Relevant bibliographies by topics / Corporate incentives

Academic literature on the topic 'Corporate incentives'

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Published: 10 December 2022
Last updated: 28 January 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Corporate incentives"

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Tang, Lu, Shihan Zhang, Chenhui Ding, and Jinyao Huan. "How Can the Sustainable Motivational Effect of Equity Incentives on Corporate Performance Be Exploited?—A Study Based on the Moderating Effect of Aspiration Level." Sustainability 14, no. 24 (December 9, 2022): 16485. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su142416485.

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How equity incentives affect corporate performance has become a consensus. However, the question of how to maximize the sustainable incentive effect of equity incentives on corporate performance and avoid “short-sighted” behavior under equity incentives has not yet been resolved. This research re-examines the sustainable incentive of equity incentives and examines the moderating role of aspiration levels based on the behavioral theory of the firm and the prospect theory. Applying panel data comprised 9588 observations from Chinese A-share listed companies spanning the period from 2011 to 2019, this study found that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between equity incentives and corporate performance. Aspiration surplus negatively moderates the curvilinear inverted U-shaped relationship. As the level of aspiration surplus changes from low to high, the curvilinear relationship between equity incentives and corporate performance is weakened. Aspiration loss positively moderates the curvilinear inverted U-shaped relationship. As the level of aspiration loss changes from low to high, the curvilinear relationship between equity incentives and corporate performance is enhanced. This study demonstrates the importance of aspiration level between equity incentives and corporate performance, guiding firms to focus on the implementation scenario as an influencing factor in order to improve the sustainable incentive effect of equity incentives.
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Mulia, Rahmi Putri, Herlina Helmy, and Mia Angelina Setiawan. "Equity Risk Incentives dan Corporate Tax Aggresiveness." Wahana Riset Akuntansi 7, no. 1 (June 25, 2019): 1437. http://dx.doi.org/10.24036/wra.v7i1.104567.

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This study aims to examine the equity risk incentives relationship with corporate tax aggressiveness. This study uses four proxies to measure corporate tax aggressiveness variables, namely Cash Effectives Tax Rate (CETR), Tax Shelter, Unrecognized Tax Benefits (UTB), and Discretionary Book Tax Differences (DTAX). The equity risk incentives variable is measured using the annual natural total log of compensation of the key management. The study population was manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2017. The study samples were determined by purposive sampling method so that samples for each CETR, Shelter, UTB and DTAX were obtained were 235, 180, 210 and 205 companies. Based on panel data regression analysis, the results show that 1) Equity Risk Incentive is negatively related to Cash Effectives Tax Rate but not significant, 2) Equity Risk Incentive is positively related to Tax Shelter but not significant, 3) Equity Risk Incentive is negatively related to Unrecognized Tax Benefits not significant, and 4) Equity Risk Incentive is positively related to the Discretionary Book Tax Differences but not significant. The conclusion of this study is that equity risk incentives are not positively related significantly with corporate tax aggressiveness so the hypothesis is rejected.Keywords: Equity Risk Incentives; Tax Aggressiveness
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Liu, Baohua, Wan Huang, and Lei Wang. "Performance-based equity incentives, vesting restrictions, and corporate innovation." Nankai Business Review International 10, no. 1 (February 21, 2019): 138–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/nbri-10-2018-0061.

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Purpose Based on the institutional background of mandatory requirement of performance-based executive equity incentives, this paper aims to investigate the impacts of executive equity incentives, vesting periods and vesting performance conditions on corporate innovation. Design/methodology/approach The empirical analysis is based on the detailed data of equity incentives in China’s listed companies from 2006 to 2014, the Tobit method is implemented to estimate the regression coefficients, and the instrumental variable (IV) approach, Heckman two stage regression, propensity score matching and difference-in-difference models are adopted to solve the problem of endogeneity in several robust tests. Findings This paper documents that equity incentives and vesting periods are significantly and positively related to corporate innovation measured by R&D investment and patent applications, yet requirements on vesting performance impede corporate innovative activities. Specifically, compared with non-equity incentive companies, the R&D investment and the number of patent applications of equity incentive companies are 40 and 46.2 per cent higher, respectively. A one year increase in equity incentive duration can correspondingly increase the R&D investment by 15 per cent and the patent applications by 18.3 per cent. However, a one standard deviation increase in industry-adjusted ROE target reduces corporate R&D investment by 5 per cent and the patent applications by 8.39 per cent. The main empirical findings still hold after several robust tests. Research limitations/implications This paper confirms that the impact of performance-based compensation system on corporate innovation depends on its structure. Specifically, the empirical findings suggest that equity incentive plans being correctly designed can enhance corporate innovative activities, but myopic managers will damage the corporate innovation. Originality/value This paper investigates the influence of equity incentive structure on equity incentive effect based on the institutional background of mandatory requirement of performance-based executive equity incentives. It provides an opportunity to understand the mystery of equity incentives, which helps to enrich the structure of equity incentive theoretically. The empirical evidence confirms the importance of tolerating short-term failure and extending the horizon of managerial decision-making on promoting innovation. Overall, the research indicates that only well-designed equity incentive plans can promote innovation, which contributes to regulators and practitioners to form a rational understanding of the premise of equity incentives in promoting innovation and provides a reference for their decision-making.
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Chee, Seungmin, Wooseok Choi, and Jae Eun Shin. "The Non-Linear Relationship Between CEO Compensation Incentives And Corporate Tax Avoidance." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 33, no. 3 (April 28, 2017): 439–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v33i3.9935.

