Journal articles: 'Conscientious Refusal to Treat'

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DOUGLAS, THOMAS. "Refusing to Treat Sexual Dysfunction in Sex Offenders." Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26, no. 1 (December 9, 2016): 143–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180116000712.

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Abstract:This article examines one kind of conscientious refusal: the refusal of healthcare professionals to treat sexual dysfunction in individuals with a history of sexual offending. According to what I call the orthodoxy, such refusal is invariably impermissible, whereas at least one other kind of conscientious refusal—refusal to offer abortion services—is not. I seek to put pressure on the orthodoxy by (1) motivating the view that either both kinds of conscientious refusal are permissible or neither is, and (2) critiquing two attempts to buttress it.

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Forster, Melanie. "Ethical position of medical practitioners who refuse to treat unvaccinated children." Journal of Medical Ethics 45, no. 8 (June 27, 2019): 552–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2019-105379.

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Recent reports in Australia have suggested that some medical practitioners are refusing to treat children who have not been vaccinated, a practice that has been observed in the USA and parts of Europe for some years. This behaviour, if it is indeed occurring in Australia, has not been supported by the Australian Medical Association, although there is broad support for medical practitioners in general having the right to conscientious objection. This paper examines the ethical underpinnings of conscientious objection and whether the right to conscientious objection can be applied to the refusal to treat unvaccinated children. The implications of such a decision will also be discussed, to assess whether refusal to treat unvaccinated children is ethically justifiable. The best interests of both existing and new patients are crucially important in a doctor’s practice, and the tension between these two groups of patients are contemplated in the arguments below. It is argued that on balance, the refusal to treat unvaccinated children constitutes unjustified discrimination.

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Martins-Vale, Madalena, Helena P. Pereira, Sílvia Marina, and Miguel Ricou. "Conscientious Objection and Other Motivations for Refusal to Treat in Hastened Death: A Systematic Review." Healthcare 11, no. 15 (July 26, 2023): 2127. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/healthcare11152127.

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Background: Conscientious objection (CO) in the context of health care arises when a health care professional (HCP) refuses to participate in a certain procedure because it is not compatible with their ethical or moral principles. Refusal to treat in health care includes, in addition to CO, other factors that may lead the HCP not to want to participate in a certain procedure. Therefore, we can say that CO is a form of refusal of treatment based on conscience. Hastened death has become an increasingly reality around the world, being a procedure in which not all HCPs are willing to participate. There are several factors that can condition the HCPs’ refusal to treat in this scenario. Methods: With the aim of identifying these factors, we performed a systematic review, following the PRISMA guidelines. On 1 October 2022, we searched for relevant articles on Pubmed, Web of Science and Scopus databases. Results: From an initial search of 693 articles, 12 were included in the final analysis. Several motivations that condition refusal to treat were identified, including legal, technical, social, and CO. Three main motivations for CO were also identified, namely religious, moral/secular, and emotional/psychological motivations. Conclusions: We must adopt an understanding approach respecting the position of each HCP, avoiding judgmental and discriminatory positions, although we must ensure also that patients have access to care. The identification of these motivations may permit solutions that, while protecting the HCPS’ position, may also mitigate potential problems concerning patients’ access to this type of procedure.

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Yang, Chelsey. "The inequity of conscientious objection: Refusal of emergency contraception." Nursing Ethics 27, no. 6 (May 13, 2020): 1408–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0969733020918926.

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In the medical field, conscientious objection is claimed by providers and pharmacists in an attempt to forgo administering select forms of sexual and reproductive healthcare services because they state it goes against their moral integrity. Such claim of conscientious objection may include refusing to administer emergency contraception to an individual with a medical need that is time-sensitive. Conscientious objection is first defined, and then a historical context is provided on the medical field’s involvement with the issue. An explanation of emergency contraception’s physiological effects is provided along with historical context of the use on emergency contraception in terms of United States Law. A comparison is given between the United States and other developed countries in regard to conscientious objection. Once an understanding of conscientious objection and emergency contraception is presented, arguments supporting and contradicting the claim are described. Opinions supporting conscientious objection include the support of moral integrity, religious diversity, and less regulation on government involvement in state law will be offered. Finally, arguments against the effects of conscientious objection with emergency contraception are explained in terms of financial implications and other repercussions for people in lower socioeconomic status groups, especially people of color. Although every clinician has the right and responsibility to treat according to their sense of responsibility or conscience, the ethical consequences of living by one’s conscience are limiting and negatively impact underprivileged groups of people. It is the aim of this article to advocate against the use of provider’s and pharmacist’s right to claim conscientious objection due to the inequitable impact the practice has on people of color and individuals with lower incomes.

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Fiala, Christian, and Joyce H. Arthur. "“Dishonourable disobedience” – Why refusal to treat in reproductive healthcare is not conscientious objection." Woman - Psychosomatic Gynaecology and Obstetrics 1 (December 2014): 12–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.woman.2014.03.001.

