Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Corporate Governance Mechanisms Shareholder Value'
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Khaldi, Mohamed Ali. "Impact des mécanismes de gouvernance sur la création et la répartition de la valeur partenariale." Thesis, Grenoble, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014GRENG007/document.
Full textThe multiplication of financial scandals since year 2000 induced debates and controversies about the governance of public companies. In the contracting paradigm, the debates on corporate governance have largely relied on shareholder value as a dominant model, in which shareholders are the only residual claimants. However, the stakeholder theory builds on the principle that the shareholder-manager agency relationship has to widen to the others stakeholders who intervene in the value creation chain, and that it is necessary to get rid of the hypothesis that shareholders are exclusive residual claimants. This move brings questions about the sharing of the organizational rent, or stakeholder value created by the firm. More specifically, the concept of stakeholder value raises questions about its measurement, its appropriation by the various stakeholders, and about the role of corporate governance mechanisms on that ground. The objective of this research is to investigate the role of firm-specific governance mechanisms (board characteristics, ownership structure) on the creation of stakeholder value on the one hand, and on the distribution of that stakeholder value to the firm and to its explicit stakeholders, on the other hand. Empirical tests are based on a panel of 103 French listed companies observed over three years (2006, 2008, and 2010). The main findings suggest that four mechanisms stand out globally positively associated to the stakeholder value created: board size and board independence, employees' voting rights (shareholder power), and the presence of an Ethics and/or Governance Committee (EGC). In terms of appropriation, two governance mechanisms seem to play a role. Firstly, board size would result in a larger part of the organizational rent captured by shareholders and suppliers, at the expense of customers and the firm itself. Secondly, the presence of an EGC results in a better consideration of the interests of some non-financial stakeholders (customers and employees), whereas the share of rent that is appropriated by financial capital providers (shareholders and debt-holders) decreases. Overall, our results concerning the implementation of an EGC turn out encouraging regarding the capacity of such mechanism to promote effective stakeholder governance within listed companies
Moldenhauer, Benjamin. "Insider ownership, shareholder structures and corporate governance /." Sternenfels : Verl. Wissenschaft & Praxis, 2007. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2882441&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.
Full textMoldenhauer, Benjamin. "Insider ownership, shareholder structures and corporate governance." Sternenfels Verl. Wiss. & Praxis, 2006. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2882441&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.
Full textWeichsler, Tobias. "Corporate Governance und Shareholder Value : eine empirische Untersuchung am Beispiel der Schweiz." kostenfrei, 2009. http://www.biblio.unisg.ch/www/edis.nsf/wwwDisplayIdentifier/3581.
Full textAnis, Radwa Magdy Mohamed. "Disclosure quality, corporate governance mechanisms and firm value." Thesis, University of Stirling, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/1893/24454.
Full textAmiot, André, and Johansson Fredrik Hallin. "Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance and CEO compenastion incentives." Thesis, Högskolan i Gävle, Företagsekonomi, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hig:diva-28334.
Full textPfeiffer, Thomas. "Corporate-Governance-Strukturen interner Märkte /." Wiesbaden : Dt. Univ.-Verl, 2003. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/374159483.pdf.
Full textJizi, Mohammad. "Corporate governance, disclosure content and shareholder value : impacts and interrelationships from the US banking sector." Thesis, Durham University, 2013. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/7359/.
Full textBlüme, Pontus. "Financialisation and Shareholder Value : Concepts of Governance in the Swedish Market for Corporate Control: 1983-2008." Thesis, Stockholms universitet, Institutionen för ekonomisk historia och internationella relationer, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-193939.
Full textWolf, Klaus. "Risikomanagement im Kontext der wertorientierten Unternehmensführung /." Wiesbaden : Dt. Univ.-Verl, 2003. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=010547816&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
Full textDarweesh, Mohamed Saleh. "Correlations Between Corporate Governance, Financial Performance, and Market Value." ScholarWorks, 2015. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/1618.
Full textEl-Faitouri, Ramadan. "An investigation of corporate governance mechanisms and value creation in the United Kingdom." Thesis, University of Liverpool, 2012. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.569050.
Full textWinter, Heike Hommel Michael. "Risikomanagement und effektive Corporate Governance : das Spannungsfeld von wertorientierter Unternehmenssteuerung und externer Rechnungslegung /." Wiesbaden : Dt. Univ.-Verl, 2004. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/388036249.pdf.
Full textNachemson-Ekwall, Sophie. "An institutional analysis of cross-border hostile takeovers : shareholder value, short-termism and regulatory arbitrage on the Swedish stock market during the sixth takeover wave." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Institutionen för Företagande och Ledning, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-1907.
Full textDiss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2012
Pålsson, Andreas. "Aktieägarvärde : Svenska familjeföretags uppfattningar om värdebaserad styrning." Thesis, Linnéuniversitetet, Institutionen för ekonomistyrning och logistik (ELO), 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-26704.