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This study examines the effect of CEO compensation incentives on corporate tax avoidance. Unlike prior literature that assumes a monotonic relation between executive compensation incentives and tax avoidance, we find a non-linear relation between the two. Specifically, we find that CEO compensation incentives exhibit a positive relation with corporate tax avoidance at low levels of compensation incentives, whereas they show a negative relation at high levels of compensation incentives. We further find that the non-linear relationship between CEO compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance does not exist for the subsample of S&P500 firms. Collectively, we provide evidence of the two counter effective forces, namely, - the incentive alignment effect and the risk-reducing effect, - that help explain the effect of CEO compensation incentives on tax avoidance.
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Li, Shujia. "Research on the impact of equity incentives on corporate tax avoidance." BCP Business & Management 21 (July 20, 2022): 14–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v21i.1169.

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Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper selects the data of China's A - share listed companies from 2008 to 2021 as the research sample, to empirically explore the impact of equity incentives on corporate tax avoidance. The result shows that equity incentives can promote corporate tax avoidance, agency cost is an important way for equity incentives to influence on corporate tax avoidance, overseas business significantly promotes the tax avoidance effect of equity incentive, and considering the nature of property rights , equity incentives promote tax avoidance of state-owned enterprises, the role is weaker than that of non-state-owned enterprises .Based on the regression results, it is necessary to grasp the focus of tax inspection, improve the tax law and develop mixed ownership economy.
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Huang, Yizhe, and Yaning Xing. "Equity Incentive and Firm Value: Evidence from the Chinese Stock Market based on Panel Regression Model." BCP Business & Management 26 (September 19, 2022): 761–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v26i.2036.

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Nowadays, more and more firms use equity incentives to encourage executives to improve firm value. In order to have a better understanding of it, this article analyzes the relationship between the equity incentives and the firm value. Based on agency theory and management incentive plan, we explore the influence of corporate equity incentives on corporate value. We download data of A-share listed companies in China’s two big Exchanges. In our process, panel regression model is set to prove our point. Our financial data come from CSMAR database and relevant data from the Wind financial terminal. After using Stata and calculating, we get 15,556 firm -year observation value, and our results show that in those companies, the implementation of corporate equity incentives will significantly promote corporate value improvement, and this relationship is still significantly established after experiencing A series of robustness. Further, there also provides us data to analyze four different types of companies. The result shows that the positive effect of equity incentives is greater in state-owned enterprises, enterprises audited by the Big Four auditors, enterprises with a high proportion of shares held by institutional investors, and companies with high growth. This paper provides support for the positive effect of the current equity incentive. At the same time, our analysis of different types of companies provides a basis for future research on a particular type.
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Zhang, Weiying. "China’s SOE reform: A corporate governance perspective." Corporate Ownership and Control 3, no. 4 (2006): 132–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i4p14.

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This paper argues that Chinese state enterprise reform has been relatively successful in solving the short-term managerial incentive problem through both its formal, explicit incentive mechanism and its informal, implicit incentive mechanism. However, it has failed to solve the long-term managerial incentive problem and the management selection problem. An incumbent manager may have incentives to make short-term (but hidden) profits, but at present there is no mechanism to ensure that only qualified people will be selected for management. The fundamental reason is that managers of SOEs are selected by bureaucrats rather than capitalists. Since bureaucrats have the authority to select managers but do not need bear the consequences of their selection, they have no proper incentives to find and appoint high ability people. Since good performance does not guarantee that the incumbent manager will stay long, the manager does not have long-term incentives. The paper also argues that these built-in problems of state ownership cannot be solved by state-dominated corporatization. Bankruptcy has not played a role in disciplining managers because the state-owned banks have neither the incentive nor the ability to enforce debt contracts. To ensure that only high ability people will be professional managers and that managers can be well disciplined, the authority of selecting management must be transferred from bureaucrats to capitalists. This calls for privatization of both state enterprises and state banks. China is well on its way to privatization of state enterprises, but privatization of state banks is yet to come
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Addison, Prue F. E., and Joseph W. Bull. "Conservation accord: Corporate incentives." Science 360, no. 6394 (June 14, 2018): 1195.3–1196. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.aau0788.

