Relevant bibliographies by topics / Corporate agency

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Corporate agency'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 3 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Corporate agency"

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Agarwal, Shubhi, Rohit Goel, and Pushpendra Kumar Vashishtha. "Corporate Governance and Agency Cost." Indian Journal of Applied Research 4, no. 5 (October 1, 2011): 153–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.15373/2249555x/may2014/47.

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Isaacs, Tracy. "Corporate Agency and Corporate Wrongdoing." New Criminal Law Review 16, no. 2 (2013): 241–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2013.16.2.241.

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This article presents a philosophical defense of the view that corporations are legitimate responsible agents who may be considered criminally liable under the law. When corporations engage in blameworthy, irresponsible, or criminal actions, corporations are responsible for their actions. Whether this means we should think of them as persons in any robust sense is a separate question and we should be skeptical about conflating responsible agency with personhood. The article concludes with the claim that responsible agency and personhood are conceptually distinct, and that in the end responsible agency is a sufficient basis for criminal liability.
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ARNOLD, DENIS G. "Corporate Moral Agency." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30, no. 1 (September 2006): 279–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.2006.00140.x.

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Welch, John R. "Corporate Agency and Reduction." Philosophical Quarterly 39, no. 157 (October 1989): 409. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219827.

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Pasternak, Avia. "From Corporate Moral Agency to Corporate Moral Rights." Law & Ethics of Human Rights 11, no. 1 (May 8, 2017): 135–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/lehr-2017-0003.

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Abstract Recent literature suggests that organizational entities, such as states and business corporations, can qualify as moral agents. Does it follow that, as members of our moral community, group agents are entitled to moral protections? This article explores the connection between groups’ moral agency and moral rights. I argue that corporate moral agency does not, in itself, ground a group’s claim for moral protections. Nevertheless, a group agent can be entitled to derivative moral rights protections, which attach to the group itself but are grounded in the interests of individuals, such as the group’s members. Furthermore, the agential status of a group helps to identify which rights can attach to it, given its moral agency. One such moral agency related right is a right not to be morally subverted. This right generates a duty for the group agent’s members to ensure that its decision-making process incorporates sound moral reasoning. The final part of the article applies these conclusions to recent debates on the rights of states. I argue that, as moral agents, states have a moral right not to be morally subverted. It follows that citizens have a pro tanto duty, directed at their state, not to engage in political activities that would subvert its moral powers.
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Douglas, Alan V. S. "Interactions between Corporate Agency Conflicts." Financial Review 44, no. 2 (May 2009): 151–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6288.2009.00214.x.

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Kumar, Praveen, and Alessandro Zattoni. "Agency Conflicts and Corporate Governance." Corporate Governance: An International Review 25, no. 4 (July 2017): 220–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/corg.12212.

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Hong, Soonwook. "Corporate governance and agency problems." International Journal of Economics and Business Research 17, no. 1 (2019): 70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijebr.2019.096586.

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Hong, Soonwook. "Corporate governance and agency problems." International Journal of Economics and Business Research 17, no. 1 (2019): 70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijebr.2019.10016871.

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Lambrecht, Bart M., and Stewart C. Myers. "Agency Dynamics in Corporate Finance." Annual Review of Financial Economics 8, no. 1 (October 23, 2016): 53–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-121415-032937.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Corporate agency"

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Smith, Thomas. "The metaphysics of corporate agency." Thesis, School of Advanced Study, University of London, 2007. http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/804/.