Full textBackground: As more and more companies have begun to focus on shareholder value and corporate governance, new normative financial functions as value-based management have emerged. Thus, it is interesting to investigate how Swedish family businesses of different characters experiencing this trend and whether it is consistent with a shareholder-oriented approach. Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine and identify the perception of Swedish listed and unlisted family business, on value-based management and its consistency with a shareholder-oriented approach. Furthermore, the study aims to describe and explain whether such business perceives that value-based management can be used as a management tool to define and ensure shareholder value. Method: I have completed six interview studies with an abductive research approach. The empirical material is mainly based on data from both personal interviews and telephone interviews but also secondary data from websites, annual reports and confirmed theories. Conclusions: The listed and unlisted family firms in this study perceive that their value creation processes is consistent with a shareholder-oriented approach. All the family firms demonstrate that both financial and non-financial objectives symbolize activities which are shareholder value consistent with the family’s basic values and interests. Furthermore has each and every firm no concrete definition of shareholder value, businesses are aware of the value but they are not using the concept in their daily operations. Shareholder value is further perceived as an integrated goal in the firm’s value creation process.
Mathibela, Kgwiti Prince. "Corporate social responsibility legal analysis and social transformation: the South African experience in a comparative perspective." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/27990.
Full textБричко, Марина Михайлівна, Марина Михайловна Бричко, and Maryna Mykhailivna Brychko. "Корпоративне управління як фактор поглиблення фінансіалізації вітчизняної економіки." Thesis, Українська академія банківської справи Національного банку України, 2014. http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/59419.
Full textMyers, Jonathan. "Changing the tune : conceptualising the effects of the global financial crisis on stakeholder perceptions of corporate value." Thesis, University of Hertfordshire, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/2299/21101.
Full textWilkinson, Michael. "Banking reform, and the importance of ownership : how the way banks are owned affects their behaviour." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2018. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/banking-reform-and-the-importance-of-ownership-how-the-way-banks-are-owned-affects-their-behaviour(5271f8f0-ee47-4e84-b691-fbd35bb10569).html.
Full textMoris, Karen. "Les médias en tant que mécanisme de gouvernance d'entreprise." Thesis, Dijon, 2010. http://www.theses.fr/2010DIJOE007.
Full textThe objective of this research had to contribute to the question: are media a corporate governance mechanism ? After doing a literature review, three research questions were asked. First, the question about the role of press as a corporate governance disciplinary mechanism was asked, then as a corporate governance mechanism with a view to creating stakeholder value, lastly, as a corporate normative governance mechanism in a neo-institutional view. Each question was the subject of one essay. First, the efficiency of press to reveal frauds of firms before an official authority was analyzed. In this purpose, logistic regression and an examination of articles of press was done. Second, the influence of press on the Danone Group’s direction was studied with a case study between 1996 and 2008. Third, to understand the influence between several kinds of press and their role in the normalization and the circulation of ideas and practical experiences about corporate governance, a case study was done also. First, the efficiency of press as a corporate disciplinary mechanism is not always perfect. By assuming that press maximizes its profits, the French press chooses the firms to cover and the frauds to disclose. It’s more a press which informs as a press which investigates. The complementarity of corporate governance mechanisms is confirmed in the efficiency of the governance system. Second, press is an efficient mechanism in a stakeholder value creation perspective. It manages to influence CEOs to search to create stakeholder value rather than shareholder value. Third, currently we notice an homogenization of organizational forms about corporate governance. It could be explained by the role of press as a corporate governance normative mechanism in a neo-institutional perspective
Silva, Luiz Fernando da. "Criação de valor para os acionistas pós-abertura de capital no segmento brasileiro de locação de veículos." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2007. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/1246.
Full textThe segment of vehicles rental is characterized as an industry that requires intensive, long-term capital for the financing of the renewal of its fleet and implementation of growth strategies. Going public is a good alternative of access to one s own capital, once the funding cost should be lower, in theory. The adoption of this financing strategy depends on principles and good corporate governance practices that are necessary for entering in the differentiated segments of corporate governance of Bovespa (São Paulo State Stock Exchange). The globalization of the markets is compelling companies to focus their attention on the management based on performance measures to check if the company and its administrators are creating value for the shareholders. In a world with fast changes, where the search for results is constant, the aggregated value aspect has been more and more questioned and debated at companies. This dissertation's purpose is to determine if a Brazilian company within the vehicles rental going public can generate value to its shareholders and increase its wealth. In order to do that, this work studied and presented results on the following aspects: the first one, a research on the vehicles rental sector in Brazil, checking, among other items, the scenery, its indicators and perspectives for 2007; the second, a determination of the history of the company Localiza Rent a Car, case study object, presenting its governance model, mapping the best corporate governance practices recommended by IBGC and by CVM in order to check the adhesion level; third, an analysis of the results disclosed by Localiza before and after OPA; and, finally, an analysis of the capital cost and the EVA® , checking if the cost of source of funds diminished and if value was generated to the shareholders after going public. Through the results obtained, we can affirm that, after OPA, Localiza generated value to its shareholders and increased its wealth, and the cost of source of founds also diminished; however, we cannot attribute this growth only to going public, because of the diversity of variables that impact the segment of vehicles rental
