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Smith, Thomas. "The metaphysics of corporate agency." Thesis, School of Advanced Study, University of London, 2007. http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/804/.
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In Chapter 1, I defend “the first thesis”, which is that expressions of the form ‘_decided to ’, ‘_wished to ’, ‘_intended to ’ and ‘_believed that p’ may be used to truly say something about something that the expression ‘the East India Company’ may be used to pick out. In Chapter 2, I defend “the second thesis”, which is stronger than the first thesis, and which is that an individual i that is picked out by a standard use of the expression ‘the East India Company’ is such that expressions of the form ‘_decided to ’, ‘_wished to ’, ‘_intended to ’ and ‘_believed that p’ may be used to truly say something about i. In Chapter 3, I defend “the third thesis”, which is stronger than the second thesis, and which is that an individual i that is picked out by a standard use of the expression ‘the East India Company’ is such that expressions of the form ‘_decided to ’, ‘_wished to ’, ‘_intended to ’ and ‘_believed that p’ may be used in the senses in which they may be used to truly say something about a human person to truly say something about i. In Chapter 4, I try to assuage perplexity as to how it is possible that the third thesis is true, by telling a likely story as to how a situation in which no decision, wish, intention or belief is made or had by anything that is not a human person might evolve into one in which the East India Company makes decisions, and has wishes, intentions and beliefs (in the senses in which a human person may make and have such things). In a postscript, I sketch an explanation of why we are justified in thinking that the Company had a diminished range of mental capacities.
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Silva, Andre Espozel Pinheiro da. "Testing dynamic agency predictions to corporate finance." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/18243.
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This papers tests theoretical predictions concerning to agent compensation, debt structure and investment in the models of dynamic agency in DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and DeMarzo, Fishman, He and Wang (2012). The results related to agent compensation are consistent with the patterns predicted in the models, indicating that the firm-years that the models would have as more likely to pay dividends are indeed the ones more likely to pay; also, among firms that pay dividends, more profits generate higher dividend payments and higher executive compensation, as predicted in the models. The prediction that firms that go well and reach a payment threshold present marginal q equal to average q, and thus after controlling for average q cash flows would not explain investment is also supported by the tests in here. On the other hand, predictions related to the role of the credit line and to the debt structure are not compatible with the results in here. The credit line doesn’t seem to be the provider of financial slack that protects the firm from low cash flows and also doesn’t seem to have the dynamics of being paid when profits are high and being more used when profits are low.
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Ray, David. "On the Concept of Corporate Moral Agency." TopSCHOLAR®, 1985. https://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses/2748.
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Much of the popular discussion of the social responsibilities of corporations overlooks the fundamental question of whether corporations (as opposed to their employees) are the type of entities to which it is proper to make responsibility ascriptions. That is the question I address in this paper. I proceed by outlining the criteria a subject must meet in order to qualify as a moral agent (the most controversial of which when applied to corporations is the capability of intentional action) and then examining five popular views on the status of corporations. The views vary widely in their conclusions, from the position that corporations are full-fledged members of the moral community to the theory that it is only their employees that have moral responsibilities. Regardless of their conclusions all are found deficient for one reason or another, most criticisms boiling down to the claim that they are based on an inadequate view of corporate structure or behavior.
Following organizational theorist Michael Keeley's lead, I conclude that corporations are not moral agents, although for much different reasons than any of the other nay-sayers whose views I examine. I suggest that whatever the details of their arguments, all theories that claim corporations are moral agents (and even some who deny it) are based on an organismic model of corporate behavior that involves goal-oriented behavior. It is my contention that when the activities of corporations are actually examined that no such corporate intentional action can be identified and that corporations therefore do not qualify as moral agents.
However, I also suggest that while we cannot properly hold corporations morally responsible for their actions, they are not shielded from moral judgements. As moral agents, we are justified in preferring one type of corporate activity over another (say, proper treatment of toxic wastes over "midnight dumping") on moral grounds. Finally, calling once again on Keeley, I point to an alternative to the organismic model of corporate behavior, the social-contract model, as a potentially more fruitful tool of inquiry into the relationships between corporations, individuals and society.
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Yu, Bing. "Agency Costs of Stakeholders and Corporate Finance." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2009. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1258316541.
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Hromasová, Lucie. "Analýza firemní identity společnosti NIOSPORT agency,a.s." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2012. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-142093.
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Master thesis focuses on issues of corporate identity of advertising agency NIOSPORT agency, a.s. The aim of this thesis is to analyze corporate identity of company NIOSPORT agency, a.s. In the theoretical part is explained what is a corporate identity, which elements are included and why it is so important for companies. Then there is a definition of an image with an emphasis on its distinction from the concept of corporate identity, explained the interdependence between corporate identity and corporate strategy, and then is paid attention on advertising agencies in general. The practical part consists of a description of a particular advertising agency NIOSPORT agency, a.s., the results of empirical research, evaluation of the image of agency and finally of recommendations for the future, arising from the theoretical part, analyzing corporate documents and of the depth interviews with the director, staff and clients of advertising agency.
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Marks, Danelle Miller. "A comparison of attitudes toward corporate advertising : corporate executives and advertising agency executives." Virtual Press, 1986. http://liblink.bsu.edu/uhtbin/catkey/474662.
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The purpose of this thesis was to examine the attitudes toward corporate advertising held by those individuals most closely associated with it: corporate and advertising agency executives. No previous research had been conducted in this particular area.An attitude scale was administered to eighty-two corporate and advertising agency executives, representing a sample from Fortune's one hundred largest corporations and the one hundred largest advertising agencies. A frequency distribution, factor analysis, and Q-study were conducted on the data collected.Findings showed the general attitude toward corporate advertising to be favorable. Two factors underlying respondent's attitudes were revealed and broadly identified as "positive value" and "negative value." Rather than viewing corporate advertising in specific terms, respondents' attitudes were factored on the basis of valence, or direction of the statements.The Q-analysis identified three types of attitude patterns existing among the respondents. Type I respondents represented large industrial manufacturers who believe corporate advertising is an effective tool for improving employee morale and recruiting new employees. Type II, consisting of advertising agencies involved in marketing to consumers, saw corporate advertising as a tool for increasing corporate awareness and creating unity among products. A conglomeration of industrial manufacturers, consumer goods manufacturers, and advertising agencies, Type III viewed corporate advertising as an effective part of a total plan, though not capable of achieving tangible objectives by itself. Type and size of firm were the only demographics which could be significantly related to the attitude patterns.These findings indicate that although differences can be found in the management function provided by corporate advertising, respondents hold similar favorable attitudes toward corporate advertising.
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Jacobs, Emmett Allen. "The agency cost of corporate control : the petroleum industry." MIT Energy Lab, 1986. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/27278.
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Trzeciakiewicz, Agnieszka. "Essays on information asymmetry, agency problem, and corporate actions." Thesis, University of Hull, 2014. http://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:10593.
