Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Corporate Governance Mechanisms Shareholder Value'

La multiplication des scandales financiers depuis l'an 2000 suscite des débats et des controverses sur la gouvernance des entreprises cotées en bourse. Dans le paradigme contractuel, les débats sur la gouvernance ont largement consacré la valeur actionnariale comme modèle dominant, et dans lequel les actionnaires sont les seuls créanciers résiduels. Toutefois, la théorie des parties prenantes part du principe que la relation d'agence actionnaire-dirigeant doit s'élargir aux autres partenaires intervenant dans la chaîne de valeur, et qu'il faut abandonner l'hypothèse du statut de créancier résiduel exclusif des actionnaires. Cet abandon conduit à s'interroger sur le partage de la rente organisationnelle, ou valeur partenariale créée par la firme. Plus précisément, le concept de valeur partenariale soulève les questions de sa mesure, de son appropriation par les différents partenaires, et du rôle des mécanismes de gouvernance à ce niveau. L'objectif de cette recherche est, dans un premier temps, d'examiner le rôle joué par les mécanismes de gouvernance propres à la firme (caractéristiques du conseil, structure de propriété) sur la valeur partenariale créée, puis, dans un deuxième temps, sur l'appropriation de cette valeur partenariale par la firme et par ses parties prenantes explicites. Les tests empiriques portent sur un panel de 103 sociétés françaises cotées observées sur trois années (2006, 2008 et 2010). Les résultats suggèrent que quatre mécanismes ressortent globalement positivement associés à la valeur partenariale créée : la taille et l'indépendance du conseil, le pouvoir actionnarial des salariés, et la présence d'un comité d'éthique et/ou de gouvernance (CEG). En matière d'appropriation, deux mécanismes de gouvernance semblent jouer un rôle. Premièrement, la taille du conseil permettrait aux actionnaires et aux fournisseurs de capter davantage de rente organisationnelle, au détriment des clients et de la firme elle-même. Deuxièmement, la présence d'un CEG incite à une meilleure prise en compte des intérêts de certaines parties prenantes non-financières dans le partage de la rente (clients, salariés), alors que la part de rente que s'approprient les apporteurs de capitaux financiers (actionnaires et créanciers) diminue. Dans l'ensemble, nos résultats concernant la mise en place d'un CEG s'avèrent encourageant quant à la capacité de ce mécanisme à promouvoir une véritable gouvernance partenariale au sein des firmes cotées
The multiplication of financial scandals since year 2000 induced debates and controversies about the governance of public companies. In the contracting paradigm, the debates on corporate governance have largely relied on shareholder value as a dominant model, in which shareholders are the only residual claimants. However, the stakeholder theory builds on the principle that the shareholder-manager agency relationship has to widen to the others stakeholders who intervene in the value creation chain, and that it is necessary to get rid of the hypothesis that shareholders are exclusive residual claimants. This move brings questions about the sharing of the organizational rent, or stakeholder value created by the firm. More specifically, the concept of stakeholder value raises questions about its measurement, its appropriation by the various stakeholders, and about the role of corporate governance mechanisms on that ground. The objective of this research is to investigate the role of firm-specific governance mechanisms (board characteristics, ownership structure) on the creation of stakeholder value on the one hand, and on the distribution of that stakeholder value to the firm and to its explicit stakeholders, on the other hand. Empirical tests are based on a panel of 103 French listed companies observed over three years (2006, 2008, and 2010). The main findings suggest that four mechanisms stand out globally positively associated to the stakeholder value created: board size and board independence, employees' voting rights (shareholder power), and the presence of an Ethics and/or Governance Committee (EGC). In terms of appropriation, two governance mechanisms seem to play a role. Firstly, board size would result in a larger part of the organizational rent captured by shareholders and suppliers, at the expense of customers and the firm itself. Secondly, the presence of an EGC results in a better consideration of the interests of some non-financial stakeholders (customers and employees), whereas the share of rent that is appropriated by financial capital providers (shareholders and debt-holders) decreases. Overall, our results concerning the implementation of an EGC turn out encouraging regarding the capacity of such mechanism to promote effective stakeholder governance within listed companies

One of the main aims of the underlying research is to respond to continuous calls for introducing and measuring a sound economic definition for best practice disclosure quality (e.g. Beyer et al., 2010) that is derived from a reliable guidance framework (Botosan, 2004) using an innovative natural language processing technique (Berger, 2011). It also aims to examine the impact of corporate governance on best practice disclosure quality. Finally, it aims to examine the joint effect of both best practice disclosure quality and corporate governance on firm value. The thesis contributes to disclosure studies in three principal ways. First, it introduces a new measure for best practice disclosure quality. Further tests show that the proposed measure is reliable and valid. A novel feature of this measure is that it captures all qualitative dimensions of information issued by the Accounting Standards Board, 2006 (ASB) Operating and Financial Review (OFR) Reporting Statement. Second, it uses machine-readable OFR statements for financial years ending in 2006-2009, and develops a language processing technique through constructing five keyword lists. Third, it examines the extent to which disclosure quantity provides a proper proxy for disclosure quality. The analysis shows that disclosure quantity is not a good proxy for disclosure quality. Accordingly, results derived, using quantity as a proxy for quality, are questionable. Results of the association between disclosure quality and corporate governance mechanisms suggest that the most effective governance mechanisms in improving disclosure quality are leadership structure, audit committee meeting frequency, and audit firm size. Using a wide set of corporate governance mechanisms, the study also contributes to three research strands and explains the inconclusive results in relation to the association between disclosure quality, corporate governance mechanisms and firm value. It provides empirical evidence as to which governance mechanisms promote the quality of voluntarily disclosed information in large UK firms. Additionally, it provides empirical evidence as to the joint effect of best practice disclosure quality, corporate governance mechanisms on firm value in the UK. Results also show that best practice disclosure quality enjoys a substitutive relationship with two corporate governance mechanisms (audit committee independence and audit committee size) and a complementary association with board independence in relation to firm value. The study has various research and policy implications. It suggests new research avenues for re-examining disclosure relationships, especially research areas that do not have persuasive conclusions such as the economic consequences of disclosure quality. Such research may inform both regulators and managers as to the costs and benefits of disclosure quality to both firms and stakeholders. It also provides feedback on the current disclosure practices by firms so that policy-makers can modify reporting frameworks/guidance accordingly.

Society's awareness of the importance of environmental-, social- and economic issues has increased over the last decades. This increased interest has led to the development of the Corporate Social Responsibility concept (CSR) in which companies actively work simultaneously with environmental, social and economic issues that extend beyond what is legally required by these companies in order to achieve a more sustainable society. As the interest in CSR has increased, a debate whether CSR is value-creating or should be considered an agency cost has arisen. To approach this question previous researches have used the CEO compensation to examine if the engagement in CSR actually is an agency cost or a value creating activity and found that agency costs can be mitigated by tying incentives to performance. Based on these assumptions this study will examine the link between CSR and agency costs using the existence of a CSR related compensation incentives for CEOs related agency costs. This study is characterized to be positivistic and within the field of positive accounting research as it has deductive approach in which hypotheses are formulated that this study intends to test which are based on what fundamental economic theories and previous research have found that may affect agency costs. The empirical data are manually collected from companies’ on NasdaqOMX Stockholm 2016 annual reports followed by an analysis of the data using univariate t-test and multiple regressions in order to relate these findings to previous research. This study finds no direct evidence that CEO compensation incentives related to CSR affect agency costs which means that we have not closed the ongoing debate whether CSR engagement is creating shareholder value or should be considered an agency cost. Nonetheless, the results show indications that agency costs are higher for companies that use CEO compensation incentives related to CSR which indicates that CSR is not beneficial to shareholders but should instead be regarded as an agency cost at the expense of shareholders. The result also indicates that a positive accounting research is not particularly useful on a small stock market with reliable results because the findings can not be generalized in a broader perspective

