Journal articles on the topic 'Conservatism – history'
To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Conservatism – history.
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Conservatism – history.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Bourke, Richard. "What is conservatism? History, ideology and party." European Journal of Political Theory 17, no. 4 (July 3, 2018): 449–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1474885118782384.
Full textAbstract:
Is there a political philosophy of conservatism? A history of the phenomenon written along sceptical lines casts doubt on the existence of a transhistorical doctrine, or even an enduring conservative outlook. The main typologies of conservatism uniformly trace its origins to opposition to the French Revolution. Accordingly, Edmund Burke is standardly singled out as the ‘father’ of this style of politics. Yet Burke was de facto an opposition Whig who devoted his career to assorted programmes of reform. In restoring Burke to his original milieu, the argument presented here takes issue with 20th-century accounts of conservative ideology developed by such figures as Karl Mannheim, Klaus Epstein and Samuel Huntington. It argues that the idea of a conservative tradition is best seen as a belated construction, and that the notion of a univocal philosophy of conservatism is basically misconceived.
2
ROBERTS, MATTHEW. "‘VILLA TORYISM’ AND POPULAR CONSERVATISM IN LEEDS, 1885–1902." Historical Journal 49, no. 1 (February 24, 2006): 217–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x05005108.
Full textAbstract:
This article is a contribution to the continuing debate on the character and electoral fortunes of the Conservative party in late Victorian England. Using the West Riding borough of Leeds as a case study, this article focuses on suburban Conservatism (villa toryism) and situates it within the broader context of urban Conservatism in and beyond Leeds. It explores the nature of Conservative electoral dominance in the period after the Third Reform Act. In doing so, it further challenges conventional interpretations about the rise of class-based politics. As the example of Leeds demonstrates, villa toryism was not the political expression of a socially homogeneous, innately conservative suburban middle class. The intense electoral competition that ensued challenges assumptions about suburbia being politically quiescent and dull. Popular Conservatism, it is argued, was a protean and socially heterogeneous political culture, of which villa toryism was one distinctive strand. Villa toryism was the suburban incarnation of respectable, self-reliant, hierarchical, and domesticated popular Conservatism. This villa toryism was distinct from, but related to, the working-class Conservatism of the older industrial districts of urban England.
3
Andreeva, Tatiana V. "The Origins of Conservative Ideology in Russia." Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. History 67, no. 4 (2022): 1384–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu02.2022.419.
Full textAbstract:
The review is devoted to the analysis of the book “Romantics, Reformers, Reactionaries. Russian Conservative Thought and Politics in the Reign of Alexander I” by the famous American historian Alexander Martin dedicated to the history of Russian conservatism in the first quarter of the 19th century. The author explores the process of formation of conservative ideology in politics, Russian social thought, culture, and also reveals its origins, defines features that are distinctive from the liberal doctrine. Against the broad background of the political and cultural life of Russia at that time, the complex relationship of various systems of conservative ideology is shown. It is demonstrated that the religious conservatism of such prominent defenders of Catholicism and Orthodoxy as Mestre and Sturdza, the clash of their opposite positions, disputes about the historical fate and civilizational purpose of Christianity, as well as the romantic nationalism of A. S. Shishkov and S. N. Glinka and the noble conservatism of N. M. Karamzin and F. V. Rostopchin reflected the search for new forms of anti-revolutionary conservative worldview. The position of Alexander Martin is especially noteworthy in relation to the significant contribution of conservative thinkers of Alexander's reign to the formation of state policy in the interests of Russia, the formation of the foundations of civil society, the development of national identity, Russian culture and language. The author comes to a reasonable conceptual conclusion that although the early conservatives did not develop a single ideology, they laid the foundation for various forms of Russian conservatism in the second quarter of the 19th – early 20th centuries.
4
Zafirovski, Milan. "Contemporary conservatism and medievalism." Social Science Information 50, no. 2 (May 26, 2011): 223–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0539018410396617.
Full textAbstract:
This article explores the historical and sociological relations between contemporary conservatism and medievalism. It first registers the reemergence and increasing prominence of conservatism in contemporary society, most notably in America during the late 20th and the early 21st centuries. It then places conservatism and medievalism and their relationship within a historical-comparative framework. The article concludes that modern conservatism originates in and continues, with some adaptations or innovations, medievalism seen as the ‘golden past’, becoming the original and persisting conservative ideal and model of society and history.
5
Jędryczka, Wiktoria. "Can History of Parasitic Diseases Increase Social Conservatism? Testing Behavioural Immune System Theory." Journal of Education Culture and Society 13, no. 2 (September 27, 2022): 383–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.15503/jecs2022.2.383.394.
Full textAbstract:
Aim. Using available data from previously published study the hypothesis that individuals with broader disease history are more conservative than those, who were infected less often in the past was tested. Methods. Publicly available database containing data regarding perceived vulnerability to disease, social conservatism and participant’s history of parasitic disease was accessed. In the study 9409 cases from 43 countries were analysed. Results. When controlling for participant’s age, sex, education level, wealth and perceived infectability, it was found, that broader disease history was a significant predictor of social conservatism. Conclusions. Individuals, who were in the past infected with parasitic diseases more often, were observed to be more conservative than people, who had suffered from these diseases less often.
