Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Contracting'
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Milton, Gary. "Contingency contracting guide/lessons for Navy contracting officers." Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/9938.
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimitedMBA Professional Report
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
The purpose of this research is to provide guidance by which future U.S. Navy Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) can effectively prepare for contingency operations. Additional research will provide guidelines for sustainment to support major contingencies. The research for this study was accomplished by reading literature on the subject of Contingency Contracting. Further research encompassed gathering information on lessons learned from past contingency contracting operations. Contingency contracting issues provided in this research project include an examination of preparatory steps required by Navy CCOs prior to deployment. Also included are sustainment issues that could positively effect a contingency operation and funding requirements that should be understood while conducting contingency operations. Additionally, this study provides conclusions and recommendations that could enhance the effectiveness of future Navy CCOs in support of contingency operations.
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Cayia, Thomas, and Joshua McCaslin. "Contracting with the enemy: the contracting officer’s dilemma." Thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/45824.
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimitedOperational contract support activities during stability and reconstruction operations rely significantly on local national contractors to provide goods and services for U.S. forces. In some cases, local national contractors are given priority in competition for contracts as a means of stimulating and rebuilding the local economy. A major risk associated with using local national contractors in contingency environments is the presence of business entities that may directly or indirectly support adversarial forces. Entering into contracts with enemy-affiliated business entities creates significant contractual and security risk for U.S. forces. Mitigating the effects of enemy-affiliated business must be a priority for contingency contracting officers. However, the process of preventing enemy-affiliated business entities from contracting with the U.S. government is complex and difficult to navigate. In this MBA Report, we analyze the reasons for this complexity and provide future policy recommendations to better counteract the contracting-with-the-enemy phenomenon.
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Burger, Kenneth Kehr Jonathan Wobensmith Brian. "Contingency contracting." Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2003. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion-image/03Dec%5FBurger%5FKehr%5FWobensmith%5fManual.pdf.
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[Thesis (M.B.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2003.][MBA professional report] [Thesis advisor(s): R. Marshall Engelbeck, Rob B. Tudor.] [Authors: Kenneth Burger, Jonathan Kehr, Brian Wobensmith.] Also available online.
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Hicks, Perry J. "Consolidation of contracting in field contracting activities in DoD." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 1995. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA306731.
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Berkland, Troy Robert. "Performance based contracting and improving the current contracting process." Connect to this title online, 2007. http://etd.lib.clemson.edu/documents/1202499107/.
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Avant, Jeanine. "Innovative government contracting." Thesis, Springfield, Va. : Available from National Technical Information Service, 1999. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA367291.
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Johnson, Ellsworth K. III, Bryan H. Paton, Edward W. Threat, and Lisa A. Haptonstall. "Joint contingency contracting." Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/34229.
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The purpose of this Master of Business Administration (MBA) Professional Report is to investigate and analyze the means by which Contingency Contracting Officers (CCO) can effectively operate in a Joint contingency environment and to validate the Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA) entry and exit criteria for contingency contracting missions. Joint contingencies encompass regional conflicts, humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, and international or domestic disaster relief missions supported with the immediate deployment of military forces. This research was accomplished by reviewing the current guidance, policies, and doctrine pertinent to contingency contracting operations and conducting personal interviews. The researchers conducted interviews with representatives of the Joint Staff, J4 (Logistics), each Service Component's acquisition headquarters, U.S. Central Command's J4 (Logistics), U.S. Pacific Command's J4 (Logistics, Engineering, and Security Assistance), and the DCMA to explore how contingency contracting operations are planned and executed; current issues and lessons learned; and understand the current structure/organization of Service Component and Combatant Command for accomplishing contingency contracting. Conclusions and recommendations address perceived shortfalls in the methodologies the Services use to plan, communicate, integrate and execute contingency contracting operations. Three possible solutions to these shortfalls include adoption of the Yoder Three-Tier Model, establishment of the Joint Contingency Contracting Command (JCCC), and the creation of universal language for conducting contracting in contingencies.
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Tawfiq, Omar Hisham. "Doing contracting differently." Thesis, University of Bristol, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.441378.
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Johnson, Ellsworth K., Bryan H. Paton, Edward W. Threat, and Lisa A. Haptonstall. "Joint contingency contracting." Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/460.