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This study investigates the implications of the asymmetric information between managers and shareholders and the resulting costly agency problems. In doing so, it focuses on the heterogeneity of executive directors with respect to their trading behaviour and personal characteristics, and the corporate governance mechanisms which can help lessen the adverse effects of the manager-shareholder agency conflicts. The study recognises that executive directors cannot be treated as a homogenous group and their incentives and the ability to impact decisions differ significantly. Two top executive directors are considered throughout this study, namely Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Finance Officers (CFOs). In this study, we address several important research questions. First, we consider whether executive directors have an informational advantage over outsiders. Second, we address if the heterogeneity of directors with respect to their role in the company and personal characteristics matters. Third, we examine whether internal corporate governance mechanisms play a significant role in moderating the manager-shareholder agency problem. Last but not least, we investigate if the nature of the interactions between asymmetric information, agency issues and corporate governance change during and after the global financial crisis of 2007-08. In carrying out our empirical analysis, we employ a unique dataset on the UK nonfinancial firms during the sample period 2000 to 2010. The detailed information about the corporate governance structure of firms and the personal characteristics of CEOs and CFOs enable us to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the research questions outlined above for three distinct periods, namely the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. Our analysis shows that the position that directors hold in the company and their characteristics can help explain the subsequent market-adjusted returns on insider trading. We find that the returns to insider purchase transactions are generally positive. However, they are weaker in the longer term, possibly suggesting that the informative content of director trades is less significant than it is perceived by the market. The main finding of our analysis in relation to the link between insider trading and the probability of bankruptcy is that insider trading increases the predictive power of insolvency models. This study also reports that CEOs exert a greater influence on the leverage decision than CFOs in firms that seem to operate under their optimal leverage. However, we observe that the CFO’s characteristics become more significant in determining leverage after the recent financial crisis. Overall, the analysis of this study provides strong evidence for the view that the presence of asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders and the costly manager-shareholder agency conflict are central to our understanding of the corporate finance decision making process and its consequences. However, more importantly, the findings of this study provide a relatively new notion that considering the heterogeneity of top executive directors in the empirical analysis of corporate decisions is essential, especially in exploring modern corporations.
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Hong, Xiangxing, and 洪祥星. "Corporate governance in China's listed companies: sinonization and agency problems." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2010. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B4545923X.
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Chen, Yuezhao. "Agency issues and the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on agency costs in Chinese listed companies." Thesis, Cardiff University, 2010. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/54376/.
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Two types of agency problems tend to predominate in the modern corporations, i.e., principal-agent (owner-manager) conflicts and principal-principal (large shareholder appropriation) conflicts. This PhD project aims to identify the principal-principal agency problems, to investigate contextual factors that affect the usefulness of governance mechanisms, to explore satisfying ways to measure agency costs, and to test the effectiveness of selected corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating agency costs in Chinese listed companies. The main discussions lie in the causes and formations of Type II agency issues, and how effective governance mechanisms work to mitigate these issues. Both qualitative and quantitative analyses are used. An in-depth case study is undertaken and a sample of 6344 observations of Chinese listed companies during 2000-2005 is used in econometric models to examine the role of various governance mechanisms in alleviating agency costs. There are some significant findings. State ownership does not have constant detrimental impact on firm performance or directly contribute to agency costs. Legal person ownership is found to be most effective in reducing agency costs but has similar impact as state ownership for performance. Foreign ownership has mix results and managerial ownership is negligible. Board and external auditing both have significant impact on firm performance and agency costs in different ways, as well as various control variables. In terms of direct measurement of agency costs, other receivables seem to generate most significant results, while free cash flow does not. Return on equity/asset also has significant results as predicted. This is a comprehensive study to contribute to existing literature on Type II agency problems and empirical research in China. Findings on these aspects will help the listed companies devise effective measures for improving corporate governance practice in China and other transitional economies. An improved corporate governance system will strengthen Chinese companies' competitiveness on global market.
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Hirsch, Gwen N. "Marketing in the Forest Service : a focus on agency image /." Master's thesis, This resource online, 1990. http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-01262010-020025/.
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Truong, Thanh, and thanh truong@rmit edu au. "Corporate Ownership, Equity Agency Costs and Dividend Policy: An Empirical Analysis." RMIT University. Economics, Finance and Marketing, 2008. http://adt.lib.rmit.edu.au/adt/public/adt-VIT20080528.094747.
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Equity agency costs are important to the firm and the management of these costs is a critical element of corporate governance, yet empirical research that focuses on the magnitude and impact of agency costs is limited. This thesis sets out to furnish empirical evidence in the area of corporate ownership with a particular focus on the magnitude of equity agency costs as well as the relation that exists between the largest shareholder in a firm and equity agency costs and between the largest shareholder and the dividend policy that a firm adopts. This thesis provides an empirical analysis of the effect of corporate ownership, together with other governance mechanisms on equity agency conflicts for the largest 500 Australian listed firms. The results from this analysis provide strong support for the view that equity agency costs are related to corporate ownership. Specifically, there is evidence of a significant non-linear relation between inside ownership and the proxies for agency costs. Further, the results demonstrate that other governance mechanisms, particularly board size, board leadership and short-term debt financing, are effective in improving the use of firm assets, yet they do not seem to restrain firm management from incurring excessive discretionary operating expenses. This thesis also extends the investigation of the corporate ownership-equity agency cost relation by focusing on the largest shareholder for 9,165 listed firms drawn from 43 countries around the world. The results suggest that cross-sectional variation in equity agency costs can be partly attributable to corporate ownership. Specifically, there is evidence of a statistically significant non-linear relation between the shareholding of the largest shareholder and the agency cost proxies. The type of the largest shareholder, i.e. whether the largest shareholder is an insider or a financial institution, is also important in analysis of this relation. Further, debt financing, dividend policy and legal origin vary in their impact on the agency cost proxies. This thesis also investigates the interaction between the largest shareholder and dividend policy for 8,279 listed firms drawn from 37 countries around the world. Consistent with previous studies, the results suggest that firms are more likely to pay dividends when profitability is high, debt is low, investment opportunities are limited, or when the largest shareholder is not an insider. It is also apparent that largest shareholding and dividend payout are related and that, consistent with the extant literature, legal system does matter in dividend policy decisions. Together, the results imply that equity agency costs vary with corporate ownership though this relation remains, of course, the subject of continuing investigation in finance. A major contribution of this thesis is demonstrating that corporate ownership, particularly the largest shareholder, plays a pivotal role in controlling agency costs. Accordingly, this suggests the following policy implication: by improving the legal environment and regulatory constraints imposed on large shareholders as well as legal protection for minority shareholders, the efficiency gains generated from large shareholder control can be translated into higher firm valuation to the benefit of all shareholders in the firm.
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Khalil, Mohamed Mohamed Mahmoud. "Earnings management, agency costs and corporate governance : evidence from Egypt." Thesis, University of Hull, 2010. http://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:7975.
