Relevant bibliographies by topics / Conflict of laws – Export controls – United States

Academic literature on the topic 'Conflict of laws – Export controls – United States'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 10 March 2023

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Contents

Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Conflict of laws – Export controls – United States.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Journal articles on the topic "Conflict of laws – Export controls – United States"

1

Boscariol, John. "At the Cross-Roads of US and Canadian Trade Controls: The Cuba Conflict." Global Trade and Customs Journal 5, Issue 6 (June 1, 2010): 237–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/gtcj2010029.

Full text
Abstract:
Canada and the United States are each other’s best trading partners. Our supply chains are deeply integrated. Corporate ownership criss-crosses the border many times over. In the context of foreign policy, although we have differed from time to time in the past, we generally target the same list of ‘bad actors’ – Iran, North Korea, Myanmar among them. Indeed, many of our sanctions programmes have been adopted pursuant to the same United Nations Security Council resolutions that are applied in similar fashion by UN member countries. Our controls on the export of goods and transfer of technology arise from our common commitments under the 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms, Dual-use Goods, Technology and other international agreements. It should come as no surprise therefore that in this environment many companies impose a single set of rules or principles regarding export controls and doing business with sanctioned countries. Under the assumption that Canadian and US laws are similar and, that any differences arise from more restrictive elements of US policy, a common default approach is for US companies to graft their US-based export control, economic sanctions policies, and procedures on to their Canadian operations; even some Canadian-based companies doing business in the United States will follow this approach. This is problematic for a number of reasons. Contrary to popular belief, Canadian export controls and economic sanctions can be more restrictive than those of the United States – aspects of the control regime for cryptographic goods and technology and the rules governing trade with and investment in Myanmar are two such examples. More importantly, there are instances in which there is direct conflict between Canadian and US law – that is, compliance with the requirements of one nation’s laws results in contravention of the laws of the other. Two examples of such conflict arise with US military controls under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and Canadian human rights legislation and with Cuban trade and investment. The latter conflict is the focus of this article.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Norton, Corey L. "Five Ways to Get in Trouble Buying from the United States." Global Trade and Customs Journal 9, Issue 6 (June 1, 2014): 267–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/gtcj2014030.

Full text
Abstract:
For many companies around the world, the United States is obviously an attractive supplier of various products and technologies. Those sales, however, are usually subject to US export controls that actually restrict the customer's own plans to resell or otherwise use what it purchased, even after an item is outside the United States. Consequently, US exporters are not the only ones that have to keep US export control compliance in mind. The customer outside the United States can also commit violations of US law even though its business activities might occur solely outside US territory. Penalties in this area are extremely steep and can be USD 250,000 or more per violation or even involve criminal charges. Given the possible penalties and that these laws are not particularly intuitive for anyone, nonetheless non-US companies, substantial enforcement cases can arise from violations of US export controls that follow US products around the world. This commentary highlights five of the more common reasons why non-US companies find themselves tangled in a US export control violation and how to avoid a mess in the first place.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Luo, Wei. "Research Guide to Export Control and WMD Nonproliferation Law." International Journal of Legal Information 35, no. 3 (2007): 447–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0731126500002468.

Full text
Abstract:
After World War II, the non-proliferation of weapons of massive destruction (WMD) and the export controls of conventional weapons and civilian and military dual use technologies have been one of the most important focal point of international cooperation. Many international treaties have been signed and the international organizations have been established to promote these non-proliferation and export control efforts. The industrialized countries and the developing countries of China, India, and Pakistan that possess nuclear weapons and missile technologies have also enacted domestic laws and set up administrative regimes to control these goods and technologies from flowing to other countries or undesirable people. Among these countries, the United States has been the leader strongly advocating non-proliferation of WMD and export controls of civilian and military dual use goods. In fact, the United States has established a very sophisticated export control system to prevent its weapons and technologies from going to the hands of any adversaries. Because the complicities and overlaps of international treaties and domestic laws on this topic, it warrants a research guide for would-be researchers to walk through the maze of international and domestic export control regimes.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Matheny III, Richard L. "So Many Feathers on the Scale: Whether and How to Voluntarily Disclose Violations of U.S. Export Controls and Economic Sanctions Laws." Global Trade and Customs Journal 6, Issue 9 (September 1, 2011): 389–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/gtcj2011048.

