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Tan, Michael N. T. School of Modern Language Studies UNSW. "Corporate governance in China." Awarded by:University of New South Wales. School of Modern Language Studies, 2006. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/24269.
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Since the late nineteen nineties, corporate governance has been recognised by the Chinese leadership as being an integral and vital part of economic reform. At the macro level the reform is to transition to a market economy and at the micro level, business enterprises are adopting sound standards of corporate governance. This thesis analyses the various models: the shareholder value, the stakeholder, the stewardship and the convergence models of corporate governance. It looks at the Chinese scenario - what model of governance has China adopted and is it appropriate? What problems of corporate governance are special to China and how are these problems being resolved? Many of the problems are due to the fact that China has adopted the shareholder value model ??? a model based on the UK / USA. However, unlike them, China does not posses the requisite institutions necessary to underpin the efficient functioning of the model. The Chinese capital markets are nascent and not well regulated, the rule of law is tentative and the regulatory bodies are lacking in enforcement powers. In an effort to encourage good corporate governance, the China Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor) scheme in December 2002 in the hope that by opening the domestic securities market to foreign financial institutions, this would result in the implementation of sound corporate governance in Chinese listed companies as they vied to attract foreign shareholders. A survey was carried out and the results have only been mildly encouraging. The QFII has not had the dramatic impact that was expected of it initially and the reason is that the quotas allocated have been small and the QFII have had many restrictions placed. Until these are loosened the impact of the QFII will continue to be modest.
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Wang, Duo. "Corporate governance and innovation in China." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.488285.
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Chen, Jian. "Essays on corporate governance in China." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2003. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/essays-on-corporate-governance-in-china(b1dbd708-606c-4865-bae4-32ee61129fda).html.
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Neuber, Andreas. "Corporate governance & culture." HKBU Institutional Repository, 2019. https://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_oa/627.
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Based on the institutional logic that enterprises will conform with the immediate cultural values and settings in a nation, the important influence of culture on corporate governance has been acknowledged in recent research. It has been shown that the quality of corporate governance varies strongly within regions and globally. Therefore, tests of cultural influences on single components of corporate governance or surrogates thereof have been conducted and their outcomes discussed. This research investigates the influence of culture on corporate governance using all 6 Hofstede cultural dimensions and a uniquely broad set of corporate governance factors that are present in reality. Using 565,787 year observations relating to 18,344 companies in 41 countries for the years 2010-2015, the results of cross-sectional regression analysis with appropriate control variables is presented. The ensuing results further enhance our understanding of culture's influence on the composition of the board of directors and will help regulators and lawmakers in their endeavors to improve relevant legislation as well as allow multinational companies to design effective and reliable corporate governance structures in their enterprises. In my analysis, I find a substantial influence of cultural dimensions on the structural elements of the composition of the board of directors around the globe. In particular board independence, time on the board, gender diversity, and absolute size of the board are impacted by the surrounding cultural environment of the enterprise. These results also hold true in a robustness test with alternative cultural dimensions. A final moderating test gives some evidence of the moderating influence the cultural environment has on the relationship between board structural elements and the quality of corporate governance.
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Zou, Weikang. "Corporate governance in banking organizations in China." Thesis, University of York, 2014. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/5126/.
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In contrast with conventional economic, political and institutional studies of corporate governance, the present thesis brings together varieties of capitalism (VoC) and discursive institutional approaches in order to analyze how corporate governance is constituted in Chinese banking organizations. The discursive institutions which produce and reproduce national arrangements of corporate governance in banking are analyzed as operating across three related levels; namely, legitimacy, paradigm, and frame. By comparison with the existing national models of corporate governance in banking, the thesis holds that the corporate governance of Chinese banks has a hybrid form that combines elements of the Continental stakeholder model, the Anglo-Saxon shareholder model, and the State-affected model. The thesis finds that the Chinese discursive institutional configuration largely shapes bank governance and is thus crucial to establishing a governance structure that is clearly distinguishable from other models. Specifically, the thesis demonstrates that the embedded discursive institutions that legitimate relations between banking and the national economy, forms of financial regulation and legal provisions in the Chinese context also legitimate a particular form of corporate governance in Chinese banking organizations. In terms of paradigm, the thesis shows how the legitimacy discourse is manifested in the competing paradigmatic shareholder and stakeholder models which are combined and integrated in the Chinese context. At the frame level, the present study elaborates on the key practical discourses in bank corporate governance in China - the board of directors, regulation of executive pay, risk management, and legal obligations, and finds that they are broadly consistent with the distinctive national discourses of the legitimacy and paradigm. For instance, implicated by the enhanced shareholder model and the stakeholder model, the bank board is oriented towards sustainable profitability to the shareholders, active support for economic development, and balance of interests of various stakeholders. The composition of the bank executive pay and specific regulatory measures, on the other hand, reveals the influence of close financial regulation and the state as the controlling shareholder in Chinese context. In risk management, echoing the paradigm of the stakeholder theory, Chinese banks have moderate risk appetites and concentrate on long-term profitability, real economic investment and sustainable development, which also represents the concerns for the financial stability by the regulators and their close supervision of the banks. For legal duties, which include the compliance duty and the fiduciary duty, the manifestation of a strong financial regulation is present, typically exemplified in shaping various standards and qualifications of legal duties.
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Pirchio, Veronica <1993>. "Corporate governance in China: Some empirical evidence." Master's Degree Thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/13717.
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Every country has its own cultural, historical, political and economic features which determine their systems of corporate governance. Also the People’s Republic of China (here after China), which is becoming one of the largest economies, has its unique and distinctive characteristics. However, compared to most of developed countries, the topic of corporate governance appeared later in China, due to the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges were set up at the beginning of 90’s and the first Code of Corporate Governance issued in 2002. In many aspects, the study of corporate governance in China attracts the attention of researchers worldwide, who provide different theoretical and empirical studies on this subject. The purpose of my thesis is to provide a detailed study on corporate governance in China, assessing some aspects empirically. The study is organized as follows: in the first chapter I will briefly explain the model of corporate governance in China, its evolution, legal framework and internal and external players which shape it; in the second chapter I will give a general overview of theoretical and empirical literature on different aspects of corporate governance in China; finally I will give empirical evidence of some corporate governance- related aspects, presenting the methodology and the results respectively in the third and fourth chapter. In order to carry on the research, a sample of Chinese listed companies’ annual reports during the period 2003-2017 were analyzed. In particular, the first empirical analysis aims at evaluating the level of corporate governance disclosure referring to the Code of Corporate Governance and other CSRC regulations, a dichotomous/binary scale method was used. The second one aims at analyzing the relation between board of directors and companies’ profitability ratios, due to there are different opinions in literature. In particular, the total number of directors in the board and the number of independent directors in the board were analyzed in relation to companies’ profitability ratios, Pearson correlation method was used.