6
Stoneman, Ethan, and Joseph Packer. "American Conservatism Unmoored." Cultural Politics 18, no. 3 (November 1, 2022): 330–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/17432197-9964801.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract The last decade witnessed a drastic reconfiguration of American conservatism by way of a newly emergent and energized dissident right. Beyond the question of ideology, this article argues that an essential aspect of this realignment occurs at the level of strategy, specifically with the adoption of agitational tactics pioneered by the progressive left. It attempts to make sense of this sea change, first, by tracing in broad strokes the history of American conservatism's opposition to much of what passes for agitational politics. It then examines the right's seemingly abrupt adoption of three species of agitational practice: Alinsky-styled radicalism, identity politics, and accelerationism. It concludes by discussing the implications of this shift, in terms of what it means both for the future of conservative discourse and for leftist groups who must now take into account the possibility of having to outmaneuver their own set of tactics.
7
Christensen, David S. "The Seeds of Accounting Conservatism." European Journal of Business and Management Research 8, no. 2 (March 27, 2023): 181–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.24018/ejbmr.2023.8.2.1897.
Full textAbstract:
Why does the accounting principle of accounting conservatism persist, despite the criticism of 20th-century deductive accounting theorists? Accounting conservatism's etymology suggests that the traditional connotation of deliberate understatement began in America, circa 1900. Its genealogy, however, reaches much deeper into the past. This research adds to the work of Basu (1997, 2009) who reports evidence of accounting conservatism in medieval Europe and China, and to the work of Bloom (2018) and Watts (2003), who provide modern rationales for accounting conservatism. By using key elements derived from its definition, accounting conservatism's genealogy is traced from ancient times to the 20th century. A review of major works on accounting history and notable articles on accounting conservatism reveals that the seeds of accounting conservatism predate Pacioli, and were sown for largely pragmatic reasons. As long as accounting retains its pragmatic flavor, accounting conservatism will likely survive its critics. It has passed the test of time.
8
THACKERAY, DAVID. "RETHINKING THE EDWARDIAN CRISIS OF CONSERVATISM." Historical Journal 54, no. 1 (January 31, 2011): 191–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x10000518.
Full textAbstract:
ABSTRACTThis article reconsiders the culture of popular Conservatism in Edwardian Britain, when it has often been claimed that the Unionist parties underwent a profound crisis. According to Ewen Green, for example, in the immediate years before the First World War, Conservative leaders failed to offer policies that could unite their party or enable it to develop an effective popular appeal. Consequently, the party appeared to be drifting towards potential disaster and disintegration. Whilst historians are correct to argue that deep divisions emerged within the Unionist ranks, inhibiting their electoral prospects, the vibrancy of rank-and-file Conservatism in Edwardian Britain nevertheless tends to be underestimated. By embracing a variety of populist causes in 1913–14, the Conservative party appeared to have found a way to overcome its electoral malaise. Moreover, by taking important steps to widen their social appeal, the Conservatives laid the foundations for post-war success during these years of supposed ‘crisis’.
9
Pushchaev, Yu V. "The Program of Alexander Shchipkov’s Social Tradition or Synthesis of Left Wing and Conservatism: Its Opportunities." Orthodoxia, no. 2 (September 28, 2023): 48–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.53822/2712-9276-2022-2-48-70.
Full textAbstract:
The article explores the concept of the social tradition and the program of the synthesis of the left wing and conservatism put forward by the political philosopher, publicist and public fi gure Alexander Shchipkov. These subjects are assessed as a logical and appropriate attempt to formulate a conservative ideology that would be actual for modern Russia while relying on the historical experience and social background of the country and corresponding to the Russian history of the 19th–20th centuries. The term “Social Tradition” is similar to the term “Synthesis of Left Wing and Conservatism”, where “social” is loaded with positive and moderate leftist content, as far as it can be deemed possible to combine it with traditional and historically conservative content. The term “tradition” can be characterized here by what is usually understood in this concept as conservatism. The paper notes the importance of the Soviet specifi cs and the correct assessment of the Soviet period of the Russian history for the successful possibility of this synthesis. The article briefl y discusses the attempts of synthesis of socialism (left wing) and conservatism (tradition and traditionalism) that preceded in the history of the Russian social thought. It also points out a problem this program has: the left tradition demands the total equality, both economic and social, while the classical conservatism has always insisted on the principles of hierarchy and class stratifi cation of the society. In this regard, the essential eclecticism of this program put forward by Alexander Shchipkov can be noted. At the same time, it is emphasized that the time of integral classical conservatism, which directly relied on religion and class stratifi cation of the society, is now the irrevocable yesterday. Today, in a sense, we are condemned to eclectic conservatism and attempts to combine incompatible. Social traditionalism or synthesis of left wing and conservatism, fi rstly, takes the best from diff erent ideologies, and, secondly, best corresponds to the Russian history of the 19th-20th centuries. The ideological integrity goes away along with the “age of ideologies”. The ideological eclecticism comes to replace it, and nobody knows for how long. This can be taken as a transition step to something new and yet unknown.
10
Moore, L. J. "Approaching Conservatism." OAH Magazine of History 17, no. 2 (January 1, 2003): 3–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/maghis/17.2.3.
Full text
11
Williamson, P. "Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century." English Historical Review 118, no. 475 (February 1, 2003): 270–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ehr/118.475.270.
Full text
12
BURNS, JENNIFER. "IN SEARCH OF A USABLE PAST: CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT IN AMERICA." Modern Intellectual History 7, no. 2 (July 1, 2010): 479–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s147924431000017x.
