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Journal articles on the topic 'Conscience'

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Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 31 July 2024

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1

Kriegel, Uriah. "Consciousness, Permanent Self-Awareness, and Higher-Order Monitoring." Dialogue 41, no. 3 (2002): 517–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300005242.

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RésuméLes discussions philosophiques actuelles sur le problème de la conscience [consciousness] se concentrent sur la question des qualia, ou qualités sensorielles. Mais les auteurs traditionnels au sujet de la conscience — tels que Kant et William James — s'intéressaient davantage à un autre aspect de l'expérience consciente, à savoir le fait que lorsqu' on est conscient [conscious], on est en même temps, et de façon permanente, conscient de soi-même [aware of oneself] comme sujet de l'expérience. Cet article explore trois modèles représentationnels du phénomène de la conscience permanente de soi [permanent self-awareness]. Chacun d'eux se révèle inadéquat pour une raison ou pour une autre. Ce que la discussion fait ainsi ressortir, c'est le genre d'exigences auxquels devrait satisfaire une bonne théorie de la conscience permanente de soi.

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2

STOKER, H. G. (HENK). "Cults and Conscience: Apologetics and the Reconfigured Conscience of Cult Members." Unio Cum Christo 6, no. 1 (April 1, 2020): 65. http://dx.doi.org/10.35285/ucc6.1.2020.art4.

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While Our Creator Made The Human Conscience An Intrinsic Part Of Us To Enable Us To Fulfill Our Calling Morally And Responsibly, Cults Use People’s Consciences To Control Them—even To Do Things That They Would Have Previously Considered As Wrong. The Conscience Goes Against The Immediate Human Impulse For Self-interest And Is Independent Of The Individual’s Will Because God Created It To Go Against That Person’s Desire. A Guilty Conscience Can Thus Be Abused As A Very Effective Means Of Control. While The So-called Christian Cults Make Their Members Willfully Obedient Through Reconfiguring Their Consciences, Christian Apologists Should Find Ways To Address The Content Of Cult Members’ Consciences To Bring Them Back To A Truly Biblical Understanding. KEYWORDS: Cults, conscience, apologetics, control, mind control, reconfigured conscience

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3

Held, Joshua R. "Conscience in Hamlet and Claudius." SEL Studies in English Literature 1500-1900 62, no. 2 (March 2024): 301–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/sel.2024.a927932.

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Abstract: Shakespeare’s Hamlet showcases the conscience of its titular prince in many soliloquies and other private moments. Yet King Claudius also shows great awareness of conscience, which serves as important context and developed contrast for Hamlet’s conscience. Claudius’s and Hamlet’s surveillance of one another continues through several major outbreaks of conscience in the play. Their mutual interest in conscience draws them into unique, ongoing conflict with one another, and produces outcomes much broader and stakes much higher than could be grasped by a study of just one of these consciences.

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4

Bernier, Paul. "Diversité du représentationnalisme de la conscience." Varia 41, no. 1 (June 25, 2014): 37–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1025722ar.

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Cet article discute de diverses versions du représentationnalisme de la conscience. L’objectif principal est de défendre une interprétation de la théorie auto-représentationnelle de la conscience (TARC) selon laquelle le contenu d’un état mental conscient serait une proposition de re qui est constituée, en partie, par l’état mental conscient lui-même. Je souligne d’abord certains problèmes importants auxquels est confrontée une des théories de la conscience les plus influentes, soit la théorie représentationnelle de la conscience (TRC) et soutiens que la principale théorie rivale, soit la théorie de la conscience d’ordre supérieur (TCOS) doit lui être préférée. Je montre que les versions standards de la TCOS sont confrontées à un problème de régression à l’infini intolérable, et je propose la TARC comme une version non standard de la TCOS.

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5

Swan, Kyle, and Kevin Vallier. "The Normative Significance of Conscience." Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6, no. 3 (June 5, 2017): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v6i3.66.

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Despite the increasing amount of literature on the legal and political questions triggered by a commitment to liberty of conscience, an explanation of the normative significance of conscience remains elusive. We argue that the few attempts to address this fail to capture the reasons people have to respect the consciences of others. We offer an alternative account that utilizes the resources of the contractualist tradition in moral philosophy to explain why conscience matters.

