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Journal articles on the topic 'Corporate agency'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 3 February 2022

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1

Agarwal, Shubhi, Rohit Goel, and Pushpendra Kumar Vashishtha. "Corporate Governance and Agency Cost." Indian Journal of Applied Research 4, no. 5 (October 1, 2011): 153–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.15373/2249555x/may2014/47.

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2

Isaacs, Tracy. "Corporate Agency and Corporate Wrongdoing." New Criminal Law Review 16, no. 2 (2013): 241–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2013.16.2.241.

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This article presents a philosophical defense of the view that corporations are legitimate responsible agents who may be considered criminally liable under the law. When corporations engage in blameworthy, irresponsible, or criminal actions, corporations are responsible for their actions. Whether this means we should think of them as persons in any robust sense is a separate question and we should be skeptical about conflating responsible agency with personhood. The article concludes with the claim that responsible agency and personhood are conceptually distinct, and that in the end responsible agency is a sufficient basis for criminal liability.

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3

ARNOLD, DENIS G. "Corporate Moral Agency." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30, no. 1 (September 2006): 279–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.2006.00140.x.

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4

Welch, John R. "Corporate Agency and Reduction." Philosophical Quarterly 39, no. 157 (October 1989): 409. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219827.

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5

Pasternak, Avia. "From Corporate Moral Agency to Corporate Moral Rights." Law & Ethics of Human Rights 11, no. 1 (May 8, 2017): 135–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/lehr-2017-0003.

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Abstract Recent literature suggests that organizational entities, such as states and business corporations, can qualify as moral agents. Does it follow that, as members of our moral community, group agents are entitled to moral protections? This article explores the connection between groups’ moral agency and moral rights. I argue that corporate moral agency does not, in itself, ground a group’s claim for moral protections. Nevertheless, a group agent can be entitled to derivative moral rights protections, which attach to the group itself but are grounded in the interests of individuals, such as the group’s members. Furthermore, the agential status of a group helps to identify which rights can attach to it, given its moral agency. One such moral agency related right is a right not to be morally subverted. This right generates a duty for the group agent’s members to ensure that its decision-making process incorporates sound moral reasoning. The final part of the article applies these conclusions to recent debates on the rights of states. I argue that, as moral agents, states have a moral right not to be morally subverted. It follows that citizens have a pro tanto duty, directed at their state, not to engage in political activities that would subvert its moral powers.

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6

Douglas, Alan V. S. "Interactions between Corporate Agency Conflicts." Financial Review 44, no. 2 (May 2009): 151–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6288.2009.00214.x.

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7

Kumar, Praveen, and Alessandro Zattoni. "Agency Conflicts and Corporate Governance." Corporate Governance: An International Review 25, no. 4 (July 2017): 220–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/corg.12212.

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8

Hong, Soonwook. "Corporate governance and agency problems." International Journal of Economics and Business Research 17, no. 1 (2019): 70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijebr.2019.096586.

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Hong, Soonwook. "Corporate governance and agency problems." International Journal of Economics and Business Research 17, no. 1 (2019): 70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijebr.2019.10016871.

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10

Lambrecht, Bart M., and Stewart C. Myers. "Agency Dynamics in Corporate Finance." Annual Review of Financial Economics 8, no. 1 (October 23, 2016): 53–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-121415-032937.

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11

Masulis, Ronald W., and Syed Walid Reza. "Agency Problems of Corporate Philanthropy." Review of Financial Studies 28, no. 2 (November 18, 2014): 592–636. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhu082.

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12

Bonazzi, Livia, and Sardar M. N. Islam. "Agency theory and corporate governance." Journal of Modelling in Management 2, no. 1 (March 20, 2007): 7–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17465660710733022.

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13

Mulgan, Tim. "Corporate Agency and Possible Futures." Journal of Business Ethics 154, no. 4 (May 3, 2018): 901–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-018-3887-1.

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14

Jerrold, Laurance. "Corporate responsibility through apparent agency?" American Journal of Orthodontics and Dentofacial Orthopedics 159, no. 3 (March 2021): 389–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ajodo.2020.12.003.

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15

Li, Songsong, Daquan Gao, and Xiaofeng Hui. "Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and Corporate Sustainable Development: A Mediating Effect Analysis." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2021 (May 8, 2021): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5558175.