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Acquisition research (Graduate School of Business & Public Policy)MBA Professional Report
The purpose of this Master Business Administration (MBA) Professional Report is to investigate and analyze the means by which Contingency Contracting Officers (CCO) can effectively operate in a Joint contingency environment and to validate the Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA) entry and exit criteria for contingency contracting missions. Joint contingencies encompass regional conflicts, humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, and international or domestic disaster relief missions supported with the immediate deployment of military forces. This research was accomplished by reviewing the current guidance, policies, and doctrine pertinent to contingency contracting operations and conducting personal interviews. The researchers conducted interviews with representatives of the Joint Staff, J4 (Logistics), each Service Component's acquisition headquarters, U.S. Central Command's J4 (Logistics), U.S. Pacific Command's J4 (Logistics, Engineering, and Security Assistance), and the DCMA to explore how contingency contracting operations are planned and executed; current issues and lessons learned; and understand the current structure/organization of Service Component and Combatant Command for accomplishing contingency contracting. Conclusions and recommendations address perceived shortfalls in the methodologies the Services use to plan, communicate, integrate and execute contingency contracting operations. Three possible solutions to these shortfalls include adoption of the Yoder Three-Tier Model, establishment of the Joint Contingency Contracting Command (JCCC), and the creation of universal language for conducting contracting in contingencies.
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Čtrnáctý, Jaromír. "Energy Performance Contracting." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2009. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-11032.
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Energy Performance Contracting is an energy saving method, when the supplier guarantees a certain minimal level of energy savings to the customer, as well as non-rising energy costs. The method was developed at the turn of 70's and 80's in the USA and has spread to dozens of countries around the world till today, although the rate of the EPC market development differs from country to country. The method is useful mostly for heating, electricity and gas cost savings by the end-users. In the Czech Republic, the method has been used since 1993. Until now, several dozens, or even hundreds of projects have been realized, mostly for public sector customers. This paper analyzes the current state of the EPC method usage around the world as well as in the Czech Republic, the key part comprises of the EPC principles description, based on data from real EPC contracts. The work is concluded by a SWOT analysis of the method and by a discussion of the following question: "Can EPC projects blockade the overall saving potential in some cases?" The key information source for most of the work were answers to questions sent to eight Czech ESCO companies representatives, as well as the outputs from guided interviews with four of them, which were taking place between January and May 2009.
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Brumfield, David W. "Analysis of bank credit card contracting at Navy field contracting activities." Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/27947.
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This research reviews the use of bank credit cards as a small purchase method in the Navy field contracting system. The paper reviews the use of the bank credit card at Naval
Weapons Center China Lake, CA, Naval Ordnance Station, Indian Head, MD, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, and Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC . The focus of the evaluation is an assessment of how successful the existing bank credit card programs are at the four sites, and the advisability of expanding the program to other field contracting activities. The study also identifies barriers and possible difficulties that would be encountered if the credit card program were to be expanded to other field contracting activities. The paper examines the existing management controls in place for the program, and makes recommendations to the Naval Supply Systems Command regarding expansion (further implementation) of the credit
card program to other field contracting activities.
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Aufderheide, Derek, Jeremy Maloy, and Michael Corrigan. "Air Force Operational Contracting Knowledge Assessment: analyzing explicit and tacit contracting knowledge." Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10729.
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MBA Professional ReportThe Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) establishes education and training standards for acquisition personnel. These standards culminate into ascending levels of certification for acquisition professionals based on education, training, and experience. While the intent of DAWIA certification is to ensure acquisition professionals possess the requisite knowledge and experience to perform their duties, currently no method exists to effectively measure an individual's contracting knowledge. The Air Force Operational Contracting Knowledge Assessment (OCKA-AF) attempts to accurately assess an individual's tacit (experiential) and explicit (factual) operational contracting knowledge across the six phases of the contracting process. The assessment tool also identifies knowledge gaps between tacit and explicit knowledge. The OCKA-AF was deployed in the form of a web-based survey to two Air Force operational contracting squadrons and Air Force contracting students attending the Naval Postgraduate School. The survey results were analyzed, upon which recommendations were made to reduce existing tacit and explicit contracting knowledge gaps. Due to its knowledge assessment capability, the OCKA-AF may be beneficial to supervisors and senior contracting leadership in determining whether current training efforts are producing the desired results in knowledge capture or provide insight into areas requiring further training emphasis.
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Skatun, J. D. F. "Topics in labour contracting." Thesis, University of Essex, 1993. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.333361.
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Kwon, Suehyun. "Essays in dynamic contracting." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72933.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2012.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
This thesis examines three models of dynamic contracting. The first model is a model of dynamic moral hazard with partially persistent states, and the second model considers relational contracts when the states are partially persistent. The last model studies preference for delegation with learning. In the first chapter, the costly unobservable action of the agent produces a good outcome with some probability, and the probability of the good outcome corresponds to the state. The states are unobservable and follow an irreducible Markov chain with positive persistence. The chapter finds that an informational rent arises in this environment. The second best contract resembles a tenure system: the agent is paid nothing during the probationary period, and once he is paid, the principal never takes his outside option again. The second best contract becomes stationary after the agent is tenured. For discount factors close to one, the principal can approximate his first best payoff with review contracts. The second chapter studies relational contracts with partially persistent states, where the distribution of the state depends on the previous state. When the states are observable, the optimal contracts can be stationary, and the self-enforcement leads to the dynamic enforcement constraint as with i.i.d. states. The chapter then applies the results to study the implications for the markets where the principal and the agent can be matched with new partners. The third chapter studies preference for delegation when there is a possibility of learning before taking an action. The optimal action depends on the unobservable state. After the principal chooses the manager, one of the agents may receive a private signal about the world. The agent decides whether to disclose the signal to the manager, and the manager chooses an action. In an equilibrium, the agents' communication strategies depend on the manager's prior. The principal prefers a manager with some difference in prior belief to a manager with the same prior.
