Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Corporate incentives'
To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Corporate incentives.
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 dissertations / theses for your research on the topic 'Corporate incentives.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse dissertations / theses on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Novaes, Walter. "Managerial incentives and corporate control." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/12595.
Full text
2
Amiot, André, and Johansson Fredrik Hallin. "Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance and CEO compenastion incentives." Thesis, Högskolan i Gävle, Företagsekonomi, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hig:diva-28334.
Full textAbstract:
Society's awareness of the importance of environmental-, social- and economic issues has increased over the last decades. This increased interest has led to the development of the Corporate Social Responsibility concept (CSR) in which companies actively work simultaneously with environmental, social and economic issues that extend beyond what is legally required by these companies in order to achieve a more sustainable society. As the interest in CSR has increased, a debate whether CSR is value-creating or should be considered an agency cost has arisen. To approach this question previous researches have used the CEO compensation to examine if the engagement in CSR actually is an agency cost or a value creating activity and found that agency costs can be mitigated by tying incentives to performance. Based on these assumptions this study will examine the link between CSR and agency costs using the existence of a CSR related compensation incentives for CEOs related agency costs. This study is characterized to be positivistic and within the field of positive accounting research as it has deductive approach in which hypotheses are formulated that this study intends to test which are based on what fundamental economic theories and previous research have found that may affect agency costs. The empirical data are manually collected from companies’ on NasdaqOMX Stockholm 2016 annual reports followed by an analysis of the data using univariate t-test and multiple regressions in order to relate these findings to previous research. This study finds no direct evidence that CEO compensation incentives related to CSR affect agency costs which means that we have not closed the ongoing debate whether CSR engagement is creating shareholder value or should be considered an agency cost. Nonetheless, the results show indications that agency costs are higher for companies that use CEO compensation incentives related to CSR which indicates that CSR is not beneficial to shareholders but should instead be regarded as an agency cost at the expense of shareholders. The result also indicates that a positive accounting research is not particularly useful on a small stock market with reliable results because the findings can not be generalized in a broader perspective
3
Li, Xinping. "Managerial incentives, capital structure and corporate governance /." May be available electronically:, 2008. http://proquest.umi.com/login?COPT=REJTPTU1MTUmSU5UPTAmVkVSPTI=&clientId=12498.
Full text
4
Covas, Francisco. "Managerial incentives, corporate investment, and economic preference /." Diss., Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC campuses, 2004. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3130203.
Full text
5
Amadeus, Musa. "Essays on the Corporate Implications of Compensation Incentives." Thesis, Boston College, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104367.
Full textAbstract:
Thesis advisor: Ronnie SadkaThis dissertation is comprised of three essays which examine the ramifications of executive compensation incentive structures on corporate outcomes. In the first essay, I present evidence which suggests that executive compensation convexity, measured as the sensitivity of managerial equity compensation portfolios to stock volatility, predicts firm-specific crashes. I find that a bottom-to-top decile change in compensation convexity results in a 21% increase in a firm's unconditional ex-post idiosyncratic crash risk. In contrast, I do not find robust evidence of a symmetric relation between compensation convexity and a firm's idiosyncratic positive jump risk. Finally, I exploit exogenous variation in compensation convexity, arising from a change in the expensing treatment of executive stock options, in buttressing my interpretations within a natural experiment setting. My results suggest that managerial equity compensation portfolios do not augment a firm's future idiosyncratic crash risk because they link managerial wealth to equity prices, but rather because they tie managerial wealth to the volatility of a firm's equity. In the second essay, I exploit an exogenous negative shock to CEO compensation convexity in examining the differential ramifications of option pay and risk-taking incentives on the systematic and idiosyncratic volatility of the firm. I find new evidence that is largely consistent with the notion that compensation convexity, stemming from option convexity, predominantly incentivizes under-diversified risk-averse CEOs to increase the value of their option portfolios by increasing the systematic volatility of the firms they manage. I hypothesize that this effect manifests as systematic volatility is readily more hedgeable than idiosyncratic volatility from the perspective of risk-averse executives who are overexposed to the idiosyncratic risk of their firms. If managers use options as a conduit through which they can gamble with shareholder wealth by overexposing them to suboptimal systematic volatility, options are not serving their intended contracting function. Instead of decreasing agency costs of risk, by encouraging CEOs to adopt innovative positive NPV projects that may be primarily characterized by idiosyncratic risk, option pay may have contributed to the same frictions it was intended to reduce. In the third essay, I present evidence that is consistent with the notion that certain managerial debt-like remuneration structures decrease the likelihood of firm-specific positive stock-price jumps. Namely, I find that a bottom-to-top decile increase in the present value of CEO pension pay leads to a roughly 25\% decrease in a firm's unconditional ex-post jump probability. However, I do not find that CEO deferred compensation decreases firm jump risk. Finally, I find that information in option-implied volatility smirks does not appear to reflect these dynamics. Together, these results suggest that not all debt-like compensation mechanisms decrease managerial risk-taking equally
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015
Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management
Discipline: Finance
6
Fairburn, James Anthony. "Promotions, incentives and the market for corporate control." Thesis, University of Southampton, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.241164.
Full text
7
Tsekeris, Athanasios. "Managerial incentives and corporate acquisitions : evidence from the US." Thesis, University of Strathclyde, 2015. http://oleg.lib.strath.ac.uk:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=26116.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis examines the impact of executive compensation on the quality of corporate acquisition decisions. A number of different issues are empirically investigated. The analysis begins with the examination of the relation between the incentives managers are provided with via their compensation contracts and the riskiness of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) investigating whether this relation is affected by the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. The study then focuses on the performance of acquiring firms exploring how and whether managerial incentives can induce value-increasing acquisitions conditional on the intensity of M&A activity. The final part of the empirical analysis examines whether the legal status of the target firm has any implications for the effectiveness of incentive compensation to mitigate managerial risk-aversion and increase shareholder value. The thesis contributes both to academic literature and to practice by identifying areas of inefficiencies of equity-based compensation contracts to mitigate agency costs. More specifically, new evidence is provided on the effectiveness of incentive compensation to induce risk-taking activity under the impact of stricter regulation. While compensation-related incentives are positively associated with the riskiness of acquisition decisions before 2002, managers have become considerably less responsive to such incentives after the enactment of SOX. Moreover, although incentive compensation can improve deal performance and overcome adverse selection concerns by inducing managers to acquire when it is optimal to do, it is not related to value-increasing decisions when acquisitions are initiated during periods of merger waves. It is further found that equity-based compensation can be rendered ineffective to mitigate agency costs when a publicly listed firm is acquired. Given these inefficiencies, a number of recommendations are made for the improvement of the design of executive compensation contracts that could provide valuable guidelines to remuneration committees to reduce excessive compensation costs and benefit shareholders.
8
Gaertner, Fabio B. "CEO After-tax Compensation Incentives and Corporate Tax Avoidance." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/145277.
