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Journal articles on the topic 'Constitutional law – Ireland'
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1
Quinlivan, Shivaun, and Lucy-Ann Buckley. "Reasonable accommodation in Irish constitutional law: two steps forward and one step back – or simply out of step?" Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 72, no. 1 (July 1, 2021): 61–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v72i1.551.
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By ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), Ireland has committed to implementing the principle of reasonable accommodation in multiple contexts. To date, however, it has failed to expand existing legislative measures. This article analyses the potential of the Irish Constitution to encompass a reasonable accommodation duty and meet Ireland’s CRPD obligations. It examines the constitutional model of equality, as well as judicial conceptualisations of disability, and argues that the Constitution is capable of accommodating a more robust legislative standard for reasonable accommodation than often thought, which is compatible with the CRPD. It also contends that recent decisions offer potential for the development of a constitutional reasonable accommodation duty. However, these apparent gains are fragile and the current constitutional capacity to accommodate CRPD requirements is undermined by continuing judicial contestation. The Constitution should therefore be amended so that Ireland can meet its international human rights obligations.
2
Horigan, Damien P. "Facilitating Korean Reconciliation through Constitutional Law." International Studies Review 10, no. 2 (October 15, 2009): 53–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2667078x-01002003.
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This article looks at the so-called Korean Problem or Korean Question from a fresh perspective. Instead of advocating a quick yet costly reunification of Korea along German lines or any specific type of federation, confederation, or commonwealth, a new approach to both Korean reconciliation and possible reunification based on negotiated constitutional change, the symbolic power of constitutions, and the Habermasian concept of constitutional patriotism is proposed. Specifically, the example of the Northern Ireland peace process is presented as an alternative legal model that can be creatively applied to conditions on the Korean Peninsula.
3
Butler, Andrew S. "JM Kelly's The Irish Constitution." Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 26, no. 3 (September 2, 1996): 615. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v26i3.6160.
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This article is a book review of G Hogan and G Whyte JM Kelly's The Irish Constitution (3rd ed, Buttersworths, Dublin, 1994) 1222 + cxxii pages (including index). A noticeable feature of the commentary and jurisprudence on modern New Zealand public law has been the willingness to draw on comparative material. Butler notes that Ireland is one such jurisdiction from which New Zealand draws inspiration, including Ireland's single transferable vote system (New Zealand's voting system at the time), as well as Ireland's status as a republic (given New Zealand's continued debate over republicanism). Butler concludes that the book is a worthwhile purchase for anyone for whom it is necessary to have ready, comprehensible and comprehensive access to Irish constitutional law.
4
Avtonomov, Alexei. "New Zealand Constitution: a fusion of legislative acts, case law (stare decisis), customs (conventions) and treaties." Sravnitel noe konstitucionnoe obozrenie 29, no. 5 (2020): 26–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.21128/1812-7126-2020-5-26-38.
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The article examines the genesis of the Constitution of New Zealand, the formation of its constituent parts and the main sources of constitutional law; it generally profiles the Constitution. The article shows the mutual influence and interweaving of the components of the unconsolidated Constitution of New Zealand in contemporary conditions. In particular, the constitutional provisions presented in the Treaty of Waitangi are examined, and attention is focused on the contemporary problems of its current interpretation and application, although the historical context of its drafting and conclusion is shown. The article deals with the interpretation of some basic constitutional terms when using different official languages of New Zealand, first of all Maori and English tongues. In this regard, one of the urgent issues, which are being discussed quite widely in New Zealand, is the discrepancies found in the wording of fundamental constitutional provisions in the official texts of the Treaty of Waitangi in these two languages. The article examines a number of court decisions containing constitutionally significant precedents (stare decisis), including those on the application of the Treaty of Waitangi. The article shows how, as a result of the judicial complex interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi and the legislation, the principles of the said Treaty have been developed. The article provides a general characterization of the laws and other regulatory legal acts that together form part of the unconsolidated Constitution of New Zealand. Special attention is paid to the 1986 Act of Constitution because of the importance of the constitutional issues regulated by this statute. The development of constitutional provisions in the 1986 Act of Constitution in comparison with the previous 1852 Act of Constitution is presented. At the same time, the laws, which are considered in New Zealand as an integral part of the Constitution, are summarized. The place and role of the laws of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the modern Constitution of New Zealand are determined. Along with this, other regulatory legal acts that form part of the Constitution are being investigated, in particular, the Letters Patent and the Cabinet Manual. The article also presents New Zealand customs, which have constitutional significance, including conventional norms, and the peculiarities of their application.
5
O'Donoghue, Aoife, and Ben T. C. Warwick. "Constitutionally questioned: UK debates, international law and Northern Ireland." Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 66, no. 1 (August 17, 2018): 93–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v66i1.145.
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This comment examines the proposed UK constitutional changes proffered following the no vote in the Scottish independence referendum from an international legal perspective. With a particular focus on the implications for Northern Ireland, this piece considers the possible consequences of further devolution, proposed federalism, changes to the UK’s relationship with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), modifications of relations with the European Union (EU) and the potential effects of change to the relationship with the Republic of Ireland. In looking at these issues through the lens of international law, this comment brings a fresh perspective to questions of constitutional change for Northern Ireland.
6
Daly, Eoin. "Competing Concepts of Religious Freedom Through the Lens of Religious Product Authentication Laws." Ecclesiastical Law Journal 13, no. 3 (August 11, 2011): 298–332. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0956618x1100041x.
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Religious product authentication laws, predicated on conceptions of doctrinal authenticity, risk curtailing the religious freedom of dissenting adherents engaged in non-orthodox forms of the regulated practice. They may also entail discrimination between, or even the ‘establishment’ of, competing doctrinal viewpoints within religions. This raises important constitutional and theoretical questions surrounding the conceptual necessity, to religious freedom, of state neutrality in religious controversies. Comparative church–state jurisprudence reveals strikingly different approaches to the question of the compatibility of religious product authentication laws with constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and state neutrality. The religion clauses of the United States Constitution preclude regulatory schemes incorporating doctrinal concepts of authenticity, whereas a failed constitutional challenge in Ireland (to a law regulating the sale of Mass cards in Ireland) rejected the contention that such laws denied constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and non-discrimination on religious grounds. This article argues that these contrasting approaches to the constitutionality of religious product authentication laws illustrate a deeper conflict surrounding the very concept of religious freedom. In particular, this comparative constitutional jurisprudence crystallises broader normative debates surrounding the competing claims of recognition and neutrality with regard to religion.