Full textAbstract:
There is no conservative thought in America, only “irritable mental gestures which seek to resemble ideas,” wrote Lionel Trilling in 1950, thus providing a generation of historians with a convenient set piece to demonstrate the inadequacies of mid-century liberalism and its blindness to the nascent conservative intellectual movement gathering strength and purpose just as Trilling wrote. Two excellent new books about American intellectual history cast this quote in yet another light. Patrick Allitt's The Conservatives: Ideas and Personalities throughout American History carefully documents a centuries-long tradition of conservative thought in America, from the founding era through the end of the twentieth century. In The Conservative Turn: Lionel Trilling, Whittaker Chambers, and the Lessons of Anti-Communism, Michael Kimmage asserts that Trilling himself be considered a source of conservative ideas in postwar America. Taken together, the books by Allitt and Kimmage indicate that a new cycle of writing about conservative thought has reached full flower. For far too long, the field of conservative intellectual history has been dominated by the figure of George Nash, author of the classic 1976 The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945. These books provide an updated and more critically sophisticated way to examine the terrain Nash strode alone for so long. More significantly, they indicate that intellectual historians are ready to consider conservatism in dialogue with liberalism, bringing new balance to the study of American ideas. Furthermore, both books, Kimmage's in particular, suggest that some of what we are calling conservative and liberal might be flying under the wrong flag. The key to sorting out the confusion will be drawing a more careful distinction between conservatism as a “movement” and as a body of ideas, and looking at both conservatisms as part of a typically American response to historical change, rather than as an exotic and abberant specimen.
13
HARP, GILLIS J. "TRADITIONALIST DISSENT: THE REORIENTATION OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM, 1865–1900." Modern Intellectual History 5, no. 3 (November 2008): 487–518. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1479244308001777.
Full textAbstract:
The last couple of decades has brought a renewed interest in American conservatism among historians. Yet most recent studies have focused on the emergence of neoconservatism after World War II and virtually no recent scholarly work has pursued the history of conservatism before the 1920s. Both Richard Hofstadter and Clinton Rossiter agreed that the late nineteenth century was an important watershed in the evolution of American conservative thought. Hofstadter argued that the new laissez-faire conservatism that became dominant during the Gilded Age was remarkable in that “it lacked many of the signal characteristics of conservatism as it is usually found.” Yet some conservatives refused to accept key features of what Clinton Rossiter once branded this new “contradictory conservatism.” This essay focuses mostly on Protestant clerical intellectuals (both Northern and Southern) who dissented from the new orthodoxy and attempted to preserve older conservative principles. Against the laissez-faire conservatives' hyperindividualism, these dissenting conservatives stressed an organic view of the social order and the importance of mediating institutions such as family and church. To the others' secularism, they offered a social theory suffused with evangelical Protestantism. This analysis highlights where these dissidents differed from their fellow conservatives and seeks also to elucidate their alternative conservative vision of the American republic. Such a study serves to clarify just how profound an ideological shift occurred among conservatives during the Gilded Age and illuminates some of the persistent tensions within American conservatism still evident today.
14
Bell, Justin. "Dewey and Conservativism: Reading Liberalism and Social Action in Light of Vannatta’s Conservatism and Pragmatism." Contemporary Pragmatism 15, no. 4 (December 3, 2018): 525–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-01501125.
Full textAbstract:
Seth Vannatta argues that there can be a fruitful synthesis of pragmatism and classical conservatism. In doing this, he focuses the methodological commitments of pragmatism and conservatism. However, I will demonstrate with a reading of Dewey’s Liberalism and Social Action that other commitments might prevent this synthesis—at least a synthesis between the thought of John Dewey and Edmund Burke. My conclusion is that pragmatism and conservativism might travel parallel to one another but that we have good reasons for keeping some separation between the theories based upon their fundamental commitments. Deweyan pragmatism remains tied to democracy; conservatism remains tied to history.
15
Vititnev, S. F. "THE PHENOMENON OF CONSERVATISM IN MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY." Post–Soviet Continent, no. 1 (March 6, 2024): 120–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.48137/23116412_2024_1_120.
Full textAbstract:
The article analyzes topical issues related to the research and prospects for the development of conservatism in Russia. An overview of existing research on this topic is presented. The importance of addressing the legacy of Russian conservatism is due to the presence of interesting theses on the part of its theorists regarding the spiritual and moral foundations of Russian civilization, the peculiarities of the country’s historical path, the development of statehood and democracy. The author argues that without studying the works of classics of conservative thought, it is impossible to comprehend the history and current state of conservatism in Russia.
16
Love, Gary. "Making a ‘New Conservatism’: The Tory Reform Committee and Design for Freedom, 1942–1949*." English Historical Review 135, no. 574 (June 2020): 605–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ehr/ceaa193.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract This article offers the first analytical overview of the political thinking and organisational history of the Tory Reform Committee (TRC). It is also a contribution to wider scholarly debates about the making of a ‘New Conservatism’ in the 1940s and the development of Conservative thought in the twentieth century. The TRC’s leading members drew on the party’s Disraelian one-nation tradition to free them from adopting doctrinaire positions. They wanted to emphasise the merits of either state intervention, planning and social reform, or private enterprise, individualism and freedom, depending on the country’s economic and social position—and the party’s electoral position. Most Tory Reformers imposed limits on the malleability of their Conservatism by rejecting laissez-faire individualism, socialism, and the earliest signs of neoliberalism. Although the group was replaced by the Design for Freedom Movement, which adopted a similar political outlook on a non-party basis between 1947 and 1949, its broader significance relates to how its support for the principles of ‘design’ and ‘freedom’ influenced Conservative debates about economic and social policy at a pivotal moment in the party’s history. Continuities of thought suggest that we should be wary of interpretations which impose an ‘origins of neoliberalism’ or proto-Thatcherite framework on the 1940s. The TRC’s ‘New Conservatism’ was meant to be adaptable, practical and Keynesian. It was a pitch for the centre ground and it was integral to the political thought of Conservative governments between 1951 and 1974.