Full textAbstract:
I examine the association between CEOs' after-tax incentives and their firms' levels of tax avoidance. Economic theory holds that firms should compensate CEOs on an after-tax basis when the expected tax savings generated from incentive alignment outweigh the incremental compensation demanded by CEOs for bearing additional tax-related compensation risk. Using publicly available data, I estimate CEOs' after-tax incentives and find a negative relation between the use of after-tax incentives and effective tax rates. While the results suggest that greater use of after-tax measures in CEO compensation leads to higher tax savings, it is possible that these savings will lead to lower pre-tax returns, or implicit taxes. Therefore, I also examine the association between the use of after-tax incentives and implicit taxes and find a positive association between the two. Finally, I find a significant positive relation between after-tax incentives and total CEO compensation, suggesting that CEOs who are compensated after-tax demand a premium for the additional risk they bear.
9
Imes, Matthew Douglas. "Essays In Executive Incentives." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2019. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/596467.
Full textAbstract:
Business Administration/FinancePh.D.
My dissertation consists of three chapters which explores various aspects of executive incentives. In the first chapter, I examine the relation between executive equity pay and stock returns. By compensating CEOs and CFOs differently, shareholders can create incentive conflicts between the firms’ top two managers that potentially affects shareholder wealth. On the one hand, incentive conflict potentially benefits shareholders by improving information exchange and establishing checks and balances in decisions made jointly by the CEO and CFO but alternatively, can harm shareholders by increasing risk through impeding the decision-making processes. I examine the relation between CEO-CFO incentive conflict and stock returns. The analysis indicates that an investor who routinely buy firms with the least incentive conflict and shorts firms with the greatest incentive conflict between CEO and CFOs will outperform the market by 475 basis points per year. I investigate whether risk, firm performance, or market inefficiency explain the excess returns and provide evidence that shareholders demand higher returns for bearing risk associated with CEO-CFO incentive similarities. Next, I explore the impact of executive incentives on bondholder wealth through looking at bond yields. Firms compensate managers to maximize shareholder value, yet these same incentives affect bondholder risk. I investigate the relation between executive equity pay and the cost of debt. My findings indicate a “u-shaped” relation between bond yields and equity pay. These results are consistent with the notion that bondholders prefer a moderate amount of executive equity pay and above or below that level, bondholders increase yields to protect their interests. Instrumenting equity pay using CEO heritage, I find support for a curvilinear relation. These findings suggest that moderate levels of equity pay mitigate the agency costs between firm shareholders and bondholders. Finally, I study the affect of board gender diversity on CEO and director compensation. Females occupy only about 12% of director positions on corporate boards. I find that boards with more female’s onboard tend to give CEOs larger fractions of equity in their compensation packages while incentivizing directors with lower fractions of equity pay. This evidence is consistent with the notion that female board members are superior monitors yet also possess greater risk-aversion than male board members.
Temple University--Theses
10
Gordon, Bruce L. (Bruce Lee). "Corporate Sale-and-Leaseback Transactions: An Examination of Corporate Incentives, Wealth Effects and Dealer Spreads." Thesis, University of North Texas, 1993. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc279191/.
Full textAbstract:
There is a limited amount of research dealing with the wealth effects of sale-and-leaseback transactions, but previous research has focused predominantly on the tax effects of these transactions. The results of these studies have often been in conflict with one another. This dissertation shows that tax effects do play a role in determining the wealth effect of sale-and-leasebacks on stockholders, but there exists a framework of finance research that suggests several other factors could play a determining role as well.
11
Meneghetti, Costanza. "Managerial incentives and the choice between public and bank debt." unrestricted, 2008. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-08132008-140059/.
Full textAbstract:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2008.Title from file title page. Jayant Kale, committee chair; Omesh Kini, Harley E. Ryan, Anastasia V. Kartasheva, committee members. Electronic text (77 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Oct. 8, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 47-49).
12
Van, Alfen Tyson D. "ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL INCENTIVES." UKnowledge, 2019. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/finance_etds/9.
Full textAbstract:
In my first chapter, I use a novel dataset of customer reviews from Amazon.com to study the impact of managerial myopia on product market reputation. Using exogenous variation due to the timing of CEO equity vesting events, I show that short-term incentive shocks predict declines in reputation. A changing product market lineup and a deterioration of existing products are two mechanisms through which reputation is affected. The effect is larger when the CEO has other short-term concerns and when the firm has a low reputation in the product market. However, higher advertising expenses mitigate the negative reputational effect among consumers. Using an alternative empirical methodology, I find that higher short-term ownership in the firm is also associated with declining product market reputation, while higher long-term ownership is associated with increasing reputation. My second chapter uses a different setting to examine the consequences of personal wealth incentives. We test whether household wealth shocks affect professional misconduct by financial advisors. We use a panel of advisors' home addresses and examine within-advisor variation relative to other advisors who work at the same firm and live in the same ZIP code. We show that advisors increase misconduct following declines in their homes' values. The increased misconduct is due, in part, to willful actions, such as churning. We show that advisors' housing returns explain misconduct targeting out-of-state customers, breaking the link between customer and advisor housing shocks. Further, the results are stronger for advisors with lower career risk from committing misconduct.
13
Shabeeb, Ali Mohamed A. "Equity compensation incentives, earnings management, and corporate governance : the UK evidence." Thesis, University of Surrey, 2013. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.599994.
Full textAbstract:
The current thesis aims to answer the following three research questions: 1) What is the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management in the UK context? 2) Do equity incentives motivate UK executives to engage in opportunistic earnings management practices? 3) Can corporate governance mechanisms moderate the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management? To answer the first research question, a panel data set drawn from 215 UK FfSE-350 index companies and 1675 firm years for the period 2004-20 11 has been used to examine the effect of large set of corporate governance mechanisms on constraining earnings management. Based on the agency theory, we hypothesise that corporate governance mechanisms can inhibit managers from engaging in opportunistic earnings management practices. We use two proxies for earnings management: current discretionary accruals measured by performance adjusted model developed by Kothari et al. (2005) and total discretionary accruals as measured by the modified Jones model developed by Dechow et al. (I995). We find that audit related mechanisms, such as audit committee's size, independence, and expertise as well as external audit efforts and quality (measured through audit fees), have a significant negative relationship with earnings management. Moreover, we find that non-audit fees have a significant positive effect on earnings management - supporting the argument that non-audit fees negatively affect an auditor's independence. Conversely, we find that board size and independence have moderate negative relationship with earnings management. To answer the second and third research questions, a panel data set drawn from 1675 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) year observations and 1540 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) year observations has been used to examine the relationship between CEO and CFO equity incentives and earnings management. In addition, we examine the moderation effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between executives' equity incentives and earnings management. Based on the managerial power approach, the current thesis hypothesises a positive association between executives' equity incentives and earnings management.
14
Arena, Matteo P. "Three essays on the corporate debt choice." Diss., Columbia, Mo. : University of Missouri-Columbia, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10355/5902.
Full textAbstract:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2006.The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file viewed on (May 2, 2007) Vita. Includes bibliographical references.
15
Hirsch, Gregory S. (Gregory Seymour). "The Motivational Impact of Incentive Programs on Young Adult Employees in Corporate Casual Restaurants." Thesis, University of North Texas, 1996. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc278724/.