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Dudzinski, Denise M., and Sarah E. Shannon. "Competent Patients’ Refusal of Nursing Care." Nursing Ethics 13, no. 6 (November 2006): 608–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0969733006069696.

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Competent patients’ refusals of nursing care do not yet have the legal or ethical standing of refusals of life-sustaining medical therapies such as mechanical ventilation or blood products. The case of a woman who refused turning and incontinence management owing to pain prompted us to examine these situations. We noted several special features: lack of paradigm cases, social taboo around unmanaged incontinence, the distinction between ordinary versus extraordinary care, and the moral distress experienced by nurses. We examined this case on the merits and limitations of five well-known ethical positions: pure autonomy, conscientious objection, paternalism, communitarianism, and feminism. We found each lacking and argue for a ‘negotiated reliance’ response where nurses and others tread as lightly as possible on the patient’s autonomy while negotiating a compromise, but are obligated to match the patient’s sacrifice by extending themselves beyond their usual professional practice.

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MUNTHE, CHRISTIAN, and MORTEN EBBE JUUL NIELSEN. "The Legal Ethical Backbone of Conscientious Refusal." Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26, no. 1 (December 9, 2016): 59–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180116000645.

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Abstract:This article analyzes the idea of a legal right to conscientious refusal for healthcare professionals from a basic legal ethical standpoint, using refusal to perform tasks related to legal abortion (in cases of voluntary employment) as a case in point. The idea of a legal right to conscientious refusal is distinguished from ideas regarding moral rights or reasons related to conscientious refusal, and none of the latter are found to support the notion of a legal right. Reasons for allowing some sort of room for conscientious refusal for healthcare professionals based on the importance of cultural identity and the fostering of a critical atmosphere might provide some support, if no countervailing factors apply. One such factor is that a legal right to healthcare professionals’ conscientious refusal must comply with basic legal ethical tenets regarding the rule of law and equal treatment, and this requirement is found to create serious problems for those wishing to defend the idea under consideration. We conclude that the notion of a legal right to conscientious refusal for any profession is either fundamentally incompatible with elementary legal ethical requirements, or implausible because it undermines the functioning of a related professional sector (healthcare) or even of society as a whole.

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Matthews, Richard. "The Moral Asymmetry of Conscientious Provision and Conscientious Refusal: Insights from Oppression and Allyship." IJFAB: International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 17, no. 1 (March 1, 2024): 49–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/ijfab-2023-0005.

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Conscientious refusal involves decisions by healthcare workers, on grounds of their conscience, to refuse to provide legal, professionally permissible and safe health interventions to patients. Conscientious provision involves decisions by healthcare workers, also on grounds of conscience, to provide safe and beneficial healthcare to patients that is prohibited by law or policy. Some bioethicists believe that the moral issues governing both are identical, and that if one permits conscientious refusals, one should also permit conscientious provisions. This article argues that this assumption of symmetry is incorrect. To demonstrate this, it does the following: first, it establishes why it matters that we understand the difference between them; second, it describes three recent cases of conscientious provision in Canadian healthcare to help characterize its nature and scope; third, it situates these cases in a socio-economically nuanced analysis of the role of the conscientious provider under conditions or privilege and oppression; finally, it applies insights from the cases and the intersectional analysis to common criticisms of conscientious refusal to reinforce the fundamental asymmetries between conscientious refusal and conscientious provision.

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Cholbi, Michael. "Public cartels, private conscience." Politics, Philosophy & Economics 17, no. 4 (May 30, 2018): 356–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470594x18779146.

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Many contributors to debates about professional conscience assume a basic, pre-professional right of conscientious refusal and proceed to address how to ‘balance’ this right against other goods. Here I argue that opponents of a right of conscientious refusal concede too much in assuming such a right, overlooking that the professions in which conscientious refusal is invoked nearly always operate as public cartels, enjoying various economic benefits, including protection from competition, made possible by governments exercising powers of coercion, regulation, and taxation. To acknowledge a right of conscientious refusal is to license professionals to disrespect the profession’s clients, in opposition to liberal ideals of neutrality, and to engage in moral paternalism toward them; to permit them to violate duties of reciprocity they incur by virtue of being members of public cartels; and to compel those clients to provide material support for conceptions of the good they themselves reject. However, so long as (a) a public cartel discharges its obligations to distribute the socially important goods they have are uniquely authorized to provide without undue burden to its clientele, and (b) conscientious refusal has the assent of other members of a profession, individual professionals’ claims of conscience can be accommodated.

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Moore, Claire M. "Objection or Obstacle: Applying Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach to the Conscientious Refusal of Emergency Contraception." IJFAB: International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 15, no. 2 (August 1, 2022): 40–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/ijfab.15.2.03.