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Opper, Sonja. "Zwischen Political Governance und Corporate Governance : eine institutionelle Analyse chinesischer Aktiengesellschaften /." Baden-Baden : Nomos-Verl.-Ges, 2004. http://www.gbv.de/dms/ilmenau/toc/389988758oppe.PDF.
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Xu, Ke. "Corporate governance in China : a 'law' unto itself." Thesis, Lancaster University, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.539643.
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Turci, Maria Maddalena <1992>. "The Corporate Governance in China: a Comparative Perspective." Master's Degree Thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/12682.
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In the last years in China, the theme of the Corporate Governance has become really central in the economic, academic and political discussions.
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the evolution of the Corporate Governance in Chinese system and to understand how much has been achieved. As well, to see how China made significant progress in pursuing a functioning Corporate Governance system.
In the first chapter, the paper examines the evolution of the Corporate Governance from the beginning of the People Republic of China in 1949, underlying how economic changes, both from inside and outside the Country, have had a significant importance. The main steps of Chinese Corporate Governance evolution are divided in phases and historical periods, from the beginning when the economy was state-controlled until China became a more market-oriented system.
The second chapter focuses on the Corporate Governance adopted in other countries, dividing them in main categories with the aim of widening the comparative analysis with other systems. The paper underlines furthermore the difference between Common Law and Civil Law and Outsider and Insider systems.
The Corporate Governance models of those, commonly defined, “leading countries” are listed and described to make evidence of point of contacts and similarities with the Chinese standard.
Taking in consideration what above reported, the last chapter analyzes the current legislation of Chinese Corporate Governance in State-Owned Enterprises and how it has been and it is relevant for the foreign direct investments.
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He, Ting. "Three essays in corporate finance and corporate governance." HKBU Institutional Repository, 2011. http://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_ra/1230.
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Lam, Wai-nang Robin, and 林偉能. "Corporate governance of public companies in Hong Kong." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1992. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B3126539X.
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Zhang, Lin, and 张琳. "Venture capital and the corporate governance of Chinese listed companies." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2010. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B45150965.
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Schiebe, Karl Friedrich. "The Chinese corporate governance mode : adapt or adopt?" Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10722/211029.
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This thesis seeks to analyse the development and determinants of the corporate governance framework in China. With a focus on the emerging corporate governance framework, the relation between regulation, firms and the single-party state is examined. Corporate governance failures have not been a significant area of study in the governance literature. The analysis of recent high-level corruption cases in the oil industry provides evidence for the persisting influence of the Party-state on governance through personal networks and family ties at the nexus of state and economy. The findings suggest that there are significant underlying constraints which limit the effectiveness of the current regulatory framework. State shareholding, agency chains and a subservient legal system with a parallel legal sphere all impair the new corporate governance system. While a basic system is in place, improving governance remains difficult. An overhaul of the current constellation and second wave of SOE reforms is deemed necessary.published_or_final_version
China Development Studies
Master
Master of Arts in China Development Studies
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Wang, Ling. "Corporate governance in China : roles of state, the supervisory board and the board of directors in large listed companies /." [S.l. : s.n.], 2006. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/520496876.pdf.
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Xi, Chao. "Corporate governance and legal reform in post-1993 China." Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.497257.
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Over the last decade or so, China's market-oriented economic reforms have brought corporate governance issues to the forefront. Though many larger state-owned enterprises have been transformed into listed companies, the manner in which they are governed has largely remained unchanged. The "insider control" problem and the expropriation of minority public shareholders by the state-owned majority shareholders have contributed to the poor performance of many listed companies in China. In order to address these issues, a legal framework for corporate governance has emerged and evolved for the governance of Chinese listed companies. This thesis examines the nature and significance of the legal framework for corporate governance that has emerged in post-1993 China, and in particular assesses the effectiveness of the reforms that have been put in place for addressing the governance issues facing Chinese listed companies. The thesis has two principal conclusions. First, in an attempt to accommodate the corporate governance reforms, a large body of Western style corporate and securities laws has been introduced in China, in the absence of the requisite complementary institutions, both formal and informal. The functioning of the imported legal rules and institutions has been constrained by the preexisting institutional infrastructure and the constantly changing political economy environment. As a result, many newly adopted corporate governance rules have yet to effectively address the fundamental agency problem facing Chinese listed companies, that is, the expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders. The second finding is more general. In addition to globalization and efficiency, there are other important factors - including local interest group politics, ideology and culture - that shape the evolution of a nation's corporate governance system. These factors differ so significantly between countries that a convergence of different national systems toward a single direction is unlikely to happen in the near future. This research fills in a serious gap in empirical legal analysis of the Chinese corporate governance reforms. It not only furthers our understanding of the nature of Chinese corporate law and governance, but also contributes to the ongoing debates on the convergence of national corporate governance systems and on legal transplants.
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Ren, Yun. "Corporate governance, conservatism and firm performance: Evidence from China." Thesis, Edith Cowan University, Research Online, Perth, Western Australia, 2014. https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses/1580.
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This thesis examines the effect of the board of directors and supervisory board on conservatism and firm performance, respectively, and the benefits of conservatism on performance. In addition, this thesis investigates whether the effectiveness of firms’ governance on conservatism and firm performance is influenced by ownership concentration and state ownership. The extant literature has shown that conservatism reduced agency conflict and was beneficial for corporate governance in developed countries; however, little evidence has been provided for emerging countries such as China.
Sample companies are selected from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for the period from 2007 to 2010. Archival data from companies’ annual reports are used and the information relating to conservatism is collected from Datastream. Panel data methodology is employed to test the developed hypotheses developed.