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In Chapter 1, I defend “the first thesis”, which is that expressions of the form ‘_decided to ’, ‘_wished to ’, ‘_intended to ’ and ‘_believed that p’ may be used to truly say something about something that the expression ‘the East India Company’ may be used to pick out. In Chapter 2, I defend “the second thesis”, which is stronger than the first thesis, and which is that an individual i that is picked out by a standard use of the expression ‘the East India Company’ is such that expressions of the form ‘_decided to ’, ‘_wished to ’, ‘_intended to ’ and ‘_believed that p’ may be used to truly say something about i. In Chapter 3, I defend “the third thesis”, which is stronger than the second thesis, and which is that an individual i that is picked out by a standard use of the expression ‘the East India Company’ is such that expressions of the form ‘_decided to ’, ‘_wished to ’, ‘_intended to ’ and ‘_believed that p’ may be used in the senses in which they may be used to truly say something about a human person to truly say something about i. In Chapter 4, I try to assuage perplexity as to how it is possible that the third thesis is true, by telling a likely story as to how a situation in which no decision, wish, intention or belief is made or had by anything that is not a human person might evolve into one in which the East India Company makes decisions, and has wishes, intentions and beliefs (in the senses in which a human person may make and have such things). In a postscript, I sketch an explanation of why we are justified in thinking that the Company had a diminished range of mental capacities.
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Silva, Andre Espozel Pinheiro da. "Testing dynamic agency predictions to corporate finance." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/18243.

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Submitted by Andre Espozel (andre.espozel@gmail.com) on 2017-04-19T17:47:32Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Andre Espozel - FGV-EPGE.pdf: 856389 bytes, checksum: 16cd3a3bbe1de2cc9ab98b718b21acb8 (MD5)
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Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-12T13:05:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Andre Espozel - FGV-EPGE.pdf: 856389 bytes, checksum: 16cd3a3bbe1de2cc9ab98b718b21acb8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-22
This papers tests theoretical predictions concerning to agent compensation, debt structure and investment in the models of dynamic agency in DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and DeMarzo, Fishman, He and Wang (2012). The results related to agent compensation are consistent with the patterns predicted in the models, indicating that the firm-years that the models would have as more likely to pay dividends are indeed the ones more likely to pay; also, among firms that pay dividends, more profits generate higher dividend payments and higher executive compensation, as predicted in the models. The prediction that firms that go well and reach a payment threshold present marginal q equal to average q, and thus after controlling for average q cash flows would not explain investment is also supported by the tests in here. On the other hand, predictions related to the role of the credit line and to the debt structure are not compatible with the results in here. The credit line doesn’t seem to be the provider of financial slack that protects the firm from low cash flows and also doesn’t seem to have the dynamics of being paid when profits are high and being more used when profits are low.
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Ray, David. "On the Concept of Corporate Moral Agency." TopSCHOLAR®, 1985. https://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses/2748.

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Much of the popular discussion of the social responsibilities of corporations overlooks the fundamental question of whether corporations (as opposed to their employees) are the type of entities to which it is proper to make responsibility ascriptions. That is the question I address in this paper. I proceed by outlining the criteria a subject must meet in order to qualify as a moral agent (the most controversial of which when applied to corporations is the capability of intentional action) and then examining five popular views on the status of corporations. The views vary widely in their conclusions, from the position that corporations are full-fledged members of the moral community to the theory that it is only their employees that have moral responsibilities. Regardless of their conclusions all are found deficient for one reason or another, most criticisms boiling down to the claim that they are based on an inadequate view of corporate structure or behavior. Following organizational theorist Michael Keeley's lead, I conclude that corporations are not moral agents, although for much different reasons than any of the other nay-sayers whose views I examine. I suggest that whatever the details of their arguments, all theories that claim corporations are moral agents (and even some who deny it) are based on an organismic model of corporate behavior that involves goal-oriented behavior. It is my contention that when the activities of corporations are actually examined that no such corporate intentional action can be identified and that corporations therefore do not qualify as moral agents. However, I also suggest that while we cannot properly hold corporations morally responsible for their actions, they are not shielded from moral judgements. As moral agents, we are justified in preferring one type of corporate activity over another (say, proper treatment of toxic wastes over "midnight dumping") on moral grounds. Finally, calling once again on Keeley, I point to an alternative to the organismic model of corporate behavior, the social-contract model, as a potentially more fruitful tool of inquiry into the relationships between corporations, individuals and society.
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Yu, Bing. "Agency Costs of Stakeholders and Corporate Finance." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2009. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1258316541.