by Suehyun Kwon.
Ph.D.
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Kennedy, Lauren (Lauren Patricia). "Contracting for disaster reconstruction." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/118249.
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Thesis: M.C.P., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, 2018.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 84-93).
The combination of more powerful and unpredictable storms and growing urban populations have led to increasing demands for disaster response and an opportunity for the logistics community to provide meaningful evaluation and expertise. In the United States, FEMA is continually updating their disaster response methods to accommodate the changing dynamics of disasters-most recently in rethinking strategies to provide interim housing for large populations of survivors. One of FEMA's most complicated challenges has been forecasting and securing the large number of skilled contractors required to complete the multitude of assessments, reconstruction projects, and rebuilding missions in the wake of large-scale storms. International governments have faced similar challenges, and through case studies and informant interviews, an evaluation of contractual structures that affect FEMA's post-disaster housing provision is presented. This thesis will present a cross case study analysis of how contracts were structured between the government and private firms hired as part of the reconstruction efforts following the 2016 flooding in Louisiana and the 2010-2011 earthquake sequence in New Zealand to find recommendations and future learning opportunities for the US government.
by Lauren Kennedy.
M.C.P.
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Amiraslani, Hami. "Essays on debt contracting." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2017. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3666/.
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This thesis consists of three studies that investigate the channels through which corporate governance reforms, accounting choice, and social capital influence contracting in the corporate bond market. In Chapter 1 (solo authored), I examine the public debt contracting consequences of shocks to managerial entrenchment. For identification, I exploit the mandatory adoption of board independence rules under the NYSE and NASD listing requirements as a regulatory reform that enhanced the intensity of CEO monitoring by independent directors. Using a large sample of corporate bond issues, I find that the rules induced economically significant contracting effects in non-compliant firms, namely in the form of lower payout, financing, and event-related covenants as well as higher credit ratings. In further tests, I show that while these effects are not mitigated by shareholder control, they ultimately depend on directors' private incentives and their ability and willingness to engage in costly monitoring. My findings speak to the debate on how equity-centric governance interacts with bondholders' interests and their incentives to impose long-term restrictions on firms' economic activities. Chapter 2 (co-authored with Peter Pope and Ane Tamayo) examines the contracting relevance of the balance sheet in the corporate bond market. Using "accounting bloat" in net asset values as a proxy for balance sheet quality, we predict and find that aggregate covenant intensity in bond indentures is negatively associated with the quality of issuers' balance sheet numbers. The magnitude of this effect is more pronounced for accounting and event-related covenants and is lower in the case of covenants that restrict payouts, refinancing, and investment activities. Our results are robust to controlling for corporate governance quality and the stringency of monitoring by lenders in syndicated loan deals. Turning to market outcomes, we find that offering yields, credit spreads, and credit ratings are decreasing in balance sheet quality, while the likelihood of agreement among credit rating agencies about new bond issues' credit risk increases with balance sheet quality. To establish a causal link between balance sheet quality and covenant structures, we exploit an exogenous court ruling in Delaware that substantially limits the fiduciary duties of directors to creditors. We show how the legal event affected bond issuers' reporting incentives and altered the debt contracting relevance of their balance sheet numbers. Finally, in Chapter 3 (co-authored with Kalr Lins, Henri Servaes and Ane Tamayo), we investigate whether a firm's capital, and the trust that it engenders, are viewed favourably by bondholders. Using firms' corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities to proxy for social capital, we find no relation between CSR and bond spreads over the 2005-2013 period. However, during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, which represents a shock to trust and default risk, high-CSR firms benefited from lower bond spreads. These effects are more pronounced for firms that, when in distress, have a greater opportunity to engage in asset substitution or divert cash to shareholders. High-CSR firms were also able to raise more debt capital on the primary market during this period, and those high-CSR firms that raised more debt were able to do so at lower at-issue bond spreads, better initial credit ratings, and for longer maturities. Our results suggest that bond investors believe that high-CSR firms are less likely to engage in asset substitution and diversion that would be detrimental to stakeholders, including debtholders. These findings also indicate that the benefits of CSR that accrued to shareholders during the financial crisis carry across to another important asset class, debt capital.