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6

Atkinson, Gary Michael. "Confusions regarding Conscience in the Time of COVID." National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 22, no. 1 (2022): 39–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ncbq20222215.

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The aim of this essay is to demonstrate three main points: (1) that many of the widespread appeals made to conscience in the time of COVID display little understanding of conscience’s fundamental nature; (2) that they assume for conscience a sacrosanct status it does not possess; and (3) that because of the first two points, conversation regarding conscience and COVID has generated considerable confusion. In support of these points, this paper (1) shows what conscience is, (2) employs St. John of the Cross’s examination of attachments to suggest that possession of a well-formed conscience is frequently a most difficult achievement, and (3) examines various expressions associated with the COVID debate to illustrate how much of the conversation has stemmed from or resulted in little real understanding.

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7

de Krey, Gary S. "Rethinking the Restoration: Dissenting cases for conscience, 1667–1672." Historical Journal 38, no. 1 (March 1995): 53–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x00016289.

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ABSTRACTOn what religious and political grounds did restoration nonconformists argue for ‘ease to tender consciences’, and what did they mean by conscience? These questions are central to any evaluation of nonconformist political thought in the early restoration. Such dissenting thinkers as Slingsby Bethel, John Humfrey, Philip Nye, John Owen, William Penn, and Sir Charles Wolseley authored arguments for conscience during the intense debate about the restoration church settlement that occurred between 1667 and 1672. This essay outlines four different cases for conscience to which these arguments contributed. Two of these cases reconciled claims for conscience with the ecclesiastical authority of the monarch. Two other cases for conscience challenged the traditional religious authority of the crown.Should any or all of these arguments for conscience be considered radical arguments? The answer to this question requires a definition of the term ‘radical’ – one that is appropriate for the late Stuart period. The grounds upon which early restoration advocates of conscience accepted an indulgence under the royal prerogative in 1672 are also explained.The essay addresses the historiography of the restoration by considering Christopher Hill's and Richard Ashcraft's views about dissenting thought. It also proposes that the 1667–72 debate about the state and religion raised so many critical issues as to constitute an early restoration crisis about conscience.

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8

Lee, Constance. "The Secularisation of Conscience: A Natural Law Critique." Australian Journal of Law and Religion 4 (2024): 57–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.55803/d661b.

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The modern conception of a ‘secular conscience’ is at one time, both paradoxical and reductive. This phenomenon is attributable to two main factors. In the formal sense, the problem stems from a facile or partial invocation of the term, a result of the fragmentation of its multiple referents. In a substantive sense, the loss of conscience’s explanatory power is a direct result of removing moral structures that underpin traditional formulations of the concept. Historically, conscience has been a necessary component of moral epistemologies. As the innate mechanism for moral discernment, conscience existed as a core part of practical reasoning. In this backdrop, one of secularism’s most profound implications has been to shift conscience’s emphasis away from notions of ‘higher responsibility’ to ‘individual authenticity’. To make sense of this shift, the present article begins by considering the process of ‘secularisation’. Harold Berman defines ‘secularisation’ as the steady displacement of existing normative foundations. The article goes on to trace the etymological development of conscience as a concept and its historical link to moral agency. An examination of traditional normative structures follows, as represented by two seminal accounts of conscience in Western natural law tradition, namely those of Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin. Notwithstanding the variations in emphases due to denominational differences, both these natural law accounts offer a coherent normative outlook, adequate to sustain an integrated concept of conscience. The article ultimately seeks to critique the explanatory potential of modern accounts of conscience by exposing the ontological predicates of secular-rational modalities from the natural law perspective.

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9

Twiner, Joseph. "Sacred Voters and Secular Elections:." Lumen et Vita 10, no. 2 (July 14, 2020): 11–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.6017/lv.v10i2.12495.

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As another major national election approaches, American Catholics need a better understanding of the political conscience. The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ document Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship (FCFC) attempts to provide guidance. However, the document has been roundly criticized by Catholics from various political persuasions. In attempting to understand political conscience today, it is helpful to return to the great thinkers of tradition, and in particular Thomas Aquinas. This paper aims at recovery of Thomas’ understanding of conscience, rooted in the act of synderesis and oriented towards the common good, as a fitting and critical interlocutor for FCFC.