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Whelan, Darius. "Application of the Paternalism Principle to Constitutional Rights: Mental Health Case-Law in Ireland." European Journal of Health Law 28, no. 3 (June 11, 2021): 223–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718093-bja10047.
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Abstract In adjudicating on matters relating to fundamental constitutional or human rights, courts make important statements about the principles which apply. The principles articulated will have a profound impact on the outcomes of such cases, and on the development of case-law in the relevant field. In the fields of medical law and mental health law, various courts have moved away from deference to medical decision-making and paternalism to a person-centred rights-based approach. However, courts in Ireland have continued to interpret mental health law in a paternalistic fashion, praising paternalism as if it is particularly suitable for mental health law. This raises profound questions about judicial attitudes to people with mental health conditions and judicial reluctance to confer full personhood on people with disabilities. This article outlines case-law in Ireland regarding paternalism in mental health law and discusses the consequences for constitutional rights in Ireland.
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Young, Alison L. "The Constitutional Implications of Brexit." European Public Law 23, Issue 4 (November 1, 2017): 757–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/euro2017043.
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This Article investigates the constitutional implications of Brexit, focusing on the extent to which Brexit challenges the classification of the UK constitution as a self-correcting unitary democracy, upholding parliamentary sovereignty. It argues that, Brexit removes some of the European layer from the UK’s emerging multi-layered constitution, but in doing so it threatens to undermine the delicate relationship between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland on which the Union is based, particularly in the light of recent political events. In addition, it argues that Brexit may not restore the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament and may also mark a further moment in the constitutionalization of the UK, modifying the balance of power between Parliament and the courts by placing more decision-making power in the hands of the courts.
9
Cahill, Maria. "Recognising Freedom of Thought in Irish Constitutional Law." European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 8, no. 2-3 (March 30, 2021): 171–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22134514-bja10015.
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Abstract Recent technological advances have made clear that the law needs to take a stance in relation to freedom of thought. Although there is no formal recognition of freedom of thought in the text of the 1937 Constitution of Ireland, I will argue that such a right does exist in Irish law on the basis of both implicit and initial explicit recognition for freedom of thought in the decisions of the superior courts. Part 2 lays out the ways in which freedom of thought is implicitly recognised in the Irish legal system, both through the protection of other constitutional rights and through the place of international law in the Irish legal order. Part 3 takes the analysis a step further, using the doctrine of unenumerated rights (a peculiarity of Irish constitutional law) to spotlight an overlooked Supreme Court judgment in which the right to freedom of thought has been judicially recognised in the absence of a textual mandate in the Constitution. It then proceeds to shore up arguments in favour of such recognition, arguing that protecting freedom of thought is a good thing, because it honours human freedom and human dignity.
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Dickson, Brice, and Tom Hickey. "Nationality and Citizenship in Ireland, North and South." Irish Studies in International Affairs 35, no. 2 (2024): 164–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/isia.2024.a932295.
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ABSTRACT: This article examines how British and/or Irish nationality is currently acquired and lost, first under the law in Northern Ireland and then under the law in Ireland. It looks at some of the rights that Irish citizens currently have in the UK and that UK citizens currently have in Ireland, paying particular attention to the impact of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement of 1998 on those rights. It then considers what rights British nationals in Northern Ireland who do not wish to be Irish nationals should acquire if Northern Ireland were to become part of a united Ireland. It posits that in such a new constitutional dispensation it would be inappropriate to continue to deny to these 'British-only' citizens the rights to vote in presidential elections and in constitutional referenda and the rights to stand for election to the presidency and to either of the houses of the legislature.
11
Bierbach, Jeremy B. "The ‘Person of Northern Ireland’: A Vestigial Form of EU Citizenship?" European Constitutional Law Review 17, no. 2 (June 2021): 232–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019621000134.
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Northern Ireland – United Kingdom – Republic of Ireland – Divergent development of Irish and British nationality law – Citizenship of the European Union – Good Friday Agreement – Brexit – Emma DeSouza – Family unity as a source of constitutional conflict – Reverse discrimination – Cross-border equality as a means of representation reinforcement – Richard Plender
12
Daly, Brenda. "“Braxton Hick’s” or the Birth of a New Era? Tracing the Development of Ireland’s Abortion Laws in Respect of European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence." European Journal of Health Law 18, no. 4 (2011): 375–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157180911x585270.
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AbstractIn Ireland, Article 40.3.3° of Bunreacht na hÉireann (the Irish Constitution) guarantees the right to life of the unborn child and the equal right to life of the mother. Abortion in Ireland is permissible only where there is a real and substantial risk to the mother’s own life. Since Ireland became a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950,2 there have been concerns that it could result in Ireland being compelled to introduce a right to abortion.3 This article commences with a review of the extant law on abortion in Ireland, tracing the Constitutional protection afforded to the unborn child. The article will discuss the impact of the European Court of Human Rights’4 jurisprudence in regard to access to abortion and to information on abortion services in Ireland in an effort to ascertain if it really has resulted in a radical change to Irish abortion laws. As such, it will also be necessary to examine the more recent decisions of the ECtHR such as Tysiac v. Poland,5 and A, B, and C v. Ireland,6 to determine both the approach of the ECtHR to access to abortion in general and also to consider if it has resulted in a liberalisation of abortion law in Ireland.
13
Orr, D. Alan. "England, Ireland, Magna Carta, and the Common Law: The Case of Connor Lord Maguire, Second Baron of Enniskillen." Journal of British Studies 39, no. 4 (October 2000): 389–421. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/386226.