O segmento de locação de veículos caracteriza-se como uma indústria que requer capital intensivo de longo prazo para financiamento da renovação de sua frota e implementação de estratégias de crescimento. A abertura de capital em bolsa de valores apresenta-se como uma boa alternativa de acesso a capital próprio, uma vez que o custo de captação em tese deveria ser menor. A adoção dessa estratégia de financiamento depende de princípios e boas práticas de governança corporativa necessários para o ingresso nos segmentos diferenciados de governança corporativa da Bovespa. A globalização dos mercados está obrigando as empresas a focarem sua atenção para a gestão baseada em medidas de desempenho para verificar se a empresa e seus administradores estão criando valor para os acionistas. Num mundo de rápidas mudanças, onde a busca por resultados é uma constante, o aspecto valor agregado tem sido cada vez mais questionado e discutido nas empresas. A presente dissertação teve por objetivo verificar se a abertura de capital de uma empresa brasileira do segmento de locação de veículos pode gerar valor aos seus acionistas e aumentar suas riquezas. Para tanto este trabalho estudou e apresentou resultados sobre os seguintes aspectos: o primeiro, uma pesquisa sobre o setor de locação de veículos no Brasil, verificando, entre outros itens, o cenário, seus indicadores e perspectivas para 2007; o segundo, um levantamento da história da empresa Localiza Rent a Car, objeto do estudo de caso, apresentando seu modelo de governança, mapeando as melhores práticas de governança corporativa recomendadas pelo IBGC e pela CVM para verificar seu nível de adesão; em terceiro, uma análise dos resultados divulgados pela Localiza antes e após a OPA; e em quarto e último, uma análise do custo de capital e do EVA® , verificando se o custo de captação de recursos diminuiu e se foi gerado valor para seus acionistas após a abertura de capital. Através dos resultados obtidos podemos afirmar que após a OPA a Localiza gerou valor para os seus acionistas e aumentou suas riquezas, além do custo de captação de recursos ter diminuído, entretanto, não podemos atribuir este crescimento somente a sua abertura de capital, devido à diversidade de variáveis que atingem o setor de locação de veículos
Badran, Jana. "La présentation des exigences de profitabilité, de responsabilité sociale et de leur articulation dans les messages des dirigeants : le cas Carrefour." Phd thesis, Université Paris-Est, 2011. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00662502.
Full textDjäken, Johan. "Doing Good While Being Good : A study of the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and the Swedish Companies Act." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Juridiska institutionen, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-306630.
Full textDen här examensuppsatsen utforskar förhållandet mellan några av aktiebolagslagens regler och det engagemang som bolag noterade på Nasdaq Stockholm uppvisar i frågor rörande Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Ämnet kan sägas vara särskilt relevant då såväl det samtida näringslivet som lagstiftaren tycks präglas av en ökad medvetenhet kring CSR-frågor. Den ökade medvetenheten i näringslivet förefaller alltmer inverka på affärsbeslut, ett faktum som inte minst avspeglas i de svenska bolagens topplaceringar i globala index som mäter bolags arbete med hållbarhetsfrågor. Samtidigt speglas lagstiftarens ökade medvetenhet av allt fler svenska som europeiska regulatoriska initiativ på området och vars yttersta syfte är att uppmuntra och stimulera hållbara företag som inte pådyvlar samhället oacceptabla sociala kostnader. Det är således inte särskilt anmärkningsvärt att bolagen, i synnerhet de med intressen anknutna till konsumentmarknaderna, tycks erkänna vikten av att bygga och underhålla långsiktiga relationer med en vidare krets av intressenter än deras aktieägare. Det är min förhoppning att den här uppsatsen kommer att bidra till den ständigt växande del av den aktiebolagsrättsliga diskursen som diskuterar till vilken grad bolag, utan att handla i strid med ABL:s bestämmelser, kan företa åtgärder kopplade till CSR. Eftersom jag inledningsvis anför att bolagen på Nasdaq Stockholm tycks ägna sig allt mer åt CSR diskuterar också uppsatsen om några av ABL:s bestämmelser bör förändras för att bättre hantera dessa företags allt större engagemang i CSR-frågor. Sammanfattningsvis argumenterar jag för att nuvarande företagsekonomisk forskning kring CSR tillsammans med de aktuella bestämmelsernas juridiska innebörd innebär att såväl bolagsstyrelser som verkställande direktörer kan företa i princip vilken investering relaterad till CSR som helst. Aktieägare är i praktiken hänvisade till att söka åstadkomma långsiktigt lönsamma satsningar på hållbarhet genom sanktioner ex post, exempelvis genom att sälja sina aktier eller rösta bort styrelsen. Detta innebär å ena sidan i praktiken, med tanke på att nuvarande företagsekonomisk forskning kring CSR:s inverkan på bolags vinster är tvetydig, att de relevanta bestämmelserna i ABL såsom de nu är utformade utgör en trygg hamn även för många av de transaktioner relaterade till CSR som är direkt värdeförstörande. Å andra sidan argumenterar jag i uppsatsen för att problemet med överinvesteringar i CSR inte nödvändigtvis behöver vara särskilt utbrett då bolagen och deras bolagsstyrning allt mer kommit att präglas av kortsiktiga investeringsperspektiv.