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10

Petit, Jean-Luc. "Critique phénoménologique d’une approche neuronale de la conscience." Trans/Form/Ação 41, spe (2018): 75–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.06.p75.

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Résumé: La conscience est toujours conscience de quelque chose, généralement une chose autre qu’elle-même - mais quelle sorte de chose est donc la conscience, considérée en et pour elle-même? Naguère redoutable paradoxe qu’une science sérieuse abandonnait volontiers aux philosophes, la conscience a-t-elle été ramenée finalement à la condition d’un objet de science parmi les autres? Le développement d’une nouvelle «neuroscience de la conscience» depuis une vingtaine d’années est souvent présenté comme une avancée naturelle pour une science forte de son succès dans l’explication des fonctions cognitives sur la base des mécanismes neuronaux du cerveau humain. Conçue, elle aussi, originairement, comme «science de la conscience», mais sur la base de l’immanence du sujet conscient à sa propre expérience vécue, la phénoménologie doit-elle réfréner son sens du paradoxe devant le projet de cette neuroscience de la conscience, pour ne pas être accusée d’irrationalisme? Faisant retour sur le dialogue Changeux-Ricœur, je relève les objections du phénoménologue à l’objectivation de notre expérience de la conscience sur la base de mécanismes corrélatifs dans le cerveau et j’examine sur l’exemple représentatif de la théorie neuronale de Changeux, Dehaene et al. dans quelle mesure cette critique phénoménologique garde une pertinence.

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11

Held, Joshua R. "Constructing Miltonic Interiority: Adam, Satan, and Conscience in Paradise Lost." Milton Studies 64, no. 1 (March 1, 2022): 95–122. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/miltonstudies.64.1.0095.

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ABSTRACT Milton’s Satan has more private speeches than any other character in Paradise Lost and displays a complex interiority, especially in his longest soliloquy, an anguish of conscience at the opening of book 4. But Milton also exhibits the interior of fallen Adam in book 10 through a soliloquy of despairing conscience that is resonant with Satan’s earlier conscience-inflicted speech. The similarities between the interiors of Adam and Satan are deliberate and potent, yet the differences are also significant, in ways that denigrate Satan, elevate Adam (and Eve), and reveal a spectrum of consciences in Paradise Lost. This article argues that Milton had much to say about interiority, particularly through the inner faculty of conscience, which he exhibits in his epic across a wide range of characters and scenarios, from angels to human beings, and from guilt and despair to divine consolation.

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12

Vermersch, Pierre. "Conscience directe, conscience réfléchie." Intellectica. Revue de l'Association pour la Recherche Cognitive 31, no. 2 (2000): 269–311. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/intel.2000.1609.

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13

Bossaert, Benjamin. "Hendrik Conscience in Slovak reception: translations of the Flemish writer in 19th cenutry Slovak context." NOVÁ FILOLOGICKÁ REVUE 15, no. 2 (January 24, 2024): 40–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.24040/nfr.2023.15.2.40-51.

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In this article, an outline of the famous Flemish writer Hendrik Conscience and his translations in Slovak reception is provided, with some additions from his international context, relevant in reception research. Some key publications in this context from Wilken Engelbrecht (Engelbrecht 2021) are supplemented by more recent archival research in Slovakia by the author. Engelbrecht (2018) further argues that the Slovak translations of Conscience arose independently of the Czech editions, in a different order and in a different literary context. He also argues that Conscience's popularity and position is different in the Slovak context, where the Catholic milieu is more emphasised and publications in Slovak were more under pressure from (Hungarian) censorship bodies. The contribution uses the findings of the comparative literature scholar Lieven D´Hulst. His (2013 and 2019) comparative studies on Conscience's reception are interesting because they offer some interesting research questions and a methodology. First of all, he examines whether the translated literature in question is able to fill specific "formal, generic or thematic niches in the target literature, especially than those niches for which the target literature itself has no or limited supply (D´Hulst 2013, p. 251)." The thesis of D´Hulst is applied on the Slovak case study within the first period of the translations of Conscience. The article presents an example of a Conscience adaptation within the Budapest-based Catholic circles of Slovak intelligentsia.

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14

Poirier, Sylvain. "L'avortement et la liberté de conscience du médecin." Les Cahiers de droit 31, no. 1 (April 12, 2005): 287–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/043008ar.