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The economy is an essential factor in constructing a resilient city, and listed companies play a vital role in the local economy. From the microbehavior of corporate governance, we examine the relationship among corporate governance, agency costs, and corporate sustainable development for a panel sample of 690 state-owned firms in China during 2015–2019. We found that agency costs mediate the relationship between board size, management compensation, debt ratio, dividend policy, and corporate sustainable development. Specifically, decreasing the board size can reduce agency costs and enhance the company’s sustainable development capabilities. The existing compensation system is to the disadvantage of the sustainable development of the company. Increasing the salaries of managers will increase agency costs and reduce the company’s ability to develop sustainably. Although increasing liabilities can reduce agency costs, increasing liabilities will increase financial risks. The bankruptcy costs caused by increasing liabilities are more significant than agency costs, which leads to a decline in the company’s ability to develop sustainably. The implementation of cash dividend policies will help reduce agency costs, thereby increasing their sustainable development capabilities. This also provides new ideas for the Modigliani–Miller (MM) theory and agency cost theory.

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16

Hasnas, John. "Does Corporate Moral Agency Entail Corporate Freedom of Speech?" Social Theory and Practice 43, no. 3 (2017): 589–612. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract20178315.

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17

Aggarwal, Rajesh K., Felix Meschke, and Tracy Yue Wang. "Corporate Political Donations: Investment or Agency?" Business and Politics 14, no. 1 (April 2012): 1–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/1469-3569.1391.

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We examine corporate donations to political candidates for federal offices in the United States from 1991 to 2004. Firms that donate have operating characteristics consistent with the existence of a free cash flow problem, and donations are negatively correlated with returns. A $10,000 increase in donations is associated with a reduction in annual excess returns of 7.4 basis points. Worse corporate governance is associated with larger donations. Even after controlling for corporate governance, donations are associated with lower returns. Donating firms engage in more acquisitions and their acquisitions have significantly lower cumulative abnormal announcement returns than non-donating firms. We find virtually no support for the hypothesis that donations represent an investment in political capital. Instead, political donations are symptomatic of agency problems within firms. Our results are particularly useful in light of the Citizens United ruling, which is likely to greatly increase the use of corporate funds for political donations.

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18

Montgomery, Cynthia A. "Corporate Diversification." Journal of Economic Perspectives 8, no. 3 (August 1, 1994): 163–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.8.3.163.

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This paper documents the significant presence of diversified firms in the U.S. economy and presents three views on why firms diversify. The market power view argues that firms diversify to wield conglomerate power across markets. The agency view argues that diversification is undertaken by managers pursuing their own interests at the expense of the firm's owners. The resource view argues that firms diversify in response to excess capacity in productive factors. A review of recent empirical research finds little support for the market-power view and a substantial amount of evidence that is consistent with the agency and resource views.

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19

Singer, Alan E. "Corporate Moral Agency and Artificial Intelligence." International Journal of Social and Organizational Dynamics in IT 3, no. 1 (January 2013): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijsodit.2013010101.

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The debate about the moral status of corporations has been wide-ranging and complex. In this paper a way of structuring the debate is proposed. At the same time, arguments within the “corporate moral agency” debate are considered in relation to the notion of Artificial Moral Agency. The entire exercise points to the importance of philosophical pragmatism and the prospect of ‘artificial ethics’.

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20

Sealy, L. S. "The Corporate Ego and Agency Untwined." Cambridge Law Journal 54, no. 3 (November 1995): 507–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008197300097233.

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21

Abdul Halim, Zairihan, Janice How, and Peter Verhoeven. "Agency costs and corporate sukuk issuance." Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 42 (April 2017): 83–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2016.05.014.

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22

Crocker, Keith J., and Joel Slemrod. "Corporate tax evasion with agency costs." Journal of Public Economics 89, no. 9-10 (September 2005): 1593–610. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.08.003.

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23

Borokhovich, Kenneth A., Kelly R. Brunarski, Yvette Harman, and James B. Kehr. "Dividends, Corporate Monitors and Agency Costs." Financial Review 40, no. 1 (February 2005): 37–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0732-8516.2005.00092.x.

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24

Mayers, D. "Agency Problems and the Corporate Charter." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 21, no. 2 (August 24, 2005): 417–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewi016.

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25

Arlen, Jennifer, Matthew Spitzer, and Eric Talley. "Endowment Effects within Corporate Agency Relationships." Journal of Legal Studies 31, no. 1 (January 2002): 1–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/324659.

