Journal articles: 'Conscious Processing'

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Changeux, Jean-Pierre G. "Conscious processing." Current Opinion in Anaesthesiology 25, no. 4 (August 2012): 397–404. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/aco.0b013e32835561de.

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Zhang, Shuhao, Feng Zhang, Yingjun Wu, Bingsheng He, and Paul Johns. "Hardware-Conscious Stream Processing." ACM SIGMOD Record 48, no. 4 (February 25, 2020): 18–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3385658.3385662.

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Velmans, Max. "What makes a conscious process conscious?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37, no. 1 (January 24, 2014): 43–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x13000885.

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AbstractNewell & Shanks' (N&S's) critical review considers only a very limited sense in which mental processes can be thought of as either conscious or unconscious and consequently gives a misleading analysis of the role of consciousness in human information processing. This commentary provides an expanded analysis of conscious processing that also reveals the various ways in which mental processes are unconscious.

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Railo, Henry, Niina Salminen-Vaparanta, Linda Henriksson, Antti Revonsuo, and Mika Koivisto. "Unconscious and Conscious Processing of Color Rely on Activity in Early Visual Cortex: A TMS Study." Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 24, no. 4 (April 2012): 819–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_00172.

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Chromatic information is processed by the visual system both at an unconscious level and at a level that results in conscious perception of color. It remains unclear whether both conscious and unconscious processing of chromatic information depend on activity in the early visual cortex or whether unconscious chromatic processing can also rely on other neural mechanisms. In this study, the contribution of early visual cortex activity to conscious and unconscious chromatic processing was studied using single-pulse TMS in three time windows 40–100 msec after stimulus onset in three conditions: conscious color recognition, forced-choice discrimination of consciously invisible color, and unconscious color priming. We found that conscious perception and both measures of unconscious processing of chromatic information depended on activity in early visual cortex 70–100 msec after stimulus presentation. Unconscious forced-choice discrimination was above chance only when participants reported perceiving some stimulus features (but not color).

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Felmingham, K., A. H. Kemp, L. Williams, E. Falconer, G. Olivieri, A. Peduto, and R. Bryant. "Dissociative responses to conscious and non-conscious fear impact underlying brain function in post-traumatic stress disorder." Psychological Medicine 38, no. 12 (February 25, 2008): 1771–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0033291708002742.

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BackgroundDissociative reactions in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) have been regarded as strategic responses that limit arousal. Neuroimaging studies suggest distinct prefrontal responses in individuals displaying dissociative and hyperarousal responses to threat in PTSD. Increased prefrontal activity may reflect enhanced regulation of limbic arousal networks in dissociation. If dissociation is a higher-order regulatory response to threat, there may be differential responses to conscious and automatic processing of threat stimuli. This study addresses this question by examining the impact of dissociation on fear processing at different levels of awareness.MethodFunctional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with a 1.5-T scanner was used to examine activation to fearful (versus neutral) facial expressions during consciously attended and non-conscious (using backward masking) conditions in 23 individuals with PTSD. Activation in 11 individuals displaying non-dissociative reactions was compared to activation in 12 displaying dissociative reactions to consciously and non-consciously perceived fear stimuli.ResultsDissociative PTSD was associated with enhanced activation in the ventral prefrontal cortex for conscious fear, and in the bilateral amygdala, insula and left thalamus for non-conscious fear compared to non-dissociative PTSD. Comparatively reduced activation in the dissociative group was apparent in dorsomedial prefrontal regions for conscious fear faces.ConclusionsThese findings confirm our hypotheses of enhanced prefrontal activity to conscious fear and enhanced activity in limbic networks to non-conscious fear in dissociative PTSD. This supports the theory that dissociation is a regulatory strategy invoked to cope with extreme arousal in PTSD, but this strategy appears to function only during conscious processing of threat.

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de Vries, Marieke, Cilia L. M. Witteman, Rob W. Holland, and Ap Dijksterhuis. "The Unconscious Thought Effect in Clinical Decision Making: An Example in Diagnosis." Medical Decision Making 30, no. 5 (March 12, 2010): 578–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0272989x09360820.