Two popular methods are used to measure conservatism: asymmetric timeliness developed by Basu (1997) and accrual-based method produced by Givoly and Hayn (2000). Two accounting-based performance measures (return on equity and net profit margin), and a market-based indicator (market to book ratio) are used in this study to measure firm performance. For corporate governance variables, five characteristics of the board of directors and four characteristics of the supervisory board are examined. They are board independence, board size, board meetings, CEO duality, top management turnover, supervisory board independence, supervisory board size, supervisory board meetings and supervisory board qualification. Ownership structure is identified by ownership concentration and state ownership. Ownership concentration is measured by the largest shareholdings and state ownership is measured as the number of shares controlled by the state divided by the total number of shares.
In terms of the effect of corporate governance on conservatism, the initial results show that as predicted, higher proportion of independent directors, top management turnover, smaller supervisory boards and more supervisors with professional knowledge or work experience lead to more conservatism. Except for supervisory board independence and supervisory board meetings, the predicted effects of the other characteristics of the board of directors and supervisory board on firm performance are supported. In addition, firms that employ more conservatism are shown to have better firm performance. The results on the moderating effect indicate that state ownership does influence the effectiveness of corporate governance on conservatism and firm performance.
In addition to the linear relationship between corporate governance, conservatism and firm performance, this thesis finds that some corporate governance mechanisms have a nonlinear U-shaped effect on conservatism or firm performance. Board size is found to have a Ushaped effect on conservatism and supervisory board independence is shown to have a Ushaped effect on firm performance. The frequency of supervisory board meetings has a Ushaped effect on firm performance measured by profit margin while it has an inverted Ushaped effect when market to book ratio is used to measure performance. For the moderating effect of ownership structure, this thesis finds that ownership concentration has an inverted U-shaped moderating effect on the effectiveness of firms’ governance on firm performance. State ownership has an inverted U-shaped influence on the relationship between firms’ governance and conservatism while it has a U-shaped influence on the effectiveness of firms’ governance on firm performance.
The findings of this thesis contribute to the corporate governance and conservatism literature in the context of emerging economies. This study also provides some meaningful implications for policy makers, accounting practice, researchers and users of financial statements in China.
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Hu, Xiaojing. "Rechtsfragen der chinesischen Corporate Governance : auf Grundlage eines Vergleichs zwischen Deutschland und China /." Frankfurt am Main [u.a.] : Lang, 2006. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=014724163&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Zhang, Tianyu. "Corporate layers and corporate transparency in a transition economy : evidence from China /." View abstract or full-text, 2004. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?ACCT%202004%20ZHANG.
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Zhu, Yuande. "On the pyramidal structure in China." Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 2009. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B41634056.
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Yao, Kun. "Preventing a crime? exploring the impact of corporate governance on corporate illegal behavior in China /." View abstract or full-text, 2006. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?MGTO%202006%20YAO.
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Xu, Jianyue. "Global Corporate Governance Convergence- the choice of UK as a relevant reference for corporate governance study in China." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.532234.
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My thesis aims to address issues of corporate governance development in China at a time when its economy is undergoing major transitional and structural changes, and, it is arguable, at a time when China's economic transformation is having an impact on the global economy. Mainly through examining the historical determinants and evolution of corporate governance structure in the United Kingdom and China, it seeks to offer meaningful insights on how China can design an effective corporate governance system - which China intends to model on the Anglo- American market-oriented system - to work in China's unique environment. Particularly, the Chinese government wants the benefits of market economies and through structural arrangement in China the State will continue to playa leading role over its national economy. Furthermore, this thesis looks into the global trend of corporate governance convergence and explores the inspirations that China could draw from it, as well as China's potential contribution. Just as scholars and policy-makers now regularly look into China's successful economic reform for ideas and answers, its corporate governance transformation will be a very useful case study for the world. Such a study can provide valuable insights for global corporate governance convergence from two aspects. First, it offers clues on how to engineer a corporate governance system which can balance government regulation and market efficiency, social accountability and economic prosperity for a long term. Second, China wants to develop a market-oriented corporate governance system, modelled on the Anglo-American one to sustain its economy success. However, the government hopes to do this through a unique structure arrangement in its economy with the purpose to retain its control over the national economy. This provides a valuable reference for many developing countries who wants to develop its economy system by combining market economy with restrained government intervention. In short, the thesis focuses on searching for a balance of co-regulation between governmental intervention and market's self-regulation.
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Yao, Shaohua, and 姚少华. "Two essays on corporate governance in Chinese listed firms." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2010. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B44525709.
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Ng, Christina Y. M. "Corporate governance systems and ownership structures : implications for corporate performance : evidence from Hong Kong." Thesis, University of Stirling, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1893/21459.
