Journal articles: 'Corporate governance - China'

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Lee, Kha Loon. "China and Corporate Governance." CFA Institute Magazine 18, no. 3 (May 2007): 32. http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/cfm.v18.n3.4670.

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Jiang, Fuxiu, and Kenneth A. Kim. "Corporate Governance in China: A Survey*." Review of Finance 24, no. 4 (May 13, 2020): 733–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfaa012.

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Abstract This article surveys corporate governance in China, as described in a growing literature published in top journals. Unlike the classical vertical agency problems in Western countries, the dominant agency problem in China is the horizontal agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders arising from concentrated ownership structure; thus one cannot automatically apply what is known about the USA to China. As these features are also prevalent in many other countries, insights from this survey can also be applied to countries far beyond China. We start by describing controlling shareholder and agency problems in China, and then discuss how law and institutions are particularly important for China, where controlling shareholders have great power. As state-owned enterprises have their own features, we separately discuss their corporate governance. We also briefly discuss corporate social responsibility in China. Finally, we provide an agenda for future research.

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Sabbaghi, Omid. "Corporate governance in China: a review." Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 16, no. 5 (October 3, 2016): 866–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cg-12-2015-0162.

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Purpose This study aims to provide a review of corporate governance in China because effective and strong corporate governance is necessary for the efficient functioning and long-term sustainability of financial markets and corporations. Design/methodology/approach The author provides a literature review of corporate governance in China through themes such as the concentration of state ownership, the degree of independence among board directors, insider trading, quality of financial disclosures and the maturity of capital markets. Findings The author reviews empirical work surrounding key corporate governance variables and identifies avenues for future research. The author finds that corporate governance mechanisms exhibit implications for firm performance, fraud, capital retention, financial constraints, institutional investors, auditing and the quality of financial disclosures. In addition, the author reviews evidence documenting the importance of independent board directors in regulation and ethical conduct. Originality/value The literature review contributes to the growing literature on responsible corporate governance and provides further understanding of the importance of business ethics for promoting the integrity and long-term sustainability of China’s capital markets and corporations and to ensure that company assets are used efficiently and productively in the best interests of investors and other stakeholders. This study offers insights to policy-makers interested in enhancing the quality of corporate governance within their nation. In addition, it provides a macro-level perspective for executives of multinational firms to consider if they are considering making a direct investment in China.

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Wang, Xuan, and Shanyue Jin. "Environmental, Social, and Governance Performance and Corporate Sustainable Development in China." International Academy of Global Business and Trade 19, no. 1 (February 28, 2023): 91–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.20294/jgbt.2023.19.1.91.

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Purpose - With the acceleration of global integration and the deepening of the market economy, sustainable development is receiving unprecedented attention worldwide. Corporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance is one of the most important ways of promoting sustainable development. Companies with good ESG performance excel both operationally and financially, maintaining their competitive advantage and achieving sustainable corporate growth. This study examines the impact of ESG performance on corporate sustainability and identifies factors that influence this relationship from the perspective of external governance structures. Design/Methodology/Approach - This study investigates the impact of corporate ESG performance on corporate sustainability using a fixed-effects model with Chinese A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2020. It also explores the moderating roles of external audit quality, the shareholding ratio of institutional investors, and analyst attention on the impact of ESG performance on corporate sustainability. Findings - The findings show that corporate ESG performance can contribute to sustainable development. External audit quality, the shareholding ratio of institutional investors, and analyst attention have positive moderating effects on ESG performance, which can contribute to sustainable development. Research Implications - This study enriches theoretical research in ESG performance and sustainability, and identifies external governance factors that contribute to the relationship between the two. Consequently, it provides suggestions for listed company growth and sustainability practices

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Schacht, Kurt. "China—an Experiment in Corporate Governance." CFA Institute Magazine 21, no. 4 (July 2010): 21. http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/cfm.v21.n4.8.

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CLARKE, Donald C. "Corporate governance in China: An overview." China Economic Review 14, no. 4 (January 2003): 494–507. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2003.09.019.

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CHEUNG, Yan-Leung, Ping JIANG, Piman LIMPAPHAYOM, and Tong LU. "Does corporate governance matter in China?" China Economic Review 19, no. 3 (September 2008): 460–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2008.01.002.

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Chen, Langnan, and Weibin Lin. "Corporate governance and fraud: Evidence from China." Corporate Ownership and Control 4, no. 3 (2007): 139–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i3p12.