Full text
Abstract:
The export control and economic sanctions laws are a minefield for U.S. companies that export products and engage in other forms of cross-border transactions. Mistakes are common, even for diligent, well-intentioned exporters. The company suspecting it has exported an item or technology outside of compliance with these complex laws must consider whether to disclose the violation to the relevant federal agency. Although usually not required by law, a voluntary disclosure can be advisable for many reasons, including avoidance or mitigation of penalties. But two things are true about the vast majority of violations: Most do not remotely threaten the national security of the United States and most are unlikely to be independently discovered by the enforcing agency. The would-be discloser is justified in wondering what is the merit-for the company and for the national security-in making a disclosure. In addition, where the company does decide to disclose, it confronts a host a questions, including what should be disclosed, how, to whom, and when to make the disclosure. This article considers these questions in the context of the three primary U.S. export-control and economic sanctions laws: the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), administered by the State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC); the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), administered by the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS); and the economic sanctions regulations administered by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Abdul Majid, Marina. "ACQUISITION OF RARE EARTH MINERALS FROM MALAYA IN VIOLATION OF EXPORT CONTROL LAWS FOR JAPAN’S ATOMIC RESEARCH DURING WORLD WAR II." International Journal of Law, Government and Communication 7, no. 30 (December 21, 2022): 87–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.35631/ijlgc.730009.

Full text
Abstract:
During World War II (WWII) from 1941-1945, the Japanese sought to obtain uranium and thorium from Malaya meant for its atomic research. This may violate international export controls or the domestic laws of the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). The main objective of this study is to investigate the extent of the Japanese acquisition of uranium and thorium in Malaya for its atomic research during WWII which may or may not have violated international or domestic export control laws of the US and UK. This qualitative study used a textual analysis for interpreting bilateral and trilateral agreements to secure uranium and thorium, the export control laws of the US and UK, and a case law. Other documentation concerning Japanese procurement of amazing in Malaya was referred. Secondary resources of books, book chapters, conference papers, journal articles, newspapers, magazines, and internet materials were also analyzed through content analysis. The write-up for this study is narrative as this study relates to history, law, and security studies. The results of this study indicate the Japan Nitrogen Company based in Malim Nawar had produced carbide, ammunition and ammonia. While this company’s branch in Hŭngnam, North Korea had been scouting for minerals for Japan’s atomic research, it is unknown if the unit in Malaya also played the same role. Amang was shipped to Japan for the extraction of monazite which in turn returned thorium and uranium were used for atomic research but some were sunk at sea or confiscated as war bounty by the US. Penang Island became a transit point for uranium sent by the Germans to the Japanese. The US and the UK export control laws were the most applicable in restricting Japan from acquiring uranium and other minerals for atomic research as international controls were just emerging and applicable among a few selected countries to yet become an accepted norm multilaterally.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Friedmann, Harriet. "The International Political Economy of Food: A Global Crisis." International Journal of Health Services 25, no. 3 (July 1995): 511–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.2190/451a-896w-gglk-elxt.

Full text
Abstract:
The largest gap between national regulation and transnational economic organization is in the agro-food sector. This gap is the legacy of the post-World War II food regime, whose implicit rules gave priority to national farm programs (including import controls and export subsidies); placed the United States at the center; generated chronic surpluses; and allowed international power to take the unusual form of subsidized exports of surplus commodities, particularly wheat. The author analyzes the emergence and contradictions of the postwar food regime as a tension between replication and integration of national agro-food sectors, often interpreted as “export of the U.S. model.” By the early 1970s, replication led to international economic conflict, while transnational corporations found national regulatory frameworks to be obstacles to further integration of a potentially global agro-food sector. A new axis between Asian import countries and new agricultural countries, such as Brazil, has destabilized the Atlantic-centered food regime, without creating a new regime. Alternative future regimes are identified, based on the shift from agriculture to food, employment, and land use as political issues: private global regulation or democratic regulation of nested, regional agro-food economies, federated at the international level.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Moore, R. K., and R. M. Willcocks. "SOME COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND MINING." APPEA Journal 25, no. 1 (1985): 143. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/aj84014.