17
Zulfadli, Zulfadli. "Leonard C. Sebastian, Syaq Hasyim and Alexander R. Arifianto (eds.) (2021). Rising Islamic Conservatism in Indonesia Islamic Groups and Identity Politics. London & New York: Routledge. 230 Pages. ISBN: 978-1-003-01092-0." Journal of Al-Tamaddun 18, no. 1 (June 19, 2023): 291–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.22452/jat.vol18no1.22.
Full textAbstract:
The rise of Islamic conservatism in post-New Order Indonesia is related to strengthening religious attitudes and understandings in religion. However, it has several socio-economic, political, theological implications and significant challenges to democracy and diversity in Indonesia. The presence of Islamic conservatism groups and the development of identity politics have resulted in the religious conservatism movement having a significant influence on society. This book is the latest study explaining Islamic conservatism, focusing on discussing Islamic groups and identity politics at the national, regional, and local levels. Conservative groups use religion as a vehicle in expressing their identity and respond to social, political, and economic issues as part of their political aspirations. The activities of Islamic conservatism groups have changed the face of Indonesian Islam from an inclusive-moderate pattern to an exclusive-literal orientation.
18
PEDERSEN, S. "Review: Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century." Twentieth Century British History 15, no. 4 (April 1, 2004): 438–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/15.4.438.
Full text
19
CAIN, P. "The Conservative Party and 'Radical Conservatism', 1880-1914: Incubus or Necessity?" Twentieth Century British History 7, no. 3 (January 1, 1996): 371–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/7.3.371.
Full text
20
Bazhov, Sergey I. "N.Ya. Danilevsky’s Course of Life and Philosophy of History." Almanac “Essays on Conservatism” 58 (October 1, 2020): 18–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.24030/24092517-2020-0-3-18-65.
Full textAbstract:
In an article devoted to the biography and philosophical and historical work of N.Ya. Danilevsky, the author examines the theory of cultural-historical types not only as the first version of the theory of local civilizations, but also as an element in the evolution of Russian conservative thought in the middle and second half of the 19th century. It is noted that certain aspects of the socio-historical views of N.Ya. Danilevsky can be viewed in the framework of the two main types of conservatism – protective, traditionalist type and enlightened, conservative-liberal model.
21
Ribuffo, Leo P. "Conservatism and American Politics." Journal of The Historical Society 3, no. 2 (March 2003): 163–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540-5923.00053.
Full text
22
PHILP, MARK. "Vulgar Conservatism, 1792–3." English Historical Review CX, no. 435 (1995): 42–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ehr/cx.435.42.
Full text
23
Polyakov, Leonid. "TOWARD STUDYING RUSSIAN CONSERVATISM: HISTORY AND METHOD." Journal of Political Theory, Political Philosophy and Sociology of Politics Politeia 67, no. 4 (2012): 29–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2012-67-4-29-44.
Full text
24
Locke, Joseph. "Protestants and American Conservatism: A Short History." Journal of American History 107, no. 3 (December 1, 2020): 722. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jahist/jaaa352.
Full text
25
Pally, Marcia. "Protestants and American conservatism: A short history." Political Theology 20, no. 8 (November 17, 2019): 715–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1462317x.2019.1696795.
Full text
26
Ibrahim, Muhammad Khalis, and Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor. "Perkembangan Konservatisme di Türkiye: Pengajaran Buat Kelestarian Islam di Malaysia." Journal of Al-Tamaddun 17, no. 2 (December 21, 2022): 113–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.22452/jat.vol17no2.9.
Full textAbstract:
Conservatism is a political philosophy that tends to preserve traditions and reject drastic change. Türkiye has a long experience of political conservatism due to the Kemalists’ radical secularization. The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AK PARTİ) is an entity that recently champions political conservatism in Türkiye. Despite having many differences, Türkiye and Malaysia share similarities as progressive, modern, and democratic Muslim countries. This paper aims to discuss AK PARTİ’s political conservatism and analyze to what extent it can be made as an example for the sustainability of Islam in Malaysia. To fulfill this objective, primary and secondary sources related to AK PARTİ’s conservatism discourse have been referred to be used as the basis of analysis of lessons that can be taken for the sustainability of Islam in Malaysia. The comparative analysis method has also been used to compare the context of Türkiye and Malaysia to understand the limitations of lessons that Malaysia can learn based on the experience of conservatism in Türkiye. As a party with a conservative democratic ideology, AK PARTİ manages to uphold political conservatism within the context of modern democracy. This success results from a synthesis between the demands of conservatism and democracy. The political conservatism in Türkiye can be made as an example for Malaysia, especially in preserving Islam as the federal religion, the existence of the king institution, the Malay-Muslim identity, and the true essence of Islam as a societal-unifying force. This paper argues that in the Malaysia context, conservatism is an important political philosophy to be upheld in order to preserve the harmony and stability of the plural society.
27
Köksal, Duygu. "The Dilemmas of a Search for Cultural Synthesis: A Portrait of Cemil Meriç as a Conservative Intellectual." New Perspectives on Turkey 21 (1999): 79–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0896634600006397.
Full textAbstract:
The altered psychological environment demanded a shift in emphasis from a pure critique of traditions to a critique of traditions coupled with a critique of modernity.Ashis Nandy, Traditions, Tyranny and UtopiasModern conservatism, at least in its philosophical form, is a child of what it attacks—modernity. If the central ethos of modernity is a belief in the plasticity of society and the individual, the central ethos of conservatism is a belief in the sanctity of community, kinship, tradition. Modernity's fascination with the new is matched by conservatism's defense of past tradition. It is on the priority of a past order bequeathed by history, and its traditional institutions, that the conservatives base their critique of modernity. The modernist idea that societies can be shaped, molded, and steered in new directions, and that individuals can direct their own destinies, finds its counterpart in conservative thought in the rediscovery of the past-its institutions, values, themes, structures.