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Cho, Sung-Bong. "Essays on contracting problems." The Ohio State University, 1991. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1272457192.
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Dahler, Matt. "Contracting for property management." Online version, 2008. http://www.uwstout.edu/lib/thesis/2008/2008dahlerm.pdf.
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Rispoli, Ivana-Christine. "Contracting in der Immobilienwirtschaft." [S.l. : s.n.], 2004. http://www.bsz-bw.de/cgi-bin/xvms.cgi?SWB11163853.
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Mettral, Thomas. "Essays in Dynamic Contracting." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/19876.
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Diese Arbeit enthält drei unabhängige Kapitel, jedes davon im Bereich der Dynamischen Vertragstheorie.
Kapitel I zeigt, dass deterministische dynamische Prinzipal-Agenten-Verträge immer mindestens so ertragreich sind wie stochastische, falls die sogenannte Methode erster Ordnung des dynamischen Mechanismus-Designs erfüllt ist. Meine Ergebnisse legen dar, dass die in der Literatur übliche Einschränkung auf deterministische Verträge zulässig ist, so lange die Methode erster Ordnung gültig ist.
Kapitel II basiert auf einer gemeinsamen Arbeit mit Ilia Krasikov und Rohit Lamba. Ein Großanbieter (Prinzipal) handelt mit einer kleinen Firma (Agent) einen wiederkehrenden Geschäftsvertrag aus, wobei sich der Agent als ungeduldiger erweist. Der optimale Vertrag wird durch zwei Schlüsseleigenschaften beschrieben: Neustart und Abbruch, die vielerlei Eigenschaften der angebotenen Verträge darlegen.
Kapitel III basiert schließlich auf einer gemeinsamen Arbeit mit Rohit Lamba. Darin besitzt der Agent dynamische private Information, die einem Markovprozess folgt. Ein monopolistischer Prinzipal verkauft dem Agenten ein nicht-dauerhaftes Gut und er verpflichtet sich in jeder Periode an den ursprünglich ausgehandelten Vertrag. Die entstehenden Informationskosten verhindern erst-beste Verträge bei auftretender Persistenz im Typ des Agenten.
Diese Arbeit stellt einen Weg bereit, wie man den optimalen deterministischen Vertrag in dynamischen Prinzipal-Agenten-Modellen erhält. Der gewöhnliche Weg mit lediglich lokal nach unten bindenden Anreizverträglichkeitsbedingungen misslingt bei hoher Persistenz der Typrealisierungen und bei stark differenzierender Diskontierung. Zudem zeigt die Arbeit wann mit Gewissheit stochastische Verträge ausgeschlossen werden können.This dissertation consists of three independent chapters, each in the field of dynamic contracting. Chapter I shows that deterministic dynamic contracts between a principal and an agent are always at least as profitable to the principal as stochastic ones, if the so-called first-order approach in dynamic mechanism design is satisfied. My results demonstrate that the usual restriction in the literature to deterministic contracts is admissible, as long as the first-order approach is valid. Chapter II is based on joint work with Ilia Krasikov and Rohit Lamba. We consider a large supplier (principal) who contracts with a small firm (agent) to repeatedly provide working capital in return for payments. The agent is less patient than the principal. The optimal contract is characterized by two key properties: restart and shutdown, which capture various aspects of contracts offered in the marketplace. Finally, Chapter III is based on joint work with Rohit Lamba. We consider the problem of optimal contracting where the agent has dynamic private information, which follows a Markov process. In each period, a monopolistic principal sells a nondurable good to the agent and she commits to the contract she made in the initial period. The emerging information costs prevent first-best contracts whenever there is persistency in the agent’s type. This thesis provides a strategy on how to obtain the optimal deterministic contract in dynamic principal-agent models with Markovian type realizations. We see that the usual approach with only local downward binding incentive compatibility constraints does not work for highly persistent type realizations and for large differences in discounting. Furthermore, I show in which situations we with certainty can exclude stochastic contracts.
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Fiacco, Bryce J., and Daniel O. Stephens. "Joint base contracting: a comparative analysis of joint base contracting activities between services." Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10598.
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MBA Professional ReportThe Defense (DoD) recently created 12 joint bases by consolidating the support functions of geographically close bases under the lead of a single service. The 2005 Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission recommended the joint-basing initiative based on the expected savings of $183.8 million annually. The objectives of the BRAC process were to achieve cost savings, transformation, improvement of capabilities, and enhancement of military value. Using a case study approach, this research identified the specific factors that contribute to the organizational successes of joint base contracting at Joint Base San Antonio (JBSA) and Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM). These factors include processes, governance structures, organizational structures, and communication. This research also identifies barriers to consolidation as well as comparing and contrasting the way JBSA and JBLM operate. Additionally, this research identifies strengths and weaknesses of the approaches used by the Air Force and the Army. Thus, by documenting specific enablers and barriers, this research should help to guide the planning and implementation of future consolidations throughout DoD and other government organizations.