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The unconscious thought effect refers to improved judgments and decisions after a period of distraction. The authors studied the unconscious thought effect in a complex and error-prone part of clinical decision making: diagnosis. Their aim was to test whether conscious versus unconscious processing influenced diagnosis of psychiatric cases. They used case descriptions from the DSM-IV casebook. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to the conscious-processing-condition (i.e., consciously thinking about the information they read in the case description), the other half to the unconscious-processing condition (i.e., performing an unrelated distracter task). The main dependent measure was the total number of correct classifications. Compared to conscious processing, unconscious processing significantly increased the number of correct classifications. The results show the potential merits of unconscious processing in diagnostic decision making.

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Aru, Jaan, Mototaka Suzuki, and Matthew E. Larkum. "Cellular Mechanisms of Conscious Processing." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 25, no. 12 (December 2021): 1096. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2021.09.008.

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Cleeremans, Axel. "Connecting Conscious and Unconscious Processing." Cognitive Science 38, no. 6 (August 2014): 1286–315. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12149.

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Velmans, Max. "Is human information processing conscious?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14, no. 4 (December 1991): 651–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00071776.

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AbstractInvestigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) Where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence, and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing? Input analysis is thought to be initially “preconscious” and “pre-attentive” - fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by “conscious,” “focal-attentive” analysis, which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed to identify complex, novel stimuli. Conscious processing has also been thought to be necessary for choice, learning and memory, and the organization of complex, novel responses, particularly those requiring planning, reflection, or creativity.The present target article reviews evidence that consciousness performs none of these functions. Consciousness nearly alwaysresultsfrom focal-attentive processing (as a form of output) but does not itselfenter intothis or any other form of human information processing. This suggests that the term “conscious process” needs reexamination. Consciousnessappearsto be necessary in a variety of tasks because they require focal-attentive processing; if consciousness is absent, focal-attentive processing is absent. From afirst-person perspective, however, conscious statesarecausally effective. First-person accounts arecomplementaryto third-person accounts. Although they can be translated into third-person accounts, they cannot be reduced to them.

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Aru, Jaan, Mototaka Suzuki, and Matthew E. Larkum. "Cellular Mechanisms of Conscious Processing." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 24, no. 10 (October 2020): 814–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2020.07.006.

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Kaunitz, Lisandro, Alessio Fracasso, Angelika Lingnau, and David Melcher. "Non-Conscious Processing of Motion Coherence Can Boost Conscious Access." PLoS ONE 8, no. 4 (April 9, 2013): e60787. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0060787.

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Kuldas, Seffetullah, Shahabuddin Hashim, Hairul Nizam Ismail, and Zainudin Abu Bakar. "Reviewing the Role of Cognitive Load, Expertise Level, Motivation, and Unconscious Processing in Working Memory Performance." International Journal of Educational Psychology 4, no. 2 (June 24, 2015): 142. http://dx.doi.org/10.17583/ijep.2015.832.

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<p class="p1">Human cognitive capacity is unavailable for conscious processing of every amount of instructional messages. Aligning an instructional design with learner expertise level would allow better use of available working memory capacity in a cognitive learning task. Motivating students to learn consciously is also an essential determinant of the capacity usage. However, motivational factors are often subject to unconscious rather than conscious emotional processing. This review sets out the need for further studies to elucidate the role of motivation and unconscious processing in the use of cognitive capacity<span class="s1">. </span></p>

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Balsdon, Tarryn, and Colin W. G. Clifford. "Visual processing: conscious until proven otherwise." Royal Society Open Science 5, no. 1 (January 2018): 171783. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.171783.