28
Epprecht, Marc. "Women's ‘Conservatism’ and the Politics of Gender in Late Colonial Lesotho." Journal of African History 36, no. 1 (March 1995): 29–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021853700026967.
Full textAbstract:
The triumph of the ‘conservative’ BNP over the ‘radical’ BCP in Lesotho's pre-independence elections has long been a source of contention among analysts. While many factors are seen to have contributed to the BCP defeat, one which consistently appears in passing or in footnotes is the ‘conservative’ inclination of Basotho women who, in 1965 comprised two-thirds of the electorate. Women's ‘conservatism’ is commonly accepted as a given, stemming from their purportedly natural domesticity, religiosity or love of tradition. This article examines the actual history of Basotho women in politics in the late colonial era (1920s–1965) and finds no empirical grounds for these assumptions. On the contrary, even the most ostensibly ‘conservative’ women often adopted non-traditional, self-emancipatory behaviour. In the context of a ‘modern’ colonial state with retrograde, often punitive policies towards women, such ‘conservatism’ was in fact rather progressive. On the other hand, Lesotho's self-proclaimed ‘radicals’ exhibited strong elements of male chauvinism, ignorance and contempt for women's needs. The implication for African nationalist or other radical politicians and sympathic academics is that failure to take serious account of women and gender can undermine political integrity and effectiveness.
29
Frohnen, Bruce P. "Hazony, Traditional Conservatism, and the Problem of History." Catholic Social Science Review 28 (2023): 49–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/cssr20232810.
Full textAbstract:
Yoram Hazony’s recent book, Conservatism: A Rediscovery, is the closest one gets to a political theory of national conservatism. Hazony recognizes many of the same political goods that traditional conservatives and Catholic thinkers do. However, Hazony’s particular understanding of nationalism undermines these goods by advocating for a centralized state at the expense of healthy regionalism. Hazony overlooks the contribution made by the Catholic Church to restraining modern executive power.
30
Dietz, Bernhard. "«Conservative Revolution» in Europe? Radical Conservatism in aTransnational Perspective, 1918–1939. Introduction." Journal of Modern European History 15, no. 1 (February 2017): 36–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.17104/1611-8944-2017-1-36.
Full text
31
Shestakov, Sergey. "Russian conservatism of the pre-Soviet formation as the ideological basis of the post-Soviet conservative ideology." OOO "Zhurnal "Voprosy Istorii" 2021, no. 01 (January 1, 2021): 75–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.31166/voprosyistorii202101statyi25.
Full textAbstract:
The article considers the historical stages of the formation and development of Russian conservative political ideology. The content of the ideological complex of the Russian conservative ideology of the pre-Soviet formation is described and analyzed. The Russian conservatism of the pre-Soviet formation is evaluated as a foundation of the modern Russian conservative ideology.
32
O’Brien, John, and Eman Abdelhadi. "Re-examining Restructuring: Racialization, Religious Conservatism, and Political Leanings in Contemporary American Life." Social Forces 99, no. 2 (April 23, 2020): 474–503. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/sf/soaa029.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract This paper assesses the continued relevance of Robert Wuthnow’s seminal theory of “religious restructuring” for explaining the relationship between religious conservatism and political allegiances in the contemporary United States. Employing a comparative approach, we evaluate the link between doctrinal conservatism (or liberalism) and political conservatism across the seven largest US religious traditions, including Islam. We find that for most Christians and Jews, doctrinal conservatism continues to be tightly linked with conservative political attitudes, even after adjusting for demographic differences and religiosity. For Muslims, Black Protestants, and Latinx Catholics however, doctrinal conservatism is unlikely to be associated with political conservatism. In short, Wuthnow’s theory still holds, but only for religious traditions that are majority white. We speculate that being “racialized religious traditions” explains the lack of restructuring we observe among Muslims, Black Protestants, and Latinx Catholics. External social and political pressures have kept unifying racialized religious identities salient for each of these traditions, preventing the internal bifurcation still characteristic of other major American religions. Our findings and approaches contribute to the two growing trends within the sociological study of religion—the analytical integration of considerations of race and racial politics into scholarship on religious life (called “complex religion”) and a recognition of the importance of cultural “styles” of religion in shaping political and social behaviors.
33
Booker, Salih, and Ann-Louise Colgan. "“Compassionate Conservatism” Comes to Africa." Current History 103, no. 673 (May 1, 2004): 232–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/curh.2004.103.673.232.
Full textAbstract:
While the hiv/aids crisis is the most urgent threat facing Africa and the world, the Bush administration's current orientation is to delay action. In contrast, Washington's interest in African oil and the specter of terrorist cells quietly shapes the immediate course of us Africa policy.
34
ROBINSON, EMILY. "THE AUTHORITY OF FEELING IN MID-TWENTIETH-CENTURY ENGLISH CONSERVATISM." Historical Journal 63, no. 5 (February 12, 2020): 1303–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x19000682.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractConservatism claims to be a philosophy of common sense and everyday experience, in which sensation takes priority over reason. This article asks how this was understood by both Conservative thinkers and grassroots members in mid-twentieth-century England, and how it sat alongside other ways of understanding the feelings and experiences of ordinary people, in a period in which these came to be regarded as a privileged form of political authority. The article shows that the Conservative everyday was rooted in individual sensory experiences, but always underpinned by the collective evocation of reverence, majesty, and awe. It traces understandings of the everyday and the awesome through political texts and grassroots publications, showing that the tension between them is what gives Conservatism its distinctive character. This is conceptualized in Burkean terms as the beautiful and the sublime. The latter guarantees order, hierarchy, and allegiance, while the former works to soften and socialize power – making it seem a matter of custom and common sense. The article suggests that this combination enabled Conservatism to adapt to the challenges of mass democracy but became ever harder to sustain in the emotional culture of post-war England, when feelings became a marker of personal authenticity, rather than cultural authority.