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Arshad, Roshayani, Faizah Darus, and Dennis Taylor. "Board composition, mimetic behaviour and corporate voluntary disclosures." Corporate Board role duties and composition 4, no. 3 (2008): 16–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv4i3art2.

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This study examines the effects of board composition and mimetic behaviour on the extent and credibility of corporate voluntary disclosure. The investigation is based on the annual reports of 155 Malaysian listed companies during the period when these companies faced new corporate governance regulation. This study provides evidence that under the influence of dominant owners on board, management voluntary disclosure decisions are driven by incentives to conform when their company is structured to meet expectations of good corporate governance. Such incentive seems to override incentives to disclose credible information to outside investors.
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Deden Tarmidi, Agustin Fadjarenie, and Lin Oktris. "Corporate Tax Policy: Impact Tunnelling Incentive, Debt Covenant, And Transfer Pricing." Jurnal Akuntansi 27, no. 1 (January 12, 2023): 157–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.24912/ja.v27i1.1249.

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Transfer pricing is considered one of the corporate policies for minimizing the tax burden. This study aims to analyze the role of transfer pricing in the influence of tunnelling incentives and debt covenants on corporate tax policy. Manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange are unit analyses in this study. Their 398-panel data after purposive sampling. Using STATA, this study found that tunnelling incentives are used in transfer pricing activities, while debt covenant and transfer pricing are used in management in tax policies. Meanwhile, debt covenant is not widely used in the transfer pricing scheme, and tunnelling incentive also does not affect management on corporate tax policy. The mediating role of transfer pricing is not found in the indirect effect of tunnelling incentives and debt covenants on corporate tax policy. This result explains that transfer pricing and debt covenants are commonly used by companies in their tax policy.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Corporate incentives"

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Novaes, Walter. "Managerial incentives and corporate control." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/12595.

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Amiot, André, and Johansson Fredrik Hallin. "Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance and CEO compenastion incentives." Thesis, Högskolan i Gävle, Företagsekonomi, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hig:diva-28334.

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Society's awareness of the importance of environmental-, social- and economic issues has increased over the last decades. This increased interest has led to the development of the Corporate Social Responsibility concept (CSR) in which companies actively work simultaneously with environmental, social and economic issues that extend beyond what is legally required by these companies in order to achieve a more sustainable society. As the interest in CSR has increased, a debate whether CSR is value-creating or should be considered an agency cost has arisen. To approach this question previous researches have used the CEO compensation to examine if the engagement in CSR actually is an agency cost or a value creating activity and found that agency costs can be mitigated by tying incentives to performance. Based on these assumptions this study will examine the link between CSR and agency costs using the existence of a CSR related compensation incentives for CEOs related agency costs. This study is characterized to be positivistic and within the field of positive accounting research as it has deductive approach in which hypotheses are formulated that this study intends to test which are based on what fundamental economic theories and previous research have found that may affect agency costs. The empirical data are manually collected from companies’ on NasdaqOMX Stockholm 2016 annual reports followed by an analysis of the data using univariate t-test and multiple regressions in order to relate these findings to previous research. This study finds no direct evidence that CEO compensation incentives related to CSR affect agency costs which means that we have not closed the ongoing debate whether CSR engagement is creating shareholder value or should be considered an agency cost. Nonetheless, the results show indications that agency costs are higher for companies that use CEO compensation incentives related to CSR which indicates that CSR is not beneficial to shareholders but should instead be regarded as an agency cost at the expense of shareholders. The result also indicates that a positive accounting research is not particularly useful on a small stock market with reliable results because the findings can not be generalized in a broader perspective
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Li, Xinping. "Managerial incentives, capital structure and corporate governance /." May be available electronically:, 2008. http://proquest.umi.com/login?COPT=REJTPTU1MTUmSU5UPTAmVkVSPTI=&clientId=12498.

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Covas, Francisco. "Managerial incentives, corporate investment, and economic preference /." Diss., Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC campuses, 2004. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3130203.

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Amadeus, Musa. "Essays on the Corporate Implications of Compensation Incentives." Thesis, Boston College, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104367.

