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Books on the topic 'Corporate Governance Mechanisms Shareholder Value'

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Published: 10 December 2022
Last updated: 28 January 2023

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1

1975-, Rebérioux Antoine, ed. Corporate governance adrift: A critique of shareholder value. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2005.

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2

Keay, Andrew R. The enlightened shareholder value principle and corporate governance. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012.

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3

Cuñat, Vicente. The vote is cast: The effect of corporate governance on shareholder value. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010.

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4

A blueprint for corporate governance: Strategy, accountability, and the preservation of shareholder value. New York: AMACOM, 2003.

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5

Sherman, Andrew J. Essays on governance: 36 critical essays to drive shareholder value and business growth. Charleston, South Carolina: Advantage Media, 2012.

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6

The art of capital restructuring: Creating shareholder value through mergers and acquisitions. Hoboken, N.J: Wiley, 2011.

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7

Profitable Sarbanes-Oxley compliance: Attain improved shareholder value and bottom-line results. Ft. Lauderdale, FL: J. Ross Pub., 2005.

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8

The shareholder value myth: How putting shareholders first harms investors, corporations, and the public. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2012.

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9

Dalchow, Andreas. Zur Bedeutung des Shareholder Value bei Konkretisierung von Organpflichten in börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaften: Eine ökonomische und juristische Analyse. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2005.

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10

Vorr, Weigand Ju rgen, ed. Corporate Governance: Eine aktienrechtliche und institutioneno konomische Analyse der Leitungsmaxime von Aktiengesellschaften. Wiesbaden: Betriebswirtschaftlicher Verlag Gabler, 2010.

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11

Dalchow, Andreas. Zur Bedeutung des Shareholder Value bei Konkretisierung von Organpflichten in börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaften: Eine ökonomische und juristische Analyse. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2005.

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12

James, Weber, and Post James E, eds. Business and Society: Stakeholders, Ethics, Public Policy. London: McGraw-Hill Education - Europe, 2004.

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13

Lazonick, William, and Jang-Sup Shin. Predatory Value Extraction. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198846772.001.0001.

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This book explains how an ideology of corporate resource allocation known as “maximizing shareholder value” (MSV), that emerged in the 1980s and came to dominate strategic thinking in business schools and corporate boardrooms, undermined the social foundations of sustainable prosperity, resulting in employment instability, income inequity, and slow productivity growth. In explaining what happened to sustainable prosperity in the United States, it focuses on the growing imbalance between value creation and value extraction that reached to the extent of “predatory value extraction.” Based on “The Theory of Innovative Enterprise,” the book analyzes the value extracting mechanism by “value-extracting insiders,” i.e. corporate executives, “value-extracting enablers,” i.e. institutional investors, and “value-extracting outsiders,” i.e. hedge-fund activists. It concludes with policy suggestions to rebuild the U.S. corporate-governance regime for combating predatory value extraction and restoring sustainable prosperity.
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14

Ruffner, Markus, Julian I. Mahari, and Hans Siegwart. Corporate Governance, Shareholder Value and Finance. Vahlen, 2002.

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15

Keay, Andrew. Enlightened Shareholder Value Principle and Corporate Governance. Taylor & Francis Group, 2012.

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16

Keay, Andrew. Enlightened Shareholder Value Principle and Corporate Governance. Taylor & Francis Group, 2012.

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17

Keay, Andrew. Enlightened Shareholder Value Principle and Corporate Governance. Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.

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18

Keay, Andrew. Enlightened Shareholder Value Principle and Corporate Governance. Taylor & Francis Group, 2012.

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19

Anand, Anita Indira. Shareholder-driven Corporate Governance. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190096533.001.0001.

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This is a book about the ways in which capital markets have come to be shaped by the ubiquity of sophisticated investors. In particular, many of today’s investors have the economic might and technical capacity to play a role in the decision-making of the corporations in which they invest. This phenomenon brings with it a host of benefits, such as mechanisms to ameliorate the moral hazard that can exist when the people who bear the risk of corporate activity are different from those who make decisions. A key element of this book is an examination of the ways in which thinking about corporations and capital markets must change to reflect the prevalence of sophisticated shareholders. The book develops a concept—shareholder-driven corporate governance—to explain the role of powerful shareholders and to propose a regulatory scheme that furthers their participation in corporate decision-making. In doing so, the book considers a number of regulatory challenges that confront securities regulators. Ultimately, the book identifies an important trend in capital markets, highlights reasons for fostering this trend, and discusses the path that regulation can and should take in order to protect investors and foster well-regulated markets.
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20

Keay, Andrew. The Enlightened Shareholder Value Principle and Corporate Governance. Routledge, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203104927.