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Unconscious perception, or perception without awareness, describes a situation where an observer's behaviour is influenced by a stimulus of which they have no phenomenal awareness. Perception without awareness is often claimed on the basis of a difference in thresholds for tasks that do and do not require awareness, for example, detecting the stimulus (requiring awareness) and making accurate judgements about the stimulus (based on unconscious processing). Although a difference in thresholds would be expected if perceptual evidence were processed without awareness, such a difference does not necessitate that this is actually occurring: a difference in thresholds can also arise from response bias, or through task differences. Here we ask instead whether the pattern of performance could be obtained if the observer were aware of the evidence used in making their decisions. A backwards masking paradigm was designed using digits as target stimuli, with difficulty controlled by the time between target and mask. Performance was measured over three tasks: detection, graphic discrimination and semantic discrimination. Despite finding significant differences in thresholds measured using proportion correct, and in observer sensitivity, modelling suggests that these differences were not the result of perception without awareness. That is, the observer was not relying solely on unconscious information to make decisions.

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Tzelgov, Joseph, Dana Ganor, and Vered Yehene. "Automatic processing results in conscious representations." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22, no. 5 (October 1999): 786–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x9957218x.

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We apply Dienes & Perner's (D&P's) framework to the automatic/nonautomatic processing contrast. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that automatic and nonautomatic processing result in representations that have explicit results. We propose equating consciousness with explicitness of aspects rather than with full explicitness as defined by D&P.

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Pavlevchev, Samuil, Minah Chang, Alessandra Natascha Flöck, and Peter Walla. "Subliminal Word Processing: EEG Detects Word Processing Below Conscious Awareness." Brain Sciences 12, no. 4 (March 30, 2022): 464. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/brainsci12040464.

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The present electroencephalography (EEG) study observed how the brain processes visual stimuli (words and shapes) displayed with four different duration times (17 ms, 33 ms, 67 ms, and 100 ms). All stimuli had to be classified into “I saw nothing”, “I saw a blur”, “I saw a word,” or “I saw a shape” via distinct button presses while brain potentials were being measured. The neurophysiological correlates of word and shape processing were subsequently analysed and compared for two distinct time points at the occipito-parietal area in both hemispheres (P7 and P8). In a further step, word and shape identification rates were also analysed. Identification rates revealed that participants recognized words and shapes when presented for 17 ms at a rate of only 6% and 7%, which is poor enough to assume an overall lack of conscious recognition. Analysis of EEG data revealed two time points of interest, one at 210 ms and the other at 280 ms post stimulus onset. Brain potentials at the earlier time point reflect modulations in presentation duration with increased amplitudes elicited by longer presentations. At this time point, no differences were seen between words and shapes in both hemispheres. The later time point, though, clearly distinguished between word and shape processing with totally missing amplitudes (i.e., brain activity) in the case of shapes in general in both hemispheres. Crucially, words presented for only 17 ms still elicited an average brain potential amplitude significantly different from the corresponding 17 ms presentations of shapes at this time point at electrode location P7, even though both stimuli categories were basically not seen (i.e., not consciously recognized). This later word-specific brain potential for the shortest presentation duration is interpreted as neurophysiological evidence of subliminal word processing. Strikingly, this difference was not found in the right hemisphere at P8.

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Breitmeyer, Bruno G. "Contributions of magno- and parvocellular channels to conscious and non-conscious vision." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 369, no. 1641 (May 5, 2014): 20130213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2013.0213.

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The dorsal and ventral cortical pathways, driven predominantly by magnocellular (M) and parvocellular (P) inputs, respectively, assume leading roles in models of visual information processing. Although in prior proposals, the dorsal and ventral pathways support non-conscious and conscious vision, respectively, recent modelling and empirical developments indicate that each pathway plays important roles in both non-conscious and conscious vision. In these models, the ventral P-pathway consists of one subpathway processing an object's contour features, e.g. curvature, the other processing its surface attributes, e.g. colour. Masked priming studies have shown that feed-forward activity in the ventral P-pathway on its own supports non-conscious processing of contour and surface features. The dorsal M-pathway activity contributes directly to conscious vision of motion and indirectly to object vision by projecting to prefrontal cortex, which in turn injects top-down neural activity into the ventral P-pathway and there ‘ignites’ feed-forward–re-entrant loops deemed necessary for conscious vision. Moreover, an object's shape or contour remains invisible without the prior conscious registration of its surface properties, which for that reason are taken to comprise fundamental visual qualia. Besides suggesting avenues for future research, these developments bear on several recent and past philosophical issues.