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Corporate governance is an important variable that can serve to enhance firm performance. This dissertation focuses on a key corporate governance variable, that of managerial ownership. While Jensen and Meckling's (1976) "convergence of interest" hypothesis suggests that increases in managerial ownership can enhance firm performance, Fama and Jensen (1983) and La Porta et al. (1999) argue that at high levels of managerial ownership there are "entrenchment effects" (that is, managers will pursue their own interests). Although there are mixed results, the UK and US literature in general suggests that the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance is non-linear in nature and conforms to a cubic relationship corresponding to "alignment-entrenchment-alignment" (that is, alignment at low levels of managerial ownership, followed by entrenchment at intermediate levels of managerial ownership and alignment once again at high levels of managerial ownership). It is doubtful whether this relationship is the same under different corporate ownership structures. Claessens et al. (2000) document the fact that most of the firms in the East-Asian region are characterised by a concentrated form of family-controlled ownership, in contrast to the diffuse form of ownership in the UK and the US. Hong Kong is a prime example of an economy dominated by a family-controlled ownership structure. The thesis contributes to the academic literature on corporate governance by its examination of the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance III Hong Kong. Based on the regression results of 1406 firm-year observations of Hong Kong listed companies from 1995 to 1998, it is found that under the family-dominated ownership structure in Hong Kong, there is a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance which corresponds to a pattern of "entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment". This is in contrast to the pattern ("alignment-entrenchment-alignment") found in the UK by Short and Keasey (1999) and in the US by Morck et al. (1988). While the finding of a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in this study supports both the "convergence of interest" hypothesis over certain ranges of managerial ownership and "entrenchment effects" over other ranges of managerial ownership, the discovery of a pattern which is opposite to that found in UK and US studies indicates that managerial ownership affects firm performance in a different way in Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, the convergence of interest effect only dominates the entrenchment effect in the intermediate range of managerial ownership, leading to the conclusion that a policy of providing management with larger amounts of equity within this intermediate range of managerial ownership should enhance firm performance. In contrast, increasing managerial share ownership in cases where the existing level of managerial share ownership is either low or high will have the effect of reducing firm value. The design of an optimal managerial compensation strategy for Hong Kong firms thus has to take account of the existing level of managerial share ownership. In contrast to the finding of other studies, the results reported in this study show that board structure variables (board size, board composition and directors' remuneration) are not significantly related to firm performance. An explanation for this may be found in the different character of the board in Hong Kong. For example, the number of independent non-executive directors in Hong Kong is low and they are very often not truly independent, while the remuneration of directors is typically not subject to review by any board committees. If these aspects of Hong Kong board structures can be successfully reformed then corporate performance should be enhanced, in line with the results reported from other countries. The data concernmg managerial ownership and performance was partitioned in accordance with the East-Asian financial crisis, which began in late 1997. The findings from this further empirical analysis suggest that the macro-economic conditions in existence before and after the crisis affect the nature of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. It is found that the convergence effect is stronger in the "prosperous years" prior to the crisis, as shown by the wider alignment range from the regression results based on the data before the East-Asian financial crisis (1995-1997). The entrenchment effect is, however, more prominent during the "difficult years" as indicated by the narrower range of alignment in the regression results based on the data for the year after the crisis (1998). The importance of corporate governance in Hong Kong was brought into sharp prominence by the East-Asian financial crisis. Weaknesses in corporate governance regimes have been widely identified as an important factor leading to the fast downturn in economies within the whole East-Asian region. Enhancing corporate governance practices is thus important for corporate recovery and growth. Various international organizations, professional bodies, regulators and academics have spent a great deal of effort over the past six years in a wide range of activities to enhance corporate governance practices in the region, and these are reviewed in the thesis. Due to the different cultural backgrounds and ownership structures in different countries, it can be argued that there is no single "best" corporate governance system. A secondary aim of this thesis is the evaluation of the corporate governance initiatives of various international organizations and the identification of areas for improvement and for reform in Hong Kong. Specific policy recommendations are made for the structural improvement of the corporate governance regime in Hong Kong.
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Chan, Tak-ching Catherine, and 陳德貞. "Corporate governance of some statutory boards in Hong Kong." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1995. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31266356.
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Hong, Xiangxing, and 洪祥星. "Corporate governance in China's listed companies: sinonization and agency problems." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2010. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B4545923X.
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Hovey, Martin, and n/a. "Corporate Governance in China: An Empirical Study of Listed Firms." Griffith University. Griffith Business School, 2005. http://www4.gu.edu.au:8080/adt-root/public/adt-QGU20061018.143503.
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Corporate governance has gained considerable prominence in the last decade as it has become a much more widely discussed and debated issue. The debate as to which model of corporate governance China should adopt continues as China forges a new era of interaction with the global market, especially since its accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001. The state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector in China is a significant contributing factor in China's endeavour to continue to develop its economy, provide employment and reduce poverty. Therefore, the success of SOE reform is important to China's future economic prosperity and ability to contend with social justice issues. The commencement of the reform process began in the late 1970s and many SOEs have attained significant progress in some important areas. However, all too many SOEs experience poor overall performance. Thus, the consequence of the corporate governance model and corporate structure selected will be considerable, especially as the country's market economy gains momentum. This thesis contributes to the ongoing body of work relating to corporate governance in China, and some clear results have been found. It also reviews the institutional setting in China and elements of the corporate governance literature in detail. As the ownership of firms is considered to be one of the key elements to enhance corporate governance, the empirical study considers issues relating to changes in ownership, concentration and ownership structures. It conducts an empirical study of the ownership and performance of listed corporations in China and based on these analyses, the thesis provides policy recommendations as to which model of corporate governance may best be suited to China during this transitional phase. The findings suggest that the ownership structure is a key element to enhancing corporate governance in China. The wealth affects of changes in listed firm ownership, which for the most part had the effect of reducing state ownership, were found to be positive. Concentration ownership structures per se were not found to enhance listed firm performance. The most significant findings were the following. Firstly, that institutional ownership, through the Legal Person holding companies, have a positive bearing on listed firm performance and thus by implication, upon improving corporate governance. Secondly, medium levels of Legal Person ownership were found to be the most effective. Thirdly, foreign institutions and individual investors were found to be positively correlated to performance. Similar results were found for offshore ownership, but to a lessor extent. Conversely, state ownership was found to be negatively correlated to performance. Other issues that were identified in the empirical analysis are that size does matter, in that large firms were found not to perform as well as smaller firms. Leverage appears to matter also, as highly leveraged firms were found not to perform well. The industry in which a firm operates was also found to have an affect on performance. The policy recommendations are based on the findings and observations of this thesis. The assumption is made that the present gradualist approach and regime will continue. As state ownership is shown to have a negative bearing on listed firm performance, the recommendation is that the state, at its various levels, should divest its holdings. This could be achieved through a privatization program in which the state denationalises a large proportion of its holdings. One of the keys would then be managing the change of ownership. Based on the observations and findings of this study, it is recommended that a privatization program should be instigated that supports blockholders and institutions, and does not focus purely on dispersing large proportions of holdings to diverse small shareholders. In addition, mergers and acquisitions that embrace economic efficiency should be encouraged and supported. The empirical study demonstrates that the ultimate ownership and control of tradeable shares ought to be channelled to pension funds, private institutional investors that should be encouraged to take strong stakes in the firms, to strategic investors, especially minority blockholders, and a proportion to international investors. This strategy would be in China's best interests in its present stage of development.
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Liu, Ming. "Corporate governance, auditor choice and auditor switch evidence from China /." online access from Digital Dissertation Consortium, 2007. http://libweb.cityu.edu.hk/cgi-bin/er/db/ddcdiss.pl?3266748.