Bédu, Nicolas. "Financiarisation et LBO : une analyse des effets des opérations de LBO sur la performance, l’emploi et la faillite des entreprises en Europe." Thesis, Bordeaux 4, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013BOR40053/document.
Full textLeveraged Buy-Out (LBO) operations provoke a number of inquiries for their role in the finance of firms. The recent development of this form of acquisition and endogenous risks associated with it reveal that LBOs constitute not only a theoretical and an empirical but also a social issue. Based on these three issues, the aim of this study is to analyze the nature of LBO, institutional determinants of its development and its effects on firms and their actors. The origin of LBO pertains to the transformation of capitalism and a revival of the theory on the nature of firm and its beneficiaries. Such a reference leads to define LBO as an expression of financialization which conveys to a shareholding conception of the nature of the firm. This hypothesis can then be grasped at two different levels. The macroeconomic analysis focused on the development of LBO in Europe provides evidence that the rise of LBO allows to define the transformations of the heterogeneous models of capitalism. On the other hand, the microeconomic analysis centered on the effects of this form of acquisition on the performance, employment and failure of European firms shows the contrasting features of the consequences of LBO operations that neither to draw general conclusions for positive effects of this form of acquisition nor to consider the development of the LBO is desirable
Gueguen, Simon. "Contribution à l'étude des conséquences économiques des divulgations d'information en matière de franchissements de seuils de contrôle." Thesis, Paris Sciences et Lettres (ComUE), 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016PSLED044/document.
Full textThe debate on the optimum level of transparency in financial markets found a major point of controversy: the ownership of public companies. The design of new financial products and the development of shareholder activism called the blockholding disclosure rules into question. This thesis analyzes the economic impact of changes in regulation, measures the value relevance of the content of blockholding announcements, and introduces a new conceptual framework allowing strategic behavior of the involved economic agents. According to our empirical results, the information disclosed by blockholders are value relevant, even when the blockholder commits to remain passive. Our theoretical model suggests that blockholders make a strategic use of the reporting window, and predicts that a shortening of the legal time period would be favorable to minority shareholders
Grando, Tadeu. "Blockholders e a criação de valor das empresas brasileiras de capital aberto." Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, 2019. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/7709.
Full textMade available in DSpace on 2019-03-25T14:07:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tadeu Grando_.pdf: 1065557 bytes, checksum: 9fd0e9a6e7d4aa9ada0cddccf3dfbc38 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019-01-03
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Estudos teóricos e empíricos recentes sugerem que os blockholders, acionistas com participação maior ou igual a 5%, exercem poder como mecanismo de governança corporativa nas empresas. O poder de governança dos blockholders pode ser exercido através de dois mecanismos: intervenção (“voz”), que se refere à disposição dos acionistas de incorrer em atividades dispendiosas para aumentar o valor da empresa; e pela ameaça da saída (“exit”), que se refere à ameaça da venda de ações da empresa no mercado. Pesquisas acadêmicas recentes tem sido realizadas nesta área, relacionando a presença de blockholders com a eficiência gerencial, sobretudo no contexto americano. Estes estudos fornecem evidências consistentes que a ação dos blockhloders nas empresas pode afetar o comportamento gerencial. Entretanto, poucos estudos abordam diretamente a relação dos blockholders com o valor das empresas. Ademais, estudos que avaliam se a presença de blockholders realmente disciplina a gestão são escassos nos países emergentes. De um modo geral, os blockholders são acionistas com participação relevante no quadro acionário e, em decorrencia deste fato, em tese, possuem fortes incentivos para monitorar, coletar informações privadas e intervir junto aos controladores e à gestão, reduzindo custos de agência, e consequentemente, aumentanto o valor das empresas. Neste sentido, a fundamentação das hipóteses desta tese defende que a presença de blockholders na estrutura de propriedade das empresas brasileiras relaciona-se positivamente com a criação de valor, e que a força desta relação depende das variáveis participação acionária, número de blockholders, sensibilidade dos gestores ao preço das ações, liquidez das ações da empresa, dos tipos de blockholders, da diversidade dos tipos de blockholders, do nível de ativismo e das inter-relações entre os blockholders nas empresas. Para resolução das hipóteses desta tese, a amostra foi constituída por empresas brasileiras abertas, não financeiras, cujos dados estão disponíveis na Economática®, totalizando 334 empresas, com 1.899 observações. Os dados se referem ao período de 2010 a 2016. Metodologicamente, para atendimento dos propósitos desta tese, formularam-se seis hipóteses, sendo que para cada hipótese configuraram-se duas regressões por mínimos quadrados ordinários, com dados em painel, conforme as métricas de criação de valor consideradas nesta pesquisa, Q de Tobin (Q) e retorno (R). Salienta-se que, para os modelos onde utilizou-se o Q aplicou-se dados em painel com efeitos fixos, e nos modelos onde utilizou-se o R aplicou-se dados em painel com pooled, conforme orientação dos testes econométricos preliminares. Os resultados gerais desta pesquisa indicam que a simples presença de blockholders, nas companhias brasileiras, não produz os resultados encontrados na literatura teórica e empírica, que fundamentaram a base desta tese. Pelo contrário, os resultados indicam uma relação negativa entre a presença dos blockholders e o valor das empresas brasileiras para ambas as métricas de valor utilizadas. Os diferentes resultados em relação aos apresentados pelos modelos teóricos e empíricos encontrados nos EUA são explicados pelas características peculiares