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The conscientious refusal to dispense emergency contraception (EC) is legally protected in fourteen states. While the ethical dimensions of these objections have been explored within moral and feminist philosophy, conscientious refusal to the over-the-counter sale of EC has not been significantly studied through an egalitarian lens, especially with attention to the existing reproductive healthcare landscape in which these refusals occur. This article argues, through Amartya Sen’s capability approach, that conscientious refusal to EC creates a burdensome inequality for people wishing to prevent pregnancy that manifests within a background of historical injustices, elevating its importance in our weighing of capabilities.

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Kuře, Josef. "Conscientious objection in health care." Ethics & Bioethics 6, no. 3-4 (December 1, 2016): 173–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ebce-2016-0018.

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Abstract The paper deals with conscientious objection in health care, addressing the problems of scope, verification and limitation of such refusal, paying attention to ideological agendas hidden behind the right of conscience where the claimed refusal can cause harm or where such a claim is an attempt to impose certain moral values on society or an excuse for not providing health care. The nature of conscientious objection will be investigated and an ethical analysis of conscientious objection will be conducted. Finally some suggestions for health care policy will be proposed.

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Jones-Nosacek, Cynthia. "Conscientious Objection, Not Refusal: The Power of a Word." Linacre Quarterly 88, no. 3 (April 19, 2021): 242–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00243639211008271.

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Conscientious objection (CO) in medicine grew out of the need to protect healthcare providers who objected to performing abortions after the Roe v. Wade decision in the 1970s which has since over time expanded to include sterilization, contraception, in vitro fertilization, stem cell research, and end-of-life issues. Since 2006, there has been a growing amount of published literature arguing for the denial of CO. Over the last three years, there has also been an increase in calling this conscientious refusal. This article will argue that the term conscientious objection is more accurate than conscientious refusal because those who object are not refusing to provide care. CO also emphasizes that there are reasoned arguments behind one’s decision not to perform certain actions because of one’s own principles and values. Summary How something is presented matters. Objection emphasizes the thought behind the action while refusal gives the impression that medical care is not given.

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Dooley, D. "Conscientious refusal to assist with abortion." BMJ 309, no. 6955 (September 10, 1994): 622–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.309.6955.622.

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Toro-Flores, Rafael, Pilar Bravo-Agüi, María Victoria Catalán-Gómez, Marisa González-Hernando, María Jesús Guijarro-Cenisergue, Margarita Moreno-Vázquez, Isabel Roch-Hamelin, and Tamara Raquel Velasco-Sanz. "Opinions of nurses regarding conscientious objection." Nursing Ethics 26, no. 4 (November 12, 2017): 1027–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0969733017731915.

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Background: In the last decades, there have been important developments in the scientific and technological areas of healthcare. On certain occasions this provokes conflict between the patients' rights and the values of healthcare professionals which brings about, within this clinical relationship, the problem of conscientious objection. Aims: To learn the opinions that the Nurses of the Madrid Autonomous Community have regarding conscientious objection. Research design: Cross-cutting descriptive study. Participants and research context: The nurses of 9 hospitals and 12 Health Centers in the Madrid Autonomous Community. The study was done by means of an auto completed anonymous questionnaire. The variables studied were social-demographical and their opinions about conscientious objections. Ethical considerations: The study was approved by the Ethical Community of Clinical Research of the University Hospital Príncipe de Asturias. Participants were assured of maximum confidentiality and anonymity. Findings: A total of 421 nurses answered the questionnaire. In total, 55.6% of the nurses confirmed they were religious believers, and 64.3% declared having poor knowledge regarding conscientious objection. The matters that caused the greatest objections were voluntary abortions, genetic embryo selection, refusal of blood transfusions, and therapy refusal. Discussion: Different authors state that the most significant cases of conscientious objections for health professionals are those regarding carrying out or assisting in abortions, euthanasia, the practice of assisted reproduction and, finally, the prescription and dispensing of the morning-after pill. In our study, the most significant cases in which the nurses would declare conscientious objections would be the refusal to accept treatment, the selection of embryos after genetic diagnosis preimplantation, the patient’s refusal to receive blood transfusions due to religious reasons and pregnant women’s request for voluntary abortions within the first 14 weeks. Conclusion: Nurses’ religious beliefs influence their opinions regarding conscientious objection. The nurses who declare themselves as religious believers object in a higher percentage than those without religious beliefs.

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Fry-Bowers, Eileen K. "A Matter of Conscience: Examining the Law and Policy of Conscientious Objection in Health Care." Policy, Politics, & Nursing Practice 21, no. 2 (May 2020): 120–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1527154420926156.

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Conscientious objection refers to refusal by a health care provider (HCP) to provide certain treatments, including the standard of care, to a patient based upon the provider’s personal, ethical, or religious beliefs. Federal and state rules regarding conscientious objection have expanded the scope of legal protections that HCPs and institutions can invoke in support of refusal. Opponents of these rules argue that allowing refusal of care deprives patients of care that conforms to professionally established guidelines, contradicts long-standing principles related to informed consent, interferes with the ability of health care facilities to provide safe and efficient care, and leaves the patient without means of redress for injury. Proponents respond that such rules are necessary to preserve the moral integrity of providers, including institutions. Although refusal rules are most often associated with abortion, some HCPs have cited moral concerns regarding contraception, sterilization, prevention/treatment of sexually transmitted infections, transition-related care for transgender individuals, medication-assisted treatment of substance use disorders, the use of artificial reproductive technologies, and patient preferences for end-of-life care. Evidence suggests that the burden of conscientious refusal falls disproportionately on vulnerable populations, and legitimate concern exists that moral disagreement is merely pretext for discrimination. A careful balance must be struck between the defending the conscience rights of HCPs and the civil rights of patients.