Full textAbstract:
This study was conducted to determine which incentive programs best influence young workers in corporate casual restaurants. The server and bar staff of the Chili's division of Brinker International, Inc. were surveyed in 18 stores in the Dallas area. From the sample. 356 usable surveys were received. The study was designed to obtain feedback about existing and future incentive programs that will enhance development of a positive working environment, along with higher productivity and a lower turnover rate.
16
Gose, Michael A. "Corporate Inversions: Realigning Tax Incentives to Keep Corporations in the United States." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2015. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1033.
Full textAbstract:
ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the corporate income tax, more specifically related to foreign sourced income, and proposes a solution to reduce the desirability of tax inversions and restore the competitiveness of United States’ corporations. The paper introduces the topic and discusses why corporate taxation has returned to the forefront of political discussion. It then addresses early 2000s regulation passed in response to increased inversion activity of the late ‘90s and how that regulation failed to achieve its intended purpose. Then, the current laws will be introduced with a focus on corporate actions to circumvent these laws in order to reduce tax liabilities. Then, I will propose a solution that emphasizes altering the incentives of corporations as opposed to creating rules to prevent corporate actions.
17
Protopapa, Marco. "An essay in corporate finance : managerial incentives, financial constraints and ownership concentration." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2009. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2196/.
Full textAbstract:
I investigate the role of internal discipliners in the form of optimal equity ownership for the purpose of committing the management to the pursuit of shareholder value in the presence of separation between ownership and control. By rooting the conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders upon the control of internal funds, a simple model allows to analyse the link between profit uncertainty, growth options and decisional powers. I derive implications for the optimal degree of equity concentration, the effect of firm fundamentals on the allocation of income and control rights, and the pay for luck phenomenon. First, optimal equity ownership is positively related to the short-term performance of the firm and negatively related to both its growth options and riskiness. Second, optimal equity ownership is negatively related to the probability of the firm being financially constrained, in the sense that the level of desired investment exceeds internally available resources. Furthermore, I also show that straight debt alone does not implement the second best, in absence of a large shareholder. Finally, I show that, in presence of financial constraints, pay for luck is associated in equilibrium to a lower optimal degree of ownership concentration. In other words, pay for luck and looser governance, as implemented by the internal discipliner of equity concentration, emerge as the equilibrium result of a constrained incentive problem.
18
Yin, Chao. "Institutional investors : their incentives for monitoring companies and the effect on corporate governance." Thesis, University of Reading, 2018. http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/78974/.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis attempts to deepen our understanding of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance. While numerous studies have examined the effectiveness of institutional investors’ monitoring and have taken into account the heterogeneity of the various types of such investors, there has been less research on differences in their portfolios and specifically on the incentives that they may have to monitor individual companies. Due to resource constraints, it would be logical for institutional investors to concentrate their monitoring efforts on a subset of the firms held in their portfolios that offer the greatest likelihood of obtaining benefits that exceed the cost of monitoring. This thesis attempts to identify whether such a policy is actually adopted by institutional investors and assesses the outcome of such attention. The first factor that might plausibly influence investors’ monitoring incentives is the weighting of a firm in their portfolio. When a firm accounts for a greater weighting in the investor’s portfolio, one might reasonably argue that the benefits of monitoring might be expected to exceed the cost. Therefore, the incentive to monitor that firm would be stronger. The first empirical study in this thesis investigates whether firms that tend to be heavily represented in institutional portfolios exhibit more investment efficiency. The study reveals that corporations do significantly improve the efficiency of their investment decisions when their shares represent a greater proportion of the holdings of institutional portfolios. Monitoring may mitigate the tendency of management to focus on their own career aims and build empires rather than enhancing shareholder value. The second empirical study investigates the market valuation of the firm’s cash holdings. Historically, it has been suggested that an increase in cash holding is associated with poorer performance by the firm. This study shows that this effect changes when one takes into account the influence of institutional investors as a result of their monitoring. It demonstrates that the presence of motivated institutional investors appears to significantly increase the marginal value of cash holdings of a firm. It is shown that when a firm accounts for a greater weighting in an institutional portfolio, the adverse effect of high levels of cash held by the firm on its operational performance largely disappears – a result that would be consistent with investors monitoring those firms more effectively. The final empirical chapter studies the relation between investors’ horizons and the monitoring incentive. Since the monitoring cost is borne in the present while any consequent pay-off would occur in the future, institutional investors’ monitoring incentives are likely to be positively related to the investment horizon. I find that the longterm holdings of different types of investors could all improve firm performance. The effect is persistent and long-lasting. These findings support the hypothesis that monitoring attention by institutional investors is related to their holding horizon.
19
Malmlund, Alexander. "The Financial Incentives to Adopting Corporate Social Responsibility and Socially Responsible Investing Practices." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2019. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/2103.
Full textAbstract:
As corporate social responsibility and socially responsible investing practices have increased substantially over the past decade, the possible financial advantages have been examined in great depth. Utilizing firms from the S&P 500 I have investigated the possible outperformance of accounting based and market based measures. I did this by examining the relationship between ESG scores, a common measure of CSR level, and the following dependent variables: return on assets, total risk, systematic risk, and idiosyncratic risk. I obtained strong evidence that an increase in CSR levels are correlated with an increased return on assets.
20
Hill, Lesley Ellen. "Executive Incentives, Corporate Governance and Tax Haven Utilisation: Evidence from Australian Financial Institutions." Thesis, Curtin University, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/79399.
Full textAbstract:
This study extends prior research investigating the relation between firms’ use of tax haven jurisdictions and performance-based remuneration incentives of CEOs. Additionally, we assess the moderating role of corporate governance attributes on the relation between firms’ use of tax havens and the remuneration characteristics of CEOs in those firms. Based on a dataset of 1054 firm-year observations comprising publicly-listed Australian financial institutions over the 2008–2018 period, we find a positive and significant relation between firms’ use of tax havens and CEOs remuneration attributes. Governance attributes of CEOs pertaining to their tenure and level of gender diversity are significantly negatively related to tax haven utilization, and negatively moderate the relation between remuneration levels and tax haven use.
21
Foreman, Denise Ann Wren. "The anticipation and interpretation of UK company announcements : the incentives to acquire information." Thesis, Brunel University, 1996. http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/6269.
Full textAbstract:
The objective of this thesis is to explain the behaviour of stock returns around the disclosure of different types of information release by UK companies. Previous literature has documented the existence of both market anticipation and the lagged impounding of value relevant information. The main objective of this research is, therefore, to identify the conditions under which investors choose to be informed in anticipation of and in response to, a corporate disclosure. More specifically, we explain the behaviour of stock returns in terms of the costs and benefits which investors must consider when deciding whether to acquire and interpret information. The results indicate that market anticipation is an increasing function of firm size, the number of years a firm has been trading and the volatility of prior stock returns. However, increased voluntary disclosure by firms would appear to reduce the ability of investors to and anticipate and interpret information. The volatility of stock returns, prior to the disclosure, is nevertheless the main driving force behind the explanation of post-announcement drift. There are also indications that investors' initial reactions to both earnings and non-earnings news are not based on informed judgements, and that bad news is generally associated with greater uncertainty than good news. Bad news would appear to be more difficult to anticipate and interpret, relative to good news. On further examination, however, investor anticipation is shown to be largely based on information as opposed to uninformed trading.