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21

Effective Top Management: Beyond the Failure of Corporate Governance and Shareholder Value. Wiley, 2006.

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22

Kaen, Fred R. Blueprint for Corporate Governance: Strategy, Accountability, and the Preservation of Shareholder Value. AMACOM, 2003.

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23

Thamm, Christian. Minority Shareholder Monitoring and German Corporate Governance: Empirical Evidence and Value Effects. Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, Peter, 2013.

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24

Thamm, Christian. Minority Shareholder Monitoring and German Corporate Governance: Empirical Evidence and Value Effects. Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, Peter, 2013.

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25

Baker, H. Kent, and Halil Kiymaz. Art of Capital Restructuring: Creating Shareholder Value Through Mergers and Acquisitions. Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, John, 2011.

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26

Baker, H. Kent, and Halil Kiymaz. Art of Capital Restructuring: Creating Shareholder Value Through Mergers and Acquisitions. Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, John, 2011.

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27

Baker, H. Kent, and Halil Kiymaz. Art of Capital Restructuring: Creating Shareholder Value Through Mergers and Acquisitions. Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, John, 2011.

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28

Baker, H. Kent, and Halil Kiymaz. Art of Capital Restructuring: Creating Shareholder Value Through Mergers and Acquisitions. Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, John, 2011.

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29

Baker, H. Kent, and Halil Kiymaz. Art of Capital Restructuring: Creating Shareholder Value Through Mergers and Acquisitions. Wiley & Sons, Limited, John, 2011.

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30

Gerard, Patrick. Performance & Reward: Managing Executive Pay to Deliver Shareholder Value. Troubador Publishing, 2006.

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31

Kaen, Fred R. Blueprint for Corporate Governance, A: Strategy, Accountability, and the Preservation of Shareholder Value. AMACOM/American Management Association, 2003.

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32

Metten, Michael. Corporate Governance: Eine Aktienrechtliche und Institutionenökonomische Analyse der Leitungsmaxime Von Aktiengesellschaften. Westdeutscher Verlag GmbH, 2010.

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33

Northrup, C. Lynn. Profitable Sarbanes-oxley Compliance: Attain Improved Shareholder Value and Bottom-line Results. J. Ross Publishing, 2006.

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34

Driver, Ciaran, and Grahame Thompson, eds. Corporate Governance in Contention. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805274.001.0001.

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This book addresses major modern controversies in corporate governance, clarifying the issues at stake and assessing the arguments for corporate reform. The main focus is on governance of the large organizations that employ the majority of workforces in developed economies and which account for most of the finance and refinance of the private sector. Shareholder value and shareholder primacy are now under increasing scrutiny having previously been positioned as natural precepts of governance. The book joins that debate with a critique and also with suggestions for company reform that allow for plurality within jurisdictions: the trust firm, industrial foundations, social enterprises, the ‘benefit corporation’, restricted voting rights, employee representation etc. The book addresses several sets of controversies in corporate governance. Part 1 places the corporate form within the context of legal constitution and governmental regulation. The second set of chapters considers corporate governance systems and their role in innovation and adaptation. The chapters in part 3 discuss labour relations and worker involvement in the governance of companies. Part 4 widens the focus to consider effects external to the firm—on consumer interests and the environment. What these issues point to is that the modern corporation is not only an economic institution but also a cultural and political one, reflecting the firm’s role in civil society The overall theme is that the corporate governance agenda has been on the wrong track and needs to be fundamentally reset.
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35

Marktwertorientierte Uberwachung der Unternehmensplanung durch den Aufsichtsrat: Ein Informationskonzept auf Basis des Shareholder Value-Ansatzes (European ... studies. Series V, Economics and management). P. Lang, 1998.

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36

Gordon, Jeffrey N. Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Law and Governance. Edited by Jeffrey N. Gordon and Wolf-Georg Ringe. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743682.013.2.

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This chapter discusses the question of “convergence or persistence” in corporate law and governance. It first considers efforts to measure convergence directly by focusing on the evolution of law-on-the-books governance provisions before analyzing capital market evidence on convergence, with particular emphasis on capital market indicators such as the decline in “cross-listings” onto US stock exchanges by firms from jurisdictions with weaker investor protection and the increase in initial public offerings (IPOs) on emerging market stock markets. The chapter proceeds by reviewing evidence of divergence, especially “divergence within convergence,” and the failure of the European Union to produce more convergent corporate governance. It also looks at the “End of History” debate over whether corporate governance has converged on a “shareholder value” model and concludes by asking whether “stability” will become a general objective of corporate governance convergence.
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37

Milhaupt, Curtis J. The Governance Ecology of China’s State-Owned Enterprises. Edited by Jeffrey N. Gordon and Wolf-Georg Ringe. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743682.013.6.

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This chapter focuses on the governance ecology of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs). More specifically, it examines the mechanisms of state capitalism in China by analyzing the distinctive system of industrial organization in which the country’s largest SOEs were assembled and currently operate. After providing the conceptual background, the chapter charts the origins of Chinese corporate capitalism and how it is presently organized. It then considers the key components and main organizational characteristics of the national business groups and contrasts them with those in Japan and Korea. It also explores SASAC’s behavior as a controlling shareholder within the larger institutions of the party-state and how it shares the role of controlling shareholder with the Communist Party. Finally, it assesses the implications of the analysis for comparative corporate governance scholarship.
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38

Institutional Investor Activism: Hedge Funds and Private Equity, Economics and Regulation. Oxford University Press, 2015.

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39

Cox, James D., and Randall S. Thomas. The Evolution in the U.S. of Private Enforcement via Litigation and Monitoring Techniques. Edited by Jeffrey N. Gordon and Wolf-Georg Ringe. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743682.013.38.

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This chapter examines the evolution of private enforcement in the United States and the lessons that can be learned by German public companies from the experiences of their US counterparts. It first looks at the place of representative shareholder litigation within the US corporate governance system before turning to the broad-based criticisms against all forms of representative shareholder litigation on the grounds of excessive litigation agency costs. It then discusses the role of shareholder derivative suits in remedying breaches of duty of loyalty, along with the use of hedge funds in shareholder monitoring. It explores the increasing role of appraisal remedy against the backdrop of developments in shareholder litigation focused on acquisitions, and highlights the limitations of hedge fund activism. Finally, it assesses the implications of shareholder monitoring mechanisms in the United States for shareholders in Germany.
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40

Hopt, Klaus J. Groups of Companies. Edited by Jeffrey N. Gordon and Wolf-Georg Ringe. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743682.013.30.

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Groups of companies are common. The empirical data are heterogeneous. Agency problems arise between the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders and between the shareholders and the creditors. Three regulatory models exist: regulation by general corporate and/or civil law (prototype: the UK); regulation by special group law (prototype: Germany); and regulation by areas of the law such as banking, competition, and tax. The main strategy is mandatory disclosure and group accounting. Related party transactions (including conflict of interest and tunneling) are dealt with by disclosure and consent requirements. In addition, appropriate standards for directors and controlling shareholders (corporate governance) have been developed. They become stricter, if insolvency is approaching. The concept of the shadow director extends liability to the controlling shareholder. Other mechanisms for creditor protection are indemnification, veil-piercing, subordination and substantive consolidation. A fair amount of international convergence exists as to shareholder protection, but not as to creditor protection.
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41

Weller, Patrick. The Prime Ministers' Craft. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199646203.001.0001.

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This book addresses major modern controversies in corporate governance, clarifying the issues at stake and assessing the arguments for corporate reform. The main focus is on governance of the large organizations that employ the majority of workforces in developed economies and which account for most of the finance and refinance of the private sector. Shareholder value and shareholder primacy are now under increasing scrutiny having previously been positioned as natural precepts of governance. The book joins that debate with a critique and also with suggestions for company reform that allow for plurality within jurisdictions: the trust firm, industrial foundations, social enterprises, the ‘benefit corporation’, restricted voting rights, employee representation etc. The book addresses several sets of controversies in corporate governance. Part 1 places the corporate form within the context of legal constitution and governmental regulation. The second set of chapters considers corporate governance systems and their role in innovation and adaptation. The chapters in part 3 discuss labour relations and worker involvement in the governance of companies. Part 4 widens the focus to consider effects external to the firm—on consumer interests and the environment. What these issues point to is that the modern corporation is not only an economic institution but also a cultural and political one, reflecting the firm’s role in civil society The overall theme is that the corporate governance agenda has been on the wrong track and needs to be fundamentally reset.
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42

Crouch, Colin. The Incompatibles. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805274.003.0012.

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It is essential to the wider public legitimacy of the shareholder value maximization approach to corporate governance that share values can be maximized only by meeting consumers’ preferences and by using resources as efficiently as possible; and that therefore shareholders’ interests represent the general interest. The claim rests on the assumption that firms are operating in more or less pure markets. Since few markets are pure, theorists have moved from the idea of consumer sovereignty to that of consumer welfare, but this represents a sleight of hand. Further, not all human needs can be served by trading in markets. That leads us to the search for alternatives. There must be a variety of these, as one lesson of the failure of neo-liberal market theory to realize its ambitions is that there is no one best way. Neo-liberal dogmatism must be replaced by a genuinely liberal pursuit of diversity.
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