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Sumner, LW. "Conscientious refusal to provide medically assisted dying." University of Toronto Law Journal 71, no. 1 (November 2020): 1–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/utlj-2020-0053.

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Munthe, Christian. "Conscientious refusal in healthcare: the Swedish solution." Journal of Medical Ethics 43, no. 4 (September 1, 2016): 257–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2016-103752.

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Pope, Thaddeus Mason. "Legal Briefing: Conscience Clauses and Conscientious Refusal." Journal of Clinical Ethics 21, no. 2 (June 1, 2010): 163–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/jce201021211.

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CLARKE, STEVE. "Two Concepts of Conscience and their Implications for Conscience-Based Refusal in Healthcare." Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26, no. 1 (December 9, 2016): 97–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180116000670.

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Abstract:Healthcare professionals are not currently obliged to justify conscientious objections. As a consequence, there are currently no practical limits on the scope of conscience-based refusals in healthcare. Recently, a number of bioethicists, including Christopher Meyers, Robert D. Woods, Robert Card, Lori Kantymir, and Carolyn McLeod, have raised concerns about this situation and have offered proposals to place principled limits on the scope of conscience-based refusals in healthcare. Here, I seek to adjudicate among their proposals. I argue that to adjudicate among them properly it is important to consider the theoretical bases for conscientious objection. I further argue that there are two such bases to be considered. Some conscientious objections are justified by appeal to all-things-considered moral judgments, and some are justified by appeal to the “dictates of conscience.” I argue that both of these bases are legitimate and that both should be accommodated in any principled scheme to limit the scope of conscientious refusals in healthcare.

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Davis, J. K. "Futility, Conscientious Refusal, and Who Gets to Decide." Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 33, no. 4 (August 1, 2008): 356–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhn019.

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Nuttall, Coral-Kay. "Conscientious Objection: Justified or Just Refusal to Care?" Journal of Perioperative Practice 17, no. 5 (May 2007): 210–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/175045890701700503.

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Groenhout, Ruth. "Reformed Theology and Conscientious Refusal of Medical Treatment." Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality 26, no. 1 (February 20, 2020): 56–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cb/cbaa001.

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Abstract Traditionally, healthcare workers have had the right to refuse to participate in abortions or physician-assisted suicide, but more recently there has been a movement in white Evangelical circles to expand these rights to include the refusal of any treatment at all to same-sex couples or their children, transgender individuals, or others who offend the provider’s moral sensibilities. Religious freedom of conscience exists in an uneasy tension with laws protecting equal rights in a liberal polity, and it is a particularly fraught question in the context of medicine, where providers’ consciences must be balanced against patients’ rights to access appropriate care. This article examines the refusal of care to classes of people, usually classes defined by various sexual issues with which the caregivers disagree. This expands conscientious refusals from the traditional concept of responses to actions and instead directs it at specific types of people. The article draws on Reformed thought to argue that such refusals are not justified and are, in fact, both a profound misreading of Christian morality and a new and dangerously expansive account of the right to conscientious refusal in medicine.

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Lupi, Carla S., Christopher M. Estes, Monica A. Broome, and Nicolette M. Schreiber. "Conscientious refusal in reproductive medicine: an educational intervention." American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 201, no. 5 (November 2009): 502.e1–502.e7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ajog.2009.05.056.

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KENNETT, JEANETTE. "The Cost of Conscience." Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26, no. 1 (December 9, 2016): 69–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180116000657.

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Abstract:The spread of demands by physicians and allied health professionals for accommodation of their private ethical, usually religiously based, objections to providing care of a particular type, or to a particular class of persons, suggests the need for a re-evaluation of conscientious objection in healthcare and how it should be regulated. I argue on Kantian grounds that respect for conscience and protection of freedom of conscience is consistent with fairly stringent limitations and regulations governing refusal of service in healthcare settings. Respect for conscience does not entail that refusal of service should be cost free to the objector. I suggest that conscientious objection in medicine should be conceptualized and treated analogously to civil disobedience.

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Blackshaw, Bruce Philip, and Daniel Rodger. "Questionable benefits and unavoidable personal beliefs: defending conscientious objection for abortion." Journal of Medical Ethics 46, no. 3 (August 31, 2019): 178–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2019-105566.