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The treason trial of Connor Lord Maguire, second baron of Enniskillen, in February 1645 brought into focus competing conceptions of the constitutional relationship of England and Ireland. Maguire had been implicated in the plot to seize Dublin Castle on 23 October 1641 during the Irish revolt of that year and was tried in early 1645 before a Middlesex jury. The key issue of the trial was whether Maguire, as a peer of Ireland, having committed treasonable acts in Ireland and elsewhere and being brought “into England against his will, might be lawfully tryed … in the King's Bench at Westminster by a Middlesex Jury, and outed of his tryal by Irish Peers of his condition by the statute of 35 Henry VIII c. 2.” In the earl of Stafford's trial almost four years earlier, the defense had consistently assumed a position that will be termed Irish constitutional exceptionalism. Both Strafford and other apologists for his rule as Lord Deputy in Ireland during the 1630s adopted this constitutional stance in response to proceedings against them in both the English and Irish Parliaments during 1641. It held that while Magna Carta and the common law generally held sway in Ireland, because of circumstances unique to that particular kingdom, significant exceptions existed with regard to the legal rights and privileges these legal instruments conferred on the king's Irish subjects. In contrast, the case for Maguire rested on a view of the constitutional relationship of England and Ireland that emphasized a more closely shared heritage of legal privileges for both commoners and peers as guaranteed by Magna Carta and the common law—a position best characterized as constitutionalist.
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de Londras, Fiona. "Constitutionalizing Fetal Rights: A Salutary Tale from Ireland." Michigan Journal of Gender & Law, no. 22.2 (2015): 243. http://dx.doi.org/10.36641/mjgl.22.2.constitutionalizing.
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In 1983, Ireland became the first country in the world to constitutionalize fetal rights. The 8th Amendment to the Constitution, passed by a referendum of the People, resulted in constitutional protection for “the right to life of the unborn,” which was deemed “equal” to the right to life of the “mother.” Since then, enshrining fetal rights in constitutions and in legislation has emerged as a key part of anti-abortion campaigning. This Article traces the constitutionalization of fetal rights in Ireland and its implications for law, politics, and women. In so doing, it provides a salutary tale of such an approach. More than thirty years after the 8th Amendment, it has become clear that Ireland now has an abortion law regime that is essentially “unliveable.” Not only that, but it has a body of jurisprudence so deeply determined by a constitutionalized fetal-rights orientation that law, politics, and medical practice are deeply impacted and strikingly constrained. This is notwithstanding the clear hardship women in Ireland experience as a result of constitutionalized fetal rights and the resultant almost-total prohibition on accessing abortion in Ireland. This Article argues that, wherever one stands on the question of whether legal abortion ought to be broadly available in a particular jurisdiction, constitutionalizing fetal rights leaves no meaningful space for judgment at either political or personal levels. Furthermore, constitutionalizing fetal rights can have unforeseen implications across jurisprudence and medical practice, creating a situation in which there is essentially no space for more liberal interpretations that respect women’s reproductive autonomy. While this may be desirable from an ideological perspective for those who hold a firm anti-abortion position, it is distinctively problematic for women and for politics.
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Malagodi, Mara, Luke McDonagh, and Thomas Poole. "New Dominion constitutionalism at the twilight of the British Empire: An introduction." International Journal of Constitutional Law 17, no. 4 (October 2019): 1166–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icon/moz082.
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Abstract This introduction to the symposium on New Dominion constitutionalism sketches the legal configuration of New Dominion status and the intellectual context from which it emerged. Dominionhood originally represented a halfway house between colonial dependence and postcolonial independence, as developed in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. By contrast, New Dominion constitutionalism refers to the transitional constitutional form developed after World War I in Ireland (1922–1937)—the “Bridge Dominion”—and the post-World War II “New” Dominions of India (1947–1950), Pakistan (1947–1956), and Ceylon (later Sri Lanka, 1948–1972). New Dominion constitutionalism represents the first model designed to manage political transitions on a global scale. Both transitional and transnational, New Dominion constitutions served as a provisional frame of government and the juridical basis for the independent constitution. Although the notion of Dominion fell into disuse, it reemerged as the concept of Commonwealth Realm through which the majority of the remaining British colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean acquired independence.
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Elliott, Mark. "Constitutional Adjudication and Constitutional Politics in the United Kingdom: The Miller II Case in Legal and Political Context." European Constitutional Law Review 16, no. 4 (December 2020): 625–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019620000401.
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For a number of years there has been nothing at all unusual about the United Kingdom finding itself in a state of constitutional upheaval; indeed, for some time, this has been the UK constitution’s default setting. This has sometimes been as a result of long-anticipated and carefully planned reforms, such as the enactment, in the late 1990s, of legislation to give domestic effect to the European Convention on Human Rights and to introduce devolved systems of government in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In contrast, more recent upheaval is attributable to often unexpected reactions to often unexpected events. For example, legislation making substantial changes to the devolution scheme in Scotland – providing, among other things, for the constitutional permanence of the Scottish Parliament and Government – was enacted to implement panicked promises made by UK politicians in the dying days of the Scottish independence referendum campaign, at which point a vote in favour of independence seemed a distinct possibility. And then, needless to say, there is Brexit – about which it is almost impossible to be guilty of hyperbole when describing its constitutional implications, so numerous and potentially far-reaching are they.
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Brazier, Rodney. "The Constitution of the United Kingdom." Cambridge Law Journal 58, no. 1 (March 1999): 96–128. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008197399001063.
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BEFORE the dawn of the millennium new legislative and executive authorities will have been established in Edinburgh, Cardiff and (subject to further political and other progress) in Belfast. This article analyses the nature of these constitutional initiatives, and examines their place in the unitary state which is the United Kingdom. It begins by tracing the history of constitutional union between England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. The legal effect of the 1998 devolution statutes is examined, in particular on the legal sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament. A triple constitutional and legal lock exists in the Scotland Act 1998 to ensure that the devolution settlement is the final step away from the pure unitary state which has enfolded Scotland in Great Britain. The nature and likely success of that lock are analysed in some detail. The lawmaking powers of the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly, and the Northern Ireland Assembly are assessed. The similarities and differences between each of the three devolved governments and the British Government are highlighted, and consequences and possible lessons for future government-making at Westminster are drawn. The article concludes with a peer into the possible constitutional futures for the United Kingdom.
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Denisenko, Vladislav V. "Deliberativity and aleatory procedures as a legitimation of somatic human rights: experience of the Republic of Ireland and the Commonwealth of Australia." Gosudarstvo i pravo, no. 1 (2023): 100. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s102694520024101-2.