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26

Tufano, Peter. "Agency Costs of Corporate Risk Management." Financial Management 27, no. 1 (1998): 67. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3666152.

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27

Nezafat, Mahdi, Tao Shen, and Qinghai Wang. "Short selling, agency, and corporate investment." Financial Management 50, no. 3 (February 26, 2021): 775–804. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/fima.12343.

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28

Akel Abrahão, Gabriel, Paulo Arvate, and Marcus Alexandre Yshikawa Salusse. "The Individual Agency of Corporate Entrepreneurship." Academy of Management Proceedings 2021, no. 1 (August 2021): 13476. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2021.13476abstract.

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29

ElKelish, Walaa Wahid. "Corporate governance risk and the agency problem." Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 18, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 254–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cg-08-2017-0195.

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Purpose This study aims to investigate the relationship between corporate governance risk and agency costs across different countries. Design/methodology/approach Corporate governance risk indicators were obtained from the Institutional Shareholder Services Europe (S.A.) for 4,135 firms across 27 countries. Agency costs and other control variables were derived from companies’ annual financial reports using the DataStream database. Ordinary least squares multiple regression analysis model was used to test the study hypothesis. Findings Agency costs have a significant negative impact on corporate governance risk across countries. The extent of corporate governance mechanisms used, however, varies across geographic regions and industry types. The relationship between corporate governance risk and agency costs is more obvious in the non-financial than financial sector. These results were robust after several statistical checks. Practical implications The findings will help stakeholders, including corporate management, regulators and investors to improve corporate governance mechanisms and capital allocation decisions across countries. Originality/value Evidence is provided on the role of agency costs in corporate governance risk across geographic regions for financial and non-financial companies. The paper also overcomes common problems in corporate governance research such as construct validity, limited data and endogeneity.

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30

Tsaruk, Vasyl. "Agency problem in management as a challenge for the corporation accounting system." Herald of Ternopil National Economic University, no. 4(94) (December 3, 2019): 103–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.35774/visnyk2019.04.103.

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Introduction. Corporate governance, as a basis for ensuring the efficient use of corporate resources, can be built on a range of models that have both advantages and disadvantages. Neo-institutional theory, in particular its separate component is agency theory. It is one of the theories that allows to substantiate the reasons for the decline in the quality of implemented corporate governance systems and to formulate ways to improve it, in particular, taking into account the role of accounting in ensuring the effectiveness of their functioning. Purpose. The aim of the article is to monitor essence and peculiarities of manifestation of agency problem in corporate governance and substantiation of place of accounting in its solution. Methods. The range of research methods related to the solution of the agent problem in the corporate governance system is applied. Dialectical method of cognition and the systematic approach to the interpretation of corporate governance, the monographic method for monitoring the positions of scientists in the sphere of solving the agent problem, the abstract and logical method for theoretical generalizations and formulation conclusions are used in the research. Results. The necessity of accounting development in solving the agency problem in corporate management is substantiated. The peculiarities of the development of neo-institutional theory as a theoretical basis of corporate governance are revealed. The necessity to study agency theory as a means of solving problems in corporate governance is substantiated. The essence of agency problem in corporate structures is revealed and the causes of its occurrence are identified. The theoretical principles of agency problem in corporate structures are highlighted. Cases of manifestation of agency problem in corporate structures are analyzed. The basic directions of improvement of the accounting system of the corporate structure with the purpose of minimizing consequences of occurrence of agency problem are highlighted. Discussion. It is advisable to focus on optimizing specific elements of the corporate accounting system in further research in order to avoid agency issues in the corporate governance system.

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31

Kontuš, Eleonora. "Agency costs, capital structure and corporate performance." Ekonomski vjesnik 34, no. 1 (2021): 73–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.51680/ev.34.1.6.

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Purpose: The aim of this study is, first to describe and explore equity agency costs; second, to explore the impact of capital structure on equity agency costs; and finally, to examine the impact of agency costs on the performance of listed companies. Methodology: Panel data regression has been used for research data analysis. Results: The results of the work show that equity to capital and long-term debt to capital variables have a positive and significant impact on the agency costs of listed companies in the Republic of Croatia. The study indicates that long-term debt to capital variable has a negative and significant impact on the agency costs of listed companies in Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Furthermore, we find evidence to suggest that changes in agency costs have little or no effect on the performance of listed companies in Croatia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. The findings suggest that the capital structure decisions affect the agency costs of listed companies and the agency costs may affect corporate performance. Conclusion: This study makes a number of contributions to the agency costs literature. It presents the first study of agency costs of listed companies in Croatia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic that uses panel data, a technique that enables us to isolate both cross section and time series effects. The present paper can help managers to better understand equity agency costs and their effects on corporate performance.