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This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance and corporate fraud by utilizing logit regression and by employing a sample of 176 firms listed in Chinese stock markets during the period from 2001 to 2005. The results s reveal that: (1) the proportion of independent members in board of directors is lower for firms experiencing corporate fraud than for no-fraud firms; (2) the firms with CEOs being the chairmen of board of directors are more likely to commit corporate fraud than the other firms; (3) the financial incentives to executives are greater for firms experiencing corporate fraud than for no-fraud firms; (4) capital structure has significant and positive effect on corporate fraud in China

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Li, Qiang, Wenjuan Ruan, Tiantian Sun, and Erwei Xiang. "Corporate governance and corporate environmental investments: Evidence from China." Energy & Environment 31, no. 6 (October 21, 2019): 923–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0958305x19882372.

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Using a data set of Chinese listed companies over the period 2008 to 2015, this paper empirically examines whether corporate governance affects the environmental investment decisions. We find that the separation of controlling shareholder’s control right and cash flow right is negatively correlated to corporate environmental investment. Moreover, managerial ownership strengthens the abovementioned negative correlation, which is consistent with the controlling shareholder–manager collusion hypothesis. A further test suggests that internal control effectively weakens the controlling shareholder–manager collusion in their environmental investment decisions.

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Lau, ChungMing, Yuan Lu, and Qiang Liang. "Corporate Social Responsibility in China: A Corporate Governance Approach." Journal of Business Ethics 136, no. 1 (December 20, 2014): 73–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2513-0.

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Ho, Virginia Harper. "Corporate Governance as Risk Regulation in China: A Comparative View of Risk Oversight, Risk Management, and Accountability." European Journal of Risk Regulation 3, no. 4 (December 2012): 463–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1867299x00002403.

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Risk management and oversight have long been recognized as core corporate governance issues and have gained renewed attention in the wake of the financial crisis. Recent corporate governance reforms in China follow these global trends. This article is the first to examine the intersections between corporate governance and risk regulation in China from a comparative perspective. It surveys corporate governance tools that have been adopted by Chinese regulators and firms to motivate effective risk oversight and risk management across the corporate enterprise, focusing on China's regulation of internal controls and risk management systems. These internal mechanisms are particularly important given the widely recognized limits of external monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in China.This article observes that recent guidelines on enterprise risk management (ERM) and internal controls reflect international corporate governance standards and that China adopts a broad perspective on risk oversight that extends to both financial and non-financial risks. China's adoption of international models offers a new opportunity to reexamine longstanding debates on the potential for global corporate governance convergence. This article argues that China has adopted a regulatory approach to internal risk oversight and management that is consistent with its historical law reform trajectory, the reality of China's state-dominated equity markets, and the continued influence of the state on firm management. Its conclusions support the literature on the path dependency of corporate governance systems and prior comparative studies of corporate governance in China that find convergence of form but divergence of function.

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Aboud, Ahmed, and Xinming Yang. "Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility: new evidence from China." International Journal of Accounting & Information Management 30, no. 2 (February 25, 2022): 211–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijaim-09-2021-0195.

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Purpose This paper aims to examine the impact of corporate governance on corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance, paying particular attention to modern Chinese businesses. Particularly, it examines how ownership concentration, boards of directors and boards of supervisors affect the quality of CSR performance. Design/methodology/approach This study employs the regression analysis using a sample from listed companies in Shanghai and Stock Exchanges covering 2014 until 2018. Findings Using a sample of listed companies in Shanghai and Stock Exchanges, the empirical evidence, A-share listed companies between 2014 and 2018, this empirical investigation demonstrates that corporate governance does indeed have a significant effect on CSR. However, various types of corporate governance mechanisms have differing effects on CSR. The authors find that ownership concentration has a positive impact on CSR performance, while the size of a company’s board of supervisors has a positive impact on CSR performance. By doing so, the authors provide practical implications to users, and regulatory authorities to make better decisions Originality/value This paper contributes to the existing literature by examining the impact of corporate governance on a company’s abilities to meet its CSR objectives in China. Much of the empirical studies on this issue are centred on the Western world, notably Western Europe and the USA.

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Tianfang, Yang. "Employee participation in corporate governance of Chinese companies: A comparative aspect." Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Law 12, no. 3 (2021): 752–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu14.2021.316.