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Hovey, Martin. "Corporate Governance in China: An Empirical Study of Listed Firms." Thesis, Griffith University, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10072/365859.
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Corporate governance has gained considerable prominence in the last decade as it has become a much more widely discussed and debated issue. The debate as to which model of corporate governance China should adopt continues as China forges a new era of interaction with the global market, especially since its accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001. The state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector in China is a significant contributing factor in China's endeavour to continue to develop its economy, provide employment and reduce poverty. Therefore, the success of SOE reform is important to China's future economic prosperity and ability to contend with social justice issues. The commencement of the reform process began in the late 1970s and many SOEs have attained significant progress in some important areas. However, all too many SOEs experience poor overall performance. Thus, the consequence of the corporate governance model and corporate structure selected will be considerable, especially as the country's market economy gains momentum. This thesis contributes to the ongoing body of work relating to corporate governance in China, and some clear results have been found. It also reviews the institutional setting in China and elements of the corporate governance literature in detail. As the ownership of firms is considered to be one of the key elements to enhance corporate governance, the empirical study considers issues relating to changes in ownership, concentration and ownership structures. It conducts an empirical study of the ownership and performance of listed corporations in China and based on these analyses, the thesis provides policy recommendations as to which model of corporate governance may best be suited to China during this transitional phase. The findings suggest that the ownership structure is a key element to enhancing corporate governance in China. The wealth affects of changes in listed firm ownership, which for the most part had the effect of reducing state ownership, were found to be positive. Concentration ownership structures per se were not found to enhance listed firm performance. The most significant findings were the following. Firstly, that institutional ownership, through the Legal Person holding companies, have a positive bearing on listed firm performance and thus by implication, upon improving corporate governance. Secondly, medium levels of Legal Person ownership were found to be the most effective. Thirdly, foreign institutions and individual investors were found to be positively correlated to performance. Similar results were found for offshore ownership, but to a lessor extent. Conversely, state ownership was found to be negatively correlated to performance. Other issues that were identified in the empirical analysis are that size does matter, in that large firms were found not to perform as well as smaller firms. Leverage appears to matter also, as highly leveraged firms were found not to perform well. The industry in which a firm operates was also found to have an affect on performance. The policy recommendations are based on the findings and observations of this thesis. The assumption is made that the present gradualist approach and regime will continue. As state ownership is shown to have a negative bearing on listed firm performance, the recommendation is that the state, at its various levels, should divest its holdings. This could be achieved through a privatization program in which the state denationalises a large proportion of its holdings. One of the keys would then be managing the change of ownership. Based on the observations and findings of this study, it is recommended that a privatization program should be instigated that supports blockholders and institutions, and does not focus purely on dispersing large proportions of holdings to diverse small shareholders. In addition, mergers and acquisitions that embrace economic efficiency should be encouraged and supported. The empirical study demonstrates that the ultimate ownership and control of tradeable shares ought to be channelled to pension funds, private institutional investors that should be encouraged to take strong stakes in the firms, to strategic investors, especially minority blockholders, and a proportion to international investors. This strategy would be in China's best interests in its present stage of development.Thesis (PhD Doctorate)
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Griffith Business School
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Shao, Li, and 邵丽. "Corporate governance in China's listed companies: ownership structure and market disciplines." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2008. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B40687533.
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Wang, Huangji. "Cross-listing corporate governance and financial center cooperation between Hong Kong and Mainland China." Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 2009. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B4327853X.
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Zhu, Yuande, and 朱元德. "On the pyramidal structure in China." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2009. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B41634056.
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Li, Jin. "An examination of corporate governance in China : a case study approach." Thesis, University of Macau, 2010. http://umaclib3.umac.mo/record=b2147750.
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Chen, Zhenyun. "The corporate governance reform of state-owned commercial banks in China." Thesis, University of Leicester, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2381/11061.
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The aim of this doctoral thesis is to identify the inadequacies and weaknesses of the current corporate governance system and structure in Chinese state-owned commercial banks by performing a comprehensive analysis of both the internal and external governance mechanisms of banks, and by learning from the advanced experience of banking in developed economies as well as international economic and banking institutions. The research commences with a conceptual approach to banks, in terms of banking and the corporate governance. It then examines the fundamental theories related to the banking and the corporate governance. The research shows that China has undergone an array of profound economic and banking reform programmes over that past three decades. Since 1995, a new governance system has been established in China’s state-owned commercial banks through institutional reforms, which have emphasized addressing the ownership, asset quality and governance issues of the banks. Subsequently, the research demonstrates that the reform efforts have made important changes in the ways that the government conducts its control and influence over the state-owned commercial banks, shifting a system from direct control and influence of business and management to control by indirect forms. The research attempts to explore the potential problems in China’s banking laws, present the corporate governance reforms of Chinese state-owned commercial banks and create an appropriate framework of corporate governance for China’s state-owned commercial banks from internal and external aspects.
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Li, Chaojie. "Corporate governance in China : CEO compensation, company performance and ultimate ownership." Thesis, Durham University, 2011. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3322/.
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This dissertation contributes to the international literature by examining the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and firm performance in China, especially under different types of ultimate shareholders, who have differing motivations and objectives regarding the structure of CEO compensation. I use unbalanced panel data from more than 1,300 Chinese A-share listed companies over 2005-2009 and find that performance, especially one of market-based measurement, has a significant impact on CEO compensation. CEO compensation levels have risen in recent years due to economic gains rather than poor corporate governance. Firms that operate under other central government ministries (SOECG) than those of the ultimate shareholder do not use performance as a guideline for CEO pay, although they have the highest CEO compensation level amongst all five groups. The size of the board directors and independent directors are contributes positively to CEO compensation. While the degree of ownership concentration and size of supervision board are negative related to CEO compensation. Moreover, CEO gets higher pay if independent direct especially financial one working province is same as companies headquarter. Most of these results are consistent with my hypothesis. Shareholders, managers, government, and others who must make improvements in China’s corporate governance standards should find these results useful. In addition, the findings can offer future research directions.
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Song, Xiaoqi. "Earnings management, tunnelling behaviour and corporate governance : the case in China." Thesis, Durham University, 2013. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/9414/.