The recent financial crisis was the largest shock to the financial system in decades. Its implications on banks' performance, corporate image and stakeholders' trust are of a high concern for all interested parties. Banks market capitalisation dropped significantly, risk levels increased and stakeholders’ confidence was shaken. This raises the importance of researching this particular area of primary concern to seek potential approaches intended to help banks to recover through increased disclosures, helping to rebuild trust and manage risk levels. Acknowledging societal needs and having effective dialogue with shareholders and stakeholders regarding banks' social profile as well as risk management practices is likely to reduce the uncertainty gap, shape banks' image and manage trust. These are indeed valuable in the wake of the financial crisis for bank continuity and enhancing shareholder value. I argue that effective corporate governance is likely to encourage more corporate social responsibility (CSR) and risk management (RM) disclosure, which in turn is expected to improve stock prices and reduce return volatility. The study examines potential solutions that assist in the management of the increasing risk levels, shaken confidence and falling market values resulting from the recent financial crisis. It contributes toward better understanding to the influence of internal corporate governance mechanisms on CSR and RM disclosure content and their substantive consequences on shareholder value. Examining a sample of US national commercial banks in the wake of the financial crisis indicates that boards with larger size, higher independence and CEO duality are inclined toward reporting a wider range of CSR and RM disclosures in annual reports, aiming to benefit the bank’s transparency and stakeholders’ long-term mutual relationship. Contrary to CSR disclosures, the number of audit committee financial experts was found to encourage better RM disclosure content implying the difference in influence on voluntary and mandatory disclosures. Insights into the desirable consequences CSR and RM disclosures content have on shareholder value are also evidenced. The study finds evidence supporting the association between CSR disclosure content and stock return indicating investors’ interest in, and consideration of, CSR information when valuing assets and building their trading decisions. The results also suggest that higher RM disclosure score reduces uncertainties of bank risk environment and provides investors with valuable information to assess financial assets and monitor management practices. This was reflected as an improvement to stock return and reduction to return volatility. Thus, effective corporate governance is more tending to enhance shareholder value through encouraging better CSR and RM disclosure content. Corporate governance should sponsor and introduce the perception of doing business responsibly and benefit from RM disclosure as a preventive tool assisting in the management of agency problems and bank risks. The economic consequences of CSR and RM disclosures imply that CSR engagement and reporting is an investment rather than an expense, and RM disclosure is a preventive tool rather than an exercise to comply with legislation requirement. Consequently, considering their content is important for better shareholder value.

Corporate governance can play a significant role in financial market stability and economic development. Corporate governance scholars have provided controversial results with respect to the relationships between corporate governance and both corporate financial performance and market value. Based on agency theory and institutional theory, the purpose of this correlational study was to investigate the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, financial performance, and market value in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's 116 firms from 2010 to 2014. Financial performance was measured by return on assets and return on equity, while market value was measured by Tobin's q. Corporate governance mechanisms involved in this study were board size, board independence, board committees, ownership structure, and executive compensation. The financial statements and corporate governance mechanisms collected from the websites of sampled firms and the Saudi stock market (Tadawul). The findings of multiple regression tests revealed a statistically significant relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and both corporate financial performance and market value. This study may contribute to social change by building confidence in the Saudi capital market and improving the lives of stakeholders and community in general. The results may help business leaders understand the influence of corporate governance on their firms' success and the country's growth. Academic researchers, investors, regulatory bodies, practitioners, and experts in the area of corporate governance may benefit as well.

Corporate governance refers to the set of mechanisms that affect the decision-making process taken by managers of quoted firms where the ownership and control are separate. The impact of corporate governance on corporate performance has been the main theme of research in accounting and finance at least since Jensen and Meckling (1976) published their work. Typically, empirical studies investigate whether different corporate governance mechanisms have an impact on directors' behaviour or corporate performance. However, corporate governance studies are complicated by the endogenous relationship that exists between control forces such as capital markets-the-regulatory system, factor markets, and internal governance mechanisms operating on a company and its decisions. This implies that the findings of empirical studies are questionable if these studies do not deal with endogeneity problems. A considerable number of empirical studies suggest that certain corporate governance mechanisms improve corporate performance, but those studies are affected by endogeneity issues. Roberts and Whited (2011) state that "endogeneity leads to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates that make reliable inference virtually impossible". The main purpose of this study, therefore, is to respond to these endogeneity concerns by using a well-developed generalised method of moments regression model (GMM) developed by Wintoki et al. (2012). The study examines the relationship between the board of directors' structure and corporate performance. Specifically, it investigates whether the presence of non-executive directors, duality, board size, director ownership, and the presence of board sub-committees have an impact on corporate performance. In addition, it also develops a governance index to find out whether the level of compliance with corporate governance regulations has an impact on corporate performance measured by ROA and Tobin's Q. To investigate these issues, the study adopts a comprehensive strategy which consists of three regression models, namely ordinary least square (OLS), fixed-effects model (FE), and generalised method of moments (GMM). Data for the analysis are extracted from annual reports, BoardEx database and Datastream databases for the period 1999 - 2009. The final sample includes a total of 634 UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. The results indicate that the level of compliance with corporate governance regulations and board structure are both partly determined by past corporate performance. After controlling for this, the results show that there is no relationship between current board of directors' structure and corporate performance. Further, the level of compliance with the recommendations of corporate governance has no impact on profitability measured by ROA. The results further reveal that the level of compliance with the Combined Code on Corporate Governance also has no impact on Tobin's Q as a proxy of corporate performance. These findings are inconsistent with many prior empirical studies and policy recommendations on corporate governance, which suggests that corporate governance mechanisms develop corporate performance. In addition, the findings indicate that the results of the earlier corporate governance studies that do not take into account the dynamic nature of corporate governance may be affected by bias.

Taking a sociological perspective on the market for corporate control this thesis calls into question financial capitalism with its preference for clear shareholder-value governance of the corporation. The institutional setting chosen to show this is Sweden, with its particularly shareholder friendly governance regime and its very active takeover market. To this is added three longitudinal case studies of cross-border hostile takeover processes during the sixth takeover wave in Europe. These reveal that the success of cross-border hostile bids has little to do with the theory of the market for corporate control, as a market where contests enable “good managers” to win over “bad managers”, with the overarching goal of enhancing wealth creation for society at large. Instead the most successful actors on a market for corporate control are those who best understand that market’s power dynamics – including the use of regulatory and moral arbitrage between different national frameworks and the leveraging of short-termism of institutional investors. The case studies are then analyzed in relation to the revised Swedish takeover rules of 2009. This shows that the revision did not address the problems detected, focusing instead on enhancing deal making and further limiting the board’s ability to work for long term value creation. As a whole this thesis calls for a development of a theory of a market for corporate control that in a more sustainable way will enable board of directors to focus on the corporation as value accretive entity. Sophie Nachemson-Ekwall has conducted her PhD work at the Stockholm School of Economics and is today a researcher
at the Center for Management and Organization at the Stockholm School of Economics Institute for Research (SIR). She has a background as a prize winning financial journalist for over 20 years and has co-authored three books about delicate issues in large Swedish corporations.

Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2012

Bakgrund:                       I takt med att företagen mer och mer har börjat fokusera på aktieägarvärde och ägarstyrning har nya normativa ekonomistyrningsfunktioner som värdebaserad styrning vuxit fram. Därmed är det intressant att undersöka hur svenska familjeföretag av olika karaktärer upplever denna trend och huruvida det överensstämmer med ett aktieägarorienterat synsätt.  Syfte:                                  Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka och kartlägga vilken uppfattning svenska noterade och onoterade familjeföretag har på värdebaserad styrning och dess överensstämmelse med ett aktieägarorienterat synsätt. Vidare syftar uppsatsen att beskriva och förklara huruvida sådana verksamheter upplever att värdebaserad styrning kan användas som ett styrningsverktyg för att definiera och säkerställa aktieägarvärde. Metod: Jag har genomfört sex stycken intervjustudier med en abduktiv forskningsansats. Det empiriska materialet grundar sig huvudsakligen på data från både personliga intervjuer och telefonintervjuer men även sekundär data från hemsidor, årsredovisningar och bekräftade teorier. Slutsatser:                         Studiens noterade och onoterade familjeföretag upplever att deras värdeskapande processer stämmer väl överens med ett aktieägarorienterat synsätt. De påvisar alla att både finansiella och icke-finansiella målsättningar symboliserar verksamheternas aktieägarvärde vilket överensstämmer med varje familjs grundläggande värderingar och intressen för respektive verksamhet. Studiens fallföretag har vidare ingen konkret definition utav aktieägarvärde, verksamheterna är medvetna om värdet men använder inte begreppet i den dagliga verksamheten. Aktieägarvärde uppfattas vidare vara en integrerad målsättning i varje familjeföretag värdeskapande process.
Background:   As more and more companies have begun to focus on shareholder value and corporate governance, new normative financial functions as value-based management have emerged. Thus, it is interesting to investigate how Swedish family businesses of different characters experiencing this trend and whether it is consistent with a shareholder-oriented approach. Purpose:                             The purpose of this paper is to examine and identify the perception of Swedish listed and unlisted family business, on value-based management and its consistency with a shareholder-oriented approach. Furthermore, the study aims to describe and explain whether such business perceives that value-based management can be used as a management tool to define and ensure shareholder value. Method:                             I have completed six interview studies with an abductive research approach. The empirical material is mainly based on data from both personal interviews and telephone interviews but also secondary data from websites, annual reports and confirmed theories. Conclusions:                     The listed and unlisted family firms in this study perceive that their value creation processes is consistent with a shareholder-oriented approach. All the family firms demonstrate that both financial and non-financial objectives symbolize activities which are shareholder value consistent with the family’s basic values ​​and interests. Furthermore has each and every firm no concrete definition of shareholder value, businesses are aware of the value but they are not using the concept in their daily operations. Shareholder value is further perceived as an integrated goal in the firm’s value creation process.