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The development of the stakeholder theory is one of the global trends in corporate governance. This article examines the problems of employee participation in corporate governance in accordance with the current legislation of the PRC and assesses the rationality of the chosen path of employee participation in corporate governance in China by conducting a comparative analysis with Germany and the United States. The author believes that due to the difference in historical origin and legislative basis, as well as taking into account structure-driven path dependence and rule-driven path dependence effects, from the point of view of legal regulation, a unique model of employee participation in corporate governance has formed in China. In addition, the mechanism of employee participation in corporate governance by the current legislation of China is generally suitable for the national conditions of China. In addition, the author makes suggestions for improving the mechanism of employee participation in corporate governance in China. Having studied the state of Russian legislation in comparison with China and other countries, the author suggests several issues that require special attention from the Russian legislator on this matter. It is noted that the study of the experience of legal regulation of employee participation in corporate governance in China will help in the development and amendment of further legislative provisions to regulate this issue in Russia, in order to advance towards better ideals of cooperation between workers and employers. Specifically, in the long term, the Russian legislator can also normatively secure employee participation in the development and adoption of managerial decisions in an appropriate form.

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Li, Larry, and Tony Naughton. "A survey of corporate governance studies in China." Corporate Ownership and Control 10, no. 4 (2013): 61–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv10i4art5.

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This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical corporate governance literature in China, concentrating on relationships between ownership, board characteristics and firm performance. In addition, we explore the recent floatation of non-tradable shares and relationship contracting (Guanxi), which are two unique corporate governance issues in China. Overall, the understanding of the key driving forces of firm organizational structure, corporate governance practices, and performance remains largely inconclusive and we make recommendations for future research direction.

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Yan, Caiyu, Hongqu He, Juan Li, Shuang Cheng, and Yanjun Zhang. "The underlying mechanism of corporate governance in China." Chinese Management Studies 13, no. 2 (June 3, 2019): 447–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cms-10-2016-0202.

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Purpose This paper aims to propose a strategy to analyze management governance in China. Design/methodology/approach This paper incorporates data on 989 Chinese listed firms over 2006 to 2016. A fixed effects model with panel data and an F-test are applied to exploit the relationship between management ownership and firm performance. A threshold model is introduced to explore the impacts of other governance mechanisms on management governance. Findings This paper finds an inverted U-shaped relationship between management ownership and firm performance. Furthermore, the threshold model demonstrates that large shareholders strengthen the positive effects of management governance and attenuate its negative effects; board size strengthens the positive effects of management governance but cannot attenuate its negative effects; and independent directors attenuate the negative effects of management governance. Practical implications This paper indicates that increasing management ownership could motivate managers to ameliorate the agent’s moral hazard problem which link the firm value premium when management ownership is less than 20.286 per cent. However, equity incentives are very rare in China. Thus, the authors expect that equity incentives will be a common phenomenon in Chinese listed firms. Originality/value This paper contributes to corporate governance literature by shedding some light on management ownership to explore the effects of management ownership. Specifically, this paper explores the effects of management ownership on firm performance and the impacts of other governance mechanisms on management governance to shape the management governance in China.

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Guo, Liang, Clive Smallman, and Jack Radford. "A critique of corporate governance in China." International Journal of Law and Management 55, no. 4 (July 3, 2013): 257–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijlma-10-2011-0012.

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Nee, Victor, Sonja Opper, and Sonia Wong. "Developmental State and Corporate Governance in China." Management and Organization Review 3, no. 1 (March 2007): 19–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-8784.2007.00061.x.

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China's state-guided economic miracle has revitalized a long-standing and unsettled debate about the role of government in transformative economic development. In a firm-level study of corporate governance we examine whether direct state involvement actually makes a positive contribution to the economic performance of newly incorporated firms in China's urban economy. We show that direct intervention into the governance of firms is likely to yield negative economic effects at the firm level. We infer from our findings that it must be other types of government intervention external to the firm that explain the success of China's developmental state in promoting rapid economic growth.

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Conyon, Martin J., and Lerong He. "CEO Compensation and Corporate Governance in China." Corporate Governance: An International Review 20, no. 6 (September 18, 2012): 575–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2012.00935.x.

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Mallin, Chris, and Xie Rong. "The development of corporate governance in China." Journal of Contemporary China 7, no. 17 (March 1998): 33–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670569808724303.

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Jiang, Chunxia, Genfu Feng, and Jianhua Zhang. "Corporate governance and bank performance in China." Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies 10, no. 2 (May 2012): 131–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14765284.2012.673779.

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Yang, Chi‐Yih, Boon Leing Tan, and Xiaoming Ding. "Corporate governance and income smoothing in China." Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting 10, no. 2 (October 19, 2012): 120–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/19852511211273688.