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Alexander, Jason Fields. "Contracting through the lens of classical pragmatism : an exploration of local government contracting /." View online version, 2009. http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/288.
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Lutz, Thomas, Michael Garrett, and William Hunt. "Contingency Contracting Officer Proficiency Assessment Test Development for Construction, Architect-Engineer, and Contingency Contracting." Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/32858.
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimitedIn September 2011, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) published a proficiency training guide titled, 51C/1102 Proficiency Guide for Construction, Architect-Engineer, & Contingency Contracting, for military contingency contracting officers (MCCOs) and 1102 interns within USACE. The training guide groups contracting tasks into four subject areas encompassing 45 separate contracting tasks in all. The research team of this report supplemented the USACE training by providing a Proficiency Assessment Test (PAT) based on the 51C/1102 Proficiency Guide to assist mentors of MCCOs/1102 interns with a tool for standardizing a way for MCCOs/1102s to demonstrate proficiency of individual tasks. Objectives of the project include the development and implementation of a pilot PAT of select contracting tasks followed by a comprehensive written proficiency assessment test used as a tool to measure proficiency for each of the 45 individual tasks. The research team vetted questions through experienced USACE MCCOs and subject matter experts. Further, these experts assisted the team by providing valuable feedback from participating in the pilot PAT. After incorporating feedback from the sponsor, the research team provided USACE a final PAT that encompassed nearly 800 questions to measure proficiency of the 45 individual tasks.
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Barbaris, Roxanne, and Christine Callanan. "United States Army contingency contracting operations: emerging roles, procedures, and challenges facing Contracting professionals." Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10370.
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Joint Applied ProjectThis Joint Applied Project analyzed the extent to which Army leadership has acknowledged and is acting upon key improvement recommendations made by the Gansler Report (2007). This project explores roles, procedures, principles and emerging issues facing contingency contracting professionals in respect to their responsibilities in expeditionary operations. Basic principles of contingency contracting and current literature relative to Army expeditionary operations were analyzed. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with both military and civilian acquisition professionals. Additionally, researcher developed surveys were distributed amongst deployed contingency contracting officers/specialists in order to approach this topic with a 'boots on the ground' perspective. From the research conducted, recommendations are provided that the Army can implement to improve modern wartime contingency contracting and better prepare and train the contracting workforce to support future contingency operations.
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Barbaris, Roxanne Callanan Christine. "United States Army contingency contracting operations emerging roles, procedures, and challenges facing Contracting professionals /." Monterey, Calif. : Naval Postgraduate School, 2008. http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/JAP/2008/Sept/08Sep%5FBarbaris%5FJAP.pdf.
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"Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Contract Management from the Naval Postgraduate School, September 2008."Advisor(s): Simon, Cary ; Nalwasky, Richard M. "September 2008." "Joint applied project"--Cover. Description based on title screen as viewed on October 31, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 97-100). Also available in print.
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Rodeschin, Darrin H. "Contracting in a foreign country." Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 1997. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA331949.
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Kubiak, Joseph C. "Environmental contracting : a case study /." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 1994. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA284547.
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Smith, Daniel J. "Electronic payments in DoD contracting." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 1993. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA269738.
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Thesis (M.S. in Management) Naval Postgraduate School, June 1993.Thesis advisor(s): Martin J. McCaffrey ; James M. Fremgen. "June 1993." Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.
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Lee, Myoungki. "Three essays on applied contracting." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1153714667.
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Wang, Lei. "Bandwidth contracting in B-ISDN." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp02/NQ32801.pdf.
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Ippolito, Filippo. "Three essays on financial contracting." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.443777.
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Kehr, Jonathan R., Kenneth Burger, Brian Wobensmith, and Jonathan R. Kehr. "Marine Corps contingency contracting MCI." Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/9816.
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MBA Professional ReportApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
MBA Professional Report
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Contingency contracting is the process where vital supplies and services needed to maintain deployed forces are obtained on behalf of the United States Government. These actions are used for emergencies, such as, disaster relief from hurricanes or from terrorist activities that occur within the United States or for actions that occur outside of the United States in order to support the deployed units. Due to the current trend in the DoD to contract out more products and services on the battlefield, an increase demand has been placed on contingency contract personnel. The purpose of this MBA Project is to develop and publish a Contingency Contracting MCI to assist the Marine Corps in training its contract personnel in preparation for deployment to a contingency operation. Currently there is not a requirement for the contracting specialist to attend a formal school prior to supporting a contingency operation. Furthermore, there are limited spaces for Marines to attend CON 234. The Contingency Contracting MCI will aid the contracting personnel with the training needed to be successful in a contingency environment and efficiently and effectively support Marine Corps units abroad. This project was sponsored by Headquarters Marine Corps, Installation and Logistics, Logistics Branch in conjunction with the Marine Corps Institute (MCI). The MBA Report has identified several problems in the current ability of the Marine Corps to train contracting personnel in contingency contracting and provides recommendations for further study. A draft Contingency Contracting MCI is included in the report.