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Thesis advisor: Ronnie Sadka
This dissertation is comprised of three essays which examine the ramifications of executive compensation incentive structures on corporate outcomes. In the first essay, I present evidence which suggests that executive compensation convexity, measured as the sensitivity of managerial equity compensation portfolios to stock volatility, predicts firm-specific crashes. I find that a bottom-to-top decile change in compensation convexity results in a 21% increase in a firm's unconditional ex-post idiosyncratic crash risk. In contrast, I do not find robust evidence of a symmetric relation between compensation convexity and a firm's idiosyncratic positive jump risk. Finally, I exploit exogenous variation in compensation convexity, arising from a change in the expensing treatment of executive stock options, in buttressing my interpretations within a natural experiment setting. My results suggest that managerial equity compensation portfolios do not augment a firm's future idiosyncratic crash risk because they link managerial wealth to equity prices, but rather because they tie managerial wealth to the volatility of a firm's equity. In the second essay, I exploit an exogenous negative shock to CEO compensation convexity in examining the differential ramifications of option pay and risk-taking incentives on the systematic and idiosyncratic volatility of the firm. I find new evidence that is largely consistent with the notion that compensation convexity, stemming from option convexity, predominantly incentivizes under-diversified risk-averse CEOs to increase the value of their option portfolios by increasing the systematic volatility of the firms they manage. I hypothesize that this effect manifests as systematic volatility is readily more hedgeable than idiosyncratic volatility from the perspective of risk-averse executives who are overexposed to the idiosyncratic risk of their firms. If managers use options as a conduit through which they can gamble with shareholder wealth by overexposing them to suboptimal systematic volatility, options are not serving their intended contracting function. Instead of decreasing agency costs of risk, by encouraging CEOs to adopt innovative positive NPV projects that may be primarily characterized by idiosyncratic risk, option pay may have contributed to the same frictions it was intended to reduce. In the third essay, I present evidence that is consistent with the notion that certain managerial debt-like remuneration structures decrease the likelihood of firm-specific positive stock-price jumps. Namely, I find that a bottom-to-top decile increase in the present value of CEO pension pay leads to a roughly 25\% decrease in a firm's unconditional ex-post jump probability. However, I do not find that CEO deferred compensation decreases firm jump risk. Finally, I find that information in option-implied volatility smirks does not appear to reflect these dynamics. Together, these results suggest that not all debt-like compensation mechanisms decrease managerial risk-taking equally
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015
Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management
Discipline: Finance
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Fairburn, James Anthony. "Promotions, incentives and the market for corporate control." Thesis, University of Southampton, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.241164.

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Tsekeris, Athanasios. "Managerial incentives and corporate acquisitions : evidence from the US." Thesis, University of Strathclyde, 2015. http://oleg.lib.strath.ac.uk:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=26116.

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This thesis examines the impact of executive compensation on the quality of corporate acquisition decisions. A number of different issues are empirically investigated. The analysis begins with the examination of the relation between the incentives managers are provided with via their compensation contracts and the riskiness of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) investigating whether this relation is affected by the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. The study then focuses on the performance of acquiring firms exploring how and whether managerial incentives can induce value-increasing acquisitions conditional on the intensity of M&A activity. The final part of the empirical analysis examines whether the legal status of the target firm has any implications for the effectiveness of incentive compensation to mitigate managerial risk-aversion and increase shareholder value. The thesis contributes both to academic literature and to practice by identifying areas of inefficiencies of equity-based compensation contracts to mitigate agency costs. More specifically, new evidence is provided on the effectiveness of incentive compensation to induce risk-taking activity under the impact of stricter regulation. While compensation-related incentives are positively associated with the riskiness of acquisition decisions before 2002, managers have become considerably less responsive to such incentives after the enactment of SOX. Moreover, although incentive compensation can improve deal performance and overcome adverse selection concerns by inducing managers to acquire when it is optimal to do, it is not related to value-increasing decisions when acquisitions are initiated during periods of merger waves. It is further found that equity-based compensation can be rendered ineffective to mitigate agency costs when a publicly listed firm is acquired. Given these inefficiencies, a number of recommendations are made for the improvement of the design of executive compensation contracts that could provide valuable guidelines to remuneration committees to reduce excessive compensation costs and benefit shareholders.
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Gaertner, Fabio B. "CEO After-tax Compensation Incentives and Corporate Tax Avoidance." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/145277.