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Xia, Donglin, and Song Zhu. "Corporate Governance and Accounting Conservatism in China." China Journal of Accounting Research 2, no. 2 (December 2009): 81–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1755-3091(13)60015-5.

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Mutlu, Canan C., Marc Van Essen, Mike W. Peng, Sabrina F. Saleh, and Patricio Duran. "Corporate Governance in China: A Meta‐Analysis." Journal of Management Studies 55, no. 6 (March 6, 2018): 943–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joms.12331.

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Feinerman, James V. "New Hope for Corporate Governance in China?" China Quarterly 191 (September 2007): 590–612. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741007001592.

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AbstractChina's recent revisions to its Company Law and Securities Law have brought new attention to issues of corporate governance in Chinese companies and financial markets. Among the chief criticisms of the earlier laws – in both their provisions and application – were the lack of protection for minority shareholders, the paucity of independent directors, the absence of transparency and inadequate financial disclosure. The acknowledged need for greater congruence between Chinese law and practice and that of countries with more developed capital markets led to the proposal of amendments to China's legislation during the first half of this decade. This article highlights several improvements resulting from the revisions as well as remaining weaknesses in the regulatory framework for corporate enterprises in China.

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Yang, Jingjing, Jing Chi, and Martin Young. "A review of corporate governance in China." Asian-Pacific Economic Literature 25, no. 1 (May 2011): 15–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8411.2011.01283.x.

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Lu, Tong, Jiyin Zhong, and Jie Kong. "How Good Is Corporate Governance in China?" China & World Economy 17, no. 1 (January 2009): 83–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-124x.2009.01132.x.

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Cheung, Yan-Leung, Ping Jiang, Piman Limpaphayom, and Tong Lu. "Corporate Governance in China: a Step Forward." European Financial Management 16, no. 1 (January 2010): 94–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-036x.2008.00446.x.

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Bai, Chong-En, Qiao Liu, Joe Lu, Frank M. Song, and Junxi Zhang. "Corporate governance and market valuation in China." Journal of Comparative Economics 32, no. 4 (December 2004): 599–616. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2004.07.002.

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Conyon, Martin J., and Lerong He. "Executive compensation and corporate governance in China." Journal of Corporate Finance 17, no. 4 (September 2011): 1158–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.006.

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Jiang, Fuxiu, and Kenneth A. Kim. "Corporate governance in China: A modern perspective." Journal of Corporate Finance 32 (June 2015): 190–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.10.010.

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Purbawangsa, Ida Bagus Anom, Solimun Solimun, Adji Achmad Reinaldo Fernandes, and Sri Mangesti Rahayu. "Corporate governance, corporate profitability toward corporate social responsibility disclosure and corporate value (comparative study in Indonesia, China and India stock exchange in 2013-2016)." Social Responsibility Journal 16, no. 7 (July 29, 2019): 983–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/srj-08-2017-0160.

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Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship of corporate governance and corporate profitability on corporate value with corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure as the intervening variable. Design/methodology/approach The population of this study was all companies listed in Indonesia, China and India Stock Exchange in 2013-2016. The inferential statistics used in this study applied the partial least square-based (PLS-based) structural equation model (SEM) method with PLS. The PLS method was selected based on the consideration that there was a construct formed with reflective indicators in this study. Findings In Indonesia, corporate governance and corporate profitability have a significant and positive effect on CSR disclosure. Similarly, CSR disclosure and corporate profitability have a significant and positive impact on corporate value. Corporate governance indirectly influences corporate value, through mediation CSR disclosure. In China, corporate governance and corporate profitability have a significant and positive effect on CSR disclosure. Similarly, CSR disclosure and corporate governance have a significant and positive impact on corporate value. Corporate profitability indirectly affects corporate value, through mediation CSR disclosure. In India, corporate governance and corporate profitability have a significant and positive effect on CSR disclosure. The same thing is seen that CSR disclosure has a significant and positive effect on corporate value. Corporate governance and corporate profitability influence indirectly corporate value, through mediation CSR disclosure. Originality/value The study is one of the few studies to investigate and compare the relationship between corporate governance, corporate profitability, CSR and corporate value. The originality of this study is on the reason that many studies that have been conducted still indicated the inconsistency in the results and diversity of the indicators, so that a similar study was conducted by involving the indicators used for measuring the corporate governance variable, which were the proportion of independent commissioners and audit committee. Meanwhile, for the corporate profitability variable, ROA and ROE were used as the indicators. The originality of this study is that it is a comparative study in three countries in Asia, namely, China, India and Indonesia. The three countries have the highest population and highest economic growth in the past five years.

