Academic literature on the topic 'Control of the application of overriding mandatory provisions'

Resumen: Este trabajo analiza algunas cuestiones que plantea la aplicación de las leyes de policía en el ámbito del Derecho contractual de la UE. Por cuanto se refiere a las normas de este tipo de terceros Estados su aplicación resulta significativamente más compleja, en especial si analizamos su tratamiento en el Reglamento Roma I, mucho más restrictivo que su predecesor el Convenio de Roma de 1980. En este contexto la reciente sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia (Nikiforidis) resulta muy relevante, ya que abre la posibilidad a los Estados miembros para tomar en consideración normas de policía de terceros Estados como elemento fáctico en el marco de la lex contractus, sin sujetarla a las restricciones y condicionantes previstos en el art. 9.3.Palabras clave: leyes de policía, normas imperativas, Derecho contractual europeo, Reglamento Roma I, sentencia Nikiforidis.Abstract: This paper addresses some of the issues raised by the application of overriding mandatory provisions, from a European approach. With regard to foreign overriding mandatory provisions, their application is significantly more complex. This approach appears in European Contract Law, particularly regarding the treatment of this issue in the Rome I Regulation, which is much more restrictive than the Rome Convention of 1980. In this context, the recent case law of European Court of Justice (Nikiforidis case) is very significant. Since the judgment gives Member States the possibility to take into account foreign overriding mandatory provisions, as a factual element within the framework of the applicable law to the contract, outside the scope of article 9.3 of the Rome I Regulation.Keywords: overriding mandatory provisions, mandatory rules, European Contract Law, Rome I Regulation, Nikiforidis case.

Abstract: Article 7(2) of the 1980 Rome Convention provided that nothing in the Convention shall restrict the application of the rules of the law of the forum in a situation where they are mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract. The Rome Convention however did not define these 'overriding mandatory provisions'. The absence of a definition gave rise to a controversy between French and German courts. According to the latter, overriding mandatory provisions only protect public interests in a strict sense. However, French courts may consider a provision that exclusively protects the interests of the weaker party as an overriding mandatory provision. The definition of 'overriding mandatory provisions' provided in Article 9(1) Rome I fails to bring any real legal certainty. Since the controversy between the French and German courts essentially relates to the systematic relationship between overriding mandatory provisions and connecting factors protecting a weaker party in the Rome I Regulation, an intervention by the European Court of Justice will be necessary. Resume: L'Article 7(2) de la Convention de Rome sur la loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles laissait au juge la possibilité d'appliquer les lois de police du for, peu importe la loi désignée par la Convention même. Néanmoins, la Convention ne dé. nissait pas la catégorie des lois de police. Chaque juge pouvant appliquer ses propres critères de quail . cation des lois de police, une différence existait entre l'approche française et allemande à cette catégorie. D'une part, la jurisprudence allemande ne quali. ait de lois de police que les dispositions visant à protéger des intérêts strictement publics. D'autre part, la jurisprudence française n'hésitait pas à quali. er les dispositions protectrices des parties faibles comme de lois de police. La dé. nition de 'lois de police' contenue dans l'Article 9(1) du Règlement Rome I ne résout pas cette divergence. En effet, celle-ci découle principalement d'une divergence dans l'interprétation des rapports réciproques entre les lois de police et les critères de rattachement protecteurs des parties faibles. Partant, il revient à la Cour de justice d'intervenir pour trancher cette divergence.

Since August 17, 2015 the courts of the Member States of the European Union apply the conflict-of-laws rules adopted in the EU Succession Regulation (EU) in succession matters. From the Polish point of view, this constitutes not only the change of the rules applied for the purposes of determining jurisdiction and the applicable law, but also a new approach to the overriding mandatory provisions. Contrary to other European instruments of private international law, the Succession Regulation neither uses the term “overriding mandatory provisions”, nor defines its meaning. Nevertheless, in Article 30 the Regulation provides for application — irrespective of the law applicable to the succession under its conflict rules — of the special rules of the State, where certain immovable property, enterprises or other special categories of assets are located, and which — for economic, family or social considerations — impose restrictions concerning or affecting the succession in respect of those assets, in so far as, under the law of that State, they are applicable irrespective of the law applicable to the succession. The interpretation of this provision cause difficulties. It is not clear whether the concept of the special provisions embodied in Article 30 refers to the concept of overriding mandatory rules, well known in the European private international law, or whether it constitutes an original solution. Another controversial issue discussed in the paper is the relevance of the mandatory rules of the forum or the third State other than those mentioned in Article 30.