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This thesis explores three aspects of minority shareholder protection in the Chinese stock market, where earnings management depends on the split share structure reform (SSSREF) and mergers and acquisitions (M&As), as well as impact of mutual fund ownership on controlling shareholders’ tunnelling behaviour and firm performance. More precisely, Chapter 2 empirically shows that China’s SSSREF has not fundamentally improved the quality of firm financial information. However, the reform exogenously created an incentive alignment effect that influences firm’s earnings management behaviour. Specifically, the use of discretionary accruals by firm`s has been constrained since the reform and has consequently shifted to less detectable and underscrutinized real earnings activities after the SSSREF. This shift is similar to that seen with the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on firm earnings behaviour in developed countries with a strong investor protection environment. The results also suggest that the shift between firm’s accrual-based and real earnings methods is an overlooked area for investors in the Chinese stock market and may require regulatory attention. Chapter 3 explore fully the role of mutual funds in corporate governance in Chinese listed firms through examining whether mutual fund ownership can effectively reduce controlling shareholders’ tunnelling behaviour and improve firms’ performance. The corresponding results find a non-linear association between mutual fund ownership and firm performance. In particular, a higher level of mutual fund ownership is associated with better firm performance, which indicates that mutual funds could serve as sophisticated investors to provide useful accounting information to outsiders, and are also capable of monitoring to improve the corporate governance mechanism. When the mutual fund ownership reaches a certain level, the negative relation between high mutual fund ownership and firm performance may imply that mutual fund managers are more likely to expropriate value from minority shareholders when they have dominant controlling power. In addition, the non-linear relation between mutual fund ownership and firm performance is still observable when controlling shareholders implement tunnelling behaviours. At last, mutual fund ownership can effectively reduce controlling shareholders’ tunnelling behaviour. Therefore, in order to realize fully the benefit of mutual fund ownership in improving corporate governance, it is necessary to further liberalize the mutual fund industry and to decentralize regulation by government agencies. Chapter 4 extends the study of Chapter 2 and examines the environment of investor protection in the Chinese stock market by looking at the relation between earnings management and M&As. In details, the findings reveal M&As in China have a positive effect on promoting real earnings management and a negative effect on limiting accrual-based earnings management during the year of M&As. This finding indicates acquirers in China prefer to engage in more real earnings management mainly because of strict regulatory supervision by CSRC and the high percentage of deals paid by cash. However, accrual-based earnings management yields a significantly positive correlation with both real earnings proxies and their interaction with M&As instead of a substitution effect between accrual-based and real earnings management around M&As. This further reflects the absence of effective corporate governance and weak investor protection for the Chinese stock market. In addition, the results show a decline in earnings informativeness in the year of the M&A, and this further supports that the adjustment of earnings upwards around M&A can lower firm’s informational quality. Finally, due to the increase in real earnings management activities around M&As, the market is more likely to react negatively to such earnings strategy, especially in the year of the M&A. Consequently, the empirical evidence in this thesis contributes to the current literature and related policy making by expanding our understanding of the Chinese stock market and paying more attention to protecting minority shareholder interests.
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Morrison, Shiona. "Corporate governance in Hong Kong: a quantitative and qualitative study." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1995. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31266745.
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Yeung, Yiu-wing, and 楊耀永. "Corporate governance of public services and quasi-governmental organisations in Hong Kong." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1990. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31264840.
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Zhu, Junheng. "Ownership, corporate governance and IPO post-listing liquidity." Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2014. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/67427/1/Junheng_Zhu_Thesis.pdf.
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This thesis investigates how ownership structure and corporate governance relate to the post-listing liquidity of IPO firms. Using a sample of 1,049 Chinese IPOs from 2001 to 2010, the results show firms with a broader shareholder base and higher ownership concentration have greater post-listing liquidity. So do firms with higher state ownership and lower institution ownership. Corporate governance is also important; post-listing liquidity is higher for firms with CEO duality, a larger and more independent board, and more frequent board meetings. The 2005 Split Share Structure Reform, which increased the proportion of tradable shares, has a positive impact on liquidity.
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Lee, Pao-Chen. "The audit committee as an additional mechanism of corporate governance in China." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2011. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/the-audit-committee-as-an-additional-mechanism-of-corporate-governance-in-china(079d2b7d-ec62-4432-afa0-653531210ea6).html.
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As the title suggests, this thesis focuses on the issues arising from the establishment of audit committees in listed companies in China, which hitherto have been adopted by companies on a voluntary basis alongside the pre-existing structure of supervisory boards, rather than as a mandatory requirement. Regarding this unique practice in China, this thesis attempts to address three research objectives: 1. To understand the effectiveness of supervisory boards (SBs) and audit committees (ACs) in China. 2. To understand how the operations of SBs and ACs improve the effectiveness of supervisory governance functions in China. 3. To understand the co-ordination between SBs and ACs in organisations. The first objective is investigated by applying quantitative methods of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and analysis of panel data. It is discovered that the companies with audit committees have more effective supervisory functions when companied to those without audit committees. The second objective was pursued by applying qualitative methods in the form of two case studies constructed using interviews and surveys conducted both via telephone and in face-to-face interviews. It is found that in both the case studies audit committees were established with the expectation of enhancing the effectiveness of the companies' supervisory functions. Furthermore, the face-to-face interview survey of five listed companies reveals that companies with audit committees in China still face issues of overlapping and missing supervisory functions between supervisory boards and audit committees. Thus the third research objective, regarding the co-ordination between the supervisory board and the audit committee in the organisation to find solutions to this very problem, is particularly relevant for corporate governance in China. This objective is investigated by interviewing two governors and conducting telephone surveys. The results highlight that there is the general expectation that these structures should be co-ordinated as one unit. There is also a demand to establish an independent control system to strengthen oversight functions, to reduce oversight costs, and to ensure the independence of the supervisors and audit committee members in order that they can execute oversight tasks, and to empower them against the executive directors and senior managers by promoting their status in the organisation.
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Xie, Dongfeng [Verfasser]. "Corporate Governance and Earnings Quality in China : Three Empirical Studies / Dongfeng Xie." Berlin : Freie Universität Berlin, 2020. http://d-nb.info/1212854489/34.