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The article demonstrates the importance of deliberative institutions and procedures in constitutional politics, on the example of the regulation of somatic and genetic human rights. The article identifies the relationship between the effectiveness of legal regulation and deliberative communication in the context of the “juridification of society”. The methodological foundations of deliberative procedures are revealed. In this work, we analyze the reasons for the development of deliberative procedures in the context of biopolitics. Particular attention is paid to the process of expanding the scope of legal regulation in the information state, and we have shown the historical process of increasing relations regulated by law. The authors illustrate the specifics of the legitimation of somatic human rights in a modern state and explore the current procedures for the legitimation of law. A comparative legal analysis of the deliberation principle in the adoption to public law decisions and the achievement of public consensus is given. The authors also assess the degree of significance of aleatory procedures, examining for this purpose the process of constitutional novelization on the example of amending national constitutions (for example, the Constitutions of the Republic of Ireland and the Commonwealth of Australia). This research also shows the effectiveness of certain aleatory procedures with the participation of randomly selected citizens, among them special attention is paid to the so-called “civil assemblies” and “citizens’ jury”. Such aleatory institutional forms are assessed as an important condition for the legitimacy and effectiveness of constitutional reforms.
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Sloan, Brian. "THE CONCEPT OF COUPLEDOM IN SUCCESSION LAW." Cambridge Law Journal 70, no. 3 (November 2011): 623–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008197311000882.
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Historically, English and Irish Law were both distinctly protective of marriage (still understood as an exclusively heterosexual institution)1 as compared to other forms of adult relationship. In the 1950 English case of Gammans v. Ekins, it was famously deemed an “abuse of the English language” to say that an unmarried couple “masquerading” as husband and wife were members of the same family.2 In its Constitution, meanwhile, the Irish state “pledges itself to guard with special care the institution of Marriage, on which the Family is founded, and to protect it against attack”.3 The powerfulness of this “pledge” can be seen from the fact that divorce was not possible in Ireland until a 1995 referendum resulted in a constitutional amendment.4
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Saunders, Cheryl. "Australian Federalism and the Role of the Governor-General." International Journal of Legal Information 28, no. 2 (2000): 407–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0731126500009185.
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Australia is both a federation and a constitutional monarchy. The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, which made the Australian Constitution law, refers to the establishment of the federation “under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.” In fact, however, since 1973, the appropriate style of the monarch in relation to Australia has been “Queen of Australia.” And ever since federation, the monarch has been represented in Australia by a Governor-General, who progressively has acquired a more significant role, in parallel with the acquisition of Australian independence.
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Cox, W. Harvey. "NORTHERN IRELAND: DIRTY WARS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMAS*." Parliamentary Affairs 45, no. 4 (October 1992): 693–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pa.a052393.
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McIntyre, Owen. "Soil Protection Law in Ireland." Journal for European Environmental & Planning Law 3, no. 3 (2006): 213–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187601006x00245.
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AbstractIn the absence of Community rules relating to soil contamination and protection, the Irish authorities have neglected to legislate for this issue. While a few common law tortious grounds of action and certain statutory regimes may be applicable to particular cases of soil contamination, their application is arbitrary and piecemeal, depending, for example, on the type of operation originally causing the contamination, on the extent of understanding of the problem at that time, on the nature of its related adverse effects, or on plans for the future use or development of the contaminated site. One particular lacuna in the coverage of the relevant Irish law relates to the problem of historical soil contamination, for which the Irish authorities have felt unable to legislate on account of a constitutional prohibition on retrospective liability. This paper seeks to set out the possible application of existing Irish rules to the problem of historical soil contamination and to highlight the shortcomings inherent therein. It also outlines the non-legislative solutions employed by Irish lawyers in the face of such legal uncertainty. It then goes on to examine the likely impacts of recent key developments, including the 2004 decision of the European Court of Justice in the Van de Walle case and the entry into force of the 2004 Environmental Liability Directive.
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Likhovski, Assaf. "Peripheral Vision: Polish-Jewish Lawyers and Early Israeli Law." Law and History Review 36, no. 2 (February 21, 2018): 235–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0738248017000669.
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Some of the founding fathers of Israel's legal system were lawyers educated in Polish law schools. What was the impact of this background on their legal thought? There are few explicit references to Polish law in Israeli legal texts. However, indirectly, legal and constitutional ideas taken from Polish law did appear in Israeli law. This article focuses on the legal writing of four Israeli lawyers in the period immediately after Israel's independence in 1948, showing how Polish law was used by these lawyers as a source for occasional precedents, for critiquing Israeli law (dominated by English law), and, mostly, for constitutional precedents.The relatively greater impact of Polish law in the constitutional realm can be attributed to the fact that Poland (like other new countries established in the interwar period in the periphery of western Europe, such as Ireland) offered Israeli lawyers constitutional models that were both more modern, and more relevant to the specific circumstances of the new state, where religion played an important role in defining the identity of the nation. The history of the impact of Polish law on Israeli law can thus serve as an example of interwar constitutional innovation in the European periphery, and its later impact on post-World War II constitutional law.
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Anthony, Gordon. "The Uniqueness of Northern Ireland Public Law." Legal Information Management 12, no. 4 (December 2012): 262–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1472669612000606.
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AbstractThis article is broadly based upon a presentation given by Gordon Anthony, which was given at the annual conference of the British and Irish Association of Law Librarians on 15 June 2012 in Belfast. Its purpose is to outline some of the ways in which public law in Northern Ireland is unique within the wider setting of the UK. Although it is true that the law of Northern Ireland shares much in common with principle and practice elsewhere in the UK, there are some notable differences that are attributable to the fact that Northern Ireland has its own court system and legal and political history. The article thus examines some of the differences that exist at the constitutional level and which can be associated with, most famously, the Belfast Agreement 1998. It also summaries some of the differences that can be found at the level of legal citation, for instance of case law and statute law for the jurisdiction.
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O'Neill, Ailbhe. "The Effect of a Finding That Legislation is Unconstitutional: The Approach of the Irish Supreme Court." Common Law World Review 36, no. 3 (September 2007): 220–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1350/clwr.2007.36.3.220.
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A number of common law jurisdictions permit the judiciary to strike down legislation which is inconsistent with that legal system's constitution. The Irish Constitution makes specific provision for this in Article 34.3.2°. The power to declare legislation invalid gives rise to a number of interesting questions concerning the temporal effect of such decisions. In Ireland, the courts have consistently adopted an approach whereby incompatible legislation which postdates the 1937 Constitution is deemed to have been void ab initio. Incompatible legislation originally passed by the British Parliament before 1937 is deemed not to have survived in Irish law from the date of the adoption of the Constitution. This gives rise to interesting issues surrounding the effect of past legal determinations which were based on such legislation. This problematic aspect of constitutional interpretation was considered at length by the Irish Supreme Court in the case of A v The Governor of Arbour Hill Prison (the ‘ A case’) in July 2006. This article explains the approach taken by the Irish courts to this aspect of constitutional interpretation and analyses the way in which the problem of legal effect was approached by the Supreme Court in the A case.
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Enright, Máiréad, Kathryn McNeilly, and Fiona De Londras. "Abortion activism, legal change, and taking feminist law work seriously." Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 71, no. 3 (June 23, 2020): OA7—OA33. http://dx.doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v71i3.317.
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Abortion laws in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland have recently undergone radical reform. This occurred following a 2018 referendum in the Republic and the passing of the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc) Act 2019 in Northern Ireland. In both jurisdictions, these legal changes are the products not only of moments of constitutional and legislative action or of litigation, but of decades of feminist protest and strategising that both generated and exploited moments of legal opportunity. In this article, drawing on a 2018 workshop and qualitative interviews with feminist activists, we focus attention on what we call the ‘feminist law work’ involved in reform, highlighting the role of non-lawyer activists in achieving legal change in instrumental, creative, emotional, and laborious ways. We argue that ‘feminist law work’ should be taken seriously as a highly skilled and indispensable driving force in formal legal change processes.
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Enright, Máiréad, Kathryn McNeilly, and Fiona De Londras. "Abortion activism, legal change, and taking feminist law work seriously." Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 71, no. 3 (November 5, 2020): 359–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v71i3.890.
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Abortion laws in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland have recently undergone radical reform. This occurred following a 2018 referendum in the Republic and the passing of the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc) Act 2019 in Northern Ireland. In both jurisdictions, these legal changes are the products not only of moments of constitutional and legislative action or of litigation, but of decades of feminist protest and strategising that both generated and exploited moments of legal opportunity. In this article, drawing on a 2018 workshop and qualitative interviews with feminist activists, we focus attention on what we call the ‘feminist law work’ involved in reform, highlighting the role of non-lawyer activists in achieving legal change in instrumental, creative, emotional, and laborious ways. We argue that ‘feminist law work’ should be taken seriously as a highly skilled and indispensable driving force in formal legal change processes.
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Anthony, Gordon. "Public Law Litigation and the Belfast Agreement." European Public Law 8, Issue 3 (September 1, 2002): 401–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/5095468.
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This article examines the approach that Northern Ireland courts have taken to the resolution of judicial review applications arising from the implementation of the Belfast Agreement of 1998. Focusing on the insights offered into the relationship between law and politics, and referring the court decisions to academic debates about the need for the adoption of revised juridical techniques in the light of constitutional change, the article suggests that the jurisprudence reflects a tension between more novel and orthodox modes of judicial reasoning. The tension, which has been most apparent in the context of approaches to statutory interpretation, is argued to have led to the Belfast Agreement having only a very limited impact on the outcome of some cases. While the limited impact can be said to be consonant with constitutional orthodoxy, the article suggests that orthodoxy is apt to diminish the significance of the wider process of change ongoing in Northern Ireland. The Belfast Agreement is structured around a number of unique institutional understandings and relations, and it is argued that these demand the adoption of more responsive juridical techniques. Thus the article concludes by identifying those aspects of the jurisprudence that might be said to provide the more appropriate means for the resolution of some Belfast Agreement disputes.
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Sandford, Mark, and Cathy Gormley-Heenan. "‘Taking Back Control’, the UK’s Constitutional Narrative and Schrodinger’s Devolution." Parliamentary Affairs 73, no. 1 (October 30, 2018): 108–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsy039.
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Abstract The UK’s decision to leave the European Union in 2016 threatens to open up a range of territorial management issues that have long remained unexplored. Since 1999, the UK’s devolution settlements have allowed divergent constitutional narratives to develop and to co-exist. This ‘constructive ambiguity’ has led UK territorial governance to take the form of ‘Schrodinger’s devolution’, where Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have and have not experienced fundamental constitutional change. However, the technical requirements of Brexit will mandate the need for exact decisions where ‘constructive ambiguity’ has existed up to now. The UK’s unwritten constitution, limited intergovernmental relations and a lack of shared rule mechanisms mean that these technical decisions have the potential to lead to ongoing political instability.
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Murphy, Mary C. "Reshaping UK/Ireland relations: Brexit’s cross-border and bilateral impact." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 38, no. 1 (January 1, 2022): 205–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grab051.
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Abstract This article considers the implications of Brexit for UK–Irish relations. It examines how Brexit has altered the terms of the British–Irish relationship by considering the impact on bilateral and cross-border economic and trade patterns. The article focuses on two primary economic effects. First, the short-term impact of Brexit and the Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol on the Northern Ireland economy, and on trade relations between Great Britain and Ireland and across the Irish border; and second, how Brexit has spurred a discussion about the (economic) appropriateness of partition on the island of Ireland in the post-Brexit period, the extent to which it has led to increased calls for a border poll, and how any future unification process might be economically managed. This includes some provisional evaluation of the economic costs and challenges in relation to future constitutional change for the island of Ireland and the UK. The discussion here connects with wider British constitutional issues including calls for Scottish independence and the possible break-up of the UK.
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Williams, John. "Law Making in a Devolved Wales: Work in Progress." Legal Information Management 14, no. 4 (December 2014): 266–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1472669614000577.
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AbstractDevolution for Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales resulted in an asymmetrical constitutional framework. The Welsh settlement was more limited than that for Northern Ireland and Scotland. However, since the Government of Wales Acts of 1998 and 2006, Wales has eventually achieved primary law-making powers. Regrettably, the stages leading to the present position resulted in an often confused and confusing body of law. Practitioners wishing to know the content of Welsh law on a subject may encounter a complex tapestry of different types of enactments. The next step for Wales must be improved accessibility and codification. The process of devolution continues. This paper by Professor John Williams was delivered at the BIALL Annual Conference in June 2014.
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Joyce, Orla. "Environmental Liability in Ireland." European Energy and Environmental Law Review 14, Issue 7 (July 1, 2005): 193–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eelr2005029.
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Summary: Environmental offences (whether causing pollution, threatening to cause pollution, breach of a local authority licence or permit, or breach of an IPC or IPPC licence) may be committed by a range of people from a body corporate to an individual manager and the ensuing liabilities can be civil, criminal or both. Claims can be (1) constitutional; (2) statutory (Irish and European); and (3) common law based. I propose in this paper to deal with these liabilities in the environmental context and also to highlight some landmark cases and what is coming down the track in the future.
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Doyle, Oran. "Mapping the Jural Border between Ireland and Northern Ireland." Review of Irish Studies in Europe 6, no. 2 (December 6, 2023): 101–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.32803/rise.v6i2.3229.
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Northern Ireland challenges a Westphalian account of the world in which sovereign states inhabit discrete geographic spaces. Its constitutional future is not determined by the central UK Government, its external border is porous for people and open for goods, some parts of EU law continue to apply. The paper shifts the focus from unitary and coherent sovereign spaces to multiple, varied and overlapping jural spaces, shedding light on some of the challenges that would be faced in the context of Irish unification. Even in a politically unified Irish state, managing the jural border between Ireland and Northern Ireland would remain a key task. The paper outlines a new account of law’s relationship to geographical space, before analysing the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. The paper concludes by addressing some structural issues that would need to be addressed if Irish unification were to occur.
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Suszycka-Jasch, Magdalena, and Hans-Christian Jasch. "The Participation of the German Länder in Formulating German EU-policy." German Law Journal 10, no. 9 (September 1, 2009): 1215–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200018113.
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On the 30 June 2009 the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, FCC) has passed its long-awaited decision on the compatibility of the Act approving the Treaty of Lisbon and the accompanying legislation with the Basic law (Grundgesetz). The FCC's decision according to which the ratification law is compatible with the Basic law was greeted with relief by many German and European policy makers. It has removed another obstacle for the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon in the European Union (EU), which still has to be ratified by Ireland, Poland and the Czech Republic, though. But also Germany's ratification still depends on the amendment of the accompanying “Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in European Union Matters” (“Extending Act”) which the FCC has declared incompatible with the Basic law insofar as the legislature, Bundestag and Bundesrat, have not been accorded sufficient rights of participation in European law-making and treaty amendment procedures. The FCC has therefore ruled that the Federal Republic of Germany's instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon may not be deposited as long as the constitutionally required legal elaboration of the parliamentary rights of participation has not entered into force. This puts pressure on German law-makers to amend the accompanying “Extending Act” possibly before the referendum in Ireland and before German elections in autumn 2009.
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Ginter, Carri. "Constitutionality of the European Stability Mechanism in Estonia: Applying Proportionality to Sovereignty." European Constitutional Law Review 9, no. 2 (August 23, 2013): 335–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019612001174.
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The Supreme Court en banc was forced to make a rushed judgment in a situation of confusion, uncertainty and absence of legal certainty prevailing in the Estonian and the EU legal environment.Dissenting justice Jaak LuikOn 12 September 2012 the Bundesverfassungsgericht gave the green light for Germany to ratify the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty), but made ratification conditional upon international law arrangements to be made to guarantee an interpretation of the ESM Treaty which would be in line with the German Grundgesetz. Although the constitutional challenge in Germany, which is the largest ‘donor’ to the ESM, was certainly of core importance as to whether the member states would be able to launch the mechanism at all, the constitutional challenges in other member states also deserve academic attention. The reference for a preliminary ruling by the Supreme Court of Ireland raised serious questions concerning the conformity of the ESM Treaty with EU law. In its Pringle decision the Court of Justice dismissed the concerns raised in the reference as being unfounded.This article focuses on the compatibility of the ‘emergency voting’ mechanism set out in Article 4(4) ESM Treaty with the principles of democracy, the rule of law and sovereignty raised before the Supreme Court of Estonia. The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia [Eesti Vabariigipõhiseadus] (henceforth: the Constitution) and the Acts of the Republic of Estonia do not foresee a separate constitutional court or the possibility of an individual constitutional petition. Thus, the issue of the constitutionality of the emergency voting procedure contained in the ESM Treaty was raised ex officio in abstract constitutional review proceedings by the Estonian Chancellor of Justice [Õiguskantsler], which ‘in Estonia combines the function of the general body of petition and the guardian of constitutionality.’ The petition for review focused on the fact that substantial budgetary decisions could be made in the future under the emergency voting procedure without the involvement of the Estonian parliament. According to the petition, ‘[w]ith accession to the Treaty the budgetary policy choices of the Riigikogu will diminish.’
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Oliver, Peter C. "“Dominion status”: History, framework and context." International Journal of Constitutional Law 17, no. 4 (October 2019): 1173–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icon/moz078.
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Abstract This article attempts to explain “Dominion status” by various means. First, it notes that the word “Dominion” has had different meanings over time, even though it is most closely associated with the status acquired by Australia, Canada, Ireland, Newfoundland, New Zealand, and South Africa in the years 1926 to 1931. Second, Dominion status from 1926 to 1931 is compared to the constitutional claims made a century and a half earlier by American colonists. Third, Dominion Status as of 1931 is explained by way of comparison with what came before, paying particular attention to issues of repugnancy, extraterritoriality, reservation and disallowance. And, finally, this article observes the importance of constitutional conventions throughout.
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Flanagan, Brian, and Sinéad Ahern. "JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING AND TRANSNATIONAL LAW: A SURVEY OF COMMON LAW SUPREME COURT JUDGES." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 60, no. 1 (January 2011): 1–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020589310000655.
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AbstractThis is a survey study of 43 judges from the British House of Lords, the Caribbean Court of Justice, the High Court of Australia, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, and the Supreme Courts of Ireland, India, Israel, Canada, New Zealand and the United States on the use of foreign law in constitutional rights cases. We find that the conception of apex judges citing foreign law as a source of persuasive authority (associated with Anne-Marie Slaughter, Vicki Jackson and Chris McCrudden) is of limited application. Citational opportunism and the aspiration to membership of an emerging international ‘guild’ appear to be equally important strands in judicial attitudes towards foreign law. We argue that their presence is at odds with Ronald Dworkin's theory of legal objectivity, and is revealed in a manner meeting his own methodological standard for attitudinal research.Wordsworth's words, written about the French Revolution, will, I hope, still ring true: Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive. But to be young was very heaven.– Justice Stephen Breyer's assessment of ‘the global legal enterprise now upon us’ before the American Society of International Law (2003)
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Doyle, Oran. "Populist constitutionalism and constituent power." German Law Journal 20, no. 2 (April 2019): 161–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/glj.2019.11.
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AbstractConstituent power is a helpful component of constitutional theory because it provides a conceptual and potentially normative explanation of how a new constitution can be made without any existing legal authority to do so. Contemporary theories of constituent power, however, unhelpfully treat constituent power as a fictive entity, typically the people, that subsists through time. This predominant account of constituent power fails adequately to explain examples of constitution-making and also lends support to the populist claim that a unitary and unchanging people has an immanent but continuing role as a constitutional actor superior to the constitution itself. This enables populist leaders to rely on prevalent understandings of constitutionalism to support the sidestepping and/or removal of constraints on their power. In this Article, I trace the connections between mainstream theories of constituent power and the academically peripheral claims of populist constitutionalism. I argue for a different understanding of constituent power as a capacity that, in principle, may momentarily be exercised by any entity. This explains how a new constitution can unlawfully replace a pre-existing constitution yet come to have lawful authority itself, without implying the diachronic existence of the constituent power as an entity. I illustrate this understanding of constituent power with reference to the constitutional development of Taiwan and Ireland. These examples show—contrary to the predominant account of constituent power—that constitutional systems may be created without the exercise of constituent power and that constitutional law can play an important role in constructing an entity capable of exercising constituent power. Seen in this way, popular references in preambles are important not for their account of how a constitution was made but rather for their account of whom a constitution is for. This account of constituent power undermines core claims of populist constitutionalism. But it also provides a salutary lesson for liberal constitutionalists: a constitution adopted for a people must broadly serve the interests of that people.
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Fahey, Elaine. "A Constitutional Crisis in a Teacup: The Supremacy of EC Law in Ireland." European Public Law 15, Issue 4 (December 1, 2009): 515–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/euro2009036.
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Villadangos Seijas, Esther. "Irlanda : reforma constitucional versus convención constitucional : análisis del déjà vu de Irlanda desde la perspectiva de la reforma constituciónal española." Teoría y Realidad Constitucional, no. 30 (June 1, 2012): 411. http://dx.doi.org/10.5944/trc.30.2012.7014.
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El presente artículo se centra en el estudio de la gestación de la crisis económica en Irlanda y en el análisis de las respuestas constitucionales a la misma. En primer lugar se analiza el papel de la reforma constitucional, estudiando el mecanismo diseñado en los arts. 46 y 47 de la Constitución. El carácter preceptivo del referéndum ha reforzado la implicación social en un total de 23 reformas aprobadas hasta la fecha. De especial trascendencia, como reacciones constitucionales ante el contexto de crisis, podemos destacar la reforma de 2011 relativa a la reducción del salario de los jueces y la afrontada en 2012, como consecuencia de la ratificación del Tratado de Estabilidad. Un segundo contenido de este trabajo expone una «relativa» novedad en el panorama constitucional, la de la Convención Constitucional. Concebida como un órgano deliberativo y participativo, estamos ante un mecanismo que trata de paliar una común demanda de las democracias actuales de fomentar la participación social como complemento a las limitaciones de los cauces parlamentarios tradicionales, subyugados a demasiadas lealtades, partidistas, endogámicas que impiden el ejercicio de sus funcione de canalización de la voluntad popular en el seguimiento de los asuntos públicos.This article focusses on Irish answers to the economic crisis. The full force of the sovereign debt crisis has been affected Ireland from 2008. The failures in the policy-making and regulatory systems have caused a critical eye on traditional ways of doing business in the political system and the public service. The paths that Ireland has followed are two. First, the constitutional amendment mechanism. It pays attention to constitutional precepts that ruler this constitutional reform, mainly articles 46 and 47. The referendum has developed a key element in this system. Ireland has developed 23 constitutional reforms nowadays. The second important element is a Constitutional Convention. This body will allow a group of randomly selected citizens to deliberate and make recommendations upon a number of areas of political reform. Many of the changes envisaged offers an space for reflection about the viability of a macro political and constitutional change strategy that the bailout require.
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O'Sullivan, Kathryn. "Rethinking ancillary relief on divorce in Ireland: the challenges and opportunities." Legal Studies 36, no. 1 (March 2016): 111–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lest.12087.
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This paper considers the highly discretionary equitable redistribution scheme governing ancillary relief in Ireland pursuant to the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996. The paper begins by drawing on the most up-to-data empirical data highlighting the principal difficulties inherent in the Irish ancillary relief system as currently applied and placing the spotlight firmly on the need for reform. It then considers the constitutional parameters that limit any change to the ancillary relief system applied before presenting a detailed proposal for reform. It concludes that although legislative change may be politically challenging, the commonly cited constitutional impediments to reform do not preclude the adoption of an alternative ancillary relief scheme. Instead, the paper argues that the adoption of a more rule-oriented, ‘pillared’, approach to ancillary relief provision may better resolve the challenges currently faced and ought to be afforded serious consideration in Ireland.
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Calvert, Harry, John Morison, and Stephen Livingstone. "Reshaping Public Power: Northern Ireland and the British Constitutional Crisis." Journal of Law and Society 23, no. 3 (September 1996): 442. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1410722.
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Morison, J. "Democracy, Governance and Governmentality: Civic Public Space and Constitutional Renewal in Northern Ireland." Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 21, no. 2 (June 1, 2001): 287–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/21.2.287.
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Gough, Fionnuala. "Human embryonic stem cell research in Ireland: Ethical and legal issues." Medical Law International 11, no. 4 (December 2011): 262–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0968533211419124.
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The paper examines the ethical and legal background to the current debate in the Republic of Ireland on the use of human embryos and embryonic stem cells (hESC) for research. How should public policy be formed to balance the potential health benefits of such research against the moral values of 21st century Irish society? The legislature has failed to address the constitutional ambiguities that have contributed to the current uncertainty as to the legal position of hESC research in Ireland. In view of the challenges posed by hESC research, it is argued that an appropriate regulatory framework should be adopted in Ireland, which will bring a degree of certainty as to what is and is not permitted. In adopting such a framework, it is suggested that hESC research should be permitted on donated supernumerary embryos up to day-14 post fertilisation.
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Kenny, David, and Conor Casey. "Shadow constitutional review: The dark side of pre-enactment political review in Ireland and Japan." International Journal of Constitutional Law 18, no. 1 (January 2020): 51–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icon/moaa006.
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Abstract Political constitutionalism is a major area of inquiry in contemporary constitutional discourse. A significant and increasingly central aspect of political constitutionalism is pre-enactment political review: laws being reviewed for constitutionality or rights compliance by parliament or the executive. This institution is said to be a good augmentation of, or even replacement for, the institution of judicial review, and it is said to bring with it a host of normative benefits. In this article, we wish to highlight an under-explored dark side to pre-enactment review. By undertaking a comparative analysis of functional pre-enactment review in several similar jurisdictions—Canada, New Zealand, and the UK—we contrast these systems, and the ordinary failings they display, with the much deeper problems of pre-enactment review in Ireland and Japan. These latter jurisdictions, we argue, not only fail to instantiate the benefits of pre-enactment review but in fact show that, in the right circumstances, pre-enactment review can have negative effects that are antithetical to the goals and values of political constitutionalism. We call this phenomenon “shadow constitutional review,” and suggest that it adds a layer of complexity and nuance to contemporary discussions of political constitutionalism.
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Torrance, David, and Adam Evans. "The Territorial Select Committees, 40 Years On." Parliamentary Affairs 72, no. 4 (August 21, 2019): 860–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsz032.
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Abstract The territorial departmental select committees have largely escaped academic scrutiny since their establishment in 1979 (for Scotland and Wales) and 1994 (Northern Ireland). This article charts the history of territorial representation in Westminster, including the creation of grand committees for Scotland and Wales and a Northern Ireland Standing Committee, before explaining the forces that led to the creation of territorial departmental select committees. The article then explores the work of these committees after their formation, and explores how they have responded to the devolution dispensations in their respective nations. A key theme of this article is the influence of constitutional developments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland on territorial committees at Westminster. Indeed, as this article highlights, the different timings of establishment, the asymmetric levels of (in)stability in the various devolution dispensations and prolonged suspensions of devolution in Northern Ireland have had an impact on the role of the respective territorial select committees.
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SKOUTARIS, Nikos. "Territorial Differentiation in EU Law: Can Scotland and Northern Ireland Remain in the EU and/or the Single Market?" Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 19 (November 8, 2017): 287–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cel.2017.11.
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AbstractIn the Brexit referendum of 23 June 2016, voters in England and Wales voted to leave the EU, while in Scotland and Northern Ireland they voted to remain. Following that, there has been a debate about how it would be possible to achieve the continuing presence in the single market of the UK constituent nations that do not want to be taken out against their will. This paper explores two pathways for Scotland and Northern Ireland to remain in the EU and/or the single market. The first entails the achievement of Scottish independence and the reunification of Ireland through democratic referendums. To this effect, the paper reviews the right of secession of those two constituent nations under UK constitutional law. It revisits the debate on the appropriate legal basis regulating Scotland’s future EU accession and discusses the Irish reunification from an EU law perspective. The second pathway explores how it would be possible for Scotland and Northern Ireland to remain in the EU and/or the single market even without seceding from the UK. In order to do that, the paper points to the remarkable flexibility of the EU legal order as evidenced in numerous cases of differentiated application of Union law. The paper shows that the EU possesses the necessary legal instruments to accommodate the divergent aspirations of the UK constituent nations.
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Key, Newton. "The “Boast of Antiquity”: Pulpit Politics Across the Atlantic Archipelago during the Revolution of 1688." Church History 83, no. 3 (July 31, 2014): 618–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009640714000584.
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John Locke and many others noted the vibrant political commentary emanating from the pulpit during the Glorious Revolution. Preachers from the full confessional spectrum in England, and especially in Scotland, Ireland, and the colonies, used occasional or state sermons to explain contemporary upheavals from the perspective of God's law, Natural law, and Civil law. Most surprising is the latter, clerical reference to civil history and ancient origins, which preachers used to answer contemporary questions of conquest and allegiance. Clergy revisited the origins and constitutional roots of the Britons, Anglo-Saxons, Scots, and Irish, and deployed histories of legendary kings and imaginary conquests to explain and justify the revolutionary events of 1688–1692. Sermons of this revolutionary era focused as much on civil as on sacred history, and sought their true origins in antiquity and the mists of myth. Episcopalian preachers, whether Church of Ireland, Scottish Episcopalian, or Church of England, seem to have been especially inspired by thanksgiving or fast days memorialized in the liturgical calendar to ponder the meaning of a deep historical narrative. Scots, Irish, and Massachusetts clergy claimed their respective immemorialism, as much as the English did theirs. But, as they re-stated competing Britannic constitutions and origin myths explicitly, they exposed imperial rifts and contradictions within the seemingly united claim of antiquity. By the beginning of the next reign and century, state sermons depended more upon reason and less upon a historicized mythic antiquity.
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Pavel Burloiu, V. "The Aftermath of Digital Rights Ireland: Romanian Constitutional Court Declares Overarching Cybersecurity Law Unconstitutional." European Data Protection Law Review 1, no. 2 (2015): 144–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.21552/edpl/2015/2/10.
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Sherlock, Ann. "Facts, Evidence and Opinion in Constitutional Litigation: The Experience in Ireland." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 40, no. 2 (April 1991): 425–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/iclqaj/40.2.425.
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