35
Vannatta, Seth. "The Problem with Conservative Art: A Critique of Russell Kirk’s Metaphysical Conservatism." Philosophies 8, no. 2 (March 15, 2023): 26. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8020026.
Full textAbstract:
In this paper I measure the progressive potentiality of art against Russell Kirk’s notion of “normative art”. Kirk argues that good literature cultivates virtue according to a transcendent norm, a law of nature. I interrogate the extent to which this art can be conservative according to Kirk’s own meaning of conservatism and read his own conservatism against itself in an effort to show which of its tenets detrimentally supersede and contradict its others. The criticism of Kirk’s discussion of normative art makes use of Charles Sanders Peirce’s more sophisticated epistemology, metaphysics, and normative science of aesthetics. Ultimately, Kirk’s conservatism and his position on normative art rely on metaphysical dualism and the gratuitous capacity of intuition. This ends in an unjustified discounting of his principles of variety, imperfectability, prescription, and continuity and their subordination to his principle of transcendence.
36
Fair, John D., and John A. Hutcheson. "British Conservatism in the Twentieth Century: An Emerging Ideological Tradition." Albion 19, no. 4 (1987): 549–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4049474.
Full textAbstract:
Lord Acton, one of the most formidable intellects of the last century, was a master of transforming seemingly complicated or contradictory principles into concise epigrammatic statements. Attempting to reconcile Edmund Burke's many liberal views with his reputed Conservatism, Acton asked why was Burke “not an entire liberal? How thoroughly he wished for liberty—of conscience—property, trade, slavery, etc. What stood against it? His notion of history. The claims of the past. The authority of time. The will of the dead. Continuity.” One of the most important lessons to be derived from Burke's writings—recognized by countless authorities as the wellspring of modern British Conservatism—is that Conservatism is not so much a system of thought or ideology as it is a general inclination and regard for history. The behavior of the Conservative Party has been governed by precedent and pragmatism rather than by rationalism and idealism. Words such as dogma, program, or even policy have never been part of its lexicon, whereas such words as spirit, tradition, or even “way“ have more aptly described its approach to politics.By the twentieth century the Conservative Party's preference for lessons from the past (in accordance with England's common law tradition) to any scientifically derived formulas had gained for it the twin monikers of “the national party” and “the stupid party.” But Conservatism does not claim to possess the “keys or the Kingdom,” notes Ian Gilmour, an active politician and Conservative theoretician. “There is no certainty about the route and no certainty about the destination. As Burke said of himself, the lead has to be heaved every inch of the way.” Such is the way that modern British Conservatives, at least, have wished to perceive themselves.
37
Popov, Andrey A. "History of the Russian Conservatism and the Slavophils." Almanac “Essays on Conservatism”, no. 2 (January 1, 2014): 22–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.24030/2409-2517-2014-2-22-24.
Full text
38
Rampton, Vanessa. "The Impossibility of Conservatism? Insights from Russian History." Monist 99, no. 4 (October 2016): 372–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/monist/onw011.
Full text
39
FUNG, EDMUND S. K. "Nationalism and Modernity: The Politics of Cultural Conservatism in Republican China." Modern Asian Studies 43, no. 3 (May 2009): 777–813. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x07003472.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThis article explores the political dynamics of modern Chinese cultural conservatism. It proceeds from the premise that modern Chinese conservatism, as distinct from traditionalism, was a response to modernity and, as such, a part of modernity. The article identifies the conservative with the nationalist, but not vice versa, and understands politico-cultural conservatism as politico-cultural nationalism. It will first trace the rise of modern Chinese conservative thought, revisit the ideas of two noted cultural conservatives Liang Shuming and Zhang Junmai, examine the politics of China-based cultural reconstruction, and then explore the conservative thought of the war period (1937–1945) to illustrate the interplay of war, culture and nationalism. It argues, basically, that although the conservatives did not defend the prevailing socio-political order as a whole, their understanding of politics from a cultural perspective was nuanced and that they stood in an ambiguous relationship with the existing regime and the party-state.
40
Bentley, Michael. "Liberal Toryism in the Twentieth Century." Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 4 (December 1994): 177–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3679220.