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32

Jones, Gareth R., and John E. Butler. "Managing Internal Corporate Entrepreneurship: An Agency Theory Perspective." Journal of Management 18, no. 4 (December 1992): 733–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014920639201800408.

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Entrepreneurship is the process by which firms notice opportunities and act (by creatively organizing transactions between factors of production) to create surplus value. Using concepts from information and agency theory, this article examines how agency problems affect the dynamics of internal corporate entrepreneurship and the level of entrepreneurial behavior The relationship between internal corporate and external entrepreneurship is explored, and the organizationalfactors that cause agency problems are examined. Finally, solutions to agency problems are suggested that also promote internal corporate entrepreneurship.

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Zulkafli, Abdul Hadi, and Ahmad Husni Hamzah. "Corporate contestability and corporate expropriation." Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets and Institutions 6, no. 4 (2016): 403–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/rcgv6i4c3art5.

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This paper presents evidence on the role of ownership in dealing with corporate expropriation of listed companies in Malaysia. From the perspective of expropriation, a single controlling shareholder is always associated with such behavior due to their power and control at the expense of minority shareholder. However, subsequent individual or coalition of large shareholders can be an important corporate governance tool by providing effective monitoring that would lessen the possibility of expropriation by the controlling shareholder. Relating to that, this study evaluates the role of controlling and large shareholders in dealing with corporate expropriation. It is found that there is a negative relationship between single controlling shareholders and dividend payout ratio indicating that firms with only controlling shareholder will pay a lower dividend due to possible expropriation through profit diversion by controlling shareholder. Using Herfindahl Index as a proxy for ownership contestability, the presence of large shareholders along with controlling shareholder has a positive relationship with dividend payout implying that increased contestability helps to curb the power of controlling shareholder to expropriate fund for their own benefit. In accordance with agency theory, the outcome suggests that large shareholders play a monitoring role in minimizing the Type II agency problem. It is also verifying the argument made based on the Catering Theory of Dividend that the presence of large shareholder brings benefit to all shareholders as they are able to reduce profit diversion by demanding for higher dividend.

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Omotosho, Sule Ishola, and Hod Anyigba. "Conceptualising corporate entrepreneurial strategy." Journal of Strategy and Management 12, no. 2 (May 9, 2019): 256–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jsma-05-2018-0046.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to conceptualize corporate entrepreneurial strategy using collaborative dynamics of contingency and agency theories, and to demonstrate how some constructs of these two theories are integrated to support long-term strategies of entrepreneurial firms in sustaining their competitive advantages and enhancing their performance. Design/methodology/approach Review of literature on strategic entrepreneurship, firm growth, contingency and agency theories were explored to support the conceptualized framework of the entrepreneurial strategy developed in this paper. The authors adopt a vignette approach to problematize theoretical gaps identified. The vignette was also used to embody the entrepreneurial strategy matrix developed. Findings This paper suggests that the effectiveness of corporate entrepreneurial strategies is influenced by the impacts of contingent environment and agency problem of goal conflicts. It provides some propositions for qualitative and empirical research that will extend the rigours of strategic entrepreneurship literature. Practical implications This paper highlights the implications of understanding and adopting diverse competitive and sustenance strategies. It provides avenues for entrepreneurial firms to take cognizance and use of the contingency and agency approaches to influence their long-term strategic directions to stay competitive. Institutional authorities will also benefit from having a conceptual reference and guide to further improve their entrepreneurship policies. Originality/value The authors took three novel steps to address the existing gap in the literature. First, the theories of entrepreneurship, contingency and agency were bound together and unified as a single framework to conceptualize entrepreneurial strategy. Second, the identified gaps were embodied in a vignette to problematize the theoretical issues and lastly, some testable propositions were put forward to explain different forms of entrepreneurial strategy. The authors also developed a corporate entrepreneurial strategy matrix based on the Covin and Miles (1999) forms of corporate entrepreneurship. It forms the basis for the propositions.