22
Heed, Emilia, and Hanna Törnbom. "Corporate Social Responsibility : Varför ska banker ta ett ansvar?" Thesis, Högskolan i Halmstad, Sektionen för ekonomi och teknik (SET), 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hh:diva-19123.
Full textAbstract:
The purpose of this thesis is to gain a deeper understanding about why Swedish banks choose to work and report CSR and also analyze differences and similarities between two banks. Research question: Why do Swedish companies within the financial sector choose to report and work with Corporate Social Responsibility? The major incentives to work and report CSR are because it benefits bank´s businesses, which is driven by stakeholders. Stakeholder pressure is also an important incentive, especially pressure from customers and employees. The incentives that differed between the two banks were morality of the business leader, society and the priority of stakeholders. The incentives that we could not support were guidelines and competitors-
23
Persson, Stefan. "Long-term CSR incentives at fashion chains in Sweden." Thesis, Uppsala University, Department of Business Studies, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-8814.
Full textAbstract:
In recent time the pressure on companies from groups like governments, regular citizens and media on taking its social responsibility has increased in rapid pace. This has led to increased interest from companies all over the world about social issues and the companies’ responsibility for these issues.
In the more competitive environment were companies act today the use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to differentiate itself against other company’s increases in importance. Together with increasing interest from stakeholders about social issues has made it central for companies not only to be social responsible but also to be good at finding future social trends that will give them competitive advantage against other actors.
The purpose of this paper is to examine how the three largest fashion chains in Sweden, Hennes & Mauritz, Lindex and KappAhl, are managing its CSR work now and how good their organisation is prepared to manage the CSR work in the future. The examination will focus on the factors that make the management of CSR successful or not, and to get an overview of if the conditions for current and future successful CSR is present at the companies. By doing a qualitative document analysis of the selected companies the conclusion is made that there is much work to be done at the three largest Swedish fashion chains to more effectively use CSR and the positive effects that a well developed CSR plan can bring to the companies. The conclusion is based on the lack of long-term remuneration incentives for the management that rewards a short-term decisions and the extensive use of collective commitments instead of exclusive CSR work.
24
Spagnolo, Giancarlo. "Essays on managerial incentives and product-market competition." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics [Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögsk.] (EFI), 1999. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/500.htm.
Full text
25
Lilhauge, Hjortshøj Toke. "Essays on empirical corporate finance : managerial incentives, information disclosure and bond covenants /by Toke Lilhauge Hjortshøj." Aarhus : School of Economics and Management, 2008. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/560680929.pdf.
Full text
26
Wang, Jeffrey J. "Asset Managers and Financial Instability: Evidence of Run Behavior and Run Incentives in Corporate Bond Funds." Thesis, Harvard University, 2015. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17417581.
Full textAbstract:
Asset managers may be a source of systemic risk due to their risk-taking strategies and vulnerability to dramatic outflows. Investor withdrawals trigger asset sales and redemption costs that only impact remaining investors in the fund. Liquidation lag and mark-to-market lag translate these redemption costs into run incentives. This paper first tests for run-like behavior in corporate bond mutual funds and then tests for the underlying run incentive, measured by the NAV impact. I find that illiquid bond funds are significantly more sensitive to past performance than liquid funds and experience up to 43.6% more outflows given a 1% decrease in returns. Furthermore, net flows into bond funds held primarily by institutional investors are less sensitive to performance but more sensitive to illiquidity than flows into funds held by retail investors, suggesting that institutional bond funds may be more vulnerable to runs. Finally, using a novel dataset, I proxy for the illiquidity of a fund’s underlying bonds and quantify the run incentive. Given 10% net outflows, funds that have insufficient cash and hold bonds of illiquidity 3-5 deviations from the mean experience a significant decrease in NAV of about 34-49 basis points. This paper contributes to the mutual fund and runs literature by offering new empirical evidence of run behavior and run incentives in corporate bond funds.Applied Mathematics
27
Wan, Hong. "Two Essays on Corporate Governance⎯Are Local Directors Better Monitors, and Directors Incentives and Earnings Management." [Tampa, Fla] : University of South Florida, 2008. http://purl.fcla.edu/usf/dc/et/SFE0002494.
Full text
28
Semadeni, Matthew Briggs. "Leaving the corporate fold examining spin-off actions and performance /." Texas A&M University, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1969/289.
Full text
29
Juks, Reimo. "Corporate governance and the firm's behaviour towards stakeholders." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Finansiell Ekonomi (FI), 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-938.
Full textAbstract:
Obey the Law and Do a Little Bit Extra? The paper provides evidence on how firms’ stakeholder orientation is associated with standard measures of corporate governance using a panel of 1778 US companies during the period of 1995-2006. We construct two binary indicators, one measuring stakeholder hostility and the other stakeholder friendliness using data from KLD ratings agency. Based on these indicators, we classify firms into four groups representing stakeholder hostile, neutral, friendly and ”friendly and hostile” firms. Our results show that both stakeholder friendly and hostile firms tend to have significantly lower insider ownership, smaller option grants, lower pay-performance sensitivities, larger boards, older executive officers and directors, lower institutional ownership and larger number of anti-takeover defenses than the firms in the neutral group. We also find that the probability of stakeholder hostile activity is positively related to the strength of corporate governance, but the effect is insignificant except in local and global community areas. A possible explanation is that in these areas stakeholders are protected mainly by ethics and social norms rather than by various regulations that is commonplace in labour, environment and customer related areas. These findings lend support for the idea that stakeholders are best protected by various regulations. Corporate Governance and Workplace Safety. This paper examines how the weakening in corporate governance affects workplace safety. We use anti-takeover laws in the US in the 1980s as a source of variation in corporate governance. Our measures of workplace safety are the number of violations of OSHA workplace safety regulation, penalties paid for these violations, the number of accidents and employees’ complaints about their workplace safety. We find that firms affected by the regulation presented significantly more workplace safety violations and penalties than otherwise similar firms that were not affected by the regulation. Accidents and complaints tend to decrease as a result of the anti-takeover regulation, but the results are not entirely robust. We also document that the increase in workplace safety violations was significantly smaller in unionized firms. This suggests that unions can play an important role in curbing managerial discretion. How Responsible is Private Equity? The financial success of leveraged buyout targets (LBOs) is frequently associated with deteriorating conditions for other stakeholders, such as workers, customers, suppliers, tax-payers and society as a whole. We obtain a comprehensive set of stakeholder ratings for a sample of 373 LBOs and examine the pre-and post-LBO performance of these ratings. LBO targets are characterized by weak stakeholder relations across a number of measures compared to their peers, in terms of corporate governance, transparency, employee relations and community relations. Controlling for this selection, we do not find systematic evidence in favor of the idea that private equity funds gain at the expense of other stakeholders. Private equity ownership alters targets in the direction of higher pay, improved work-life benefits, increased charitable giving, and decreased concerns related to retirement benefits, adverse economic impact, tax disputes, unfair marketing practices and antitrust problems.Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2010; Sammanfattning jämte 3 uppsatser.
30
Petkova, Kunka, and Alfons J. Weichenrieder. "The Relevance of Depreciation Allowances as a Fiscal Policy Instrument: A Hybrid Approach to CCCTB?" WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Universität Wien, 2018. http://epub.wu.ac.at/6536/1/SSRN%2Did3249512.pdf.