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The main purpose of this study is to provide further insights into the potential influence of a number of internal and external governance mechanisms in constraining earnings management and determining the agency costs level. In addition, this study attempts to enhance the understanding of a number of issues relating to ownership structure and corporate governance in an emerging country setting. The international corporate collapse and accounting scandals surrounding some prominent large companies (e.g. Enron, Xerox, World.com, HealthSouth, Tyco, Waste management, RiteAid and Subeam) raised concern about the effectiveness of different monitoring devices that protect investors‘ interests. The majority of failures have resulted, in part, from accounting manipulation and dereliction of efficient corporate governance mechanisms that control opportunistic behaviour of management. This study argues that agency conflicts within a firm are considered to be among the influential sources of earnings management activities. In emerging countries with highly concentrated ownership, the prevalence of agency conflicts is more likely to lie mainly between controlling and minority shareholders rather than between managers and outside shareholders. Such conflicts, combined with the weak legal protection of minority shareholders and the flexibility inherent in accounting choices, are likely to induce managers to manipulate the reported earnings and adopt a range of activities that might be contrary to minority stockholders‘ interests. Using an original data set for a sample of Egyptian listed firms, the findings of the empirical analyses are in agreement with this argument. It is shown that corporate governance mechanisms do not work in isolation but they interact to effectively curb earnings management and alleviate different agency conflicts. It is also shown that firm-specific characteristics (e.g., growth opportunities) play a crucial role in understanding the conditional role of such mechanisms and other governance mechanisms, such as dividends and short debt, may help resolve corporate agency problems.
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Amiot, André, and Johansson Fredrik Hallin. "Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance and CEO compenastion incentives." Thesis, Högskolan i Gävle, Företagsekonomi, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hig:diva-28334.
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Society's awareness of the importance of environmental-, social- and economic issues has increased over the last decades. This increased interest has led to the development of the Corporate Social Responsibility concept (CSR) in which companies actively work simultaneously with environmental, social and economic issues that extend beyond what is legally required by these companies in order to achieve a more sustainable society. As the interest in CSR has increased, a debate whether CSR is value-creating or should be considered an agency cost has arisen. To approach this question previous researches have used the CEO compensation to examine if the engagement in CSR actually is an agency cost or a value creating activity and found that agency costs can be mitigated by tying incentives to performance. Based on these assumptions this study will examine the link between CSR and agency costs using the existence of a CSR related compensation incentives for CEOs related agency costs. This study is characterized to be positivistic and within the field of positive accounting research as it has deductive approach in which hypotheses are formulated that this study intends to test which are based on what fundamental economic theories and previous research have found that may affect agency costs. The empirical data are manually collected from companies’ on NasdaqOMX Stockholm 2016 annual reports followed by an analysis of the data using univariate t-test and multiple regressions in order to relate these findings to previous research. This study finds no direct evidence that CEO compensation incentives related to CSR affect agency costs which means that we have not closed the ongoing debate whether CSR engagement is creating shareholder value or should be considered an agency cost. Nonetheless, the results show indications that agency costs are higher for companies that use CEO compensation incentives related to CSR which indicates that CSR is not beneficial to shareholders but should instead be regarded as an agency cost at the expense of shareholders. The result also indicates that a positive accounting research is not particularly useful on a small stock market with reliable results because the findings can not be generalized in a broader perspective
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Chi, Jianxin. "Conditional tests of corporate governance theories." Diss., Texas A&M University, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/2339.
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Agency theories suggest that governance matters more when agency conflicts are potentially more severe. However, empirical studies often do not control for the potential severity of agency conflicts. I show that the marginal benefit of governance varies with the free cash flow level, a proxy for the potential severity of agency conflicts. As the free cash flow level increases, higher governance quality becomes incrementally more value-enhancing, and lower governance quality becomes incrementally more value-destroying. This is consistent with the hypothesis that better governance helps resolve the agency conflicts in investment decisions when a firm has more free cash flows (Jensen, 1986). This study highlights the importance of controlling for the potential severity of agency conflicts in governance studies and provides an improved method to estimate the marginal benefit of a governance mechanism.
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Ronnegard, David. "Corporate moral agency and the role of the corporation in society." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.430065.
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Appiah, Kingsley O. "Corporate governance and corporate failure : evidence from listed UK firms." Thesis, Loughborough University, 2013. https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/13576.
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This study is motivated by the numerous reforms to strengthen the efficacy of corporate boards and their oversight committees, in the wake of high profile corporate failures. The empirical question, however, is whether recent proposals would enhance board and their committee effectiveness and in this way, reduce the likelihood of firm`s failure. This study examines whether the composition, structure and functions of corporate boards and their interactions are related to the probability of corporate failure. Prior studies employ agency and resource dependency theories in isolation as theoretical lenses. This study, however, employs these aforementioned theories as theoretical lenses and argues that the board control and resource function affects the relationship between corporate board attributes and corporate failure. This study examines a sample of 358 UK listed firms, consisting of 95 failed firms and 263 non-failed firms during the period 1999-2011. This study also uses a unique hand-collected data set that measures the corporate governance attributes and functions of these 358 firms over a period of five years preceding failure or otherwise, resulting in 1748 firm-years observations. This study reveals that the probability of failure is lower in firms with large board size, former government officials, independent remuneration committee chairman and greater proportion of outside directors as well as effective audit and remuneration committees. This study also finds that the prospect of corporate failure is higher in firms with less than three independent NEDs on both the audit and nomination committees, without audit committee and where audit committee has no one with financial expertise. The results, however, suggest that the possibility of corporate failure is higher in firms whose boards have a female director and where the nomination committee meets often or where its membership is exclusively preserved for independent NEDs. On the interaction effects, the results show that frequency of board meetings as well as its interactions with presence of female directors, audit and remuneration committees effectiveness are positively related to the probability of corporate failure. The results also indicate that a number of interactions between corporate board attributes and functions are unrelated to the likelihood of corporate failure. These include the interactions between board composition measures (i.e. proportion of outside directors, presence of female directors and board size) and the board resource proxy (i.e. former government official). These associations, especially remuneration committee effectiveness, remuneration committee chairman independence, firm size and profitability, are not only statistically and economically significant but also robust to different specifications. Further, the Receiver Operating Curves indicate that the impact of corporate governance measures after controlling for firm size, liquidity, profitability, age, industry effects, and leverage is more profound in two years preceding failure. The implication of this is that corporate governance mechanisms alone are insufficient to rescue the firm on the verge of collapse. The findings are consistent with the idea that failing firms decline in size, managerial performance, corporate board attributes as well as their board`s ability to discharge it`s monitoring and resource roles. This study adds to the debate on the impact of corporate governance on corporate failure by developing, analysing and testing a robust UK corporate failure prediction model which is underpinned by a multi-theoretical framework: agency and resource dependency theories. This study also offers several recommendations for policy makers and firm-level corporate governance strategies in the mix of the numerous corporate governance reforms worldwide, this in particular makes this study unique.
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Martens, Knuth. "Managementüberwachung durch den Aufsichtsrat : ein Beitrag zur Corporate-governance-Diskussion aus agencytheoretischer Sicht /." Lohmar ; Köln : Eul, 2000. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=008779583&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Amini, Moghadam Shahram. "Two Essays on Competition, Corporate Investments, and Corporate Earnings." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/82851.