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Conscientious objection in healthcare has come under heavy criticism on two grounds recently, particularly regarding abortion provision. First, critics claim conscientious objection involves a refusal to provide a legal and beneficial procedure requested by a patient, denying them access to healthcare. Second, they argue the exercise of conscientious objection is based on unverifiable personal beliefs. These characteristics, it is claimed, disqualify conscientious objection in healthcare. Here, we defend conscientious objection in the context of abortion provision. We show that abortion has a dubitable claim to be medically beneficial, is rarely clinically indicated, and that conscientious objections should be accepted in these circumstances. We also show that reliance on personal beliefs is difficult to avoid if any form of objection is to be permitted, even if it is based on criteria such as the principles and values of the profession or the scope of professional practice.

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Natanel, Katherine. "Resistance at the Limits: Feminist Activism and Conscientious Objection in Israel." Feminist Review 101, no. 1 (July 2012): 78–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/fr.2011.51.

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This article investigates the relationship between feminism and conscientious objection in Israel, evaluating the efficacy of feminist resistance in the organised refusal movement. While recent feminist scholarship on peace, anti-occupation and anti-militarism activism in Israel largely highlights women's collective action, it does so at the risk of eliding the relations of power within these groups. Expanding the scope of consideration, I look to the experiences of individual feminist conscientious objectors who make visible significant tensions through their accounts of military refusal and participation in the organised conscientious objection movement. Drawing on original ethnographic research, this article problematises feminist activism in the organised Israeli refusal movement through three primary issues: political voice; privilege; and the realisation of gender agendas. Using Michel Foucault's conceptualisation of power as it has been critiqued and qualified by feminist scholars, I consider the ways in which resistance may be both multiple and a diagnostic of power, allowing activists and academics not only to envision new avenues for social change, but also to recognise their constraints. Critically, feminist theories of intersectionality enrich and complicate this Foucauldian approach to power, providing further modes of critique and strategy in the context of feminist activism in Israel. Ultimately, I argue not only for engagement with the limits of power, but also attention to their function, as in theory and praxis these boundaries critically inform our theorising on gender and resistance.

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Киселева, Екатерина Вячеславовна, and Ольга Сергеевна Кажаева. "Conscientious Objection to Abortion: A Comparative International Legal Framework." Праксис, no. 3(5) (November 15, 2020): 71–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.31802/praxis.2020.5.3.005.

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В настоящем исследовании дается сравнительно-правовой анализ подхода к пониманию содержания и взаимного положения некоторых прав человека, связанных с искусственным прерыванием беременности, понимания, отраженного на универсальном уровне международно- правового сотрудничества государств в актах договорных органов защиты прав человека. Если по существу факт искусственного прерывания беременности поднимает правозащитные вопросы в отношении трёх субъектов (женщины, вынашивающей ребёнка, нерожденного ребёнка и врача, осуществляющего аборт или отказывающегося от проведения такового), то со стороны защиты прав человека речь ведётся почти исключительно о женщине, чья жизнь и материалистически понимаемые интересы приоритизируются над всеми остальными правозащитными аспектами. В настоящей работе сравнению подвергаются именно права различных субъектов, оказывающихся связанными через аборт, объем и защищенность этих прав международным правом. В качестве международно-правовой основы для сравнения взят Международный билль о правах человека. Тезисы авторов иллюстрируются двумя делами в отношении врачей, отказавшихся проводить процедуру аборта исходя из христианских убеждений в Польше и Аргентине, соответственно. Статья подготовлена при финансовой поддержке РФФИ в рамках научного проекта № 18-011- 00292. This study provides a comparative legal analysis of the understanding of the content and mutual position of some human rights associated with artificial termination of pregnancy, the understanding reflected at the universal level of international legal inter-state cooperation in the acts of human rights treaty bodies. While, in essence, the fact of artificial termination of pregnancy raises human rights questions in relation to three subjects (a woman carrying a child, an unborn child and a doctor who performs an abortion or refuses to perform it), from the point of human rights protection, it is almost exclusively about a woman, whose life and materialistically understood interests are prioritized over all other human rights aspects. In this work, it is the rights of various subjects who find themselves bound through abortion, the scope and protection of these rights by international law, limited to the International Bill of Human Rights as an international legal basis for comparison are subjected to comparison. The authors illustrate their theses with two cases against the doctors who refused to carry out an abortion procedure for reasons of conscience in accordance with their Christian beliefs in Poland and Argentina, correspondingly. The article was prepared with the financial support of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research within the framework of research project № 18-011-00292.

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Davis, John K. "Conscientious Refusal and a Doctors?s Right to Quit." Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 29, no. 1 (February 1, 2004): 75–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1076/jmep.29.1.75.30410.

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Monni, G., W. Chavkin, S. de Zordo, and A. C. Gonzalez Velez. "I255 RELIGIOUSLY BASED “CONSCIENTIOUS” REFUSAL OF REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE." International Journal of Gynecology & Obstetrics 119 (October 2012): S225. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0020-7292(12)60285-9.