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Zhu, Lei, and Bei Tang. "Debt Financing, Corporate Governance and Overinvestment." Advanced Materials Research 219-220 (March 2011): 1081–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.219-220.1081.

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This paper examines the impact of debt financing on overinvestment in Chinese listed companies. Using an accounting-based framework to measure over-investment and free cash flow, we find evidence that, debt financing can’t mitigate overinvestment in Chinese listed manufacturing companies. Further tests examine whether firm’s governance structures are associated with overinvestment. The evidence suggests that governance factors also can’t mitigate over-investment in China. Reasons lie that hard constraint of debt financing doesn’t play its role in China. There also exists assets maturity and debt maturity mismatching problems in Chinese manufacturing listed companies.

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Zheng, Danchen. "Empirical Analysis of Listed Agricultural Corporate Governance Structure and Corporate Performance." E3S Web of Conferences 235 (2021): 02029. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202123502029.

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Agriculture is the basic industry in China, and the development of agricultural listed companies is influenced by internal structure and corporate governance. An effective corporate governance structure can reduce costs to a certain extent, thereby increasing company value and overall strength. This paper selects the financial data of 2013-2018 A-share agricultural listed company in Shanghai and Shenzhen as a sample, puts forward the hypothesis through theoretical analysis, conducts Pearson correlation test on the sample data, and constructs multiple regression model to verify the three aspects of corporate governance structure. The relationship between corporate performance and research results shows that the relationship between equity concentration, equity balance, executive compensation and corporate performance of agricultural listed companies in China is in a “U” shape, and the size of the board of directors is significantly positively correlated with corporate performance to some extent, while the correlation between other governance structural factors and firm performance is not significant.

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Cheng, Wei-Qi. "Protection of minority shareholders in Hong Kong and China: do culture and institutional design make any difference?" Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 61, no. 1 (March 11, 2020): 53–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v61i1.441.

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The corporate governance system in Hong Kong and mainland China was transplanted from Western countries. However, the latest ranking in corporate governance in Asia shows that Hong Kong moved to the top of the 2007 ranking above 11 other Asian countries while China was not even included.2 How can such a huge difference be explained? This article compares and discusses the reasons for the difference in corporate governance in Hong Kong and China. In particular, it focuses on discussing local cultural influences and institutional design on the implementation of the system of protection of minority shareholders in Hong Kong and China.

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Yang, Jessica Hong, and Nada Kakabadse. "The financial system reform in China: The lesson learnt from the global financial crisis." Corporate Ownership and Control 8, no. 4 (2011): 56–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv8i4p3.

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This paper reviews the impact of the global financial crisis on financial system reform in China. Scholars and practitioners have critically questioned the efficiencies of the Anglo-American principal-agent model of corporate governance which promotes shareholder-value maximisation. Should China continue to follow the U.K.-U.S. path in relation to financial reform? This conceptual paper provides an insightful review of the corporate governance literature, regulatory reports and news articles from the financial press. After examining the fundamental limitations of the laissez-faire philosophy that underpins the neo-liberal model of capitalism, the paper considers the risks in opening up China’s financial markets and relaxing monetary and fiscal policies. The paper outlines a critique of shareholder-capitalism in relation to the German team-production model of corporate governance, promoting a “social market economy” styled capitalism. Through such analysis, the paper explores numerous implications for China to consider in terms of developing a new and sustainable corporate governance model. China needs to follow its own financial reform through understanding its particular economy. The global financial crisis might help China rethink the nature of corporate governance, identify its weakness and assess the current reform agenda.

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Yiu, Daphne W., William P. Wan, and Yuehua Xu. "Alternative Governance and Corporate Financial Fraud in Transition Economies: Evidence From China." Journal of Management 45, no. 7 (March 12, 2018): 2685–720. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206318764296.

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How corporate governance mechanisms function in transition economies is a key topic for corporate governance researchers and policy makers. We propose that alternative governance mechanisms are in place to mitigate corporate fraudulent behaviors in the fluid state of transition economies where the establishment and enforcement of corporate governance legislation are presently insufficient. Drawing on the twin set of institutional logics—the institutional embeddedness logic and the institutional substitution logic—we posit that three salient types of prevailing alternative governance mechanisms (relational, administrative, and foreign governance) play important roles in transition economies because they are complementary to the institutional conditions at the time of the transition process. Conducting a bivariate probit analysis of a matched sample of corporate financial fraud cases in China, we find that strategic alliances, business group affiliation, nontradable state shares, local government ownership, use of foreign auditors, and foreign listing can deter corporate financial fraud, while foreign listing is also effective in detecting fraud. We also find that the deterrence effects of strategic alliances and business group affiliation become weaker as law development improves, while foreign listing and legal governance are completely substitutive. Our study provides a contextualized view of corporate governance that connects its effectiveness with institutionalization and the institutional state of a country. Our study also enriches our understanding of some unfamiliar forms of governance mechanisms that are in place and complementary to a country’s institutional conditions.