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Healy, Pamela A., Sang Won Sok, and Alejandro Ramirez. "The value of competitive contracting." Thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/43923.
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimitedIn the environment of shrinking budgets, there is a trend toward competitive contracting. Research indicates that the government can achieve significant cost savings from competition among industry. This paper will determine how much cost savings could be achieved. It will also analyze numerous contract-related Government Accountability Office reports and provide a summary of the Better Buying Power initiatives. This paper will also identify circumstances that prohibit full and open competition and patterns where competition is most successful. Finally, this paper will provide recommendations to assist federal executives in maximizing competitive contracting and provide the knowledge needed help achieve mandates for improved efficiency and reduced costs.
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Conti, Karen M. "A handbook for contracting officers." Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10239.
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Joint Applied ProjectThe purpose of this Joint Applied Project is to develop and field a Contracting Officer/Team Leader Handbook. Multiple factors have led to an environment that is less than optimal for the accomplishment of the acquisition mission. There has been a significant loss of corporate knowledge in the Communications-Electronics Life Cycle Management Command (CE LCMC) workforce combined with acceleration in promotions to the GS-13 level. The experience level of current Contracting Officers is limited due to rapid promotions. In the past few years the organizational culture focused more on cycle time reductions, versus the quality of the work product in order to satisfy the needs of the customer. In addition, since the supervisory role was raised to the GS-14 level, and GS-13's were relieved of supervisory responsibility, there has been increased confusion as to the role of the team leader. Initial research suggests that Contracting Officers/Team Leaders need another resource to support them in the accomplishment of their varied duties. The C-E LCMC Acquisition Center's strategic plan for the next 12-month period sets forth a vision of a new business culture - one that defines competency at three different levels. The first level is "Do" a complex task (being able to repeat this task consistently), followed by level two, which is "Understand Why" (being able to take learned knowledge and apply that to solving the next problem and doing the next task; being able to improve execution each time and refine), and ending with level three "Explain the Why" (mastering knowledge and skill so that one can do it again and show someone how to do it and why), which leads others to competency. The plan is to enhance the workforce skill sets, ensure contracting is done right, and focus on leadership development. The objective of this project is to align with this plan and provide a guide that supports Contracting Officers/Team Leaders in three key areas: technical competence, leadership, and customer relations.
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Summerour, Thomas J. Jr, and Dennis E. Wilson. "Automated contracting: a productivity study." Thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/27684.
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.This study examined the productivity of the Standard Army Automated Contracting System (SAACONS) and the Standard Automated Contracting Systems for Federal Agencies (SACONS-FEDERAL). Both systems were analyzed in a beforeafter quasi experimental design using archival data that measured inputs, outputs, and social effects. The inputs measurements used were staff size, grade structure, and overtime usage. Output measurements included workload and quality of service as represented by Procurement Administrative Lead Time (PALT). The social effects (morale, teamwork, and professionalism) were represented by sick leave usage. While there was no statistically significant increase in workload, the quality of work measure - PALT - decreased by 24 percent for SAACONS and 3 percent for SACONS-FEDERAL after automation. This result was obtained as the staff size for each activity was reduced (the SACONS-FEDERAL staff size had to be adjusted to reflect an increase in the pre-automation authorized manning levels). Overtime usage for SAACONS reduced sharply while it increased for SACONS-FEDERAL.
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Guth, Lawrence. "Area-contracting maps between rectangles." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/31158.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Mathematics, 2005.Includes bibliographical references (p. 207-208).
In this thesis, I worked on estimating the smallest k-dilation of all diffeomorphisms between two n-dimensional rectangles R and S. I proved that for many rectangles there are highly non-linear diffeomorphisms with much smaller k-dilation than any linear diffeomorphism. When k is equal to n-l, I determined the smallest k-dilation up to a constant factor. For all values of k and n, I solved the following related problem up to a constant factor. Given n-dimensional rectangles R and S, decide if there is an embedding of S into R which maps each k-dimensional submanifold of S to an image with larger k-volume. I also applied the k-dilation techniques to two purely topological problems: estimating the Hopf invariant of a map from a 3-manifold to a high-genus surface, and determining whether there is a map of non-zero degree from a 3-manifold to a hyperbolic 3-manifold.
by Lawrence Guth.