do mercado brasileiro, especialmente no que tange às diferenças em relação à estrutura de propriedade. Num mercado como o dos EUA, um blockholder com 5% de participação na empresa é um grande acionista, é uma ameaça aos controladores e à gestão, já que lá o controle é exercido, na maioria das vezes, com menos do que 50% do capital total. No Brasil, na maioria das vezes, as empresas possuem controle acionário definido, com isso o blockholder não tem a mesma força. Desta forma, como observado nesta pesquisa, os blockholders brasileiros, em maioria, são passivos. Essa passividade faz com que os controladores e ou gestores da empresa utilizem os blockholders para diluição do capital acionário e dos direitos sobre o fluxo de caixa da empresa, o que aumenta os incentivos de expropriação por parte dos controladores e gestores, elevando os custos de agência e reduzindo o valor das empresas. No mesmo sentido, percebe-se que as métricas relacionadas com a força dos blockholders como mecanismo de governança não possuem efeito positivo na relação dos blockholders com a criação de valor das empresas. Pelo contrário, as métricas vinculadas à participação acionária e ao número de blockholders relacionam-se negativamente com a criação de valor nas empresas, reforçando o argumento teórico de que a diluição do capital acionário e do fluxo de caixa do controlador aumenta os incentivos deste em expropriar. Os diferentes tipos de blockholders ou a heterogeneidade destes, na maioria dos casos, não apresentou relação com a criação de valor nas empresas. Em relação à diversidade dos blockholders presentes na estrutura de propriedade das empresas, conclui-se que esta afeta negativamente o valor das empresas, ou seja, quanto mais tipos diferentes de blockholders presentes na estrutura de propriedade das empresas, pior são os resultados em relação às métricas de criação de valor. Entretanto, quando se identifica a presença nas empresas brasileiras de blockholders ativos e suas inter-relações, percebe-se que, nesta situação, os blockholders potencializam o efeito de criação e o valor na empresa, convergindo com as premissas teóricas apresentadas por estudos americanos que fundamentaram esta tese. Essa aproximação dos resultados pode ser atribuída ao perfil dos investidores ativos brasileiros que realmente agem como mecanismo de governança, o que acontece na maioria dos casos com os blockholders no mercado americano. Os resultados desta tese permitem o avanço da literatura nacional e internacional sobre o tema, demonstrando que, sob uma estrutura de propriedade concentrada, sobretudo com a presença da figura de um “dono” e/ou acionista majoritário nas empresas, como é o caso brasileiro, a interferência dos blockholders, de forma geral, no monitoramento da gestão, se torna mais difícil. No ambiente brasileiro a maioria dos blockholders não consegue utilizar o seu poder de voz, em decorrência da alta concentração de propriedade e das dificuldades de exercer influência efetiva junto ao controlador ou à gestão. No mesmo sentido, também se observa uma dificuldade em relação ao mecanismo de exit, pois a maioria das empresas listadas não fornece liquidez suficiente nos papéis para que o poder de ameaça de saída faça sentido.
Recent theoretical and empirical studies have suggested that blockholders, who hold the shares of 5% or more in companies, exercise their power as a mechanism of corporate governance. The governance power of blockholders can be exercised through two intervention mechanisms, one is "voice", which refers to the willingness of shareholders to incur costly activities to increase the value of the company, and another is the threat of exit, which refers to the threat of the sale of company shares in the market. Newly academic research have been carried out in this area, relating the presence of blockholders with managerial efficiency, especially in the American context. These studies provide consistent evidences that the action of blockhloders in companies can affect managerial behavior. However, few studies directly aproach the relationship between blockholders and companies' value. In addition, studies that assess whether the presence of blockholders actually discipline management are scarce in emerging countries. In general, the blockholders are shareholders with relevant participation in the ownership structure, as a result of this fact, in thesis, they have strong incentives to monitor, to collect private information and to intervene together with controllers or management, reducing agency costs and, consequently, increasing the companies value. In this sense, the hypotheses of this thesis argue that the presences of blockholders in the ownership structure of Brazilian companies are positively related to the creation of value, and that the strength of these relationship depends on the variables equity interest of blockholder, the number of blockholders, the managers' sensitivity to share price, liquidity of company shares, the types of blockholders, the diversity of the types of blockholders, the level of activism, and the interrelations among the blockholders in the companies. To resolve the hypotheses of this thesis, the sample was made up of Brazilian non-financial companies, whose data are available in Economática®, totaling 334 companies, with 1,899 observations. The data refer to the period from 2010 to 2016. Methodologically, to answer the purposes of this thesis, six hypotheses were formulated, and for each hypothesis, two ordinary least squares regressions were configured, with panel data, according to the metrics of value creation considered in this research, Q of Tobin (Q) and return (R). For the models where the Q was used, panel data with fixed effects were applied, and in the models where the R was used, panel data with pooled were applied, according to the orientation of the preliminary econometric tests. The general results of this thesis indicate that the mere presence of blockholders in Brazilian companies does not produce the kind of results which were found in the theoretical and empirical literature, which provided the basis for this thesis. On the contrary, the results indicate a negative relation between the presence of blockholders and the value of Brazilian companies for both metrics of value of this research. The different results in relation to those presented by the theoretical and empirical models found in USA are explained by the peculiar characteristics of the Brazilian