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Nelson, L. J. "Conscientious refusal, abortion, and the professional standard of care." Ethics, Medicine and Public Health 11 (October 2019): 36–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jemep.2019.100416.

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Ablyatipova, N. A., and I. Yu Volkova. "BONA FIDE ACQUISITION OF UNENTITLED PERSONS: ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT AND SYSTEM OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE." Scientific Notes of V. I. Vernadsky Crimean Federal University. Juridical science 7 (73), no. 3 (2) (2022): 74–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.37279/2413-1733-2021-7-3(2)-74-81.

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The article studies the institution of conscientious acquisition, the conditions for recognizing the person in the conscientious acquirer, enshrined in civil law and the positions of the highest courts. Analyzing the concept of a bona fide acquirer, the authors highlighted signs of good faith, established the main conditions necessary to effectively protect violated law. The authors analyzed the peculiarities of consideration by the courts of affairs on the recognition of a person with a conscientious acquirer and circumstances affecting the adoption by the courts of decisions about meeting the claims of applicants or refusal to satisfy them. Based on the analysis of the current civil legislation and judicial practice, a number of conditions are formulated under which the acquirer will be recognized as conscientious, which will prevent the emergence of such violations, as well as expand the possibilities of restoring violated rights.

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Spudis, E. V., J. K. Penry, and S. Graves. "Conscientious Neurologists Treat In-Flight Epilepsy." Archives of Neurology 51, no. 5 (May 1, 1994): 519–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/archneur.1994.00540170103021.

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Wong, Brian, and Joseph Chan. "How Should Liberal Democratic Governments Treat Conscientious Disobedience as a Response to State Injustice?: A Proposal." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 91 (April 4, 2022): 141–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246122000042.

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AbstractThis paper suggests that liberal democratic governments adopt a reconciliatory approach to conscientious disobedience. Central to this approach is the view – independent of whether conscientious disobedience is always morally justified – that conscientious disobedience is normatively distinct from other criminal acts with similar effects, and such distinction is worthy of acknowledgment by public apparatus and actors. The prerogative applies to both civil and uncivil instances of disobedience, as defined and explored in the paper. Governments and courts ought to take the normative distinction seriously and treat the conscientious disobedients in a more lenient way than they treat ordinary criminals. A comprehensive legislative scheme for governments to deal with prosecution, sentencing, and imprisonment of the conscientious disobedients will be proposed, with the normative and practical benefits of such an approach discussed in detail.

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Weinstock, Daniel. "Conscientious Refusal and Health Professionals: Does Religion Make a Difference?" Bioethics 28, no. 1 (September 30, 2013): 8–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12059.

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Fenton, Elizabeth, and Loren Lomasky. "Dispensing with Liberty: Conscientious Refusal and the "Morning-After Pill"." Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 30, no. 6 (December 1, 2005): 579–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03605310500421389.

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WICCLAIR, MARK R. "Conscientious Refusals by Hospitals and Emergency Contraception." Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 20, no. 1 (January 2011): 130–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180110000691.

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Hospitals sometimes refuse to provide goods and services or honor patients’ decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment for reasons that appear to resemble appeals to conscience. For example, based on the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services (ERD), Catholic hospitals have refused to forgo medically provided nutrition and hydration (MPNH), and Catholic hospitals have refused to provide emergency contraception (EC) and perform abortions or sterilization procedures. I consider whether it is justified to refuse to offer EC to victims of sexual assault who present at the emergency department (ED). A preliminary question, however, is whether a hospital’s refusal to provide services can be conceptualized as conscience based.

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Darzé, Omar, and Ubirajara Barroso Júnior. "Prevalence, Attitudes, and Factors Motivating Conscientious Objection toward Reproductive Health among Medical Students." Revista Brasileira de Ginecologia e Obstetrícia / RBGO Gynecology and Obstetrics 40, no. 10 (October 2018): 599–605. http://dx.doi.org/10.1055/s-0038-1673367.

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Objective We have evaluated the prevalence of and the motivating factors behind the refusal to provide reproductive health services and the ethical knowledge of the subject among medical students from the Escola Bahiana de Medicina e Saúde Pública, in the state of Bahia, Brazil. Methods The present cross-sectional study involved 120 medical students. A questionnaire was utilized. The dependent variables were students' objections (or not) regarding three clinical reproductive health cases: abortion provided by law, contraceptive guidance to an adolescent without parental consent, and prescription of emergency contraception. The independent variables were age, gender, religion, ethical value, degree of religiosity, and attendance at worship services. Ethical knowledge comprised an obligation to state the reasons for the objection, report possible alternatives, and referral to another professional. Data were analyzed with χ2 tests and t-tests with a significance level of 5%. Results Abortion, contraception to adolescents, and emergency contraception were refused by 35.8%, 17.5%, and 5.8% of the students, respectively. High religiosity (p < 0.001) and higher attendance at worship services (p = 0.034) were predictors of refusing abortion. Refusal to provide contraception to adolescents was significantly higher among women than men (p = 0.037). Furthermore, 25% would not explain the reason for the refusal, 15% would not describe all the procedures used, and 25% would not refer the patient to another professional. Conclusion Abortion provided by law was the most objectionable situation. The motivating factors for this refusal were high commitment and religiosity. A reasonable portion of the students did not demonstrate ethical knowledge about the subject.