Ph.D.
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Tang, Aodi. "Essays on contracting for experimentation." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/31523.
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This thesis is composed of four chapters and addresses the contracting issue under strategic experimentation. The first chapter presents an overview of the thesis and introduces the strategic bandit model, which is commonly adopted in the other three chapters. The chapter also previews the main results and implications of the thesis. The second chapter discusses the contracting issue between a principal and a team of agents where the actions of agents are unobservable to the principal. The main contribution of this chapter is to fill the gap of strategic experimentation literature by introducing the free-rider problem in teamwork. The chapter first deals with the optimal hiring choice of the principal under perfect information. Since the belief of the state being good decreases if no one succeeds over time, the paper shows that the principal tends to hire fewer agents in response to the downward-adjusted posterior belief. When the principal can neither monitor the agents' actions nor distinguish the agents who succeed, this chapter shows the optimal incentivising contract consists of an upfront payment from the agents to the principal, a bonus to every agent conditioning on success and a stopping time. Under this contract, the principal can implement first-best experimentation and incentivise all agents to work until the optimal stopping time. The third and fourth chapters discuss the financial contracting issue in innovation where an innovator requires external funding from an investor. The third chapter adopts a \bad news" exponential bandit to study the financial contracting under adverse selection between the innovator and the investor. The innovator, owns the innovation project, is privately informed of either a high or low prior belief of the good state but seeks a large amount of external investment from the less-informed investor. Experimentation is conducted by the innovator using internal funding before the external investment. The posterior belief about the good state increases in the amount of internal funding if no bad news arrives during experimentation, but the project will be abandoned as long as bad news arrives. The chapter shows that the amount of internal funding can be used by the investor to separate the agents with different priors. Under the unique least-costly separating equilibrium, the high-prior innovator spends even more than the low-prior first-best internal funding in order to deter the low-prior one from mimicking, and the low-prior one remains at his first-best. This chapter enriches the financial experimentation literature by proposing internal funding as a novel signalling tool and establishing a Pareto dominating separating equilibrium. The fourth chapter studies a multi-stage innovation financing problem between an agent and an investor with asymmetric information on the progress of the project. The innovation is comprised of two stages where the agent needs to complete the first development stage in order to proceed to the second experiment stage. The model assumes that the completion of the first stage can be early or late following a binary distribution, and the arrival of success in the experimentation stage follows a "good news" exponential bandit. Each period, a fixed amount of investment is needed from the investor. However, the investor can not observe nor verify the project progress. The chapter shows that the optimal incentive-compatible contract consists of differential maximum funding periods in the event of early and late completion of the first stage respectively and subsequent bonuses to the investor conditioning on a success in the second stage. We prove that the first-best experimentation time is attainable as long as the bonus of the late completion exceeds that of the early completion, and the difference between the two bonuses should be confined within a certain range. In the extension, we consider the case when the first stage completion time is informative such that an early completion indicates a higher prior in the good state than the late completion. Under imperfect information, the agent has a stronger incentive to mimic the early completion if the first stage is completed late as a longer experimentation time will be granted according the first-best contract. The chapter proves that the first-best is still achievable under a similar bonus contract but the difference between the two bonuses becomes smaller. This chapter contributes to the experimentation financing literature including the information imperfectness on project progress and multi-stage spillover effects.
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Cheng, Lin. "Organized Labor and Debt Contracting." The Ohio State University, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1343146465.
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Sokhela, Duduzile Martha. "Contracting in social work supervision." Pretoria : [s.n.], 2007. http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-09302008-095648.
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Goodwin, Connie M. "Acquisition reform through Alpha Contracting." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2002. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion-image/02Dec%5FGoodwin.pdf.
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Summerour, Thomas J. Wilson Dennis E. "Automated contracting a productivity study /." Monterey, California : Naval Postgraduate School, 1990. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA241822.
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Thesis (M.S. in Management)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 1990.Thesis Advisor(s): Haga, William J. Second Reader: McCaffrey, Martin J. "December 1990." Description based on title screen as viewed on March 30, 2010. DTIC Descriptor(s): Contract Administration, Lead Time, Management, Experimental Design, Teams(Personnel), Morale, Theses, Quality, Procurement, Productivity, Workload, Archives, Cooperation, Output, Measurement. DTIC Identifier(s): Automation, Contracts, Productivity, SAACONS(Standard Army Automated Contracting System), SACONS-Federal(Standard Automated Contracting System For Federal Agencies), PALT(Procurement Administrative Lead Time). Author(s) subject terms: Productivity, Automated Contracting. Includes bibliographical references (p. 114-116). Also available in print.