This dissertation presents a legal and regulatory framework of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the effect it has on social transformation in South Africa. It is premised on Dodds' theory of stakeholder protection which is articulated with greater clarity by Jeff Smith. He states that directors are agents of all stakeholders. In other words, they have the responsibility to ensure that every stakeholder's rights and interests are protected and fulfilled. This, he further explains, should be carried out by means of a balancing exercise between each stakeholder interest in every transaction. The dissertation demonstrates how the private sector can 'effectively' utilise principles of CRS to contribute towards and expedite social transformation. The significance of social transformation rests on it being a constitutional imperative as employed to redress the legacy of Apartheid. Lastly, the dissertation discusses CSR and how it affects social transformation in India and the United Kingdom (UK) with the aim of gleaning comparative insights. The dissertation then makes recommendations that the South African CSR legislation should embody objectives of our broader national interests similar to the Indian approach. In addition, it argues for a fully defined set of directors' duties which promotes compliance with CSR goals similar to the UK approach.

Глобальну економічну кризу 2008–2009 рр. характеризують як фінансову за природою її походження, змістом та основними її проявами. Починаючи з 1980-х років, неефективна політика держа-ви та відсутність обмежуючих заходів дозволила фінансовому сек-тору активно розвиватися, досягати високих темпів зростання та посилювати вплив фінансів на економічний і соціальний розвиток.

Could shareholder primacy, with its assumed short-termist practices, have had its day when it comes to managerial activity centered on creating corporate value? Many business and opinion leaders appear to take this position, not least Jack Welch who famously declared 'shareholder primacy is the dumbest idea in the world!' Indeed, in a post-Crash economy has a wider stakeholder focus with a longer-term outlook superseded any business notions of shareholder primacy and wealth maximization? This research examines these possibilities through a consideration of the narrative companies produce, such as annual reports. From this corpus material, an assessment is made of whether UK managers' perceptions about corporate value generation changed over the period covering the worldwide financial crisis, with respect to their relative favouring of shareholders and stakeholders. The corpus of narrative material used is visualized as a conceptual space in which a conversation reflecting perceptual bias to the generation of corporate value occurs. To explore such corpuses, in order to compare narratives at points either side of the 2008 Crash, a new methodology was devised called narrative staining. Hence, a detection and visual mapping over the period was made possible of managers' changing perceptions concerning primacy (shareholder or stakeholder orientation) with its mediation by termism (a short or long-term bias). Termism is also originally conceived as part of a larger temporal category, which includes a sense of urgency to act (urgent versus non-urgent) that is similarly examined. The investigation reveals that over time perceptual change about value creation happened, though in unanticipated ways. Companies pre-Crash were often short-term stakeholder oriented then moved post-Crash to a long-term shareholder orientation. A focus for this study was the corporate domain, consisting of a selection of FT250 companies. However, managerial perceptions about corporate value creation are influenced not simply by the conversation of the corporate domain but rather by a multi-actor conversation taking place throughout the business environment. To comprehend this effect, the research mines further corpuses that comprise the UK's regulatory domain (hard and soft law), the press (Financial Times and other newspapers), and relevant peripheral stakeholder organizations (including the Confederation of British Industry, the Institute of Directors, and the Trades Union Congress). These organizations demonstrated more complex, unforeseen, perceptual effects as the financial crisis proceeded with many aligning according to their political or business agenda, which also impacted any sense of urgency to act they had. There appears to be no previous attempt at an extensive and multivariate analysis of this nature. And the findings challenge prevalent characterizations of shareholder and stakeholder behaviour. Moreover, the research shows that utilizing a wide set of stakeholder corpuses acts a viable proxy for broader financial perspectives amongst UK organizations. The technique of narrative staining therefore provides insights, hitherto inaccessible, for assessing and consolidating large-scale perceptual bias regarding value creation across the economy. The technique also has significant potential for other applications.

Despite claims made by the UK Government in 2015 that the process of banking reform had come to an end, the debate about how to reform banks very much continues. There is now an increasing willingness to question both whether banks should be owned by, and run for, their shareholders, and whether the role they play in creating and allocating credit can safely be left to be determined solely by private interests. Where banking reform goes from here is not entirely certain. It could even be said to have reached something of a fork in the road. The obvious way open to us is to continue down the path forged by the neoliberal agenda, trusting market forces to determine credit-creation and allocation, and continuing to champion the banking sector as a sort of national treasure to be preserved in its own right. An alternative course could be to more radically control what banks do, to have more of a say about what activities they should finance more or less generously and to treat the sector not as an end in itself, but more as a means, an essential engine for economic growth which needs to be more carefully controlled and driven. Whichever way we go from here, the question of 'ownership' and whether it needs to be reformed remains relevant. Indeed, it is doubtful whether banks can really be trusted to behave themselves and to serve our interests if the requirement to maximise shareholder returns provides conflicting incentives for them to be reckless, self-serving and exploitative. Ultimately, how important the issue of ownership is depends upon how far the way banks are owned drives them to misbehave. This thesis seeks to explore that relationship and its relevance to banking reform. It does so by looking at how pressures arising from the way banks are owned encourage bad strategic decisions and bad behaviours in a number of UK banks. It conducts case studies of two stakeholder-owned banks and two shareholder-owned banks, and analyses a body of evidence which tends very strongly to suggest that the way banks are owned is indeed liable to contribute towards the adoption of unsafe strategies, and bad behaviours. The thesis proceeds to argue that we still need to tackle this 'ownership' problem which continues to drive much of the dysfunctionality in banking. Fixing 'ownership' will not necessarily ensure that credit is created in sensible quantities and allocated in sensible ways where needed in the economy, and it will not be the only reform needed to discourage bad behaviour. It is however a necessary reform, and one which still needs to be made. The entire notion that banks are owned by and should be run for their shareholders needs radically to be reigned in, and we need to be far more experimental and creative in exploring ways of making banks act more like stewards or trustees administering other people's assets - and in safe and productive ways which are in fitting with the interests of the state, its citizens and tax-payers. This thesis explores ways of doing that by making banks more 'ownerless', including creating any National Investment Bank, such as that recently proposed by the Labour Party, as a truly 'ownerless' institution.