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Paz-Fuchs, Amir, and Michael Sfard. "The Fallacies of Objections to Selective Conscientious Objection." Israel Law Review 36, no. 3 (January 2002): 111–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700017994.

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AbstractThis paper critically analyzes the theoretical and pragmatic arguments raised against the refusal of individuals to serve in a specific military campaign that they view as immoral. The Israeli Supreme Court case of Zonshein v Judge-Advocate General will serve as an axis of the discussion, as it combines two related facets: first, the Court's decision touches upon most of the difficult issues in the field of conscientious objection. And second, the development leading up to the decision was accompanied by an exceptional clash of academics, each side summoning expert opinions in support of its claim.Courts worldwide have accepted that a categorical distinction exists between universal and selective conscientious objection. The combination of the Zonshein decision and the accompanying academic debate presents the opportunity to reexamine the theoretical and pragmatic reasons that are offered as support for distinguishing the two ‘types’ of conscientious objection. Close scrutiny finds them wanting.

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Sweifach, Jay. "Conscientious Refusal in Schools of Social Work: Rights, Remedies, and Responsibilities." Teaching Ethics 13, no. 1 (2012): 37–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tej201213129.

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Nelson, Lawrence. "Provider Conscientious Refusal of Abortion, Obstetrical Emergencies, and Criminal Homicide Law." American Journal of Bioethics 18, no. 7 (July 3, 2018): 43–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2018.1478017.

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Hartsock, Jane A. "Provider Conscientious Refusal, Medical Malpractice, and the Right to Civil Recourse." American Journal of Bioethics 18, no. 7 (July 3, 2018): 66–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2018.1478020.

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CARD, ROBERT F. "The Inevitability of Assessing Reasons in Debates about Conscientious Objection in Medicine." Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26, no. 1 (December 9, 2016): 82–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180116000669.

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Abstract:This article first critically reviews the major philosophical positions in the literature on conscientious objection and finds that they possess significant flaws. A substantial number of these problems stem from the fact that these views fail to assess the reasons offered by medical professionals in support of their objections. This observation is used to motivate the reasonability view, one part of which states: A practitioner who lodges a conscientious refusal must publicly state his or her objection as well as the reasoned basis for the objection and have these subjected to critical evaluation before a conscientious exemption can be granted (the reason-giving requirement). It is then argued that when defenders of the other philosophical views attempt to avoid granting an accommodation to spurious objections based on discrimination, empirically mistaken beliefs, or other unjustified biases, they are implicitly committed to the reason-giving requirement. This article concludes that based on these considerations, a reason-giving position such as the reasonability view possesses a decisive advantage in this debate.

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Madjid, Abdul. "Sentencing over Objection to Mobilization as Military Reserve: An analysis of National and International Laws." Brawijaya Law Journal 9, no. 1 (April 30, 2022): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.21776/ub.blj.2022.009.01.01.

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Law Number 23 of 2019 concerning National Resource Management for State Defense does not regulate conscientious objection, which refers to the right of a person to refuse to participate in a war or military service on the grounds of religion and morality. Their absence in such services is replaced by other responsibilities such as working in public health services, providing security, and being involved in other social services. Article 77 Paragraph (1) of Law Number 23 of 2019 expressly provides for sentences that should be imposed on those who refuse to serve as a military reserve, where the rule is not in accordance with the principle of conscientious objection which gives a person the right to refuse on the basis of conscience. This research discusses the legal consequences of the enactment of two rules regarding military service and the application of different conscientious objections. This study applied normative juridical methods and approaches to examine the consistency and relevance of various statutes and government regulations that govern conscientious objection. This study also used conceptual and statutory approaches to explore why conscientious objection is considered a ground for refusal to participate in conscription according to International Human Rights Law. The findings revealed that the conception of defense and compulsory military service in Indonesia does not leave any chance to guarantee the rights of citizens to refuse to participate in military service according to the conscience and belief of every individual (conscientious objection). This is in contrast to the regulatory provisions of international human rights ratified by Indonesia under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Additionally, there is a need for clear arrangements regarding conscientious objection and the requirements that must be met by citizens who submit these principles for the rejection of military service in Indonesia.

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CARMAN, MARY. "The Dictates of Conscience: Can They Justify Conscientious Refusals in Healthcare Contexts?" Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 28, no. 02 (April 2019): 303–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180119000112.