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MA, Yiu Chung. "CEO compensation and loan contracting." Digital Commons @ Lingnan University, 2011. https://commons.ln.edu.hk/econ_etd/3.
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The agency theory literature implies the pay-performance based managerial compensation can relieve the agency problem between shareholders and managers. As the interests of shareholders and managers are aligned, managers have incentive to invest in best projects and hence to improve firms’ performance. While the use of equity compensation to managers may reduce the agency cost between managers and shareholders, its impact on agency cost of debts is ambiguous. On the one hand, a large portion of equity compensation discourages risk-averse managers to invest in risky investment and hence reduce the credit risk. On the other hand, while the equity compensation brings the interests of managers in alignment to shareholder it may encourage managers to take opportunistic corporate strategies and to exploit the wealth of creditors. As a result, creditors may response to the CEO compensation package by imposing different covenant restrictions according to their perception of the credit risk.
Supported with empirical evidence, this research finds that loan agreement contains more restrictive covenants if the firm’s CEO has a higher portion of option compensation to the total compensation, but contains less restrictive covenants if the firm’s CEO has a higher portion of stock compensation to the total compensation. It implies that creditors view that the increase in the use of option compensation would increase the credit risk of the firm, while the increase in the use of stock compensation would decrease the credit risk. This research also investigates the relation between the CEO option compensation and some specific financial covenants. The finding shows that the use of liquidity covenant and minimum net worth covenant is positively related to the CEO option compensation.
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Carter, Donald Kyle. "Department of the Army field contracting activities' contracting efforts with the Federal Prison Industries, Inc." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 1993. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA276426.
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Ensley, Trent K. "Department of the Army field contracting activities' contracting efforts under the Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 1993. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA276359.
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Quander, Angel Y., and Jillian N. Woppert. "Analysis of alpha contracting from three perspectives: government contracting, the government program office, and industry." Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10569.
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Joint Applied ProjectApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited
Since it's inception as a 1990s-era acquisition reform, alpha contracting has been a collaborative effort utilized in a sole-source environment between government and industry to streamline an acquisition from beginning to end. This work examines alpha contracting from the three perspectives of the government contracting office, government program office, and industry to provide comprehensive data resulting in best practices for all participants at the Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM). This study analyzes literature review, case studies, and the results of a survey that was distributed to members of each of the three perspectives to identify attitudes toward using alpha contracting, as well as the audience's perceptions of efficacy and self-efficacy. Also, examined through this work are the benefits, challenges and risks to each of the three perspectives. The recommendation from this project is to utilize the results of this study to improve alpha contracting at RDECOM.
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Loftus, Brion William. "Department of the Navy field contracting activities' contracting efforts with the Federal Prison Industries, Inc." Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/26445.
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Murphy, Jay A. "Design-build contracting in the Navy." Thesis, Springfield, Va. : Available from National Technical Information Service, 1999. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA367219.
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Glaser, Eric L. "Pareto optimum improvement in Government contracting." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 1999. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA374474.
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Thesis (M.S. in Management) Naval Postgraduate School, December 1999."December 1999". Thesis advisor(s): David R. Henderson, Jeffrey R. Cuskey. Includes bibliographical references (p. 131-134). Also available online.
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Perez, Maria. "Electronic Contracting for Inter-Enterprise Collaboration." Thesis, Blekinge Tekniska Högskola, Avdelningen för för interaktion och systemdesign, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:bth-1249.
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A Virtual Enterprise (VE) is a temporal alliance between two or more Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) geographically dispersed, which collaborate together in order to reach new business opportunities that would be unreachable in other ways. It is a business collaboration paradigm that aims at responding to the uncertainty and instability of the current global economy. VE requires support for electronic contract management, since electronic contracts formalize the agreements between the participating enterprises and coordinate their behavior. Although there is an abundance of previous work on electronic contracts, there is a lack of models and approaches related to VE contracts, which have an intrinsic dynamic and flexible nature, since they regulate independent behavior of diverse parties, and also aim at high automation in the formation and execution. This thesis aims at contributing to the VE contracting challenge. It includes a state of the art survey that identifies useful technologies and describes the most significant or relevant approaches. The state of the art survey identifies three main contracting issues: Contract specification, which determines the structure, content and performance of the contract; deontic logic norms, which represent the contractual interactions between the parties in terms of obligations, prohibitions and permissions; and ontology, which provides contracts with semantic meaning and allows interoperability. Furthermore, a simple XML-based VE Contract Representation Language and a Layered Contract Ontology, which provides common vocabulary to the contractual parties, are presented. Finally a VE scenario, including the associated contract, is described as an illustrative example.
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Maenhout, Mascha. "Strain fields within contracting skeletal muscle." Eindhoven : Maastricht : Technische Universiteit Eindhoven ; University Library, Maastricht University [Host], 2002. http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=7018.
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