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Soukhtanlou, Mohammad, Reza Rostami, Mohammad Ali Salehinejad, Masoud Gholamali Lavasani, Ali Sharifi, and Amin Hekmatmanesh. "Electrophysiological processing of happiness during conscious and sub-conscious awareness in depression." Neurology, Psychiatry and Brain Research 33 (September 2019): 32–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.npbr.2019.06.001.

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Musculus, Lisa, Noel Kinrade, Sylvain Laborde, Melina Gleißert, Miriam Streich, and Babett Helen Lobinger. "Movement-Specific Reinvestment in Older People Explains Past Falls and Predicts Future Error-Prone Movements." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 18, no. 10 (May 12, 2021): 5129. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18105129.

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The tendency to think about or consciously control automated movements (i.e., movement-specific reinvestment) is a crucial factor associated with falling in the elderly. We tested whether elderly people’s movement-specific reinvestment depended on their past falling history and whether it can predict future error-prone movements. In a longitudinal pre-post design, we assessed n = 21 elderly people’s (Mage = 84.38 years, SD = 5.68) falling history, movement-specific reinvestment (i.e., Movement-Specific Reinvestment Scale), and physical functioning (i.e., Short-Physical-Performance Battery). Following a baseline assessment, participants reported their movement behavior in a daily diary for 2 months, after which we assessed their movement-specific reinvestment and physical functioning again (longitudinal, pre-post design). Results revealed, first, that participants’ movement self-consciousness score was fairly stable, while their conscious-motor-processing score was less stable. Second, conscious motor processing was higher in participants who had fallen as opposed to those who had not fallen in the past. Third, conscious motor processing predicted error-prone future movement behavior reported in the daily diary. For identifying individuals who are more prone to fall, caregivers, rehabilitation staff, or doctors could apply the Movement-Specific Reinvestment Scale to screen elderly people’s psychomotor behavior. Based on conscious motor processing, monitoring cognitions could be tailored in theory-based, individual interventions involving both cognitive and motor training.

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Duijn, Tina van, Simon Thomas, and Rich SW Masters. "Chipping in on the role of conscious processing during children's motor learning by analogy." International Journal of Sports Science & Coaching 14, no. 3 (April 2, 2019): 383–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1747954119841162.

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The capacity for storing and manipulating information (a function of working memory) is not fully developed until adulthood, so children are not always able to process explicit instructions when learning a new skill. A teaching method that may solve this problem is analogy learning, which compares the to-be-learned skill with a well-known concept by way of a single metaphorical instruction. In adults, analogy learning has been shown to lead to lower load on working memory by reducing the need for conscious processing; however, the effects are unclear in children. If analogy instructions work similarly in children, the propensity to consciously control movements may affect how well children learn by analogy. It is in the interest of coaches and teachers to determine whether analogy instructions can be used to reduce conscious processing in children, and whether propensity for conscious control of movements (movement specific reinvestment) predicts benefits from analogy learning. Thirteen-year-old golf novices (n = 44) were pre-tested and post-tested after practicing a golf-chipping task using explicit rules. One week later, an analogy for learning the golf chip was introduced, and an identical set of post-tests was repeated. Propensity for conscious control/reinvestment predicted improvement in accuracy after the analogy was introduced. Children's motor learning by analogy may be affected by their propensity for conscious control of movements, which suggests that coaches should adapt instructions to individual differences between learners.

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Moser, Julia, Franziska Schleger, Magdalene Weiss, Katrin Sippel, Lorenzo Semeia, and Hubert Preissl. "Magnetoencephalographic signatures of conscious processing before birth." Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 49 (June 2021): 100964. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2021.100964.

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Jin, Haiyang, Paul Corballis, Matt Oxner, and William Hayward. "Holistic Processing of Conscious and Unconscious Faces." Journal of Vision 18, no. 10 (September 1, 2018): 357. http://dx.doi.org/10.1167/18.10.357.