Full text
Abstract:
The petroleum industry in Australia is at the centre of a web of complex laws. In addition to the legislation under which petroleum exploration and production tenements are granted there is a multiplicity of statutes and regulations, Commonwealth and State, which have a direct bearing on the conduct of those involved in exploring for or exploiting Australia's petroleum reserves. For example, the level of participation by foreigners is governed by the Commonwealth Foreign Investment Guidelines and the Foreign Takeovers Act 1975; the Commonwealth has control over the export of petroleum under the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations and domestic markets are subject to the operation of the Crude Oil Allocation Scheme. The Commonwealth continues to have the right to regulate the transfer of funds to and from Australia under the Banking (Foreign Exchange) Regulations. Certain States such as South Australia and New South Wales have their own foreign investment guidelines.Not only this, there are revenue laws which govern very much the way in which petroleum projects are organised, interests transferred and otherwise dealt with and finance made available, such as State stamp duty legislation, Commonwealth income tax laws, and Commonwealth legislation imposing registration fees on dealings in exploration permits and production licences. A new tax, Resource Rent Tax, is to be introduced.Then there are laws which have an indirect bearing on petroleum activities such as the Companies Code which, in addition to governing the administration and organisation of companies, controls the way funds can be raised.The statutory and regulatory framework is only part of the picture. The rights and obligations of participants in petroleum projects as between themselves are almost always set out in a joint venture or joint operating agreement, the combination between the participants being known as an unincorporated joint venture. This form of business organisation is not a partnership; it is not the creature of legislation. Indeed it has been rarely referred to in Acts of Parliament. Problems arising under the joint venture agreement will be considered against the backdrop of the general law which unfortunately has seldom been called upon to resolve disputes between participants in joint ventures. An illustration of one of these rare instances is Brian Pty Ltd v United Dominions Corporation Ltd (1983), where the New South Wales Court of Appeal considered the fiduciary relationship of joint venturers.Despite this legislative and regulatory' backdrop and the uncertainties as to the true effect of joint venture agreements, the industry up until quite recently has survived with little litigation. This is no longer the case. Recent and pending litigation shows that there is no reluctance on the part of participants to take their disputes to court, often at great expense and with unfortunate results for previously close relationships. It must now be said that money spent to achieve proper and clear agreement on organisational and legal matters at the earliest stage of a project is money just as well spent as that on drilling and other operational activities.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Altamimi, Abdulmalik M. "The European Peace Facility and the UN Arms Trade Treaty: Fragmentation of the International Arms Control law?" Journal of Conflict and Security Law, June 21, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krac024.

Full text
Abstract:
Abstract In March 2021, the European Council set up the European Peace Facility (EPF), to serve as a legal instrument for the provision of security and peace assistance measures. It includes the supply of military and defence-related equipment to the European Union’s partner countries worldwide. The official aim of the EPF is to prevent conflict, preserve peace and strengthen international security and stability. The European Council assures its Member States that these measures will be accompanied by risk assessments and legal safeguards that respect international law, and comply with arms export control laws. However, the EPF’s biggest challenge is circumnavigating the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which primarily aims to prevent the diversion of and illicit trade in conventional arms. This article examines the legality of the EPF’s assistance measures by referring to the ATT, and the law of international responsibility. This timely analysis will be relevant to policymakers and lawyers responsible for regulating the international transfer of conventional arms.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Cozzi, Fabio. "Will Blockchain Technologies Strengthen or Undermine the Effectiveness of Global Trade Control Regulations and Financial Sanctions?" Global Jurist 20, no. 2 (July 6, 2020). http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/gj-2019-0047.