L’objectif de ce travail de recherche a été de contribuer à répondre à la question suivante : dans quelle mesure les médias constituent-ils un mécanisme de gouvernance d’entreprise ? Après avoir réalisé une revue de littérature, trois questions de recherche ont été formulées. Tout d’abord, la question du rôle de la presse en tant que mécanisme de gouvernance d’entreprise disciplinaire a été posée, puis, plus précisément, celle de son rôle en tant que mécanisme de gouvernance disciplinaire partenariale, et enfin celle de mécanisme de gouvernance normative au sens néo-institutionnel. Chaque question a fait l’objet d’un essai. Tout d’abord, l’efficacité de la presse dans la révélation des fraudes commises par les entreprises, avant qu’une autorité officielle ne la sanctionne, a été examinée au moyen de régressions logistiques et d’analyse d’articles de presse. Ensuite, l’influence de la presse sur les dirigeants du groupe Danone a été analysée, par une étude de cas, de 1996 à 2008. Enfin, une étude de cas portant sur les liens entre divers types de presse a permis d’étudier leur rôle et leur influence dans la normalisation et la diffusion d’idées et de pratiques en matière de gouvernance d’entreprise. Premièrement, l’efficacité de la presse en tant que mécanisme de gouvernance disciplinaire doit être relativisée. Sous l’hypothèse de maximisation de ses profits, la presse française choisit les entreprises qu’elle couvre et les fraudes qu’elle révèle. Elle est plutôt une presse informative qu’une presse investigatrice. La complémentarité des mécanismes de gouvernance est confortée comme facteur d’efficacité du système de gouvernance. Deuxièmement, la presse est un mécanisme efficient de gouvernance partenariale : elle parvient à inciter les dirigeants d’entreprise à chercher à créer de la valeur partenariale plutôt qu’actionnariale. Troisièmement, l’homogénéisation actuelle de formes organisationnelles concernant la gouvernance d’entreprise semble s’expliquer par le rôle de la presse en tant que mécanisme de gouvernance d’entreprise normative au sens néo-institutionnel
The objective of this research had to contribute to the question: are media a corporate governance mechanism ? After doing a literature review, three research questions were asked. First, the question about the role of press as a corporate governance disciplinary mechanism was asked, then as a corporate governance mechanism with a view to creating stakeholder value, lastly, as a corporate normative governance mechanism in a neo-institutional view. Each question was the subject of one essay. First, the efficiency of press to reveal frauds of firms before an official authority was analyzed. In this purpose, logistic regression and an examination of articles of press was done. Second, the influence of press on the Danone Group’s direction was studied with a case study between 1996 and 2008. Third, to understand the influence between several kinds of press and their role in the normalization and the circulation of ideas and practical experiences about corporate governance, a case study was done also. First, the efficiency of press as a corporate disciplinary mechanism is not always perfect. By assuming that press maximizes its profits, the French press chooses the firms to cover and the frauds to disclose. It’s more a press which informs as a press which investigates. The complementarity of corporate governance mechanisms is confirmed in the efficiency of the governance system. Second, press is an efficient mechanism in a stakeholder value creation perspective. It manages to influence CEOs to search to create stakeholder value rather than shareholder value. Third, currently we notice an homogenization of organizational forms about corporate governance. It could be explained by the role of press as a corporate governance normative mechanism in a neo-institutional perspective

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The segment of vehicles rental is characterized as an industry that requires intensive, long-term capital for the financing of the renewal of its fleet and implementation of growth strategies. Going public is a good alternative of access to one s own capital, once the funding cost should be lower, in theory. The adoption of this financing strategy depends on principles and good corporate governance practices that are necessary for entering in the differentiated segments of corporate governance of Bovespa (São Paulo State Stock Exchange). The globalization of the markets is compelling companies to focus their attention on the management based on performance measures to check if the company and its administrators are creating value for the shareholders. In a world with fast changes, where the search for results is constant, the aggregated value aspect has been more and more questioned and debated at companies. This dissertation's purpose is to determine if a Brazilian company within the vehicles rental going public can generate value to its shareholders and increase its wealth. In order to do that, this work studied and presented results on the following aspects: the first one, a research on the vehicles rental sector in Brazil, checking, among other items, the scenery, its indicators and perspectives for 2007; the second, a determination of the history of the company Localiza Rent a Car, case study object, presenting its governance model, mapping the best corporate governance practices recommended by IBGC and by CVM in order to check the adhesion level; third, an analysis of the results disclosed by Localiza before and after OPA; and, finally, an analysis of the capital cost and the EVA® , checking if the cost of source of funds diminished and if value was generated to the shareholders after going public. Through the results obtained, we can affirm that, after OPA, Localiza generated value to its shareholders and increased its wealth, and the cost of source of founds also diminished; however, we cannot attribute this growth only to going public, because of the diversity of variables that impact the segment of vehicles rental
O segmento de locação de veículos caracteriza-se como uma indústria que requer capital intensivo de longo prazo para financiamento da renovação de sua frota e implementação de estratégias de crescimento. A abertura de capital em bolsa de valores apresenta-se como uma boa alternativa de acesso a capital próprio, uma vez que o custo de captação em tese deveria ser menor. A adoção dessa estratégia de financiamento depende de princípios e boas práticas de governança corporativa necessários para o ingresso nos segmentos diferenciados de governança corporativa da Bovespa. A globalização dos mercados está obrigando as empresas a focarem sua atenção para a gestão baseada em medidas de desempenho para verificar se a empresa e seus administradores estão criando valor para os acionistas. Num mundo de rápidas mudanças, onde a busca por resultados é uma constante, o aspecto valor agregado tem sido cada vez mais questionado e discutido nas empresas. A presente dissertação teve por objetivo verificar se a abertura de capital de uma empresa brasileira do segmento de locação de veículos pode gerar valor aos seus acionistas e aumentar suas riquezas. Para tanto este trabalho estudou e apresentou resultados sobre os seguintes aspectos: o primeiro, uma pesquisa sobre o setor de locação de veículos no Brasil, verificando, entre outros itens, o cenário, seus indicadores e perspectivas para 2007; o segundo, um levantamento da história da empresa Localiza Rent a Car, objeto do estudo de caso, apresentando seu modelo de governança, mapeando as melhores práticas de governança corporativa recomendadas pelo IBGC e pela CVM para verificar seu nível de adesão; em terceiro, uma análise dos resultados divulgados pela Localiza antes e após a OPA; e em quarto e último, uma análise do custo de capital e do EVA® , verificando se o custo de captação de recursos diminuiu e se foi gerado valor para seus acionistas após a abertura de capital. Através dos resultados obtidos podemos afirmar que após a OPA a Localiza gerou valor para os seus acionistas e aumentou suas riquezas, além do custo de captação de recursos ter diminuído, entretanto, não podemos atribuir este crescimento somente a sua abertura de capital, devido à diversidade de variáveis que atingem o setor de locação de veículos

La présentation des exigences de profitabilité, de responsabilité sociale et de leur articulation dans les discours des dirigeants : le cas Carrefour. Notre recherche a pour objet d'analyser comment les dirigeants -au nom de leur entreprise- présentent et articulent, dans leurs discours, les deux exigences majeures du capitalisme d'aujourd'hui : celle de maximisation de la valeur pour l'actionnaire et celle de Responsabilité Sociale des Entreprises (RSE). La première, portée par les investisseurs institutionnels dans le cadre d'un " capitalisme financier ", s'est constituée à l'adresse des entreprises cotées et de leurs dirigeants, et semble s'imposer au modèle français de gouvernement d'entreprise. La seconde, l'exigence de RSE -portée par les acteurs de la société civile- pousse les entreprises et leurs dirigeants à se préoccuper des dimensions sociales et environnementales de leur activité. Dans cette perspective, une étude empirique longitudinale a été menée sur les messages des Rapports Annuels et des Rapports de Développement Durable du Groupe Carrefour sur la période 1993-2007. Elle a permis d'observer une domination de plus en plus totale des critères du capitalisme financier sur les discours des dirigeants et de renforcer les thèses de la concomitance de l'émergence du discours de la maximisation de la valeur pour l'actionnaire et de la RSE et de la faible articulation des deux discours.