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Hromasová, Lucie. "Analýza firemní identity společnosti NIOSPORT agency,a.s." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2012. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-142093.

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Master thesis focuses on issues of corporate identity of advertising agency NIOSPORT agency, a.s. The aim of this thesis is to analyze corporate identity of company NIOSPORT agency, a.s. In the theoretical part is explained what is a corporate identity, which elements are included and why it is so important for companies. Then there is a definition of an image with an emphasis on its distinction from the concept of corporate identity, explained the interdependence between corporate identity and corporate strategy, and then is paid attention on advertising agencies in general. The practical part consists of a description of a particular advertising agency NIOSPORT agency, a.s., the results of empirical research, evaluation of the image of agency and finally of recommendations for the future, arising from the theoretical part, analyzing corporate documents and of the depth interviews with the director, staff and clients of advertising agency.
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Marks, Danelle Miller. "A comparison of attitudes toward corporate advertising : corporate executives and advertising agency executives." Virtual Press, 1986. http://liblink.bsu.edu/uhtbin/catkey/474662.

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The purpose of this thesis was to examine the attitudes toward corporate advertising held by those individuals most closely associated with it: corporate and advertising agency executives. No previous research had been conducted in this particular area.An attitude scale was administered to eighty-two corporate and advertising agency executives, representing a sample from Fortune's one hundred largest corporations and the one hundred largest advertising agencies. A frequency distribution, factor analysis, and Q-study were conducted on the data collected.Findings showed the general attitude toward corporate advertising to be favorable. Two factors underlying respondent's attitudes were revealed and broadly identified as "positive value" and "negative value." Rather than viewing corporate advertising in specific terms, respondents' attitudes were factored on the basis of valence, or direction of the statements.The Q-analysis identified three types of attitude patterns existing among the respondents. Type I respondents represented large industrial manufacturers who believe corporate advertising is an effective tool for improving employee morale and recruiting new employees. Type II, consisting of advertising agencies involved in marketing to consumers, saw corporate advertising as a tool for increasing corporate awareness and creating unity among products. A conglomeration of industrial manufacturers, consumer goods manufacturers, and advertising agencies, Type III viewed corporate advertising as an effective part of a total plan, though not capable of achieving tangible objectives by itself. Type and size of firm were the only demographics which could be significantly related to the attitude patterns.These findings indicate that although differences can be found in the management function provided by corporate advertising, respondents hold similar favorable attitudes toward corporate advertising.
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Jacobs, Emmett Allen. "The agency cost of corporate control : the petroleum industry." MIT Energy Lab, 1986. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/27278.

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Trzeciakiewicz, Agnieszka. "Essays on information asymmetry, agency problem, and corporate actions." Thesis, University of Hull, 2014. http://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:10593.