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Xu, He, and Chang Seop Rhee. "Corporate Governance Structure and Accounting Information Disclosure Quality: Evidence from Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China." International Studies Review 19, no. 1 (October 19, 2018): 99–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2667078x-01901005.

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This study investigates the effect of corporate governance structure on the quality of accounting information disclosure using Shenzhen stock exchange data. Existing literatures reported that corporate governance can help to improve accounting quality. However, China's corporate governance structure may have different consequences from prior studies because it has less maturity than developed countries in Europe and the United States. China government, in particular, has a very strong influence on the companies in China and we needs to be verified if the corporate governance structure works properly. From the empirical tests, we find that the proportion of stateowned shares, the proportion of tradable shares, ownership concentration, the size of the board of directors, the proportion of ownership of the board of directors, and size of the board of supervisors are positively associated with the quality of accounting information disclosure. This study will contribute to academics and practitioners by documenting the factors of corporate governance structure on accounting disclosure quality in China.

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SHAN, YUAN GEORGE, and DAVID K. ROUND. "China's Corporate Governance: Emerging Issues and Problems." Modern Asian Studies 46, no. 5 (February 29, 2012): 1316–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x1200008x.

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AbstractAs China approaches economic superpower status, its need to achieve considerably higher standards of corporate governance is becoming paramount. Despite impressive recent advances in its capital and stock exchange markets, the on-going overhang of state ownership in its former state-owned enterprises, together with an unwieldy and ineffective dual board governance system, has left China facing major corporate governance problems that will deter the private investment necessary for its continued growth. This paper illustrates these problems, and suggests possible reforms that will provide the foundation for the efficient further development of China's capital markets that is needed to help China become a major economic superpower.

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Zhang, Xu Bei. "The Comparison on Corporate Governance between Temasek and State-Owned Companies in China." Advanced Materials Research 998-999 (July 2014): 1634–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.998-999.1634.

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This paper proceeds as follows. Corporate governance, broadly speaking, is a science which studies enterprise power arrangement. In the narrow sense, it belongs to the ownership of enterprises; it is a science which researches how to empower professional managers and to use regulatory authority to their performance of duties. The improvement of the efficiency of the state-controlled corporate governance depends on the choice of corporate governance mechanism. Constrained by the institutional environment, the corporate governance is also affected by the internal governance structure. State-owned enterprises still face great difficulties when they manager to make a clear boundary between the central enterprises and government, separate ownership and management completely, achieve a sound governance structure. Temasek has a high quality management mode. The company special board composition and the control method of the layered progressive and effective restraint mechanism play a key role. State-owned enterprises can learn from Temasek’s experience of corporate governance, and promote the reform of the governance structure, to stimulate the vitality of enterprises.

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Chen, Jean Jinghan. "Corporatisation of China’s state-owned enterprises and corporate governance." Corporate Ownership and Control 1, no. 2 (2003): 82–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv1i2p7.

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This paper reviews the notable Chinese State-Owned Enterprises’ (SOEs) low efficiency and shows that the agency problems with SOEs constitutes the characteristics of corporate governance - insiders’ control, soft budget constraints, managerial slack and lack of competent managers. It is this corporate governance structure that results in SOEs’ inefficiency. The paper further argues that the current corporatisation of SOEs in China through share issue does not improve corporatised SOEs’ performance because it has not effectively dealt with the agency problems associated with public ownership, and, therefore, falls short in addressing the critical issue of corporate governance. The creation of an effective corporate governance mechanism requires the development of the country’s market-oriented institutions. It is difficult to prescribe what type of governance structure China should adopt, although it is argued that for former SOEs a neo-corporatist approach with a two-tier board structure may have advantage over a neo-liberal approach with a single board. For China, the most important issue is not to find a fixed set of governance models from which to copy, but to develop institutions that are conducive to effective corporate governance.

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Yu, Guanghua. "Takeovers in China: The Case against Uniformity in Corporate Governance." Common Law World Review 34, no. 2 (April 2005): 169–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1350/clwr.34.2.169.65365.