Full textAbstract:
A major goal of the EU Commission in the area of direct taxation is the introduction of a common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) in Europe. While hardly discussed in the literature, such a system would limit national discretion over tax depreciation. In a sample of up to 47 countries, we find that the probability of a tax reform that improves the depreciation allowances increases, if the macroeconomic situation is weak. This suggests that changes in depreciation allowances are used as a fiscal instrument for stabilization. A common consolidated tax base deprives national governments from implementing investment incentives via accelerated depreciation. This paper discusses the possible implementation of a hybrid system that combines features of formula apportionment and separate accounting. Such a hybrid system may substantially mitigate transfer pricing problems and other tax planning issues, whilst preserving national discretion over depreciation allowances.Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series
31
Fodor, Daniel. "Theoretical incentives vs. perceived motives for using interest rate derivatives in Swedish corporations." Thesis, KTH, Industriell ekonomi och organisation (Inst.), 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-161227.
Full textAbstract:
The purpose of this research is to highlight if contemporary practices for using interest rate derivatives in large non-financial Swedish corporations are consistent with theoretical incentives for using such derivative instruments. Most theoretical incentives were developed before the financial crisis of 2007-08. The introduction of new regulations, accounting practices and pricing methods has changed the prices of derivatives and the administrative burden related to hedging. Traditional academic literature commonly gives eight incentives for why corporations use interest rate derivatives (described further in the thesis). Following surveys and interviews with 13 relevant corporate professionals, the study finds that three of the theoretical incentives strongly motivate corporate managers’ use of interest rate derivatives. Four other theoretical incentives are found to partially explain motives for corporate managers’ hedging practices, whilst one of the theoretical incentives is found to be an irrelevant motive for corporate managers in practice. In addition to the tested incentives, the study finds that Swedish corporations which occasionally raise capital in non-functional currencies actively use cross-currency swaps to convert outstanding non-functional debt currency to the company’s functional currency. The practice is commonly recognised amongst industry professionals but not widely cited in academia. Compared to 10-15 years ago, treasury functions in Swedish corporations are found to require more knowledge in accounting and administration and less market savvy. During this period, the number of dealers in Swedish corporate treasury departments has been reduced significantly, as corporations have effectively outsourced part of their market operations to banks.Denna uppsats undersöker om verkliga motiv och praxis för användning av räntederivat i svenska storföretag är förenliga med teoretiska incitament för räntederivatanvändning som ofta förekommer i akademisk litteratur. De flesta teoretiska förklaringsmodeller för företags användning av räntederivat utvecklades och beskrevs innan den globala finanskrisen 2007-08. Efter krisen har värderingen av räntederivat samt det administrativa arbetet kring instrumenten förändrats till följd av implementering av nya finansiella regler, bokföringsregler och prissättningsmetoder. Akademisk litteratur beskriver generellt åtta teoretiska incitament om varför företag använder räntederivat (vilka finns sammanfattade i detta arbete). För att verifiera teoretiska grunder och medvetenhet kring dessa teorier genomfördes en enkätundersökning samt djupintervjuer med totalt 13 beslutsfattare inom räntederivat i svenska storföretag. Studiens resultat ger starkt stöd till att tre av de teoretiska incitamenten i hög grad överensstämmer med verkliga motiv för användning av räntederivat, samt att fyra incitament delvis kunde förklara verkliga motiv, medan stöd saknades för ett teoretiskt incitament. Utöver de åtta testade incitamenten visar studiens resultat att det finns ett ytterligare motiv för användning av räntederivat: räntevalutaswappar används av flera svenska storföretag som emitterar obligationer i utländsk valuta för att konvertera pengar till företagets funktionella valuta. Förfarandet är känt inom industrin men understuderat i akademisk litteratur. Studien visar att kunskap inom bokföring och administration relaterat till finansiella derivat har blivit allt viktigare för svenska storföretags internbanker, medan vikten av att ha en aktiv marknadssyn minskat, jämfört mot 10-15 år sedan. Över denna tidsperiod har antalet handlare i storföretagens internbanker minskat kraftigt, då flera av funktionerna i praktiken har outsourcats till banker.
32
Chen, Yuhui. "Issues in executive compensation." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/16776.
Full textAbstract:
Diese Dissertation stellt empirische Evidenz zu den Fragen der Verguetung von Fuehrungskraeften. Analyse der Daten der US-Firmen auflistet, finde ich eine umgekehrte U-foermige Beziehung zwischen Management Ownership und Unternehmensperformance, aber diese Beziehung verschwindet, wenn Unternehmensperformance von den letzten Jahr kontrolliert wird. Ich finde auch, dass die Executive Option Awards positiv auf Unternehmensperformance bezogen, während Executive Stock Awards hat keinen statistischen signifikanten Einfluss auf den Unternehmensperformance. Statistische Evidenz zeigt auch, dass die Struktur der Verguetung von Fuehrungskraeften Vertraege zu Unternehmen Eigenschaften und Executive persoenlichen Merkmalen zusammenhaengt.This dissertation provides empirical evidence on the issues of executive compensation. Analyzing data of U.S. listing firms, I find an inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and firm performance, but this relation vanishes when firm performance from last period is controlled. I also find that executive option awards is positively related to firm performance, while executive stock awards has no statistically significant impact on firm performance. Evidence also indicates that the structure of executive compensation contracts is related with observable and unobservable firm attributes and executive personal characteristics.
33
Trezevant, Robert Heath. "The effect of tax law changes on corporate investment and financing behavior: Empirical evidence from changes brought about by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/184897.
Full textAbstract:
This dissertation examines the relationship between debt and investment-related tax shields using changes in these classes of tax shields scaled by expected operating earnings following the passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act(ERTA) in 1981. The substitution effect predicts that a negative relationship between changes in the two classes of tax shields will be observed in response to the increased investment-related tax shields offered by ERTA. Debt tax shields should decrease following ERTA since the probability of losing the tax benefit of tax shields would rise as investment-related tax shields increased following ERTA. Firms' probability of losing the deductibility of tax shields is used to segregate the sample into two groups. For the group of firms with a low probability of losing the deductibility of tax shields, the substitution effect is inapplicable and the relation between changes in the two classes of tax shields simply represents the debt securability effect. Since fixed assets can be used as collateral for debt, the debt securability hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between changes in debt and investment-related tax shields after the passage of ERTA. The model developed to segregate debt securability from the substitution effect reveals that, as predicted, the debt securability effect is positive for all firms and that the substitution effect is negative for those firms with a large probability of losing the benefits of tax shields. This reverses the findings of prior research. Controls for pecking order theory effects are introduced into the model to assure that the substitution effect observed is not due to debt ratio as predicted by Myers (1984). The findings described above remain intact except that the debt securability effect does not exist and the substitution effect is weaker for high-debt firms. Furthermore, support is offered for the pecking order theory. These results are robust to alternate specifications of time periods tested, variable definitions, data screening criteria and model specifications.
34
Kinney, Michael Richard. "Changes in corporate capital structures and investment in response to tax incentives in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/184996.