Resumen: La sentencia del Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Cataluña de 18 de marzo de 2019 resuelve sobre la validez de una donación entre esposos de un bien inmueble sito en Ingarö (Suecia). La sentencia se pronuncia sobre la aplicación al caso del Reglamento Roma I y del desplazamiento del art. 11CC como norma de conflicto aplicable a la validez formal de la donación, tampoco la considera ley de policía del foro.Palabras clave: requerimientos de forma, donaciones internacionales entre esposos, leyes de policía, Reglamento Roma I. art. 11CC. Abstract: The Judgment of the High Court of Cataluña of 18 March 2019 ruled on the formal validity of an international gift between spouses of a land situated in Ingarö (Sweden). The Judgment apply the Rome I Regulation and avoid the application of art. 11CC even as an overriding mandatory provision of the law of the forum.Keywords: form requirements, international gifts between spouses, overriding mandatory provisions, Rome I Regulation. art. 11CC.

The paper refers to the concept of public interest contained in Art. 9 of the Rome I Regulation. The author argues that in the light of the processes taking place on the labor market (such as the digitization of the labor market and employment via platforms) and problems with defining the scope of the directive on posted workers in the context of drivers of international transport, courts may treat national regulations in the field of labor law as overriding mandatory provisions. The main goal of the paper is to draw attention to the need to increase the interest in the doctrine of labor law in the sphere of the potential application of Art. 9 Rome I. With regard to employment issues, a question arises regarding the minimum wage applicable in a given country in conjunction with the issue of the freedom to provide services. The European Court of Justice referred to the issue of ensuring fair remuneration of employees as an important element of the “overriding general interest” justifying the restriction of the freedom to provide services. In the deliberations in the Mazzoleni judgment, the ECJ also emphasized that the application of the minimum wage of the country in which the service is performed may be a disproportionate burden, especially in a situation where the enterprise providing the services is located in the border territory and the work performed in the host country is temporary, short and part-time. An interesting issue is the “translation” of the considerations contained in the aforementioned judgment into the emerging employment through internet platforms. Some background for the above considerations is the fact that in the literature of private international law, among the overriding mandatory provisions, the most frequently indicated are anti-monopoly provisions, in the field of foreign exchange law, regarding the prohibition of import or export of certain goods, but this is also important from the point of view of the paper, more and more often regulations based on a private-law method of regulation. The paper also includes considerations regarding the concept of “public interest”.

The law applicable to the matrimonial property regime under Regulation 2016/1103 governs all the property relations between the spouses and with regard to third parties including the rules providing for the protection of the family home. The choice of law rules of the Regulation are based on the principle of party autonomy and on the need to ensure the predictability of the applicable law, to the detriment of the links connecting the current situation of the spouses with the law intended to govern it. Against the background of an increasing cross-border mobility, the connecting factors of the objective conflict rule, fixed at the time of the conclusion of the marriage, prove to be unsuitable with regard to the protective rules of the family home whose implementation would command the application of the law having the closest connection to the real situation of the spouses. In this context, the exceptional mechanisms consisting in the escape clause and in the overriding mandatory provisions of the lex fori are also inadequate to ensure the effectiveness of the protective measures of the family home under the lex situs.

In this research article, the problem question is raised: What are the criteria to apply the control of diffuse conventionality by the Council of State and the Constitutional Court with respect to the position of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights? From which it is intended to analyze the divergence between the positions adopted by the Council of State and the Constitutional Court regarding the diffuse control of conventionality and its application as a mandatory figure to be applied within the Colombian State in order to comply with the provisions provided by the ACHR. It is concluded that the Constitutional Court still shows an abstentionist position of investing as a conventional judge, considering under a little evolutionary concept that applying the control in question can endanger the Constitution and its role as a constitutional judge. Therefore, the need for the Constitutional Court to adopt the example advocated by the Council of State is proposed, in order to guarantee not only the conventional provisions, but also the Constitution itself.