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Au Canada, le débat sur l'avortement, qui est en grande partie d'ordre moral et éthique, favorise pour la femme et par ricochet pour son médecin l'expression de croyances dictées par leurs consciences individuelles. Au Canada, la liberté de conscience constitue une liberté fondamentale. Par contre, l'exercice de cette liberté par le médecin est limité soit par les droits et libertés fondamentaux du patient ou encore par les droits des patients à recevoir des services de santé. Par ailleurs, en France, le législateur qui est intervenu afin de décriminaliser l'avortement a permis expressément, mais selon certaines conditions, aux professionnels de la santé de refuser de participer à une interruption volontaire de grossesse par le biais d'une objection de conscience. L'objet de cette étude porte donc sur l'avortement et l'objection de conscience du médecin à la lumière du droit tant canadien que québécois et français.

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15

Loht, Shawn. "Drapers and Gardeners." Film and Philosophy 24 (2020): 98–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/filmphil2020247.

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This article examines Martin Heidegger's concept of conscience in Being and Time as it is manifested by the characters Don Draper from the television series Mad Men (Matthew Weiner, 2007-2013) and Chauncey Gardiner in the film Being There (Hal Ashby, 1979). The article suggests that Draper hears and occasionally responds to what Heidegger terms the “call of conscience,” whereas Gardiner neither hears this call nor responds to it. Gardiner poses a problem case for Heidegger’s account of Dasein by virtue of failing to exhibit conscience. A question latent in Gardiner’s makeup is what causes him to be this way. The contrast of the characters Draper and Gardiner is approached through the lens of the portrayal of secret identity in filmic media. Both characters live public lives that are at odds with their genuine selves, but they react to this disconnect differently. Core concepts addressed vis-a-vis Heidegger’s account of conscience include facticity, falling, discourse, authenticity, and death. The article concludes that Draper hears and responds to conscience’s call because he has a discursive comprehension of the disconnect between his true self and the public life he has lived; a crucial component of the phenomenon of conscience according to Heidegger is the existential capacity for discourse. Gardiner, in contrast, does not hear conscience at all because his Dasein lacks the discursive element that conscience requires in order to be activated. Gardiner’s being-in-the-world is such that he fails to understand the divide between his lived self and his public self. For Gardiner, these are the same.

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16

Seager, William. "Introspection and the Elementary Acts of Mind." Dialogue 39, no. 1 (2000): 53–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300006399.

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RésuméFred Dretske a développé, à titre de composante de sa théorie de la conscience, une théorie de I'introspection. Celle-ciprésente une plausibilityé indépendante, elle résiste à des objections qui affectent nombre d'autres théories et elle suggère des liens très féconds dans plusieurs domaines de la science cognitive. La version qu'en donne Dretske est restreinte à la connaissance introspective des états perceptuels. Mon objectif ici est d'étendre la théorie à tous les états mentaux. Le mécanisme qui est fondamental dans cette approche est celui de la «conscience déplacée», c'est-à-dire le fait d'en venir à connaître quelque chose via l'expérience consciente que nous avons de quelque chose d'autre. Nous atteignons la connaissance introspective par l'application à notre propre expérience consciente du monde (et de nos corps) de la connaissance que nous avons de ce qui est de l'ordre du mental.

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17

Absillis, Kevin, and Marlou De Bont. "Who's afraid of Conscience? Naar een andere kijk op het oeuvre waarmee een volk leerde lezen." WT. Tijdschrift over de geschiedenis van de Vlaamse beweging 74, no. 1 (March 12, 2015): 44–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.21825/wt.v74i1.12120.

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Ooit gevierd als ‘de man die zijn volk leerde lezen’, lijkt Hendrik Conscience vandaag in de publieke opinie voornamelijk nog bekend te staan als ‘de man die zijn volk voor de moderniteit op de vlucht joeg’. Voor nogal wat cultuurcritici en historici is zijn oeuvre immers een toonbeeld van het ‘antimoderne’ cultuurnationalisme dat in de negentiende eeuw de voedingsbodem zou zijn geweest van de Vlaamse beweging. Dit artikel verdedigt de stelling dat het moderniteitsdiscours dat de huidige beeldvorming rond Conscience voedt een genuanceerde lezing van diens werk in de weg staat. Een korte analyse van De leeuw van Vlaenderen (1838) en een meer uitvoerige van De Boerenkrijg (1853), vaak gezien als Consciences meest retrograde roman, toont aan dat zijn houding tegenover de moderniteit minder eenzijdig en vijandig is dan over het algemeen wordt gedacht. Het artikel suggereert bovendien dat zijn cultuurnationalisme niet mag worden verward met een hardnekkig pleidooi voor het in stand houden van oude tradities, maar veeleer kan worden begrepen als een poging om deze tradities te hervormen en te verzoenen met de moderniteit.________ Who’s afraid of Conscience? Towards a different view of the oeuvre with which a people learned to read Once celebrated as ‘the man who taught his people to read’, Hendrik Conscience nowadays appears to be mainly known in public opinion as ‘the man who caused his people to flee modernity’. A considerable number of cultural critics and historians consider his oeuvre in fact to be a model of the ‘antimodernist’ cultural nationalism, which was held to be a breeding ground of the Flemish movement during the nineteenth century. This article defends the position that the discourse about modernity that determines the present conceptualisation about Conscience obstructs a nuanced reading of his work. A brief analysis of De leeuw van Vlaenderen (The lion of Flanders) (1838) and a more extensive analysis of De Boerenkrijg (The Peasants’ War)(1853), which is often viewed as Conscience’s most retrograde novel, demonstrates that his attitude towards modernity is less one-sided and hostile than is generally assumed. The article also suggests that his cultural nationalism is not to be confused with a tenacious plea for maintaining old traditions, and that it should rather be understood as an attempt to reform these traditions and to reconcile them with modernity.

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18

de Vries, Peter. "Conscience." Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies 14, no. 6 (August 25, 2014): 606–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532708614548132.

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19

Murray, Jessica. "Conscience." Victorian Literature and Culture 51, no. 3 (2023): 367–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1060150323000116.

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The word “conscience” appears frequently in Victorian writings across realms of discourse, in which it assumed an edge of ambivalence and energy difficult for us to perceive in the twenty-first century. While conscience today may seem a residual concept, recent critical strains in Victorian studies have suggested the possibilities bound up in examining anew this complex and multivalent word. Turning particularly to the writings of Charles Darwin and George Eliot reveals a self-conscious awareness not only of how the fluctuating meanings of conscience capture broader social shifts, but the ways these shifts are registered and enacted in language.

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20

Jeannerod, Marc. "Conscience de l'action, conscience de soi." Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger 129, no. 3 (2004): 325. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rphi.043.0325.

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21

BUSER, Pierre. "CONSCIENCE DE L’HOMME, CONSCIENCE DE L’ANIMAL." Bulletin de l'Académie vétérinaire de France, no. 1 (2010): 333. http://dx.doi.org/10.4267/2042/48182.

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22

Gullickson, Terri. "Review of Solar Conscience/Lunar Conscience." Contemporary Psychology: A Journal of Reviews 39, no. 10 (October 1994): 987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/034204.

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23

Meaney, Joseph. "The Vital Importance of Conscientious Discernment." Ethics & Medics 46, no. 1 (2021): 3–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/em20214612.

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Conscientious discernment—which involves the ability to see right and wrong clearly—is an important task that all people must undertake on a daily basis. It is difficult to properly form one’s conscience, which is not a feeling or a mere moral intuition. To the contrary, it is rooted in object truth and reason; and through conscience, a person recognizes the morality, or immorality, of an act. As a result, moral education—teaching the difference between virtue and sin—is a crucial responsibility of parents. But young people are highly sensitive to hypocrisy, so we must live as examples, resisting complacency and continuing to form our consciences throughout our lives.

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Carlson, Paula J. "Lady Meed and God's Meed: the Grammar of ‘Piers Plowman’ B 3 and C 4." Traditio 46 (1991): 291–311. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s036215290000427x.