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Laureys, S., F. Perrin, M. E. Faymonville, C. Schnakers, M. Boly, V. Bartsch, S. Majerus, G. Moonen, and P. Maquet. "Cerebral processing in the minimally conscious state." Neurology 63, no. 5 (September 13, 2004): 916–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1212/01.wnl.0000137421.30792.9b.

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Pribram, Karl H., and Shelli D. Meade. "Conscious awareness: processing in the synaptodendritic web." New Ideas in Psychology 17, no. 3 (December 1999): 205–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0732-118x(99)00024-0.

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Dehaene, Stanislas, and Jean-Pierre Changeux. "Experimental and Theoretical Approaches to Conscious Processing." Neuron 70, no. 2 (April 2011): 200–227. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2011.03.018.

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Dehaene, Stanislas, Lucie Charles, Jean-Rémi King, and Sébastien Marti. "Toward a computational theory of conscious processing." Current Opinion in Neurobiology 25 (April 2014): 76–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2013.12.005.

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Machado, C., C. Schnakers, M. Boly, S. Majerus, and S. Laureys. "Cerebral processing in the minimally conscious state." Neurology 65, no. 6 (September 26, 2005): 973–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1212/wnl.65.6.973.

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Mullen, Richard, and Lew Hardy. "Conscious Processing and the Process Goal Paradox." Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology 32, no. 3 (June 2010): 275–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1123/jsep.32.3.275.

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The three experiments reported here examined the process goal paradox, which has emerged from the literature on goal setting and conscious processing. We predicted that skilled but anxious performers who adopted a global movement focus using holistic process goals would outperform those who used part-oriented process goals. In line with the conscious processing hypothesis, we also predicted that performers using part process goals would experience performance impairment in test compared with baseline conditions. In all three experiments, participants performed motor tasks in baseline and test conditions. Cognitive state anxiety increased in all of the test conditions. The results confirmed our first prediction; however, we failed to find unequivocal evidence to support our second prediction. The consistent pattern of the results lends support to the suggestion that, for skilled athletes who perform under competitive pressure, using a holistic process goal that focuses attention on global aspects of a motor skill is a more effective attentional focus strategy than using a part process goal.

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Bekinschtein, T. "Emotion processing in the minimally conscious state." Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry 75, no. 5 (May 1, 2004): 788. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/jnnp.2003.034876.

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Cariani, Peter. "Anesthesia, Neural Information Processing, and Conscious Awareness." Consciousness and Cognition 9, no. 3 (September 2000): 387–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/ccog.1999.0420.

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Micher, Nitzan, Diana Mazenko, and Dominique Lamy. "Role of Conscious Perception in Semantic Processing." Journal of Vision 22, no. 14 (December 5, 2022): 3466. http://dx.doi.org/10.1167/jov.22.14.3466.

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Ellmers, Toby J., Adam J. Cocks, Elmar C. Kal, and William R. Young. "Conscious Movement Processing, Fall-Related Anxiety, and the Visuomotor Control of Locomotion in Older Adults." Journals of Gerontology: Series B 75, no. 9 (August 6, 2020): 1911–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/geronb/gbaa081.

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Abstract Objectives Older adults anxious about falling will often consciously process walking movements in an attempt to avoid falling. They also fixate their gaze on the present step rather than looking ahead to plan future actions. The present work examined whether conscious movement strategies result in such restricted visual planning. Methods A total of 18 community-dwelling older adults (agemean = 71.22; SD = 5.75) walked along a path and stepped into two raised targets. Repeated-measures analyses of variance were used to compare gaze behavior and movement kinematics when participants walked: (a) at baseline (ground level); (b) under conditions designed to induce fall-related anxiety (walkway elevated 0.6 m); and (c) in the absence of anxiety (ground level), but with explicit instructions to consciously process movements. Results Participants reported increased conscious movement processing when walking both on the elevated walkway (fall-related anxiety condition) and at ground level when instructed to consciously process gait. During both conditions, participants altered their gaze behavior, visually prioritizing the immediate walkway 1–2 steps ahead (areas needed for the on-line visual control of individual steps) at the expense of previewing distal areas of the walking path required to plan future steps. These alterations were accompanied by significantly slower gait and increased stance durations prior to target steps. Conclusions Consciously processing movement (in the relative absence of anxiety) resulted in gaze behavior comparable to that observed during conditions of fall-related anxiety. As anxious participants also self-reported directing greater attention toward movement, this suggests that fall-related anxiety may disrupt the visual control of gait through increased conscious movement processing.

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Ben-Haim, Moshe Shay, Olga Dal Monte, Nicholas A. Fagan, Yarrow Dunham, Ran R. Hassin, Steve W. C. Chang, and Laurie R. Santos. "Disentangling perceptual awareness from nonconscious processing in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 118, no. 15 (March 30, 2021): e2017543118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2017543118.

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Scholars have long debated whether animals, which display impressive intelligent behaviors, are consciously aware or not. Yet, because many complex human behaviors and high-level functions can be performed without conscious awareness, it was long considered impossible to untangle whether animals are aware or just conditionally or nonconsciously behaving. Here, we developed an empirical approach to address this question. We harnessed a well-established cross-over double dissociation between nonconscious and conscious processing, in which people perform in completely opposite ways when they are aware of stimuli versus when they are not. To date, no one has explored if similar performance dissociations exist in a nonhuman species. In a series of seven experiments, we first established these signatures in humans using both known and newly developed nonverbal double-dissociation tasks and then identified similar signatures in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). These results provide robust evidence for two distinct modes of processing in nonhuman primates. This empirical approach makes it feasible to disentangle conscious visual awareness from nonconscious processing in nonhuman species; hence, it can be used to strip away ambiguity when exploring the processes governing intelligent behavior across the animal kingdom. Taken together, these results strongly support the existence of both nonconscious processing as well as functional human-like visual awareness in nonhuman animals.

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Salti, Moti, Asaf Harel, and Sébastien Marti. "Conscious Perception: Time for an Update?" Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 31, no. 1 (January 2019): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_01343.

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Understanding the neural mechanisms underlying conscious perception has become a central endeavor in cognitive neuroscience. In theories of conscious perception, a stimulus gaining conscious access is usually considered as a discrete neuronal event to be characterized in time or space, sometimes referred to as a conscious “episode.” Surprisingly, the alternative hypothesis according to which conscious perception is a dynamic process has rarely been considered. Here, we discuss this hypothesis and its implications. We show how it can reconcile inconsistent empirical findings on the timing of the neural correlates of consciousness and make testable predictions. According to this hypothesis, a stimulus is consciously perceived for as long as it is recoded to fit an ongoing stream composed of all other perceived stimuli. We suggest that this “updating” process is governed by at least three factors (1) context, (2) stimulus saliency, and (3) observers' goals. Finally, this framework forces us to reconsider the typical distinction between conscious and unconscious information processing.

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Kouider, Sid, and Stanislas Dehaene. "Levels of processing during non-conscious perception: a critical review of visual masking." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 362, no. 1481 (April 2, 2007): 857–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2007.2093.

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Understanding the extent and limits of non-conscious processing is an important step on the road to a thorough understanding of the cognitive and cerebral correlates of conscious perception. In this article, we present a critical review of research on subliminal perception during masking and other related experimental conditions. Although initially controversial, the possibility that a broad variety of processes can be activated by a non-reportable stimulus is now well established. Behavioural findings of subliminal priming indicate that a masked word or digit can have an influence on perceptual, lexical and semantic levels, while neuroimaging directly visualizes the brain activation that it evokes in several cortical areas. This activation is often attenuated under subliminal presentation conditions compared to consciously reportable conditions, but there are sufficiently many exceptions, in paradigms such as the attentional blink, to indicate that high activation, per se , is not a sufficient condition for conscious access to occur. We conclude by arguing that for a stimulus to reach consciousness, two factors are jointly needed: (i) the input stimulus must have enough strength (which can be prevented by masking) and (ii) it must receive top-down attention (which can be prevented by drawing attention to another stimulus or task). This view leads to a distinction between two types of non-conscious processes, which we call subliminal and preconscious. According to us, maintaining this distinction is essential in order to make sense of the growing neuroimaging data on the neural correlates of consciousness.