The article explores the new approaches of the Federal Antimonopoly Service to the application of certain provisions of the law on the control of foreign investment in business entities of strategic importance.The question of the correlation of the concepts of “control” and “the possibility of blocking decisions” was examined, as well as the problems of legal uncertainty re mandatory preliminary approval of a transaction in which a foreign investor plans to purchase shares of a business entity that is related to the strategic type of activity.The authors concluded that it is necessary and advisable to classify a business company as strategic based on legislation by its implementation of a type of activity that is adjacent to strategic.

This paper discusses the application of the EU directive as a source of European private international law with an emphasis on the post-Lisbon period in private international law of the member states. After presenting the main features of a directive in private international law, such as the legal basis for those “measures” in secondary legislation, types of directive, their structure, purpose and the effects of a directive, the author points out the special importance of the directive expressed in the Ingmar and Unamar cases of the Court of Justice of the European Union. In both cases the legal framework was Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents. In the Ingmar case of 2000, although lacking a (unilateral) conflict of law rule, the Court gave, by interpretation, the position of an unwritten (or hidden) conflict of law rule to a substantive law provision of the Directive. At the same time the Court determined that the provisions of Articles 17 to 19 are to be regarded as mandatory rules for the purposes of private international law. For the former EC legal order it was essential that a principal established in a non-member country (USA), whose commercial agent acts within the EC, cannot evade those provisions by freely choosing un-harmonized applicable law. In 2013 Court of Justice of the European Union was again asked to deal with Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 but in the new Unamar case with parties from Bulgaria (principal) and Belgium (commercial agent). Again, the Court confirmed the mandatory character of Articles 17 and 18 of the Directive and applied also Art. 7(2) of the Rome Convention of 1980. In his ruling it took into consideration the provisions of Art. 9(1) of the Rome I Regulation in which there is a definition of overriding mandatory provisions. Taking into account the terms of the mandatory provisions, but this time also consistent with the wording of Article 9(1) of the Rome I Regulation of 2008, the Court concluded that the law chosen by the parties to a commercial agency contract may be rejected by the court of another Member State before which the case has been brought in favor of the law of the forum, owing to the mandatory nature in the legal order of that Member State, only if the court of the forum state held it to be crucial to grant the commercial agent protection, going beyond that provided for by the directive, thus taking account of the nature of such mandatory provisions. From June 1988 to today (2021) the EEC, the EC and the EU adopted a considerable number of directives as measures for the approximation of national law dealing mostly with consumer, but also employment and insurance issues, setting forth conflict rules. These sector-specific rules (or special conflict rules for certain (consumer) contracts) from the second-generation directives based on unilateral conflict rules prevail over the conflict rules of the Rome Convention of 1980 (Art. 20) and the Rome I Regulation of 2008 (Art. 23) in relation to particular matters, lay down conflict-of-law rules relating to contractual obligations. This situation creates a “labyrinth” of legal sources dealing with conflict-of-law rules on the national, (ex international) and on the European level. The described fragmentation of a situation where conflict-of-law rules are depressed among several instruments and where there are differences between those rules, contrary to Recital 40(1)-1) Rome I Regulation, has not been avoided. But at the same time the Rome I Regulation did not exclude the possibility of including conflict-of- rules with regard to particular matters (Recital 40(1-2) Rome I Regulation). At the end of this paper the author answered one additional question: How to solve the problem of the lack of coordination between the Rome I Regulation of 2008 and other provisions of EU law, including national laws implementing those acts? The first step may be to give a narrow interpretation of Art. 23 of the Rome I Regulation and to give precedence only to special EU conflict-of-law rules in relation to a particular matter. Stricto sensu it means, all provisions in the consumer directives which provide that, if a contract has a direct link to the territory of one or more Member States, EU law will apply, even if the parties have chosen the law of a third country, should not (always) be regarded as choice of law rules. Such a consideration has the potential to exclude the application of Art. 23 of the Rome I Regulation and rather apply Article 3(4) or 9(2) of Rome I. An example of such “conflict-of-law rule” is Article 22(4) of Consumer Credit Directive 2008/48 EC of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers (OJ EU L 133/66). The second step is to reopen the lost political battle from 2008 of the European Parliament for a general precedence of all EU internal market law. Thirteen years after Rome I was adopted we have some additional arguments in favor of applying the general principle of supremacy in EU law without breaching “the proper functioning of the internal market” (Recital 40(2) of the Rome I Regulation). The first argument is general, known as the process of communitarization. Its result is not just Rome I (without Article 23) but also Directive 2011/83/ EU of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, which is a new legal act in the post-Lisbon period of the EUPIL and among consumer directives should be seen as lex posterior. It is not for the first time that in such kind of Directive there is no unilateral conflict rule with the aim to protect all EU values by applying EU law. But the relevant provision lays down that the consumer should not be deprived of the protection granted by that Directive, and that, where the law applicable to the contract is that of a third country, Regulation Rome I should apply in order to determine whether the consumer retains the protection granted by that Directive (Recital 58 of the Directive on consumer rights). Taking into consideration all above mentioned arguments, the author concludes: in the third decade of the 21st century the post-Lisbon legal practice regarding special EU conflict-of-law rules relating to particular matters contained in EU Directives on consumer protection should no longer prevail. The application of the Directives with or without a unilateral conflict rule in a situation with an international element should instead be safeguarded through the application of the provisions of Articles 3(4) and Art. 6(2) for consumer protection, and Article 9(2) of the Rome I Regulation of 2008 in order to determine whether the consumer retains the protection granted by that Directive.