Full textAbstract:
This study examines the empirical reactions of major U.S. corporations to cost recovery tax incentives contained in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. The major provision of the act, that is relevant to this study, increases the rate of cost recovery on new investment placed in service after 1980. The purpose of the study is to determine if the empirical responses of the firms to these tax incentives are consistent with recent extensions to financial economic theory. The relevant theory predicts that firms will be sensitive to changes in statutory rates of cost recovery, and they will react to increases in rates of cost recovery in two ways. First, they will respond by increasing their level of investment in covered assets. Second, they will manage the level of their total tax deductions by offsetting (to some extent) the increased level of investment-related deductions with reductions in the level of other tax shields (particularly debt-related deductions). The evidence that is examined is largely consistent with the predictions of the theory. The pattern of growth across firms in the immediate years after the implementation of the act is congruent with tax-sponsored increases in investment. Further, the increase in the available investment-related tax deductions appears to be offset in part by decreases in the level of the debt-related deductions.
35
Cleaveland, Mary Catherine. "The relationship between r&d investment and dividend payment tax incentives and their role in the dividend tax puzzle." unrestricted, 2006. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-12122006-125647/.
Full textAbstract:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2006.Ernest R. Larkins, committee chair; Fred A. Jacobs, Detmar W. Straub , Sally Wallace, committee members. Electronic text (100 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Aug. 9, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 78-85).
36
Braun, Lucas. "Incentivos aos administradores: a opção de compra de ações." Universidade de São Paulo, 2013. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2132/tde-10012014-155751/.
Full textAbstract:
A outorga de opções de compra de ações ao administrador de uma companhia é tradicionalmente vista como uma prática de governança corporativa salutar, na medida em que contribui para a superação do conflito de agência existente entre executivos e acionistas. No entanto, esta dissertação de mestrado tem como objetivo oferecer uma visão alternativa ao tema. Pretende-se demonstrar que, caso este incentivo não seja estruturado e acompanhado corretamente, o seu uso pode levar à destruição de valor da companhia. Deste modo, exploram-se, nos dois capítulos iniciais, as bases jurídicas e econômicas da concessão de opções de compra de ações. No capítulo seguinte são abordados quatro aspectos fundamentais desta questão, os quais, surpreendentemente, são ignorados pela doutrina nacional. São eles: o custo das opções de compra de ações, as limitações dos seus benefícios, os seus principais problemas e as possíveis explicações para a realização de tais outorgas. No quarto capítulo, discutem-se as falhas das estratégias legais disponíveis para o controle das distorções surgidas no contexto da outorga de opções de compra de ações. Na parte final desta dissertação, são apresentadas as conclusões sobre o tema, propondo-se que o regulamento de listagem nos segmentos de práticas de governança corporativa da BM&FBOVESPA seja alterado para contemplar regras específicas quanto à outorga de opções de compra de ações. Adicionalmente, os anexos à dissertação resumem os principais resultados de uma extensa pesquisa a respeito das características da remuneração dos administradores e dos incentivos baseados em ações adotados pelas companhias abertas brasileiras.Granting of stock options to a companys manager is generally seen as a positive corporate governance practice as it helps to overcome the agency problem between shareholders and executives. This thesis however aims to offer an alternative approach to this subject. Its purpose is to demonstrate that, to the extent that this incentive is not properly designed and monitored, it may lead to destruction of companys value. Therefore, the first two chapters explore the legal and economical foundations of the stock options grants. The next chapter discusses four fundamental aspects of this matter, which, surprisingly enough, are ignored by the Brazilian legal literature. They are the following: the cost of granting stock options, the shortcomings of its benefits, its main problems and the plausible explanations for such grants. The flaws of the legal strategies available to control the distortions caused by stock options are discussed in the fourth chapter. In the final part of the thesis, the conclusions of this study are presented and an amendment to the corporate governance listing rules of BM&FBOVESPA is suggested, in order to address specific rules regarding stock options grants. Additionally, the schedules to this thesis summarize the main findings of an extensive research on the characteristics of executive compensation and stock-based incentives adopted by Brazilian listed companies.
37
Liu, Xuejiao, and 刘雪娇. "The effects of CEO equity-based compensation on firm promptness in remedying material weaknesses in internal control." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10722/200360.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis investigates how chief executive officer (CEO) equity incentives affect the remediation of material weaknesses (MWs) in internal control. First, we predict that the sensitivity of CEO stock and stock option portfolios to stock price (CEO price sensitivity or delta) has a positive impact on firm promptness in remedying MWs, because CEOs whose personal wealth is tied to stock price suffer losses from negative market reactions to the public disclosure of MWs. Second, we predict that the sensitivity of CEO stock option portfolio to stock-return volatility (CEO volatility sensitivity or vega) has a negative impact on firm promptness in remedying MWs, as firms with internal control weaknesses are associated with higher information and operating risks that manifest in stock return volatility.
Our empirical results, based on a sample of firms disclosing MWs in internal control under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) during November 15, 2003 and August 27, 2006, are consistent with the above predictions. We further provide evidence that an effective board of directors could mitigate the undesirable, negative impact of CEO volatility sensitivity on MWs remediation. We measure firms’ promptness in remedying MWs based on their subsequent internal control audit opinions (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Goh 2009); and CEO price (volatility) sensitivity as the dollar change in CEO stock and option portfolios (option portfolio) from a 1 percent change in stock price (Core and Guay 2002).
This thesis is innovative with respect to the prediction and evidence of the opposing effects from CEO price and volatility sensitivities on internal control quality. This new evidence contributes to the literature that examines managerial incentives embedded in stock-based and option-based compensation plans in various economic contexts (e.g., Knopf et al. 2002; Coles et al. 2006; Low 2009; Armstrong et al. 2013). Our findings suggest that when stock constitutes a major part of CEO compensation, the mandatory disclosure requirement of SOX provides a channel for the stock market to discipline CEO. However, when options dominate CEO compensation, volatility sensitivity and the associated risk-taking incentive can cause CEOs to delay rectifying internal control deficiencies. These results have interesting policy implications for regulators and firms concerning mandatory disclosure and compensation design. Moreover, this thesis contributes to the broad literature on corporate governance by documenting an interaction between corporate governance and CEO incentives, namely that strong corporate governance mitigates the undesirable risking-taking incentive caused by CEO option holdings. Overall, this thesis deepens our understanding on mechanisms through which regulators, firm executives, and boards of directors strengthen internal control over financial reporting in the post-SOX era.published_or_final_version
Business
Doctoral
Doctor of Philosophy
38
Oliveira, Edimundo Dias de. "A relação entre o nível de gastos socioambientais voluntários e a obtenção de benefícios fiscais." Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie, 2013. http://tede.mackenzie.br/jspui/handle/tede/927.