market, especially with respect to the differences in ownership structure. In a market like the US, a blockholder with a 5% stake in the company is a large shareholder, is a threat to controllers and managements, since control there is exercised, for the most part, with less then 50% of the total capital. In Brazil most of the time companies have a defined shareholder control, so the blockholders does not have the same strengh. Thus, as seen in this research, Brazilian blockholders, in the majority, are passive. This passivity causes company controllers and managers to use blockholders to dilute equity capital and cash flow rights of the company, which increases expropriation incentives by controllers and managers, raising agency costs and reducing the value of companies. In the same way, it can be observed that the metrics related to the strength of the blockholders as mechanisms of governance do not have a positive effect on the relationship of the blockholders with the creation of value of the companies. On the contrary, the metrics related to the shareholding and the number of blockholders are related negatively to the creation of value in the companies, reinforcing the theoretical argument that the dilution of stock capital and the cash flow of the controller increases the incentives of controller’s expropriation. The different types of blockholders or the heterogeneity of these, in most cases, were not related to the creation of value in companies. In relation to the diversity of the blockholders present in the corporate ownership structure, it is concluded that this affects negatively the value of the companies, that means, the more types of different blockholders present in the ownership structure of the companies, the worse the results in relation to the metrics for creating value. However , when the presence of active blockholders and their interrlationsships is in identified in brazilian companies, it can be seen that, in this situation, blockholders potentiate the creation effect and value in the company, converging with the theoretical premises presented by American studies that supported this thesis. This approximation of the results can be attributed to the profile of the Brazilian active investors that really act as mechanisms of governance, which happens in most cases with the blockholders in the American market. The results of this thesis allow the advanced of the national and international literature about theme, demonstrating that under a concentrated property structure, especially with the presence of the figure of a "owner" and / or majority shareholder in companies, as in the case of Brazil, , in general, the monitoring of management becomes more difficult. In the Brazilian environment, the majority of blockholders cannot use their voice power, due to the high concentration of ownership and the difficulties of exercising effective influence with the controller or the management. In the same way, there is also a difficulty with the exit mechanism, since most listed companies do not provide sufficient liquidity in the roles for the threat of exit power to make sense.
Rozo, Jose Danubio. "Relação entre mecanismos de governança corporativa e medidas de performance econômica das empresas brasileiras integrantes do índice Brasil da bolsa de valores de São Paulo." Universidade de São Paulo, 2003. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/12/12136/tde-16112014-160006/.
Full textUp until twenty years go, the term Corporate Governance didnt exist in the English language. The codes of good practices of Corporate Governance began to arise in the early nineties in England, in the United States and in Canada, as an answer to an unsatisfactory performance of leading companies - recognized as a deficiency of effectiveness in the board of directors and also as an answer to the pressures exerted by institutional investors. In Brazil, the term Corporate Governance is still more recent, but begins to be pondered and to deserve attention of researchers, of Stock Exchanges and associations. This study aims to identify possible relationship among independent variables, representative of Corporate Governance mechanisms, and measures of economic performance of enterprises of the Brazil Index IBX of the São Paulo Stock Exchange BOVESPA, with data referring to the period comprehended between 1997 and 2001. Using the statistic technique of panel data, model of error components, we work with 16 independent variables representing the Corporate Governance mechanisms: concentration of propriety (5 variables), characteristics of the board of directors (3 variables), voting capital (1 variable), remuneration of the executive directorate (2 variables), financial policy (3 variables), internal control (1 variable), and one more control variable, representing the size of the enterprises. These variables are regressed against each one of the five variables of the studied economic performance measures. Such variables have measured up the Market Value Added, the market to book value price ratio, TOBINS Q, profitability over the assets and profitability over the net equity. The results indicate that the property concentration, the voting capital, the remuneration of the executive directorate and the financial policy are related to the economic performance. Surprisingly, the voting capital and the remuneration of the executive directorate are negatively related to performance. We can also observe that the economic performance measure utilized makes difference in the study of the Corporate Governance mechanisms, because that ones purely accountants doesnt have any relation with the mechanisms tested. This study, comprising such diverse mechanisms, variables and also the observed period, is among the leading empiric studies of Corporate Governance in Brazil. We hope to offer a contribution to the academics holding an interest in the matter, as well as to shareholders, managers, market analysts, consultants, Stock Exchange administrators, regulating bodies and class associations.
Ducros, Éric. "Les engagements contractuels des actionnaires de référence lors de l'introduction en bourse." Phd thesis, Université Paris-Est, 2009. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00491909.
Full textWu, Mei-Ying, and 吳美穎. "Self-governance Mechanisms-Shareholder Components, Ownership Concentration, and Corporate Governance Performance." Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/18000256766678526084.