This thesis investigates the current interrelationship between the provisions contained in the Swedish Company Act (2005:551) and activities related to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) pursued by companies listed at Nasdaq Stockholm. The focal point of this thesis could be argued to be of particular relevance in this day and age, as companies listed at Nasdaq Stockholm continue to perform at the top of the league in global sustainability performance measurements, and Swedish and European legislators have intensified their efforts to encourage businesses to operate in a way that does not incur unacceptable social costs to society. Thus, most companies, particularly those with a vested interest in the private consumer market, seem to recognise the importance of fostering long-term relationships with a wide sphere of stakeholders. The purpose of the thesis has been to contribute to the steadily increasing body of legal research that discusses to what extent Swedish companies, without breaching corporate law, could involve themselves in CSR investments. Since I, initially, conclude that Swedish publicly listed companies seem to increasingly invest in activities related to CSR, the thesis also discusses whether the relevant provisions of the SCA need to change to better adapt to companies’ involvement in CSR activities. In brief, I argue, that current business research on CSR coupled with the aforementioned relevant provisions of the SCA allow boards and managing directors to pursue practically any CSR investments, and that shareholders are mostly restricted to rely on relatively blunt ex post actions against a board and/or managing director that has pursued an ill-considered CSR investment, including the obvious choices of voting to replace the board or selling their shares. And since current business research has not consistently proven the positive impact of CSR policies on the financial performance of businesses there are reasons to suspect that the law practically, due to the shielding force of the business judgment rationale and the legislator’s wish to protect most transactions, cannot be effectively applied to stop CSR investments, even if these are nothing but costs for the business. On the other hand, the findings of the thesis also suggest that the occurrence of such unwise CSR investments is not necessarily a proliferating problem, since many companies listed at Nasdaq Stockholm nowadays have powerful and short-sighted institutional owners. The situation might therefore very well be the opposite and that executives struggle to manage for the long-term, as the logic of the market tell them to do otherwise.
Den här examensuppsatsen utforskar förhållandet mellan några av aktiebolagslagens regler och det engagemang som bolag noterade på Nasdaq Stockholm uppvisar i frågor rörande Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Ämnet kan sägas vara särskilt relevant då såväl det samtida näringslivet som lagstiftaren tycks präglas av en ökad medvetenhet kring CSR-frågor. Den ökade medvetenheten i näringslivet förefaller alltmer inverka på affärsbeslut, ett faktum som inte minst avspeglas i de svenska bolagens topplaceringar i globala index som mäter bolags arbete med hållbarhetsfrågor. Samtidigt speglas lagstiftarens ökade medvetenhet av allt fler svenska som europeiska regulatoriska initiativ på området och vars yttersta syfte är att uppmuntra och stimulera hållbara företag som inte pådyvlar samhället oacceptabla sociala kostnader. Det är således inte särskilt anmärkningsvärt att bolagen, i synnerhet de med intressen anknutna till konsumentmarknaderna, tycks erkänna vikten av att bygga och underhålla långsiktiga relationer med en vidare krets av intressenter än deras aktieägare. Det är min förhoppning att den här uppsatsen kommer att bidra till den ständigt växande del av den aktiebolagsrättsliga diskursen som diskuterar till vilken grad bolag, utan att handla i strid med ABL:s bestämmelser, kan företa åtgärder kopplade till CSR. Eftersom jag inledningsvis anför att bolagen på Nasdaq Stockholm tycks ägna sig allt mer åt CSR diskuterar också uppsatsen om några av ABL:s bestämmelser bör förändras för att bättre hantera dessa företags allt större engagemang i CSR-frågor. Sammanfattningsvis argumenterar jag för att nuvarande företagsekonomisk forskning kring CSR tillsammans med de aktuella bestämmelsernas juridiska innebörd innebär att såväl bolagsstyrelser som verkställande direktörer kan företa i princip vilken investering relaterad till CSR som helst. Aktieägare är i praktiken hänvisade till att söka åstadkomma långsiktigt lönsamma satsningar på hållbarhet genom sanktioner ex post, exempelvis genom att sälja sina aktier eller rösta bort styrelsen. Detta innebär å ena sidan i praktiken, med tanke på att nuvarande företagsekonomisk forskning kring CSR:s inverkan på bolags vinster är tvetydig, att de relevanta bestämmelserna i ABL såsom de nu är utformade utgör en trygg hamn även för många av de transaktioner relaterade till CSR som är direkt värdeförstörande. Å andra sidan argumenterar jag i uppsatsen för att problemet med överinvesteringar i CSR inte nödvändigtvis behöver vara särskilt utbrett då bolagen och deras bolagsstyrning allt mer kommit att präglas av kortsiktiga investeringsperspektiv.

Les opérations de leveraged Buy-Out (LBO) suscitent de nombreux questionnements quant à leur rôle dans le financement des entreprises. Les risques endogènes et le développement récent de cette forme d’acquisition révèlent que les LBO constituent non seulement un enjeu théorique et empirique mais également sociétal. L’objectif de cette thèse, qui s’empare de ces trois enjeux, est une analyse de la nature des LBO, des déterminants institutionnels de son développement et de ses effets pour les entreprises et leurs acteurs. La genèse des LBO participe d’un processus de transformation du capitalisme et d’un renouveau théorique sur la nature de la firme et des intérêts qu’elle est supposée servir. Elle nous conduit à définir les LBO, qui véhiculent une conception actionnariale de la nature de la firme, comme une manifestation du processus de financiarisation. Cette hypothèse est alors appréhendée à deux niveaux distincts. L’analyse macroéconomique se focalise sur le développement des LBO en Europe, elle met en évidence que l’essor des LBO permet de caractériser les transformations hétérogènes des modèles de capitalisme. L’analyse microéconomique se centre sur les effets de cette forme d’acquisition sur la performance, l’emploi et la défaillance des entreprises européennes. Il en ressort que les conséquences des opérations des LBO sont contrastées, de sorte qu’il n’est possible ni d’inférer des conclusions de portée générale quant aux effets positifs de cette forme d’acquisition ni de considérer que le développement de la pratique des LBO est souhaitable
Leveraged Buy-Out (LBO) operations provoke a number of inquiries for their role in the finance of firms. The recent development of this form of acquisition and endogenous risks associated with it reveal that LBOs constitute not only a theoretical and an empirical but also a social issue. Based on these three issues, the aim of this study is to analyze the nature of LBO, institutional determinants of its development and its effects on firms and their actors. The origin of LBO pertains to the transformation of capitalism and a revival of the theory on the nature of firm and its beneficiaries. Such a reference leads to define LBO as an expression of financialization which conveys to a shareholding conception of the nature of the firm. This hypothesis can then be grasped at two different levels. The macroeconomic analysis focused on the development of LBO in Europe provides evidence that the rise of LBO allows to define the transformations of the heterogeneous models of capitalism. On the other hand, the microeconomic analysis centered on the effects of this form of acquisition on the performance, employment and failure of European firms shows the contrasting features of the consequences of LBO operations that neither to draw general conclusions for positive effects of this form of acquisition nor to consider the development of the LBO is desirable

La question du niveau optimal de transparence sur les marchés financiers a trouvé un terrain de débat exemplaire : celui de la propriété économique des sociétés cotées. La conception de nouveaux produits financiers et le développement de stratégies activistes ont provoqué une remise en question des règles de déclaration de franchissements de seuils de contrôle. Cette thèse analyse les conséquences économiques des évolutions réglementaires, évalue la pertinence des déclarations de l’acquéreur, et propose un nouveau cadre conceptuel intégrant la possibilité de comportements stratégiques des acteurs concernés. Selon nos résultats empiriques, les informations contenues dans les annonces sont pertinentes, même lorsque le blockholder s’engage à rester passif. Notre modèle théorique suggère que les blockholders utilisent le délai de déclaration de manière stratégique, et qu’un raccourcissement de ce délai serait favorable aux actionnaires minoritaires
The debate on the optimum level of transparency in financial markets found a major point of controversy: the ownership of public companies. The design of new financial products and the development of shareholder activism called the blockholding disclosure rules into question. This thesis analyzes the economic impact of changes in regulation, measures the value relevance of the content of blockholding announcements, and introduces a new conceptual framework allowing strategic behavior of the involved economic agents. According to our empirical results, the information disclosed by blockholders are value relevant, even when the blockholder commits to remain passive. Our theoretical model suggests that blockholders make a strategic use of the reporting window, and predicts that a shortening of the legal time period would be favorable to minority shareholders