Full textAbstract:
Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:32:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
Edimundo Dias de Oliveira.pdf: 1381678 bytes, checksum: 2bf3f35a312fcff1c3baf03df7d00e17 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2013-08-15Volunteer expenses with the Environment is becoming, every time more, regular action in various companies. Involvement and propagation practices, also policies aimed for corporate sustainability, can be considered common today, counting even with standard reports that provide some descriptive elements about these practices. There is, however, a gap in the scientific literature about the relevance of such participation spending on business structure. Many companies indicate in their reports the existence of social and environmental costs, but the real impact of these actions are unclear, beyond the supposed improvement of the institutional image. This exploratory, qualitative approach, aimed to verify if the level of corporate environmental spending is associated significantly with the tax benefits that they may have. The sample consisted of 35 companies of the Índice de Sustentabilidade Empresarial (ISE) of BM&F Bovespa . The techniques that were applied are the content analysis. The results showed that the average level of environmental expenses are higher than the tax benefits obtained, indicating that these companies used a combination of donations, sponsorships and investments, suggesting the existence of other factors beyond the tax benefits limits involved.
Gastos socioambientais voluntários se tornam, cada vez mais, ações regulares em várias empresas. Envolvimento e divulgação de práticas e políticas voltadas à sustentabilidade corporativa podem ser considerados comuns nos dias de hoje, contando com relatórios que oferecem alguns elementos descritivos sobre essas práticas. Existe, entretanto, uma lacuna na literatura científica sobre a relevância da participação de gastos dessa natureza na estrutura empresarial. Muitas empresas apontam em seus relatórios a existência de gastos socioambientais, porém o real impacto dessas ações ainda não são claras, além da suposta melhoria da imagem institucional. Este estudo exploratório, de abordagem qualitativa, objetivou verificar se o nível de gastos socioambientais das empresas está associado, significativamente, com os benefícios fiscais que as mesmas possam obter. A amostra foi formada por 35 empresas integrantes do índice de Sustentabilidade Empresarial (ISE) da BM&F Bovespa. Aplicaram-se técnicas de análise de conteúdo. Os resultados obtidos apontaram que o nível médio de gastos socioambientais é superior aos benefícios fiscais obtidos, indicando que estas empresas utilizaram uma combinação entre doação, patrocínio e investimento, sugerindo a existência de outros fatores envolvidos além dos limites de benefícios fiscais.
39
Dyballa, Katharina [Verfasser], Kornelius [Akademischer Betreuer] Kraft, and Philip [Gutachter] Jung. "Corporate governance in the private and public sector : Empirical studies on the determination of managerial incentives in the private sector and efficiency and quality in the public sector / Katharina Dyballa ; Gutachter: Philip Jung ; Betreuer: Kornelius Kraft." Dortmund : Universitätsbibliothek Dortmund, 2017. http://d-nb.info/1149920440/34.
Full text
40
Gershkowitz, Todd M. "Creating an incentive for investor intermediaries to improve corporate governance." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/37115.
Full textAbstract:
Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2006.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 95-98).
At the end of the 1980s, there was some speculation that leveraged buyouts (LBOs) would lead to the demise of the public company in favor of privately owned companies after a decade of the market for corporate control serving as a check against agency costs and management inefficiency. Of course, this didn't happen, and throughout the 1990s, in addition to the market for corporate control, the use of stock-based managerial incentives served a similar purpose. But the failure of these measures to prevent the next cycle of corporate governance crises that occurred in the last five years (e.g., WorldCom, Enron) ushered in an era of hard governance whereby market mechanisms and incentives have given way to Sarbanes-Oxley legislation and stock exchange rules designed to ensure proper stewardship of companies by their boards of directors. A central theme of this thesis is that, although this new era of hard governance might have decreased the degree of information asymmetry between investors and their agents, and thus improved the state of corporate governance, it may be that this has simply lulled us into a false sense of security until the next cycle of corporate governance crises. Companies might adopt symbolic mechanisms that are decoupled from actual practice to evidence compliance with increasing rules and regulations.
(cont.) Some research suggests that a different course-soft governance-is necessary to foster a constructive relationship between companies and their investors, through investor intermediaries such as hedge funds. Soft governance refers to the exercise of voice by investor intermediaries instead of exit (i.e., trading out of a company's stock). It is believed that not only is soft governance necessary to supplement hard governance, but that the lack of it might also be a significant lost opportunity that could contribute to an erosion of U.S. business competitiveness. This thesis is devoted to an assessment of a specific mechanism for instituting soft governance, referred to as Ownership Shares, a concept introduced by the founder of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Robert A. G. Monks, in 2004.
by Todd M. Gershkowitz.
S.M.
41
Mohlin, Ingela, and Malin Norrman. "Kontrollerande aktieägare och företagsvärde : En empirisk studie av hur den kontrollerande aktieägarens kapitalandel respektive röstandel påverkar ett företags värde." Thesis, Uppsala University, Department of Economics, 2005. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-5958.
Full text
42
Gao, Jie, and 高洁. "Essays on incentive contracts, earnings management, expectation management and related issues." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2009. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B43278656.
Full text
43
Gao, Jie. "Essays on incentive contracts, earnings management, expectation management and related issues." Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 2009. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B43278656.
Full text
44
Dostálová, Iveta. "Využití nástrojů interního marketingu pro zvýšení spokojenosti zaměstnanců." Master's thesis, Vysoké učení technické v Brně. Fakulta podnikatelská, 2020. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-416853.
Full textAbstract:
The diploma thesis focuses on the use of internal marketing to increase satisfaction of the employees in the specific company. There is a theoretical background of given issue in the theoretical part. The analytical part is centred on the analysis and description of the current situation in the company. One part of the analysis is also a questionnaire. In the proposal part, the definite solutions are introduced in accordance to gained information. These changes will lead to an increase of the employee satisfaction.
45
Hjorth, Amanda, and Rundström Julia Pantzar. "Transparens i skatteredovisning : Vad anser koncernskattechefer?" Thesis, Högskolan i Skövde, Institutionen för handel och företagande, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:his:diva-13070.
Full textAbstract:
Bakgrund: OECD har tillsammans med G20-länderna beslutat att koncerner skall skatterapportera i enlighet med ett nytt underlag utifrån en ny lagstiftning, som heter Country-By-Country-rapportering (CbCr). Detta innebär att företagen skall börja rapportera bland annat betald skatt och sina anställda per jurisdiktion där företaget verkar och på så vis kommer en ökad transparens inom skatteredovisning att ske. Ur myndigheters synpunkt är detta en ändring mot det positiva, men frågan blir vad företagen och dess koncernskattechefer anser om denna ändring i skatteraportering. Syfte: Uppsatsens syfte är att identifiera och beskriva koncernskattechefers attityder till en ny lagstiftning som ändrar dagens skatterapportering genom CbCr som leder till en ökad transparens i skatteredovisningen, samt att se vad som påverkar identifierad attityd. Denna studie kommer att bidra genom att ge ett empiriskt underlag som öppnar för framtida forskning kring attityder hos koncernskattechefer vid den ökade transparensen i skatteredovisning. Studien ger också ett kunskapsunderlag för statliga myndigheter, i synnerhet skattemyndigheter, och för berörda koncerner samt svenskt näringsliv. Metod: Genom en kvalitativ metod med intervjuer av koncernskattechefer hos 8 stora koncerner samt skatteverket har empiriskt material samlats in som leder till en vidare analys och slutsats. Slutsats: De mest framträdande resultaten i denna uppsats har varit att en del koncernskattechefer ser samband mellan skatt och socialt ansvar och är därmed positiva till implementeringen eftersom det kommer att stärka det sociala kontraktet. Andra koncernskattechefer ser risker med CbCr och ökade kostnader och därmed minskade incitamentsersättningar och har en negativ attityd till en ökad transparens i skatteredovisningen.Background: A decision made by OECD, together with G20-countries says that Corporate Groups shall report report tax according to new guideline, called Country-By-Country-reporting. This means that corporate groups for example will report tax paid per jurisdiction and therefore will the tax transparency be increased. According to authorities, the new implementation is positive but the question is whether the corporate groups and their corporate group tax managers will be positive or not. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to identify and explain attitudes of tax managers when a new legislation changes today´s tax reporting in the form of a CbC-report which will increase transparency in the tax reporting, and what elements are behind these identified attitudes.This study will contribute by giving an empirical material thats opens to further research about corporate group tax managers attitudes with increased tax transparency. The study also gives better knowledge for public authorities, particularly the tax authority and to concerned corporate groups. Method: Through a qualitative method with interviews with corporate group tax managers with 8 large corporate groups and tax authorities, empirical material has been gathered, which leads to further analysis and a conclusion. Conclusion: The most prominent results in this essay has been the fact that some corporate group tax managers sees the connection between tax and social responsibility and therefor are positive to the implementation because it will strengthen the social contract.Other corporate group tax managers sees the hazards with CbCr and appurtenant costs and therefor decreased incentive compensation. These corporate group tax managers have a negative attitudes towards an increased tax transparency.