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The general focus of my dissertation, which consists of two essays, is on how changes in the financial and economic environment surrounding a firm affect managerial incentives and firm policies regarding investment in physical capital, innovation, equity offerings, and repurchases. The first essay in my dissertation examines how product market competition affects firms' investment decisions. While competition among firms benefits consumers via lower prices, greater product variety, higher product quality, and greater innovation, recent studies provide evidence that competition has been declining in the U.S. economy over the past decade. The evidence shows that American firms' profits are at near-record levels relative to GDP and are persistent. Industries have become more concentrated as a result of mergers and acquisitions, and barriers to entry have risen and the rate of new entry has been declining for decades. Taking these findings at face value, we examine empirically whether companies feel less compelled to invest in physical capital and in research and development because they face fewer threats from rival firms.
Using both traditional proxies and recently developed text-based measures of industry concentration, we show that firms operating in competitive industries invest significantly more in both physical capital and research and development relative to their peers in concentrated industries. We also report that the propensity to invest less by managers of monopolistic firms is partially mitigated by superior corporate governance that reduces the agency problem, and by certain product market characteristics such as low pricing power and low product differentiation/entry barriers. However, after accounting for all these mitigating factors, the negative association between industry concentration and investment persists. Our results are robust to including various control variables and exclusion of firms from industries that face significant competition from imports. The results are also robust to controlling for endogeneity caused by missing time-invariant and time-varying industry level factors that could potentially be related to both the level of concentration and investments.
Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that firms in competitive industries have a greater incentive to invest and innovate to survive and thrive in a competitive environment relative to the managers of the firms in more concentrated industries whose incentive to invest and innovate is to maintain their monopoly rents. Our findings have obvious policy implications in that investment and hence economic growth is being adversely affected in the current era of increasing industry concentration and declining competition.
The second essay in my dissertation investigates whether information contained in equity issues and buybacks is fully incorporated into prices such that the market reaction to subsequent earnings announcements is unrelated to those corporate actions. Korajczyk at al. (1991) argue that firms prefer to issue equity when the market is most informed about the quality of the firm to prevent adverse selection costs associated with new equity issues. This implies that equity issues tend to follow credible information releases contained in earnings announcements. However, analyzing a sample of 19,466 SEO pricing dates between 1970 and 2015 and 15,106 buyback announcements between 1994 and 2015 shows that a considerable number of equity offerings and repurchase announcements take place before the announcement of earnings. About 28% of buybacks and 32% of SEO pricings are made in the three weeks prior to an earnings announcement. Given these statistics, we examine whether these corporate actions provide information about upcoming earnings announcements (earnings predictability) to the extent that new information has not been fully incorporated into prices by market participants.
We find evidence of earnings predictability: the market reaction to earnings following buyback announcements is higher by 5.1% than the reaction to earnings following equity issues over the (-1,+30) window when four-factor abnormal returns are used; the difference is 2.2% when unadjusted returns are considered. The results are robust to several alternate sample construction methodologies. There are at least two puzzling effects of earnings predictability that are difficult to reconcile with the market efficiency hypothesis. First, there is an incomplete adjustment to SEO pricings and buyback announcements that results in residual market reaction to earnings announcements. Second, prices continue to drift after earnings announcements: upward for buybacks and downward for SEO pricings. Unlike post-earnings announcement drift, the drift documented here does not depend on the market reaction to earnings announcement. We test several reasons for this anomalous behavior including prior returns, price, size of buyback or SEO, analyst forecast errors, and bid-ask spread. We find that information asymmetry proxies partially explain the persistence of earnings predictability following SEO pricings and buyback announcements.Ph. D.
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Galvão, Maria Azul Rodrigues. "Corporate governance nos bancos portugueses." Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/7887.
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Mestrado em FinançasNa Europa, a preocupação com as questões do Corporate Governance teve origem no Reino Unido em 1992, com a publicação do Relatório Cadbury, como reação a escândalos societários britânicos (BCCI, Mirror Group) com impacto em diversos países. Em Portugal a preocupação com o Corporate Governance só ganhou relevância em 1999 com aprovação pela CMVM de recomendações relativas a regras de conduta a observar no exercício do Corporate Governance das empresas admitidas à negociação. Essas regras de conduta para as empresas cotadas incluem empresas financeiras e não-financeiras. Vários têm sido os estudos desenvolvidos para as empresas não financeiras. Neste trabalho pretende-se estudar o Governance nas empresas financeiras e saber qual o nível de concretização das recomendações sobre o assunto em instituições financeiras portuguesas. Analisamos, por isso, algumas instituições financeiras portuguesas dentro do domínio global do Corporate Governance. Para concretizar este objetivo, desenvolvemos o estudo para os quatro maiores grupos financeiros que atuando em Portugal, reportam as suas contas consolidadas em Portugal. São elas: a Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD), o Banco Comercial Português (BCP), o Banco Espírito Santo (BES) e o Banco BPI (BPI). Pode-se confirmar que nas Instituições Financeiras analisadas, todas optaram por um modelo One Tier, tendo como base o Modelo Anglo-Saxónico aplicado em países como EUA e Reino Unido e todas elas seguem as recomendações da CMVM e EU.
Europe's concern with issues of began in the UK in 1992 with the publication of the Cadbury Report, in response to British corporate scandals (BCCI Mirror Group) whit impact in many countries. In Portugal, concerns about Corporate Governance has gained prominence only in 1999 with the approval of the CMVM recommendations regarding rules of conduct to be observed in exercising Corporate Governance of companies admitted to trading. These rules of conduct for listed companies include financial and non-financial companies. Several studies have been developed for non-financial companies. This paper aims to study the governance in financial companies and what level of recommendations’s implementation on the subject at Portuguese financial institutions. This study analyzes the Portuguese banks within the overall domain of Corporate Governance. From this analysis, a comparative study between four banking groups which consolidated accounts in Portugal developed, namely: Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD), Banco Comercial Português (BCP), Banco Espírito Santo (BES) and Banco Português de Investimento (BPI). It is possible to confirm that the financial institutions analyzed, all opted for a Tier One model, based on the model applied in Anglo-Saxon countries like USA and UK and they all follow the recommendations of the CMVM and EU.
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Cao, Bolong. "Debt financing and the dynamics of agency costs." Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC campuses, 2006. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3213073.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2006.Title from first page of PDF file (viewed June 26, 2006). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 113-117).
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Lin, Suzanne Ching-Fang. "Agency costs of free cash flow and the market for corporate control." University of Western Australia. School of Economics and Commerce, 2006. http://theses.library.uwa.edu.au/adt-WU2006.0042.
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[Truncated thesis] This thesis investigates the relevance of Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory to the market for corporate control in Australia. Jensen posits that firms generating cash in excess of that required to fund positive NPV projects face greater agency problems as the free cash flow exacerbates the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. One implication from Jensen’s free cash flow theory is that firms with high levels of free cash flow are more likely to initiate takeovers that are value-decreasing. There are two practical issues in testing Jensen’s theory; first, constructing an appropriate proxy for free cash flow and secondly, identifying firms with free cash flow. These issues are addressed directly in the first of the two essays that comprise this thesis. The first essay develops and assesses the merits of four operational measures for free cash. One of them is a stock measure while the others are flow measures. The stock measure is included because previous studies have mostly used the stock measure of cash when identifying firms rich in free cash (henceforth, cash rich firms), despite that Jensen (1986) has made explicit reference to free cash flow. We test the validity of this approach by investigating whether stock measures of free cash coincide with flow measures. Our results reveal that the stock and flow measures of free cash give rise to quite different lists of cash rich firms. This is an important empirical contribution of the thesis. Given the lack of definitive criteria for deciding which operational measure of free cash flow is most appropriate, we identify multiple sets of free cash flow firms based on the different operational measures developed. For each operational definition, two methods are used to identify cash rich firms. The first method defines a firm as cash rich if its cash variable ranks in the tenth percentile. The second method defines firms as cash rich if their cash variable value is greater than one and a half standard deviations of the value predicted by a model.
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Beaudoin, Cathy A. Agoglia Chris Tsakumis George T. "Earnings management : the role of the agency problem and corporate social responsibility /." Philadelphia, Pa. : Drexel University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1860/2805.
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Chahar, Vijit Singh <1983>. "The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: Lessons from Corporate Governance." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2014. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/6726/.
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This dissertation seeks to improve the usage of direct democracy in order to minimize agency cost. It first explains why insights from corporate governance can help to improve constitutional law and then identifies relevant insights from corporate governance that can make direct democracy more efficient.
To accomplish this, the dissertation examines a number of questions. What are the key similarities in corporate and constitutional law? Do these similarities create agency problems that are similar enough for a comparative analysis to yield valuable insights? Once the utility of corporate governance insights is established, the dissertation answers two questions. Are initiatives necessary to minimize agency cost if referendums are already provided for? And, must the results of direct democracy be binding in order for agency cost to be minimized?
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Andersson, Maria, and Manal Daoud. "Corporate governance disclosure : by Swedish listed corporations." Thesis, Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, 2005. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-67.
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The Enron collapse in 2001 has resulted in an increasing attention to corporate governance. Even in Sweden, some scandals have occurred, for example Skandia, ABB, Trustor; a parallel could be drawn, implying that these scandals have resulted in increased attention to corporate governance. Corporate governance concerns the relationship between a corporation’s management, board of directors, shareholders and other stakeholders. The problems with the relationship between managers and share-holders are referred to as the principle-agent problem. The increase in corporate governance disclosure can be seen as a way by the corporations to regain the trust from the shareholders. Can agency theory be used to explain why some corporation disclose more corporate governance information than others?
The purpose with this master thesis is, with starting point in agency theory, to contribute to the understanding of which factors that influence corporations to disclose corporate governance information in the annual reports.
For this thesis, a quantitative research has been performed. Annual reports from corporations listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange have been examined, to be able to develop a corporate governance disclosure index and to measure 15 characteristics, derived from the agency theory and two control variables. The data was analysed in SPSS , using both linear and multiple regressions.
The analysis showed that role duality actually measured if a corporation had a foreign parent company and corporations listed on the O-list other on Stockholm Stock Exchange served as proxies for smaller corporations. Therefore, it was possible to con-clude that corporations were influenced by the origin of the parent company and the size of the corporation to disclose corporate governance information. Another conclusion was that corporate governance characteristics derived from agency theory is not appropriate when trying to find factors that influence corporations to disclose corporate governance information. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it is inappropriate to take the starting point in the agency theory.
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Anthony, Andrea. "Agency Problems and Cash Savings from Equity Issuance." Thesis, University of Oregon, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/18424.
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I examine the effect of ownership structure on firms' propensities to save the proceeds of a share issuance as cash. Specifically, I focus on changes in cash savings at the time of a seasoned equity offering (SEO), a moment at which the firm experiences a large inflow of cash, to determine whether ownership structures such as managerial blockholdings or the presence of institutional investors materially affect firms' decisions regarding their level of cash savings. I find that firms with managerial blockholders are more inclined to save share issuance proceeds as cash, relative to firms with outside blockholders or no blockholders present. This finding could be interpreted as consistent with either managerial entrenchment or incentive alignment, so I distinguish between these competing forces by examining SEO announcement returns. The market's reaction to SEO announcements when managerial blockholders are present is significantly worse on average when the firm has excess cash, lending support to the entrenchment explanation. I also find that firms with greater total institutional ownership save more cash from equity issuance, which is consistent with the theory that greater firm monitoring allows optimal corporate cash holdings to increase because shareholders are less concerned about potential misuses of cash.
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Meisner, Nielsen Kasper. "Corporate governance and performance in firms with concentrated ownership /." Copenhagen, 2005. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/510443214.pdf.
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Lowrance, Daniel Scott. "An examination of agency costs the case of REITs /." Diss., Texas A&M University, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1969/127.
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Down, Jonathan T. "Matching internal governance mechanisms to strategic process : an agency theory perspective on implementing strategic decisions /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/8753.
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Grigoleit, Jens. "Effekte des institutionenökonomischen Paradigmas der Corporate Governance." Doctoral thesis, Technische Universitaet Bergakademie Freiberg Universitaetsbibliothek "Georgius Agricola", 2010. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:105-qucosa-26718.
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Das Thema Corporate Governance nimmt in der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Forschung und insb. in der Managementwissenschaft breiten Raum ein. Während andere Bereiche der Managementforschung allerdings durch eine Vielzahl unterschiedlicher Forschungsansätze gekennzeichnet sind, wird die Corporate Governance-Forschung einseitig von institutionenökonomischen Theorien dominiert. Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht die Folgen dieser einseitig geprägten Sichtweise. Es wird nachgewiesen, dass die verbreitete Argumentationslogik sowie die Umsetzung der darauf basierenden Gestaltungsempfehlungen eine systematische Verdrängung von Vertrauen und proorganisationalen Verhalten bewirken und so zu einer sich selbst bewahrheitenden Prophezeiung geraten. Anhand mehrerer Untersuchungen wird nachgewiesen, dass auch die empirische Validität der verbreiteten Erklärungsansätze zweifelhaft ist. Als Ursachen dafür werden die Vernachlässigung wesentlicher sozio-kultureller und organisatorischer Rahmenfaktoren sowie entwicklungsdynamischer Effekte identifiziert.
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Kim, Moo Sung. "Corporate Structure, Governance and Strategic Decisions." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2013. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/216591.
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Business Administration/FinancePh.D.
After Shleifer and Vishny (1997) introduce agency conflicts between controlling insiders and outside investors, a new research trend has emerged, which focuses on controlling insiders' incentives for opportunistic behavior and assumes that controlling insiders may want more opaque corporate information environment to mask their pursuance of private control benefits. However, there are still open issues on the topic of how different controlling shareholder types, such as business group owners, institutional owners and family owners, each affect corporate information environment. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the different roles of controlling ownership types on corporate informational environment. Chapter 1 examines earnings management behaviors of firms affiliated with business groups, using a unique dataset for South Korean business groups (chaebols) between 1993 and 2007. Contrary to predictions of agency theory, we find that group firms are actually less engaged in earnings management than non-group firms, and we offer controlling family's concern for group reputation as an explanation. Group firms are also shown to use more real cash flow-based earnings management than discretionary accruals management. The results are robust with respect to the method of control sample construction, alternative models and group definitions, and endogeneity. There is also evidence that corporate reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, including regulations on auditing and combined group-wide financial reports, appear to have mitigated the use of earnings management by group firms. These results are consistent with the notion that concerns for group reputation may mitigate agency-based opportunistic earnings management behaviors. Chapter 2 examines whether domestic and foreign institutional investors improve corporate transparency in the presence of controlling benefits. We construct the transparency index, as well as its sub-indices based on firm- and market-level information, using group and non-group firm-level data for South Korea between 2001 and 2007. The results show that foreign institutional ownership improves overall corporate transparency, while the effects of domestic institutional ownership are insignificant. This is traceable to sub-index findings that foreign investors are associated with improvement in both firm-level and market-level transparency, while domestic institutional investors are associated with a decrease in firm-level transparency, but with an increase in market-level transparency, which may offset each other. The effects are non-linear for domestic institutional ownership, while those of foreign institutional ownership remain monotonic. These findings are consistent with the notion that domestic institutional investors are conflicted by their role as monitors to boost transparency and by their desire to pursue control benefits by exploiting insider information and promoting selective transparency. Foreign investors, lacking such controlling benefit opportunities, tend to promote general transparency. Chapter 3 examines how the dynamics between family owners and market participants, such as analysts, market makers and investors determine a firm's overall transparency, using South Korean data between 2001 and 2007. Our results show that family ownership has a positive relation with earning-based transparency, while it has a negative relation with market-based transparency. As a result, family ownership seems to have no impact on overall transparency. However, an analysis based on sorting of family ownership shows that firms with less than 30% family ownership show a positive significant relation to overall transparency, but firms with family ownership of 30% or higher have an insignificant relation with overall transparency. This discrepancy may exist because family owners may want to promote corporate transparency through better earning-based information dissemination, but market participants discount such efforts and this discount increases as family ownership increases.
Temple University--Theses
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Victor, Elizabeth Kaye. "Structure and Agency: An Analysis of the Impact of Structure on Group Agents." Scholar Commons, 2012. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4246.
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Different kinds of collectives help to coordinate between individuals and social groups to solve distribution problems, supply goods and services, and enable individuals to live fulfilling lives. Collectives, as part of the process of socialization, contribute to the normalization of behaviors, and consequently, structure our ability to be self-reflective autonomous agents. Contemporary philosophy of action models characterize collective action as the product of individuals who have the proper motivations to perform cooperative activities (bottom-up); or they begin with the social-level phenomena and explain this in terms of individual actions and the mental states that motivate them (top-down). One general goal of this project is to show how and why both of these approaches through focusing solely on the individuals involved fail to capture and account for important types of group actions: those of economic group agents.
Group agents, one kind of organized collective, are unique in that they have the potential to develop group-level decision-making processes that result in the capacity of the group to engage in practical reasoning. Because of this capacity, group agents can be stable and respond to reason--capacities we would not expect from other kinds of collectives. Inasmuch as we value the possibility of influencing the reflexive dynamics that perpetuate social institutions, understanding the range of organization structures and their agential capacities will open up the possibility of altering the course of those dynamics toward more just systems of organization. Understanding what kinds of group agents currently operate within the systems of organizations that make up social institutions is the first step in determining how to move toward developing group agents that are also moral agents. By analyzing how different systems of constraint--inside and outside the firm--inform one another to influence the possibility of design and the group's possibilities for action, I use Christian List and Philip Pettit's account of group agency as a springboard to develop a more adequate account of how structure influences and constrains the possibilities of economic group agents in non-idealized circumstances (i.e. this world, with our history).
My chapters include 1) a taxonomy of organization structures and an analysis of how a narrow conception of organization structure in jurisprudence can lead to systems of constraint that limit the rights and freedoms of individuals even as it seeks to extend them, 2) an evaluation of the popular accounts of collective action (cf. Raimo Tuomela, 1997; Michael Bratman, 1993, 1997, 2009; and Christian List and Philip Pettit, 2011) that could be made to accommodate the actions of certain kinds of economic associations, 3) an exploration of the standards of evaluation that influence these powerful group agents, and how these standards limit the economic group agent's capacity to engage in moral reasoning, and 4) an analysis of the group agent's reasoning capacity and the internal mode of interaction between group agent and group members that perpetuate group agency.
I argue that we can understand group agents that have the capacity to be moral agents as the products of a particular kind of decision-making process within an organization's structure. The decision-making process, together with the organization structure and group member support, produces and sustains judgments and actions at the level of the group that cannot be reduced to the beliefs and actions of particular members. In this way, the group displays a systematic unity of actions based on its own judgments. That is, the group exhibits agency. Moral group agents exhibit more than practical reasoning; they also demonstrate the capacity for critical reflection upon the ends they pursue. Member buy-in promotes a tight connection between group members and their role in bringing about and sustaining group agency, and is the foundation of the group agent. Without a holistic organization structure, a member's personal identities could undermine group aims, thereby undermining group agency. Group moral agency, I argue, begins with promoting an organizational way of life conducive to collective flourishing and respect for members.
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Pfeiffer, Thomas. "Corporate-Governance-Strukturen interner Märkte /." Wiesbaden : Dt. Univ.-Verl, 2003. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/374159483.pdf.
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Kovermann, Jost Hendrik [Verfasser], and Patrick [Akademischer Betreuer] Velte. "Tax avoidance, corporate governance and corporate finance - agency-theoretical analysis, literature review and empirical investigation / Jost Hendrik Kovermann ; Betreuer: Patrick Velte." Lüneburg : Universitätsbibliothek der Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, 2020. http://d-nb.info/1204267278/34.
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Wagner, Sascha Benjamin. "Corporate Governance in Switzerland and Singapore A comparative Case Study of two Government-linked companies /." St. Gallen, 2007. http://www.biblio.unisg.ch/org/biblio/edoc.nsf/wwwDisplayIdentifier/02606176002/$FILE/02606176002.pdf.
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Hagmüller, Jürgen. "Publizitätsverhalten von Unternehmen : eine Corporate Governance-Perspektive /." Wiesbaden : Gabler, 2008. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/563643498.pdf.
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Wang, Yong. "Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2010. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/68464.
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Business AdministrationPh.D.