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Made available in DSpace on 2019-03-25T14:07:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tadeu Grando_.pdf: 1065557 bytes, checksum: 9fd0e9a6e7d4aa9ada0cddccf3dfbc38 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019-01-03
CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
Estudos teóricos e empíricos recentes sugerem que os blockholders, acionistas com participação maior ou igual a 5%, exercem poder como mecanismo de governança corporativa nas empresas. O poder de governança dos blockholders pode ser exercido através de dois mecanismos: intervenção (“voz”), que se refere à disposição dos acionistas de incorrer em atividades dispendiosas para aumentar o valor da empresa; e pela ameaça da saída (“exit”), que se refere à ameaça da venda de ações da empresa no mercado. Pesquisas acadêmicas recentes tem sido realizadas nesta área, relacionando a presença de blockholders com a eficiência gerencial, sobretudo no contexto americano. Estes estudos fornecem evidências consistentes que a ação dos blockhloders nas empresas pode afetar o comportamento gerencial. Entretanto, poucos estudos abordam diretamente a relação dos blockholders com o valor das empresas. Ademais, estudos que avaliam se a presença de blockholders realmente disciplina a gestão são escassos nos países emergentes. De um modo geral, os blockholders são acionistas com participação relevante no quadro acionário e, em decorrencia deste fato, em tese, possuem fortes incentivos para monitorar, coletar informações privadas e intervir junto aos controladores e à gestão, reduzindo custos de agência, e consequentemente, aumentanto o valor das empresas. Neste sentido, a fundamentação das hipóteses desta tese defende que a presença de blockholders na estrutura de propriedade das empresas brasileiras relaciona-se positivamente com a criação de valor, e que a força desta relação depende das variáveis participação acionária, número de blockholders, sensibilidade dos gestores ao preço das ações, liquidez das ações da empresa, dos tipos de blockholders, da diversidade dos tipos de blockholders, do nível de ativismo e das inter-relações entre os blockholders nas empresas. Para resolução das hipóteses desta tese, a amostra foi constituída por empresas brasileiras abertas, não financeiras, cujos dados estão disponíveis na Economática®, totalizando 334 empresas, com 1.899 observações. Os dados se referem ao período de 2010 a 2016. Metodologicamente, para atendimento dos propósitos desta tese, formularam-se seis hipóteses, sendo que para cada hipótese configuraram-se duas regressões por mínimos quadrados ordinários, com dados em painel, conforme as métricas de criação de valor consideradas nesta pesquisa, Q de Tobin (Q) e retorno (R). Salienta-se que, para os modelos onde utilizou-se o Q aplicou-se dados em painel com efeitos fixos, e nos modelos onde utilizou-se o R aplicou-se dados em painel com pooled, conforme orientação dos testes econométricos preliminares. Os resultados gerais desta pesquisa indicam que a simples presença de blockholders, nas companhias brasileiras, não produz os resultados encontrados na literatura teórica e empírica, que fundamentaram a base desta tese. Pelo contrário, os resultados indicam uma relação negativa entre a presença dos blockholders e o valor das empresas brasileiras para ambas as métricas de valor utilizadas. Os diferentes resultados em relação aos apresentados pelos modelos teóricos e empíricos encontrados nos EUA são explicados pelas características peculiares do mercado brasileiro, especialmente no que tange às diferenças em relação à estrutura de propriedade. Num mercado como o dos EUA, um blockholder com 5% de participação na empresa é um grande acionista, é uma ameaça aos controladores e à gestão, já que lá o controle é exercido, na maioria das vezes, com menos do que 50% do capital total. No Brasil, na maioria das vezes, as empresas possuem controle acionário definido, com isso o blockholder não tem a mesma força. Desta forma, como observado nesta pesquisa, os blockholders brasileiros, em maioria, são passivos. Essa passividade faz com que os controladores e ou gestores da empresa utilizem os blockholders para diluição do capital acionário e dos direitos sobre o fluxo de caixa da empresa, o que aumenta os incentivos de expropriação por parte dos controladores e gestores, elevando os custos de agência e reduzindo o valor das empresas. No mesmo sentido, percebe-se que as métricas relacionadas com a força dos blockholders como mecanismo de governança não possuem efeito positivo na relação dos blockholders com a criação de valor das empresas. Pelo contrário, as métricas vinculadas à participação acionária e ao número de blockholders relacionam-se negativamente com a criação de valor nas empresas, reforçando o argumento teórico de que a diluição do capital acionário e do fluxo de caixa do controlador aumenta os incentivos deste em expropriar. Os diferentes tipos de blockholders ou a heterogeneidade destes, na maioria dos casos, não apresentou relação com a criação de valor nas empresas. Em relação à diversidade dos blockholders presentes na estrutura de propriedade das empresas, conclui-se que esta afeta negativamente o valor das empresas, ou seja, quanto mais tipos diferentes de blockholders presentes na estrutura de propriedade das empresas, pior são os resultados em relação às métricas de criação de valor. Entretanto, quando se identifica a presença nas empresas brasileiras de blockholders ativos e suas inter-relações, percebe-se que, nesta situação, os blockholders potencializam o efeito de criação e o valor na empresa, convergindo com as premissas teóricas apresentadas por estudos americanos que fundamentaram esta tese. Essa aproximação dos resultados pode ser atribuída ao perfil dos investidores ativos brasileiros que realmente agem como mecanismo de governança, o que acontece na maioria dos casos com os blockholders no mercado americano. Os resultados desta tese permitem o avanço da literatura nacional e internacional sobre o tema, demonstrando que, sob uma estrutura de propriedade concentrada, sobretudo com a presença da figura de um “dono” e/ou acionista majoritário nas empresas, como é o caso brasileiro, a interferência dos blockholders, de forma geral, no monitoramento da gestão, se torna mais difícil. No ambiente brasileiro a maioria dos blockholders não consegue utilizar o seu poder de voz, em decorrência da alta concentração de propriedade e das dificuldades de exercer influência efetiva junto ao controlador ou à gestão. No mesmo sentido, também se observa uma dificuldade em relação ao mecanismo de exit, pois a maioria das empresas listadas não fornece liquidez suficiente nos papéis para que o poder de ameaça de saída faça sentido.
Recent theoretical and empirical studies have suggested that blockholders, who hold the shares of 5% or more in companies, exercise their power as a mechanism of corporate governance. The governance power of blockholders can be exercised through two intervention mechanisms, one is "voice", which refers to the willingness of shareholders to incur costly activities to increase the value of the company, and another is the threat of exit, which refers to the threat of the sale of company shares in the market. Newly academic research have been carried out in this area, relating the presence of blockholders with managerial efficiency, especially in the American context. These studies provide consistent evidences that the action of blockhloders in companies can affect managerial behavior. However, few studies directly aproach the relationship between blockholders and companies' value. In addition, studies that assess whether the presence of blockholders actually discipline management are scarce in emerging countries. In general, the blockholders are shareholders with relevant participation in the ownership structure, as a result of this fact, in thesis, they have strong incentives to monitor, to collect private information and to intervene together with controllers or management, reducing agency costs and, consequently, increasing the companies value. In this sense, the hypotheses of this thesis argue that the presences of blockholders in the ownership structure of Brazilian companies are positively related to the creation of value, and that the strength of these relationship depends on the variables equity interest of blockholder, the number of blockholders, the managers' sensitivity to share price, liquidity of company shares, the types of blockholders, the diversity of the types of blockholders, the level of activism, and the interrelations among the blockholders in the companies. To resolve the hypotheses of this thesis, the sample was made up of Brazilian non-financial companies, whose data are available in Economática®, totaling 334 companies, with 1,899 observations. The data refer to the period from 2010 to 2016. Methodologically, to answer the purposes of this thesis, six hypotheses were formulated, and for each hypothesis, two ordinary least squares regressions were configured, with panel data, according to the metrics of value creation considered in this research, Q of Tobin (Q) and return (R). For the models where the Q was used, panel data with fixed effects were applied, and in the models where the R was used, panel data with pooled were applied, according to the orientation of the preliminary econometric tests. The general results of this thesis indicate that the mere presence of blockholders in Brazilian companies does not produce the kind of results which were found in the theoretical and empirical literature, which provided the basis for this thesis. On the contrary, the results indicate a negative relation between the presence of blockholders and the value of Brazilian companies for both metrics of value of this research. The different results in relation to those presented by the theoretical and empirical models found in USA are explained by the peculiar characteristics of the Brazilian market, especially with respect to the differences in ownership structure. In a market like the US, a blockholder with a 5% stake in the company is a large shareholder, is a threat to controllers and managements, since control there is exercised, for the most part, with less then 50% of the total capital. In Brazil most of the time companies have a defined shareholder control, so the blockholders does not have the same strengh. Thus, as seen in this research, Brazilian blockholders, in the majority, are passive. This passivity causes company controllers and managers to use blockholders to dilute equity capital and cash flow rights of the company, which increases expropriation incentives by controllers and managers, raising agency costs and reducing the value of companies. In the same way, it can be observed that the metrics related to the strength of the blockholders as mechanisms of governance do not have a positive effect on the relationship of the blockholders with the creation of value of the companies. On the contrary, the metrics related to the shareholding and the number of blockholders are related negatively to the creation of value in the companies, reinforcing the theoretical argument that the dilution of stock capital and the cash flow of the controller increases the incentives of controller’s expropriation. The different types of blockholders or the heterogeneity of these, in most cases, were not related to the creation of value in companies. In relation to the diversity of the blockholders present in the corporate ownership structure, it is concluded that this affects negatively the value of the companies, that means, the more types of different blockholders present in the ownership structure of the companies, the worse the results in relation to the metrics for creating value. However , when the presence of active blockholders and their interrlationsships is in identified in brazilian companies, it can be seen that, in this situation, blockholders potentiate the creation effect and value in the company, converging with the theoretical premises presented by American studies that supported this thesis. This approximation of the results can be attributed to the profile of the Brazilian active investors that really act as mechanisms of governance, which happens in most cases with the blockholders in the American market. The results of this thesis allow the advanced of the national and international literature about theme, demonstrating that under a concentrated property structure, especially with the presence of the figure of a "owner" and / or majority shareholder in companies, as in the case of Brazil, , in general, the monitoring of management becomes more difficult. In the Brazilian environment, the majority of blockholders cannot use their voice power, due to the high concentration of ownership and the difficulties of exercising effective influence with the controller or the management. In the same way, there is also a difficulty with the exit mechanism, since most listed companies do not provide sufficient liquidity in the roles for the threat of exit power to make sense.