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Ren, Bing. "The corporate network of interlocking directorates, corporate governance, and firm performance in China's transitional economy." online access from Digital Dissertation Consortium access full-text, 2005. http://libweb.cityu.edu.hk/cgi-bin/er/db/ddcdiss.pl?3222660.
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Lee, Mui-fong, and 李梅芳. "Corporate accountability and transparency in transition economy : examples from China's commercial banks." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10722/198843.
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This research is in the field of corporate governance and focuses on corporate accountability and transparency of China’s commercial banks, in particular SOCBs. Since 1979, the banking system of China has been undertaken reforms to transform from a mono banking system to a banking system in which banks should be profit-driven. The focus of the reforms has been changed from off-loading of NPLs to the improvement of corporate governance of commercial banks. However, China’s SOCBs still appear to be inefficient and poor in disclosure of information, though they are now more profitable. They are also required to make certain loans in line with the policies of the Chinese government. This research aims at finding out issues related to the governance and disclosure systems of China’s commercial banks from a legal perspective and suggesting possible direction to solve the issues. For the governance system, directors who are accountable to their stakeholders, not only the majority shareholders, play an important role in enhancing the operations of banks. For the disclosure system, auditors and CRAs, the gatekeepers of the financial sector, could help to reduce information asymmetry and enhance the transparency of banks, leading to a more effective use of market discipline in monitoring the operations of banks.
To improve the operations of banks, this research highlights the need to improve various institutions in addition to the reforms of banks, with the focus of reforms on the legal and regulatory systems relating to the governance mechanism, disclosure system, audit industry and credit rating industry. Though legal rules on the above areas are mostly stipulated in line with international standards or in line with regulations of other developed countries, they are usually scattered in various administrative regulations, departmental rules and normative documents and some of the provisions are still principles based in lack of implementation details. In lawmaking, there should be more revision, harmonization and consolidation of existing regulations and rules. In particular, the provisions associated with the liability risks of directors/ banks/ auditors/ audit firms/ CRAs/ responsible personnel of CRAs should be revisited and revised to enhance the enforceability of regulations and rules by regulators. Regulators of banks, auditors and CRAs should also take up more proactive roles in preventing possible risks in the financial sector rather than passively conducting box-ticking compliance. They should also increase supervisory intensity and effectiveness, with sufficient resources and clear mandate.
Though the Chinese government holds controlling shares of SOCBs and certain bank loans made are still policy-led, this research argues that a well-established and effective legal and regulatory system on governance mechanism and disclosure system, via the help of auditors and CRAs, could help withstand political influence and enhance a healthy and sustainable development of the financial sector. Without an effective legal and regulatory system, China’s banking system may still be subject to external and internal influence which will affect the progress of gradual transformation to a real market economy.published_or_final_version
Real Estate and Construction
Doctoral
Doctor of Philosophy
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Wang, Huangji, and 王煌基. "Cross-listing corporate governance and financial center cooperation between Hong Kong and Mainland China." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2009. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B4327853X.
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Mui, Tat-ming, and 梅達明. "The corporate governance of NGOs in social welfare sector in Hong Kongafter 2000." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2007. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B38637054.
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Zhang, Yefeng. "Fraudulent financial reporting in China: Evidence from renaming behaviour." Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2019. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/132322/1/Yefeng_Zhang_Thesis.pdf.
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Using a sample of listed companies in China during 2010-2017, this study examines the association between corporate's renaming behaviour and fraudulent financial reporting activities (FFRs). The moderating role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and powerful directors in mitigating the association between corporate renaming and financial reporting fraud is further investigated. The results suggest that companies with renaming experience are more prone to commit financial fraud. The positive association between corporate renaming and FFRs is less pronounced for SOEs than for non-SOEs. Reported results also show that the power of board of directors positively moderates the association between renaming behaviour and the likelihood of FFRs.
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Liu, Sun. "The determinants and economic effects of increased corporate disclosure : the case of China." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2009. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk:80/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=103122.
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This thesis adds to the ongoing accounting and financial literature by investigating the determinants and economic effects of corporate disclosure in a low disclosure environment – the two Chinese stock markets. It examines two research questions: whether the imposition of exogenously-imported corporate governance legislation and international accounting standards (IAS) lead to a fundamental improvement of corporate disclosure practices; and the estimation risk perspective of whether increased corporate disclosure results in a lower cost of equity capital through reducing the risk premiums on information uncertainty on firm-special characteristics. Results for the first question demonstrate that, while corporate disclosure is increased over time, neither advanced corporate governance mechanisms nor the IAS facilitate material improvement in voluntary disclosure. Instead, the ownership structure, especially foreign-ownership, seems to play a more essential role in determining companies’ disclosure practices. In regards to the second research question, this thesis shows stock prices of listed Chinese companies are largely informational inefficient, and that, under this circumstance, the level of corporate disclosure is strongly negatively associated with stock return volatilities. This negative association appears to result from the high-margin decrease in information asymmetry on firm-special characteristics when listed companies increase mandatory disclosure. This finding therefore provides further country-level evidence in support of the view that the extent of negative association between corporate disclosure and the cost of equity capital is primarily dependent upon the features of stock markets and the disclosure environment in different nations. This thesis concludes with recommendations for the Chinese government and the market regulator, the China Securities Regulation Committee (CSRC), to fundamentally improve current political and legal systems and to effectively enforce the mandatory disclosure legislation.
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Wong, Wai-kei, and 王偉琪. "A study of corporate governance among the listed Chinese family enterprises in Hong Kong." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2001. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31242455.
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Shi, Kan. "The Factors Influencing Sustainability Disclosure: An Empirical Investigation on Companies Operating in China." Thesis, Griffith University, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10072/371142.
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Sustainability disclosure has emerged as a main tool for communicating a company’s commitment and contribution to the environment and society. Various theories have been developed to provide explanations and predictions that attempt to understand sustainability disclosure behaviour. Empirical studies, likewise, adopt different theoretical frameworks, conventionally linking one or more firm-specific characteristics to sustainability disclosure practice.