Full text輔仁大學
管理學研究所
92
As everyone knows, good corporate governance can improve firm performance and national competitiveness. Except the mechanisms external to the firm such as the capital market for corporate control and transparency, internal corporate governance mechanism is the basic and more important part. From the self-governance view, this study analyses how the shareholder components (including inside investors and outside investors) and ownership concentration affect firm’s corporate governance. We also investigate whether the effects among the electronic, weave, and financial industries are the same or not. Besides, are these effects different as time goes? As the definition by OECD and Corporate Governance Association Taiwan, corporate governance is not only to ensure the rights of managers, board directors, and shareholders but also the stakeholders (i.e., creditors, employees and business associates). Moreover, the objectives of corporate governance should include short-term profit maximizing and long-run sustainable operating. In the measure of corporate governance performance, we use profit ratios, efficiency ratios, operating ratios, debt ratios, and employee expenses ratios. According to our empirical result, we find the shareholder components and ownership concentration affect the corporate governance performance, and have different influences in different industry and time. Our empirical results are summarized as following: 1.The board, supervisors, and foreign investors have positive effects on the corporate governance. However, the financial institutional investors have a negative effect on the corporate governance. And we find that a firm with a more concentrative ownership has a better corporate governance performance. 2.Most of the shareholder components and ownership concentration have positive (negative) effects on the corporate governance performance in the electronic (weave) corporations, but there is no clear effect in the financial corporations. 3.The shareholder components and ownership concentration have more positive effect on the corporate governance performance as tome goes. Therefore we contend that the internal corporate governance system is developing gradually.
Chen, Guan-Liang, and 陳冠良. "Corporate Governance, Monitoring Mechanisms, Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Value." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/93064756546888687615.
Full text中國文化大學
會計學系
101
The goal of this paper is to investigate the association between corporate gov-ernance (CG) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement and examine whether the firms engaging in corporate social responsibility can maximize the market value. As a main core of this paper, we test two competing hypotheses, the over-investment hypothesis based on agency theory and the conflict-resolution hy-pothesis based on stakeholder theory. The over-investment explanation posits that top managements use the CSR engagement to enhance their private benefits of so-cial-citizen reputation that could hurt the market value of firm, whereas the conflict resolution explanation postulates that using CSR activities to reduce potential con-flicts between top management and various stakeholders and could eventually max-imize the interests of the shareholders and the market value of firm. The study finds that CSR is positively associated with the internal and external corporate governance and monitoring mechanisms, including board size, and institutional ownership. We also find CSR engagement is associated with industry adjusted Tobin’s Q. The coef-ficient on institutional investors and board size are positively significant, suggesting that institutional investors and board size can be a monitoring role to make a firm’s information environment transparent and reduce the agency cost and resolve the con-flicts between top management and various stakeholders. We also find the insider ownership can interfere the CSR decision-making. Consistent with the prior literature and economic intuition, the finding suggests that governance characteristics can monitor the CSR engagement; CSR engagement could reduce potential conflicts be-tween top management and various stakeholders.
Toksal, Asli [Verfasser]. "The impact of corporate governance on shareholder value / vorgelegt von Asli Toksal." 2004. http://d-nb.info/974090808/34.
Full text"The relationship between economic value added and shareholder value: the case of Hong Kong and China." 2002. http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5891151.
Full textThesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2002.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 71-74).
Abstracts in English and Chinese.
Abstract --- p.ii
摘要 --- p.iii
Acknowledgements --- p.iv
Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction and Overview --- p.1
Chapter Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.4
Chapter 2.1 --- Shareholder Value and Corporate Governance --- p.4
Chapter 2.2 --- Measures of Value --- p.7
Chapter Chapter 3 --- Data and Methodology --- p.12
Chapter 3.1 --- Data --- p.12
Chapter 3.2 --- Economic Value Added (EVA) --- p.12
Chapter 3.2.1 --- Net Operating Profit After Taxes (NOPAT) --- p.14
Chapter 3.2.2 --- Invested Capital (INCAP) --- p.16
Chapter 3.2.3 --- Cost of Capital --- p.17
Chapter 3.2 --- Hypothesis of Interest --- p.18
Chapter Chapter 4 --- Empirical Results --- p.23
Chapter 4.1 --- The Cost of Capital --- p.23
Chapter 4.2 --- Economic Value Added (EVA) in China and Hong Kong --- p.25
Chapter 4.2.1 --- Analysis of the EVA: Overall --- p.25
Chapter 4.2.2 --- Analysis of the EVA: Industry --- p.28
Chapter 4.2.3 --- Discussions --- p.31
Chapter 4.3 --- Testing of the Hypothesis --- p.36
Chapter 4.3.1 --- EBEI and CFO in China and Hong Kong --- p.37
Chapter 4.3.2 --- Regression on Market Value --- p.41
Chapter 4.3.3 --- Discussions --- p.43
Chapter Chapter 5 --- Summary and Concluding Remarks --- p.68
Bibliography --- p.71
Ching-yi, Chang, and 張靜宜. "An Analysis of Association between Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Business Value." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/38533250072749150262.