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When William Langland revised his poem Piers Plowman for the second time, he added a long, intricate analogy to the third passus. In all three versions of Piers, the dreamer, Will, finds himself in this early passus at a king's court and witnesses a debate between two figures, Lady Meed and Conscience, about the appropriateness of their possible marriage. The B text, the one scholars most often discuss, presents the would-be bride, Lady Meed, arguing that regardless of their nature the gifts she dispenses at court are integral to the smooth operation of society. These gifts, then, are honorable, and Lady Meed's nature need not prevent her marriage to Conscience. The reluctant Conscience, however, distinguishes between two kinds of meed, one holy and one corrupt. He holds that Lady Meed represents only the corrupt meed and so is intrinsically immoral. Her ‘gifts’ and ‘payments,’ he says, are not proportionate to desert, as she claims, but are instead bribes and payoffs. Rather than easing the functioning of society, they subvert it. On these grounds, Conscience refuses to marry Lady Meed. The king before whom Lady Meed and Conscience argue is initially torn about the nature of Lady Meed, as indeed readers of the poem have remained. In what appears to be an effort to clarify Conscience's argument, Langland adds almost a hundred lines to the debate in the C text.

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MIROSHNICHENKO, MAXIM. "I HAVE ALL SORTS OF VOICES IN MY HEAD MEDITATIONS ON GEORGY CHERNAVIN’S BOOK THE CONSCIENCE’S DOUBLE Chernavin G. The Conscience’s Double. Moscow, 2023. (In press)." HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES 12, no. 2 (2023): 596–611. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2023-12-2-596-611.

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The review analyzes the book The Conscience’s Double by Georgy Chernavin. I focus on the concepts of false twins of conscience, guilt, and duty in the extended context of philosophical and artistic discourse. The problem of the difference between conscience and its ersatz forms, which give rise to a distorted ethical consciousness, is considered. The main emphasis is opportunistic conscience, neurotic guilt, and false debt. The review suggests that Chernavin’s book studies the “sad theory” of moral disorientation and requires the supplementation with a hypothetical “cringe theory.” In this case, the “sad theory” makes it possible to expand the phenomenological discourse by including a discussion of conscience, illustrating the uncertainty of the boundaries between the phenomenological and the symbolic, and highlighting the subject’s dependence on what they are not. In this work, there is a potential for developing an original ontology of the relationship between conscience and its evil counterpart, especially between a “spiritually sighted” and a “blindly corporeal” person. The scrutinized guilt for the lost absence of guilt is an experience that, although not lived, is important for the subject’s self-constitution. This experience, like the inner side of the subject, determines its conscious functioning and forms something like a Mobius strip. An Evil Genius makes this bond, and I am trying to conceptualize their “weakened” being.

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Siksou, Maryse. "Conscience et consciences : Les symptômes neuropsychologiques fournissent-ils des données d'observation valides pour l 'étude de la conscience ?" Intellectica. Revue de l'Association pour la Recherche Cognitive 31, no. 2 (2000): 227–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/intel.2000.1608.

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27

Masson, M., M. Brun, and M. L. Bourgeois. "Examen de conscience et prise de conscience." Annales Médico-psychologiques, revue psychiatrique 160, no. 8 (October 2002): 585–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0003-4487(02)00238-x.

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28

Sawada, Tetsuo. "Du phénomène de perversion dans la pathologie transcendantale de Marc Richir." Revue internationale Michel Henry, no. 6 (September 13, 2018): 161–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.14428/rimh.v0i6.6823.

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Le phénomène de « perversion » occupe une position bien particulière dans les domaines psychopathologique et psychanalytique. Selon la théorie de Freud, le rêve a pour effet de libérer les désirs refoulés pendant la journée. Au lieu d’être refoulés au tréfonds de l’inconscient, la plupart des vécus du pervers se manifestent dans sa vie en prenant des formes anormales ou immorales telles que le voyeurisme ou l’exhibitionnisme. La perversion est donc un phénomène foncièrement conscient et corporel. Or, si la phénoménologie est définie comme l’analyse de la structure des vécus de la conscience intentionnelle, il s’avère nécessaire d’analyser phénoménologiquement cette structure de la perversité au lieu de se contenter d’étudier la conscience dite saine ou normale. Pour aborder cette question, cet article analyse le texte de Marc Richir, intitulé Phantasia, imagination, affectivité, car il y tente de dégager la structure de la conscience du pervers d’une façon tout à fait innovante.