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Yamashiro, Hiroyuki, Hiroki Yamamoto, Jun Saiki, Hiroaki Mano, Masahiro Umeda, and Chuzo Tanaka. "Relative weights on conscious and non-conscious visual processing in human retinotopic areas." Neuroscience Research 58 (January 2007): S54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neures.2007.06.316.

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Morsella, Ezequiel, and John A. Bargh. "Supracortical consciousness: Insights from temporal dynamics, processing-content, and olfaction." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30, no. 1 (February 2007): 100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x07001070.

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To further illuminate the nature of conscious states, it may be progressive to integrate Merker's important contribution with what is known regarding (a) the temporal relation between conscious states and activation of the mesodiencephalic system; (b) the nature of the information (e.g., perceptual vs. premotor) involved in conscious integration; and (c) the neural correlates of olfactory consciousness.

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Hsu, Shen-Mou, and Yu-Fang Yang. "Temporal neural mechanisms underlying conscious access to different levels of facial stimulus contents." Journal of Neurophysiology 119, no. 4 (April 1, 2018): 1356–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1152/jn.00747.2017.

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An important issue facing the empirical study of consciousness concerns how the contents of incoming stimuli gain access to conscious processing. According to classic theories, facial stimuli are processed in a hierarchical manner. However, it remains unclear how the brain determines which level of stimulus content is consciously accessible when facing an incoming facial stimulus. Accordingly, with a magnetoencephalography technique, this study aims to investigate the temporal dynamics of the neural mechanism mediating which level of stimulus content is consciously accessible. Participants were instructed to view masked target faces at threshold so that, according to behavioral responses, their perceptual awareness alternated from consciously accessing facial identity in some trials to being able to consciously access facial configuration features but not facial identity in other trials. Conscious access at these two levels of facial contents were associated with a series of differential neural events. Before target presentation, different patterns of phase angle adjustment were observed between the two types of conscious access. This effect was followed by stronger phase clustering for awareness of facial identity immediately during stimulus presentation. After target onset, conscious access to facial identity, as opposed to facial configural features, was able to elicit more robust late positivity. In conclusion, we suggest that the stages of neural events, ranging from prestimulus to stimulus-related activities, may operate in combination to determine which level of stimulus contents is consciously accessed. Conscious access may thus be better construed as comprising various forms that depend on the level of stimulus contents accessed. NEW & NOTEWORTHY The present study investigates how the brain determines which level of stimulus contents is consciously accessible when facing an incoming facial stimulus. Using magnetoencephalography, we show that prestimulus activities together with stimulus-related activities may operate in combination to determine conscious face detection or identification. This finding is distinct from the previous notion that conscious face detection precedes identification and provides novel insights into the temporal dynamics of different levels of conscious face perception.

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Moors, Agnes, Jan De Houwer, Dirk Hermans, and Paul Eelen. "Unintentional Processing of Motivational Valence." Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A 58, no. 6 (August 2005): 1043–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02724980443000467.

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Recent motivational affective priming studies (Moors & De Houwer, 2001; Moors, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2004) showed that primes that indicate success on a goal-inducing task facilitate positive target responses whereas primes that indicate failure on that task facilitate negative target responses. In the current studies, we examined whether these priming effects depend on consciously intentional processing of the motivational valence of the primes. In Experiment 1, the outcome of success or failure was presented not only immediately before the target (i.e., the prime) but also a second time after the target response. This should encourage participants to ignore the prime. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to respond to the targets within 600 ms after target onset. As a result, participants had little opportunity to process the motivational prime valence in a consciously intentional way. Nevertheless, strong affective priming effects were found in both studies. These results provide additional support for the claim that motivational valence can be processed without the conscious intention to do so.

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Velmans, Max. "Why conscious free will both is and isn't an illusion." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27, no. 5 (October 2004): 677. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x04420159.