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Corporate governance has attracted enormous attention both in the area of law and in the area of financial economics. In comparative corporate governance studies, many people have devoted their energy to finding a best corporate governance model. I argue that a functional analysis does not support the view that there is a single best model in the world. I further use the transplantation of an English-style takeover law into China to explain that the importation of foreign law is not always based on careful analysis of whether the imported foreign law is the best in the world. Furthermore, I discuss the subsequent adjustment of the transplanted English takeover law to the takeover market in China to show that the transplantation of foreign law is subject to local political and economic conditions. If there is no best corporate governance model and the transplantation of foreign law into other countries with different social and political background does not achieve similar objectives, the search for a best corporate governance model is misguided.

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Xin, Tang. "Commentary on “New Hope for Corporate Governance in China?”." China Quarterly 191 (September 2007): 613–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741007001609.

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The concept of corporate governance was not discussed in Chinese academic literature until the year when the first Company Law of the People's Republic was enacted. From scholarship to practice, corporate governance saw great progress throughout the following decade.

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Peng, Ke, Tong Tong Xu, and Guo Fang Ning. "Impact of Corporate Governance on Environmental Information Disclosure-Evidence from China." Applied Mechanics and Materials 448-453 (October 2013): 4314–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.448-453.4314.

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This study examined the impact of corporate governance on environmental information disclosure in the China context. Our data was based on Shanghai A-share companies for the period 2008 to 2011. We examined the effect of corporate governance from different aspects. We found that Outstanding shares rate, State-holding ratio, and CEO/Chairman duality negatively affect environmental disclosure index (EDI) significantly; Proportion of independent directors, supervisory board and board sizes positively affect EDI significantly. Our results indicate that in China, corporate governance does influence the extent of environmental information disclosure significantly.

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Tomasic, Roman, and Jenny Jian Rong Fu. "Government-owned companies and corporate governance in Australia and China: beyond fragmented governance." Corporate Ownership and Control 3, no. 4 (2006): 123–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i4p10.

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The ownership and control of government owned companies presents a major challenge for the integrity of established corporate law ideas regarding accountability of directors and the independence of government owned companies. Drawing upon experience from China and Australia, the article discusses some of the key corporate governance tensions that have emerged from the corporatization of state owned assets. The attempt to uncritically apply private sector ideas to the corporatisation of state-owned and controlled companies is fraught with difficulties that are discussed in this article. The article also examines attempts to place state owned companies on a sounder conceptual footing through changes to their culture brought about by adopting and embedding guidelines and standards, such as the recent OECD Guidelines on the Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises

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Huang, Shaokai, and Rui Xie. "Impact Of Shareholder Activism On Corporate Governance In China: Evidence From Companies Listed On The Shenzhen Stock Exchange “A” Shares." European Scientific Journal, ESJ 12, no. 1 (January 29, 2016): 114. http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2016.v12n1p114.

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This paper investigates impact of shareholder activism on corporate governance in China. The separation of ownership and management of companies often to some extent causes agency problems between shareholders and company managers. In Western countries, shareholders of a company usually actively participate in the company’s management and closely monitor management issues in order to enhance the company’s performance. At present, China’s securities market, along with institutional investors, is undergoing a rapid development. Nevertheless, problems in corporate governance among listed companies have been hindering the development of capital markets in China. Meanwhile, institutional investors have experienced significant growth. Moreover, national policies, as well as the split-share structure reform, further encourage the growth of institutional investors and their active participation in corporate governance for further promotion of the development of capital markets. Making empirical contribution, this paper tests how effective institutional investors participate in the governance of listed companies on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) “A” Shares after share reform in China. Results of empirical estimation indicate that China’s institutional investors do participate in corporate governance, but only to some extent. Positive behaviors of Chinese shareholders have played a favorable role in improving corporate governance.