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Funchal, Bruno, and Jedson Pereira Pinto. "Corporate events’ performance and corporate governance: the Brazilian evidence." Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 18, no. 1 (February 5, 2018): 14–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cg-11-2016-0219.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relation between corporate governance and corporate events’ performance. Firms that engage in corporate events seem to perform at least as bad as similar firms that did not. Based on agency theory, the authors hypothesize that lower corporate performance is associated to differences in governance levels. Design/methodology/approach Bessembinder and Zhang’s (2013) approach to evaluate the performance of corporate events has been expanded by considering unique corporate governance features from Brazilian stock market. Findings The results suggest that after controlling for governance levels, event rms and control rms have similar performance. A number of analyses were performed to rule out alternative explanations. Originality/value The results call attention for the role of agency costs in evaluating corporate events’ performance.

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36

Weber, Ryan. "Constrained Agency in Corporate Social Media Policy." Journal of Technical Writing and Communication 43, no. 3 (July 2013): 289–315. http://dx.doi.org/10.2190/tw.43.3.d.

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MOULINE, Boubker, and Hicham SADOK. "Agency theory and corporate cash holding decisions." International Journal of Financial, Accounting, and Management 2, no. 4 (April 24, 2020): 259–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.35912/ijfam.v2i4.308.

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Purpose: This article aims to examine the relationship between agency costs related to managerial discretion and cash holdings by Moroccan companies. In order to do this we will mobilize both agency theory and free cash flow theory. To date, and to our knowledge, no research has been conducted on the cash flow of Moroccan companies in the light of agency theory Research methodology: This research uses econometric models based on a positivist approach with a hypothetical-deductive method. Results: Our results show that there is a strong positive relationship between cash holdings and cash flow. It also turns out that the liquidity of these companies is significantly negatively affected by the debt leverage and the growth opportunities of the company. Limitations: we have limited ourselves to the examination of the intrinsic characteristics of the company. We omitted the institutional and legal framework. This would have required an international sample with different jurisdictions and degrees of shareholder protection. Contribution: This study contributes to cash holdings research in Morocco by exploring the reasons for holding cash through a sample of Moroccan non-financial companies that are listed on the Casablanca Stock Exchange for a period of 12 years (from 2007 to 2018). Keywords: Cash holdings, Morocco, Agency theory, Free cash flow theory, Firm-specific variables

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Rönnegard, David. "How Autonomy Alone Debunks Corporate Moral Agency." Business and Professional Ethics Journal 32, no. 2 (2013): 77–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/bpej2013321/24.

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McLean, Robert A. "Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification." CFA Digest 27, no. 4 (November 1997): 49–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/dig.v27.n4.171.

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Vargas-Hernández, José G., and María Elizabeth Teodoro Cruz. "Corporate governance and agency theory: Megacable case." Corporate Governance and Sustainability Review 2, no. 1 (2018): 59–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cgsrv2i1p5.

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The objective of this research is to determine the importance of the implementation of a corporate governance system in the Mexican company Megacable in its development, from the review of the theoretical and empirical literature. Therefore, a descriptive and explanatory study was carried out that describes the concepts related to the aforementioned elements. and financial reports of two periods are analyzed, as well as the main attributes that explain the success of the company. Among the main results obtained are that the Megacable group is the cable operator; Mexico’s largest internet and telephony in terms of subscribers, its structure as a controlling company that is managed through a series of subsidiaries and controlling companies and smaller operating companies in the same sector. It can be concluded that implementing efficient corporate governance among small and medium enterprises will have a clearer way of how to implement and execute the plans and best practices that will allow them to be leaders in their sector.

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Luo, Jin-hui, Xue Li, and Huayang Chen. "Annual report readability and corporate agency costs." China Journal of Accounting Research 11, no. 3 (September 2018): 187–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2018.04.001.

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Cheng-Guajardo, Luis. "Responsibility Unincorporated: Corporate Agency and Moral Responsibility." Philosophical Quarterly 69, no. 275 (July 11, 2018): 294–314. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqy031.

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43

DENIS, DAVID J., DIANE K. DENIS, and ATULYA SARIN. "Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification." Journal of Finance 52, no. 1 (March 1997): 135–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03811.x.

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Gates, Stephen J. "Recent Changes to Corporate Capacity and Agency." Federal Law Review 15, no. 3 (September 1985): 206–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0067205x8501500303.