The paper presents an overview of the most important regulations and institutions affecting the level of quality and fittingness of the vehicle fleet, in order to increase the level of general traffic safety in the Republic of Serbia. The Traffic Safety Agency, among other things, alone or in cooperation with others, regulates, controls and implements the system of homologation, testing and control of conformity of vehicles, equipment and parts. It authorizes and supervises other organizations for vehicle control and testing. The role of standardization in this process is dual: first - it refers to the subject of testing - vehicles, and second - to the quality of testing - authorized organizations. The paper discusses the important provisions of regulations for vehicle testing and analyzes the impact of the standards ISO 17020 and ISO 17025 on the work of authorized organizations. In conclusion, it was proposed that in order to achieve and maintain high level of testing quality, mandatory accreditation of authorized organizations should be prescribed. Mandatory application of the standards would have a positive impact on the traffic safety segment which depends on the technical characteristics of the vehicle, and as well, reduce the Agency's obligations.

Le mécanisme des lois de police en droit international privé chinois est un produit importé et sa définition législative est influencée par la définition européenne. Bien que la définition française de loi de police et la définition chinoise ne soient pas textuellement identiques, il nous semble que la notion de loi de police ne change pas selon qu’il s’agit de droit français ou de droit chinois. Cependant, n’étant prévu par le droit positif chinois que depuis 2011, le mécanisme des lois de police est relativement jeune, non seulement au regard de ce mécanisme lui-même mais aussi au regard de ses relations avec d’autres mécanismes de droit international privé ayant des liens avec lui, comme l’exception d’ordre public international. Nous chercherons les expériences françaises en la matière et étudierons la notion française et chinoise de loi de police, d’autres mécanismes de droit international privé en lien avec le mécanisme des lois de police et les illustrations des lois de police dans la jurisprudence. Malgré les critiques, l’application immédiate et impérative est toujours le caractère le plus important des lois de police du for dans l’instance directe, mais ce n’est le cas ni pour l’instance indirecte ni pour les lois de police étrangères. Selon la jurisprudence française et chinoise, le non-respect par le juge étranger ou par un tribunal arbitral de la loi de police de l’État requis n’entraîne pas automatiquement le refus de reconnaissance ou d’exécution. Concernant les lois de police étrangères, le texte législatif chinois est muet, mais cela ne signifie pas que l’application ou la prise en considération de la loi de police étrangère est interdite en droit chinois
The overriding mandatory provisions in Chinese private international law is imported and its legislative definition is incorporated by the European one. Although the French definition of overriding mandatory provisions and the Chinese definition are not textually identical, it seems to us that the notion of overriding mandatory provisions does not change depending on whether it is French law or Chinese law. However, having been provided for by Chinese positive law only since 2011, the overriding mandatory provisions mechanism is relatively young, not only with regard to this mechanism itself but also to its relations with other mechanisms of private international law having links with it, such as the international public policy exception. We will seek French experiences in this area and study the French and Chinese notion of overriding mandatory provisions, other mechanisms of private international law in connection with them and their illustrations in case law. Despite the criticisms, the immediate and mandatory application is always the most important character of the overriding mandatory provisions of the forum in the direct instance, but this is not the case for foreign overriding mandatory provisions or for the indirect instance. According to French and Chinese case law, the non-respect by the foreign judge or by an arbitral tribunal of the overriding mandatory provisions of the requested state does not automatically result in the refusal of recognition or enforcement. Regarding the foreign overriding mandatory provisions, the Chinese legislative text is silent, but this does not mean that their application or take into consideration is prohibited in Chinese law