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Ji, Xu_Dong, Kamran Ahmed, and Wei Lu. "The impact of corporate governance and ownership structure reforms on earnings quality in China." International Journal of Accounting & Information Management 23, no. 2 (May 5, 2015): 169–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijaim-05-2014-0035.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance and ownership structures on earnings quality in China both prior and subsequent to two important corporate reforms: the code of corporate governance (CCG) in 2002 and the split share structure reform (SSR) in 2005. Design/methodology/approach – This study utilises informativeness of earnings (earnings response coefficient), conditional accounting conservatism and managerial discretionary accruals to assess earnings quality using 12,267 firm-year observations over 11 years from 2000 to 2010. Further, two dummy variables for measuring the changes of CCG and SSR are employed to estimate the effects of CCG and SSR reforms on earnings quality via OLS regression. Findings – This study finds that the promulgation of the CCG in 2002 has had a positive impact, but the SSR reform in 2005 has had little effect on listed firms’ earnings quality in China. These results hold good after controlling for a number of ownership, governance and other variables and estimating models with multiple measures of earnings’ quality. Research limitations/implications – Future research could focus on how western style corporate governance mechanisms have been constrained by the old management systems and governmental dominated ownership structures in Chinese listed firms. The conclusion is that simply coping Western corporate governance model is not suitable for every country. Practical implications – The results will assist Chinese regulators in improving reporting quality, ownership structure and governance mechanisms in China. The results will help international investors better understand quality of financial information in China. Originality/value – This is the first to our knowledge that addresses the effects of major governance and ownership reforms together on accounting earnings quality and, thus, makes a significant contribution on understanding the effect of regulatory reforms on improving earnings quality. In doing so, it also indirectly assesses the effectiveness of western-style corporate governance mechanisms introduced in China.

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Zhang, Yanling. "Yutong Bus, China: management buy-out." Emerald Emerging Markets Case Studies 1, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/20450621111129645.

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Subject area Corporate governance, privatisation. Study level/applicability Masters level programmes, with particular focus on corporate governance, privatisation, and organizational development. Case overview Yutong Bus is a real and highly publicized case in China. It is a listed company carved out from a state-owned enterprise (SOE), Yutong Group. Later the management successfully bought out Yutong Group and thus indirectly controlled the company. The deal transformed Yutong Group from a SOE to a private company. The management was innovative in pushing through the management buy-out (MBO), but politically, it created a public outcry about the loss of state-owned assets. The key issue here is the selection of state owned enterprises suitable for privatization and, more importantly, the determination of selling price. In China “the market for corporate control is still lagging behind” (Shanghai Stock Exchange). Expected learning outcomes Students would be expected to gain an understanding of recent economic reform in China, Corporate Governance in the Chinese context and wider issues associated with privatization and MBOs. Supplementary materials Teaching note.

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Pasko, Oleh, Li Zhang, Kateryna Tuzhyk, Nelia Proskurina, and Viktoriia Gryn. "Do sustainability reporting conduct and corporate governance attributes relate? Empirical evidence from China." Problems and Perspectives in Management 19, no. 4 (October 21, 2021): 110–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/ppm.19(4).2021.10.

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Adopting agency and stakeholders theories, this study aims to investigate the relationship between corporate governance attributes (board size, board independence, female directors, and CEO duality) and sustainability reporting conduct in China. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 10,330 firm-year observations of Chinese listed companies over the period from 2015 to 2018. Data are supplied by WIND and CSMAR databases, whilst regression analysis is applied to test the hypotheses. Results indicate that board size and board independence were found to be positively associated with the sustainability reporting conduct, while female directors and CEO duality both do not have a significant effect on sustainability reporting conduct in the Chinese institutional settings. This paper advances on arguments of the agency and stakeholders theories with these findings. The larger and more independent board facilitates better monitoring of the managers, what leads to decision-making based on a more appreciation of stakeholders’ perspectives. The study is premised on the presence/absence of sustainability reporting, and it does not take into consideration the quality aspect, which can result in erroneous interpretation. The results should not be generalized as the sample was based on China’s companies for 2015–2018. This study has policy implications for managers and policymakers alike concerning designing board composition conducive to sustainability reporting conduct.

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Yu, Miaojie. "Corporate governance of state-owned enterprises in China." Corporate Ownership and Control 5, no. 1 (2007): 493–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i1c3p8.

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In the last thirty years, China has undergone three stages of corporate governance mechanisms, namely, (1) the “power-delegating and profit-sharing” system; (2) the “contracted managerial responsibility” system; and (3) the corporatization of large stateowned enterprises (SOEs). This paper will explore each mechanism, their advantages and disadvantages in detail. The main finding is that the various practices of corporate governance of SOEs are not suitable for China’s SOEs mainly due to the lack of sufficient incentive. Instead, a mixed mechanism of the “control-based” and the “marketoriented” mechanisms is more attractive given China’s unique institutional setting

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Chng, Daniel Han Ming, Sam Park, and Qing Ye. "Institutional reform and evolving corporate governance in China." Academy of Management Proceedings 2016, no. 1 (January 2016): 13281. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2016.13281abstract.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Corporate governance - China'

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