Até cerca de vinte anos, o termo Corporate Governance (Governança Corporativa) não existia na língua inglesa. Os códigos de boas práticas de Governança Corporativa começaram a surgir no início dos anos noventa na Inglaterra, nos Estados Unidos e no Canadá, em resposta ao desempenho insatisfatório de companhias líderes, percebido como uma deficiência de efetividade dos conselhos de administração, e em resposta às pressões exercidas pelos investidores institucionais. No Brasil, o termo Governança Corporativa é ainda mais recente, mas já começa a ser preocupação e a merecer a atenção de pesquisadores, Bolsa de Valores e associações. Este estudo objetiva identificar possíveis relações entre variáveis independentes, representativas de mecanismos de Governança Corporativa, e medidas de performance econômica de empresas integrantes do Índice Brasil IBX da Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo BOVESPA, com dados do período de 1997 a 2001.Utilizando a técnica estatística de dados em painel, modelo de componentes de erros, trabalha-se 16 variáveis independentes representando os mecanismos de Governança Corporativa: concentração de propriedade (5 variáveis), características do conselho de administração (3 variáveis), capital votante (1 variável), remuneração da diretoria executiva (2 variáveis), política financeira (3 variáveis), controle interno (1 variável) e mais uma variável de controle representando o tamanho das empresas. Essas variáveis são regredidas contra cada uma das cinco variáveis de medidas de performance econômica estudadas. Tais variáveis mediram o Market Value Added, a razão preço de mercado e valor patrimonial da ação, TOBINS Q, rentabilidade sobre o ativo e rentabilidade sobre o patrimônio líquido. Os resultados indicam que a concentração de propriedade, o capital votante, a remuneração da diretoria executiva e a política financeira são relacionadas à performance econômica. Surpreendentemente, o capital votante e a remuneração da diretoria executiva são negativamente relacionados à performance. Observa-se, também, que a medida de performance econômica utilizada faz diferença no estudo dos mecanismos de Governança Corporativa, pois aquelas puramente contábeis não apresentaram qualquer relação com os mecanismos testados. Este estudo, com esta abrangência de mecanismos, variáveis e período tratado, está dentre os estudos empíricos de Governança Corporativa pioneiros no Brasil. Espera-se oferecer uma contribuição aos acadêmicos interessados no assunto, bem como a acionistas, gestores, analistas de mercado, consultores, administradores de Bolsa de Valores, órgãos reguladores e associações de classe.
Up until twenty years go, the term Corporate Governance didnt exist in the English language. The codes of good practices of Corporate Governance began to arise in the early nineties in England, in the United States and in Canada, as an answer to an unsatisfactory performance of leading companies - recognized as a deficiency of effectiveness in the board of directors and also as an answer to the pressures exerted by institutional investors. In Brazil, the term Corporate Governance is still more recent, but begins to be pondered and to deserve attention of researchers, of Stock Exchanges and associations. This study aims to identify possible relationship among independent variables, representative of Corporate Governance mechanisms, and measures of economic performance of enterprises of the Brazil Index IBX of the São Paulo Stock Exchange BOVESPA, with data referring to the period comprehended between 1997 and 2001. Using the statistic technique of panel data, model of error components, we work with 16 independent variables representing the Corporate Governance mechanisms: concentration of propriety (5 variables), characteristics of the board of directors (3 variables), voting capital (1 variable), remuneration of the executive directorate (2 variables), financial policy (3 variables), internal control (1 variable), and one more control variable, representing the size of the enterprises. These variables are regressed against each one of the five variables of the studied economic performance measures. Such variables have measured up the Market Value Added, the market to book value price ratio, TOBINS Q, profitability over the assets and profitability over the net equity. The results indicate that the property concentration, the voting capital, the remuneration of the executive directorate and the financial policy are related to the economic performance. Surprisingly, the voting capital and the remuneration of the executive directorate are negatively related to performance. We can also observe that the economic performance measure utilized makes difference in the study of the Corporate Governance mechanisms, because that ones purely accountants doesnt have any relation with the mechanisms tested. This study, comprising such diverse mechanisms, variables and also the observed period, is among the leading empiric studies of Corporate Governance in Brazil. We hope to offer a contribution to the academics holding an interest in the matter, as well as to shareholders, managers, market analysts, consultants, Stock Exchange administrators, regulating bodies and class associations.

Ce travail vise à déterminer dans le cadre des sociétés s'introduisant en bourse les facteurs explicatifs de la présence d'engagements contractuels par les principaux actionnaires d'une part et leur impact sur la valeur de la firme d'autre part. Le terme " engagement contractuel " fait référence à deux mécanismes mis en place au moment de l'introduction en bourse : les engagements de conservation d'actions par les dirigeants et les pactes d'actionnaires. Notre étude porte sur un échantillon de 292 entreprises introduites en bourse entre 1996 et 2000 sur le nouveau marché et le second marché de la bourse de Paris. Nos résultats montrent que la présence et la durée des engagements de conservation d'actions des dirigeants servent à signaler la valeur de la firme lorsque l'asymétrie d'information est grande mais aussi à compenser certaines inefficiences du système de gouvernance de l'entreprise. Nous observons également un impact négatif sur la valeur de la firme des engagements de conservation des dirigeants alors que ceux concernant les sociétés de capital risque l'influence positivement. Concernant les pactes d'actionnaires, nos travaux montrent que leur mise en place est d'autant plus probable que les dirigeants anticipent une cession future de l'entreprise. Ils ont par ailleurs une influence positive sur la valeur de la firme tant qu'ils ne protègent pas les signataires d'une prise de contrôle hostile ; dans ce dernier cas l'effet sur la valeur de la firme est négatif. Finalement, nous montrons qu'il existe une réaction négative du cours de bourse autour du jour de l'expiration des engagements de conservation.

碩士
輔仁大學
管理學研究所
92
As everyone knows, good corporate governance can improve firm performance and national competitiveness. Except the mechanisms external to the firm such as the capital market for corporate control and transparency, internal corporate governance mechanism is the basic and more important part. From the self-governance view, this study analyses how the shareholder components (including inside investors and outside investors) and ownership concentration affect firm’s corporate governance. We also investigate whether the effects among the electronic, weave, and financial industries are the same or not. Besides, are these effects different as time goes? As the definition by OECD and Corporate Governance Association Taiwan, corporate governance is not only to ensure the rights of managers, board directors, and shareholders but also the stakeholders (i.e., creditors, employees and business associates). Moreover, the objectives of corporate governance should include short-term profit maximizing and long-run sustainable operating. In the measure of corporate governance performance, we use profit ratios, efficiency ratios, operating ratios, debt ratios, and employee expenses ratios. According to our empirical result, we find the shareholder components and ownership concentration affect the corporate governance performance, and have different influences in different industry and time. Our empirical results are summarized as following: 1.The board, supervisors, and foreign investors have positive effects on the corporate governance. However, the financial institutional investors have a negative effect on the corporate governance. And we find that a firm with a more concentrative ownership has a better corporate governance performance. 2.Most of the shareholder components and ownership concentration have positive (negative) effects on the corporate governance performance in the electronic (weave) corporations, but there is no clear effect in the financial corporations. 3.The shareholder components and ownership concentration have more positive effect on the corporate governance performance as tome goes. Therefore we contend that the internal corporate governance system is developing gradually.

碩士
中國文化大學
會計學系
101
The goal of this paper is to investigate the association between corporate gov-ernance (CG) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement and examine whether the firms engaging in corporate social responsibility can maximize the market value. As a main core of this paper, we test two competing hypotheses, the over-investment hypothesis based on agency theory and the conflict-resolution hy-pothesis based on stakeholder theory. The over-investment explanation posits that top managements use the CSR engagement to enhance their private benefits of so-cial-citizen reputation that could hurt the market value of firm, whereas the conflict resolution explanation postulates that using CSR activities to reduce potential con-flicts between top management and various stakeholders and could eventually max-imize the interests of the shareholders and the market value of firm. The study finds that CSR is positively associated with the internal and external corporate governance and monitoring mechanisms, including board size, and institutional ownership. We also find CSR engagement is associated with industry adjusted Tobin’s Q. The coef-ficient on institutional investors and board size are positively significant, suggesting that institutional investors and board size can be a monitoring role to make a firm’s information environment transparent and reduce the agency cost and resolve the con-flicts between top management and various stakeholders. We also find the insider ownership can interfere the CSR decision-making. Consistent with the prior literature and economic intuition, the finding suggests that governance characteristics can monitor the CSR engagement; CSR engagement could reduce potential conflicts be-tween top management and various stakeholders.