The unification of the conflict-of-law rules in matters of matrimonial property regimes at EU level seeks to mitigate differences in substantive law in particular legal systems. The aim of this contribution is to analyse the doctrine of overriding mandatory provisions and consider the applicability of the public policy exception, which limit the application of the law otherwise applicable determined in compliance with the unified conflict-of-law rules. The question author addresses in this paper is whether these institutes of the general part of private international law provide for sufficient safeguards to protect the fundamental values and public interests of the forum law in matters of matrimonial property regimes.

This contribution provides a comparative study of the position of overriding mandatory rules in regional, supranational and international conflicts instruments, in particular the Rome I Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (2008) and the proposed African Principles on the Law Applicable to International Commercial Contracts (2020). COVID-19 regulations are referred to as an unequivocal example of overriding mandatory provisions in the context of the disruption of international commerce. The application of the proper law of the contract, the lex fori and the law of the country of performance, as well as the application of the legal systems of other countries are considered. Although strongly influenced by the corresponding provision in the Rome I Regulation, it is suggested that article 11 of the African Principles provides more clarity. The African Principles constitute the sole instrument which explicitly mentions that the overriding mandatory rules of the proper law of the contract are applicable in principle. The African Principles clarify that, for the purposes of the application of the law of the country of performance, any substantial performance under the contract is relevant (that is, both the characteristic and the monetary performance). The African Principles expressly include the country of commencement, continuation and completion of the performance in determining the content of the notion of the law of the country of performance. In respect of the application of the overriding mandatory rules of legal systems other than the lex fori, the proper law and the law of the country of performance, the African Principles reflect a via media between the opposing positions in the Rome I Regulation and its predecessor, the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980): in exceptional circumstances, the overriding mandatory rules of another legal system may be applied, provided that such law has a manifestly close connection to the particular situation. As the doctrine of overriding mandatory rules can be better explained from a unilateralist rather than a Savignian conflicts paradigm, it is argued that American-style comparative interest or impairment analysis could provide valuable ideas in respect of the exercise of the discretion of a court in cases of the cumulation of overriding mandatory rules. Finally, the submission is made that the law applicable to the contract should govern the effect of an overriding mandatory rule on contractual liability, unless the provision itself stipulates the consequences.

Miriam Saag-Maaβ‎ reviews the potential for human rights and environmental cases against multinationals in Germany. Outlining the rules on jurisdiction as per EU and national law. The chapter discusses the application of the Rome II Regulation to choice of law and the potential relevance of overriding mandatory provisions of German law and the possibility of claims for impairment or interference with property including the injunctive relief to prevent flooding caused by greenhouse emissions in Lliaya v. RWE. It also outlines the elements for liability for corporate human rights abuse under section 823(I) BGB and for the omission to comply with safety duties, in particular the potential for claims against a parent or buying company for breach of a safety duty by subsidiaries and suppliers. It considers key issues arising in Jabbir v. KiK, including the application of the Pakistani law and outlines key barriers to justice relating to discovery, collective actions, recovery of legal costs and funding.

In this paper author analyses the conflict-of-law regime for cross-border franchise contracts in European private international law. The study begins with the autonomous characterisation of franchise contract in the context of application of the Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations. It continues with the analysis of conflict-of-law rules of Rome I Regulation which have to be applied to franchise contract, where the attention is given to the choice of law rule of Art. 3 of Rome I Regulation and to the hard conflict-of law rule for franchise contracts contained in Art. 4 (1) (e) of Rome I Regulation which may be derogated by special escape clause of Art. 4 (3) of Rome I Regulation. Finally, author analyses the issue of application of national imperative provisions which protect the franchisee and overriding mandatory rules which can directly affect the cross-border franchise contracts.