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I examine the association between CEOs' after-tax incentives and their firms' levels of tax avoidance. Economic theory holds that firms should compensate CEOs on an after-tax basis when the expected tax savings generated from incentive alignment outweigh the incremental compensation demanded by CEOs for bearing additional tax-related compensation risk. Using publicly available data, I estimate CEOs' after-tax incentives and find a negative relation between the use of after-tax incentives and effective tax rates. While the results suggest that greater use of after-tax measures in CEO compensation leads to higher tax savings, it is possible that these savings will lead to lower pre-tax returns, or implicit taxes. Therefore, I also examine the association between the use of after-tax incentives and implicit taxes and find a positive association between the two. Finally, I find a significant positive relation between after-tax incentives and total CEO compensation, suggesting that CEOs who are compensated after-tax demand a premium for the additional risk they bear.
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Imes, Matthew Douglas. "Essays In Executive Incentives." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2019. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/596467.

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Business Administration/Finance
Ph.D.
My dissertation consists of three chapters which explores various aspects of executive incentives. In the first chapter, I examine the relation between executive equity pay and stock returns. By compensating CEOs and CFOs differently, shareholders can create incentive conflicts between the firms’ top two managers that potentially affects shareholder wealth. On the one hand, incentive conflict potentially benefits shareholders by improving information exchange and establishing checks and balances in decisions made jointly by the CEO and CFO but alternatively, can harm shareholders by increasing risk through impeding the decision-making processes. I examine the relation between CEO-CFO incentive conflict and stock returns. The analysis indicates that an investor who routinely buy firms with the least incentive conflict and shorts firms with the greatest incentive conflict between CEO and CFOs will outperform the market by 475 basis points per year. I investigate whether risk, firm performance, or market inefficiency explain the excess returns and provide evidence that shareholders demand higher returns for bearing risk associated with CEO-CFO incentive similarities. Next, I explore the impact of executive incentives on bondholder wealth through looking at bond yields. Firms compensate managers to maximize shareholder value, yet these same incentives affect bondholder risk. I investigate the relation between executive equity pay and the cost of debt. My findings indicate a “u-shaped” relation between bond yields and equity pay. These results are consistent with the notion that bondholders prefer a moderate amount of executive equity pay and above or below that level, bondholders increase yields to protect their interests. Instrumenting equity pay using CEO heritage, I find support for a curvilinear relation. These findings suggest that moderate levels of equity pay mitigate the agency costs between firm shareholders and bondholders. Finally, I study the affect of board gender diversity on CEO and director compensation. Females occupy only about 12% of director positions on corporate boards. I find that boards with more female’s onboard tend to give CEOs larger fractions of equity in their compensation packages while incentivizing directors with lower fractions of equity pay. This evidence is consistent with the notion that female board members are superior monitors yet also possess greater risk-aversion than male board members.
Temple University--Theses
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Gordon, Bruce L. (Bruce Lee). "Corporate Sale-and-Leaseback Transactions: An Examination of Corporate Incentives, Wealth Effects and Dealer Spreads." Thesis, University of North Texas, 1993. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc279191/.

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There is a limited amount of research dealing with the wealth effects of sale-and-leaseback transactions, but previous research has focused predominantly on the tax effects of these transactions. The results of these studies have often been in conflict with one another. This dissertation shows that tax effects do play a role in determining the wealth effect of sale-and-leasebacks on stockholders, but there exists a framework of finance research that suggests several other factors could play a determining role as well.
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Books on the topic "Corporate incentives"

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Auerbach, Alan J. Tax loss carryforwards and corporate tax incentives. [Cambridge, Mass: Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology], 1986.

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Desai, Mihir A. Corporate tax avoidance and high powered incentives. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004.

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Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development., ed. Corporate tax incentives for foreign direct investment. Paris: OECD, 2001.

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Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Secretary-General. Board practices: Incentives and governing risks. Paris: OECD, 2011.

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Terando, William D. Incentives behind corporate formations of master limited partnerships. [Urbana, Ill.]: College of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1991.

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Lerner, Joshua. Innovation and incentives: Evidence from corporate R&D. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.

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Modén, Karl-Markus. Tax incentives of corporate mergers and foreign direct investments. [Göteborg]: Göteborgs universitet, 1993.

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Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development., ed. Business and the environment: Policy incentives and corporate responses. Paris: OECD, 2007.

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John, Kose. Risk-shifting incentives and signalling through corporate capital structure. New York: Salomon Brothers Center for the Study of Financial Institutions, Graduate School of Business Administration, New York University, 1987.

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John, Kose. Risk-shifting incentives and signalling through corporate capital structure. New York: Salomon Brothers Center for the Study of Financial Institutions, Graduate School of Business Administration, New York University, 1987.

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Book chapters on the topic "Corporate incentives"

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Geiler, Philipp, and Luc Renneboog. "Executive Compensation: Incentives and Externalities." In Corporate Governance, 263–83. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118258439.ch14.