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This study investigates the implications of the asymmetric information between managers and shareholders and the resulting costly agency problems. In doing so, it focuses on the heterogeneity of executive directors with respect to their trading behaviour and personal characteristics, and the corporate governance mechanisms which can help lessen the adverse effects of the manager-shareholder agency conflicts. The study recognises that executive directors cannot be treated as a homogenous group and their incentives and the ability to impact decisions differ significantly. Two top executive directors are considered throughout this study, namely Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Finance Officers (CFOs). In this study, we address several important research questions. First, we consider whether executive directors have an informational advantage over outsiders. Second, we address if the heterogeneity of directors with respect to their role in the company and personal characteristics matters. Third, we examine whether internal corporate governance mechanisms play a significant role in moderating the manager-shareholder agency problem. Last but not least, we investigate if the nature of the interactions between asymmetric information, agency issues and corporate governance change during and after the global financial crisis of 2007-08. In carrying out our empirical analysis, we employ a unique dataset on the UK nonfinancial firms during the sample period 2000 to 2010. The detailed information about the corporate governance structure of firms and the personal characteristics of CEOs and CFOs enable us to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the research questions outlined above for three distinct periods, namely the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. Our analysis shows that the position that directors hold in the company and their characteristics can help explain the subsequent market-adjusted returns on insider trading. We find that the returns to insider purchase transactions are generally positive. However, they are weaker in the longer term, possibly suggesting that the informative content of director trades is less significant than it is perceived by the market. The main finding of our analysis in relation to the link between insider trading and the probability of bankruptcy is that insider trading increases the predictive power of insolvency models. This study also reports that CEOs exert a greater influence on the leverage decision than CFOs in firms that seem to operate under their optimal leverage. However, we observe that the CFO’s characteristics become more significant in determining leverage after the recent financial crisis. Overall, the analysis of this study provides strong evidence for the view that the presence of asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders and the costly manager-shareholder agency conflict are central to our understanding of the corporate finance decision making process and its consequences. However, more importantly, the findings of this study provide a relatively new notion that considering the heterogeneity of top executive directors in the empirical analysis of corporate decisions is essential, especially in exploring modern corporations.
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Hong, Xiangxing, and 洪祥星. "Corporate governance in China's listed companies: sinonization and agency problems." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2010. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B4545923X.

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Chen, Yuezhao. "Agency issues and the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on agency costs in Chinese listed companies." Thesis, Cardiff University, 2010. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/54376/.

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Two types of agency problems tend to predominate in the modern corporations, i.e., principal-agent (owner-manager) conflicts and principal-principal (large shareholder appropriation) conflicts. This PhD project aims to identify the principal-principal agency problems, to investigate contextual factors that affect the usefulness of governance mechanisms, to explore satisfying ways to measure agency costs, and to test the effectiveness of selected corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating agency costs in Chinese listed companies. The main discussions lie in the causes and formations of Type II agency issues, and how effective governance mechanisms work to mitigate these issues. Both qualitative and quantitative analyses are used. An in-depth case study is undertaken and a sample of 6344 observations of Chinese listed companies during 2000-2005 is used in econometric models to examine the role of various governance mechanisms in alleviating agency costs. There are some significant findings. State ownership does not have constant detrimental impact on firm performance or directly contribute to agency costs. Legal person ownership is found to be most effective in reducing agency costs but has similar impact as state ownership for performance. Foreign ownership has mix results and managerial ownership is negligible. Board and external auditing both have significant impact on firm performance and agency costs in different ways, as well as various control variables. In terms of direct measurement of agency costs, other receivables seem to generate most significant results, while free cash flow does not. Return on equity/asset also has significant results as predicted. This is a comprehensive study to contribute to existing literature on Type II agency problems and empirical research in China. Findings on these aspects will help the listed companies devise effective measures for improving corporate governance practice in China and other transitional economies. An improved corporate governance system will strengthen Chinese companies' competitiveness on global market.
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Books on the topic "Corporate agency"

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Agency, Environment. Corporate plan. Bristol: Environment Agency, 1999.

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Agency, Teacher Training. Teacher Training Agency corporate plan. London: Teacher Training Agency, 2000.

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Stein, Jeremy C. Agency, information and corporate investment. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001.

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Great Britain. Department of Agriculture for Northern Ireland. Rivers Agency. Rivers Agency: Corporate and business plan. Belfast: Rivers Agency, 1996.

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Agency, Great Britain Department of Agriculture for Northern Ireland Rivers. Rivers Agency: Corporate and business plan. Belfast: Rivers Agency, 1998.

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Casson, Mark. Corporate culture and the agency problem. Reading: University of Reading, Department of Economics, 1991.

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Crocker, Keith J. Corporate tax evasion with agency costs. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004.

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Rönnegard, David. The Fallacy of Corporate Moral Agency. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9756-6.

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Corporate plan 2002-2003. Stirling: SEPA, 2001.

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1945-, Pettit Philip, ed. Group agency: The possibility, design, and status of corporate agents. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

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Book chapters on the topic "Corporate agency"

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Asai, Kentaro. "Agency Theory." In Corporate Finance and Capital Structure, 17–27. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003016380-4.

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Menyah, Kojo. "Agency Theory." In Encyclopedia of Corporate Social Responsibility, 64–69. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28036-8_108.

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Huber, Wm Dennis. "Agency and agency law." In Corporate Law and the Theory of the Firm, 29–38. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge studies in the economics of legal relationships: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003019770-4.

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Mäntysaari, Petri. "Agency and Corporate Governance." In The Law of Corporate Finance: General Principles and EU Law, 159–207. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02750-5_8.

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Rönnegard, David. "Corporate Collective Moral Agency." In Issues in Business Ethics, 73–90. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9756-6_8.

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Judith, Wylie, Anne Marie Ward, and Hamill Philip. "Agency and Corporate Governance." In Encyclopedia of Corporate Social Responsibility, 55–63. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28036-8_659.

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Clacher, Iain, David Hillier, and Patrick Mccolgan. "Agency Theory: Incomplete Contracting and Ownership Structure." In Corporate Governance, 141–56. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118258439.ch8.

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Scott, Kenneth E. "Agency Costs and Corporate Governance." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, 26–30. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_7.

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Swamy, Shekar. "The corporate entity and agency interaction." In Raising the Corporate Umbrella, 275–317. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230554580_11.

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Ojo, Olatoye, and Funmi Araloyin Olasanmi. "Real Estate Agency and CSR." In Encyclopedia of Corporate Social Responsibility, 1971–76. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28036-8_684.

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Conference papers on the topic "Corporate agency"

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Singer, Alan E. "Corporate and Artificial Moral Agency." In 2013 46th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/hicss.2013.149.

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Liu, Zhi-Qiang, and Zhi-Ning Pan. "Religious Culture and Corporate Agency Costs1." In International Academic Conference on Frontiers in Social Sciences and Management Innovation (IAFSM 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.200207.016.

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Imelda, Elsa, and Dewi Ayu Patricia. "Capital Structure, Corporate Governance, and Agency Costs." In International Conference on Entrepreneurship and Business Management (ICEBM) Untar. SCITEPRESS - Science and Technology Publications, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0008490602030207.

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Zhu, Wei, and Lin Wen. "Corporate Governance and Agency Conflicts: GOME's Control Contest." In 2011 International Conference on Management and Service Science (MASS 2011). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmss.2011.5998456.

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"Analysis of Corporate Governance Based on The Agency Theory." In 4th International Seminar of Research Month. Galaxy Science, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.11594/nstp.2019.0401.

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Xin, Chen. "Corporate Environmental Responsibility's Lack and Fulfillment: Based on ISCT and Agency Theory." In 2014 Enterprise Systems Conference (ES). IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/es.2014.42.

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Song, Guanghui, and Xiaohui Wang. "China State-Owned Overseas Corporation's Optimal Corporate Governance Based on Double Principal-Agency Theory." In 2010 International Conference on Management and Service Science (MASS 2010). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmss.2010.5577379.

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Amelinda, Rita, and Ignatius Roni Setyawan. "Agency Conflict Control on Corporate Values in Companies With the Best GCG Period 2008-2014." In The 2nd Tarumanagara International Conference on the Applications of Social Sciences and Humanities (TICASH 2020). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.201209.015.

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Bodul, Dejan. "REDEFINING THE CLASSIC CONCEPT OF THE COURT? -RESPONSES TO THE CORPORATE SOLVENCY PROBLEM IN THE ONGOING COVID-19 CRISIS." In EU 2021 – The future of the EU in and after the pandemic. Faculty of Law, Josip Juraj Strossmayer University of Osijek, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.25234/eclic/18315.

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The coronavirus pandemic is pushing large number of firms towards insolvency by dramatically changing consumption patterns and business operations. The first wave of liquidity-focused policy responses (Act on Intervention Measures in Enforcement and Insolvency Proceedings for Duration of Special Circumstances) prevented or delayed more severe consequences for the corporate sector. While some liquidity support is still needed, the crucial issue that must be tackled now is that of corporate solvency. This paper addresses the role of the Financial Agency (hereinafter: FINA), which, as a legal entity with public authority, has (in)appropriate legal authority in bankruptcy proceedings over the rights of entities. As in the previous paper, a multidisciplinary scientific approach is advocated, which should contribute to the consideration of various aspects of the relationship between FINA, the state, the judiciary and the current tendency of Dejudicijalization.
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Chuang, Lu, Li Xiuhong, and Zhu Li. "Earnings Quality and the Agency Costs of Managerial Discretion: The Corporate Governance Effect of Accounting Information." In 2010 International Conference on E-Business and E-Government (ICEE). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icee.2010.985.

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Reports on the topic "Corporate agency"

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Stein, Jeremy. Agency, Information and Corporate Investment. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w8342.

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Crocker, Keith, and Joel Slemrod. Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Costs. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w10690.

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Romero-Rodríguez, Luis Miguel, Ángel Torres-Toukoumidis, and Amor Pérez-Rodríguez. Gestión Comunicacional de Crisis: Entre la agenda corporativa y mediática. Estudio de caso Volkswagen España / Crisis Communication Management: Between the corporate and the media agenda. Case study Volkswagen. Revista Internacional de Relaciones Públicas, June 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.5783/rirp-13-2017-06-83-100.

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TANG, Denise Tse-Shang, Stefanie TENG, Celine TAN, Bonnie LAM, and Christina YUAN. Building inclusive workplaces for lesbians and bisexual women in Hong Kong’s financial services industry. Centre for Cultural Research and Development, Lingnan University, April 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.14793/ccrd2021001.

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Workplace inclusion is a core component of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Hong Kong. Workplace inclusion points to the need for employers to recognize diversity among employees, to acknowledge their contributions to the work environment and to raise professional standards for the work force. Diversity within a workplace indicates inclusion of persons with different backgrounds as in racial, ethnic, sex, health status, sexual orientation and gender identity. Women are already less represented at senior levels across various business sectors in Hong Kong. Lesbians and bisexual women face a double glass ceiling in the workplace as a result of both their gender and sexual orientation. Funded by Lingnan University’s Innovation and Impact Fund, and in partnership with Interbank Forum and Lesbians in Finance, Prof. Denise Tse-Shang Tang conducted an online survey and two focus groups targeting lesbians and bisexual women working in Hong Kong’s financial and banking industry. The aim of the study is to examine the specific challenges and barriers faced by lesbians and bisexual women in Hong Kong’s financial services industry. We found that only 37% of survey respondents were out at work, with 23% partially out to close colleagues. In other words, there are still key concerns with being out at work. On the issue of a glass ceiling for LGBT+ corporate employees, 18% of the survey respondents agreed and 47% somewhat agreed that such a ceiling exists. When asked whether it is harder for lesbians and bisexual women to come out in the workplace than it is for gay men, 32% agreed and 46% somewhat agreed. 27% agreed and 39% somewhat agreed with the statement that it is difficult for lesbians and bisexual women to climb up the corporate ladder. Other findings pointed to the low visibility of lesbians and bisexual women in corporate settings, lack of mentorship, increased levels of stress and anxiety, and the fear of being judged as both a woman and a lesbian. Masculine-presenting employees face significantly more scrutiny than cisgender female employees. Therefore, even though discussion on diversity and inclusion has been on the agenda for better corporate work environment in Hong Kong, there still remain gaps in raising awareness of lesbian and bisexual women’s issues.
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