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Fortis, Jean-Michel. "Sur le corrélat cérébral de l'intention consciente : temps, liberté, conscience." Intellectica. Revue de l'Association pour la Recherche Cognitive 20, no. 1 (1995): 171–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/intel.1995.1482.

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Kramlich, Maureen. "Coercing Conscience." National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 4, no. 1 (2004): 29–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ncbq20044164.

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Bates, Jane. "Conscience vote." Nursing Standard 29, no. 23 (February 4, 2015): 26–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.7748/ns.29.23.26.s31.

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Tannahill, Anne. "Parish Conscience." Books Ireland, no. 129 (1989): 5. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20626107.

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O'Shea, Tom. "Godless Conscience." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14, no. 3 (October 16, 2022): 95–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3447.

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Abstract. John Cottingham suggests that “only a traditional theistic framework may be adequate for doing justice to the role of conscience in our lives.” Two main reasons for endorsing this proposition are assessed: the religious origins of conscience, and the need to explain its normative authority. I argue that Graeco-Roman conceptions of conscience cast doubt on this first historical claim, and that secular moral realisms can account for the obligatoriness of conscience. Nevertheless, the recognition of the need for an objective foundation for conscience which emerges from these debates should be embraced by both secular and religious ethicists alike.

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Bailey, Tom. "Nietzsche’s Conscience." New Nietzsche Studies 5, no. 3 (2003): 213–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/newnietzsche2003/20045/63/4/1/217.

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Joy, Alexander B. "Conscience Cleaners." After Dinner Conversation 2, no. 9 (2021): 20–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/adc20212981.

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Should a criminal suffering from the remorse of the crime he committed be permitted to be freed of that pain? In this work of philosophical short story fiction, Mr. Henmore’s was convicted of a terrible crime many years ago. He served his time, and been paroled, and is genuinely remorseful for what he did. In fact, his pain is so great, even years later, he suffers severe, almost daily, mental anguish from the knowledge of what he did. His lawyer has gone before the Grand Rectification Council to ask permission to have Mr. Henmore’s memory wiped clean of the crime he committed so as to enter his suffering. After making his case on behalf of his client, it is now up to the Council, should Mr. Henmore forever remember the horrible thing he has done?

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OP, Richard Finn,. "Reviewing Conscience." Arion: A Journal of the Humanities and the Classics 24, no. 1 (2016): 161–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/arn.2016.0012.

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McMurray, Keeley. "Constructing Conscience." Implicit Religion 23, no. 1 (September 23, 2020): 68–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/imre.41402.

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Richard Finn, OP. "Reviewing Conscience." Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the Classics 24, no. 1 (2016): 161. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/arion.24.1.0161.

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Breithaupt, Fritz. "Goethe’s Conscience." MLN 129, no. 3 (2014): 549–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/mln.2014.0039.

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Wilkinson, Dominic. "Rationing conscience." Journal of Medical Ethics 43, no. 4 (October 12, 2016): 226–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2016-103795.

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Turner, Jack. "Performing Conscience." Political Theory 33, no. 4 (August 2005): 448–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0090591705276269.

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Tillett, Jackie. "“Conscience” Clauses." Journal of Perinatal & Neonatal Nursing 22, no. 3 (July 2008): 179–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/01.jpn.0000333915.69339.76.

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Richards, E. G. "Biology's conscience." Nature 319, no. 6056 (February 1986): 804. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/319804b0.

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Keenan, James F. "Redeeming Conscience." Theological Studies 76, no. 1 (March 2015): 129–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0040563914565296.

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Wiesel, Elie. "Without Conscience." New England Journal of Medicine 352, no. 15 (April 14, 2005): 1511–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/nejmp058069.

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Adams, Robert. "Circumstantial conscience?" Physics World 31, no. 12 (December 2018): 22–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/2058-7058/31/12/26.

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Betts, Christopher. "Conscience offset." New Scientist 219, no. 2928 (August 2013): 31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0262-4079(13)61942-9.

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Sneed, Christine. "Clear Conscience." New England Review 35, no. 3 (2014): 138–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ner.2014.0121.

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Jones, David. "Social conscience." Nature 376, no. 6541 (August 1995): 556. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/376556a0.

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Kuehn, Bridget M. "“Conscience” Regulations." JAMA 300, no. 12 (September 24, 2008): 1403. http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/jama.300.12.1403-a.

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