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Agell, Jonas, Peter Englund, and Jan Södersten. "The Corporate Response." In Incentives and Redistribution in the Welfare State, 72–105. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-333-99485-6_4.

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Lahlou, Ismail. "Director Compensation Incentives and Acquisition Outcomes." In Corporate Board of Directors, 127–82. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05017-7_4.

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Oh, Won-Yong, Zhenhua Li, and Seoyeon Park. "The Effects of CEO Characteristics and Incentives on Corporate Social Responsibility." In Corporate Responsibility, 162–82. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137450722_8.

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Berglöf, Erik. "Corporate Governance, Financial Systems and the Transition to Capitalism: Towards a Conceptual Framework." In Property Relations, Incentives and Welfare, 147–70. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25287-9_6.

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Centonze, Francesco. "Public–Private Partnerships and Agency Problems: The Use of Incentives in Strategies to Combat Corruption." In Preventing Corporate Corruption, 43–67. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04480-4_4.

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Yeh, Chris. "The Misaligned Incentives that Hamper Innovation, and the Simple Structural Changes that Fix these Problems." In Corporate-Startup-Partnerschaften, 93–99. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-64051-7_9.

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Schön, Wolfgang. "Transfer Pricing – Business Incentives, International Taxation and Corporate Law." In Fundamentals of International Transfer Pricing in Law and Economics, 47–67. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25980-7_4.

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Lilford, Eric, and Pietro Guj. "Corporate Income Tax Provisions and Fiscal Incentives Specific to Mining." In Mining Taxation, 71–100. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49821-4_5.

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Erkens, Michael H. R. "Disclosure Incentives, Enforcement, and Culture: Impact on Corporate Risk Disclosure." In Disclosure Behavior of European Firms around the Adoption of IFRS, 53–149. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-13441-9_3.

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Conference papers on the topic "Corporate incentives"

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Han Zhong-xue and Zhou Ting-ting. "Corporate Diversification Discounts: Incentives Diminishing and Investment Misallocation." In 2008 International Seminar on Business and Information Management (ISBIM 2008). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isbim.2008.87.

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Wu, Long, and Yunjing He. "Impact of Tax Incentives on the Efficiency of Corporate Technological Innovation." In 2021 7th International Conference on Information Management (ICIM). IEEE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icim52229.2021.9417145.

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Qiyuan, Chen, and Ma hong. "Senior Executive Incentives and Corporate EVA Based Performance—A Study Based on OLS Model." In 2020 2nd International Conference on Economic Management and Model Engineering (ICEMME). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icemme51517.2020.00171.

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Gao, Yue, and Jianying Zhang. "Empirical Research on Executive Incentives and the Corporate Performances of Chinese Listed Real Estate Companies." In ICCREM 2015. Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engineers, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/9780784479377.122.

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Van, Hao Thien. "The Effectiveness of Corporate Tax Incentives in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment: The case of Vietnam." In Proceedings of the Volgograd State University International Scientific Conference "Competitive, Sustainable and Safe Development of the Regional Economy" (CSSDRE 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/cssdre-19.2019.58.

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Tian, Jinmei. "The Influence of Media Attention and Equity Incentives on Corporate Tax Avoidance in the Information Age." In ICCIR 2021: 2021 International Conference on Control and Intelligent Robotics. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3473714.3473762.

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VILKĖ, Rita, Lina PAREIGIENĖ, and Aldona STALGIENĖ. "CHALLENGES AND INCENTIVES FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: AN AGRARIAN DISCOURSE." In Rural Development 2015. Aleksandras Stulginskis University, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.15544/rd.2015.120.

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Crisis of recent decade had proved many times the interconnectivity and interdependency among all actors, sectors and areas of concern throughout the globalized value chains. Today sustainable development strategies are under reconstruction by global governance bodies together with stakeholders from around the world, concerning the main issue of durable future. Agriculture as main provider of public goods, recently had experienced pressure from public society and entered the debates for an essential review of the underlying support principles, based on multifunctionality, which hardly meet the goals of sustainable development. Recently some evidence appeared that the gap between multifunctionality and sustainability might be closed with help of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The paper aims to disclose the challenges and incentives which accelerated the origination of CSR concept and related discussions in an agrarian discourse through the provision of public goods. Systemic analysis and synthesis of theoretical insights of foreign and local scientific literature and the methods of induction and deduction were applied to investigate the theoretical aspect and characteristics of CSR and public goods in agrarian discourse. Theoretical research results propose that the concept of CSR does provide a basis for further analysis and discussion concerning the role of agriculture as a subject of government support from a broader systems perspective, which means a shift in paradigms, emphasized by movement from the sectoral policy and agricultural support to a more inclusive place-based development.
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Rakićević, Zoran, Jovana Rakićević, and Bojan Balaž. "Examining Internal Environment for Corporate Entrepreneurship: Evidence from Serbian Public Sector." In Organizations at Innovation and Digital Transformation Roundabout. University of Maribor Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.18690/978-961-286-388-3.49.