The role of Institutional investors in alleviating the agent problem of management and its valuation effect has been studied extensively in corporate finance. We complement this stream of research by exploring management's control over institutional investors with misaligned objectives, particularly public pension fund, and the consequential valuation effect. We investigate the politic motive of public pension fund's shareholder activism and its impact on the target firms' operational performance, address the control of a strong management on public pension funds' self-serving agenda, and finally we compare the ownership adjustment pattern of public pension funds to other institutional investors to conclude public pension funds' ownership adjustment reflects their private pursuit. The first chapter explores the politic facet and performance effect of shareholder activism sponsored by public pension fund. In this study, we show that having a public pension fund as the leading sponsor of a shareholder proposal significantly improves the proposal's likelihood of being accepted by the target firm. The increased acceptance rate sources from the subset of proposals addressing a social responsibility issue, and targeting firms with weak insider control. An investigation of the public pension board reveals that the board's political profile is the primary determinant of public pension fund's propensity to lead a proposal, and the target firm's acceptance rate. We also assess the performance impact of shareholder proposals. For target firms with strong insider control, the performance impact of accepted social responsibility proposals is significantly positive; that of governance proposals is negligible. For target firms with weak insider control, the performance impact associated with public pension funds is either negative or negligible. These results suggest that the motive driving public pension funds' dominant presence in shareholder activism is not market based, but laden with purpose other than value creation. In the second chapter, we postulate that the widely documented negative valuation effect of ownership by public pension will be weak on firms with extra managerial control mechanism and/or whose managerial ownership of cash flow is high. For firms with high level managerial ownership of cash flow, management bears higher cost for a concession made with public pension fund's misaligned objective. An efficient market will expect this effect and value the managerial control over public pension fund to the extent that the management's benefit is aligned with outside shareholders. Consequently, the cross section valuation difference of firms held by public pension funds can be explained by the managerial ownership of cash flow, managerial control derived from extra mechanism such as dual class share, however, has no explanative power. The last chapter investigates the link between private benefits and institutional holding change. We assume the cross section equilibrium of block holding will break when market sentiment is high. Consequently, block holder tends to shed more shares loaded with less private benefits by taking advantage of opportunities available in a high sentiment market. The empirical results support this conjecture. When the market sentiment is high, Institutional block holders tend to shed more private benefits meager dual-class share than private benefits affluent non-dual class share. This pattern does not exist when the market sentiment is low. Most importantly, public pension fund is identified as the major driver of this effect.
Temple University--Theses
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Unsal, Omer. "Political Contributions and Firm Performance: Evidence from Lobbying and Campaign Donations." ScholarWorks@UNO, 2017. http://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/2361.
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The following dissertation contains two distinct empirical essays which contribute to the overall field of Financial Economics. Chapter 1 titles as “Corporate Lobbying, CEO Political Ideology and Firm Performance”. We investigate the influence of CEO political orientation on corporate lobbying efforts. Specifically, we study whether CEO political ideology, in terms of manager-level campaign donations, determines the choice and amount of firm lobbying involvement and the impact of lobbying on firm value. We find a generous engagement in lobbying efforts by firms with Republican leaning-managers, which lobby a larger number of bills and have higher lobbying expenditures. However, the cost of lobbying offsets the benefit for firms with Republican CEOs. We report higher agency costs of free cash flow, lower Tobin’s Q, and smaller increases in buy and hold abnormal returns following lobbying activities for firms with Republican managers, compared to Democratic and Apolitical rivals. Overall, our results suggest that the effects of lobbying on firm performance vary across firms with different managerial political orientations. Chapter 2 titled as “Corporate Lobbying and Labor Relations: Evidence from Employee” Litigations. We utilize employee litigations and other work-related complaints to examine if lobbying firms are favored in judicial process. We gather 27,794 employee lawsuits (after initial court hearing) between 2000 and 2014 and test the relationship between employee allegations and firms’ lobbying strategies. We find that employee litigations increase the number of labor-related bills in our sample. We document that the increase in employee lawsuits may drive firms into lobbying to change policy proposals. We also find robust evidence that the case outcome is different for lobbying firms compared to non-lobbying rivals, which may protect the shareholder wealth in the long run. Our results present that lobbying activities may make a significant difference in employee allegations. Our findings highlight the benefit of building political capital to obtain a biased outcome in favor of politically-connected firms.
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Lindeiner, Benita von. "Essays on dividend taxation, agency problems, and investment behaviour /." [S.l.] : [s.n.], 2007. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=016095564&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Hop, K. G. "Corporate payout policy: a study on multinationality and legal origin." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-377174.
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This paper investigates determinants of payout levels and payout composition in multinational corporations and domestic corporations and how payout differs between the two, as well as the effect of a country’s legal tradition on payout, on a worldwide sample. My main findings are that multinational corporations’ total payout is slightly lower than domestic corporations’ payout when taking into account a country’s legal tradition affects. No support is found that multinationals and domestic corporations differ in payout composition and payout composition is not changing over time, according to my results. My findings are partly consistent with theories on how ownership structures and agency problems affect payout policy. Still, the puzzle in unsolved.
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Edholm, Axel, and Ludvig Karlsson. "What Matters in Swedish Corporate Governance?" Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-357956.
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By using five measures of corporate governance, this paper sheds light on the relationship between corporate governance, firm performance and firm valuation in a sample of large Swedish firms between 2013-2016. The study is conducted on the grounds of the Agency Theory as proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and influenced by corporate governance research by Bhagat and Bolton (2008). Using Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA) as estimates of firm valuation and firm performance respectively, we find mixed results compared to prior research concerning the effects of good corporate governance. Our study shows that greater equity holdings of board members are significantly and positively impactful on Tobin’s Q as well as ROA. Furthermore, we find that a larger board size has a significant inverse relationship with both Tobin’s Q and ROA, which is consistent with prior research suggesting that smaller boards are more effective. Interestingly and partly inconclusive with prior research however, we find that greater equity holdings of the CEO is significantly and negatively impactful on Tobin’s Q as well as ROA. These results are robust for multiple controls and various models.
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Davila, Juan Pablo. "Corporate Governance and firm value: evidence from Colombia and Mexico." Thesis, Cranfield University, 2014. http://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk/handle/1826/9276.
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This research is the result of the author’s quest to answer the question whether
Corporate Governance is effective in Emerging Markets. Literature on Corporate
Governance in the emerging markets of Latin America is limited mostly due to the
relatively slower development of capital markets and the late adoption of
corporate governance principles. Corporate Governance laws, which largely follow
Sarbanes Oxley guidelines, were published and implemented in the mid 00´s and
no research has checked their impact on corporate value in Latin America.
This research reports compromises two empirical projects. The first project
focused on the relationship between boards of directors attributes such size and
composition, Corporate Governance law and firm value for Colombia. The second
project focused on another Corporate Governance variable, CEO Duality and tested
whether it has had any impact in Mexico. This second project also studied whether
board attributes such as size and composition and Corporate Governance law were
related to firm value.
Based on the listed companies from Colombia and Mexico for the years 2001 to
2012 the author found no relationship between board size or composition and firm
value. Results from Mexico, where CEO duality is allowed showed that it has no
relationship with firm value. These results do not support or contradict either
Agency theory or stewardship theory. Results on the impact of the adoption of a
Corporate Governance law in firm value are mixed. Results for Colombia contradict
previous literature by reporting a positive relationship between Corporate
Governance laws and firm results while results from Mexico support previous
research by reporting no relationship between these variables.
This research is valuable for regulators and policy makers in their quest to assess
the impact of the adoption of Corporate Governance laws in emerging markets. .
Since effective Corporate Governance is important in easier access to financing it is
important for shareholders to know which Corporate Governance mechanisms are
positively related to firm value. Similarly, it is also important for investors (both
foreign and local) in assessing the risk for equity investments in Colombia and
Mexico.
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Nordqvist, Björn. "Vad påverkar hur människor ser på ett företag? : En studie av relationen mellan ett företags identitet och dess rykte." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för informatik och media, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-308454.
