Books on the topic 'Construction contracts – Mathematical models'
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William, Schwartzkopf, ed. Calculating lost labor productivity in construction claims. New York: Wiley Law Publications, 1995.
Find full textMarcet, Albert. Recursive contracts. Florence: European University Institute, 1998.
Find full textKalashnikov, Vladimir Vi͡acheslavovich. Mathematical methods for construction of queueing models. Pacific Grove, Calif: Wadsworth & Brooks/Cole, 1990.
Find full textKalashnikov, V. V., and S. T. Rachev. Mathematical Methods for Construction of Queueing Models. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-1475-2.
Full textEnglmaier, Florian. Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion. Bonn, Germany: IZA, 2005.
Find full textBarten, A. P. Methodological aspects of macroeconomic model construction. Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia, 1987.
Find full textLacker, Jeffrey Malcolm. Optimal contracts under costly state falsification. West Lafayette, Ind: Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, and Management Sciences, Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, 1989.
Find full textLacker, Jeffrey Malcolm. Optimal contracts under costly state falsification. West Lafayette, Ind: Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, and Management Sciences, Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, 1988.
Find full textFredley, John. Contracts with the trades: Scope of work models for home builders. Washington, D.C: Home Builder Press, 1997.
Find full textP, Baker George. Subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993.
Find full textBajari, Patrick L. Bidding for incomplete contracts: An empirical analysis. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.
Find full textMathewson, G. Frank. Incentives and exclusive dealing in franchise contracts. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1985.
Find full textLang, William W. An examination of wage behavior in macroeconomic models with long term contracts. [Philadelphia, Pa.]: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 1989.
Find full textKolotilov, I︠U︡ V. Simulation of construction operations in analytical systems. New York: Izvestiya Publishers of the Administration of the President of Russian Federation, 2013.
Find full textBright, Judy Kathryn, ed. Mathematics for carpentry and the construction trades. 2nd ed. Upper Saddle River, N.J: Prentice Hall, 2002.
Find full textHori, Kazumi. Hōrudo appu mondai ni kansuru keiyaku no riron oyobi sono keiyakuhō no bunseki e no ōyō. Tōkyō: Mitsubishi Keizai Kenkyūjo, 2008.
Find full textEdlin, Aaron S. Contract renegotiation in agency problems. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1997.
Find full textHosios, Arthur. Self-selection with renegotiation. Toronto: Dept. of Economics and Institute for Policy Analysis, University of Toronto, 1991.
Find full textHosios, Arthur. Self-selection with renegotiation. Toronto: Dept. of Economics, Institute for Policy Analysis, University of Toronto, 1988.
Find full textNakaizumi, Takuya. Fukanbi keiyaku riron no ōyō kenkyū: Application of incomplete contract theory. Yokohama-shi: Kantō Gakuin Daigaku Shuppankai, 2004.
Find full textHori, Kazumi. Hōrudo appu mondai ni kansuru keiyaku no riron oyobi sono keiyakuhō no bunseki e no ōyō. Tōkyō: Mitsubishi Keizai Kenkyūjo, 2008.
Find full textArvan, Lanny David. Optimal long term labor contracts when workers have heterogenous opportunities. [Urbana]: College of Commerce and Business Administration, Bureau of Economic and Business Research, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1985.
Find full textFuhrer, Jeffrey C. Optimal monetary policy in a model of overlapping price contracts. [Boston]: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1994.
Find full textA, Hart Robert. Wage and profit sharing compensation under efficient contracts. Stirling: Department of Economics, University of Stirling, 1989.
Find full textGibson, Rajna. Option valuation: Analyzing and pricing standardized option contracts. Genève: Georg, 1988.
Find full textOption valuation: Analyzing and pricing standardized option contracts. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991.
Find full textConcrete and concrete structures: Numerical modelling and applications. London: Elsevier Applied Science, 1989.
Find full textCarbonell-Nicolau, Oriol. Testing out contractual incompleteness: Evidence from soccer. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005.
Find full textCarbonell-Nicolau, Oriol. Testing out contractual incompleteness: Evidence from soccer. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005.
Find full textRosen, Sherwin. Contracts and the market for executives. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1990.
Find full textRosén, Åsa. Contributions to the theory of labour contracts. [Gothenberg: Göteborgs universitet, 1991.
Find full textJovanovic, Boyan. Contracts and money. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996.
Find full textL, Gruneberg Stephen, ed. The economics of the modern construction sector. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.
Find full textBentolila, Samuel. The macroeconomic impact of flexible labour contracts: An application to Spain. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1991.
Find full textGorton, Gary. The design of bank loan contracts, collateral, and renegotiation. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993.
Find full textLevin, Jonathan. Contracting for government services: Theory and evidence from U.S. cities. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.
Find full textRey, Patrick. The role of exclusive territories in producers' competition. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1994.
Find full textLevin, Jonathan. Contracting for government services: Theory and evidence from u.s. cities. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.
Find full textBernheim, B. Douglas. Exclusive dealing. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996.
Find full textTheodoridis, Ariane. Currency basket construction and currency basket policy: Theoretical and empirical aspects of currency basket construction and currency basket policy in Austria and the Nordic countries. Genéve: Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales, 1997.
Find full textIvakhnenko, Alekseĭ Grigorʹevich. Modeli i metody upravlenii͡a︡ ėnergeticheskim stroitelʹstvom. Kiev: "Budivelʹnyk", 1985.
Find full textKhibukhin, V. P. Matematicheskie metody planirovanii͡a︡ i upravlenii͡a︡ stroitelʹstvom. 2nd ed. Leningrad: Stroĭizdat, Leningradskoe otd-nie, 1990.
Find full textLinguistic geometry: From search to construction. Boston: Kluwer Academic, 2000.
Find full textFabel, Oliver. Insurance and incentives in labor contracts: A study in the theory of implicit contracts. Frankfurt am Main: A. Hain, 1990.
Find full textKaplow, Louis. Optimal insurance contracts when establishing the amount of losses is costly. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993.
Find full textEdlin, Aaron S. Cadillac contracts and up-front payments: Efficient investment under expectation damages. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1994.
Find full textSchmitz, Patrick. Investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts. Aachen: Shaker, 1999.
Find full textAntràs, Pol. Incomplete contracts and the product cycle. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003.
Find full textPfeffer, Karin. Integrating spatio-temporal environmental models for planning ski runs. Utrecht: Koninklijk Nederlands Aardrijkskundig Genootschap, 2003.
Find full textSercu, Piet. The optimal number of contracts in cross- or delta-hedges. Kowloon, Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics and Finance, 1997.
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