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In today’s fast-changing, turbulent and highly competitive business environment, internal entrepreneurship, i.e. intrapreneurship is seen as an instrument for established organizations to provide a fast response to new business challenges and opportunities. It is especially demanding and challenging to encourage intrapreneurship in the public sector organizations where, compared to the private sector, there is a much greater diversity of objectives to be fulfilled, as well as a greater conflict between profit and social responsibility; less flexibility in the decision-making process; and where financial incentives for improvements are much smaller. This paper examines the level of internal environment development for internal entrepreneurship in the public sector of the Republic of Serbia, as well as the differences in the tendency towards internal entrepreneurship among three categories of public organizational systems (public institutions, public administration, and public enterprises). For this purpose, Corporate Entrepreneurship Assessment Instrument (CEAI) developed by Kuratko, Hornsby, and Covin (2014) is used as a research tool developed for diagnosing organization’s internal environment for entrepreneurship through five dimensions: top management support, work discretion/autonomy, rewards/reinforcement, time availability, and organizational boundaries. The Survey sample covers 126 employees from Serbian public sector organizations.
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Li, Haihong, Yufei Wang, and Jiting Xu. "Empirical Research on Management Incentives and Corporate Risk-taking Based on Analysis of A-share Listed Companies." In Proceedings of the 2019 3rd International Conference on Education, Management Science and Economics (ICEMSE 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icemse-19.2019.63.

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Wei, Wang. "Managerial equity incentives withdrawal and corporate value of listed companies in China: Analyses based on institutional change perspective." In 2013 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2013.6586483.

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Reports on the topic "Corporate incentives"

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Desai, Mihir, and Dhammika Dharmapala. Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w10471.

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Auerbach, Alan, and James Poterba. Tax Loss Carryforwards and Corporate Tax Incentives. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w1863.

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Poterba, James, Nirupama Rao, and Jeri Seidman. Deferred Tax Positions and Incentives for Corporate Behavior Around Corporate Tax Changes. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12923.

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Lerner, Josh, and Julie Wulf. Innovation and Incentives: Evidence from Corporate R&D. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w11944.

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Gompers, Paul, and Josh Lerner. The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Successes: Organizational Structure, Incentives, and Complementarities. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6725.

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Bernstein, Jeffrey, and M. Ishaq Nadiri. Corporate Taxes and Incentives and the Structure of Production: A Selected Survey. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w2579.

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Abramovsky, Laura, Yani Tyskerud, and Nicolo Bird. Review of corporate tax incentives for investment in low- and middle-income countries. Institute for Fiscal Studies, March 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1920/bn.ifs.2018.bn0229.

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Abramovsky, Laura, Yani Tyskerud, Ataklti Weldeabzgi, India Keable-Elliott, Tom Harris, Nicolo Bird, Edward Abrokwah, and Yohannes Abrha Beyene. Are corporate tax incentives for investment fit for purpose? Revisiting economic principles and evidence from low- and middle-income countries. The IFS, March 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1920/re.ifs.2018.0142.

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Lazonick, William, and Matt Hopkins. Why the CHIPS Are Down: Stock Buybacks and Subsidies in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry. Institute for New Economic Thinking Working Paper Series, September 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.36687/inetwp165.

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The Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) is promoting the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) for America Act, introduced in Congress in June 2020. An SIA press release describes the bill as “bipartisan legislation that would invest tens of billions of dollars in semiconductor manufacturing incentives and research initiatives over the next 5-10 years to strengthen and sustain American leadership in chip technology, which is essential to our country’s economy and national security.” On June 8, 2021, the Senate approved $52 billion for the CHIPS for America Act, dedicated to supporting the U.S. semiconductor industry over the next decade. As of this writing, the Act awaits approval in the House of Representatives. This paper highlights a curious paradox: Most of the SIA corporate members now lobbying for the CHIPS for America Act have squandered past support that the U.S. semiconductor industry has received from the U.S. government for decades by using their corporate cash to do buybacks to boost their own companies’ stock prices. Among the SIA corporate signatories of the letter to President Biden, the five largest stock repurchasers—Intel, IBM, Qualcomm, Texas Instruments, and Broadcom—did a combined $249 billion in buybacks over the decade 2011-2020, equal to 71 percent of their profits and almost five times the subsidies over the next decade for which the SIA is lobbying. In addition, among the members of the Semiconductors in America Coalition (SIAC), formed specifically in May 2021 to lobby Congress for the passage of the CHIPS for America Act, are Apple, Microsoft, Cisco, and Google. These firms spent a combined $633 billion on buybacks during 2011-2020. That is about 12 times the government subsidies provided under the CHIPS for America Act to support semiconductor fabrication in the United States in the upcoming decade. If the Congress wants to achieve the legislation’s stated purpose of promoting major new investments in semiconductors, it needs to deal with this paradox. It could, for example, require the SIA and SIAC to extract pledges from its member corporations that they will cease doing stock buybacks as open-market repurchases over the next ten years. Such regulation could be a first step in rescinding Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-18, which has since 1982 been a major cause of extreme income inequality and loss of global industrial competitiveness in the United States.
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Lazonick, William. Investing in Innovation: A Policy Framework for Attaining Sustainable Prosperity in the United States. Institute for New Economic Thinking Working Paper Series, March 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.36687/inetwp182.