Tian Vane Ing.
Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2002.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 71-74).
Abstracts in English and Chinese.
Abstract --- p.ii
摘要 --- p.iii
Acknowledgements --- p.iv
Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction and Overview --- p.1
Chapter Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.4
Chapter 2.1 --- Shareholder Value and Corporate Governance --- p.4
Chapter 2.2 --- Measures of Value --- p.7
Chapter Chapter 3 --- Data and Methodology --- p.12
Chapter 3.1 --- Data --- p.12
Chapter 3.2 --- Economic Value Added (EVA) --- p.12
Chapter 3.2.1 --- Net Operating Profit After Taxes (NOPAT) --- p.14
Chapter 3.2.2 --- Invested Capital (INCAP) --- p.16
Chapter 3.2.3 --- Cost of Capital --- p.17
Chapter 3.2 --- Hypothesis of Interest --- p.18
Chapter Chapter 4 --- Empirical Results --- p.23
Chapter 4.1 --- The Cost of Capital --- p.23
Chapter 4.2 --- Economic Value Added (EVA) in China and Hong Kong --- p.25
Chapter 4.2.1 --- Analysis of the EVA: Overall --- p.25
Chapter 4.2.2 --- Analysis of the EVA: Industry --- p.28
Chapter 4.2.3 --- Discussions --- p.31
Chapter 4.3 --- Testing of the Hypothesis --- p.36
Chapter 4.3.1 --- EBEI and CFO in China and Hong Kong --- p.37
Chapter 4.3.2 --- Regression on Market Value --- p.41
Chapter 4.3.3 --- Discussions --- p.43
Chapter Chapter 5 --- Summary and Concluding Remarks --- p.68
Bibliography --- p.71

碩士
國立高雄應用科技大學
商務經營研究所
95
Since Asian financial crisis took place in 1997, the economy of a lot of Asian countries has been mauled, the famous enterprises including Enron、Xerox and WorldCom broke out the financial scandal in 2000. All fully show that the companies are lack of supervision mechanism and imperfect internal controls, so people contribute great discussion to the issues of corporate governance. Also, countries all over the world pay more attention to strengthen the importance of the corporate governance. The purposes of this paper are to exam the relationships between corporate governance mechanisms and business value of listed company of every industry. We use the 2002-2005 annual reports of Taiwan public-listed companies as independent variable and dependent variable, which published in 2006 and 2004, respectively. The industries of public-listed companies are chosen as research targets, including textile industry, financial industry, and electronic industry, etc. Furthermore we use separate industry and all sample industry to investigate the effect of the return on stock and Assets that the company should reveal information of corporate governance which listed company in accordance with request on “ The Rules of Financial Publication Standards to Issuers ” by regression analysis. The results reveal that Hypothesis 3 is supported. As with other Hypotheses, only partial of the results are supported.

碩士
國立嘉義大學
管理研究所
93
This study investigates the relationship between corporate diversification and corporate value, and the impact of corporate governance mechanisms to the relationship. The corporate governance mechanisms include the ownership structure, which measure the separation of ownership and control. The empirical results find that diversification positively affects corporate value. The results also find that the separation of ownership and control will negatively affect the relationship between diversification and corporate value. When the separation of ownership and control becomes more serious, the incentive effects become much slighter and the entrenchment effects will dominate its influence to the corporate value. Thus, the positive relationship between diversification and corporate value will be discounted by the badly structured corporate governance mechanisms.

Thesis: Stakeholder's value Goal of this thesis is to evaluate stakeholder's theory, as one of the ways of corporate governance. Shareholder model and stakeholder model dominate in corporate governance currently. At its core are two models considered competing. The method of corporate governance is largely influenced by the historical development of the legal and economic relationships in a particular nation. Therefore, before solving the very essence of stakeholder's theory, brief historical excursion into both model sis necessary. Work is divided into six chapters, first chapter is preceded by a short introduction and after sixth chapter follows the conclusion. The first chapter outlines the corporate governance as a field that is overarching stakeholder's theory. The second chapter presents the shareholder theory including its history. At the same time I try to focus on those aspects of the shareholder theory, which are in direct contrast to the stakeholder's theory. In the third chapter I describe the stakeholder's theory, including the historical context of the development of this model. In the fourth chapter I focus on a problem that accompanies stakeholder's theory: Is the purpose of the corporation to create value for its shareholders or for its stakeholders? First, though, I focus on what...

博士
大葉大學
管理研究所博士班
97
Most of the prior research on corporate governance uses one single or several variables to investigate the issues. However, corporate governance is a multidimensional issue so that it is insufficient to use one single or several variables to explore the whole corporate governance mechanisms. This study uses a sample of 261 firms from electronics industry listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange during the year of 2006. The research first specifies the integration of the observed variables into multi-dimensional constructs, tests the fitness of integrated model, and further investigates the effect of corporate governance mechanism on firm value. This paper integrates thirteen empirically observed corporate governance variables into three dimensional constructs, i.e. information transparency, ownership structure and board structure. And, the models composed by integrated dimensions for measuring corporate governance mechanisms are tested and found the models are fit. Moreover, we discover that the all of the three structural models including corporate governance to operating efficiency, corporate governance to firm value and operating efficiency to firm value, show significantly positive relationship. In addition, through the assessment of models and the analysis of path coefficients, the results show that there probably exists a mediator–operating efficiency. That is, corporate governance mechanisms would affect firms’ operating efficiency, and consequently affect the firm value.

碩士
長榮大學
經營管理研究所
101
To increase the quality and value relevance of accounting data, International Financial Reporting Standards require the disclosure of fair value hierarchy data. The three levels of the fair value hierarchy are the following: (1) Level 1 inputs, which are obtainable quotes for similar assets or liabilities in active markets; (2) Level 2 inputs, which are observable inputs except for Level 1 inputs; and (3) Level 3 inputs, which are unobservable inputs. We explore the correlation between fair value hierarchy data and corporate value in Taiwan, using data from publicly listed or over-the-counter companies in each quarter from the first quarter of 2011 (when fair value hierarchy data was first reported) to the third quarter of 2012. The results of this study show that the value relevance of Level 1 and Level 2 fair value inputs are more substantial than Level 3 inputs. In addition, the results show that the implementation of corporate governance mechanisms does not significantly increase the relevance between Level 3 fair value inputs and corporate value. The primary reason for this is that the corporate governance in Taiwan is inadequate. A report from the Asian Corporate Governance Association has demoted Taiwan from fourth place to sixth place, demonstrating that the corporate governance of Taiwan could still improve.

Good corporate governance should be the cornerstone of all company management. Directors ought to know in whose interests the company should be managed. This thesis attempts to answer the following question: whose interests must be granted primacy in the management of a company? In chapter 1 it is stated that shareholders' interests are traditionally granted primacy in the management of a company. There has, however, been a shift in public opinion towards recognition of a wider variety of interests that should be considered than only those of the shareholders. These interests include, inter alia, environmental interests and those of the investors, employees and consumers. This thesis thus focuses on the primary stakeholders, namely individual shareholders, creditors, employees, consumers and suppliers. In chapter 2 a theoretical foundation is provided on the nature of a company. The different theories on the nature of a company, emphasising either shareholder primacy or stakeholder protection, are discussed. A combined new theory is proposed. It is suggested that the confusion relating to the meaning of "the company" needs to be eliminated. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 provide an international comparison of the company law in Botswana, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The focus falls, firstly, on directors' duties, secondly, on the question in whose interests directors should manage a company and, thirdly, on the codification of their duties. In chapter 6 the South African position is evaluated. First, the possible stakeholders are identified and the protection currently afforded them is explained. The reports of the King Committee on Corporate Governance, the Policy Document on company law reform as well as the Companies Bill of 2007 are discussed. Draft clauses are recommended to be incorporated in new company legislation to provide directors with clarity on what is expected of them. It is the aim of this thesis to provide clarity on whose interests should receive primacy when directors manage a company. The outcome of this research should provide a clear indication to South African directors of what is expected of them and who the beneficiaries of their fiduciary duties are.
Law
LL.D.