Full text
Abstract:
AbstractFinancial sanctions and trade control regulations are becoming increasingly relevant in the current global situation, characterized by multiple ongoing conflicts, sophisticated terrorist organizations, and serious tensions between international economic actors. The United Nations, under Article 41 of the UN Charter, the United States and Europe, in particular, regularly introduce and enforce a number of tools (e. g., financial restrictions, trade restrictions, arms embargoes, travel bans). Such tools can range from comprehensive, “territory-wide” sanctions against States to targeted sanctions on entities, including individuals, to obtain a change in policy or activity by the target country, part of the country, governments, entities, and individuals, with the ultimate aim of pursuing peace, human rights, democracy, and respect for the rule of law. Recent history proves that companies and financial institutions have adopted complex solutions to conceal transactions with sanctioned countries and entities.Blockchain technology, through the use of distributed digitalized ledgers, grants a high level of transparency, for instance providing real-time updates on the development of an export transaction, and the use of smart contracts can automatize payments, or the triggering of guarantees, etc. While blockchain technology continues to be an area of enormous promise, it is also one of risk, if not managed properly, especially in a transnational, multi-jurisdictional context. Not only might the use of blockchain-based solutions prove challenging for the enforcement of current international sanctions programs by competent authorities, but blockchain technologies developers will also need to set up solutions suitable to comply with the requirements imposed by the various sanctions in place. At the same time, businesses will need to determine which measures and due diligence practices are needed to protect against the risks of a sanctions violation, which can result in significant fines and even criminal penalties. This paper explores how blockchain solutions that may be implemented in the context of international financial and commercial transactions can interrelate (or interfere) with sanctions enforcement and sanctions compliance, highlighting the multiple legal issues that may arise in connection thereto.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Conflict of laws – Export controls – United States"

1

KUSCHKA, Marius. "Amerikanische Exportkontrollen und die Europäische Gemeinschaft : Positionen aus dem Völkerrecht und aus dem Europarecht." Doctoral thesis, 1985. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/5450.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Books on the topic "Conflict of laws – Export controls – United States"