Despite the extensive work has already been done by researchers in sustainability disclosure behaviour, there are still research gaps to be bridged. This study is inspired by the imperativeness of understanding the sustainability disclosure behaviours and focuses on a specific group of Chinese companies that are facing legitimacy crises. The purpose of this study is to investigate the motivations for, and the determinants of, corporate sustainability disclosure behaviour. Following a strand of literature which considers legitimacy as a main motivation for sustainability disclosure, companies facing legitimacy crises have been identified to make a comparison to those companies not facing legitimacy crises. Additionally, sustainability performance and corporate governance are investigated as salient determinants of corporate sustainability disclosure. This study examines the direct and interactive effects of legitimacy crises, sustainability performance and corporate governance on the quantity and quality of sustainability disclosure. The findings of this study could contribute theoretically to the extant literature on the how legitimacy crises, sustainability performance and corporate governance could individually influence a company’s sustainability behaviour. Moreover, one novel contribution of this study is the proposal of an interactive relationship of the three factors that have long been considered as independent and how they jointly influence corporate sustainability disclosure.
The targeted sample group in this study comprises the companies facing legitimacy crises. Internet searching on news archive, government websites and other external sources has helped to identify those companies exposed involved in environmental and social misconduct in a period from 2010 to 2015. These companies form the original sample (i.e. misconduct group); and a control group of companies is formed by matching their size, ownership structure, industry and the year of observation to this original sample (non-misconduct or match group). The total sample size, 414 observations across six years, includes 207 observations in the misconduct group and 207 in the non-misconduct (match) group.
Two sets of analyses were performed to test the hypotheses: comparison tests and regression analyses. Mean comparison tests provided preliminary results, while the mean of the quantity and quality of sustainability disclosure is compared. Regression analyses employed an OLS regression model and tested two sets of models on: (a) the direct effects of legitimacy crises, sustainability performance, and corporate governance on both the quantity and the quality of sustainability disclosure; (b) the interactions of the above three factors on the quantity and the quality of sustainability disclosure, including the interactions between any two factors and one three-way interaction. Additional regression analyses were performed to explore the effects of sustainability performance and legitimacy crises on the changes in the quantity and the quality of sustainability disclosure.
The core findings of this study are: (i) sustainability performance and corporate governance are significantly and positively associated with the quantity and the quality of sustainability disclosure, whereas legitimacy crisis is positively associated with the quantity, but negatively associated with the quality of sustainability disclosure; (ii) sustainability performance has no considerable influence on the quantity and quality of sustainability disclosure in the misconduct group, but has significantly positive effect on the quantity and quality of sustainability in the non-misconduct group. In contrast, corporate governance is significantly and positively associated with the quantity and quality of sustainability disclosure in both the misconduct and non-misconduct groups; (iii) the three-way interaction is discussed according to eight scenarios (based on the changes in the three variables) and is presented statistically as positively associating with both the quantity and the quality of sustainability disclosure. These findings could lead to future investigation on the interactive effects of individual factors which have long been treated as irrelated. Moreover, this study provide evidence on “contingent” determinants rather than “fixed” determinants. To be specific, motivation for sustainability disclosure could be different, such as for legitimacy purpose or for resource-based purpose, under various circumstance.Thesis (PhD Doctorate)
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Dept Account,Finance & Econ
Griffith Business School
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Song, Xiaolei. "Corporate governance : a legal study on the reform of state-owned enterprises in China." Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 2016. http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23583/.
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Corporate governance (CG) has been introduced to China as central to establishing the modern company system. The current Chinese CG principles and legal framework are the results of China having absorbed lessons and copied advanced and matured CG models from other countries. This thesis evaluates the process of CG practice by Chinese State-owned enterprises (SOEs), and concludes that the main issue for Chinese SOEs is not to adopt a fixed model of CG to copy, but to develop a complete and continuous set of institutions that lead to effective CG in the context of China's economic and social environment. At this transitional stage, what are the significance and the functions of CG in China? And how do these functions applied in reality? During the last decade of practice, what are the achievements and problems of CG in the reform of SOEs in China? What are the future perspectives of Chinese SOEs' reform? The series of questions above describe the dynamic of this thesis. In discussing the phenomenon of CG in the reform of SOEs, this thesis reviews the debates about the role of CG in China's SOEs reform. Furthermore, this thesis will analyze the tensions concerning CG in the process of SOEs reform, in relation to ownership, boards of directors, shareholders and boards of supervisors. Moreover, explorations taking a legal approach are made in this thesis in order to find and fill the gap between theory and practice about CG of SOEs in China. The research into the CG of Chinese SOEs is a challenging and stimulating field. The aim of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the CG of Chinese SOEs and offer some suggestions for improvement to make the development of CG of Chinese SOEs more attractive to experts and scholars, so as to better guide the practice.
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HAN, Xue. "The impact of corporate governance on the choice of transfer pricing methods in China." Digital Commons @ Lingnan University, 2008. https://commons.ln.edu.hk/mgt_etd/5.
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Recent scandals involving related party transactions (RPTs) have attracted researchers’ and governments’ attention. Because imperfections exist in the legislation of RPTs, business groups might abuse transfer pricing of such transactions for certain purposes. These purposes include earnings management of listed companies that seek to attract investors and profit shifting from subsidiaries to parent companies. This study investigates the impact of corporate governance on the choice of transfer pricing methods in China.
I classify transfer pricing methods into two major groups (i.e., market-based and cost-based methods). I hypothesize that companies with weak corporate governance are more likely to use cost-based pricing methods, which are regarded as subjective and more easily manipulated. According to previous studies on corporate governance, a smaller board size, CEO-Chairman duality (i.e. the CEO and the Chairman of the company are the same person), and a lower percentage of independent directors on the board are indicators of weak corporate governance. Using data collected from annual reports of Chinese listed firms in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Markets from 2003 to 2005, I find that government-controlled companies are more likely to use market-based methods than others. It is consistent with the hypothesis that ownership has an impact on the choice of transfer pricing methods. The results also show that when the chairman of the board and the CEO of the company is the same person, companies are more likely to use cost-based methods. However, inconsistent with my hypothesis, the results indicate that firms with small boards are more likely to choose cost-based methods than firms with large boards. This study extends prior research on transfer pricing by focusing on the impact of corporate governance. Furthermore, this study suggests that regulators might limit transfer pricing manipulations by stipulating a firm’s corporate governance structure. This research also draws both regulators’ and investors’ attention to the impact of corporate governance on transfer pricing methods.