Full textAbstract:
DUST has scarcely had time to settle on Lady Thatcher; yet already a thick sediment of historical significance attaches to the fifteen years of her ascendancy. The period between 1975 and 1990 looks likely to prove as significant for the political ideologies of the twenty-first century as that between, say, 1885 and 1906 currently looks for our own. In the twilight world of John Major (who appears part-antidote, part-surrogate), Conservative ideology is becoming informed by reviews from both sides as they reflect on not only what went wrong but what it was that seemingly went so right, from a party point of view, for so long. We have just had placed before us, for example, John Campbell's admirable biography of Sir Edward Heath, on theone hand, and Alan Clark's transfixing diaries very much on the other. Such documents supplement amass of theorising and comment by political scientists and journalists, most of which dwells on the twin themes of discontinuity and dichotomy. The history of the Tory party is seen to enter a period of catastrophe by the end of the Heath government out of which there emerges a distinct party ideology which people call ‘Thatcherism’: a ‘New Conservatism’ radically distinct from the compromise and accommodation that marked politics after 1951. But that process was contested within the party—hence a dichotomy between two persuasions: the hawks and the doves, the dries and the wets, the Tories and the Conservatives, the true blues and the Liberals. Language of this kind has a particular interest to historians. They want to raise issues about its chronological deep-structure: how ‘new’ was this ‘New Conservatism’?. They recognise the need to situate the dichotomies of the moment in a wider context of Conservative experience: how singular is a doctrine of dichotomy within Conservative party doctrine? Above all they bring into question bald postulates about the nature of current Conservatism which do not compare experience across time
41
Zirakzadeh, Cyrus Ernesto. "Political Prophecy in Contemporary American Literature: The Left-Conservative Vision of Norman Mailer." Review of Politics 69, no. 4 (2007): 625–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670507000988.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractPopular and prize-winning writer Norman Mailer has advanced a view of American politics and society that he calls “left conservatism.” This paper analyzes elements of Mailer's critique and describes how the parts fit together. Special attention is given to his interpretation of economic history and social psychology, his vision of moral health that he associates with the term “hipster,” and his fear of a new political mentality in the United States that he conveys through a neologism, the “wad.” The paper closes with a sketch of the ways Mailer's left conservatism both dovetails with and departs from the concerns and arguments of other contemporary American conservative thinkers.
42
Gifford, L. J. "Conservatism and American Political Development." Journal of American History 98, no. 1 (June 1, 2011): 273–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jahist/jar184.
Full text
43
Zilber, Andrey S., and Sergey V. Lugovoy. "I. Kant’s conservative liberalism from the standpoint of E. Burke’s liberal conservatism." Philosophy Journal 14, no. 3 (2021): 50–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2021-14-3-50-64.
Full textAbstract:
I. Kant and E. Burke both presented and developed their political views in 1790s in the common context of the French Revolution. We compare their views in two aspects. First, we consider the question whether Kant in his writings has implicitly referred to Burke’s pamphlet “Reflections on the Revolution in France”. In our view, it remains unproven and doubtful that Kant had read this book (in German translation). Second, we consider Kant’s political views as liberal and Burke’s ones as conservative. We rely on those scholars who distinguish liberalism and conservatism building on the anthropological foundations of political philosophy. Some scholars define Kant’s moderate liberalism as a variation of conservatism, although Kant explicitly criticizes a number of ultra-conservative views. Burke is widely known as the founder of modern conservatism but also has substantial liberal points in his views. Both philosophers sought to find balance between stability and improvement of a political order, but they propose completely different criteria for a reform policy. For Kant, all reforms should aim to realize the abstract ideal of universal law. Alongside, Kant recommends only moderate and prudent reforms in order to preserve the freedom and safety of states as political organisms. Burke views reforms as a means of reconciling traditions and customs with changing circumstances. Our conclusion is that Burke cannot be named among the prototypes of those ultra-conservatives whom Kant describes as the most implacable opponents of his views. We support the assessment of Kant’s position as conservative liberalism and Burke's position as liberal conservatism. This perspective reveals a certain similarity of their views despite their fundamental differences.
44
BLACK, LAWRENCE. "THE LOST WORLD OF YOUNG CONSERVATISM." Historical Journal 51, no. 4 (November 18, 2008): 991–1024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x08007164.
Full textAbstract:
ABSTRACTThe Young Conservatives were primarily a social club, hosting dances, beauty contests, car rallies and winning endorsements from sports stars. They made a virtue of this apolitical reputation to recruit a mass, middle-class membership, and with rhetoric of service and citizenship embedded themselves in local civil society. This article reflects on why this associational culture has been neglected by political and social historians. In the approach of Raphael Samuel's ‘Lost world of British Communism’, it explores the worldview and lifestyle of YCs in 1950s and 1960s Britain, drawing on national, local, and oral sources. Boasting of being ‘the free world's largest youth political movement’ it was a considerable political resource and confounds Conservatism's aged public image in this period. The article accounts for the Ycs' falling membership through the 1960s and discusses its legacy. Decline came as it experienced social and cultural change, as the value of mass party membership diminished and as, after the Macleod report, YCs sought to become more conventionally ‘political’. The resulting debates about politics–social mix are illuminating about political culture more generally. It argues the YCs were not simply victims of social change, but that the decision to become ‘political’ was also a factor. Until the later 1960s it contends the YCs attest to the persistence of strands of Conservatism described by interwar historians like McKibbin and Light – an associational appeal, whose light touch deftly avoided the appearance of being partisan in anything other than name.
45
Kersch, Ken I. "Ecumenicalism Through Constitutionalism: The Discursive Development of Constitutional Conservatism inNational Review, 1955–1980." Studies in American Political Development 25, no. 1 (March 10, 2011): 86–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0898588x10000106.