46
Wu, Kaishu. "The Interaction of Incentive and Opportunity in Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Financially Constrained Firms." Thesis, University of Oregon, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/23753.
Full textAbstract:
I hypothesize and find that the variation in corporate tax avoidance is jointly determined by firms’ incentive and opportunities to avoid taxes. Specifically, the positive relation between financial constraints (my proxy for an incentive to avoid taxes) and tax avoidance is significantly stronger for firms with high tax planning opportunities (TPO), where TPO is the distance between a firm’s actual and predicted ETRs. I further show that firms with TPOs based on high permanent (temporary) book-tax differences exhibit more permanent (temporary) book-tax differences under financial constraints. From a risk perspective, I find no evidence that financially constrained firms with low TPO exhibit more tax risk but some evidence that those with high TPO do so. In general, the findings in this paper provide evidence consistent with an incentive-opportunity interaction story to help explain differences in corporate tax avoidance.
47
Moore, Elwood D. "The Relationship between Fitness-Based Incentive Programs and Exercise Adherence in a Corporate Fitness Facility." Fogler Library, University of Maine, 2003. http://www.library.umaine.edu/theses/pdf/MooreED2003.pdf.
Full text
48
Schaffner, Carmen Paternostro. "A dança expressionista alemã: contribuições e incentivos para a dança na Bahia." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFBA, 2013. http://www.repositorio.ufba.br/ri/handle/ri/8157.
Full textAbstract:
Submitted by Diana Alves (ppgdancaufba.adm@gmail.com) on 2013-01-25T12:57:03Z
No. of bitstreams: 2
Dissertação Corrigida.pdf: 14184767 bytes, checksum: 2cc40030e7b591d6053bf9b3235f9fe4 (MD5)
Carmen Pré-textuais novas.pdf: 36205 bytes, checksum: 8545b3edbfca63586926ec744fea8aca (MD5)Made available in DSpace on 2013-01-25T12:57:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação Corrigida.pdf: 14184767 bytes, checksum: 2cc40030e7b591d6053bf9b3235f9fe4 (MD5) Carmen Pré-textuais novas.pdf: 36205 bytes, checksum: 8545b3edbfca63586926ec744fea8aca (MD5)
FAPESB
Trata essa dissertação de desenvolver estudos e pesquisas sobre A Dança Expressionista Alemã: Contribuições e Incentivos para a Dança na Bahia, que poderão trazer novos entendimentos da dança contemporânea, assim como agregar informações e análises acadêmicas com relação à importância da criação da Escola de Dança da UFBA e sua permanência como centro de excelência nesta arte. Apoiada em conhecimentos extraídos de publicações teóricas e históricas, aprendizagens adquiridas, processos de experimentação, encenações chaves, coreografias marcantes, percursos artísticos representativos e materiais documentais, a pesquisa abrange outras áreas como estética, filosofia e história para discutir dança em sua especificidade. Serão avaliados os conceitos do movimento expressionista alemão e sua influência sobre a Ausdruckstanz (dançaexpressão), sua estrutura e alicerces teóricos influenciados por métodos pioneiros, desenvolvidos principalmente por François Delsart, Rudolf Laban e Oskar Schlemmer da Bauhaus.
Programa de Pós Graduação em Dança- Escola de Dança
49
Gomes, João Pedro Leal. "O tratamento fiscal dos encargos com juros enquanto incentivo ao endividamento." Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/4650.
Full textAbstract:
Mestrado em Contabilidade, Fiscalidade e Finanças EmpresariaisEste trabalho, baseado na revisão de literatura e na análise do sistema fiscal português e de outros países da União Europeia (UE), tem por objectivo indagar de que modo o endividamento pode ser incentivado pelas normas fiscais e quais as soluções que têm sido acolhidas para minimizar essa influência na estrutura financeira das empresas. Assim, o facto de os encargos com juros relativos ao capital alheio poderem ser dedutíveis para efeitos de determinação do lucro tributável das sociedades torna esta forma de financiamento mais vantajosa do que poderia acontecer com o mesmo montante a ser investido através da forma de capital próprio. Este tratamento preferencial dado aos juros não existe somente em Portugal. Apesar da existência de diversas regras adoptadas quer por Portugal, quer pelos diversos Estados Membros (EM) da UE para reduzir esta distorção, o tratamento fiscal dos encargos com juros, continua a ser extremamente vantajoso face à fonte de financiamento via capital próprio. Com base na análise empreendida apresentam-se algumas sugestões de alteração do sistema fiscal português e indicam-se pistas para investigação futura.
This work based on literature review and analysis of the Portuguese tax system and other European Union (EU) countries, which objective is to ask how the debt can be encouraged by tax rules and the solutions that have been taken to minimize this influence in the financial structure of companies. Thus, the fact that interest expenses relating to borrowed capital may be deductible for purposes of determining the taxable profits of the companies make this the most advantageous form of financing of what could happen with the same amount to be invested by the form of equity. This preferential treatment given to interest does not only exist in Portugal. Despite the existence of various rules adopted either by Portugal and the various EU Member States (MS) to reduce this distortion, the tax treatment of interest payments, continues to be extremely advantageous in view of the source of financing through equity. Based on the analysis taken we present some suggestions for amending the Portuguese tax system and indicates clues for future research.
50
"Corporate Social Responsibility and Compensational Incentives." Thesis, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10388/ETD-2015-08-2209.
Full textAbstract:
We construct a measure of CEO concern for non-equity stakeholders based on corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores, and we investigate how such incentives affect firm leverage and cash holding. In general, we find that non-equity stakeholder incentives decrease leverage and increase cash holding, after controlling for CEO managerial incentives and other firm characteristics. Our findings suggest that corporate social responsibility benefit non-equity stakeholders, which may come at the expense of shareholders.