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45

Hanke, Philip C., and Klaus Heine. "Subsidies and Corporate Governance - An Agency Approach." Managerial and Decision Economics 36, no. 4 (March 10, 2014): 256–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.2665.

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46

Solbrig, Heide. "Digital Domestics: Race, Agency, and Corporate Software." Parallax 3, no. 2 (September 1997): 93–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13534645.1997.9522390.

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47

Carson, Thomas L. "Corporate moral agency: A case from literature." Journal of Business Ethics 13, no. 2 (February 1994): 155–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00881584.

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48

Putra, Wahyu Manuhara. "PENGARUH KONFLIK KEAGENAN TERHADAP CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DAN KINERJA PERUSAHAAN." MAKSIMUM 1, no. 2 (March 12, 2012): 109. http://dx.doi.org/10.26714/mki.1.2.2011.109-114.

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Abstract This study aimed to test whether the Corporate Governance associated the Agent- Conflicts This research Used exploratory principal components analysis and kanonikal analysis on 6 individual governance variables to get the 5 factors representing different dimensions of corporate governance and treasures the agent, conflict firms based on 7 agency conflict proxies used in the literature. Results of analysis found that Companies with greater agency conflict has a mechanism for better corporate governance, in particular that the low ownership structure has a high impact on institutional ownership. Overall the result support the theory that the existence and role of corporate governance mechanisms on firm is a function of agency Conflict in the company. Keyword : Agency Conflicts, Corporate Governance, exploratory principal components analysis, kanonikal analysis

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Shachar, Itamar Y., and Lesley Hustinx. "Modalities of agency in a corporate volunteering program: Cultivating a resource of neoliberal governmentality." Ethnography 20, no. 2 (November 19, 2017): 205–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1466138117741503.

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Recent scholarly discussions on agency relate the concept to privilege, affect and subject formation, while challenging its equation with resistance to structural limitations. This article utilizes these discussions in a new terrain of ethnographic exploration: the engagement of corporate volunteers with underprivileged youth, coordinated by a transnational nonprofit that relies on corporate sponsorship. Based on a multi-sited ethnographic study that followed these activities in the US, Belgium and Israel, the article describes how corporate volunteers and coordinators projected an individualized and optimistic agency onto the beneficiaries of their activity, while perceiving their own agency as limited despite their privileged position. The simultaneous use of these two contradictory notions of agency governs employees’ engagement at work and their ideological adherence to corporate capitalism, making ‘agency’ a resource of neoliberal governmentality. These ethnographic insights contribute to explaining why corporations are increasingly interested in promoting volunteering as a salient Corporate Social Responsibility strategy.

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Tsaruk, Vasyl. "Ways to solve agency problems in corporate structures with using accounting information: non-institutional aspects." INNOVATIVE ECONOMY, no. 7-8 (November 2019): 145–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.37332/2309-1533.2019.7-8.21.

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Abstract:

Purpose. The aim of the article is to analyse and substantiate the ways to solve the consequences of an agency problem in corporate structures based on the use of accounting information. Methodology of the research. The theoretical basis of the research is the scientific works of domestic and foreign scientists on the problems of accounting information formation in the issues of solving agency problems in corporate structures. The following methods are used to achieve the goal of the study: general scientific methods (abstraction, comparison, generalization, analysis, synthesis) – to know the basic elements of accounting information; critical analysis and systematic approach – when disclosing the characteristics of the main elements of solving an agency problem in corporate structures; abstract and logical method – to formulate the conclusions of the study. Findings. The types of opportunistic behaviour regarding the moment of contracting according to agency theory are substantiated. The role of accounting information at the pre-contractual stage of activity of corporate structures is determined. The features of understanding of accounting as one of the basic elements of the corporate governance system, which allows to minimize the consequences of an agency problem, are revealed. The role of accounting information at the post-contracting stage of corporate structures activity is determined. Originality. The possibility of using accounting information for the implementation of opportunistic behaviour by agents in the activity of corporate structures is substantiated. The ability of the accounting system to counteract the hidden intentions that agents may have after contracting has been identified. A matrix classification of approaches to solving the consequences of agency problems in corporate structures has been developed. Practical value. Implementation of the components of accounting information proposed in the study will allow to substantiate the role of accounting information in the application of each of the selected approaches to solving the consequences of the agency problem in corporate structures. Key words: corporate governance; agency problem; adverse selection; moral hazard; accounting information.

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