Full textAbstract:
Contemporary conservatism places an affinity for, fidelity to, and defense of the U.S. Constitution at the center of its electoral, institutional, and movement politics. Through a survey of popular constitutional discourse in postwar conservatism's premiere magazine,National Reviewbetween 1955 and 1980—presented in the context of the development of (conservative) political thought and the institutional infrastructure for idea generation and propagation—I argue that that defense began to assume an ecumenically populist, antielitist, and antijudicial form only beginning in the mid-1950s, and a shared commitment to “originalism” only in the late 1970s. From the 1950s through the late 1970s, conservative constitutional argument was centered not on the judiciary, but rather on the (often divisive) constitutionalism of Congress and the executive, and on divergent views concerning structuralist versus moralist constitutional understandings. Over time, however, through dialogic engagement taking place over and through unfolding political events, the movement's diverse intellectual strands reframed and reinforced their relationship by focusing less on their differences and more on an ecumenically shared populist critique of judicial power emphasizing a virtuousdemosarrayed against an ideologically driven, antidemocratic, law-wielding elite. During this formative period, besides advocating a particular approach to textual interpretation, constitutional discourse played a critical role in fashioning movement symbols and signifiers, forming hopes and apprehensions, defining threats and reassurances, marking friends and enemies, stimulating feelings of belonging and alienation, fidelity and betrayal, and evoking both rational logics and intense emotions—all of which motivate and inform the heavily constitutionalized politics of American conservatism today.
46
Dietz, Bernhard. "The Neo-Tories and Europe: A Transnational Historyof British Radical Conservatism in the 1930s." Journal of Modern European History 15, no. 1 (February 2017): 85–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.17104/1611-8944-2017-1-85.
Full textAbstract:
The Neo-Tories and Europe: A Transnational History of British Radical Conservatism in the 1930s This article analyses the British Neo-Tories of the 1930s as part of a pan-European counter-movement against political modernity. This network of right-wing intellectuals and allied Conservative politicians saw democracy, liberalism and capitalism in a state of degeneration and aimed at the establishment of a corporate state in Great Britain through a «revolution from above». The article concentrates on the importance on the transnational implications of this discourse and in particular of the exchange with their German intellectual counterparts. It emphasises how this exchange of ideas was affected by National Socialism on the British side and explores what the possibilities and limits of right-wing exchange between Germany and England were after Hitler's rise to power. The article argues that for the Neo-Tories, the European exchange of ideas was a source of inspiration, reassurance and hope; however, it also eventually meant their downfall, as the beginning of the Second World War marked the end of British participation in transnational radical conservatism.
47
Nickerson, M. "Women, Domesticity, and Postwar Conservatism." OAH Magazine of History 17, no. 2 (January 1, 2003): 17–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/maghis/17.2.17.
Full text
48
Teslya, Andrey. "The Place of Slavophilism in the Typology of Conservatism." Stasis 10, no. 2 (January 20, 2021): 13–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.33280/2310-3817-21-10-2-13-40.
Full textAbstract:
In the history of political thought, Russian Slavophilism of the period from 1840s till 1880s has two established traditions of interpretation: as a variant of conservative ideology and as one form of Russian liberalism of the 1840s, along with Westernism (in this case, the later history of Slavophilism, i.e. the period between 1860s and 1880s, is viewed as a departure from initially liberal stances. Beginning with the framework of Andrzej Walicki, the article attempts to demonstrate the underpinnings of this peculiar duality of evaluations. Slavophilism is understood as liberal conservatism; the article also uncovers the structural conditions, on which the liberal component of Slavophile views are based. Special attention is given to the analysis of processes, which led to the dominance of the interpretation, according to which Russian Slavophilism is a conservative ideology, where the liberal component is defined as situational. The reason for such a reading are rooted in the peculiar position of Russian liberalism in the late XIX century, when the nationalism agenda was interpreted as entirely pertaining to the conservative side of the political spectrum.
49
Teslya, Andrey. "The Place of Slavophilism in the Typology of Conservatism." Stasis 10, no. 2 (January 20, 2021): 13–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.33280/2310-3817-2020-10-2-13-40.
Full textAbstract:
In the history of political thought, Russian Slavophilism of the period from 1840s till 1880s has two established traditions of interpretation: as a variant of conservative ideology and as one form of Russian liberalism of the 1840s, along with Westernism (in this case, the later history of Slavophilism, i.e. the period between 1860s and 1880s, is viewed as a departure from initially liberal stances. Beginning with the framework of Andrzej Walicki, the article attempts to demonstrate the underpinnings of this peculiar duality of evaluations. Slavophilism is understood as liberal conservatism; the article also uncovers the structural conditions, on which the liberal component of Slavophile views are based. Special attention is given to the analysis of processes, which led to the dominance of the interpretation, according to which Russian Slavophilism is a conservative ideology, where the liberal component is defined as situational. The reason for such a reading are rooted in the peculiar position of Russian liberalism in the late XIX century, when the nationalism agenda was interpreted as entirely pertaining to the conservative side of the political spectrum.
50
LOVE, GARY. "THE PERIODICAL PRESS AND THE INTELLECTUAL CULTURE OF CONSERVATISM IN INTERWAR BRITAIN." Historical Journal 57, no. 4 (November 12, 2014): 1027–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x14000429.
Full textAbstract:
ABSTRACTConservatives usually play down their intellectual credentials because it provides them with an effective means of distancing themselves from the ‘doctrinaire’ or the intellectualized politics of the left. But this approach was challenged by a significant group of Conservative MPs and intellectuals during the interwar period. Conservatives wrote articles for a range of periodicals, which were still important channels of communication for the sharing of political ideas between the wars. Stanley Baldwin banned government ministers from publishing independent journalism, which meant that it was mainly young, ambitious, or marginalized Conservative MPs who wrote for periodicals. When left-wing sentiment started to swell up during the Second World War, some Conservative supporters started to question the interwar leadership's neglect of the party's intellectual and publishing culture. It was now thought that the Conservative party lacked a convincing media-based popular ideology to compete with the left. But if Baldwin prioritized other aspects of the interwar party's appeal, the intellectual culture of Conservatism still acted as an important barrier to communist and fascist thought in elite political circles. This culture also had important resonances for the party in the post-war period because it contributed to its self-evaluation and policy restatements after 1945.