1

1956-, Seward Bernard L., ed. Technology control, competition, and national security: Conflict and consensus. Lanham: University Press of America, 1987.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Various bills and resolutions: Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, on H.R. 3887, H.R. 275, H.R. 1746, H.R. 3890, H.R. 2705, H.R. 2949, H.R. 3320, H.R. 3912, H.R. 3913, H.Res. 435, H. Res. 550, H. Res. 573, H. Res. 726, H. Res. 740, and H. Res. 747, H. Con. Res. 234, and H. Con. Res. 236, October 23, 2007. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2008.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Affairs, United States Congress House Committee on Foreign. Various bills and resolutions: Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, on H.R. 982, H.R. 1469, H.R. 1405, H.R. 1441, H.R. 1678, H. Con. Res. 100, H. Res. 100, H. Res. 125, H. Res. 158, H. Res. 196, H. Res. 240, H. Res. 267, and H.R. 1681, March 27, 2007. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2007.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Various bills and resolutions: Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, on H.R. 1400, H.R. 2844, H.Res. 121, H.R. 2798, H.R. 176, H.R. 2293, H. R. 2843, S. 377, H. Res. 208, H. Res. 287, H. Res. 294, H. Res. 378, H. Res. 380, H.Res. 426, H. Res. 427, H. Res. 467, H. Res. 482, H. Res. 497, H. Res. 500, H. Con. Res. 136, and H. Con. Res. 139, June 26, 2007. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2007.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Various bills and resolutions: Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, second session, on H.R. 3202, H.R. 6328, H.R. 6456, H. Res. 937, H. Res. 1008, H. Res. 1069, H. Res. 1159, H. Res. 1254, H. Res. 1266, H. Res. 1279, H. Res. 1290, and H. Res. 1307, H. Con. Res. 344, H. Con. Res. 361 and H. Con. Res. 371, July 16, 2008. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2008.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Various bills and resolutions: Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, second session, on H.R. 5916, H.R. 5834, H.R. 3658, H. Res. 1011, H. Res. 1063, H. Res. 1109, H. Res. 1127, H. Res. 1166, H. Con. Res. 317, H. Con. Res. 318, H. Con. Res. 332, and H. Con. Res. 337, April 30, 2008. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2008.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Various bills and resolutions: Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, second session, on H. Res. 1351, H. Res. 1361, H. Res. 1369, H. Con. Res. 374, H.R. 6574 and H. Res. 1370, July 24, 2008. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2008.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Various bills and resolutions: Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, second session, on H. Res. 185, H. Res. 854, H. Res. 865, H. Res. 951, H. Con. Res. 154, H. Con. Res. 255, H. Con. Res. 278, H. Con. Res. 290, H.R. 5501, and H.R. 1084, February 27, 2008. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2008.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Various bills and resolutions: Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, on H.R. 2828, H.R. 3432, H.Res. 405, H. Res. 624, H. Res. 635, H. Res. 651, H. Con. Res. 200, and H. Con. Res. 203, H.R. 2003, S. 1612 and H. Res. 676, September 26, 2007. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2008.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Various bills and resolutions: Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, on H.R. 3096, H.R. 1567, H.R. 1302, H.R. 2185, H.R. 3062, H. Res. 32, H. Res. 34, H. Res. 238, H. Res. 508, H. Res. 518, H. Res. 548, H. Res. 557, H. Res. 564, H. Res. 575, and H. Res. 583, July 31, 2007. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2007.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Book chapters on the topic "Conflict of laws – Export controls – United States"

1

Voetelink, Joop. "Limits on the Extraterritoriality of United States Export Control and Sanctions Legislation." In NL ARMS, 187–217. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-471-6_11.

Full text
Abstract:
AbstractThe sovereignty of states is reflected in the notion of jurisdiction, empowering them to enact and enforce laws and regulations, and to adjudicate disputes in court. The jurisdiction of states and the exercise thereof is primarily territorial, limiting the exercise of state authority to their respective national territories except in specific situations. However, in an increasingly globalized and interconnected world, it would be hard to maintain that a state should be denied the right to exercise its sovereign powers beyond national borders when there are reasonable grounds for doing so. Consequently, the exercise of extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction has become more accepted, although it is limited to particular situations and circumstances. These have to do with the exercise of jurisdiction over nationals, vessels and aircraft registered in or pertaining to the legislating state, as well as certain activities aimed at undermining the state’s security or solvency or which constitute crimes under international law. However, in principle it is not allowed to regulate activities of foreign nationals or entities operating wholly outside the legislating state’s territory. One area where this has become increasingly prevalent is through the exercise of export controls over foreign nationals and legal persons. The United States (US) has long been engaged in the exercise of this type of extraterritorial jurisdiction and is, without doubt, the state that is most proactive in doing so. This chapter considers US extraterritorial claims with respect to its export control and sanctions legislation and explores the limits of this practice under public international law.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Klappe, Ben, and Mark Keunen. "Case: Non-compliance at Fokker Services." In NL ARMS, 55–67. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-471-6_4.

Full text
Abstract:
AbstractFrom late 2005 through to late 2010, Fokker Services BV (FSBV) failed to comply with the economic sanctions the United States (US) Government had established against Iran and Sudan. By scanning the case, violations by FSBV came to light in a structured way, laying bare how FSBV operated to evade export control, breaching sanctions regimes and export control laws. Next, analysis stipulated that the cause and conditions of the violation of the export control regulations were mainly rooted in the tone at the top, the role of (intermediary) management and the absence of a Compliance Program. Subsequently, a short-term and a long-term response were formulated addressing the tone at the top, the development of an Internal Compliance Program, and the application of soft controls to promote an ethical culture.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography