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Academic literature on the topic 'Corporate Governance Mechanisms Shareholder Value'

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Published: 10 December 2022
Last updated: 28 January 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Corporate Governance Mechanisms Shareholder Value"

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Li, Weian, and Jianbo Niu. "Private interest and social interest of shareholders: empirical evidence from China." Corporate Ownership and Control 5, no. 1 (2007): 254–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i1c2p1.

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We try to explore the relation among three factors: the private benefits that main shareholders can obtain from the firm, the social benefits derived from a certain ownership structure and the ownership concentration costs. Different corporations have different optimal governance mechanism. Noticing the substitute relation between the level of the management-and-shareholder-conflicts and the different governance mechanism, we take use of the data from China’ stock market and conduct an empirical analysis on the influence both of the different shareholder’s participating in governance and the ownership structure over corporate performance, and have reached two conclusions. First, in the companies with a higher level of conflicts between the management and the shareholders, the shareholder will be more active in participating in governance because the benefits earned here is much more than the company with a lower level of conflicts. Second, when the other governance mechanisms in one company perform poorly, the shareholder is less active in participating in governance because the extra benefits earned here cannot offset their costs. So only in these companies with poor governance mechanisms, the shareholders’ active monitoring can produce benefits. These conclusions can help our further research on the relationship among the shareholder supervision, ownership structure and corporate value, and we should also re-evaluate some traditional theoretical viewpoints
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Nwoke, Uchechukwu. "Neoliberal corporate governance mechanisms." International Journal of Law and Management 61, no. 5/6 (October 31, 2019): 542–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijlma-10-2018-0246.

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Purpose This paper aims to identify and analyze the neoliberal, Anglo-American corporate governance mechanisms which embed shareholder value in Nigeria, and assess how they constitute major “practical barriers” to effective corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the country. While some of these mechanisms operate internally – performance-related pay (executive remuneration) – the use of non-executive directors – others operate externally – the markets for corporate control and the stock markets. Design/methodology/approach The paper adopts the doctrinal approach through a critical evaluation of concepts. Using existing literature in the subject area, it evaluates the nature of these mechanisms and argues that their operations amount to “practical barriers” to effective CSR in the country. Findings The paper finds that the existence of these mechanisms incentivizes corporate managers to maximize shareholder value and raise the share price of corporations as high as possible. It also leads to the financialization of corporate governance, rent seeking and the pursuit of short-term profits by corporations. In this context, within the Nigerian corporate governance framework, the existence and operations of these mechanisms amount to “practical barriers” to effective CSR. Originality/value The paper offers a fresh insight into the existence and operations of the neoliberal corporate governance mechanisms which embed shareholder value. By critically assessing the operations of these mechanisms in the Nigerian situation, it extends the body of knowledge in this area by showing how they amount to practical barriers to effective CSR in the country.
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Hennessey, Sean M. "Corporate governance mechanisms for publicly-traded companies." Corporate Ownership and Control 5, no. 4 (2008): 309–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i4c2p4.

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The resolution of conflicts between shareholders and managers, at minimal cost, is the goal of corporate governance. This paper discusses four mechanisms, two internal, two external, that attempt to ensure managers act in the best interests of shareholders: 1) the board of directors, 2) management compensation plans, 3) the market, and 4) takeovers. Theoretically, these four forms of corporate governance should ensure management maximizes shareholder value. But, agency costs are real for shareholders. In practice each the mechanisms may be severely limited in their ability to protect shareholders. The best protection is an independent, credible board of directors. Without good boards, shareholders are left to the mercy of the agents. In such cases, it is very difficult, and expensive, to discipline the senior managers of a publicly-traded company
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Li, Ting, Xinlei Zhao, and Aiwu Zhao. "Voting with hands, earnings management and corporate governance." Review of Accounting and Finance 18, no. 2 (May 13, 2019): 178–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/raf-02-2016-0016.

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Purpose Motivated by managers’ intentions to pursue private interests by engaging in earnings management, this paper aims to investigate whether voting with hands (shareholders cast votes on shareholder proposals) by shareholders acts as an external disciplining mechanism over earnings management relative to corporate governance. Also, as corporate governance can scrutinize managers’ behavior, this study also examines whether there is a substitutive relation between shareholder proposals and corporate governance mechanism. Design/methodology/approach First, this paper uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of discrepancy accruals on the percentage of “For” votes for shareholder proposals to test the incremental effect of shareholder proposals on earnings management. Second, firms receiving shareholder proposals are matched with those not receiving proposals by propensity scores, and the levels of earnings management and corporate governance between these two groups are compared by univariate analysis and OLS regressions. In addition, six portfolios are created based on whether firms receive shareholder proposals, as well as on the levels of corporate governance, to assess whether external control from shareholder proposals can substitute internal control for corporate governance in disciplining earnings management. Regressions of earnings management on corporate governance (shareholder proposals) are conducted in the sub-samples formed on shareholder proposals (corporate governance) to further explore the above substitution effects. Findings Based on a sample of 2,041 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2010, this paper finds that the “For” votes received from the shareholder proposals have a significant negative relationship with the practice of earnings management, even when corporate governance is controlled. The negative relationship between shareholder proposal and magnitude of earnings management is also found to be stronger when firms have weak corporate governance. The overall evidence suggests that the external control from “voting-with-hand” shareholders has a significant impact on earnings management. In addition, shareholder proposals can substitute the monitoring mechanism for corporate governance in constraining managers’ myopic behavior. Originality/value This paper contributes to the extant literature by using the percentage of “For” votes for shareholder proposals as a proxy for shareholder pressure and concerns. This study contributes to the earnings management literature by showing the disciplinary effect of outside shareholders on managers’ reporting behavior. Also, it contributes to the corporate governance research by presenting that shareholder proposals can substitute for the internal control of corporate governance in decreasing earnings management. This paper should be of interest to investors and standard setters.
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Kay, John, and Aubrey Silberston. "Corporate Governance." National Institute Economic Review 153 (August 1995): 84–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002795019515300107.

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Both those who are critical of the current structure of corporate governance, and those who support it, share a common set of prenaises. The corporation is owned by its shareholders: managers exert power and responsibility on behalf of their shareholders: corporate governance is a question of effective accountability to shareholders. If there are problems, they should be dealt with by making these mechanisms more effective. This article challenges that view.The principal-agent model bears no relationship to the way large companies are actually run. The attempt to bring reality in line with the model is one possible road to reform: another is to adjust the model to reality. Shareholders do not own large companies, in any ordinary sense of the word own. Firms like BT or BP are social institutions, owned by nobody. The distinction between plc and the owner managed limited company should be real, and not just titular. Corporate managers are not the agents of the shareholders, but the trustees of the assets of the corporation, which include its reputation, its distinctive capabilities, and the skills of the employees and suppliers. Their objective should not be to maximise shareholder value but to further the interests of the business.This account is probably a better description of the current state of British company law than the principal-agent model, but we advocate a new company statute to put the matter beyond doubt. Disposing of the fiction that executives are the agents of shareholders allows us to establish an effective system for achieving the key goals of corporate governance: freedom for managers to manage, combined with real accountability for their performance. We advocate a fixed four-year term for company chief executives, involving a wide ranging and searching review of effectiveness which would involve not only directors and shareholders but advisors, associated companies and employees.It is better that property should be private, but that man should make it common in use …. it is the task of the legislator to see that the citizens become like that. Aristotle
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Lee, Ji-Hyun, and Su-Yol Lee. "Effect of the Absence of Unethical Controlling Shareholders on Firm Value and the Moderating Role of Corporate Governance: Evidence from South Korea." Sustainability 14, no. 6 (March 18, 2022): 3607. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su14063607.

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Prior research on unethical controlling shareholder is limited. This study examines the effect of the evanishment of unethical controlling shareholders’ risk on firm value and how corporate governance moderates this effect from a principal–principal agency perspective. This research proposes a contingent model of corporate governance as a mechanism to provide professional managers with managerial autonomy. This study identifies 43 cases of controlling shareholders of Korean conglomerates being absent due to their imprisonment from 2006 to 2015. The regression analysis results indicate that the evanishment of controlling shareholders’ risks does not significantly influence the affiliated firms’ value. This study supports the positive effect of corporate governance on firm value. Although the statistical significance is low, it observes a tendency for corporate governance to amplify the relationship between the dissolution of unethical controlling shareholders’ risks and firm value. This study contributes to the literature by being one of the first to explore unethical controlling shareholders’ risks based on corporate governance theory.
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Liao, Qunfeng, and Bo Ouyang. "Shareholder litigation risk and real earnings management: a causal inference." Review of Accounting and Finance 18, no. 4 (November 11, 2019): 557–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/raf-06-2018-0122.

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Purpose The authors study how shareholder litigation risk impacts a firm’s decision of real earnings management (REM). This paper aims to shed light on how shareholder litigation risk impacts REM. The authors further explore how the intensifying effect varies systematically conditioning on the degree of information asymmetry and the strength of internal corporate governance. Design/methodology/approach In this study, the authors use the 1999 Ninth Circuit Court ruling as a quasi-experiment that reduces shareholder litigation risk to address endogeneity and establish a causal inference. Findings The difference-in-difference tests suggest lower shareholder litigation risk intensifies REM. In other words, higher litigation risk mitigates REM. Cross-sectional test results suggest the negative effect of decreased shareholder litigation is more pronounced when monitoring difficulty is higher, when information environment is more impoverished and when internal corporate governance is weaker. The negative effect is also stronger in firms with higher sensitivity to legal threats. Originality/value Protection of investors’ interest is the focus of corporate governance. Designed as an important corporate governance mechanism, shareholder litigation enables investors to pursue legal actions to recover their losses in the event of corporate misbehaviors. However, whether shareholder litigation is an effective corporate governance tool and beneficial to shareholders and firms is not without controversy. The authors contribute to the debate by providing evidence that supports the argument that shareholder litigation threat significantly disciplines REM, a form of costlier earnings management technique and myopic investment behavior.
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Al-Ibbini, Omran Ahmad, and Osama Samih Shaban. "Internal corporate governance mechanisms, investors’ confidence and stock price fluctuations risk." Journal of Governance and Regulation 10, no. 1 (2021): 22–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/jgrv10i1art2.

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The primary goal of corporate governance is to create a balance of power-sharing among shareholders, directors, and management to enhance shareholder value and protect the interests of other stakeholders. The main aim of this study is to find out the effect of internal corporate governance in improving the confidence of investors and minimizing stock fluctuations risk. In order to achieve the objectives of the study, a questionnaire has been designed and distributed randomly to 200 traders at the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). Resolution data were analyzed using the statistical program (Smart PLS), in addition to other statistical methods. The study concluded that there is a significant statistical effect of internal corporate governance mechanisms in improving the confidence of investors and minimizing stock fluctuations risk. Also, the study recommended to maintain the current level of investors’ confidence and to work on developing the legal framework for corporate governance in the light of the proposed development of a conceptual framework, and economic growth.
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Valipour, Hashem, and Mostafa Sohouli Vahed. "Reviewing Conservative Relationship between Accounting and Corporate Governance Mechanisms." International Journal of Business and Management 12, no. 6 (May 18, 2017): 172. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v12n6p172.

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This research has the aim of reviewing relationship between some corporate governance mechanisms and conservatism in financial reports. Conservatism is potentially useful for corporate governance in some ways: first it reduce opportunistic engagement of management against itself. Second, it results in management report about loss from selling assets and ceases operation and finally it prevents continuity of management investment in projects with negative net present value. Estimated coefficient of independent variable of ownership concentration is positive and their p-value is less than 5%, so it can be said that there is a positive and significant relationship between ownership concentration and conservative accounting and the first sub-hypothesis is accepted. Estimated coefficient of independent variable of BD (Board of directors) size is positive and its p-value is higher than 5%, so it can be said that there is no significant relationship between BD size and conservative accounting then the second sub-hypothesis is rejected. Estimated coefficient of independent variable of BD composition is positive and its p-value is less than 5%, so it can be said that there is a positive and significant relationship between BD composition and conservative accounting then the third sub-hypothesis is accepted. Estimated coefficient of independent variable of shareholder directors is negative and its p-value is higher than 5%, so it can be said that there is no significant relationship between shareholder directors and conservative accounting then the forth sub-hypothesis is rejected.
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Mohammad Kamal Hossain, Md. Shajul Islam, and Md Moslahur Reza. "Do Corporate Governance Mechanisms Truly Act as the Drivers of Shareholder Value in the Banking Sector in Bangladesh? Evidence from the Economic Profit Perspective." International Journal of Business and Society 23, no. 2 (August 8, 2022): 1005–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.33736/ijbs.4855.2022.

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This study examines whether corporate governance mechanisms (CGMs) truly act as the drivers of shareholder value (SV) in the banking sector in Bangladesh from the economic profit perspective. The study employs a random-effects model to test hypotheses in a sample of 29 banks listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange for the period 2014–2018. Relying on the test results of CGMs on SV measured from the economic profit perspective, this study finds that only the independent audit committee acts as a driver of truly creating shareholder value. Contrary to expectations, other CGMs in the analysis (e.g. board size, independent non-executive directors, audit committee size, audit committee meetings, and institutional shareholding) are not found to create true shareholder value. The outcomes of the study are a matter of concern for the regulatory bodies of the Bangladeshi banking sector and institutions involved in constructing the code of corporate governance, as the existing CGMs are suboptimal in the sense that they do not truly act as value-driving mechanisms for shareholder value.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Corporate Governance Mechanisms Shareholder Value"

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Khaldi, Mohamed Ali. "Impact des mécanismes de gouvernance sur la création et la répartition de la valeur partenariale." Thesis, Grenoble, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014GRENG007/document.

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La multiplication des scandales financiers depuis l'an 2000 suscite des débats et des controverses sur la gouvernance des entreprises cotées en bourse. Dans le paradigme contractuel, les débats sur la gouvernance ont largement consacré la valeur actionnariale comme modèle dominant, et dans lequel les actionnaires sont les seuls créanciers résiduels. Toutefois, la théorie des parties prenantes part du principe que la relation d'agence actionnaire-dirigeant doit s'élargir aux autres partenaires intervenant dans la chaîne de valeur, et qu'il faut abandonner l'hypothèse du statut de créancier résiduel exclusif des actionnaires. Cet abandon conduit à s'interroger sur le partage de la rente organisationnelle, ou valeur partenariale créée par la firme. Plus précisément, le concept de valeur partenariale soulève les questions de sa mesure, de son appropriation par les différents partenaires, et du rôle des mécanismes de gouvernance à ce niveau. L'objectif de cette recherche est, dans un premier temps, d'examiner le rôle joué par les mécanismes de gouvernance propres à la firme (caractéristiques du conseil, structure de propriété) sur la valeur partenariale créée, puis, dans un deuxième temps, sur l'appropriation de cette valeur partenariale par la firme et par ses parties prenantes explicites. Les tests empiriques portent sur un panel de 103 sociétés françaises cotées observées sur trois années (2006, 2008 et 2010). Les résultats suggèrent que quatre mécanismes ressortent globalement positivement associés à la valeur partenariale créée : la taille et l'indépendance du conseil, le pouvoir actionnarial des salariés, et la présence d'un comité d'éthique et/ou de gouvernance (CEG). En matière d'appropriation, deux mécanismes de gouvernance semblent jouer un rôle. Premièrement, la taille du conseil permettrait aux actionnaires et aux fournisseurs de capter davantage de rente organisationnelle, au détriment des clients et de la firme elle-même. Deuxièmement, la présence d'un CEG incite à une meilleure prise en compte des intérêts de certaines parties prenantes non-financières dans le partage de la rente (clients, salariés), alors que la part de rente que s'approprient les apporteurs de capitaux financiers (actionnaires et créanciers) diminue. Dans l'ensemble, nos résultats concernant la mise en place d'un CEG s'avèrent encourageant quant à la capacité de ce mécanisme à promouvoir une véritable gouvernance partenariale au sein des firmes cotées
The multiplication of financial scandals since year 2000 induced debates and controversies about the governance of public companies. In the contracting paradigm, the debates on corporate governance have largely relied on shareholder value as a dominant model, in which shareholders are the only residual claimants. However, the stakeholder theory builds on the principle that the shareholder-manager agency relationship has to widen to the others stakeholders who intervene in the value creation chain, and that it is necessary to get rid of the hypothesis that shareholders are exclusive residual claimants. This move brings questions about the sharing of the organizational rent, or stakeholder value created by the firm. More specifically, the concept of stakeholder value raises questions about its measurement, its appropriation by the various stakeholders, and about the role of corporate governance mechanisms on that ground. The objective of this research is to investigate the role of firm-specific governance mechanisms (board characteristics, ownership structure) on the creation of stakeholder value on the one hand, and on the distribution of that stakeholder value to the firm and to its explicit stakeholders, on the other hand. Empirical tests are based on a panel of 103 French listed companies observed over three years (2006, 2008, and 2010). The main findings suggest that four mechanisms stand out globally positively associated to the stakeholder value created: board size and board independence, employees' voting rights (shareholder power), and the presence of an Ethics and/or Governance Committee (EGC). In terms of appropriation, two governance mechanisms seem to play a role. Firstly, board size would result in a larger part of the organizational rent captured by shareholders and suppliers, at the expense of customers and the firm itself. Secondly, the presence of an EGC results in a better consideration of the interests of some non-financial stakeholders (customers and employees), whereas the share of rent that is appropriated by financial capital providers (shareholders and debt-holders) decreases. Overall, our results concerning the implementation of an EGC turn out encouraging regarding the capacity of such mechanism to promote effective stakeholder governance within listed companies
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Moldenhauer, Benjamin. "Insider ownership, shareholder structures and corporate governance /." Sternenfels : Verl. Wissenschaft & Praxis, 2007. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2882441&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.

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Moldenhauer, Benjamin. "Insider ownership, shareholder structures and corporate governance." Sternenfels Verl. Wiss. & Praxis, 2006. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2882441&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.

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Weichsler, Tobias. "Corporate Governance und Shareholder Value : eine empirische Untersuchung am Beispiel der Schweiz." kostenfrei, 2009. http://www.biblio.unisg.ch/www/edis.nsf/wwwDisplayIdentifier/3581.

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Anis, Radwa Magdy Mohamed. "Disclosure quality, corporate governance mechanisms and firm value." Thesis, University of Stirling, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/1893/24454.

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One of the main aims of the underlying research is to respond to continuous calls for introducing and measuring a sound economic definition for best practice disclosure quality (e.g. Beyer et al., 2010) that is derived from a reliable guidance framework (Botosan, 2004) using an innovative natural language processing technique (Berger, 2011). It also aims to examine the impact of corporate governance on best practice disclosure quality. Finally, it aims to examine the joint effect of both best practice disclosure quality and corporate governance on firm value. The thesis contributes to disclosure studies in three principal ways. First, it introduces a new measure for best practice disclosure quality. Further tests show that the proposed measure is reliable and valid. A novel feature of this measure is that it captures all qualitative dimensions of information issued by the Accounting Standards Board, 2006 (ASB) Operating and Financial Review (OFR) Reporting Statement. Second, it uses machine-readable OFR statements for financial years ending in 2006-2009, and develops a language processing technique through constructing five keyword lists. Third, it examines the extent to which disclosure quantity provides a proper proxy for disclosure quality. The analysis shows that disclosure quantity is not a good proxy for disclosure quality. Accordingly, results derived, using quantity as a proxy for quality, are questionable. Results of the association between disclosure quality and corporate governance mechanisms suggest that the most effective governance mechanisms in improving disclosure quality are leadership structure, audit committee meeting frequency, and audit firm size. Using a wide set of corporate governance mechanisms, the study also contributes to three research strands and explains the inconclusive results in relation to the association between disclosure quality, corporate governance mechanisms and firm value. It provides empirical evidence as to which governance mechanisms promote the quality of voluntarily disclosed information in large UK firms. Additionally, it provides empirical evidence as to the joint effect of best practice disclosure quality, corporate governance mechanisms on firm value in the UK. Results also show that best practice disclosure quality enjoys a substitutive relationship with two corporate governance mechanisms (audit committee independence and audit committee size) and a complementary association with board independence in relation to firm value. The study has various research and policy implications. It suggests new research avenues for re-examining disclosure relationships, especially research areas that do not have persuasive conclusions such as the economic consequences of disclosure quality. Such research may inform both regulators and managers as to the costs and benefits of disclosure quality to both firms and stakeholders. It also provides feedback on the current disclosure practices by firms so that policy-makers can modify reporting frameworks/guidance accordingly.
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Amiot, André, and Johansson Fredrik Hallin. "Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance and CEO compenastion incentives." Thesis, Högskolan i Gävle, Företagsekonomi, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hig:diva-28334.

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Society's awareness of the importance of environmental-, social- and economic issues has increased over the last decades. This increased interest has led to the development of the Corporate Social Responsibility concept (CSR) in which companies actively work simultaneously with environmental, social and economic issues that extend beyond what is legally required by these companies in order to achieve a more sustainable society. As the interest in CSR has increased, a debate whether CSR is value-creating or should be considered an agency cost has arisen. To approach this question previous researches have used the CEO compensation to examine if the engagement in CSR actually is an agency cost or a value creating activity and found that agency costs can be mitigated by tying incentives to performance. Based on these assumptions this study will examine the link between CSR and agency costs using the existence of a CSR related compensation incentives for CEOs related agency costs. This study is characterized to be positivistic and within the field of positive accounting research as it has deductive approach in which hypotheses are formulated that this study intends to test which are based on what fundamental economic theories and previous research have found that may affect agency costs. The empirical data are manually collected from companies’ on NasdaqOMX Stockholm 2016 annual reports followed by an analysis of the data using univariate t-test and multiple regressions in order to relate these findings to previous research. This study finds no direct evidence that CEO compensation incentives related to CSR affect agency costs which means that we have not closed the ongoing debate whether CSR engagement is creating shareholder value or should be considered an agency cost. Nonetheless, the results show indications that agency costs are higher for companies that use CEO compensation incentives related to CSR which indicates that CSR is not beneficial to shareholders but should instead be regarded as an agency cost at the expense of shareholders. The result also indicates that a positive accounting research is not particularly useful on a small stock market with reliable results because the findings can not be generalized in a broader perspective
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Pfeiffer, Thomas. "Corporate-Governance-Strukturen interner Märkte /." Wiesbaden : Dt. Univ.-Verl, 2003. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/374159483.pdf.

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Jizi, Mohammad. "Corporate governance, disclosure content and shareholder value : impacts and interrelationships from the US banking sector." Thesis, Durham University, 2013. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/7359/.

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The recent financial crisis was the largest shock to the financial system in decades. Its implications on banks' performance, corporate image and stakeholders' trust are of a high concern for all interested parties. Banks market capitalisation dropped significantly, risk levels increased and stakeholders’ confidence was shaken. This raises the importance of researching this particular area of primary concern to seek potential approaches intended to help banks to recover through increased disclosures, helping to rebuild trust and manage risk levels. Acknowledging societal needs and having effective dialogue with shareholders and stakeholders regarding banks' social profile as well as risk management practices is likely to reduce the uncertainty gap, shape banks' image and manage trust. These are indeed valuable in the wake of the financial crisis for bank continuity and enhancing shareholder value. I argue that effective corporate governance is likely to encourage more corporate social responsibility (CSR) and risk management (RM) disclosure, which in turn is expected to improve stock prices and reduce return volatility. The study examines potential solutions that assist in the management of the increasing risk levels, shaken confidence and falling market values resulting from the recent financial crisis. It contributes toward better understanding to the influence of internal corporate governance mechanisms on CSR and RM disclosure content and their substantive consequences on shareholder value. Examining a sample of US national commercial banks in the wake of the financial crisis indicates that boards with larger size, higher independence and CEO duality are inclined toward reporting a wider range of CSR and RM disclosures in annual reports, aiming to benefit the bank’s transparency and stakeholders’ long-term mutual relationship. Contrary to CSR disclosures, the number of audit committee financial experts was found to encourage better RM disclosure content implying the difference in influence on voluntary and mandatory disclosures. Insights into the desirable consequences CSR and RM disclosures content have on shareholder value are also evidenced. The study finds evidence supporting the association between CSR disclosure content and stock return indicating investors’ interest in, and consideration of, CSR information when valuing assets and building their trading decisions. The results also suggest that higher RM disclosure score reduces uncertainties of bank risk environment and provides investors with valuable information to assess financial assets and monitor management practices. This was reflected as an improvement to stock return and reduction to return volatility. Thus, effective corporate governance is more tending to enhance shareholder value through encouraging better CSR and RM disclosure content. Corporate governance should sponsor and introduce the perception of doing business responsibly and benefit from RM disclosure as a preventive tool assisting in the management of agency problems and bank risks. The economic consequences of CSR and RM disclosures imply that CSR engagement and reporting is an investment rather than an expense, and RM disclosure is a preventive tool rather than an exercise to comply with legislation requirement. Consequently, considering their content is important for better shareholder value.
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Blüme, Pontus. "Financialisation and Shareholder Value : Concepts of Governance in the Swedish Market for Corporate Control: 1983-2008." Thesis, Stockholms universitet, Institutionen för ekonomisk historia och internationella relationer, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-193939.

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Wolf, Klaus. "Risikomanagement im Kontext der wertorientierten Unternehmensführung /." Wiesbaden : Dt. Univ.-Verl, 2003. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=010547816&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.

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Books on the topic "Corporate Governance Mechanisms Shareholder Value"

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1975-, Rebérioux Antoine, ed. Corporate governance adrift: A critique of shareholder value. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2005.

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Keay, Andrew R. The enlightened shareholder value principle and corporate governance. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012.

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Cuñat, Vicente. The vote is cast: The effect of corporate governance on shareholder value. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010.

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A blueprint for corporate governance: Strategy, accountability, and the preservation of shareholder value. New York: AMACOM, 2003.

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Sherman, Andrew J. Essays on governance: 36 critical essays to drive shareholder value and business growth. Charleston, South Carolina: Advantage Media, 2012.

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The art of capital restructuring: Creating shareholder value through mergers and acquisitions. Hoboken, N.J: Wiley, 2011.

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Profitable Sarbanes-Oxley compliance: Attain improved shareholder value and bottom-line results. Ft. Lauderdale, FL: J. Ross Pub., 2005.

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The shareholder value myth: How putting shareholders first harms investors, corporations, and the public. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2012.

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Dalchow, Andreas. Zur Bedeutung des Shareholder Value bei Konkretisierung von Organpflichten in börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaften: Eine ökonomische und juristische Analyse. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2005.

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Vorr, Weigand Ju rgen, ed. Corporate Governance: Eine aktienrechtliche und institutioneno konomische Analyse der Leitungsmaxime von Aktiengesellschaften. Wiesbaden: Betriebswirtschaftlicher Verlag Gabler, 2010.

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Book chapters on the topic "Corporate Governance Mechanisms Shareholder Value"

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Metten, Michael. "Das Shareholder Value-Konzept." In Corporate Governance, 155–75. Wiesbaden: Gabler, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-8619-1_4.

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Durguti, Esat, and Emine Gashi. "Application of Corporate Governance Mechanisms to Protect the Value of Shareholders: Evidence of the Banking Sector in Kosovo." In Digital Economy, Business Analytics, and Big Data Analytics Applications, 557–65. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05258-3_44.

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Metten, Michael. "Corporate Governance zwischen Shareholder Value und aktienrechtlicher Zielkonzeption." In Corporate Governance, 177–258. Wiesbaden: Gabler, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-8619-1_5.

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Andreadakis, Stelios. "Enlightened Shareholder Value: Is It the New Modus Operandi for Modern Companies?" In Corporate Governance, 415–32. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31579-4_18.

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Lazonick, William. "Maximizing Shareholder Value as an Ideology of Predatory Value Extraction *." In The Emergence of Corporate Governance, 170–86. New York, NY: Routledge, 2021. | Series: Routledge international studies in business history: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003009146-11.

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Conyon, Martin J., and Joachim Schwalbach. "Corporate governance, executive pay and performance in Europe." In Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value, 13–33. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5192-5_2.

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Lazonick, William, and Mary O’Sullivan. "Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for Corporate Governance." In Corporate Governance and Sustainable Prosperity, 11–36. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230523739_2.

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Hopt, Klaus J. "Industriebeteiligungen und Depotstimmrecht der Großbanken als Problem des corporate governance." In Shareholder Value und die Kriterien des Unternehmenserfolgs, 111–27. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag HD, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58669-9_5.

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Tuschke, Anja, and Marius Luber. "Corporate Governance in Germany: Converging Towards Shareholder Value-Orientation or Not So Much?" In The Convergence of Corporate Governance, 75–92. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137029560_4.

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v. Werder, Axel. "Corporate Governance: Vertragen sich die deutsche Unternehmensverfassung und das Shareholder Value-Prinzip?" In Betriebswirtschaftslehre und Rechtsentwicklung, 9–16. Wiesbaden: Gabler Verlag, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-86547-2_2.

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Conference papers on the topic "Corporate Governance Mechanisms Shareholder Value"

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BELU, Alina Mădălina, Cătălina SITNIKOV, and Anca BĂNDOI. "CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISM PRACTICED BY ROMANIAN ENTITIES." In International Management Conference. Editura ASE, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24818/imc/2021/04.07.

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Abstract:
Corporate governance defines all the principles, rules and norms that ensure the administration and management by managers of entities, in the interest of current and potential investors; this interest is classic and the most common. In its context, managers are studied in relation to shareholders. Being a political report, in which there are other stakeholders, the governance acquires an extended interest. A distinct place is occupied in the case of managers and shareholders, creditors and employees, with their claims. Corporate governance has an important role to play in protecting shareholders 'interests as it supports maximizing the value of long-term ownership of the company, and in stimulating investors' attention to the company by making the company's activities and processes transparent and efficient as investors need accurate and quality information. The purpose of the research: to determine the way in which the managers of several entities in Romania perceive the main elements of corporate governance. Method: we resorted to the approach of a statistical-mathematical analysis of quantitative type, for data collection using the questionnaire as a research tool. Findings: pursuing the purpose of analyzing corporate governance, some ideas can be advanced and developed, such as the fact that corporate governance does not only involve supervision and stimulation in order to achieve performance, it must encourage experiments and the dissemination of advanced practices, make a decisive contribution not only in defending the interests of investors but also in ensuring social stability, encouraging mobility and qualitative growth of human capital, orderly development of production processes, close correlation with cultural values.
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Atici, Gonca. "A review on blockchain governance." In Corporate governance: Theory and practice. Virtus Interpress, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cgtapp23.

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Having both opportunities and threats, blockchain is inevitably a game-changer disruptive innovation in our time. It keeps penetrating a wide scope of areas including banking, insurance, supply chain, trade finance and many more. During this penetration, it both affects and is affected by traditional governance mechanisms. Like the evolution of traditional governance mechanisms from shareholder to stakeholder model, blockchain technology advances towards optimizing the reciprocal effects of on-chain and off-chain governance. Based on the sophisticated and technology-dominated papers in the literature, this study handles blockchain governance by focusing on both technical and economic aspects of the concept. By analyzing different features of blockchain governance, we come up with the view that technical and economic success seems to be the highest in a hybrid governance structure at this stage
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Yanti, Elvi, and Dina Patrisia. "The impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Firm Value." In Proceedings of the Third Padang International Conference On Economics Education, Economics, Business and Management, Accounting and Entrepreneurship (PICEEBA 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/piceeba-19.2019.64.

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Solihati, Garin, Riaty Handayanti, and Tri Kurniawan. "The Influence of Corporate Governance Mechanisms And Return On Assets On Firm Value." In Proceedings of the First Annual Conference of Economics, Business, and Social Science, ACEBISS 2019, 26 - 30 March, Jakarta, Indonesia. EAI, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/eai.26-3-2019.2290690.

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Raj, Rengalakshmi, Thamizoli Perumal, and Venkataraman Balaji. "MobiMOOC – A Practical Learning Tool to Promote Corporate Literacy for Effective Functioning of Farmer Producer Organizations." In Tenth Pan-Commonwealth Forum on Open Learning. Commonwealth of Learning, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.56059/pcf10.2639.

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Agriculture is the primary source of livelihood to more than 70% of rural households in India. Of the total farmers, 87% are small-holders with less than two hectares of land. Yet they play an imperative role in agriculture development and poverty reduction. They face constraints to adopt technologies, access credit services, buy inputs, get market links and achieve economies of scale. As a mitigation measure, in the recent past, Indian government has adopted the development of the Farmer Producer Organization (FPO) to collectivize farmers with the core objectives of doubling farmers income by reducing production costs, improving productivity, strengthening participation in the value-chain and foster business principles. As on date 10,000 FPOs are formed in India with an average 700 to 1000 shareholders and registered under the company’s act. However, there have been gaps and challenges in securing the active participation of the shareholders in contributing to the business. The recent impact study conducted in the state of Maharashtra pointed out that FPOs resulted in rising in price realization among 22% of members and 28% accessed inputs at a lesser cost. Although results are encouraging, promoting the participation of all members in business transactions is crucial to the growth of the company. The main barriers are limited understanding among shareholders about their roles, responsibilities, rights, operational structure, and governance of the organization. Members perceive the FPO as one more collective and thus they miss connecting the corporate dimension in their organization. Thus, promoting continuous learning among shareholders and leaders about the above-listed issues is necessary for their active participation in the company activities and achieving a successful business. // Against this backdrop, a corporate literacy course was designed and piloted using the MobiMOOC digital tool with 24 FPOs from five districts, having an average shareholder base of 1035, in Tamil Nadu, India. Contents are prepared based on the learner's needs assessment conducted and categorized into blocks, divided into units and chunks. The contents were disseminated to farmers as voice calls on simple mobile phones with options of retrieving (IVRS) and listening when convenient to individual farmers. In this paper we will discuss the experiences of pedagogy adopted, design and dissemination of contents, feedback of learners on how it supported in gaining and knowledge on FPOs, and how they practiced the learning in their FPOs businesses and its impacts. The paper will also touch upon the scope for replication of the learnings.
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Reports on the topic "Corporate Governance Mechanisms Shareholder Value"

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Cuñat, Vicente, Mireia Gine, and Maria Guadalupe. The Vote is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w16574.

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