Full text國立高雄應用科技大學
商務經營研究所
95
Since Asian financial crisis took place in 1997, the economy of a lot of Asian countries has been mauled, the famous enterprises including Enron、Xerox and WorldCom broke out the financial scandal in 2000. All fully show that the companies are lack of supervision mechanism and imperfect internal controls, so people contribute great discussion to the issues of corporate governance. Also, countries all over the world pay more attention to strengthen the importance of the corporate governance. The purposes of this paper are to exam the relationships between corporate governance mechanisms and business value of listed company of every industry. We use the 2002-2005 annual reports of Taiwan public-listed companies as independent variable and dependent variable, which published in 2006 and 2004, respectively. The industries of public-listed companies are chosen as research targets, including textile industry, financial industry, and electronic industry, etc. Furthermore we use separate industry and all sample industry to investigate the effect of the return on stock and Assets that the company should reveal information of corporate governance which listed company in accordance with request on “ The Rules of Financial Publication Standards to Issuers ” by regression analysis. The results reveal that Hypothesis 3 is supported. As with other Hypotheses, only partial of the results are supported.
Wu, Ai-Shan, and 吳艾珊. "The Relationship between Corporate Diversification and Corporate Value-A Study of the Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/69282156438812900807.
Full text國立嘉義大學
管理研究所
93
This study investigates the relationship between corporate diversification and corporate value, and the impact of corporate governance mechanisms to the relationship. The corporate governance mechanisms include the ownership structure, which measure the separation of ownership and control. The empirical results find that diversification positively affects corporate value. The results also find that the separation of ownership and control will negatively affect the relationship between diversification and corporate value. When the separation of ownership and control becomes more serious, the incentive effects become much slighter and the entrenchment effects will dominate its influence to the corporate value. Thus, the positive relationship between diversification and corporate value will be discounted by the badly structured corporate governance mechanisms.
Fencíková, Lucie. ""Stakeholder Value" jako nový fenomén práva obchodních korporací." Master's thesis, 2016. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-350637.
Full textDurnev, Artyom Alex. "Essays on corporate transparency and governance practices /." 2003. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/557808855.pdf.
Full textHsu, Chung-cheng, and 徐忠誠. "The Influence of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Firm Value-Operating Efficiency as A Mediator." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/24904901569259675100.
Full text大葉大學
管理研究所博士班
97
Most of the prior research on corporate governance uses one single or several variables to investigate the issues. However, corporate governance is a multidimensional issue so that it is insufficient to use one single or several variables to explore the whole corporate governance mechanisms. This study uses a sample of 261 firms from electronics industry listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange during the year of 2006. The research first specifies the integration of the observed variables into multi-dimensional constructs, tests the fitness of integrated model, and further investigates the effect of corporate governance mechanism on firm value. This paper integrates thirteen empirically observed corporate governance variables into three dimensional constructs, i.e. information transparency, ownership structure and board structure. And, the models composed by integrated dimensions for measuring corporate governance mechanisms are tested and found the models are fit. Moreover, we discover that the all of the three structural models including corporate governance to operating efficiency, corporate governance to firm value and operating efficiency to firm value, show significantly positive relationship. In addition, through the assessment of models and the analysis of path coefficients, the results show that there probably exists a mediator–operating efficiency. That is, corporate governance mechanisms would affect firms’ operating efficiency, and consequently affect the firm value.
Schoch, Oliver Paul. "Volkswagen´s quest to increase shareholder value: the carve-out of traton." Master's thesis, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/123026.
Full textShih-ChiaTsai and 蔡士嘉. "Value Relevance of Fair Value Hierarchy Information and the Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms: Evidence from Taiwan Capital Market." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/78500088976814661534.
Full textLi, Yin-Chou, and 李銀洲. "Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the Value Relevance of Fair Value Hierarchy Information: Using the Financial Industry in Taiwan as an Example." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/04657875988349020725.
Full text長榮大學
經營管理研究所
101
To increase the quality and value relevance of accounting data, International Financial Reporting Standards require the disclosure of fair value hierarchy data. The three levels of the fair value hierarchy are the following: (1) Level 1 inputs, which are obtainable quotes for similar assets or liabilities in active markets; (2) Level 2 inputs, which are observable inputs except for Level 1 inputs; and (3) Level 3 inputs, which are unobservable inputs. We explore the correlation between fair value hierarchy data and corporate value in Taiwan, using data from publicly listed or over-the-counter companies in each quarter from the first quarter of 2011 (when fair value hierarchy data was first reported) to the third quarter of 2012. The results of this study show that the value relevance of Level 1 and Level 2 fair value inputs are more substantial than Level 3 inputs. In addition, the results show that the implementation of corporate governance mechanisms does not significantly increase the relevance between Level 3 fair value inputs and corporate value. The primary reason for this is that the corporate governance in Taiwan is inadequate. A report from the Asian Corporate Governance Association has demoted Taiwan from fourth place to sixth place, demonstrating that the corporate governance of Taiwan could still improve.
Matouš, Michal. "Nástroje ochrany zájmu obchodní korporace." Master's thesis, 2016. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-350512.
Full textRoper, Andrew Hardy. "Essays on capital structure /." 2002. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/557987636.pdf.
Full textEsser, Irene-Marié. "Recognition of various stakeholder interests in company management." Thesis, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10500/2277.
Full textLaw
LL.D.