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The purpose of the study is to examine the relationship between an organization's identity and its corporate reputation. The organization in focus is a Swedish travel agency. Although identity and reputation has been studied separately before, they are closely connected and have synergistic effects, in that they affect each other. Connecting the two fields can benefit both the profession and research. Not only that, it is also expected to occur as a result of the development of technology, where the internet has made it possible for organizations to communicate through their own channels and describe how they think about themselves, and thus affect the way they want to be perceived. To analyze the organization's identity and corporate reputation, and the relationship between them, the study uses a model developed by Huang-Horowitz and Freberg. To achieve the purpose, data is collected by two methods, qualitative text analysis and semi-structured interviews. The result shows that the organization's identity and reputation interact in a succesful way in two of three categories. A challenge for the object of study is to distinguish itself from its competitors, as the results shows.
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Lai, Wei-Ting, and 賴威廷. "Corporate Diversification, Agency Cost and Corporate Governance." Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/98520293667703316438.
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碩士東海大學
企業管理學系碩士班
92
This study discusses the relationship between corporate diversification, agency cost and corporate governance. First, we examine the effect of diversification type to excess value using Berger & Ofek(1995) procedure and return of asset. To make sure that diversification will result in average valuation discounts. Further, we analyze whether agency cost causes a diversification discount or not. Third, we investigate whether corporate governance structure is different between non-diversified and diversified firms. Finally, we also examine whether diversified firms improve their corporate governance structure solve the situation of value discount or not. Using a sample of 2560 firm-years between 1994 and 2002, we explore that segment diversification will decrease business value, but geography diversification will increase business value. Further, we find evidence to support that segment diversified firms have more serious agency problem including agency cost of cash flow, managerial incentive, and debt. In addition to, we also use ownership structure and rating system to measure firm’s corporate governance structure. In ownership structure, we find that relative to non-diversified firm, CEOs, block holders, and board of directors in diversified firms have lower stock ownership. Finally, in rating system side we explore that diversified firm enjoys lower corporate governance’s rating. Moreover, we find out that diversified firms can improve business value by corporate governance. In conclusion, we explore that agency costs and downgrading corporate governance will cause diversified discount. Moreover, we also find that diversified firm urgently requires upgrade of corporate governance to improve this situation.
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Chen, Mei-Lian, and 陳美蓮. "Agency Problems, Corporate Governance and Conservatism." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/09782165490207312758.
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碩士國立高雄大學
金融管理學系碩士班
97
This study examines whether accounting conservatism can mitigate the agency problems and whether the governance role of accounting conservatism could be substituted by corporate governance mechanisms. The empirical results show that the accounting conservatism exists in Taiwan corporations. However, there is no evidence that the accounting conservatism in Taiwan is increasing over time, which is inconsistent with those found in the U.S. The empirical results indicate that conservative accounting reduces agency problems due to managers’ limited horizons/liabilities, free cash flows, deviation between control and cash flow rights, and directors’ shares collateralization. However, conservative accounting cannot mitigate interest conflicts induced by over-compensation of managers. Moreover, the results indicate that the level of the accounting conservatism decreases when corporate governance mechanisms are stronger, implying a substitution effect between corporate governance and accounting conservatism.
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Schackermann, Uli. "A Kantian approach to moral corporate agency." Thesis, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10539/5817.
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Corporations as such are often not perceived to have moral agency,
and directors and officers of the corporation are frequently not
considered responsible for corporate actions. However, I appeal to
Peter French's view that reflection on a corporate internal decision
(CID) procedure shows that a corporation should be considered a
moral agent. Many writers have cast doubt on the correctness of
French's view, but I defend it from several major objections.
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Chi, Ting-chu, and 姬亭竹. "Corporate Governance and Diversification: The Agency Theory." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/05614484755452015249.
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碩士國立成功大學
國際企業研究所碩博士班
95
Diversification is becoming a trend these days. Investigating the relationship between diversification and firm’s performance over 2001-2005, this paper indicates that diversification impairs firm value. We would like to know why management pursues this value reduction strategy, especially focusing on the agency cost theory. From the empirical evidence, we find the level of diversification is negatively related to managerial equity ownership and to the proportion of outside directors. Besides, there exists no relationship between CEO duality and the magnitude of corporate diversification. Holding double positions of board of directors and CEO has no significant influence on firm’s diversification strategy. In conclusion, these findings suggest that agency problems are responsible for firms maintaining diversification. Finally, the study reveals that CEO’s compensation will increase as the level of diversification increases because of CEO entrenchment and ability matching.
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Chang, Yu-Chien, and 張瑜倩. "Controlling Shareholder Agency and Corporate Liquidity Choice." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/72khr6.
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Li, Yung-Chung, and 李允中. "Does the corporate governance reduce agency costs ?" Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/4fchpr.
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碩士健行科技大學
財務金融系碩士班
105
Based on the domestic stock listed companies as the research object, the period is between 2011 to 2015, excluding finance and insurance industry, the 170 firms are our final samples . It is divided into electronics, electrical, electronic and non-electronic combined samples, and from equity structure, directors and supervisors structure and capital structure research, three facets to explore and research. Research results show that the higher the ownership concentration and corporate insider shareholding ratio, the corporate agency cost will be lower.
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"Agency problem of corporate real estate holdings." 2008. http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5896860.
Full textAbstract:
Ko, Iat Meng.Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-55).
Abstracts in English and Chinese.
Abstract --- p.i
Acknowledgement --- p.iii
Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1
Chapter 2 --- Research Method --- p.6
Chapter 2.1 --- Corporate Real Estate Holding Measures --- p.6
Chapter 2.2 --- Free Cash Flow Measure --- p.6
Chapter 2.3 --- Corporate Governance Measures --- p.9
Chapter 2.3.1 --- Outside Blockholder Ownership --- p.10
Chapter 2.3.2 --- CEO Compensation --- p.10
Chapter 2.4 --- Merger and Acquisition Effect --- p.11
Chapter 2.5 --- The Endogeneity Problem of Acquisition --- p.13
Chapter 3 --- The Data --- p.16
Chapter 4 --- Empirical Results --- p.19
Chapter 4.1 --- Free Cash Flow and Corporate Governance --- p.19
Chapter 4.2 --- M&A Effect --- p.20
Chapter 4.3 --- Self-Selection Correction --- p.21
Chapter 4.3.1 --- Estimating the Probability of Acquisition´ؤ Probit Estimation --- p.22
Chapter 4.3.2 --- Self-Selection Model --- p.23
Chapter 4.4 --- Effects of Target Firms --- p.24
Chapter 4.5 --- Changes in Profitability Around Acquisition --- p.25
Chapter 4.6 --- Sub-samples --- p.26
Chapter 4.6.1 --- Free Cash Flow and Corporate Governance --- p.27
Chapter 4.6.2 --- M&A Effect --- p.28
Chapter 4.6.3 --- Self-Selection Correction --- p.28
Chapter 4.6.4 --- Effects of Target Firms --- p.29
Chapter 4.6.5 --- Changes in Profitability Around Acquisition --- p.29
Chapter 5 --- Conclusion --- p.51
Bibliography --- p.53