThis article examines managerial ownership structure and at-issue yield spreads on corporate bonds. There is a positive relation between managerial ownership and borrowing costs, and this relation is weaker at higher levels of ownership. In addition, managerial stock options have a larger effect on yield spreads than stock ownership. These effects exist after controlling for firm and bond characteristics, and are robust to endogeneity and sample selection concerns. The evidence suggests that rational bondholders price new debt issues using the information about a firm's future risk choices contained in managerial incentive structures, and that lenders anticipate higher risk-taking incentives from managerial stock options than from equity ownership.

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