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Wegner's analysis of the illusion of conscious will is close to my own account of how conscious experiences relate to brain processes. But our analyses differ somewhat on how conscious will is not an illusion. Wegner argues that once conscious will arises it enters causally into subsequent mental processing. I argue that while his causal story is accurate, it remains a first-person story. Conscious free will is not an illusion in the sense that this first-person story is compatible with and complementary to a third-person account of voluntary processing in the mind/brain.

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Blake, Randolph. "K2: Probing Visual Processing outside of Conscious Awareness." i-Perception 3, no. 9 (October 2012): 565. http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/if565.

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Panagiotaropoulos, Theofanis I., Liping Wang, and Stanislas Dehaene. "Hierarchical architecture of conscious processing and subjective experience." Cognitive Neuropsychology 37, no. 3-4 (May 18, 2020): 180–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02643294.2020.1760811.

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Smith, M. L. "Rapid Processing of Emotional Expressions without Conscious Awareness." Cerebral Cortex 22, no. 8 (September 27, 2011): 1748–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhr250.

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Vul, Edward, and Donald I. A. MacLeod. "Contingent aftereffects distinguish conscious and preconscious color processing." Nature Neuroscience 9, no. 7 (June 11, 2006): 873–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nn1723.

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Stienen, Bernard M. C., and Fiona N. Newell. "Human sounds facilitates conscious processing of emotional faces." Seeing and Perceiving 25 (2012): 118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187847612x647513.

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The interaction of audio–visual signals transferring information about the emotional state of others may play a significant role in social engagement. There is ample evidence that recognition of visual emotional information does not necessarily depend on conscious processing. However, little is known about how multisensory integration of affective signals relates to visual awareness. Previous research using masking experiments has shown relative independence of audio–visual integration on visual awareness. However, masking does not capture the dynamic nature of consciousness in which dynamic stimulus selection depends on a multitude of signals. Therefore, we presented neutral and happy faces in one eye and houses in the other resulting in perceptual rivalry between the two stimuli while at the same time we presented laughing, coughing or no sound. The participants were asked to report when they saw the faces, houses or their mixtures and were instructed to ignore the playback of sounds. When happy facial expressions were shown participants reported seeing fewer houses in comparison to when neutral expressions were shown. In addition, human sounds increase the viewing time of faces in comparison when there was no sound. Taken together, emotional expressions of the face affect which face is selected for visual awareness and at the same time, this is facilitated by human sounds.

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Park, S. H., W. K. Lam, M. C. J. Hoskens, L. Uiga, A. M. Cooke, and R. S. W. Masters. "Inhibitory control, conscious processing of movement and anxiety." Psychology of Sport and Exercise 46 (January 2020): 101587. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psychsport.2019.101587.

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Breitmeyer, B. G., E. Tapia, and E. C. Broyles. "Spatial attention in conscious and nonconscious visual processing." Journal of Vision 9, no. 8 (March 22, 2010): 225. http://dx.doi.org/10.1167/9.8.225.

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Mashour, George A., Pieter Roelfsema, Jean-Pierre Changeux, and Stanislas Dehaene. "Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis." Neuron 105, no. 5 (March 2020): 776–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2020.01.026.

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Siéroff, Eric. "Hemineglect, extinction, and the importance of conscious processing." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25, no. 3 (June 2002): 354–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x02480065.

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Neuropsychological studies on hemineglect and extinction show that “neglected” or “extinguished” stimuli can access a semantic level. However, processing of these stimuli is usually not accomplished at the same level as non-neglected stimuli. These data are compatible with Perruchet & Vinter's hypothesis of the importance of consciousness in the construction of representations and knowledge.

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Dehaene, Stanislas, Jean-Pierre Changeux, Lionel Naccache, Jérôme Sackur, and Claire Sergent. "Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: a testable taxonomy." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10, no. 5 (May 2006): 204–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2006.03.007.

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Spiering, Mark, Walter Everaerd, and Ellen Laan. "Conscious Processing of Sexual Information: Mechanisms of Appraisal." Archives of Sexual Behavior 33, no. 4 (August 2004): 369–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:aseb.0000028890.08687.94.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Conscious Processing'

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