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Abstract:In a recent article in this journal, Steve Clarke (2017) identifies two different bases for conscience-based refusals in healthcare: (1) all-things-considered moral judgments, and (2) the dictates of conscience. He argues that these two bases have distinct roles in justifying conscientious objection. However, accepting that there are these two bases, I argue that both are not able to justify conscientious objection. In particular, I argue that the second basis of the dictates of conscience cannot justify conscience-based refusal in a healthcare context. Even if someone objects in a healthcare context on the basis of the dictates of her conscience, and even if we can explain why she objects with reference to the dictates of her conscience, her objection will only be justified if she makes a judgment.

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Brauer, Simon G., John D. Yoon, and Farr A. Curlin. "US primary care physicians’ opinions about conscientious refusal: a national vignette experiment." Journal of Medical Ethics 42, no. 2 (July 1, 2015): 80–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2015-102782.

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Linn, Ruth. "Combatant Medics as Selective Conscientious Objectors—Morally or Politically Motivated Behavior? An Israeli Example from the War in Lebanon." Psychological Reports 64, no. 3_suppl (June 1989): 1275–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1989.64.3c.1275.

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According to Cohen, soldiers' refusal to take part in an ongoing war out of their “cry of conscience” might be direct or indirect in form, and morally or politically motivated. The dominant group among a sample of 36 Israeli selective conscientious objectors during the first year of the war in Lebanon (June 1982-June 1985) were combatant medics. Were their motives moral ones? The following paper delineates the motives of this group of moral actors.

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Valero, María José. "Freedom of Conscience of Healthcare Professionals and Conscientious Objection in the European Court of Human Rights." Religions 13, no. 6 (June 16, 2022): 558. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13060558.

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The recent social and legal debate in several European countries on abortion, euthanasia, and assisted suicide has caused a strong resurgence of the concerns of healthcare personnel as to the real possibility of protecting their consciences in their professional sphere. Individual refusal for religious, moral, deontological, or ethical reasons to participate in activities that directly or indirectly could result in the termination of a human life constitutes the most extreme manifestation of the legal phenomenon of conscientious objection. Although the European Convention on Human Rights does not recognize a general right to conscientious objection, since Bayatyan v. Armenia, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights has identified a connection between conscience-related claims to compulsory military service and Article 9 of the Convention. However, to this date, this doctrine has not been applied to cases that affect health-sensitive areas like abortion and contraception. This article analyzes the activity of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to the right to freedom of conscience and to conscientious objection, particularly in healthcare, and offers several final observations projected to possible future conflicts.

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Zampas, Christina, and Ximena Andión-Ibañez. "Conscientious Objection to Sexual and Reproductive Health Services: International Human Rights Standards and European Law and Practice." European Journal of Health Law 19, no. 3 (2012): 231–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157180912x639116.

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Abstract The practice of conscientious objection often arises in the area of individuals refusing to fulfil compulsory military service requirements and is based on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as protected by national, international and regional human rights law. The practice of conscientious objection also arises in the field of health care, when individual health care providers or institutions refuse to provide certain health services based on religious, moral or philosophical objections. The use of conscientious objection by health care providers to reproductive health care services, including abortion, contraceptive prescriptions, and prenatal tests, among other services is a growing phenomena throughout Europe. However, despite recent progress from the European Court of Human Rights on this issue (RR v. Poland, 2011), countries and international and regional bodies generally have failed to comprehensively and effectively regulate this practice, denying many women reproductive health care services they are legally entitled to receive. The Italian Ministry of Health reported that in 2008 nearly 70% of gynaecologists in Italy refuse to perform abortions on moral grounds. It found that between 2003 and 2007 the number of gynaecologists invoking conscientious objection in their refusal to perform an abortion rose from 58.7 percent to 69.2 percent. Italy is not alone in Europe, for example, the practice is prevalent in Poland, Slovakia, and is growing in the United Kingdom. This article outlines the international and regional human rights obligations and medical standards on this issue, and highlights some of the main gaps in these standards. It illustrates how European countries regulate or fail to regulate conscientious objection and how these regulations are working in practice, including examples of jurisprudence from national level courts and cases before the European Court of Human Rights. Finally, the article will provide recommendations to national governments as well as to international and regional bodies on how to regulate conscientious objection so as to both respect the practice of conscientious objection while protecting individual’s right to reproductive health care.

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Linn, Ruth. "RESISTANCE AND MOTIVATION - MORAL, POLITICAL OR PERSONAL? ISRAELI SOLDIERS AS SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS DURING THE INTIFADA." Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal 23, no. 1 (January 1, 1995): 35–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.1995.23.1.35.

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A person's belief in the moral character of his own act is surely not the only court before which that act may be judged. While a reflective conscience is a necessary court, and a very important one, it is not a sufficient one. The audience would want to know whether the individual was acting conscientiously, and whether this way of acting might have moral and/or political motivation. The following paper utilizes Cohen's model for identification of the motivatio n for conscientious disobedience and develops a model of a personally motivated refusal as well.

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Hinkley, A. E. "Genetic Testing, Conscientious Refusal of Medical Treatment to Children, and Organ Donation: An Introduction." Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35, no. 2 (March 4, 2010): 81–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhq016.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Conscientious Refusal to Treat'

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