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“Sustainable prosperity” denotes an economy that generates stable and equitable growth for a large and growing middle class. From the 1940s into the 1970s, the United States appeared to be on a trajectory of sustainable prosperity, especially for white-male members of the U.S. labor force. Since the 1980s, however, an increasing proportion of the U.S labor force has experienced unstable employment and inequitable income, while growing numbers of the business firms upon which they rely for employment have generated anemic productivity growth. Stable and equitable growth requires innovative enterprise. The essence of innovative enterprise is investment in productive capabilities that can generate higher-quality, lower-cost goods and services than those previously available. The innovative enterprise tends to be a business firm—a unit of strategic control that, by selling products, must make profits over time to survive. In a modern society, however, business firms are not alone in making investments in the productive capabilities required to generate innovative goods and services. Household units and government agencies also make investments in productive capabilities upon which business firms rely for their own investment activities. When they work in a harmonious fashion, these three types of organizations—household units, government agencies, and business firms—constitute “the investment triad.” The Biden administration’s Build Back Better agenda to restore sustainable prosperity in the United States focuses on investment in productive capabilities by two of the three types of organizations in the triad: government agencies, implementing the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, and household units, implementing the yet-to-be-passed American Families Act. Absent, however, is a policy agenda to encourage and enable investment in innovation by business firms. This gaping lacuna is particularly problematic because many of the largest industrial corporations in the United States place a far higher priority on distributing the contents of the corporate treasury to shareholders in the form of cash dividends and stock buybacks for the sake of higher stock yields than on investing in the productive capabilities of their workforces for the sake of innovation. Based on analyzes of the “financialization” of major U.S. business corporations, I argue that, unless Build Back Better includes an effective policy agenda to encourage and enable corporate investment in innovation, the Biden administration’s program for attaining stable and equitable growth will fail. Drawing on the experience of the U.S. economy over the past seven decades, I summarize how the United States moved toward stable and equitable growth from the late 1940s through the 1970s under a “retain-and-reinvest” resource-allocation regime at major U.S. business firms. Companies retained a substantial portion of their profits to reinvest in productive capabilities, including those of career employees. In contrast, since the early 1980s, under a “downsize-and-distribute” corporate resource-allocation regime, unstable employment, inequitable income, and sagging productivity have characterized the U.S. economy. In transition from retain-and-reinvest to downsize-and-distribute, many of the largest, most powerful corporations have adopted a “dominate-and-distribute” resource-allocation regime: Based on the innovative capabilities that they have previously developed, these companies dominate market segments of their industries but prioritize shareholders in corporate resource allocation. The practice of open-market share repurchases—aka stock buybacks—at major U.S. business corporations has been central to the dominate-and-distribute and downsize-and-distribute regimes. Since the mid-1980s, stock buybacks have become the prime mode for the legalized looting of the business corporation. I call this looting process “predatory value extraction” and contend that it is the fundamental cause of the increasing concentration of income among the richest household units and the erosion of middle-class employment opportunities for most other Americans. I conclude the paper by outlining a policy framework that could stop the looting of the business corporation and put in place social institutions that support sustainable prosperity. The agenda includes a ban on stock buybacks done as open-market repurchases, radical changes in incentives for senior corporate executives, representation of workers and taxpayers as directors on corporate boards, reform of the tax system to reward innovation and penalize financialization, and, guided by the investment-triad framework, government programs to support “collective and cumulative careers” of members of the U.S. labor force. Sustained investment in human capabilities by the investment triad, including business firms, would make it possible for an ever-increasing portion of the U.S. labor force to engage in the productive careers that underpin upward socioeconomic mobility, which would be manifested by a growing, robust, and hopeful American middle class.
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